From 5145dc279c73bdcae347f63bc6b84f76999dcbc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Derrick Stolee Date: Mon, 23 May 2022 11:43:35 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] urlmatch: create fetch.credentialsInUrl config Users sometimes provide a "username:password" combination in their plaintext URLs. Since Git stores these URLs in plaintext in the .git/config file, this is a very insecure way of storing these credentials. Credential managers are a more secure way of storing this information. System administrators might want to prevent this kind of use by users on their machines. Create a new "fetch.credentialsInUrl" config option and teach Git to warn or die when seeing a URL with this kind of information. The warning anonymizes the sensitive information of the URL to be clear about the issue. This change currently defaults the behavior to "ignore" which does nothing with these URLs. We can consider changing this behavior to "warn" by default if we wish. At that time, we may want to add some advice about setting fetch.credentialsInUrl=ignore for users who still want to follow this pattern (and not receive the warning). As an attempt to ensure the parsing logic did not catch any unintentional cases, I modified this change locally to to use the "die" option by default. Running the test suite succeeds except for the explicit username:password URLs used in t5550-http-fetch-dumb.s and t5541-http-push-smart.sh. This means that all other tested URLs did not trigger this logic. Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee --- Documentation/config/fetch.txt | 13 ++++++++++ t/t5601-clone.sh | 7 ++++++ urlmatch.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 63 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/config/fetch.txt b/Documentation/config/fetch.txt index cd65d236b43ffc..6aa2a0bec19333 100644 --- a/Documentation/config/fetch.txt +++ b/Documentation/config/fetch.txt @@ -96,3 +96,16 @@ fetch.writeCommitGraph:: merge and the write may take longer. Having an updated commit-graph file helps performance of many Git commands, including `git merge-base`, `git push -f`, and `git log --graph`. Defaults to false. + +fetch.credentialsInUrl:: + A URL can contain plaintext credentials in the form + `protocol://:@domain/path`. Using such URLs is not + recommended as it exposes the password in multiple ways. The + `fetch.credentialsInUrl` option provides instruction for how Git + should react to seeing such a URL, with these values: ++ +* `ignore` (default): Git will proceed with its activity without warning. +* `warn`: Git will write a warning message to `stderr` when parsing a URL + with a plaintext credential. +* `die`: Git will write a failure message to `stderr` when parsing a URL + with a plaintext credential. diff --git a/t/t5601-clone.sh b/t/t5601-clone.sh index 4a61f2c901ea3d..34be520b7834fa 100755 --- a/t/t5601-clone.sh +++ b/t/t5601-clone.sh @@ -71,6 +71,13 @@ test_expect_success 'clone respects GIT_WORK_TREE' ' ' +test_expect_success 'clone warns or fails when using username:password' ' + test_must_fail git -c fetch.credentialsInUrl=warn clone https://username:password@localhost attempt1 2>err && + grep "warning: URL '\''https://username:\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*@localhost/'\'' uses plaintext credentials" err && + test_must_fail git -c fetch.credentialsInUrl=die clone https://username:password@localhost attempt2 2>err && + grep "fatal: URL '\''https://username:\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*@localhost/'\'' uses plaintext credentials" err +' + test_expect_success 'clone from hooks' ' test_create_repo r0 && diff --git a/urlmatch.c b/urlmatch.c index b615adc923ae01..6b91fb648a7bd2 100644 --- a/urlmatch.c +++ b/urlmatch.c @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ #include "cache.h" #include "urlmatch.h" +#include "config.h" #define URL_ALPHA "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" #define URL_DIGIT "0123456789" @@ -106,6 +107,46 @@ static int match_host(const struct url_info *url_info, return (!url_len && !pat_len); } +static void detected_credentials_in_url(const char *url, size_t scheme_len) +{ + char *value = NULL; + const char *at_ptr; + const char *colon_ptr; + struct strbuf anonymized = STRBUF_INIT; + + /* "ignore" is the default behavior. */ + if (git_config_get_string("fetch.credentialsinurl", &value) || + !strcasecmp("ignore", value)) + goto cleanup; + + at_ptr = strchr(url, '@'); + colon_ptr = strchr(url + scheme_len + 3, ':'); + + if (!colon_ptr) + BUG("failed to find colon in url '%s' with scheme_len %"PRIuMAX, + url, (uintmax_t) scheme_len); + + /* Include everything including the colon. */ + colon_ptr++; + strbuf_add(&anonymized, url, colon_ptr - url); + + while (colon_ptr < at_ptr) { + strbuf_addch(&anonymized, '*'); + colon_ptr++; + } + + strbuf_addstr(&anonymized, at_ptr); + + if (!strcasecmp("warn", value)) + warning(_("URL '%s' uses plaintext credentials"), anonymized.buf); + if (!strcasecmp("die", value)) + die(_("URL '%s' uses plaintext credentials"), anonymized.buf); + +cleanup: + free(value); + strbuf_release(&anonymized); +} + static char *url_normalize_1(const char *url, struct url_info *out_info, char allow_globs) { /* @@ -144,6 +185,7 @@ static char *url_normalize_1(const char *url, struct url_info *out_info, char al */ size_t url_len = strlen(url); + const char *orig_url = url; struct strbuf norm; size_t spanned; size_t scheme_len, user_off=0, user_len=0, passwd_off=0, passwd_len=0; @@ -191,6 +233,7 @@ static char *url_normalize_1(const char *url, struct url_info *out_info, char al } colon_ptr = strchr(norm.buf + scheme_len + 3, ':'); if (colon_ptr) { + detected_credentials_in_url(orig_url, scheme_len); passwd_off = (colon_ptr + 1) - norm.buf; passwd_len = norm.len - passwd_off; user_len = (passwd_off - 1) - (scheme_len + 3);