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minimax inequality

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The minimax inequality was first proved by John von Neumann. It is the starting point to discuss two-players zero-sum static games theory.

Theorem 1: minimax inequality, simple strategies

For any $m \times n$ matrix $A_{i,j}$, we have

- $\begin{array}{ll} (1) & \displaystyle \max_{1 \leq i \leq m} \min_{1 \leq j \leq n} A_{i,j} \leq \displaystyle \min_{1 \leq j \leq n} \max_{1 \leq i \leq m} A_{i,j} \\ (2) & \displaystyle \max_{1 \leq i \leq m} \min_{1 \leq j \leq n} A_{i,j} = \displaystyle \min_{1 \leq j \leq n} \max_{1 \leq i \leq m} A_{i,j} \text{ if and only if } A_{i,\tilde{j}} \leq A_{\tilde{i},\tilde{j}} \leq A_{\tilde{i},j} \quad \forall i,j \\ & \displaystyle \text{where} \\ & \displaystyle \text{where}$ is valid for some (i, j)

For a 2 players zero-sum game, the entries of $A_{i,j}$ is interpreted as the payoff when player 1 has chosen the i^{th} strategy while player 2 has chosen the j^{th} strategy. The value $A_{\tilde{i},\tilde{j}}$ is known as the value of the game.

Proof Since $\min_{1 \le j \le n} A_{i,j} \le \max_{1 \le i \le m} A_{i,j} \quad \forall i, j$. The LHS is independent of jwhile the RHS is independent of \bar{i} , therefore we obtain $\max_{1 \le i \le m} \min_{1 \le j \le n} A_{i,j} \le \min_{1 \le j \le n} \max_{1 \le i \le m} A_{i,j}$

Theorem 2: minimax inequality, mixed strategies

Let
$$S_m = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^m \mid x_i \ge 0 \ \forall i \ , \ \sum_{i=1}^m x_i = 1\} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^m$$
. For any $m \times n$ matrix

 $A_{i,j}$, we have

$$\max_{x \in S_m} \min_{y \in S_n} \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j} x_i y_j = \min_{y \in S_n} \max_{x \in S_m} \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j} x_i y_j$$

Here $0 \le x_i \le 1$ is interpreted as the probability that Player 1 will choose strategy i while $0 \le y_i \le 1$ is the probability that Player 2 will choose strategy j.

Proof For any
$$x \in S_m$$
 and any $y \in S_n$ we have $\max_{x \in S_m} \min_{y \in S_n} \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j} x_i y_j \le \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j} x_i y_j$

Taking maximum for
$$x \in S_m$$
 on both sides, we have $\max_{x \in S_m} \min_{x \in S_n} \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j} x_i y_j \le \max_{s \in S_m} \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j} x_i y_j \le \max_{s \in S_m} \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j} x_i y_j \le \max_{s \in S_m} \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j} x_i y_j \le \max_{s \in S_m} \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j} x_i y_j \le \max_{s \in S_m} \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j} x_i y_j \le \max_{s \in S_m} \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j} x_i y_j \le \max_{s \in S_m} \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j} x_i y_j \le \max_{s \in S_m} \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j} x_i y_j \le \max_{s \in S_m} \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j} x_i y_j \le \max_{s \in S_m} \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j} x_i y_j \le \max_{s \in S_m} \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j} x_i y_j \le \max_{s \in S_m} \sum_{j=1}^m \sum_{i=1}^n A_{i,j} x_i y_j \le \max_{s \in S_m} \sum_{j=1}^m \sum_{i=1}^n A_{i,j} x_i y_j \le \max_{s \in S_m} \sum_{j=1}^m \sum_{i=1}^n A_{i,j} x_i y_j \le \max_{s \in S_m} \sum_{j=1}^m \sum_{s \in S_m} \sum_{j=1}^m A_{i,j} x_i y_j \le \max_{s \in S_m} \sum_{s \in S_m} \sum_{j=1}^m \sum_{s \in S_m} \sum_{s \in$

Taking minimum for
$$y \in S_n$$
 on both sides, we have $v_1 = \max_{x \in S_m} \min_{y \in S_n} \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j} x_i y_j \le v_2 = \min_{y \in S_n} \max_{x \in S_n} \sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j} x_j y_j \le v_2 = \min_{y \in S_n} \max_{x \in S_n} \sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j} x_j y_j \le v_2 = \min_{y \in S_n} \max_{x \in S_n} \sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j} x_j y_j \le v_2 = \min_{y \in S_n} \max_{x \in S_n} \sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j} x_j y_j \le v_2 = \min_{y \in S_n} \max_{x \in S_n} \sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j} x_j y_j \le v_2 = \min_{y \in S_n} \max_{x \in S_n} \sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j} x_j y_j \le v_2 = \min_{y \in S_n} \max_{x \in S_n} \sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j} x_j y_j \le v_2 = \min_{y \in S_n} \max_{x \in S_n} \sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j} x_j y_j \le v_2 = \min_{y \in S_n} \max_{x \in S_n} \sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j} x_j y_j \le v_2 = \min_{y \in S_n} \max_{x \in S_n} \sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j} x_j y_j \le v_2 = \min_{y \in S_n} \max_{x \in S_n} \sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j} x_j y_j \le v_2 = \min_{y \in S_n} \max_{x \in S_n} \sum_{x \in S$

The prove of other half of the inequality takes two steps:

Step 1 Suppose there is a
$$y \in S_n$$
 such that $\sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j} y_j \leq 0 \implies$ There

is some
$$\tilde{x} \in S_m$$
 such that $\sum_{i=1}^m \left(\sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j}y_j\right)\tilde{x}_i \leq 0$

$$\Rightarrow \max_{x \in S_n} \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j} x_i y_j \le 0 \quad \Rightarrow \quad v_2 = \min_{y \in S_n} \max_{x \in S_m} \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j} x_i y_j \le 0 \quad (*1)$$

Step 2 Suppose there is a $x \in S_m$ such that $\sum_{i=1}^m A_{i,j} x_i y_j > 0 \implies$ There

is some
$$\tilde{y} \in S_n$$
 such that $\sum_{j=1}^n \left(\sum_{i=1}^m A_{i,j} x_i\right) \tilde{y}_j \ge 0$

$$\Rightarrow \min_{y \in S_n} \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j} x_i y_j \ge 0 \quad \Rightarrow \quad v_1 = \max_{x \in S_m} \sum_{j=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n A_{i,j} x_i y_j \ge 0 \quad (*2)$$

Combining (*1) and (*2) we see that either $0 \le v_1$ or $v_2 \le 0$ is the case and $v_1 < 0 < v_2$ cannot be valid. Repeat the same procedure to the matrix $\tilde{A}_{i,j} = A_{i,j} - \lambda$ and we see that $v_1 - \lambda < 0 < v_2 - \lambda$ is invalid, i.e. $v_1 < \lambda < v_2$ is not valid for any λ . Since λ is arbitrary, we conclude that $v_2 \le v_1$.

An entire theory on minimax has already been developed and is one of the major research area in optimization theory. The following contains some good sources for further reference:

References

[1] V.F.Demyanov and V.N.Malozemov, *Introduction to Minimax*, Keter Publishing House Jerusalem Ltd, 1974.