

# **HoneyFun Security Review**

March 25, 2025 - March 26, 2025

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Conducted by: **KeySecurity** 

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# 1 About KeySecurity

KeySecurity is a innovative Web3 security company that hires top-talented security researchers for your project. We have conducted over 40+ security reviews for various projects, collectively holding over \$300,000,000 in TVL. For security audit inquiries, you can reach out to us on Twitter/X or Telegram @gkrastenov or check our previous work here.

# 2 About HoneyFun

Honeyfun AI is pioneering the co-ownership framework for AI agents specifically tailored for the Berachain ecosystem, focusing on defi, gaming and entertainment. We envision AI agents as pivotal revenue-generating entities in the future, as we believe the era of Utility AI Agents is just beginning, and in the coming years, their untapped potential across every field will be revealed.

### 3 Disclaimer

Audits are a time, resource, and expertise bound effort where trained experts evaluate smart contracts using a combination of automated and manual techniques to identify as many vulnerabilities as possible. Audits can show the presence of vulnerabilities **but not their absence**.

### 4 Risk classification

Severity	Impact: High	Impact: Medium	Impact: Low
Likelihood: High	Critical	High	Medium
Likelihood: Medium	High	Medium	Low
Likelihood: Low	Medium	Low	Low

### 4.1 Impact

- **High** leads to a significant loss of assets in the protocol or significantly harms a group of users.
- **Medium** only a small amount of funds can be lost or a functionality of the protocol is affected.
- **Low** any kind of unexpected behaviour that's not so critical.

#### 4.2 Likelihood

- High direct attack vector; the cost is relatively low to the amount of funds that can be lost.
- **Medium** only conditionally incentivized attack vector, but still relatively likely.
- **Low** too many or too unlikely assumptions; provides little or no incentive.

# 4.3 Actions required by severity level

- Critical client must fix the issue.
- **High** client **must** fix the issue.
- **Medium** client **should** fix the issue.
- Low client could fix the issue.

# **5 Executive summary**

### Overview

Project Name	HoneyFun Meme Contract
Repository	https://github.com/honey-fun/honey-fun-contracts
Commit hash	7274b4fc1da2120578b9aa14b6efc60ec6eef227
Review Commit hash	56dace7bd175c3eb9fe0c96ec5b9f84199aa066c
Documentation	https://docs.honey.fun/
Methods	Manual review

### Scope

84		
Meme.sol		
Memerican		
1.1011101001		

### Timeline

March 25, 2025	Audit kick-off
March 25, 2025	Preliminary report
March 26, 2025	Mitigation review

## **Issues Found**

Severity	Count
High	0
Medium	0
Low	0
Information	2
Total	2

# **6 Findings**

### 6.1 Information

### 6.1.1 Emit event in crucial place

**Severity:** *Information* **Context:** Meme.sol#L69

**Description:** Emit an event in crucial places, such as in the makeTransferable() function, when the transferable functionality of the meme is set to true.

```
function makeTransferable() external override onlyTransferControllerAccess {
  isTransferable = true;
  //@audit-issue emit event
}
```

**Recommendation:** Emit event in makeTransferable() function.

**Resolution and Client comment:** Resolved.

### 6.1.2 Use \_totalSupply directly instead of calling totalSupply() internally

**Severity:** *Information* **Context:** Meme.sol#L63

**Description:** In the constructor of the Meme contract, the total supply of the token is provided directly. Use the \_totalSupply variable instead of internally calling the totalSupply() function when the initial supply is minted.

```
_mint(_mintTo, totalSupply()); //@audit-issue use directly _totalSupply
```

**Recommendation:** Use \_totalSupply directly instead of calling totalSupply() internally.

**Resolution and Client comment:** Resolved.