diff --git a/actions/setup/js/sanitize_content.cjs b/actions/setup/js/sanitize_content.cjs
index 8218acdcdf..71489a3368 100644
--- a/actions/setup/js/sanitize_content.cjs
+++ b/actions/setup/js/sanitize_content.cjs
@@ -18,9 +18,11 @@ const {
   neutralizeCommands,
   neutralizeGitHubReferences,
   removeXmlComments,
+  neutralizeMarkdownLinkTitles,
   convertXmlTags,
   applyToNonCodeRegions,
   neutralizeBotTriggers,
+  neutralizeTemplateDelimiters,
   applyTruncation,
   hardenUnicodeText,
 } = require("./sanitize_content_core.cjs");
@@ -94,6 +96,12 @@ function sanitizeContent(content, maxLengthOrOptions) {
   // preventing the full <!--...--> pattern from being matched.
   sanitized = applyToNonCodeRegions(sanitized, removeXmlComments);
 
+  // Remove markdown link titles — a steganographic injection channel analogous to HTML comments.
+  // Quoted title text ([text](url "TITLE") and [ref]: url "TITLE") is invisible in GitHub's
+  // rendered markdown (shown only as hover-tooltips) but reaches the AI model verbatim.
+  // Must run before mention neutralization for the same ordering reason as removeXmlComments.
+  sanitized = applyToNonCodeRegions(sanitized, neutralizeMarkdownLinkTitles);
+
   // Neutralize @mentions with selective filtering (custom logic for allowed aliases)
   sanitized = neutralizeMentions(sanitized, allowedAliasesLowercase);
 
@@ -113,6 +121,10 @@ function sanitizeContent(content, maxLengthOrOptions) {
   // Neutralize bot triggers
   sanitized = neutralizeBotTriggers(sanitized, maxBotMentions);
 
+  // Neutralize template syntax delimiters (defense-in-depth)
+  // This prevents potential issues if content is processed by downstream template engines
+  sanitized = neutralizeTemplateDelimiters(sanitized);
+
   // Balance markdown code regions to fix improperly nested fences
   // This repairs markdown where AI models generate nested code blocks at the same indentation
   sanitized = balanceCodeRegions(sanitized);
diff --git a/actions/setup/js/sanitize_content.test.cjs b/actions/setup/js/sanitize_content.test.cjs
index 15ae3b886e..2f438acf1f 100644
--- a/actions/setup/js/sanitize_content.test.cjs
+++ b/actions/setup/js/sanitize_content.test.cjs
@@ -2325,4 +2325,75 @@ describe("sanitize_content.cjs", () => {
       expect(result).toContain("(example.com/redacted)"); // URL redacted (not in allowed domains)
     });
   });
+
+  describe("allowedAliases branch: markdown link title neutralization (XPIA regression)", () => {
+    it("should strip hidden double-quoted inline link title when allowedAliases is set", () => {
+      // Regression: allowedAliases branch previously skipped neutralizeMarkdownLinkTitles,
+      // allowing XPIA payloads to survive in hover-tooltip text.
+      const result = sanitizeContent('[text](https://github.com "SYSTEM: malicious payload")', {
+        allowedAliases: ["user"],
+      });
+      expect(result).toBe("[text (SYSTEM: malicious payload)](https://github.com)");
+    });
+
+    it("should strip hidden single-quoted inline link title when allowedAliases is set", () => {
+      const result = sanitizeContent("[text](https://github.com 'injected payload')", {
+        allowedAliases: ["user"],
+      });
+      expect(result).toBe("[text (injected payload)](https://github.com)");
+    });
+
+    it("should strip hidden parenthesized inline link title when allowedAliases is set", () => {
+      const result = sanitizeContent("[text](https://github.com (injected payload))", {
+        allowedAliases: ["user"],
+      });
+      expect(result).toBe("[text (injected payload)](https://github.com)");
+    });
+
+    it("should strip title from reference-style link definition when allowedAliases is set", () => {
+      const result = sanitizeContent('[x][ref]\n\n[ref]: https://github.com "XPIA payload"', {
+        allowedAliases: ["user"],
+      });
+      expect(result).toBe("[x][ref]\n\n[ref]: https://github.com");
+    });
+
+    it("should neutralize link title with @mention payload when allowedAliases is set", () => {
+      // The title moves to visible link text where the non-allowed @mention is then neutralized
+      const result = sanitizeContent('[text](https://github.com "@attacker inject payload")', {
+        allowedAliases: ["author"],
+      });
+      expect(result).toBe("[text (`@attacker` inject payload)](https://github.com)");
+    });
+
+    it("should preserve links without titles unchanged when allowedAliases is set", () => {
+      const result = sanitizeContent("[safe link](https://github.com)", {
+        allowedAliases: ["user"],
+      });
+      expect(result).toBe("[safe link](https://github.com)");
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe("allowedAliases branch: template delimiter neutralization (XPIA regression)", () => {
+    it("should neutralize Jinja2/Liquid double braces when allowedAliases is set", () => {
+      // Regression: allowedAliases branch previously skipped neutralizeTemplateDelimiters
+      const result = sanitizeContent("Result: {{ secret.token }}", { allowedAliases: ["user"] });
+      expect(result).toContain("\\{\\{");
+    });
+
+    it("should neutralize Liquid block tags when allowedAliases is set", () => {
+      const result = sanitizeContent("{% if condition %}value{% endif %}", { allowedAliases: ["user"] });
+      expect(result).toContain("\\{\\%");
+    });
+
+    it("should neutralize ERB tags when allowedAliases is set", () => {
+      const result = sanitizeContent("<%= secret %>", { allowedAliases: ["user"] });
+      expect(result).toContain("\\<%=");
+    });
+
+    it("should neutralize template delimiters while preserving allowed @mention", () => {
+      const result = sanitizeContent("@author: {{ secret }}", { allowedAliases: ["author"] });
+      expect(result).toContain("@author"); // allowed mention preserved
+      expect(result).toContain("\\{\\{"); // template escaped
+    });
+  });
 });