

# Memory Mystery - HACKTORIA

<https://rogue-larch-47f.notion.site/Memory-Mystery-HACKTORIA-d2224f50e7944f6997e11883dfd2dacc>

**Always use a dedicated computer / isolated virtual machine with no connection to your internal network when carrying out a 'forensic' analysis.**

Artifact

OS detection

Lists process memory ranges that potentially contain injected code

List processes in a tree

List process command line args

List sessions

Find the offset file to dump

Dump the file

Looking for the zip file

Dumps user hashes from memory

Looking into the registry

Dump the registry to get SAM

Get the Hint :)

THE END - crack the zip with the new hint

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## ≡ BRIEFING

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Greetings Special Agent,

We have received some catastrophic news from our sources about a cyber attack had hit a high-profile organization. Our sources have informed us that the attackers may have overlooked to remove some volatile traces contained in the compromised systems.

Based on our sources, the cyber attack was done by an Advanced Persistent Threat group called APT777. They managed to stay off radar for some time, but we believe that we can trace them back this time.

We have attached a memory dump file of one of the most critical compromised systems that needs to be analyzed using your digital forensics skills to gather more information on this group, and trace them using the evidences that you may find in the memory dump. Hope your ROCK spirit and technical skills help you this time too.

We understand that this mission will not be easy, but we have faith in your abilities. If you choose to accept this mission, you will be provided with all the necessary resources to complete it. Good luck, Agent. The fate of the cyber world rests in your hands.

As always, Special Agent K. The Contract is yours, if you choose to accept.

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## ≡ MATERIALS

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Download the file here:

<https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1HdSmyAUW-oOrbEoEZZCpkRQIfKrDpJfG>

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## Artifact

```
SHA256 - 47c55dcd6a69b9ab1219c6d806de36473171988804dafec8c29e
82e4d37a7b2c  CompromisedSystemMem.vmem
MD5 - d88f2d9e3b7b80f0f2a1c67a03636146  CompromisedSystemMem.
vmem
```

## OS detection

```
volatility3 -f CompromisedSystemMem.vmem windows.info
```

```
Kernel Base 0x82851000
DTB 0x185000
Symbols file:///root/.local/share/pipx/venvs/volatility3
Is64Bit False
IsPAE True
layer_name 0 WindowsIntelPAE
memory_layer 1 FileLayer
KdDebuggerDataBlock 0x8297bc28
NTBuildLab 7601.17514.x86fre.win7sp1_rtm.10
CSDVersion 1
KdVersionBlock 0x8297bc00
Major/Minor 15.7601
MachineType 332
KeNumberProcessors 1
SystemTime 2023-04-24 14:59:30
NtSystemRoot C:\Windows
NtProductType NtProductWinNt
NtMajorVersion 6
NtMinorVersion 1
PE MajorOperatingSystemVersion 6
PE MinorOperatingSystemVersion 1
PE Machine 332
PE TimeDateStamp Sat Nov 20 08:42:49 2010
```

*PE from 2010!!! Old stuff. Windows 7 is the OS so we'll use the proper plugins*

## Lists process memory ranges that potentially contain injected code

```
volatility3 -f CompromisedSystemMem.vmem windows.malfind|grep exe
```

```
[Aug 22, 2024 - 12:32:42 (CEST)] exegol-thm memory-mystery # volatility3 -f CompromisedSystemMem.vmem windows.malfind|grep exe
WARNING volatility3.framework.layers.vmware: No metadata file found alongside VMEM file. A VMSS or VMSN file may be required to
the same file name, e.g. CompromisedSystemMem.vmem and CompromisedSystemMem.vms.
776gresssvchost.exe 0xde0000 0xde1fff VadS PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE 2 1 Disabled N/A
1052 svchost.exe 0x610000 0x611fff VadS PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE 2 1 Disabled N/A
1312 explorer.exe 0x1e8000 0x1e81fff VadS PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE 2 1 Disabled N/A
1312 explorer.exe 0x3130000 0x3130fff VadS PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE 1 1 Disabled N/A
2316 wmpnetwk.exe 0x970000 0x971fff VadS PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE 2 1 Disabled N/A
2956 notepad.exe 0x2a00000 0x2a00fff VadS PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE 1 1 Disabled N/A
2956 notepad.exe 0x2bd0000 0x2bd1fff VadS PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE 2 1 Disabled N/A
[Aug 22, 2024 - 12:32:53 (CEST)] exegol-thm memory-mystery #
```

*Not so much! what the heck is gresssvchost.exe  
Notepad has been used*

## List processes in a tree

```
volatility3 -f CompromisedSystemMem.vmem windows.pstree
```

```
504 396 winlogon.exe 0x82511580 3 110 1 False 2023-04-24 14:41:37.000000 N/A \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe
\winlogon.exe
1312 1288 explorer.exe 0x82577380 38 959 1 False 2023-04-24 14:41:39.000000 N/A \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Windows\explorer.exe C:\Win
.EXE
* 3704 1312 notepad.exe 0x82558d40 1 62 1 False 2023-04-24 14:58:43.000000 N/A \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Windows\System32\notepad.exe
:\Users\Hoxed\Desktop\note.txt C:\Windows\system32\NOTEPAD.EXE
* 2956 1312 notepad.exe 0x825af750 5 247 1 False 2023-04-24 14:48:50.000000 N/A \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Windows\System32\notepad.exe
:\Windows\system32\notepad.exe
* 1556 1312 vmtoolsd.exe 0x863fdb90 6 218 1 False 2023-04-24 14:41:39.000000 N/A \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Program Files\VMware\VMware Too
Mware\VMware Tools\vmtoolsd.exe" -n vmusr C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\vmtoolsd.exe
* 3840 1312 notepad.exe 0x82501030 1 62 1 False 2023-04-24 14:59:24.000000 N/A \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Windows\System32\notepad.exe
:\Users\Hoxed\Desktop\note.txt C:\Windows\system32\NOTEPAD.EXE
```

*Juicy!! After logon, Notepad is used by the user **HOXED** ← :) I like the name*

***\Users\Hoxed\Desktop\note.txt** has been written  
To be noted, VMware Tools is also used*

**PID is 1312**

## List process command line args

```
volatility3 -f CompromisedSystemMem.vmem windows.cmdl
```

```
2300 WmiPrivSE.exe C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe
3704 notepad.exe "C:\Windows\system32\notepad.exe" C:\Users\Hoxed\Desktop\note.txt
3840 notepad.exe "C:\Windows\system32\notepad.exe" C:\Users\Hoxed\Desktop\note.txt
3940 cmd.exe Required memory at 0x7ffdf010 is not valid (process exited?)
3980 conhost.exe Required memory at 0x7ffdf010 is not valid (process exited?)
3960 ipconfig.exe Required memory at 0x7ffdc010 is not valid (process exited?)
[Aug 22 2024 - 12:51:13 (CEST)] exegol-thm memory-mystery # volatility3 -f CompromisedSystemMem.vmem windows.cmdl
```

## List sessions

```
volatility3 -f CompromisedSystemMem.vmem windows.sessions.Sessions
```

```
1 - 504 winlogon.exe /SYSTEM 2023-04-24 14:41:37.000000
1 - 1300 dwm.exe WIN-MNF9FL8RCB0/Hoxed 2023-04-24 14:41:39.000000
1 Console 1312 explorer.exe WIN-MNF9FL8RCB0/Hoxed 2023-04-24 14:41:39.000000
1 - 1408 taskhost.exe WIN-MNF9FL8RCB0/Hoxed 2023-04-24 14:41:39.000000
1 Console 1556 vmtoolsd.exe WIN-MNF9FL8RCB0/Hoxed 2023-04-24 14:41:39.000000
1 Console 2956 notepad.exe WIN-MNF9FL8RCB0/Hoxed 2023-04-24 14:48:50.000000
1 Console 3704 notepad.exe WIN-MNF9FL8RCB0/Hoxed 2023-04-24 14:58:43.000000
1 Console 3840 notepad.exe WIN-MNF9FL8RCB0/Hoxed 2023-04-24 14:59:24.000000
```

*Nothing much, notepad notepad notepad, so let's dig in and **dump the note.txt***

## Find the offset file to dump

```
volatility3 -f CompromisedSystemMem.vmem windows.filescan|grep -i note.txt
# To Dump an specific PID in case of a big memory dump file
# volatility3 -f CompromisedSystemMem.vmem -o . windows.memmap.Memmap --pid 1312 --dump
```

```
0x3fc77360 100.0\Users\Hoxed\Desktop\note.txt 128
```

## Dump the file

```
volatility3 -f CompromisedSystemMem.vmem -o . windows.dumpfiles --physaddr 0x3fc77360
```

Cache	FileObject	FileName	Result
DataSectionObject	0x3fc77360	note.txt	file.0x3fc77360.0x8428cf78.DataSectionObject.note.txt.dat

```
cat file.0x3fc77360.0x8428cf78.DataSectionObject.note.txt.dat  
JBQWG23UN5ZGSYJAINXW45DSMFRXIICGNFWGKLT2NFYA====
```

```
JBQWG23UN5ZGSYJAINXW45DSMFRXIICGNFWGKLT2NFYA====
```

```
JBQWG23UN5ZGSYJAINXW45DSMFRXIICGNFWGKLT2NFYA====
```

So it is base64 or something similar, you can use **Cyberchef with the magic Recipe**.

```
cat file.0x3fc77360.0x8428cf78.DataSectionObject.note.txt.dat|base32 -d
```

**Hacktoria Contract File.zip** ← Nice, we have to find this file now

The screenshot shows the CyberChef web interface. On the left, the 'Operations' sidebar is visible with a search bar and a 'Favourites' section containing links like 'To Base64', 'From Base64', 'To Hex', and 'From Hex'. The main area displays a 'Recipe' editor with a 'From Base32' operation selected. Below this, there is a checkbox for 'Remove non-alphabet chars' which is currently unchecked. The 'Input' field on the right contains the base32 encoded string: 'JBQWG23UN5ZGSYJAINXW45DSMFRXIICGNFWGKLT2NFYA===='. The 'Output' field shows the decoded result: 'Hacktoria Contract File.zip'.

# Looking for the zip file

Similar as above

```
[Aug 22, 2024 - 14:32:58 (CEST)] exegol-thm memory-mystery # volatility3 -f CompromisedSystemMem.vmem windows.filescan|grep Hacktoria
WARNING volatility3.framework.layers.vmware: No metadata file found alongside VMEM file. A VMSS or VMSN file may be required to correctly process a VMEM
he same file name, e.g. CompromisedSystemMem.vmem and CompromisedSystemMem.vmss.
0x3da0fac0 100.0\Hacktoria Contract File.zip 128
0x3f257f80 \Users\Hoxed\AppData\Local\Temp\vmware-Hoxed\VMwareDnD\8d66c36c\Hacktoria Contract File.zip 128
0x3fc9f658 \Users\Hoxed\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\Hacktoria Contract File.lnk 128
[Aug 22, 2024 - 14:33:33 (CEST)] exegol-thm memory-mystery # volatility3 -f CompromisedSystemMem.vmem -o windows.dumpfiles --physaddr 0x3da0fac0
Volatility 3 Framework 2.7.0
WARNING volatility3.framework.layers.vmware: No metadata file found alongside VMEM file. A VMSS or VMSN file may be required to correctly process a VMEM
he same file name, e.g. CompromisedSystemMem.vmem and CompromisedSystemMem.vmss.
Progress: 100.00 PDB scanning finished
Cache FileObject FileName Result
DataSectionObject 0x3da0fac0 Hacktoria Contract File.zip file.0x3da0fac0.0x85869a90.DataSectionObject.Hacktoria Contract File.zip.dat
[Aug 22, 2024 - 14:33:53 (CEST)] exegol-thm memory-mystery # 7z x file.0x3da0fac0.0x85869a90.DataSectionObject.Hacktoria\Contract\File.zip.dat
```

**A password is required to decompress the file.**

I wasted a lot of time because I tried every dictionary I could find.  
After 2 hours, I have to admit that I missed something.

## Dumps user hashes from memory

**I was wondering if the user creds where the one to find to unlock the zip.**

It's not :( .


```
volatility3 -f CompromisedSystemMem.vmem windows.hashdump.Has
hdump
```

```
Progress: 100.00 PDB scanning finished
User rid lmhash nthash
Administrator 500 aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee 31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0
Guest 501 aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee 31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0
Hoxed 1000 aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee 7a21990fcd3d759941e45c490f143d5f
```

## Free Password Hash Cracker

Enter up to 20 non-salted hashes, one per line:

7a21990fcd3d759941e45c490f143d5f



Crack Hashes

**Supports:** LM, NTLM, md2, md4, md5, md5(md5\_hex), md5-half, sha1, sha224, sha256, sha384, sha512, ripeMD160, whirlpool, MySQL 4.1+ (sha1 sha1\_bin)), QubesV3.1BackupDefaults

Hash	Type	Result
7a21990fcd3d759941e45c490f143d5f	NTLM	12345

## Looking into the registry

```
volatility3 -f CompromisedSystemMem.vmem windows.registry.hiv  
elist
```

```
Offset  FileFullPath  File Output  
0x87c104c8          Disabled  
0x87c1a248  \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM      Disabled  
0x87c44268  \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE    Disabled  
0x87cd7008  \SystemRoot\System32\Config\DEFAULT      Disabled  
0x87ce3008  \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Boot\BCD          Disabled  
0x87ce39c8  \SystemRoot\System32\Config\SOFTWARE      Disabled  
0x888ca520  \??\C:\System Volume Information\Syscache.hve Disabled  
0x8a6f47c8  \??\C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\NetworkService\NTUSER.DAT Disabled  
0x8a77e5c0  \??\C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\LocalService\NTUSER.DAT Disabled  
0x8d15d9c8  \??\C:\Users\Hoxed\ntuser.dat      Disabled  
0x8d16a008  \??\C:\Users\Hoxed\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat Disabled  
0x968eb008  \SystemRoot\System32\Config\SECURITY      Disabled  
0x969519c8  \SystemRoot\System32\Config\SAM Disabled
```

### Juicy SAM is here!!!

The Security Accounts Manager (SAM) is a database *file* in the *Microsoft Windows* operating system (OS) that contains usernames and passwords



**Again I wanted to stick with Volatility3 but could not manage to extract the SAM after few hours.  
So I moved on volatility2**

## Dump the registry to get SAM

*With Volatility2 you need the right Profile*

```
volatility2 -f CompromisedSystemMem.vmem imageinfo
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
INFO      : volatility.debug      : Determining profile based on
KDBG search...
          Suggested Profile(s) : Win7SP1x86_23418, Win7SP0x8
6, Win7SP1x86_24000, Win7SP1x86
          AS Layer1 : IA32PagedMemoryPae (Kernel A
S)
          AS Layer2 : FileAddressSpace (/workspac
e/memory-mystery/CompromisedSystemMem.vmem)
          PAE type : PAE
          DTB : 0x185000L
          KDBG : 0x8297bc28L
          Number of Processors : 1
          Image Type (Service Pack) : 1
          KPCR for CPU 0 : 0x8297cc00L
          KUSER_SHARED_DATA : 0xffdf0000L
          Image date and time : 2023-04-24 14:59:30 UTC+0000
          Image local date and time : 2023-04-24 17:59:30 +0300

volatility2 -f CompromisedSystemMem.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x8
6 dumpregistry -D output
```

**Get the Hint :)**


```

strings -n10 output/registry.0x969519c8.SAM.reg
CMI-CreateHive{899121E8-11D8-44B6-ACEB-301713D5ED8C}
Administrators
S-1-5-21-1154659777-2139612456-419014984
Event Log Readers
24F3736544
Performance Monitor Users
UserPasswordHint <-- Looking good
Administrator
Administratoroni
Performance Log Users
LastSkuUpgrade
Distributed COM Users
ServerDomainUpdates
Event Log Readers

```

## .reg files contains binary data

head output/registry.0x969519c8.SAM.reg



```

regf\Yyv P\SystemRoot\System32\Config\SAMIn
$ln
$ln
$mtmIhbinYyvxnk,=
V<04CMI-CreateHive(899121E8-11D8-44B6-ACEB-301713D5ED8C)nk
/lfsAMBuilvk
85k1 %skh l
I?
?
sk`4dHX4? nk =
V<Hh
RXACTvk`CPxD041? nk =
V<
XhDomainsvk
ACvknk Opv
Users vknk =
VhNamesIfNamevknk =
V< ph
Groupsvervknk =
V<xhNamesIfNamevknk `3dV<
x- hAliasesIf( AliaGrouUserknk Opv( `20
h2Names

```

xxd output/registry.0x969519c8.SAM.reg

```

00002ce0: e019 0000 4e61 6d65 e0ff ffff 766b 0100 ....Name....vk..
00002cf0: 7c01 0000 6037 0000 0300 0000 0100 0000 |...`7.....
00002d00: 4300 0000 0000 0000 d8ff ffff 766b 1000 C.....vk..
00002d10: 1a00 0000 301d 0000 0300 0000 0100 0000 ....0.....
00002d20: 5573 6572 5061 7373 776f 7264 4869 6e74 UserPasswordHint
00002d30: e0ff ffff 6500 6e00 6400 2000 6900 7400 ....e.n.d. .i.t.
00002d40: 2000 7700 6900 7400 6800 2000 3500 0000 .w.i.t.h. .5...
00002d50: 4001 0000 9000 0000 a000 0000 1400 0000 @.....
00002d60: 4400 0000 0200 3000 0200 0000 02c0 1400 D.....0.....
00002d70: 0e00 0501 0101 0000 0000 0001 0000 0000 .....
00002d80: 02c0 1400 ffff 1f00 0101 0000 0000 0005 .....

```

## THE HINT

UserPasswordHint end it with 5

## THE END - crack the zip with the new hint

*Let's add 5 at the end of each line of the most common wordlist*

```
sed 's/$/5/' /opt/rockyou.txt > rockyou_modified.txt
```

```
head rockyou_modified.txt
```

```
1234565
```

```
123455
```

```
1234567895
```

```
password5
```

```
iloveyou5
```

```
princess5
```

```
12345675
```

```
zip2john file.0x3da0fac0.0x85869a90.DataSectionObject.Hacktor
```

```
ia\ Contract\ File.zip > file.hash
```

```
john --wordlist=rockyou_modified.txt file.hash
```

WE HAVE THE PASS TO UNLOCK THE ZIP AND...

THE FINAL FLAAAAAAAAAGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!





— gl0bal01