From facca53ac3c2e8a5e2a4fe54c9c15de656c72de1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fabian Stelzer Date: Fri, 10 Sep 2021 20:07:39 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] ssh signing: verify signatures using ssh-keygen To verify a ssh signature we first call ssh-keygen -Y find-principal to look up the signing principal by their public key from the allowedSignersFile. If the key is found then we do a verify. Otherwise we only validate the signature but can not verify the signers identity. Verification uses the gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile (see ssh-keygen(1) "ALLOWED SIGNERS") which contains valid public keys and a principal (usually user@domain). Depending on the environment this file can be managed by the individual developer or for example generated by the central repository server from known ssh keys with push access. This file is usually stored outside the repository, but if the repository only allows signed commits/pushes, the user might choose to store it in the repository. To revoke a key put the public key without the principal prefix into gpg.ssh.revocationKeyring or generate a KRL (see ssh-keygen(1) "KEY REVOCATION LISTS"). The same considerations about who to trust for verification as with the allowedSignersFile apply. Using SSH CA Keys with these files is also possible. Add "cert-authority" as key option between the principal and the key to mark it as a CA and all keys signed by it as valid for this CA. See "CERTIFICATES" in ssh-keygen(1). Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano --- Documentation/config/gpg.txt | 35 ++++++ builtin/receive-pack.c | 4 + gpg-interface.c | 215 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 252 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/config/gpg.txt b/Documentation/config/gpg.txt index 9b95dd280c3749..51a756b2f15f85 100644 --- a/Documentation/config/gpg.txt +++ b/Documentation/config/gpg.txt @@ -39,3 +39,38 @@ gpg.ssh.defaultKeyCommand: signature is requested. On successful exit a valid ssh public key is expected in the first line of its output. To automatically use the first available key from your ssh-agent set this to "ssh-add -L". + +gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile:: + A file containing ssh public keys which you are willing to trust. + The file consists of one or more lines of principals followed by an ssh + public key. + e.g.: user1@example.com,user2@example.com ssh-rsa AAAAX1... + See ssh-keygen(1) "ALLOWED SIGNERS" for details. + The principal is only used to identify the key and is available when + verifying a signature. ++ +SSH has no concept of trust levels like gpg does. To be able to differentiate +between valid signatures and trusted signatures the trust level of a signature +verification is set to `fully` when the public key is present in the allowedSignersFile. +Therefore to only mark fully trusted keys as verified set gpg.minTrustLevel to `fully`. +Otherwise valid but untrusted signatures will still verify but show no principal +name of the signer. ++ +This file can be set to a location outside of the repository and every developer +maintains their own trust store. A central repository server could generate this +file automatically from ssh keys with push access to verify the code against. +In a corporate setting this file is probably generated at a global location +from automation that already handles developer ssh keys. ++ +A repository that only allows signed commits can store the file +in the repository itself using a path relative to the top-level of the working tree. +This way only committers with an already valid key can add or change keys in the keyring. ++ +Using a SSH CA key with the cert-authority option +(see ssh-keygen(1) "CERTIFICATES") is also valid. + +gpg.ssh.revocationFile:: + Either a SSH KRL or a list of revoked public keys (without the principal prefix). + See ssh-keygen(1) for details. + If a public key is found in this file then it will always be treated + as having trust level "never" and signatures will show as invalid. diff --git a/builtin/receive-pack.c b/builtin/receive-pack.c index a34742513aca7e..f17c7d2246b031 100644 --- a/builtin/receive-pack.c +++ b/builtin/receive-pack.c @@ -131,6 +131,10 @@ static int receive_pack_config(const char *var, const char *value, void *cb) { int status = parse_hide_refs_config(var, value, "receive"); + if (status) + return status; + + status = git_gpg_config(var, value, NULL); if (status) return status; diff --git a/gpg-interface.c b/gpg-interface.c index 0f1c6a02e53257..433482307c0d36 100644 --- a/gpg-interface.c +++ b/gpg-interface.c @@ -3,13 +3,14 @@ #include "config.h" #include "run-command.h" #include "strbuf.h" +#include "dir.h" #include "gpg-interface.h" #include "sigchain.h" #include "tempfile.h" #include "alias.h" static char *configured_signing_key; -static const char *ssh_default_key_command; +static const char *ssh_default_key_command, *ssh_allowed_signers, *ssh_revocation_file; static enum signature_trust_level configured_min_trust_level = TRUST_UNDEFINED; struct gpg_format { @@ -55,6 +56,10 @@ static int verify_gpg_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc, struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload, size_t payload_size, const char *signature, size_t signature_size); +static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc, + struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload, + size_t payload_size, const char *signature, + size_t signature_size); static int sign_buffer_gpg(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature, const char *signing_key); static int sign_buffer_ssh(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature, @@ -90,7 +95,7 @@ static struct gpg_format gpg_format[] = { .program = "ssh-keygen", .verify_args = ssh_verify_args, .sigs = ssh_sigs, - .verify_signed_buffer = NULL, /* TODO */ + .verify_signed_buffer = verify_ssh_signed_buffer, .sign_buffer = sign_buffer_ssh, .get_default_key = get_default_ssh_signing_key, .get_key_id = get_ssh_key_id, @@ -357,6 +362,200 @@ static int verify_gpg_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc, return ret; } +static void parse_ssh_output(struct signature_check *sigc) +{ + const char *line, *principal, *search; + char *key = NULL; + + /* + * ssh-keygen output should be: + * Good "git" signature for PRINCIPAL with RSA key SHA256:FINGERPRINT + * + * or for valid but unknown keys: + * Good "git" signature with RSA key SHA256:FINGERPRINT + * + * Note that "PRINCIPAL" can contain whitespace, "RSA" and + * "SHA256" part could be a different token that names of + * the algorithms used, and "FINGERPRINT" is a hexadecimal + * string. By finding the last occurence of " with ", we can + * reliably parse out the PRINCIPAL. + */ + sigc->result = 'B'; + sigc->trust_level = TRUST_NEVER; + + line = xmemdupz(sigc->output, strcspn(sigc->output, "\n")); + + if (skip_prefix(line, "Good \"git\" signature for ", &line)) { + /* Valid signature and known principal */ + sigc->result = 'G'; + sigc->trust_level = TRUST_FULLY; + + /* Search for the last "with" to get the full principal */ + principal = line; + do { + search = strstr(line, " with "); + if (search) + line = search + 1; + } while (search != NULL); + sigc->signer = xmemdupz(principal, line - principal - 1); + } else if (skip_prefix(line, "Good \"git\" signature with ", &line)) { + /* Valid signature, but key unknown */ + sigc->result = 'G'; + sigc->trust_level = TRUST_UNDEFINED; + } else { + return; + } + + key = strstr(line, "key"); + if (key) { + sigc->fingerprint = xstrdup(strstr(line, "key") + 4); + sigc->key = xstrdup(sigc->fingerprint); + } else { + /* + * Output did not match what we expected + * Treat the signature as bad + */ + sigc->result = 'B'; + } +} + +static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc, + struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload, + size_t payload_size, const char *signature, + size_t signature_size) +{ + struct child_process ssh_keygen = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT; + struct tempfile *buffer_file; + int ret = -1; + const char *line; + size_t trust_size; + char *principal; + struct strbuf ssh_principals_out = STRBUF_INIT; + struct strbuf ssh_principals_err = STRBUF_INIT; + struct strbuf ssh_keygen_out = STRBUF_INIT; + struct strbuf ssh_keygen_err = STRBUF_INIT; + + if (!ssh_allowed_signers) { + error(_("gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile needs to be configured and exist for ssh signature verification")); + return -1; + } + + buffer_file = mks_tempfile_t(".git_vtag_tmpXXXXXX"); + if (!buffer_file) + return error_errno(_("could not create temporary file")); + if (write_in_full(buffer_file->fd, signature, signature_size) < 0 || + close_tempfile_gently(buffer_file) < 0) { + error_errno(_("failed writing detached signature to '%s'"), + buffer_file->filename.buf); + delete_tempfile(&buffer_file); + return -1; + } + + /* Find the principal from the signers */ + strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args, fmt->program, + "-Y", "find-principals", + "-f", ssh_allowed_signers, + "-s", buffer_file->filename.buf, + NULL); + ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, NULL, 0, &ssh_principals_out, 0, + &ssh_principals_err, 0); + if (ret && strstr(ssh_principals_err.buf, "usage:")) { + error(_("ssh-keygen -Y find-principals/verify is needed for ssh signature verification (available in openssh version 8.2p1+)")); + goto out; + } + if (ret || !ssh_principals_out.len) { + /* + * We did not find a matching principal in the allowedSigners + * Check without validation + */ + child_process_init(&ssh_keygen); + strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args, fmt->program, + "-Y", "check-novalidate", + "-n", "git", + "-s", buffer_file->filename.buf, + NULL); + pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, payload, payload_size, + &ssh_keygen_out, 0, &ssh_keygen_err, 0); + + /* + * Fail on unknown keys + * we still call check-novalidate to display the signature info + */ + ret = -1; + } else { + /* Check every principal we found (one per line) */ + for (line = ssh_principals_out.buf; *line; + line = strchrnul(line + 1, '\n')) { + while (*line == '\n') + line++; + if (!*line) + break; + + trust_size = strcspn(line, "\n"); + principal = xmemdupz(line, trust_size); + + child_process_init(&ssh_keygen); + strbuf_release(&ssh_keygen_out); + strbuf_release(&ssh_keygen_err); + strvec_push(&ssh_keygen.args, fmt->program); + /* + * We found principals + * Try with each until we find a match + */ + strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args, "-Y", "verify", + "-n", "git", + "-f", ssh_allowed_signers, + "-I", principal, + "-s", buffer_file->filename.buf, + NULL); + + if (ssh_revocation_file) { + if (file_exists(ssh_revocation_file)) { + strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args, "-r", + ssh_revocation_file, NULL); + } else { + warning(_("ssh signing revocation file configured but not found: %s"), + ssh_revocation_file); + } + } + + sigchain_push(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); + ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, payload, payload_size, + &ssh_keygen_out, 0, &ssh_keygen_err, 0); + sigchain_pop(SIGPIPE); + + FREE_AND_NULL(principal); + + if (!ret) + ret = !starts_with(ssh_keygen_out.buf, "Good"); + + if (!ret) + break; + } + } + + sigc->payload = xmemdupz(payload, payload_size); + strbuf_stripspace(&ssh_keygen_out, 0); + strbuf_stripspace(&ssh_keygen_err, 0); + /* Add stderr outputs to show the user actual ssh-keygen errors */ + strbuf_add(&ssh_keygen_out, ssh_principals_err.buf, ssh_principals_err.len); + strbuf_add(&ssh_keygen_out, ssh_keygen_err.buf, ssh_keygen_err.len); + sigc->output = strbuf_detach(&ssh_keygen_out, NULL); + sigc->gpg_status = xstrdup(sigc->output); + + parse_ssh_output(sigc); + +out: + if (buffer_file) + delete_tempfile(&buffer_file); + strbuf_release(&ssh_principals_out); + strbuf_release(&ssh_principals_err); + strbuf_release(&ssh_keygen_out); + strbuf_release(&ssh_keygen_err); + + return ret; +} + int check_signature(const char *payload, size_t plen, const char *signature, size_t slen, struct signature_check *sigc) { @@ -473,6 +672,18 @@ int git_gpg_config(const char *var, const char *value, void *cb) return git_config_string(&ssh_default_key_command, var, value); } + if (!strcmp(var, "gpg.ssh.allowedsignersfile")) { + if (!value) + return config_error_nonbool(var); + return git_config_pathname(&ssh_allowed_signers, var, value); + } + + if (!strcmp(var, "gpg.ssh.revocationfile")) { + if (!value) + return config_error_nonbool(var); + return git_config_pathname(&ssh_revocation_file, var, value); + } + if (!strcmp(var, "gpg.program") || !strcmp(var, "gpg.openpgp.program")) fmtname = "openpgp";