

Writeup For The Office (PatriotCTF)

This is a quick write-up for my CCI Round 2. I have a flight tomorrow and I'm going on a trip to Qatar and Turkey, so I had to quickly grab a CTF problem, solve it, and write this up lol, so here it is.

The Office

ASAP as Possible ✓
150

I am dead inside ✓
175

Dwight U Ignorant ● ✓
300

Makin That Paper
350

Corner Of Memes

Looks like a interesting CTF that comes from the famous TV series The Office

Problem 1:

Challenge

8 Solves



ASAP as Possible 150

Read the scenario, and then look at the forensic data to answer the questions.

What was the name of the file that ran the ransomware?

Remember to enter the flag in the format masoncc{flag}



LiveRespons...

We're given a zip file.

After downloading and extracting it, you'll find a folder named `LinuxResponse` and looks like the files were already extracted for us.

I tried solving it using **Midnight Commander (CLI)** and **FTK Imager** : two different approaches depending on whether you're using **Linux or Windows**.

I'll walk you through both methods because it's important to understand them from a **forensics perspective** cause you never know which OS you'll be working with during an investigation.

Like for this problem Midnight Commander helped me traverse files quickly and open text files while FTK helped me find the csv files which can be opened easily with Linux

So what are Midnight and FTK?

Midnight Commander (mc) is a text-based file manager for Linux that lets you navigate and analyze file systems in the terminal.

FTK Imager is a forensic tool for Windows used to preview, extract, and analyze data from disk images.

Anyways lets stop beating around the bush and dive in!!!..

After opening **LiveResponseData**, we are met with four subdirectories, both in Linux and Windows.

```
mc [user@parrot]:~/Desktop/LiveResponseData x Parrot Terminal
```

Left	File	Command	Options	Right
<	~/Desktop/LiveResponseData			. [^]>
'n	Name		Size	Modify time
/..			UP--DIR	Apr 24 03:24
/UserInfo			38	Feb 21 2018
/PersistenceMechanisms			162	Feb 21 2018
/NetworkInfo			108	Feb 21 2018
/CopiedFiles			102	Feb 21 2018
/BasicInfo			326	Feb 21 2018
.DS_Store			14340	Feb 24 2018

Evidence Tree

- C:\Users\lamaan\Downloads\LiveResponseData (2)
 - _MACOSX
 - LiveResponseData
 - BasicInfo
 - CopiedFiles
 - eventlogs
 - ie
 - Michael
 - mft
 - registry
 - parsed
 - NetworkInfo

File List

Name
BasicInfo
CopiedFiles
NetworkInfo
PersistenceMechanisms
UserInfo
._DS_Store

i will start by using MC on Linux, then switch to FTK, because as we go further into the CTF, we see there are event logs and CSV files of MFTs, which are more easily visible on a Windows machine.

Since the question asks us to find **ransomware**, my first guess is to check the running software, which can be found at `./BasicInfo/running_processes.txt`.

Left	File	Command	Options	Right
<-	~/Desktop/LiveResponseData/BasicInfo			>[^]<-
'n	Name	Size	Modify time	.n
/..	UP--DIR	Feb 21	2018	/..
.DS_Store	6148	Feb 21	2018	/..B
*system_info.txt	2357	Feb 21	2018	/..J
*Running_processes.txt	18251	Feb 21	2018	/..c
*List_hidden_directories.txt	22109	Feb 21	2018	/..c
*LastActivityView.html	664234	Feb 24	2018	/..d
*Installed_software_wmic.txt	2298	Feb 21	2018	/..g
*Full_file_listing.txt	10873K	Feb 21	2018	/..g
*DiskDrivelist_wmic.txt	340	Feb 21	2018	/..j
				/..j
				/..k

At first, while reading through `./running_process.txt`, I wasn't able to find anything suspicious (though later I realized we could have found it here!).

Hence i decided why don't i look at LastActivity.html?...

Scrolling down i was able to find it!!....

```
nowrap>C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe<td bgcolor=#FFFFFF nowrap>&nbsp;<td bgcolor=#FFFFFF nowrap>exe
<tr><td bgcolor=#FFFFFF nowrap>2/21/2018 2:13:06 PM<td bgcolor=#FFFFFF nowrap>Run .EXE file<td bgcolor=#FFFFFF nowrap>PAYLOAD_133MMK.EXE<td
bgcolor=#FFFFFF nowrap>C:\Users\Kevin\DOWNLOADS\PAYLOAD_133MMK.EXE<td bgcolor=#FFFFFF nowrap>&nbsp;<td bgcolor=#FFFFFF nowrap>EXE
```

C:\Users\Kevin\DOWNLOADS\PAYLOAD_133MMK.EXE.

Luckily for us, the adversary hadn't changed the file name 🤪 (which doesn't usually happen in real situations, since adversaries aren't this dumb and typically rename the file to obfuscate it).

So what did we find?:

User: Kevin

File directory: Downloads ---(mostly from the internet then)

Filename: PAYLOAD_133MMK.EXE.

Coming from my previous sleuthing, where I hadn't found it in `./running_processes.txt`, looking back and using Ctrl+F, I was able to find it...




payload_133MMK.exe	5460	2	1,044 K	Unknown	WIN-541GSLG5KBP\Kevin	0:01:07	N/A
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Yup The same file with a PID of 540 running for estimated CPU Time Window Title of 0:01:07.

Hence the first answer was

`masoncc{PAYLOAD_133MMK.EXE}`

Problem 2:



Challenge

9 Solves

×

I am dead inside

175

Which user did the attacker use to deploy the ransomware?


Remember to enter your answer as `masoncc{flag}`

Flag

Submit

Ok, this one was easy...but I initially misread it and thought we had to find the command that ran the payload. That led me to stumble upon the `.evtx` files, which is why I switched to a Windows device to check the Security logs. I couldn't find any command execution logs, and then I re-read the question and realized... we just needed the user 😊. Felt kinda dumb since in the previous problem, we had already found that Kevin downloaded the file.

the evtx files are as below:



Application.evtx	5/12/2025 11:15 PM	Event Log	2,116 KB
HardwareEvents.evtx	5/12/2025 11:15 PM	Event Log	68 KB
Internet Explorer.evtx	5/12/2025 11:15 PM	Event Log	68 KB
Kaspersky Event Log.evtx	5/12/2025 11:15 PM	Event Log	68 KB
Key Management Service.evtx	5/12/2025 11:15 PM	Event Log	68 KB
Media Center.evtx	5/12/2025 11:15 PM	Event Log	68 KB
Microsoft-Windows-Application Server-Applica...	5/12/2025 11:15 PM	Event Log	68 KB
Microsoft-Windows-Application Server-Applica...	5/12/2025 11:15 PM	Event Log	68 KB
Microsoft-Windows-Application-Experience%4...	5/12/2025 11:15 PM	Event Log	68 KB
Microsoft-Windows-Application-Experience%4...	5/12/2025 11:15 PM	Event Log	68 KB
Microsoft-Windows-Application-Experience%4...	5/12/2025 11:15 PM	Event Log	68 KB
Microsoft-Windows-Application-Experience%4...	5/12/2025 11:15 PM	Event Log	1,028 KB
Microsoft-Windows-Application-Experience%4...	5/12/2025 11:15 PM	Event Log	68 KB

maybe going threw the etvx files was a blessing in disguise and help us in further problems?....Lets see!!..

masoncc{Kevin}

Problem 3:

Challenge

3 Solves

×

Dwight U Ignorant

300

What is the name of the decryptor that will work on the ransomware'd files?

Remember to enter your answer in the format masoncc{flag}

Flag

Submit

Looks like we have a good question here : we need to find the **decrypter** that was used on the ransomware-encrypted files. You might be wondering what a decrypter is. Basically, when an adversary gains access to your laptop, they encrypt your files and then demand payment in exchange for the method to decrypt them — classic ransomware XD. Later, we come across a wallet address and a `.txt` file with instructions on how to decrypt the files.

Okay, so the first thing I did was look through the MFT file. Why would the MFT be useful for finding the decrypter?

Well, **I figured the decrypter must have been executed or created at some point**, so checking the MFT (Master File Table) could help reveal any newly created or recently accessed files — especially ones with suspicious names or unusual execution paths. I think I searched for terms like “decrypter” or similar keywords to track it down.

Below is what I found in the MFT CSV provided (also why I used Windows—since Excel makes it so much easier to go through a CSV file!!)

```
10|2|48081|10|GAMEEX~1|:\Users\Kevin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\GameExplorer\FOLDER|ALLOCATED||not_indexed|directory|DOS||2018-02-21 19:07:26.6161258|2
17|2|48069|10|EASEOF~1.WAL|:\Users\Kevin\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Accessories\Accessibility\Ease of Access.lnk.[Mkliukang@india.com].w
16|2|48070|10|DESKTO~2.WAL|:\Users\Kevin\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\SendTo\Desktop (create shortcut).DeskLink.[Mkliukang@india.com].wallet|FILE|ALLOCATED
13|2|48068|10|DESKTO~1.WAL|:\Users\Kevin\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Accessories\System Tools\Desktop.ini.[Mkliukang@india.com].wallet|F
14|2|48069|10|DESKTO~1.WAL|:\Users\Kevin\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Accessories\Accessibility\Desktop.ini.[Mkliukang@india.com].wallet|FI
```

Ooooo looks like i found something interesting

We see clear signs that Kevin's files have been encrypted — several file names now include the `.wallet` extension and contain the ransomware tag `[Mkliukang@india.com]`. This indicates that the attacker's payload successfully ran and encrypted files in Kevin's user profile, confirming the impact of the ransomware.

So I dig deeper by searching "Kevin" to see if I could find something interesting. Since this is something I haven't worked with before, I found it tricky to make sense of it.

```
0x044AC400|GOOD|OK|17032113|2|48071|10|INFORM~1.LNK|:\Users\Kevin\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\INFORMATION HOW DECRYPT our FI.Lnk|F
```

Looking more i see a text file with a information how to decrypt the file??...maybe this is the key to find the decrypter?...so i went back on ftk to search for it...maybe i might find a suitable `.dat` file where i can extract it

```

Kevin_NTUSER.txt      62,904 (6... Regular F... 2/21/2018 3:35...
Michael_NTUSER.txt    61,960 (6... Regular F... 2/21/2018 3:37...
Pam_NTUSER.txt        58,294 (5... Regular F... 2/21/2018 3:37...

Software\RealVNC\VNCViewer4\MRU not found.
-----
recentdocs v.20100405
(NTUSER.DAT) Gets contents of user's RecentDocs key

RecentDocs
**All values printed in MRUList\MRUListEx order.
Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RecentDocs
LastWrite Time Wed Feb 21 19:14:37 2018 (UTC)
  2 = INFORMATION HOW DECRYPT our FI.txt
  1 = paper_numbers.txt
  0 = sensitive_document.txt

Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RecentDocs\.txt
LastWrite Time Wed Feb 21 19:14:37 2018 (UTC)
MRUListEx = 1,0
  2 = INFORMATION HOW DECRYPT our FI.txt
  1 = paper_numbers.txt
  0 = sensitive_document.txt

-----
recentdocs_timeline v.20161112
(NTUSER.DAT) Gets contents of user's RecentDocs key and place last write times into timeline based on MRUListEx

RecentDocs
Wed Feb 21 19:14:37 2018      :      INFORMATION HOW DECRYPT our FI.txt

The last write times are now placed in line with the values in the MRUListEx value
Wed Feb 21 19:14:37 2018      2 = INFORMATION HOW DECRYPT our FI.txt
Wed Feb 21 01:22:21 2018      1 = paper_numbers.txt
Wed Feb 21 01:22:21 2018      0 = sensitive document.txt

```

Oooo I found something! Not gonna lie, I'm super confused right now since I don't know what to do — but CTFs are meant to be a learning experience, so I dive forth... and then, BAM! A light bulb goes off in my head — *WOOOH!* What if I open the `./KEVIN/Desktop` directory and try extracting it? Could that actually work??

i found this <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gLAyejgJ3Qs> which speaks abt extracting NTUSER DAT to use registry explorer and thought maybe it would help..registry explorer if your wondering is a tool to read registry stuff and dat stuff by Eric Zukerman the goat of forensics.

NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders... I looked it up and was like maybe it's here?.. hmm uhh?.. and then I looked at the MFT image again and went like oh shoot, it's gonna be on

NTUSER.DAT > Software > Microsoft > Windows > CurrentVersion > Explorer > RecentDocs

Hence, I locked in and went looking again lol — and there I found it on Registry Editor.

Extension	Value Name	Target Name	Link Name	MrU Position	Opened On	Extension Last Opened
.txt	1	INFORMATION HOW DECRYPT our FI.txt	INFORMATION HOW DECRYPT our FI.lnk	0	2018-02-21 19:14:37	
.txt	0	paper_numbers.txt	paper_numbers.lnk	1		

Lmao I was still stuck, not really sure how to pull the file out—felt like I hit a roadblock 🤔. But then I realized... **you can actually open files directly from the registry editor?! Wild.**

Earlier I figured out that you **can't extract** the actual `.txt` file **directly** from the NTUSER.DAT or RecentDocs view, which meant I had to somehow access

`C:\Users\Kevin\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\` —but I couldn't find that anywhere in the LinuxResponse files.

Then it hit me—**WAIT**, what if I check the `.pf` file for the payload ransomware? Maybe that would give me some lead or trace on where it was executed from or who ran it.

A `.pf` file, if you're not familiar, is a **Windows prefetch file**. It's basically a tracking file that logs how often and when a program was executed. So yeah, diving into that might just point us to the actual decryptor or at least confirm Kevin's involvement. **Kind of realized it might not help since it just a tracking file**

Filename	Created Time	Modified Time	File Size	Process EXE	Process Path	Run Counter	Last Run Time	Missing Pr...
PAYLOAD_133MMKE...	5/13/2025 12:41:...	2/21/2018 9:32:5...	402,968	PAYLOAD_133MM...	\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\USERS\KEVL...	1	2/21/2018 2:13:06 PM	No
PAYLOAD_133MMKE...	5/13/2025 12:45:...	5/13/2025 12:45:...	402,968	PAYLOAD_133MM...	\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\USERS\KEVL...	1	2/21/2018 2:13:06 PM	No

Filename	Full Path	Device Path	In...
SIE7OQ40.EXE		\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\SRECY...	73
SIE7OQ40.EXE.[MKLI...		\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\SRECY...	95
SIPAIGAK.EXE		\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\SRECY...	71
SIPAIGAK.EXE.[MKLIU...		\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\SRECY...	72

Properties

Filename: `PAYLOAD_133MMK.EXE-E9A3C311 (1).pf`

Created Time: `5/13/2025 12:45:46 PM`

Modified Time: `5/13/2025 12:45:47 PM`

File Size: `402,968`

Process EXE: `PAYLOAD_133MMK.EXE`

Process Path: `\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\USERS\KEVIN\DOWNL...`

Run Counter: `1`

Last Run Time: `2/21/2018 2:13:06 PM`

Missing Process: `No`

OK

However we are able to see that it ran once which helps us to realize that the executable might have ran once and put stuff somewhere.

At this point i was about to give up then by chance i searched the wallet name on google [mkliukang@india.com] thinking it would help

No way—it's 1:08, my flight is at 1:30 and **boarding**, and I **found it!!** Apparently, this type of ransomware follows a specific format... Reading [this blog](#) showed that it's a strain of the **Dharma** virus, which is decryptable using **Kaspersky RakhniDecryptor**.

masoncc{RakhniDecryptor}.

Learning Outcome:

What I Learned from the this CTF

Alright , this CTF was a real ride. Here's a quick breakdown of what I learned while rushing through the challenge. 😄

1. Importance of Environment (Linux vs Windows)

- Knowing when to use **Midnight Commander (Linux)** vs **FTK Imager (Windows)** helped a lot. MC made it super quick to traverse folders and open text files, while FTK was amazing for viewing .csv (MFT) and .evtx logs.
- Lesson? Be comfortable switching environments based on the type of data you're analyzing.

2. Running Processes & Activity Tracking

- The `running_process.txt` file was useful but only if I paid attention. At first, I didn't see anything, but later I ctrl+F'd and found the payload.
- Also learned about checking `LastActivity.html` to see recent user activity. Super useful for tracking file executions.

3. Registry Analysis

- Learned how to check the `NTUSER.DAT` file using **Registry Explorer**.
- Found paths like `RecentDocs` which gave clues on recently accessed files.
- Even though you can't extract files directly from the registry, it points you in the right direction.

4. .pf Files (Prefetch Files)

- These are gold in Windows Forensics. They show what files were run, how many times, and when.
- Though it didn't give me the decryptor directly, it confirmed that the payload was run and reinforced Kevin's involvement.

5. Searching Strings in MFT / CSVs

- The MFT file gave away that `.wallet` ransomware extension and even included the attacker email.
- Helps in attribution, and confirms that encryption actually happened.
- Made me realize how useful it is to keyword search for stuff like `@india.com`, `wallet`, etc.

6. Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT)

- Googled the attacker email and found it's linked to Dharma ransomware.
- Then, using Elastio's blog, learned that **Kaspersky RakhniDecryptor** can decrypt old Dharma variants.
- Boom. Found the flag literally while boarding. Felt like a hacker in a movie fr.

Gona board the flight now hope i get threw the 2nd round of CCI with this one !!.