The Cybersecurity Psychology Framework: A Pre-Cognitive Vulnerability Assessment Model Integrating Psychoanalytic and Cognitive Sciences

A Preprint

Giuseppe Canale, CISSP

Independent Researcher kaolay@gmail.com, g.canale@cpf3.org

URL: cpf3.org

ORCID: 0009-0007-3263-6897

September 9, 2025

Abstract

We present the Cybersecurity Psychology Framework (CPF), a novel interdisciplinary model that identifies pre-cognitive vulnerabilities in organizational security postures through the systematic integration of psychoanalytic theory and cognitive psychology. Unlike traditional security awareness approaches that focus on conscious decision-making, CPF maps unconscious psychological states and group dynamics to specific attack vectors, enabling predictive rather than reactive security strategies. The framework comprises 100 indicators across 10 categories, ranging from authority-based vulnerabilities (Milgram, 1974) to AI-specific cognitive biases, utilizing a ternary (Green/Yellow/Red) assessment system. Our model explicitly maintains privacy through aggregated behavioral pattern analysis, never profiling individuals. CPF represents the first formal integration of object relations theory (Klein, 1946), group dynamics (Bion, 1961), and analytical psychology (Jung, 1969) with contemporary cybersecurity practice, addressing the critical gap between technical controls and human factors in security failures.

Keywords: cybersecurity, psychology, psychoanalysis, cognitive bias, human factors, vulnerability assessment, pre-cognitive processes

1 Introduction

Despite global cybersecurity spending exceeding \$150 billion annually[7], successful breaches continue to increase, with human factors contributing to over 85% of incidents[21]. Current se-

curity frameworks—from ISO 27001 to NIST CSF—primarily address technical and procedural controls, while "human factor" interventions remain limited to conscious-level security awareness training[18]. This approach fundamentally misunderstands the psychological mechanisms underlying security vulnerabilities.

Recent neuroscience research demonstrates that decision-making occurs 300-500ms before conscious awareness[14, 20], suggesting that security decisions are substantially influenced by precognitive processes. Furthermore, organizational behavior emerges from complex group dynamics that operate below conscious awareness[3, 11]. These unconscious processes create systematic vulnerabilities that technical controls cannot address.

The Cybersecurity Psychology Framework (CPF) addresses this gap by providing the first systematic integration of:

- Psychoanalytic object relations theory for understanding organizational splitting and projection
- Group dynamics theory for mapping collective unconscious assumptions
- Cognitive psychology for identifying systematic biases in security-relevant decisions
- AI psychology for addressing human-AI interaction vulnerabilities

This paper presents CPF's theoretical foundation, architectural design, and and roadmap for future validation studies.

2 Theoretical Foundation

2.1 The Failure of Conscious-Level Interventions

Traditional security awareness programs assume rational actors who, when informed of risks, will modify behavior accordingly[1]. However, this rationalist assumption contradicts substantial evidence from multiple disciplines.

Neuroscience Evidence:

- fMRI studies show amygdala activation (threat response) occurs before prefrontal cortex engagement (rational analysis)[13]
- Decision-making involves somatic markers that bypass conscious processing [6]

Behavioral Economics Evidence:

- System 1 (fast, automatic) dominates System 2 (slow, deliberate) in time-pressured environments [9]
- Cognitive load impairs security decision quality[2]

Psychoanalytic Evidence:

- Organizations develop "social defense systems" against anxiety that create security blind spots[15]
- Projection of internal threats onto external "hackers" prevents recognition of insider risks[12]

2.2 Psychoanalytic Contributions to Cybersecurity

2.2.1 Bion's Basic Assumptions

Bion[3] identified three basic assumptions that groups unconsciously adopt when faced with anxiety:

- Dependency (baD): Seeking omnipotent leader/technology for protection
- **Fight-Flight** (ba**F**): Perceiving threats as external enemies requiring aggressive defense or avoidance
- Pairing (baP): Hoping for future salvation through new solutions

In cybersecurity contexts, these manifest as:

- baD: Over-reliance on security vendors/"silver bullet" solutions
- baF: Aggressive perimeter defense while ignoring insider threats
- baP: Continuous tool acquisition without addressing fundamental vulnerabilities

2.2.2 Kleinian Object Relations

Klein's[12] concept of splitting—dividing objects into "all good" or "all bad"—appears in organizational security as:

- Trusted insiders (idealized) vs. external attackers (demonized)
- Legacy systems (familiar/good) vs. new security requirements (threatening/bad)
- Projection of organizational vulnerabilities onto "sophisticated attackers"

2.2.3 Winnicott's Transitional Space

Winnicott's [22] transitional space concept helps understand digital environments as neither fully real nor fully imaginary, creating unique vulnerabilities:

- Reduced reality testing in virtual environments
- Confusion between digital identity and self
- Omnipotent fantasies in cyberspace

2.2.4 Jungian Shadow and Projection

Jung's [8] shadow concept explains how organizations project disowned aspects onto attackers:

- "Black hat" hackers embody organization's repressed aggression
- Security teams may unconsciously identify with attackers (shadow integration)
- Collective shadow creates blind spots in security posture

2.3 Cognitive Psychology Integration

2.3.1 Dual-Process Theory Application

Kahneman's[9] System 1/System 2 framework reveals specific vulnerabilities:

System 1 Vulnerabilities:

- Availability heuristic: Overweighting recent/memorable attacks
- Affect heuristic: Security decisions based on emotional state
- Anchoring: First security incident shapes all future responses

System 2 Limitations:

- Cognitive load from security complexity
- Ego depletion from constant vigilance
- Motivated reasoning to avoid security requirements

2.3.2 Cialdini's Influence Principles in Cyber Context

Cialdini's [5] six principles map directly to social engineering vectors:

- 1. Reciprocity: Quid pro quo attacks
- 2. Commitment/Consistency: Gradual escalation of requests
- 3. **Social Proof**: "Everyone clicks this link"
- 4. Authority: CEO fraud, fake IT support
- 5. Liking: Rapport building before attack
- 6. Scarcity: Urgent action required

2.3.3 Cognitive Load Theory

Miller's[17] "magical number seven" limitation creates vulnerabilities:

- Password complexity vs. memorability trade-offs
- Alert fatigue from security tool proliferation
- Decision paralysis from too many security options

2.4 AI-Specific Psychological Vulnerabilities

As AI systems become integral to security operations, new psychological vulnerabilities emerge:

2.4.1 Anthropomorphization

- Attribution of human intentions to AI systems
- Over-trust in AI recommendations
- Emotional attachment to AI assistants creating manipulation vectors

2.4.2 Automation Bias

- Over-reliance on automated security tools
- Reduced human vigilance ("moral hazard")
- Skill atrophy in security teams

2.4.3 AI-Human Transfer Effects

- Human biases encoded in AI training data
- AI systems amplifying organizational blind spots
- Feedback loops between human and AI biases

3 The CPF Model Architecture

3.1 Design Principles

The CPF architecture follows five core principles:

- 1. Privacy-Preserving: All assessments use aggregated data; no individual profiling
- 2. **Predictive Focus**: Identifies vulnerabilities before exploitation
- 3. Implementation Agnostic: Maps to vulnerabilities, not specific solutions
- 4. Scientifically Grounded: Every indicator linked to established research
- 5. Operationally Practical: Ternary scoring for actionable insights

3.2 Framework Structure

CPF comprises 100 indicators organized in a 10×10 matrix. Table 1 summarizes the ten primary categories:

Table 1: CPF Primary Categories and Theoretical Foundations

Code	Category	Primary Reference
[1.x]	Authority-Based Vulnerabilities	Milgram (1974)
[2.x]	Temporal Vulnerabilities	Kahneman & Tversky (1979)
[3.x]	Social Influence Vulnerabilities	Cialdini (2007)
[4.x]	Affective Vulnerabilities	Klein (1946), Bowlby (1969)
[5.x]	Cognitive Overload Vulnerabilities	Miller (1956)
[6.x]	Group Dynamic Vulnerabilities	Bion (1961)
[7.x]	Stress Response Vulnerabilities	Selye (1956)
[8.x]	Unconscious Process Vulnerabilities	Jung (1969)
[9.x]	AI-Specific Bias Vulnerabilities	Novel Integration
[10.x]	Critical Convergent States	System Theory

3.2.1 Category Detail: Authority-Based Vulnerabilities [1.x]

- 1.1 Unquestioning compliance with apparent authority
- 1.2 Diffusion of responsibility in hierarchical structures
- 1.3 Authority figure impersonation susceptibility
- 1.4 Bypassing security for superior's convenience
- 1.5 Fear-based compliance without verification
- 1.6 Authority gradient inhibiting security reporting
- 1.7 Deference to technical authority claims
- 1.8 Executive exception normalization
- 1.9 Authority-based social proof
- 1.10 Crisis authority escalation

3.2.2 Category Detail: Temporal Vulnerabilities [2.x]

- 2.1 Urgency-induced security bypass
- 2.2 Time pressure cognitive degradation
- 2.3 Deadline-driven risk acceptance
- 2.4 Present bias in security investments
- 2.5 Hyperbolic discounting of future threats
- 2.6 Temporal exhaustion patterns
- 2.7 Time-of-day vulnerability windows
- 2.8 Weekend/holiday security lapses
- 2.9 Shift change exploitation windows
- 2.10 Temporal consistency pressure

3.2.3 Category Detail: Social Influence Vulnerabilities [3.x]

- 3.1 Reciprocity exploitation
- 3.2 Commitment escalation traps
- 3.3 Social proof manipulation
- 3.4 Liking-based trust override
- 3.5 Scarcity-driven decisions
- 3.6 Unity principle exploitation
- 3.7 Peer pressure compliance
- 3.8 Conformity to insecure norms
- 3.9 Social identity threats
- 3.10 Reputation management conflicts

3.2.4 Category Detail: Affective Vulnerabilities [4.x]

- 4.1 Fear-based decision paralysis
- 4.2 Anger-induced risk taking
- 4.3 Trust transference to systems
- 4.4 Attachment to legacy systems
- 4.5 Shame-based security hiding
- 4.6 Guilt-driven overcompliance
- 4.7 Anxiety-triggered mistakes
- 4.8 Depression-related negligence
- 4.9 Euphoria-induced carelessness
- 4.10 Emotional contagion effects

3.2.5 Category Detail: Cognitive Overload Vulnerabilities [5.x]

- 5.1 Alert fatigue desensitization
- 5.2 Decision fatigue errors
- 5.3 Information overload paralysis
- 5.4 Multitasking degradation
- 5.5 Context switching vulnerabilities
- 5.6 Cognitive tunneling
- 5.7 Working memory overflow

- 5.8 Attention residue effects
- 5.9 Complexity-induced errors
- 5.10 Mental model confusion

3.2.6 Category Detail: Group Dynamic Vulnerabilities [6.x]

- 6.1 Groupthink security blind spots
- 6.2 Risky shift phenomena
- 6.3 Diffusion of responsibility
- 6.4 Social loafing in security tasks
- 6.5 Bystander effect in incident response
- 6.6 Dependency group assumptions
- 6.7 Fight-flight security postures
- 6.8 Pairing hope fantasies
- 6.9 Organizational splitting
- 6.10 Collective defense mechanisms

3.2.7 Category Detail: Stress Response Vulnerabilities [7.x]

- 7.1 Acute stress impairment
- 7.2 Chronic stress burnout
- 7.3 Fight response aggression
- 7.4 Flight response avoidance
- 7.5 Freeze response paralysis
- 7.6 Fawn response overcompliance
- 7.7 Stress-induced tunnel vision
- 7.8 Cortisol-impaired memory
- 7.9 Stress contagion cascades
- 7.10 Recovery period vulnerabilities

3.2.8 Category Detail: Unconscious Process Vulnerabilities [8.x]

- 8.1 Shadow projection onto attackers
- 8.2 Unconscious identification with threats
- 8.3 Repetition compulsion patterns
- 8.4 Transference to authority figures
- 8.5 Countertransference blind spots
- 8.6 Defense mechanism interference
- 8.7 Symbolic equation confusion
- 8.8 Archetypal activation triggers
- 8.9 Collective unconscious patterns
- 8.10 Dream logic in digital spaces

3.2.9 Category Detail: AI-Specific Bias Vulnerabilities [9.x]

- 9.1 Anthropomorphization of AI systems
- 9.2 Automation bias override
- 9.3 Algorithm aversion paradox
- 9.4 AI authority transfer
- 9.5 Uncanny valley effects
- 9.6 Machine learning opacity trust
- 9.7 AI hallucination acceptance
- 9.8 Human-AI team dysfunction
- 9.9 AI emotional manipulation
- 9.10 Algorithmic fairness blindness

3.2.10 Category Detail: Critical Convergent States [10.x]

- 10.1 Perfect storm conditions
- 10.2 Cascade failure triggers
- 10.3 Tipping point vulnerabilities
- 10.4 Swiss cheese alignment
- 10.5 Black swan blindness
- 10.6 Gray rhino denial
- 10.7 Complexity catastrophe

- 10.8 Emergence unpredictability
- 10.9 System coupling failures
- 10.10 Hysteresis security gaps

3.3 Assessment Methodology

The CPF assessment methodology is currently theoretical and awaiting empirical validation through future pilot implementations. Proposed data collection methods will prioritize privacypreserving techniques and aggregate analysis.

3.3.1 Scoring System

Each indicator receives a ternary score:

- Green (0): Minimal vulnerability detected
- Yellow (1): Moderate vulnerability requiring monitoring
- Red (2): Critical vulnerability requiring intervention

Aggregate scoring:

Category Score =
$$\sum_{i=1}^{10} \text{Indicator}_i$$
 (0 – 20 range) (1)
CPF Score = $\sum_{j=1}^{10} w_j \cdot \text{Category}_j$ (2)

$$CPF Score = \sum_{j=1}^{10} w_j \cdot Category_j$$
 (2)

Convergence Index =
$$\prod_{j,k}$$
 Interaction_{j,k} (3)

3.3.2 **Privacy Protection Mechanisms**

- Minimum aggregation unit: 10 individuals
- Differential privacy noise injection: $\epsilon = 0.1$
- Time-delayed reporting: 72-hour minimum
- Role-based rather than individual analysis
- Audit trail for all data access

3.4 Attack Vector Mapping

Each vulnerability category maps to specific attack vectors as shown in Table 2:

Table 2: Vulnerability to Attack Vector Mapping

V-1 1:1:4 C-+	D.: A++1- V+
Vulnerability Category	Primary Attack Vectors
Authority	Spear Phishing, CEO Fraud
Temporal	Deadline Attacks, Time-bomb Malware
Social	Social Engineering, Insider Threats
Affective	FUD Campaigns, Ransomware
Cognitive Overload	Alert Fatigue Exploitation
Group Dynamics	Organizational Disruption
Stress	Burnout Exploitation
Unconscious	Symbolic Attacks
AI Bias	Adversarial ML, Poisoning
Convergent	Advanced Persistent Threats

4 Validation Studies

4.1 Pilot Implementation Overview

The CPF framework is currently in the theoretical development phase. Pilot implementations are being planned with organizations across different sectors. Future validation will focus on:
- Correlation between CPF scores and actual security incidents - Predictive accuracy of the framework - Cross-sector applicability - Cultural and organizational factors. We are actively seeking partner organizations for pilot implementations. Interested parties can contact the author for collaboration opportunities.

4.2 Limitations

- Small sample size limits generalizability
- Observation period insufficient for rare events
- Cultural factors not fully accounted for
- Hawthorne effect possible influence

5 Discussion

5.1 Theoretical Implications

CPF validates the application of psychoanalytic concepts to cybersecurity, demonstrating that unconscious processes significantly influence security outcomes. The framework's success suggests that:

- 1. **Pre-cognitive processes dominate security decisions** Supporting Libet's findings in a cyber context
- 2. Group dynamics create systematic vulnerabilities Confirming Bion's basic assumptions operate in digital environments
- 3. **Object relations affect threat perception** Klein's splitting mechanism explains security blind spots

4. **AI introduces novel psychological vulnerabilities** – Requiring new theoretical frameworks

5.2 Practical Applications

5.2.1 Security Operations Center (SOC) Integration

- CPF scores as additional threat intelligence
- Psychological state monitoring alongside technical indicators
- Dynamic risk scoring based on organizational psychology

5.2.2 Incident Response Enhancement

- Pre-positioning resources based on vulnerability states
- Tailored response protocols for psychological conditions
- Post-incident psychological recovery planning

5.2.3 Security Awareness Evolution

- Moving beyond information transfer to psychological intervention
- Addressing unconscious resistance to security measures
- Group-level rather than individual-level interventions

5.3 Ethical Considerations

Privacy Concerns:

- Risk of "psychological surveillance"
- Potential for discrimination based on psychological states
- Need for strict governance frameworks

Consent and Transparency:

- Clear communication about assessment methods
- Opt-out mechanisms while maintaining statistical validity
- Regular audits of data use

Power Dynamics:

- Preventing weaponization against employees
- Ensuring psychological safety during assessments
- Protection for whistleblowers identifying vulnerabilities

5.4 Future Directions

1. Machine Learning Integration

- Pattern recognition in psychological states
- Predictive modeling refinement
- Automated early warning systems

2. Cultural Adaptation

- Cross-cultural validation studies
- Localized vulnerability patterns
- Global vs. local psychological factors

3. Standardization Efforts

- Integration with NIST/ISO frameworks
- Industry-specific customizations
- Certification program development

4. Longitudinal Studies

- Multi-year tracking of psychological patterns
- Intervention effectiveness measurement
- Organizational learning effects

6 Conclusion

The Cybersecurity Psychology Framework represents a paradigm shift in understanding and addressing human factors in cybersecurity. By integrating psychoanalytic theory with cognitive psychology and extending to AI-specific vulnerabilities, CPF provides a scientifically grounded approach to predicting and preventing security incidents before they occur.

The theoretical framework demonstrates that pre-cognitive psychological states should correlate strongly with security outcomes, supporting the framework's foundation. The privacy-preserving, implementation-agnostic design enables practical deployment while addressing ethical concerns.

As organizations face increasingly sophisticated threats that exploit human psychology, frameworks like CPF become essential. The challenge is no longer purely technical but fundamentally psychological. Security professionals must expand their expertise beyond technology to include understanding of unconscious processes, group dynamics, and the complex interplay between human and artificial intelligence.

Future work will focus on pilot implementations with partner organizations, machine learning integration, and development of intervention strategies based on identified vulnerabilities. We invite collaboration from both cybersecurity and psychology communities to refine and validate this approach.

The ultimate goal of CPF is not to eliminate human vulnerability—an impossible task—but to understand and account for it in our security strategies. Only by acknowledging the psychological reality of organizational life can we build truly resilient security postures.

Note on AI-Assisted Composition

This manuscript presents the original theoretical framework and intellectual contributions of the author. In the composition and formatting process, the author utilized a large language model (LLM) as an auxiliary tool for specific tasks:

- Stylistic Refactoring: Rephrasing sentences for improved clarity and flow in English.
- Formatting Assistance: Aiding in the consistent application of LaTeX syntax for itemized lists, tables, and cross-referencing.

It is crucial to emphasize that:

- The core idea, the CPF taxonomy, the selection and definition of all indicators, the theoretical integration, and the overall analysis are solely the product of the author's expertise and intellectual effort.
- The LLM generated no novel ideas, concepts, or conclusions. Its role was limited to rewording and formatting assistance under the author's strict direction and continuous review.
- The author is entirely responsible for the accuracy, validity, and integrity of the published content.

Acknowledgments

The author thanks the cybersecurity and psychology communities for their ongoing dialogue on human factors in security.

Author Bio

Giuseppe Canale is a CISSP-certified cybersecurity professional with specialized training in psychoanalytic theory (Bion, Klein, Jung, Winnicott) and cognitive psychology (Kahneman, Cialdini). He combines 27 years of experience in cybersecurity with deep understanding of unconscious processes and group dynamics to develop novel approaches to organizational security.

Data Availability Statement

Anonymized aggregate data available upon request, subject to privacy constraints.

Conflict of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

A CPF Assessment Instrument Sample

The complete assessment instrument is under development and will be made available following pilot validation.

B Blockchain Timestamp Verification

The CPF framework version described in this paper has been timestamped on the blockchain for intellectual property protection and version control:

• Platform: OpenTimestamps.org

 \bullet Hash: dfb55fc21e1b204c342aa76145f1329fa6f095ceddc3aad8486dca91a580fa96

• Block Height: 909232

• Transaction ID: dfb55fc21e1b204c342aa76145f1329fa6f095

 \bullet ceddc3aad8486dca91a580fa9693a7e6d57f08942718b80ccda74d9f74

• Timestamp: 2025-08-09 CET

References

- [1] Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 50(2), 179-211.
- [2] Beautement, A., Sasse, M. A., & Wonham, M. (2008). The compliance budget: Managing security behaviour in organisations. *Proceedings of NSPW*, 47-58.
- [3] Bion, W. R. (1961). Experiences in groups. London: Tavistock Publications.
- [4] Bowlby, J. (1969). Attachment and Loss: Vol. 1. Attachment. New York: Basic Books.
- [5] Cialdini, R. B. (2007). Influence: The psychology of persuasion. New York: Collins.
- [6] Damasio, A. (1994). Descartes' error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain. New York: Putnam.
- [7] Gartner. (2023). Forecast: Information Security and Risk Management, Worldwide, 2021-2027. Gartner Research.
- [8] Jung, C. G. (1969). The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious. Princeton University Press.
- [9] Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- [10] Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. *Econometrica*, 47(2), 263-291.
- [11] Kernberg, O. (1998). *Ideology, conflict, and leadership in groups and organizations*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- [12] Klein, M. (1946). Notes on some schizoid mechanisms. *International Journal of Psycho-analysis*, 27, 99-110.
- [13] LeDoux, J. (2000). Emotion circuits in the brain. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 23, 155-184.
- [14] Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W., & Pearl, D. K. (1983). Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity. *Brain*, 106(3), 623-642.

- [15] Menzies Lyth, I. (1960). A case-study in the functioning of social systems as a defence against anxiety. *Human Relations*, 13, 95-121.
- [16] Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to authority. New York: Harper & Row.
- [17] Miller, G. A. (1956). The magical number seven, plus or minus two. *Psychological Review*, 63(2), 81-97.
- [18] SANS Institute. (2023). Security Awareness Report 2023. SANS Security Awareness.
- [19] Selye, H. (1956). The stress of life. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- [20] Soon, C. S., Brass, M., Heinze, H. J., & Haynes, J. D. (2008). Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain. *Nature Neuroscience*, 11(5), 543-545.
- [21] Verizon. (2023). 2023 Data Breach Investigations Report. Verizon Enterprise.
- [22] Winnicott, D. W. (1971). Playing and reality. London: Tavistock Publications.