diff --git a/csharp/ql/src/experimental/CWE-918/RequestForgery.cs b/csharp/ql/src/experimental/CWE-918/RequestForgery.cs
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d9b83eeea3ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/csharp/ql/src/experimental/CWE-918/RequestForgery.cs
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+namespace RequestForgery.Controllers
+{
+    public class SSRFController : Controller
+    {
+        [HttpPost]
+        [ValidateAntiForgeryToken]
+        public async Task<ActionResult> Bad(string url)
+        {
+            var request = new HttpRequestMessage(HttpMethod.Get, url);
+
+            var client = new HttpClient();
+            await client.SendAsync(request);
+
+            return View();
+        }
+
+        [HttpPost]
+        [ValidateAntiForgeryToken]
+        public async Task<ActionResult> Good(string url)
+        {
+            string baseUrl = "www.mysecuresite.com/";
+            if (url.StartsWith(baseUrl))
+            {
+                var request = new HttpRequestMessage(HttpMethod.Get, url);
+                var client = new HttpClient();
+                await client.SendAsync(request);
+
+            }
+
+            return View();
+        }
+    }
+}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/csharp/ql/src/experimental/CWE-918/RequestForgery.qhelp b/csharp/ql/src/experimental/CWE-918/RequestForgery.qhelp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..fb04540e13da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/csharp/ql/src/experimental/CWE-918/RequestForgery.qhelp
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+<!DOCTYPE qhelp PUBLIC "-//Semmle//qhelp//EN" "qhelp.dtd">
+<qhelp>
+
+
+  <overview>
+    <p>Directly incorporating user input into a HTTP request without validating the input
+can facilitate Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks. In these attacks, the server
+may be tricked into making a request and interacting with an attacker-controlled server. 
+</p>
+
+  </overview>
+  <recommendation>
+
+    <p>To guard against SSRF attacks, it is advisable to avoid putting user input
+directly into the request URL. Instead, maintain a list of authorized
+URLs on the server; then choose from that list based on the user input provided.</p>
+
+  </recommendation>
+  <example>
+
+    <p>The following example shows an HTTP request parameter being used directly in a forming a
+new request without validating the input, which facilitates SSRF attacks.
+It also shows how to remedy the problem by validating the user input against a known fixed string.
+</p>
+
+    <sample src="RequestForgery.cs" />
+
+  </example>
+  <references>
+    <li>
+      <a href="https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Server_Side_Request_Forgery">OWASP SSRF</a>
+    </li>
+
+  </references>
+</qhelp>
diff --git a/csharp/ql/src/experimental/CWE-918/RequestForgery.ql b/csharp/ql/src/experimental/CWE-918/RequestForgery.ql
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8b2025c4ce2a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/csharp/ql/src/experimental/CWE-918/RequestForgery.ql
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/**
+ * @name Uncontrolled data used in network request
+ * @description Sending network requests with user-controlled data allows for request forgery attacks.
+ * @kind path-problem
+ * @problem.severity error
+ * @precision high
+ * @id cs/request-forgery
+ * @tags security
+ *       external/cwe/cwe-918
+ */
+
+import csharp
+import RequestForgery::RequestForgery
+import semmle.code.csharp.dataflow.DataFlow::DataFlow::PathGraph
+
+from RequestForgeryConfiguration c, DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink
+where c.hasFlowPath(source, sink)
+select sink.getNode(), source, sink, "$@ flows to here and is used in a server side web request.",
+  source.getNode(), "User-provided value"
diff --git a/csharp/ql/src/experimental/CWE-918/RequestForgery.qll b/csharp/ql/src/experimental/CWE-918/RequestForgery.qll
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0f73e0f3d8b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/csharp/ql/src/experimental/CWE-918/RequestForgery.qll
@@ -0,0 +1,234 @@
+import csharp
+
+module RequestForgery {
+  import semmle.code.csharp.controlflow.Guards
+  import semmle.code.csharp.frameworks.System
+  import semmle.code.csharp.frameworks.system.Web
+  import semmle.code.csharp.frameworks.Format
+  import semmle.code.csharp.security.dataflow.flowsources.Remote
+
+  /**
+   * A data flow source for server side request forgery vulnerabilities.
+   */
+  abstract private class Source extends DataFlow::Node { }
+
+  /**
+   * A data flow sink for server side request forgery vulnerabilities.
+   */
+  abstract private class Sink extends DataFlow::ExprNode { }
+
+  /**
+   * A data flow BarrierGuard which blocks the flow of taint for
+   * server side request forgery vulnerabilities.
+   */
+  abstract private class BarrierGuard extends DataFlow::BarrierGuard { }
+
+  /**
+   * A data flow configuration for detecting server side request forgery vulnerabilities.
+   */
+  class RequestForgeryConfiguration extends DataFlow::Configuration {
+    RequestForgeryConfiguration() { this = "Server Side Request forgery" }
+
+    override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof Source }
+
+    override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof Sink }
+
+    override predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node prev, DataFlow::Node succ) {
+      interpolatedStringFlowStep(prev, succ)
+      or
+      stringReplaceStep(prev, succ)
+      or
+      uriCreationStep(prev, succ)
+      or
+      formatConvertStep(prev, succ)
+      or
+      toStringStep(prev, succ)
+      or
+      stringConcatStep(prev, succ)
+      or
+      stringFormatStep(prev, succ)
+      or
+      pathCombineStep(prev, succ)
+    }
+
+    override predicate isBarrierGuard(DataFlow::BarrierGuard guard) {
+      guard instanceof BarrierGuard
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * A remote data flow source taken as a source
+   * for Server Side Request Forgery(SSRF) Vulnerabilities.
+   */
+  private class RemoteFlowSourceAsSource extends Source {
+    RemoteFlowSourceAsSource() { this instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * An url argument to a `HttpRequestMessage` constructor call
+   * taken as a sink for Server Side Request Forgery(SSRF) Vulnerabilities.
+   */
+  private class SystemWebHttpRequestMessageSink extends Sink {
+    SystemWebHttpRequestMessageSink() {
+      exists(Class c | c.hasQualifiedName("System.Net.Http.HttpRequestMessage") |
+        c.getAConstructor().getACall().getArgument(1) = this.asExpr()
+      )
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * An argument to a `WebRequest.Create` call taken as a
+   * sink for Server Side Request Forgery(SSRF) Vulnerabilities. *
+   */
+  private class SystemNetWebRequestCreateSink extends Sink {
+    SystemNetWebRequestCreateSink() {
+      exists(Method m |
+        m.getDeclaringType().hasQualifiedName("System.Net.WebRequest") and m.hasName("Create")
+      |
+        m.getACall().getArgument(0) = this.asExpr()
+      )
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * An argument to a new HTTP Request call of a `System.Net.Http.HttpClient` object
+   * taken as a sink for Server Side Request Forgery(SSRF) Vulnerabilities.
+   */
+  private class SystemNetHttpClientSink extends Sink {
+    SystemNetHttpClientSink() {
+      exists(Method m |
+        m.getDeclaringType().hasQualifiedName("System.Net.Http.HttpClient") and
+        m.hasName([
+            "DeleteAsync", "GetAsync", "GetByteArrayAsync", "GetStreamAsync", "GetStringAsync",
+            "PatchAsync", "PostAsync", "PutAsync"
+          ])
+      |
+        m.getACall().getArgument(0) = this.asExpr()
+      )
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * An url argument to a method call of a `System.Net.WebClient` object
+   * taken as a sink for Server Side Request Forgery(SSRF) Vulnerabilities.
+   */
+  private class SystemNetClientBaseAddressSink extends Sink {
+    SystemNetClientBaseAddressSink() {
+      exists(Property p |
+        p.hasName("BaseAddress") and
+        p.getDeclaringType()
+            .hasQualifiedName(["System.Net.WebClient", "System.Net.Http.HttpClient"])
+      |
+        p.getAnAssignedValue() = this.asExpr()
+      )
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * A method call which checks the base of the tainted uri is assumed
+   * to be a guard for Server Side Request Forgery(SSRF) Vulnerabilities.
+   * This guard considers all checks as valid.
+   */
+  private class BaseUriGuard extends BarrierGuard, MethodCall {
+    BaseUriGuard() { this.getTarget().hasQualifiedName("System.Uri", "IsBaseOf") }
+
+    override predicate checks(Expr e, AbstractValue v) {
+      // we consider any checks against the tainted value to sainitize the taint.
+      // This implies any check such as shown below block the taint flow.
+      // Uri url = new Uri("whitelist.com")
+      // if (url.isBaseOf(`taint1))
+      (e = this.getArgument(0) or e = this.getQualifier()) and
+      v.(AbstractValues::BooleanValue).getValue() = true
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * A method call which checks if the Uri starts with a white-listed string is assumed
+   * to be a guard for Server Side Request Forgery(SSRF) Vulnerabilities.
+   * This guard considers all checks as valid.
+   */
+  private class StringStartsWithBarrierGuard extends BarrierGuard, MethodCall {
+    StringStartsWithBarrierGuard() {
+      this.getTarget().hasQualifiedName("System.String", "StartsWith")
+    }
+
+    override predicate checks(Expr e, AbstractValue v) {
+      // Any check such as the ones shown below
+      // "https://myurl.com/".startsWith(`taint`)
+      // `taint`.startsWith("https://myurl.com/")
+      // are assumed to sainitize the taint
+      (e = this.getQualifier() or this.getArgument(0) = e) and
+      v.(AbstractValues::BooleanValue).getValue() = true
+    }
+  }
+
+  private predicate stringFormatStep(DataFlow::Node prev, DataFlow::Node succ) {
+    exists(FormatCall c | c.getArgument(0) = prev.asExpr() and c = succ.asExpr())
+  }
+
+  private predicate pathCombineStep(DataFlow::Node prev, DataFlow::Node succ) {
+    exists(MethodCall combineCall |
+      combineCall.getTarget().hasQualifiedName("System.IO.Path", "Combine") and
+      combineCall.getArgument(0) = prev.asExpr() and
+      combineCall = succ.asExpr()
+    )
+  }
+
+  private predicate uriCreationStep(DataFlow::Node prev, DataFlow::Node succ) {
+    exists(ObjectCreation oc |
+      oc.getTarget().getDeclaringType().hasQualifiedName("System.Uri") and
+      oc.getArgument(0) = prev.asExpr() and
+      oc = succ.asExpr()
+    )
+  }
+
+  private predicate interpolatedStringFlowStep(DataFlow::Node prev, DataFlow::Node succ) {
+    exists(InterpolatedStringExpr i |
+      // allow `$"http://{`taint`}/blabla/");"` or
+      // allow `$"https://{`taint`}/blabla/");"`
+      i.getText(0).getValue().matches(["http://", "http://"]) and
+      i.getInsert(1) = prev.asExpr() and
+      succ.asExpr() = i
+      or
+      // allow `$"{`taint`}/blabla/");"`
+      i.getInsert(0) = prev.asExpr() and
+      succ.asExpr() = i
+    )
+  }
+
+  private predicate stringReplaceStep(DataFlow::Node prev, DataFlow::Node succ) {
+    exists(MethodCall mc, SystemStringClass s |
+      mc = s.getReplaceMethod().getACall() and
+      mc.getQualifier() = prev.asExpr() and
+      succ.asExpr() = mc
+    )
+  }
+
+  private predicate stringConcatStep(DataFlow::Node prev, DataFlow::Node succ) {
+    exists(AddExpr a |
+      a.getLeftOperand() = prev.asExpr()
+      or
+      a.getRightOperand() = prev.asExpr() and
+      a.getLeftOperand().(StringLiteral).getValue() = ["http://", "https://"]
+    |
+      a = succ.asExpr()
+    )
+  }
+
+  private predicate formatConvertStep(DataFlow::Node prev, DataFlow::Node succ) {
+    exists(Method m |
+      m.hasQualifiedName("System.Convert",
+        ["FromBase64String", "FromHexString", "FromBase64CharArray"]) and
+      m.getParameter(0) = prev.asParameter() and
+      succ.asExpr() = m.getACall()
+    )
+  }
+
+  private predicate toStringStep(DataFlow::Node prev, DataFlow::Node succ) {
+    exists(MethodCall ma |
+      ma.getTarget().hasName("ToString") and
+      ma.getQualifier() = prev.asExpr() and
+      succ.asExpr() = ma
+    )
+  }
+}
diff --git a/csharp/ql/test/experimental/CWE-918/RequestForgery.cs b/csharp/ql/test/experimental/CWE-918/RequestForgery.cs
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..32347505b352
--- /dev/null
+++ b/csharp/ql/test/experimental/CWE-918/RequestForgery.cs
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+// semmle-extractor-options: ${testdir}/../../resources/stubs/System.Web.cs /r:System.Threading.Tasks.dll /r:System.Collections.Specialized.dll /r:System.Runtime.dll /r:System.Private.Uri.dll
+
+using System;
+using System.Threading.Tasks;
+using System.Web.Mvc;
+using System.Net.Http;
+
+namespace RequestForgery.Controllers
+{
+    public class SSRFController : Controller
+    {
+        [HttpPost]
+        [ValidateAntiForgeryToken]
+        public async Task<ActionResult> Bad(string url)
+        {
+            var request = new HttpRequestMessage(HttpMethod.Get, url);
+
+            var client = new HttpClient();
+            await client.SendAsync(request);
+
+            return View();
+        }
+
+        [HttpPost]
+        [ValidateAntiForgeryToken]
+        public async Task<ActionResult> Good(string url)
+        {
+            string baseUrl = "www.mysecuresite.com/";
+            if (url.StartsWith(baseUrl))
+            {
+                var request = new HttpRequestMessage(HttpMethod.Get, url);
+                var client = new HttpClient();
+                await client.SendAsync(request);
+
+            }
+
+            return View();
+        }
+    }
+}
+// Missing stubs:
+namespace System.Net.Http
+{
+    public class HttpClient
+    {
+        public async Task SendAsync(HttpRequestMessage request) => throw null;
+    }
+
+    public class HttpRequestMessage
+    {
+        public HttpRequestMessage(HttpMethod method, string requestUri) => throw null;
+    }
+
+    public class HttpMethod
+    {
+        public static readonly HttpMethod Get;
+    }
+}
diff --git a/csharp/ql/test/experimental/CWE-918/RequestForgery.expected b/csharp/ql/test/experimental/CWE-918/RequestForgery.expected
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..70ba2594fdff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/csharp/ql/test/experimental/CWE-918/RequestForgery.expected
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+edges
+| RequestForgery.cs:14:52:14:54 | url : String | RequestForgery.cs:16:66:16:68 | access to parameter url |
+nodes
+| RequestForgery.cs:14:52:14:54 | url : String | semmle.label | url : String |
+| RequestForgery.cs:16:66:16:68 | access to parameter url | semmle.label | access to parameter url |
+subpaths
+#select
+| RequestForgery.cs:16:66:16:68 | access to parameter url | RequestForgery.cs:14:52:14:54 | url : String | RequestForgery.cs:16:66:16:68 | access to parameter url | $@ flows to here and is used in a server side web request. | RequestForgery.cs:14:52:14:54 | url | User-provided value |
diff --git a/csharp/ql/test/experimental/CWE-918/RequestForgery.qlref b/csharp/ql/test/experimental/CWE-918/RequestForgery.qlref
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3d529ae5a2ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/csharp/ql/test/experimental/CWE-918/RequestForgery.qlref
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+experimental/CWE-918/RequestForgery.ql
\ No newline at end of file