**Appendix: Cooperation Under Autonomy Codebook for IIGO 2.0 Dataset**

***This is a living dataset. We would welcome the addition of other variables or cases. We would be pleased to incorporate them in IIGO 2.0 Dataset or to facilitate compatibility with other data files.***

**Codebook for IIGO 2.0 Dataset**

Informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) meet three definitional criteria:

1. high-level associations of three or more states;
2. based on explicitly shared expectations, but without a formal treaty and;
3. hold recurrent meetings but without a formal institutional arrangement such as a secretariat.

To build the IIGO 2.0 dataset, we began with the Union of International Association’s (UIA) Yearbook of International Organizations (2019) which lists all non-profit international organizations. From this highly inclusive list, we selected cases that meet our three IIGO criteria (explained further below).

In order to not over-rely on the Yearbook, we also scrutinized several other lists of international institutions such as the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Project (ATOP) (Leeds et al 2002). We also examined lists of Global Summits (Patrick, 2017) to evaluate fit with our criteria.

As we assembled key information about each IIGO, we were careful to follow up on other related organizations that were possible IIGOs (e.g., locating the G7 leads quickly to the G20). Much like a ‘snowball sampling’ technique (where an interview with one subject leads to other subjects), this resulted in a few additional cases being added to the dataset. We also did general searches in diplomatic sources and queried experts in the field. We would welcome any suggestions of possible omissions.

Here we detail the coding principles that guided our decisions. We also provide a list of 250 organizations that were ‘close calls’ either because other experts asked us about them or because they had some (but not all attributes of IIGOs) that presented difficult decisions worthy of documentation and explanation. This list is not a comprehensive set of all ‘close calls because that was not our research goal but simply a step towards developing a comprehensive dataset of ‘pure’ case IIGOs. Nonetheless, we provide this list for transparency and intellectual advancement. With regard to transparency, we want to show our thinking in determining the dataset and be clear about possible exclusions. In terms of intellectual advancement, we hope that the list of close calls can promote research on the growing number of other kinds of IGOs (that fall out of the pure case FIGO or IIGO definitions) that are not receiving sufficient attention in IR research.

**Criteria for Identifying IIGOs**

To be included in the IIGO 2.0 dataset, an IGO must satisfy three criteria:

1. **High-level association of three or more states**
2. States are the primary members. Although non-governmental organizations, FIGOs, and private firms may participate as observers or even members, it is key that the relationship is *intergovernmental*. States count as members when they attend IIGO meetings (see more below on high-level political participation), share in its activities, and are generally expected to participate in IIGO activities when they occur.
   1. The list of valid states comes from [Correlates of War](http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/cow-country-codes).
   2. Associations that are public-private partnerships were not included. For example, we do not include the World Economic Forum.
   3. The list of members need not be ‘set in stone’ and many IIGOs have a fluctuating membership from one meeting to the next. Nevertheless, most IIGOs have a relatively stable membership or grow slowly over time.
   4. Bilateral relationships are not included. For example, we do not include the Shimoda Conference.
   5. Relationships between one state and a FIGO are not included if the main meetings are between one state and a representative of the FIGO rather than with high-level representatives of the member states of that FIGO. For example, we do not include the EU-China summit.
   6. While one state sometimes plays an outsized role in creating an IIGO, or in supporting its operations (e.g. by providing administrative services), the relationship needs to be multilateral. For example, we exclude foreign policy initiatives of one state such as the Belt and Road Forum or the China-CEEC.
3. IIGO membership is defined by high-level political participation. Heads of Government, Ambassadors, or Ministers—with the authority to make political commitments on behalf of their respective states—need to be regularly part of (some) meetings.
   1. Lower-level transgovernmental networks solely among officials not authorized to make broad political commitments but who primarily address administrative or technical decisions are excluded. Terms like ‘network’ and ‘administrators’ often indicate the lower-level nature of officials. For example, we do not include the Pacific Islands, Australia and New Zealand Electoral Administrators Network (PIANZEA) because the highest level attendees have insufficient authority to set policy on their own.
   2. Lower-level officials can attend IIGO meetings, and often comprise technical working groups between plenary meetings, but high-level officials get together for key aspects of coordination. These high-level meetings are often referred to as ‘ministerials’.
   3. Central Bank governors count as high-level participants. For example, we include the Group of Ten because Ministers of Finance and Central Bank Governors are the key attendees. We do not include Central Bank Supervisors as high-level participants but instead consider them to be lower-level technocrats. For example, we do not include the International Conference of Banking Supervisors as an IIGO.
4. The entity has to be a ‘stand-alone’ organization, not an ‘IIGO within a FIGO.’
   1. ‘Coalition groups’ that organize bargaining/negotiation within FIGOs are excluded. For example, we exclude Friends of Fish because it primarily operates as a bloc within the World Trade Organization.
   2. Some entities have ‘contact group’ in their title that does not immediately disqualify them. We look for whether the group stands on its own.
5. **Explicitly shared expectations but without a treaty**
6. Evidence of common goals or purpose establishes shared expectations, though their articulation need not be formal. Evidence can be established through the following (but not limited to):
   1. Joint Statements
   2. Communiques
   3. Websites
   4. Memoranda of Understanding
   5. Declarations
   6. Acts
   7. Guiding Principles
   8. Charter
   9. Framework
   10. Goals
   11. Plan of Action
   12. Programme
   13. Resolution
7. States’ shared expectations cannot be legally binding. The key disqualifier is whether the group was established by an international treaty (recorded in the UN Treaty Series).
8. States’ shared expectations should be related to an ongoing and open-ended purpose. This contrasts with ad hoc meetings to address problems and with conference series that have an immediate and specific purpose and are limited in duration. For example, we exclude the 19th century international monetary conference series which states used to negotiate institutions to regulate the international monetary and financial world order.
9. Ascription of ‘groupness’ by third parties do not establish shared expectations of group members. For example, we do not include the Asian Tigers.
10. **IIGOs hold recurrent meetings but have no significant formal institutionalization such as a secretariat or headquarters**
11. Meetings must be recurrent. States need not meet at *regular* intervals but there must be the expectation of future interactions related to the shared group expectations. Some IIGOs may take a hiatus for a long period and pick back up when conditions are more favorable or issues are more pressing.
12. An IIGO does not have significant formal (permanent) institutionalization such as a secretariat or headquarters.
    1. Entities are excluded if they have a named secretariat that is housed in its own structure with a permanent address. For example, the Regional Cooperation Council does not qualify because it has a Secretariat based in Sarajevo, and a Liaison Office in Brussels.
    2. Entities are excluded if they have permanent staff (including a Secretary or Secretary General) that are hired by the organization itself (i.e. not on secondment from member states). For example, we exclude the Indian Ocean Rim Association because it has a permanent Secretary General responsible for assigning work, managing the budget, and facilitating meetings.
    3. Many IIGOs engage a FIGO or member state to provide administrative functions; they qualify as IIGOs if the relationship is not permanent (e.g. set up as a temporary service agreement, even if renewable) and if support positions are only to assist IIGO interactions rather than to exercise control. For example, the Global Forum on Migration and Development is chaired and hosted alternately by a developed country and a developing country, and has no permanent location. The annual Chair’s work plan may be implemented in different places – most preparatory meetings are held in Geneva, while the final meeting is usually held in the host county. But it has a rudimentary administrative support structure – the Geneva-based GFMD Support Unit provides administrative and logistical support to the Chair-in-Office. The Support Unit is hosted by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) but the IOM has no influence on the GFMD.
    4. The use of rotating chairs or meeting hosts who provide a “temporary secretariat” (as in the G20) often indicates an IIGO.
    5. Some IIGOs rely on ‘virtual’ secretariats that facilitate the organization of or hosting of (virtual) meetings.

**Variables**

**The IIGO 2.0 dataset includes the following variables.**

**Name**

The full name of the IIGO. Some IIGOs have changed names over time, often to add new mandates or modify aims. When there is a clear link and continuity from one entity to the next (i.e. they cover the same general issues, include some membership and do not exist at the same time), we group the organizations into one record so as to not artificially inflate the dataset with extra IIGOs. For example, we group the G22, 33, and 20 into the same record.

**Abbrev**

The abbreviation (or abbreviations) of the IIGO.

**Issue Area**

We code each IIGO into one of four mutually exclusive issue areas: Political, Economic, Security, and Social Affairs. We base this on a refinement of the three COW issue area categories where we separate the Security cases out of the Politics category.

Since many IIGOs cover multiple areas, we code issue areas according to what the IIGO does ‘most’. If it is truly a wide range, we code the issue area as ‘political’. This has implications: the security category, for example, is a conservative estimate of how many IIGOs handle security because IIGOs that handle security plus other issues are put in the political category.

The security category includes topics related to human security. For example, the Budapest Process is coded as 'security' because it is related to border management and asylum processes.

IIGOs related to energy are coded as ‘economic’ to follow the COW coding (for example, which codes the IAEA as economic).

The Social affairs issue area includes a wide array of topics such as education, health, the environment etc.). If the entity is not obviously economic or political, we categorize it as social.

**Regional**

Coded 1 if the IIGO is comprised of geographically contiguous states

Coded 0 otherwise

**Nbr\_State\_Mbrs\_2017\_or\_end**

Count of the number of member states in the IIGO in 2017 or when the IIGO ended (either formalized or died). While it would be optimal to record member states by year, this information was not systematically available across most IIGOs.

Observers, FIGO ‘members’ (such as the EU) are not considered in this count.

**Beg Year**

The earliest year the IIGO member states started to meet recurrently or showed evidence of coordinating shared expectations. Often this is the first summit meeting when a joint communique is released or the year a joint declaration is announced.

**Formal\_1\_or\_Dead\_2**

Coded 1 if the IIGO has formalized (by obtaining a secretariat or legalized treaty among member states).

Coded 2 if the IIGO has died. See below.

Otherwise, 0.

**End\_IIGO\_Year**

If the IIGO is no longer considered a ‘pure case’ IIGO (adhering to all three criteria above) and either formalizes or ‘dies’), the year is recorded (see below). The IIGO is considered ‘dead’ after 10 consecutive years of no activity related to the group’s shared expectations. Last meeting is taken as date of death.

If we know the IIGO has died but cannot confirm the date, it is recorded as ‘UK’ (unknown).

Otherwise, missing.

**Ind.\_Sec\_Year**

If member states set up a permanent, formal secretariat with agency, the year is recorded. At this point in time, it is no longer considered a ‘pure case’ IIGO.

Otherwise, missing.

**Formal\_Treaty\_Year**

If member states sign a legalized treaty, the year the treaty goes into force is recorded. At this point in time, it is no longer considered a ‘pure case’ IIGO.

Otherwise, missing.

**Follow\_on\_org**

If the IIGO is preceded or superseded by another entity, the name is listed here. Otherwise coded as 0.

**Three data files are stored separately as .xls files:**

1. **Appendix Table I: IIGO 2.0 dataset**
2. **Appendix Table II: ‘Close Calls’ for IIGO 2.0 dataset**

We provide a list of ‘close call’ cases that were considered for inclusion but ultimately rejected. The list includes the reason we did not include the case but there may be other reasons as well – we stopped the moment we found grounds not to include it. However, the reasons may provide insight to the coding in practice.

1. **Appendix Table III: IIGO by state 2017 (or end).**