

The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods

JENNIFER MILLIKEN

Graduate Institute of International Studies

Customary 'how to' manuals are usually insulting, but wise 'how to' manuals seldom teach how to. (Glassner, 1980)

Studies involving discourse as a key theoretical concept have in recent years been one of the most active and interesting areas of International Relations. Discourse theorizing crosses over and mixes divisions between post-structuralists, postmodernists and some feminists and social constructivists. Whatever divergent claims are otherwise made by these groups of scholars, they share certain theoretical commitments about how discourses work, generally and in International Relations, leading to a common research interest in discourse studies to 'illustrate how . . . textual and social processes are intrinsically connected and to describe, in specific contexts, the implications of this connection for the way we think and act in the contemporary world' (George, 1994: 191). Also broadly shared is an insistence that discursive studies of the knowledge/power nexus in International Relations are a form of critical theorizing.

What constitutes good research in the examination of the knowledge/power nexus? Through their challenge to standard disciplinary approaches, some discourse scholars have articulated a stance (or 'mode of thinking') which, in David Campbell's words, does not employ 'an epistemic realism, whereby the world comprises material objects whose existence is independent of ideas or beliefs about them', but rather embraces 'a logic of interpretation that acknowledges the improbability of cataloguing, calculating, and specifying "real causes", concerning itself instead with considering the manifest political consequences of adopting one mode of

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representation over another' (Campbell, 1993: 7–8). Beyond this call to study the politics of representation, there has, however, been strikingly little examination of appropriate methods and criteria for discourse study. The problem is *not*, as some critics would have it, that there is little or no research (see the rather extensive references to this article). Rather, it is that no common understanding has emerged in International Relations about the best ways to study discourse.

The inattention to issues of discourse research is not without its reasons. Scholars working in this area wish to challenge the 'scientism' of mainstream International Relations: its search for scientific theories and laws, whether cast in neopositivist (inductive) or rationalist (deductive) terms and, accompanying that, its seeming obsession with methodology (Der Derian, 1989; George, 1994). However, to refuse to engage in mainstream modes of doing social science should not mean the near exclusion from debate of issues of research and method. Scant attention to these issues puts discourse analysts at a disadvantage within the research community. Arguably, it also gives discourse theorizing something of an 'unself-consciousness concerning its analytic and research endeavours', thereby foreclosing what could be a useful dialogue among scholars concerning how best to 'critically reevaluate foreign policy theory as practice', and 'divest power politics "practice" of its legitimacy', which are among the stated goals of discursive critique (George, 1994: 16, 204, 210).

In a step towards a wider dialogue on this issue, I look in this article at discourse analysis as an emerging research programme engaging a community of scholars. Although this community certainly lacks a paradigm of science meeting Kuhn's criteria (as do all others in International Relations), it does have paradigmatic elements. On the basis of a combination of 'canonical' citations and constructive narratives, as well as theory and methodology, members of this community have assimilated a particular approach to International Relations, and to how they can contribute to the explanation and critique of international practices. I draw upon this conceptual network (or 'world' as Kuhn also called it) to elucidate some of the basic commitments of this community and, given its commitments, to evaluate and critique existing research within it, and to draw out criteria for and exemplars of different types of discourse studies. My reading of premises and criteria no doubt simplifies matters, omitting key topics and lumping together others in ways that many will not find acceptable. But I hope at least to demonstrate that, in order to advance its critical agenda, discourse scholars could benefit from more serious reflection on how to do discourse studies well.

Towards a Normal Science of Discourse Analysis

Constructed from the outside, discourse scholars have certainly been represented as a community, albeit most often as a deviant community. Discourse scholarship is regularly criticized as bad science, because of its lack of testable theories or empirical analyses (e.g. Keohane, 1988; Mearsheimer, 1994/5), and indeed, as dangerous science, seductive but 'prolix and self-indulgent' (Walt, 1991: 223). Partly in response to their being tarred with the same brush, some interpretive and social constructivist scholars have made efforts to distinguish their community and its commitments from those of 'postmodern constructivists', 'relativists' and 'constitutivists', labels under which they explicitly place discourse scholarship (Wendt, 1995: 72; Adler, 1997: 323, 326). These metatheoretical commentaries from scholars identifying themselves as outside of the discourse community can sometimes offer informed and thoughtful reflections about the presuppositions and potentialities of the discourse literature. But the boundary-drawing involved, especially when based on claims such as that members of the discourse community, like prisoners in a jail, are 'condemned to interpret discourses', generally reinforces a conception of International Relations in which discourse scholarship is situated on the margins (Adler, 1997: 326; see, in contrast, Krause and Williams, 1996; Price and Reus-Smit, 1998).

The conception of discourse scholarship as deviant and marginal has not been promulgated only by scholars wishing to distinguish and privilege their own research programmes. Some discourse scholars have also labelled discourse study in these ways, for example, naming it as 'dissident scholarship' and as work that is 'foreign' to the rest of the International Relations discipline (Ashley and Walker, 1990b: 399; George, 1994: 191). Based on their postmodern critique of foundationalism, these scholars — leading figures of the community — have represented the 'foreignness' of discourse analysis as partly lying in its rejection of methodological and research design criteria, which, in their view, constitutes attempts to silence alternative experiences and perspectives (Ashley and Walker, 1990b; Campbell, 1996). They have also opposed efforts to categorize this scholarship or to assess its accomplishments (Ashley, 1996). All of these things, *desiderata* for those working within other paradigms, are understood to render scholarship complicit with structures of domination, which gain normalcy partly via 'sovereign' social scientific projects claiming foundations and setting 'rules for thinking and research' (George, 1994: 196).

This stance against 'scientism' has drawn people, myself included, to discourse analysis as a post-positivist project that is critically self-aware of the closures imposed by research programmes and the modes of analysis which scholars routinely use in their work and treat as unproblematic. The stance

has also worked strategically in that it has given to the discourse community one of the means by which scholarship can be included and excluded,¹ as well as one of its enduring narratives for claiming 'cognitive authority' vis-à-vis other disciplinary approaches (Fuller, 1988: 196). But the position which this entails — of rejecting as 'paradigmatic conceits' the elaboration of methods and the setting of research standards, debate about research design, or evaluation of substantive research — deserves to be questioned, for three reasons (Ashley and Walker, 1990b: 398). First, it puts discourse analysts and their critics essentially on the same side with respect to social science standards (what these are, and what it means to meet them), and thereby makes them fellow travellers in the assessment of discourse analysis, in the sense that both conclude that this type of approach is not fundamentally about doing rigorous empirical research or developing better theories. Discourse analysis as (good) abnormal science is one inversion away from the definition of (bad) abnormal science used by other scholars to discount this sort of work. Second, closure on these topics involves 'the imposition of unnecessary limitations upon the work of thought', contradicting the spirit of critical praxis that is supposed to be at the centre of discourse analysis (Ashley and Walker, 1990b: 402; on this point, see also Waever, 1996; O Tuathail, 1996; Price and Reus-Smit, 1998). Third, this position is at odds with other aspects of recent discourse scholarship, including the elaboration of different analytic approaches and of methods of analysis and, via a growing number of substantive empirical analyses, the development of both theoretical concepts for and critical readings of International Relations.

As the latter developments already suggest, the 'non-paradigmatic' status of discourse scholarship is also open to doubt, since discourse analysis can be seen to form a research programme that is evolving and being developed (progressively, one might even argue). That programme may be different from others in its commitment to studying the politics of representation (although see Price and Reus-Smit, 1998: 268–70), but it is not otherwise all that exotic or foreign a mode of collective intellectual labour. Like other research programmes, its adherents attend to, cite and follow up on the work of knowledge producers socially acknowledged as important for the research programme.² As part of a shared 'argumentation format' demarcating the programme, scholars in this area also acknowledge and build their research upon a set of theoretical commitments that organize discourse studies and implicitly restrict appropriate contexts of justification/discovery (for example, some claims may be grounded on empirical facts determined through study of data of some sort, others may be grounded on reason and reflection alone) (Fuller, 1988: 191–2). Among the most important of these commitments are the following three analytically distinguishable bundles of theoretical claims.

Discourses as systems of signification: this first commitment is to a concept of discourse as structures of signification which construct social realities. Underlying this commitment is a constructivist understanding of meaning — things do not mean (the material world does not convey meaning); rather, people construct the meaning of things, using sign systems (predominately, but not exclusively linguistic). However, discourse theorists understand significative construction in a way not shared by all constructivists. First, drawing on Saussure, emphasis is given to the *relationships* in which things are placed in a sign system and, more precisely, in relations by which one object is distinguished from another in the system (de Saussure, 1974). Second, drawing on Derrida's philosophical work, discourses are expected to be structured largely in terms of *binary oppositions* — educated/ignorant, modern/traditional, Western/Third World — that, far from being neutral, establish a relation of power such that one element in the binary is privileged (Derrida, 1981).

Discourse productivity: the second theoretical commitment is to discourses as being productive (or reproductive) of things defined by the discourse. The point here is that beyond giving a language for speaking about (analysing, classifying) phenomena, discourses make intelligible some ways of being in, and acting towards, the world, and of operationalizing a particular 'regime of truth' while excluding other possible modes of identity and action. More specifically, discourses define *subjects authorized to speak and to act* (e.g. foreign policy officials, defence intellectuals, development experts) and 'the relations within which they see and are seen by each other and in terms of which they conduct the . . . business with respect to that issue-area' (Keeley, 1990: 92). Discourses also define *knowledgeable practices* by these subjects towards the objects which the discourse defines, rendering logical and proper interventions of different kinds, disciplining techniques and practices, and other modes of implementing a discursively constructed analysis. In the process, people may be destroyed as well as disciplined, and social space comes to be organized and controlled, i.e. *places and groups are produced as those objects*. Finally, of significance for the legitimacy of international practices is that discourses produce as subjects *publics (audiences) for authorized actors*, and their *common sense* of the existence and qualities of different phenomena and of how public officials should act for them and in their name (e.g. to secure the state, to aid others). Throughout, discourses are understood to work to define and to enable, and also to silence and to exclude, for example, by limiting and restricting authorities and experts to some groups, but not others, endorsing a certain common sense, but making other modes of categorizing and judging meaningless, impracticable, inadequate or otherwise disqualified.

The play of practice: the theoretical commitment of discourse productivity directs us towards studying dominating or hegemonic discourses, and their structuring of meaning as connected to implementing practices and ways of making these intelligible and legitimate. However, even if dominating discourses are 'grids of intelligibility' for large numbers of people, the third theoretical commitment is to all discourses as being unstable grids, requiring work to 'articulate' and 'rearticulate' their knowledges and identities (to fix the 'regime of truth') and open-ended meshes, making discourses changeable and in fact historically contingent. As Roxanne Doty explains,

Its [a discourse's] exterior limits are constituted by other discourses that are themselves also open, inherently unstable, and always in the process of being articulated. This understanding of discourse implies an overlapping quality to different discourses. Any fixing of a discourse and the identities that are constructed by it can only be of a partial nature. It is the overflowing and incomplete nature of discourses that opens up spaces for change, discontinuity, and variation. (Doty, 1996: 6)

Following from this commitment to 'the play of practice', as Ashley (1989) and Doty (1997) among others, have called it, is a concern in the discourse literature for drawing out the efforts made to stabilize and fix dominant meanings, as well as for studying 'subjugated knowledges', alternative discourses excluded or silenced by a hegemonic discourse, and explaining how these alternative discourses worked or work, perhaps in resistance to the dominant knowledge/power.³ At least in theory, this latter aspect of discourse study differentiates discourse studies from other approaches, such as the study of norms in International Relations, which generally considers only the 'collective understandings of the proper behaviour of actors' of western elites, other knowledges apparently being presumed to be inconsequential (Legro, 1997: 33). This commitment also entails a critique of conventional International Relations theory as providing 'ahistorical accounts of continuity and structural form' that ignore historical transformations, and a concern for 'genealogies' exploring historical discontinuities and ruptures in International Relations that conventional theories have erased (Walker, 1993: 110).

In what follows, I will take these three theoretical commitments as presuppositions of discourse analysis — as an interrelated set of starting points for it to be a *normal science* for its practitioners. I will therefore not discuss whether these commitments are reasonable or justified, nor answer common objections to them such as 'language isn't everything', 'events are not constructed, they are caused', or 'where is the space for agency'. Nor will I weigh the strengths and weaknesses of alternative frameworks to the discourse approach given some extra-paradigmatic explanatory goal (e.g. the goal of explaining the role of ideas in foreign policy, or of improving

explanations of international norms). These are important and necessary intellectual issues, but they are generally not intended, nor do they generally help, to develop discourse research in International Relations.⁴ Treating the study of discourse as normal science does not mean, however, that I will ignore ‘hard questions’ about discursive analyses as they have evolved in International Relations. Rather, I will use these theoretical commitments as an *internally established basis* for critically evaluating discourse research. Separating ‘discourse analysis’ into different, albeit related types of research and methods, I will also offer exemplars of good work that has been done in the area and suggest ways that discourse studies could be improved both conceptually and in terms of their research design.

Studying Discourses as Systems of Signification

The study of structures of signification is basic to all discursive approaches. If discourses are differential systems of signification, however, how do these systems operate to construct things and give people knowledge about social reality? One answer at least loosely shared in the International Relations literature is that discourses operate as background capacities for persons to differentiate and identify things, giving them taken-for-granted qualities and attributes, and relating them to other objects. As background capacities, though, discourses do not exist ‘out there’ in the world; rather, they are *structures* that are actualized in their regular use by people of discursively ordered relationships in ‘ready-at-hand language practices’ or other modes of signification (Shapiro, 1989: 11). This view of a discourse as ‘a structure of meaning-in-use’ implies that discursive studies must empirically analyse language practices (or their equivalents) in order to draw out a more general structure of relational distinctions and hierarchies that orders persons’ knowledge about the things defined by the discourse (Weldes and Saco, 1996: 373).

There is no single method for analysis and abstraction along these lines, but rather a number of ways that scholars can identify key aspects of significative practices and, based on their study, establish a discourse. Nonetheless, in light of the relative lack of explicit discussion of methods for analysing systems of signification, it may help to give a brief sketch of one particular method. This method, *predicate analysis*, is suitable for the study of language practices in texts (e.g. diplomatic documents, theory articles, transcripts of interviews), the main research materials for International Relations discourse analysts.⁵ I will illustrate the method using the example of how one might analyse the discursive constitution of International Relations subjects, which is also a key issue for many working in this area. Note, however, that predicate analysis is not in principle limited to the study

of subjects, and can therefore also be an aid in, for example, analysing the social construction of space and of geopolitical reasoning.

Predicate analysis focuses on the language practices of predication — the verbs, adverbs and adjectives that attach to nouns. Predications of a noun construct the thing(s) named as a particular sort of thing, with particular features and capacities. Among the objects so constituted may be subjects, defined through being assigned capacities for and modes of acting and interacting. For example, suppose a diplomatic document stated:

If the US does not take any action in Korea, this would produce a marked psychological reaction in the public mind and in the minds of Asian leaders. US prestige would be damaged throughout the region. Japan, the linchpin of our policy in Asia, would lose morale and experience a strengthening of the widespread desire for neutrality, with the result that not even a commitment of significant US military strength would keep Japan in the West.⁶

Among the predications of *Japan* in this statement are:

- linchpin of US policy in Asia
- would lose morale
- would experience a strengthening of the widespread desire for neutrality
- would not be kept in the West (Western alliance)
- (as with other Asian countries) Japanese leaders and the Japanese public would have a marked psychological reaction.

The language practice of these predications constructs Japan (its leaders and public) as a subject that experiences emotions (a desire for neutrality) and reacts psychically (loses morale) but that does not generally act in a positive sense. Even the possibility of Japan leaving the Western alliance is presented in quite passive terms. Thus these predications construct Japan as an independent but subordinate state that is key to US policy, but one that is acted upon, especially psychologically, rather than one that makes decisions of its own and rationally chooses a course of action.

As the references to Korea and the United States in our example already suggest, a text never constructs only one thing. Instead, in implicit or explicit parallels and contrasts, other things (other subjects) will also be labelled and given meaningful attributes by their predicates. A set of predicate constructs defines a *space of objects* differentiated from, while being related to, one another. For example, suppose that our diplomatic document also stated that ‘if the US were to give rapid and unhesitating support for the Republic of Korea, this would reassure the Japanese as to their own fate. Soviet aggressive intentions in the Far East would be underlined, enhancing Japanese willingness to accept US protection.’ That predication constructs the *United States* as a subject that, in contrast to Japan, makes choices and takes material action that affects the psychic states of other states (e.g. to

reassure those other states). Implicitly, in assigning to it 'intentions', the *Soviet Union* is also constructed as being like the United States in this respect. But the Soviet Union is also constituted as an aggressor state ('Soviet aggressive intentions'), in opposition to the United States, a protector state for Japan ('US protection').

I have referred to a text in the singular in my illustration, and research based on predicate analysis would certainly entail systematic analysis of a text's object space, drawing up lists of predications attaching to the subjects the text constructs and clarifying how these subjects are distinguished from and related to one another. Discourses, though, are background capabilities that are used socially, at least by a small group of officials if not more broadly in a society or among different elites and societies. Also, the concern in discursive analysis is not only with particular distinctions (that made in a text between Japan and the United States), but also with the structuring of relational distinctions, posited to be a 'center that organizes and makes them [particular distinctions] coherent' (Doty, 1997: 378). Since discourses are social systems of signification, it will not do (as sometimes appears to be the case) to base a discursive analysis only on one text, even some 'key' document (e.g. NSC-68, the Caribbean Basin Report). A single text cannot be claimed to support empirically arguments about discourse as a social background, used regularly by different individuals and groups. Instead, if the analysis is to be about social signification, a discourse analysis should be based upon a set of texts by different people presumed (according to the research focus) to be authorized speakers/writers of a dominant discourse or to think and act within alternative discourses. In order to address issues of selection bias — and to enable better theorization — one might also more narrowly select texts by whether they take different positions on a relevant issue (e.g. whether or not NATO should intervene in Kosovo), and so could provide evidence of a discourse as a social background for meaningful disputes among speakers of the discourse.

Assuming an appropriate initial set of texts, how is a researcher to undertake an examination of the structuring of relational distinctions? The import of this concern is that beyond identifying the object spaces of different texts, a discourse analysis should compare these object spaces to uncover the relational distinctions that arguably order the ensemble, serving as a frame (most often hierarchical) for defining certain subject identities. So, to continue our earlier example, a researcher might find that in different texts Japan was repeatedly represented via emotion predicates (e.g. 'fear', 'desire') in contrast to the US, represented via judgement predicates (e.g. 'weigh options'). She might also find that in the object spaces of the texts she was studying, Japan was represented via immaturity predicates (e.g. 'politically immature'), in opposition to the US, represented via predicates

suggestive of maturity (e.g. 'firm and courageous leadership'). In this step of the analysis, the researcher would abstract from these two particular oppositions to a core opposition underlying both, for example, a core opposition of *reason/passion*.

Three points may help to clarify this sketch of a predicate analysis. First, the method is useful not just for establishing a particular discourse, but also for elucidating both how discourses overlap, as well as the structures of meaning that they share. Many scholars, for example, have evoked the notion of a 'Western security discourse' mainly on the basis of empirical analyses of representations by US officials and US intellectuals of statecraft (e.g. Campbell, 1993; Klein, 1994). However, the 'security imaginary' of the United States is not congruent with that of the elites of other Western countries, and (following the theoretical commitment of the play of practice) it would therefore be appropriate to examine how different Western discourses do and do not overlap. This question can be addressed concretely through a comparison of the object definitions and core distinctions used systematically by members of different groups (see Milliken, 1999, forthcoming, for Western discourse analysed in this fashion). Alternative discourses involve for their study more than an initial empirical differentiation. But whether one is seeking to establish the nature of subjugated knowledges, or to study empirically historical continuity and change in discourses, a predicate analysis can help a researcher to better justify and refine an interpretation.

Second, what is being proposed for predicate analysis is a process of empirical study and abstraction which goes hand in hand, in the sense that theoretical categories are drawn from and answer to the empirical data upon which a study is based. This approach has long been advocated by qualitative sociologists under the rubric of 'grounded theory' (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). In the sociological formulation, a grounded theory is one that, rather than selectively choosing data according to *a priori* theoretical categories, formulates the theory from the data by developing provisional categorizations via empirical study and abstraction, comparing on the basis of new data whether these categories fit and, if necessary, reformulating the categories so that they are empirically valid. Thus the theory emerges from empirical research, about which it generalizes in a grounded fashion.⁷

Predicate analysis as grounded theory offers an answer to a problem that researchers necessarily encounter in studying discourse, namely when to stop analysing texts. An analysis can be said to be complete (validated) when upon adding new texts and comparing their object spaces, the researcher finds consistently that the theoretical categories she has generated work for those texts. This is also a partial response to the issue of the reliability of discourse analyses, i.e. that the interpretation offered has been checked and

reworked until it fits with and explains consistently texts that were not originally part of its empirical base. It is worth highlighting that the reliability of any interpretation ought also to be a matter of external checks. Thus a researcher could usefully compare her theorization to others' studies (discursive or not) of the same issue, again to test her categories and to ascertain whether in this light her interpretation continues to work well; and she could also discuss her findings with others who know the empirical materials with which she is working.

Third, in presenting predicate analysis here, I am not advocating it as the only appropriate method for studying systems of signification. Other methods also exist and could be used instead of or together with predicate analysis. One such method is *metaphorical analysis* as developed by the linguists Mark Johnson and George Lakoff (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987; see also Lincoln, 1989, for a third method of narrative analysis). A metaphorical analysis focuses upon metaphors (conventional ways of conceptualizing one domain in terms of another) as structuring possibilities for human reasoning and action. From empirical study, the researcher establishes metaphors used regularly in the language practices of a group or society to make sense of the world (e.g. governments as overindulgent mothers, using money they don't have, and citizens as children begging for handouts). Abstracting from these particular metaphors, a theory of metaphorical categorization is then developed to account for particular metaphors as variations of a central model or models. The potential for this approach to discourse analysis is evident in George Lakoff's (1996) study of liberal and conservative metaphorical common sense in contemporary American politics, and Paul Chilton's (1996) examination of Cold War security discourses in the United States, Western and Eastern Europe from 1945 to 1990 (see also Milliken, 1996; Mutimer, 1999).

In giving attention to certain linguistic elements and their combination, predicate and metaphorical analyses are more formal approaches for studying language practices than is typical of International Relations work in this area. Some may find them (or similar methods focusing on specific signification mechanisms) too close to 'methodologism, of which there is already a surfeit in international relations theory' (Der Derian, 1989: 7). I demur. In other disciplines, treatments of significative practices are considered entirely appropriate, in part because they make abstract theory about signification researchable in the actual products of a sign system. In any case, and separately from the value of this particular method, the importance of a method as such deserves to be highlighted. Using a method for 'reading' or 'seeing' can make research better organized and, therefore, easier to carry through. Through its control over interpretive procedures, it can also bring greater insight into how a discourse is ordered, and into how discourses

differ in their construction of social reality. Not insignificantly, it can also be shared to facilitate communication and debate among scholars.

Incorporating Issues of Productivity

Although discourse analysis is concerned with significant practices and the knowledge systems underlying them, it is insufficient to study only the way a discourse constitutes background capabilities for people to understand their social world. The theoretical commitment of discourse productivity also makes it important to explain how a discourse *produces* this world — how it selectively constitutes some and not others as ‘privileged storytellers . . . to whom narrative authority . . . is granted’, how it renders logical and proper certain policies by authorities and in the implementation of those policies shapes and changes people’s modes and conditions of living, and how it comes to be dispersed beyond authorized subjects to make up common sense for many in everyday society (Campbell, 1993: 7). The significance of discourse productivity is theoretical in nature, since examining discourse productivity differentiates discourse study from other approaches that do not examine ‘how foundations and boundaries are drawn — how states [or other entities] are written . . . with particular capacities and legitimacies at particular times and places’ (Weber, 1995: 29). This aspect of discourse analysis also has clear political and ethical significance, since in explaining discourse productivity, scholars can potentially denaturalize dominant forms of knowledge and expose to critical questioning the practices that they enable.

No individual study, even a monograph, can deal with all aspects of discursive productivity, however, and there are foci that follow from choices that scholars make about whose system of signification they will principally study. Surveying the International Relations literature, three types of studies can be distinguished on this basis — foreign policy, International Relations theory and international diplomacy/organization. Extending significant analyses of foreign policy elites, *foreign policy studies* address discursive productivity by analysing how an elite’s ‘regime of truth’ made possible certain courses of action by a state (e.g. intervening militarily in the Gulf War) while excluding other policies as unintelligible or unworkable or improper (e.g. doing nothing, seeking a diplomatic settlement) (Campbell, 1993; Weldes and Saco, 1996). Arguments may also be made for how a particular case or cases illuminate the more general and long-term production of the state as a sovereign entity (Campbell, 1992) and of international relationships and hierarchies (Shapiro, 1988; Doty, 1996). *International Relations theory studies* usually extend analyses of theoretical representations via arguments that knowledge produced in the academy is fused with that of

policy-makers to make up a 'dominant intellectual/policy perspective' (George, 1994: 34). Theoretical representations (as scientific truth) are then presented as helping to legitimize to elites and a broader public particular policies taken by states and international organizations (Milliken and Sylvan, 1996), as well as helping to reproduce a common sense among different populations more generally supportive of state-centrism, the Cold War, the liberal economic order and post-Cold War reassertion of Western dominance over post-colonial states (Ashley, 1989; Klein, 1994). Finally, *international diplomacy/organization studies* extend analyses of diplomatic interchanges and organizational knowledges to the discursive production of authorities and experts and their networks (Litfin, 1994). They also seek to demonstrate how the coordination of policies is made possible between different state elites and how policies that might seem *a priori* plausible are excluded from the international agenda and from state practices (Price, 1997; Mutimer, 1999).

These different types of studies are viewed within the discourse community as sharing the same context of discovery/justification for explaining discursive productivity, namely scholarly reasoning and reflection (and not primarily empirical study or theory-building). Explanations of policy productivity in both foreign policy and diplomacy/organization studies, for instance, are based mostly on counter-factual reasoning about how, if the significative system and its objects had been different, a different policy or agreement might have been possible (Mutimer, 1999). Some bolster this explanation via comparisons to rival or complementary explanations (Price, 1997). As Price and Reus-Smit (1998: 277–8) rightly observe, this strategy can add strength to explanations of discursive productivity, but it too is essentially justification via scholarly reasoning. More can and should be done in this area in terms of conceptual development and empirical research. Two aspects of discourse productivity that deserve further refinement (and individual study) are the production of common sense, and the production of policy practices.

Common Sense

A recurrent theme in the discourse literature is that discourses produce (reproduce) the common sense(s) of societies, limiting possible resistance among a broader public to a given course of action, legitimating the state as a political unit, and creating reasonable and warranted relations of domination (Ashley and Walker, 1990b; Waever, 1995; Huysmans, 1998). This thematic is tied closely to a critical goal of discourse analysis, that the readers of discourse studies would reflect upon and change their common sense. With most readers being university students and colleagues, the challenge to

common sense is directed at discursive authorities (scientific experts and would-be policy-makers and international affairs workers), but especially at the educated audience for these authorities.⁸

Despite its critical significance, exploration of the production of common sense has been relatively limited, with most work being done in International Relations theory, but some also in foreign policy analysis. With regard to such theory, scholars have argued that theoretical practice 'is . . . implicated in the production of particular discourses', as in the case of the United States in the Cold War era (Doty, 1997: 386). More broadly, International Relations theory has been presented as a 'modernist' form of representation, contributing to the common sense acceptance of the paradigm of sovereignty with its core opposition between International Relations (as a domain of ever-repeated violence and anarchy) and domestic politics (as a realm of order and progress) (Ashley, 1989: 295 and *passim*; see also Walker, 1993; George, 1994). It is argued that International Relations theorists therefore have 'complicity in the practices of statecraft' which they should re-examine, as should readers of their texts (Ashley, 1996: 246).

Those presenting these arguments acknowledge that International Relations theory is one of many sites of the production of common sense. The overwhelming (continued) concentration on the theory site nonetheless works to belie this acknowledgement. Without questioning that International Relations theory does contribute to the creation of common sense, it is time to rethink this concentration. International Relations theory is limited as an *academic knowledge site* for the production of common sense. Economics, law and history are at least as important, yet they are rarely reflected on, much less studied in our discipline (a notable exception is Edkins, 1996a). The study of theory is also limited as an *expert knowledge site*. Most expert knowledge of International Relations is created and circulated not as the 'pure science' of (mainly US neoliberal and neorealist) International Relations theorists, but as the 'applied science' of scholars advising governments and international organizations, working for think tanks and non-governmental organizations, and *speaking publicly on issues of the day* in institutional publications, magazine articles, editorials, television interviews and trade books.

A second issue for theory and foreign policy arguments alike is a lack of concepts for explaining *processes of this production*. Put differently, writing (security, for example) also implicates processes of reading in which people come in some fashion to take up discursive constructions as representing reality for them. One way that this 'uptake' can be usefully theorized is via concepts of articulation and interpellation that Jutta Weldes, building upon Stuart Hall's work, has developed for foreign policy study (for another approach, see Edkins, 1996b).

Articulation in Weldes' usage means the construction of discursive objects and relationships out of 'cultural raw materials' and 'linguistic resources' that already make sense within a particular society (1999: 154). In combining and recombining extant cultural materials, and in repeating successful combinations, 'contingent and contextually specific representations of the world' can be forged that 'come to seem as though they are inherently or necessarily connected and the meanings they produce come to seem natural, to be an accurate description of reality' (Weldes, 1999: 154–5). *Interpellation* refers to how these representations work to 'hail' individuals so that they come to accept the representations as natural and accurate. The basic idea is that foreign policy representations by governments and other authorized speakers do not only define an object space for International Relations, but also create subject positions or identities for individuals to identify with and to 'speak from' (Weldes, 1999: 163). As Weldes writes of this construction of common sense during the Cuban Missile Crisis,

They [the representations used by US officials during and after the Cuban Missile Crisis] invited members of their audience . . . to imagine themselves as a powerful yet concerned family member who — because they were committed to the solidarity of the Western hemisphere, to the integrity and virtue of the 'American family' and its common values, to democracy and diversity, and to the disavowal of secrecy and treachery — was in a uniquely responsible position that both enabled and obliged them to challenge the global threat posed by totalitarianism and the hemispheric threat posed by the Soviet 'Trojan horse' and by 'Communist infiltration' of Cuba. In so doing . . . [t]he audience was interpellated as a democratic subject which . . . defended the free way of life around the world . . . as open and honest people . . . [who] wished to preserve peace and order, freedom and the independence of nations. (1999: 343–4)

Concepts of articulation and interpellation take us some distance in thinking through the issue of the production of common sense. But they — or similar efforts to theorize this issue — must also face the question of what works as 'cultural raw materials' and 'linguistic resources' for different societies or, indeed, within a society. Weldes notes in passing that the use of 'we' to mean the United States and actions taken by the US government, a powerful and highly common mode of interpellation in US culture, is not so prevalent in other cultures (1999: 184, n. 9). Similarly, neoliberalism — an apparently successful set of articulations in Reagan's America and Thatcher's Britain — did not work equally well to interpellate publics in France, Germany or Switzerland, among others. Thus explaining the production of common sense appears best served by empirical study that examines

‘mundane’ cultural knowledge in specific contexts, and asks what resources it actually provides.

I would suggest two approaches to what would largely be a new domain of inquiry for discourse scholarship in International Relations. The first is a popular culture approach, analysing the ‘everyday’ cultural conditions of novels, comic books, television and film and how they render sensible and legitimate particular state actions. Although it too easily translates US popular culture into modern culture in general, Michael Shapiro’s (1997) study is one exemplar of work of this sort. The second approach is anthropological, analysing the ‘everyday’ culture of people in their work and family lives. Here, International Relations scholars could learn from Joseph Masco’s (1999, forthcoming) investigation of ‘national security’ as meaningful to Native Americans, Nuevomexicanos and US military industrial workers living near and off the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Sandia National Laboratory in New Mexico.

Policy Practices

In contrast to International Relations theory studies, foreign policy and diplomacy/organization studies are directly concerned with explaining how a discourse articulated by elites produces policy practices (individual or joint). These types of discourse analysis also share an understanding of what it means to explain the production of policy practices, namely to take the significative system which they have analysed, and to argue for that system as structuring and limiting the policy options (joint policies, norms of state practice) that policy-makers find reasonable.⁹ This approach is an appropriate one, and one which I too have followed. But like the treatment of common sense, it also deserves to be re-examined and refined as a way to explain policy production. The current approach’s main weakness (or puzzle, in another idiom) is that it leaves out what happens after a policy is promulgated among high-level officials, i.e. the implementation of policy as actions directed towards those objectified as targets of international practices.

Analysing how policies are implemented (and not just formulated) means studying the operationalization of discursive categories in the activities of governments and international organizations, and the ‘regular effects’ on their targets of interventions taken on this basis (Ferguson, 1994: xiv). The operationalization practices of these entities is a subject rarely taken up in mainstream International Relations, as attested to by the general lack of discussion of implementation in most theories and studies of foreign policy or of international regimes. When implementation is considered, the discussion is usually couched in very general terms, outlined as a stylized

type of act or policy (e.g. 'land redistribution', 'intervention', 'foreign aid') but not as explanation of how the actions putatively covered by the term were organized and enacted in particular circumstances. Governments and international organizations do document and record implementation practices and take measures of their effects, but in an arcane language that, for public consumption, usually involves the use of vague and general labels (e.g. 'measures taken to improve debt servicing' to describe IMF demands to Indonesia). Discourse studies which include the implementation of policy practices can potentially problematize such labels and expose readers to the 'micro-physics of power' in International Relations (Foucault, 1980: 27). This exposure might in turn give readers a basis with which to 'question' and 'enquire about' the workings of states and international organizations, a critical goal that discourse studies share (Edkins, 1996a: 575).

Michel Foucault's (1977) work on the development of criminality and the prison system demonstrates the need for the study of policy implementation. In Foucault's analysis, a significant process of definition was necessary — but not by itself sufficient — in order to create a disciplinary society. Rather, the meaning of categories for 'the criminal' and 'the delinquent' also had to be operationalized through measures organizing space in prisons and practices of surveillance developed to regulate the lives of prison inmates. It was the two processes together, and not just or mainly fixing objectives and naming things, that produced a discourse of criminality that could discipline subjects, shaping their activities down to the smallest detail.

In the concepts of disciplinary technologies, surveillance and governmentality, Foucault's studies provide International Relations scholars with a means to theorize the production of foreign policy and international practices (Foucault, 1977, 1980, 1991). This type of thinking — basically in terms of examination of how corporate actors order, control and shape bodies and spaces — has perhaps been most fruitfully pursued outside of our discipline in development anthropology (Ferguson, 1994; Escobar, 1995) and geography (O Tuathail, 1996). Exemplars in International Relations can also be found, though, including Milliken and Sylvan's (1996) examination of the implementation of US intervention in Vietnam, Bigo's (1996) work on procedures for police cooperation in Europe, and Doty's (1996) study of British colonial policy towards Kenya.

Doty's examination of the British colonial practices of land ordinances and tribal reserves illustrates what such research can provide that a study of policy formulation alone cannot accomplish. Her study shows, first of all, how British policy became comprehensible via the construction of Kenyans as 'natives' needing to be controlled and mastered, and of the British as civilized subjects capable of handling the power and authority necessary for this. Looking at the operationalization of policy, Doty then examines

Britain's governance of Kenya, tracing how, in its organization of space and the controls it established for persons' movements, employment, etc., the British administration put into action the 'truths' it was constructing for Kenyan 'natives'. The latter aspect of her study is essential, for it enables Doty to explain how this discourse produced Kenyan 'natives', literally by disciplining their bodies and by reforming and regulating the social, economic and political spaces in which they lived and worked.

Not every analysis of foreign policy or international organization can or should address in depth how the policies being analysed are operationalized. It would be a 'progressive problem shift', however, for this to become a type of study regularly undertaken by discourse scholars in International Relations. For scholars considering such an undertaking, a comment on data sources is also appropriate. Most International Relations theories of foreign policy or international organization, focusing on policy formulation and not on implementation, will have limited utility for a research project of this kind. The same applies to diplomatic or policy histories, if written (as is usually the case) with a focus on the decision-makers and not on the 'action in the field'. Researchers interested in historical studies are likely to be better served by field histories (e.g. military histories) and, especially, by archival research and writings by first-hand observers. Similarly, scholars engaged in contemporary studies should use first-hand media reports, Internet network resources and even fieldwork and interviews.

Addressing the Play of Practice

Explanations of the production of discourse have largely been explanations of how a dominating discourse of International Relations produces the social reality that it defines. However, discourses require effort on the part of authorized speakers in order to produce and reproduce them, and such efforts are not always successful. This open-endedness and instability of discourses means that they are liable to slip and slide into new relationships via resistances that their articulation and operationalization may engender. To be considered well done, any type of discourse study thus needs to address not just the orderly constitution of international society, but how this order is inherently contingent, entailing that its orderliness needs to be worked for it to be reproduced.

International Relations scholars use or propose four main methods for addressing the play of practice in their work, all based on empirical analysis and evidence. In the *deconstructive method*, the contingent nature of a discourse is revealed through textual analyses that show how internally to a text, the poles of oppositions which it privileges and the 'realities' it thereby makes basic or original can be reversed and displaced, thereby producing

other 'truths'. The 'orthodox meanings' of a discourse in such cases are shown to lack the stable foundations claimed for them, indicating that these are imposed readings which could have been different.

The *juxtapositional method* works similarly to deconstruction, but does so by juxtaposing the 'truth' about a situation constructed within a particular discourse to events and issues that this 'truth' fails to acknowledge or address, and also by pairing dominant representations with contemporaneous accounts that do not use the same definitions of what has happened and that articulate subjects and their relationships in different ways. The point of this method, as David Campbell (1992, 1993) has explained, is not to establish the 'right story' but to render ambiguous predominant interpretations of state practices and to demonstrate the inherently political nature of official discourses.

The next method, focusing on *subjugated knowledges*, is essentially an extension of the juxtapositional method, with the difference that alternative accounts are not just pointed out but are explored in some depth, showing that they are enabled by a discourse that does not overlap substantially with a dominating discourse. This may also involve an examination of how the subjugated knowledge itself works to create conditions for resistance to a dominating discourse, and also perhaps an exploration of how the dominating discourse excludes or silences its alternative.

Finally, in the *genealogical method*, the contingency of contemporary discursive practices is examined through historical studies of past discursive practices that 'record the singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality' (Foucault, 1977: 139). That is, in a genealogical study history is not interpreted as a progression leading to the present, but as a series of discursive formations that are discontinuous, breaking with one another in terms of discursive objects, relations, and their operationalization. Genealogical studies thereby emphasize that dominating discourses, including contemporary ones, involve relations of power in which unity with the past is artificially conserved and order is created from conditions of disorder.

These methods for studying the play of practice are often combined, which is a good triaging strategy in qualitative research terms as well as a good way to help convince the sceptical reader. However, it can be questioned whether some of these methods do not work better than others to achieve the critical aims of discourse study. My own view is that the approaches of subjugated knowledges and genealogy have the most potential to lead readers to question orientations and actions that they ordinarily take for granted. These approaches do not only show that the world could in principle be interpreted differently (deconstruction) or that in some instances it has been interpreted differently (juxtaposition). They also have the potential of showing that the world has been and is being

interpreted (judged, enacted) in different ways in a routine and regular fashion by various groups and cultures as part of their everyday being-in-the-world. Concretizing other possibilities is surely the best way to enable people to imagine how their being-in-the-world is not only changeable but, perhaps, ought to be changed.

But if studies of subjugated knowledges or of past alternatives have this potential, this has not been fully realized in the discourse programme in International Relations. Current research on genealogical and, in particular, subjugated knowledges is not especially extensive. As I next discuss, there is also a need to improve upon their research design.

Studying the Politics of Hegemony

In oft-repeated figurations of 'dissent' and 'marginality', the less orthodox part of the International Relations literature has given considerable metatheoretical space to the study of subjugated knowledges and to resistance to dominating discourses (Ashley and Walker, 1990a; George, 1994; Ashley, 1996). However, little systematic research on 'the politics of hegemony' has been undertaken. Only a handful of studies actually study subjugated discourses, as opposed to pointing at putative examples of these, and fewer still inquire directly into how 'dissent' is made and unmade (see, among this limited group, Manzo, 1992; Sylvester, 1994; Hansen, 1996; Fierke, 1998; Saco, 1999, forthcoming).

Undoubtedly, part of the problem lies with the potential difficulties of such research. Unlike studying US foreign policy towards Vietnam or Western diplomatic discourse on chemical weapons, subjugated knowledges are often not articulated in English or in other languages commonly spoken by North Americans and West Europeans. These discourses may also be local (e.g. the culture of farmers in northern India) and therefore not be recorded, thus requiring fieldwork for their investigation. Even if they are recorded, they are still likely to present to a researcher 'another world' whose referents take time to learn (e.g. the cyberculture community, development discourse in Chad). However, these research issues are not the only reason for the relative inattention given to the politics of hegemony. A contributing factor is the truncated understanding of discursive productivity which has been typical of work in our field. If people's common sense of the world is taken as already made (and in one form only), there does not appear to be any point in studying the politics of hegemony. If international practice is treated as an issue of formulation and choice by elites, and not as policy definitions that in their operationalization have regular effects on their targets, resistance becomes difficult to imagine and, even more so, to trace out.

The ‘top–down’ view of discourse implicit in these orientations has not been as prevalent in other fields, and International Relations scholars can find in disciplines such as cultural studies and anthropology concepts and approaches to help them in theorizing the politics of hegemony in International Relations (another source within International Relations is work being done in Gramscian political economy.) Bruce Lincoln’s work provides an illustration of one possible approach. Lincoln uses narrative analysis to identify the cultural myths (i.e. narratives that in a culture have ‘the status of *paradigmatic truth*’) by which elites can articulate an official version of a course of action and of a social order likely to be persuasive in their society (1989: 24). As he points out, though, societies are syntheses of constituent subgroups ‘only imperfectly and precariously bound together by the officially sanctioned sentiments of affinity’ (1989: 10). Elite discourse may therefore fail in its hailings, opening a space for those marginalized under the existing social order to agitate for change. To construct new social formations, these people make use as well of myths, albeit in different ways. They can contest the authority of an official myth, so as to ‘deprive it of the capacity to continually reconstruct accustomed social forms’ (Lincoln, 1989: 25). Drawing on other available cultural myths, they can seek to counter the persuasiveness of an official myth with a different paradigm. They can also reinterpret the official myth in a different variation that is supportive of social change.

In his studies of (among other events) the Spanish civil war, the Iranian revolution and the St Bartholomew’s Day massacre, Lincoln shows how myths as cultural resources have been articulated in different ways by subgroups in societies so as to produce the conditions for resistance and, indeed, for social change. This general approach (with its clear connections to Weldes’ work on societal common sense) is by no means limited to a particular state and to resistance within that state. It can also be applied to ‘global’ processes and ‘international’ discourses, as Akhil Gupta does in his ethnographic examination of indigenous discourses of agronomy and ecology in the Uttar Pradesh state of India, and of how these ‘mingle and jostle with one another to interrupt the teleological narratives’ of post-1945 development discourse (Gupta, 1998: 13). Gupta’s analysis does not valorize indigenous discourses for their antimodernism or their authenticity, which are definite risks in this sort of study. Rather, he highlights how they are ‘hybridized discourses’ — blending ‘scientific’ theories, ‘humoral’ accounts of the lands and its capacities and strengths and prevailing development discourses, and how this hybridization gives farmers a way to make sense of and to organize against the emerging regulation of biodiversity (1998: 159, 5).

Constructing Genealogies

The clear message of Akhil Gupta's study, echoed also in Diana Saco's (1999) work on the politics of cyberspace, is that new modes of governmentality that are being instituted to regulate the relationship between people and things are not processes of complete closure. They operate by fits and starts, often creating the conditions for unintended consequences. This type of analysis is one which we might expect to see developed also in International Relations genealogies. However, what one learns from reading many (although not all) of the genealogical investigations is not so much about how discourses of International Relations have been discontinuous, with heterogeneous conditions of emergence and spaces for dissent, but how dominating discourses have been largely *continuous*.

Following in part on Derrida's deconstructions of western philosophy, many discourse scholars have given a strong reading to modernity and its binary oppositions as constitutive of International Relations theories, both past and present. Michael Shapiro (1992), for example, presents geopolitical thinking as a discourse that helped constitute and has gone on constituting International Relations throughout the modern era; and Jens Bartelson (1995) traces the contemporary discourse of sovereignty in international political theory as a formation intact since the Renaissance. The result is to bind a rather long history (at least post-Kant to the present) to a continuation of the same discursive structure and logic of difference, with the effect that despite surface changes, International Relations becomes a quasi-eternal recurrence. Discourses constitutive of state practices have also been cast as modernist, and analysed as being basically continuous for several centuries or more in their oppositional structures and modes of productivity. David Campbell, for example, argues that US identity constructions from the 17th and 18th centuries are 'oddly similar' in 'structural logic and modes of representation' to the Cold War, indeed, that the Cold War is 'another episode in the on-going production and reproduction of American identity' (Campbell, 1992: 145). Similarly, Iver Neumann's (1998) study of Russia as an object in European identity formation illustrates that although the qualities and attributes given Russia in European discourse have varied somewhat, such variation is secondary to enduring core oppositions rendering Russia an enemy 'other' of Europe.

Perhaps these quasi-structuralist readings are correct, and that only contrasts like, say, that between a Greek versus a modern era can draw out a discursive formation different from that of the present era. The conclusion is troubling, though, not least of all for its political prospects. If the United States has always drawn upon similar identity oppositions in its foreign policy practices, it seems unlikely that this discourse can develop any time soon 'an

orientation to the inherently plural world that is not predicated upon the desire to contain, master, and normalize threatening contingencies through violence' (Campbell, 1992: 252). If Russia has been Europe's enemy 'other' for several centuries, this would seem an historical lesson also valid today for European policy-makers. Even if one argues that this is not so, there would still be the issue of how such a long-standing feature of European culture and political practice can ever be changed.

As an historical thesis, the continuity reading is, however, questionable. Gearoid O Tuathail's work on the emergence of geopolitics in the late 19th century demonstrates this problem. As he argues (1996: 16–17), in a remark on the modernist reading of geopolitics by critical theorists in *International Relations* as well as geography,

The difficulty with such generalized inflations of the concept of geopolitics . . . is that they can efface the historical and geographical particularity of geopolitics as a way of envisioning and writing space-as-global from the turn of the century. The term 'geopolitics' was first coined in 1899. As a consequence of the imagined significance of a German school of geopolitics in explaining Nazi foreign policy during World War II, geopolitics became the name of a tradition with a canon of classical texts and a parade of prophetic men . . . The inflation of the term in recent critical intellectual discourse . . . is understandable and not new.

State practices and international relationships have also changed historically rather more than the thesis suggests. To list some of these changes, marriage has stopped being a typical mode of alliance formation, just as alliances themselves have changed. Slavery has disappeared as a form of international commerce. Vassal states, suzerain states and imperial states, all possible international statuses/state identities in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, became impossible entities by the mid-20th century. So too did practices of colonialism. Exterminism was once practiced in US foreign policy (as well as by certain other Western states), but it has now become unthinkable. Techno-war, on the other hand, has emerged in this century as a new type of US policy practice. So has foreign aid, as well as other technologies of power of the development discourse.

Examining the work of those like Saco (1997), Price (1997) or others who are able to genealogize *International Relations* in a more differentiated way, two things appear to contribute to breaking with 'generalized inflations'. The first is that the researcher foregoes his or her conceptualizations in favour of studying how others have constituted their meanings. As David Sylvan, Corinne Graff and Elisabetta Pugliese note (1998: 5), a fixed meaning for the concept of sovereignty often continues to be used by genealogists despite claims to the contrary. Jens Bartelson (1995), for example, fixes a meaning for the concept of sovereignty as a frame separating

the 'inside' of political units from their 'outside'; the frame is said to vary, but from the Renaissance to today, the frame-meaning is treated by Bartelson as remaining the same. A discourse study adopting a grounded theory approach, in contrast, can attend to how sovereignty might have been defined rather differently by others in the past.

Second, genealogies that reveal discontinuities do not treat the past as a series of interpretations (series of representations of Russia, series of US identity constructions), they instead focus on state practices and how these are and are not produced by significative systems. In this vein, they ask about practices that could be pursued in earlier periods, but that are not possible now (e.g. chemical weapons). They also look at the way that relationships were previously regularly constituted, but not practiced today (e.g. alliance through marriage). In other words, they use study of *impossibilities in practices* as a means for comparing discursive formations and differentiating them historically.

The answer that some give to the issue of genealogizing continuities is that it is a matter of emphasis (stressing historical similarities rather than difference) and of political strategy — against the chorus of 'a New World Order', for example, it may be critically useful and important to point out continuities between the Cold War and today's International Relations. However, as historians of the present, discourse scholars presumably seek to help people find potentialities for contemporary change. A person's ability to do this is unlikely to be encouraged by repeated demonstrations of structural quasi-permanence which (in a rather utopian fashion) locate 'real difference' only in pre-modern social realities.

Conclusion

The study of discourse in International Relations is not just a project of metatheoretical critique, it has also become a vibrant research programme that deserves to be further advanced. Building upon theoretical commitments of the discourse community, I have sought in this article to lay out some potential areas for advancement, including improving the analysis of significative systems, furthering the study of common sense and policy practices, and developing research into the politics of hegemony and historical change in discourses. Research in these areas can contribute to progress in discourse scholarship, both as a social science and as political and ethical criticism.

Notes

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1. See, for example, George's examination of '“alternative” scholarship' that due to its 'commitment to a positivist ontology of real meaning' and its 'closure of . . . behavioralist training rituals' ends up by reinforcing the 'discursive limitations of the orthodoxy' (George, 1994: 15 and *passim*).
2. There is actually a tripartite ascription of value, to 'canonical' social theory and philosophical texts (e.g. de Saussure, Foucault, Derrida), to 'credible' contemporary works in social theory (e.g. Butler, Lefebvre, Levinas) and International Relations (e.g. Ashley, Der Derian, Shapiro, Campbell) and to International Relations work 'discredited' by its rationalism, positivism, etc. (e.g. Keohane, Waltz, Ruggie, Wendt). Perhaps the most valued of all are the credible works in social theory.
3. The term 'subjugated knowledges' comes from Foucault, who defined these as 'a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity' (Foucault, 1980: 82).
4. For International Relations works directly addressing the reasons for the discursive treatment of language, causality and agency, and comparing them to other approaches in International Relations, see Shapiro (1988); Walker (1993); Doty (1997); Laffey and Weldes (1997); Weldes (1999). For social and political theory treatments of the same issues, see Laclau and Mouffe (1987); Gibbons (1987); Butler (1990); Purvis and Hunt (1993); Harré and Gillett (1994).
5. For the linguistics background to this method, see Lecomte (1986) and Lecomte and Marandin (1986). I owe my familiarity to it to David Sylvan's work (see Alker and Sylvan, 1994); the method is also discussed in Doty (1993), and used in Doty (1996), Milliken and Sylvan (1996) and Milliken (1999, forthcoming).
6. This example and those which follow are invented by me for the purposes of illustration, but are in fact based upon US Korean War policy documents.
7. To counter a possible confusion here, the idea is not that the researcher starts with a blank slate conceptually, but that rather, in contrast to an hypothesis testing model, deliberately seeks to develop and challenge her concepts in response to the research process.
8. Other readerships are possible, and some have sought to reach them, through media appearances (e.g. Ole Waever), teaching and publishing outside a university context (e.g. James Der Derian), in Britain's Open University (e.g. Jenny Edkins), or through engaging directly with policy-makers and military officials (e.g. Andrew Latham, Sandra Whitworth). These projects can involve compromise, and risk cooptation by dominant forms of knowledge, but they also pose perhaps the greatest challenge to contemporary practice that discourse scholarship can offer.

9. An additional important part of such studies is to show the prior historical 'naturalization' of the discourse (in an alteration of or, more often, a reproduction of the discourse's structures of meaning).

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