## 2 minute pitch

I'm doing information design in decentralized matching markets, with application to online marketplaces, such as Airbnb.

In decentralized matching markets it is important that buyers and sellers find and form the most valuable matches. But it is also important that the matches happen fast.

Let me give you an example. On Uber, a driver wants to know the passenger's star rating, where the passenger is going and maybe the passenger's gender. At first sight, it makes perfect sense for the platform designer to show to the driver all information it has about the passenger. However, more information increases the return to search and screening. The driver will reject low-value rides, such as short rides or rides to remote neighborhoods, because he knows there will be more requests coming. As a result, the passenger will wait long to get a ride, which decreases user experince for passengers. Uber is a two-sided market so it cares about both sided, drivers and passengers.

I study how a two-sided platform should design an information disclosure policy to alleviate sellers cream-skimming behavior and improve efficiency. E.g. what passenger attributes on Uber, or guest attributes on Airbnb should be made visible to sellers?

I develop a model of market with search and matching, where sellers have limited capacities. I show that