
## Bank risk-taking increases as the population ages!

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
					IV	IV
VARIABLES	$\Delta$ LTI					
exposure	0.443***	0.435***	0.446***	0.406***	0.678***	0.599***
	(0.068)	(0.071)	(0.073)	(0.076)	(0.091)	(0.091)
Observations	20,500	20,500	20,500	20,500	20,500	20,500
R-squared	0.002	0.060	0.066	0.110		
Bank Controls	-	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	Δ
County Controls	-	-	$\checkmark$	-	-	-
County FE	-	-	-	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
Bank FE	-	-	-	-	-	-

## Banks were more exposed to aging had higher NPL ratios during the GFC



## Because seniors (65+) hold more deposits, increasing banks' lending capacity

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$\Delta$ deposits	$\Delta$ deposits	$\Delta$ deposits	$\Delta$ deposits	$\Delta$ deposits
0.793***	0.759***	0.563***	0.640***	0.471**
(0.294)	(0.279)	(0.195)	(0.203)	(0.203)
12,947	12,947	12,947	12,942	12,244
$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	✓	Δ
-	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	-	-
-	-	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
-	-	-	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
	<ul> <li>Δ deposits</li> <li>0.793***         <ul> <li>(0.294)</li> </ul> </li> <li>12,947             <ul> <li>✓</li> <li>-</li> <li>-</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	Δ deposits       Δ deposits         0.793***       0.759***         (0.294)       (0.279)         12,947       √         √       √         -       √		

## Yet, they borrow less, pushing banks to other markets and riskier borrowers

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
VARIABLES	never borrow	never borrow	has any debt	has any debt	turned down	turned down
respondent age 65+	0.209***	0.188***	-0.422***	-0.358***	-0.251***	-0.158***
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(800.0)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Observations	41,366	41,366	41,366	41,366	41,366	41,366
R-squared	0.080	0.101	0.176	0.247	0.058	0.178
Survey wave FE	-	✓	-	✓	-	✓
Controls	-	✓	-	✓	-	✓