**Appendix**

# List of Organizations Under Study

Table A1: List of organizations, lifespans, and vitality

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Organization | Acronym | Start Year | Until | Vitality (Average) |
| Association of Caribbean States | ACS | 1994 | 2013 | 2.00 |
| Arab Maghreb Union | AMU | 1989 | 2013 | 2.04 |
| Andean Community | ANCOM | 1969 | 2013 | 2.64 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation | APEC | 1989 | 2013 | 3.00 |
| Association of South East Asian Nations | ASEAN | 1967 | 2013 | 3.00 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| League of Arab States | Arab League | 1948 | 2013 | 2.00 |
| Bangkok Agreement | BA | 1975 | 2013 | 1.00 |
| Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation | BSEC | 1992 | 2013 | 2.00 |
| Central American Common Market | CACM | 1960 | 2013 | 2.07 |
| Central Asian Cooperation Organization | CACO | 1991 | 1994 | 1.00 |
| Central Asian Economic Cooperation | CAEC | 1998 | 2002 | 1.00 |
| Central Asian Economic Union | CAEU | 1994 | 1998 | 1.00 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Caribbean Community | CARICOM | 1973 | 2013 | 2.20 |
| Caribbean Community FTA | CARIFTA | 1965 | 1973 | 2.00 |
| Council of Arab Economic Unity | CArabEU | 1964 | 2013 | 2.00 |
| Council of Baltic Sea States | CBSS | 1992 | 2013 | 2.00 |
| Communaute Economique De L’afrique De L’ouest | CEAO | 1974 | 1994 | 2.05 |
| Central American Free Trade Area | CEFTA | 1992 | 2013 | 2.82 |
| Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa |  |  |  | 2.27 |
| (Communaut conomique et Montaire de l’Afrique Centrale) | CEMAC | 1999 | 2013 |  |
| Community of Sahel and Saharan States | CEN-SAD | 1998 | 2013 | 2.00 |
| Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries | CEPGL | 1976 | 2013 | 2.13 |
| Commonwealth of Independent States | CIS | 1991 | 2013 | 2.70 |
| Council for Mutual Economic Assistance | CMEA | 1949 | 2013 | 2.00 |
| Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa | COMESA | 1994 | 2013 | 2.20 |
| Preferential Trade Agreement among Eastern and Southern Africa | COMESAPTA | 1981 | 1993 | 1.00 |
| East African Community | EAC | 2000 | 2013 | 2.29 |
| East African Common Market | EACM | 2001 | 2013 | 1.31 |
| Eurasian Economic Community | EAEC | 2001 | 2013 | 1.00 |
| Economic Community of Central African States | ECCAS | 1983 | 2013 | 2.13 |
| Economic Cooperation Organization | ECO | 1985 | 2013 | 2.79 |
| Economic Community of West African States | ECOWAS | 1975 | 2013 | 2.28 |
| European Free Trade Agreement | EFTA | 1960 | 2013 | 3.00 |
| European Union | EU | 1957 | 2013 | 3.00 |
| EurAsEC Customs Union | EURASEC | 2008 | 2013 | 2.00 |
| Gulf Free Trade Agreement | GAFTA | 1998 | 2013 | 2.88 |
| Gulf Cooperation Council | GCC | 1981 | 2013 | 2.58 |
| Georgia Ukraine Armenia Moldova | GUAM | 1997 | 2013 | 2.00 |
| Intergovernmental Authority on Development | IGAD | 1996 | 2009 | 2.00 |
| Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) | IGADD | 1986 | 1996 | 2.00 |
| Indian Ocean Commission | IOC | 1982 | 2013 | 2.13 |
| Latin American Free Trade Association | LAFTA | 1960 | 1980 | 2.00 |
| Latin American Integration Association | LAIA | 1980 | 2013 | 2.35 |
| Common Market for the Southern Cone | MERCOSUR | 1991 | 2013 | 2.35 |
| Mano River Union | MRU | 1973 | 2013 | 2.15 |
| Melanesian Spearhead Group | MSG | 1993 | 2013 | 2.19 |
| North American Free Trade Agreement | NAFTA | 1994 | 2013 | 2.95 |
| NAFTA (Canada + US) | NAFTA-CUS | 1989 | 1993 | 2.52 |
| Nordic Council | NC | 1952 | 2013 | 2.00 |
| Common Afro-Mauritian Organization | OCAM | 1948 | 2013 | 2.00 |
| La Organizacin de Estados Centroamericanos | ODECA | 1952 | 1973 | 2.00 |
| Organization of Eastern Caribbean States | OECS | 1981 | 2013 | 2.12 |
| Papua New Guinea-Australia Trade and Commercial Relations Agreement | PATCRA | 1977 | 2013 |  |
| Pacific Islands Countries Trade Agreement | PICTA | 2006 | 2013 | 1.50 |
| Pacific Islands Forum | PIF | 1971 | 2013 | 2.00 |
| South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation | SAARC | 1985 | 2013 | 2.14 |
| South African Customs Union | SACU | 1960 | 2013 | 2.19 |
| Southern Africa Development Community | SADC | 1981 | 2013 | 2.39 |
| South Asian Free Trade Agreement | SAFTA | 2004 | 2013 | 2.00 |
| Shanghai Cooperation Organization | SCO | 1996 | 2013 | 2.22 |
| Sistema de la Integracin Centroamericana | SICA | 1993 | 2013 | 2.19 |
| South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement | SPARTECA | 1981 | 2013 | 1.00 |
| Union Africaine et Malgache (UAM) |  |  |  |  |
| African and Malagasy Union | UAM | 1961 | 1964 | 2.00 |
| Afro-Malagasy Union for Economic Cooperation |  |  |  |  |
| (Union Africaine et Malgache de Coopration conomique) | UAMCE | 1948 | 1964 | 2.00 |
| West African Customs Union | UDAO | 1959 | 1966 | 2.00 |
| Central African Customs Union | UDEAC | 1960 | 1999 | 2.00 |
| Union douanire et economique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest |  |  |  |  |
| (West African Customs and Economic Union) | UDEAO | 1966 | 1974 | 2.00  2.50 |
| West African Economic and Monetary Union | WAEMU | 1994 | 2013 |

# Alternate Operationalizations of Independent Variables

The main analysis used a measure of each international organization’s level of proposed economic integration as a way of controlling for the design of the agreement. But IOs have other design features as well. To account for some of these other features, this section of the analysis uses the [McCall Smith (2000)](#_bookmark2) measure of legalization to control for the design of the agreement in terms of its legal standing with respect to domestic law. The highest possible score means that an organization’s legal apparatus, such as a dispute-settlement mechanism, has supranational standing. Specifically, the judgments of the organizations’ legal mechanisms would supersede domestic legislation. Organizations can vary along this dimension, with greater or lesser strength of their legal systems. Scholars tend to associate a stronger legal mechanism with deeper levels of proposed cooperation within the IO.

There is a high degree of missingness in this variable; it covers a wide variety of international organizations and was not designed specifically for economic organizations. Missing values here are replaced with zeros. Furthermore, the bureaucratic autonomy variable also has a degree of correlation with the legalization variable, leading to multicollinearity in the estimates. In the estimates, transparency measures are positively associated with live organizations and negatively associated with dead organizations. However, their effects are not significant in connection with zombie organizations. This assures us that organizations classified as zombies are not engaging in other productive activities, even if they are not fulfilling their primary mission.

## Table A2: Alternate Operationalization of Agreement Design: Legalization

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |
|  | Vitality | Vitality |
| (Zombie) |  |  |
| Bureaucratic Autonomy | -2.189 |  |
|  | (1.77) |  |
| IO Legalization | 0.271 | 0.071 |
|  | (0.28) | (0.33) |
| IO Competition | 0.280\* | 0.178 |
|  | (0.12) | (0.12) |
| Member GDP | -1.167\*\*\* | -0.551 |
|  | (0.29) | (0.30) |
| IO Age | 0.061\* | 0.081\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.04) |
| Member Similarity | 1.986 | 2.227 |
|  | (2.44) | (5.78) |
| Member Conflict | 1.360\*\* | 0.403\*\*\* |
|  | (0.46) | (0.11) |
| Secretariat City Hardship |  | 1.076\* |
|  |  | (0.46) |
| Constant | 26.187\*\*\* | 7.756 |
|  | (7.38) | (9.90) |
| χ2 | 23.973 | 24.844 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.551 | 0.434 |
| Log Likelihood | -139.983 | -107.775 |
| N | 450 | 286 |

Multinomial logit stimations of the lifespan of economic organizations (life, zombie, death), by organi- zation/year. Dependent variable is a multinomial variable for vitality. Life is basegroup; the variable for legalization includes no “dead” organizations, so that category is dropped. Robust standard errors, clustered by organization, in parentheses. \*indicates *p < .*10, \*\*indicates *p < .*05, and \*\*\* indicates *p < .*01.

# Competing Explanations

The central hypotheses centered on the vitality of IOs to the extent that they fulfilled their main mission of economic integration. However, IOs could also evolve away from those initial areas of cooperation into other, more productive issue areas. The tests below account for this possibility. The table presents models that include a variable accounting for whether IOs have moved encompass security cooperation as part of their mission statement [(Haftel and Hofmann, 2017).](#_bookmark1)

The relationship is a mixed one. Controlling for bureaucratic autonomy, IOs that cover security are less likely to be alive and more likely to be dead. This result is somewhat puzzling but could indicate that successful economic organizations infrequently do well in the security area on top of their initial mandate; it may be difficult for organizations to succeed in both peacekeeping and trade promotion. Controlling for the attractiveness of the city, IOs that also include security cooperation are less likely to be dead, and more likely to appear to be zombies. This last result could be consistent with the idea that IOs that can attract bureaucrats to good cities may drift from their initial area of economic cooperation and move instead into security cooperation, making them “zombies” with respect to economic integration but thriving in the area of security. This indicates that IOs can adapt successfully, even if their initial mission flags. However, further tests of this rival explanation in the appendix indicate that organizations that engage in the transparent transmission of information tend not to be associated with zombie status.

Table A3: **Evolution of IO Missions**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Life | Life | Death | Death | Zombie | Zombie |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bureaucratic Autonomy | 4.006\*\* |  | -6.427\* |  | -1.971 |  |
|  | (1.37) |  | (2.87) |  | (1.14) |  |
| IO Competition | -0.069 | -0.019 | 0.056 | 0.245 | 0.030 | -0.049 |
|  | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.17) | (0.20) | (0.09) | (0.10) |
| Member GDP | 0.547\*\*\* | 0.294 | 0.193 | 0.340 | -0.588\*\*\* | -0.433\*\* |
|  | (0.16) | (0.15) | (0.15) | (0.20) | (0.16) | (0.16) |
| Level of Proposed Integration | -0.246 | -0.024 | -0.073 | -0.153 | 0.156 | -0.003 |
|  | (0.26) | (0.20) | (0.32) | (0.33) | (0.26) | (0.19) |
| IO Age | 0.005 | -0.010 | -0.018 | -0.007 | 0.002 | 0.018 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.02) | (0.03) |
| Member Similarity | 0.345 | -0.578 | -1.345 | -1.039 | 1.186 | 1.844 |
|  | (1.72) | (1.92) | (1.80) | (2.28) | (2.26) | (2.41) |
| Member Conflict | -0.761\*\* | -0.342\* | 0.000 | 0.000 | 1.241\*\*\* | 0.658\*\* |
|  | (0.29) | (0.17) | (.) | (.) | (0.30) | (0.24) |
| Security Mandate | -0.198 | -0.192 | -0.300 | 0.000 | 0.201 | 0.379 |
|  | (0.19) | (0.22) | (0.19) | (.) | (0.18) | (0.24) |
| Secretariat City Hardship |  | -1.710\*\*\* |  | 1.081 |  | 1.462\*\* |
|  |  | (0.49) |  | (0.65) |  | (0.47) |
| Constant | 15.720\*\* | -5.437 | -4.596 | -12.114 | 14.441\*\* | 7.780 |
|  | (5.38) | (4.46) | (5.09) | (6.36) | (5.14) | (4.98) |
| 2 | 37.525 | 26.467 | 14.053 | 8.335 | 45.178 | 30.993 |
| Psedo R2 | 0.249 | 0.279 | 0.217 | 0.122 | 0.243 | 0.302 |
| Log likelihood | -482.541 | -345.876 | -225.413 | -170.580 | -497.878 | -324.641 |
| N | 949 | 692 | 918 | 522 | 949 | 692 |

Estimations of the lifespan of economic organizations (life, zombie, death), by organization/year. Binary dependent variables for each outcome, with logit estimations. Standard errors, clustered by organization, in parentheses\*indicates *p < .*10, \*\*indicates *p < .*05, and \*\*\* indicates *p < .*01.

* *∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗*

Further research would be needed to explore this dynamic.

The next set of tests looks at the possibility that IOs undertake activities beyond their primary mission of economic cooperation. Specifically, I examine whether IOs might have flagged in their initial endeavors at cooperation but are still remaining active by producing reports and other outputs that would aid in the transmission of information to member states. Such IOs might be encouraging cooperation through socialization of member-state delegates and providing information that would enable cooperative outcomes.

To account for this possibility, I use a measure from [Grigorescu (2010)](#_bookmark0) that looks at the development of bureaucratic oversight mechanisms in IOs. This variable is an indirect measure of the activities that IOs perform. It measures IOs’ policies toward public access to information. IOs that allow for transparency are also likely to be engaged in the types of “soft” activities that might ensure cooperation through socialization. Furthermore, IOs that did not allow for public access would likely not be providing information that would be helpful for cooperation. An IO that undertook greater transparency measures would likely not do so if it did not have reports and regular operations to share. Table A4 depicts these results.

## Table A4: Alternate Operationalization of IO Missions (IO Transparency)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Life | Life | Death | Death | Zombie | Zombie |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bureaucratic Autonomy | 4.389\*\*\* |  | -7.350\* |  | -2.005 |  |
|  | (1.21) |  | (3.06) |  | (1.17) |  |
| IO Competition | -0.065 | -0.028 | 0.063 | 0.176 | 0.037 | -0.024 |
|  | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.18) | (0.19) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Member GDP | 0.472\*\* | 0.248 | 0.132 | 0.340 | -0.528\*\*\* | -0.374\* |
|  | (0.16) | (0.15) | (0.18) | (0.21) | (0.15) | (0.16) |
| Level of Proposed Integration | -0.246 | 0.014 | -0.187 | -0.054 | 0.183 | -0.035 |
|  | (0.25) | (0.20) | (0.37) | (0.28) | (0.23) | (0.19) |
| IO Age | -0.000 | -0.015 | -0.016 | -0.031 | 0.006 | 0.029 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.03) |
| Member Similarity | -0.027 | -0.651 | -1.138 | -0.870 | 1.573 | 2.520 |
|  | (1.72) | (2.02) | (1.70) | (1.91) | (2.14) | (2.66) |
| Member Conflict | -0.568\* | -0.260\* | 0.000 | 0.000 | 1.092\*\*\* | 0.496\*\* |
|  | (0.23) | (0.13) | (.) | (.) | (0.28) | (0.19) |
| IO Transparency | -0.399\* | -0.299 | 0.362 | -0.267 | 0.207 | 0.340 |
|  | (0.19) | (0.24) | (0.48) | (0.57) | (0.22) | (0.23) |
| Secretariat City Hardship |  | -1.745\*\*\* |  | 1.026 |  | 1.489\*\* |
|  |  | (0.51) |  | (0.53) |  | (0.49) |
| Constant | -13.211\* | -3.926 | -3.173 | -11.671 | 12.323\*\* | 5.283 |
|  | (5.16) | (4.41) | (5.46) | (6.76) | (4.62) | (4.75) |
| χ2 | 45.093 | 26.123 | 15.040 | 12.188 | 45.910 | 28.523 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.274 | 0.289 | 0.237 | 0.121 | 0.245 | 0.301 |
| Log likelihood | -466.815 | -340.787 | -219.585 | -184.834 | -496.449 | -325.339 |
| N | 949 | 692 | 918 | 662 | 949 | 692 |

Estimations of the lifespan of economic organizations (life, zombie, death), by organization/year. Standard errors, clustered by organization, in parentheses. \*indicates *p < .*10, \*\*indicates *p < .*05, and \*\*\* indicates *p < .*01.

IO transparency is positively associated with life and negatively associated with death in IOs, but it has no significant effect on zombie organizations. The primary concern here would be if organizations that turned into zombies would be engaging in productive activity beyond promoting economic cooperation. However, this does not appear to be the case. It would be ideal to have a more comprehensive measure of the daily activities that IOs undertake as part of their missions, and future research could work on operationalizing such a measure. The transparency measure has a high degree of missingness across the economic IOs in this sample, which makes it difficult to stand as a definitive test of this possibility. Future work could explore this relationship in greater depth.

Table Four: Region fixed effects:

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |
|  | Life | Death | Zombie |
|  |  |  |  |
| Bureaucratic Autonomy | 2.894 | -4.606\* | -0.541 |
|  | (1.51) | (1.93) | (1.56) |
| Secretariat City Hardship | -1.478\*\* | 1.108 | 1.385\*\* |
|  | (0.54) | (0.77) | (0.51) |
| IO Competition | -0.301 | 0.162 | 0.432 |
|  | (0.31) | (0.45) | (0.28) |
| Level of Proposed Integration | -0.436 | 0.156 | 0.142 |
|  | (0.27) | (0.33) | (0.26) |
| Member GDP | 0.308 | 0.089 | -0.474\* |
|  | (0.20) | (0.30) | (0.20) |
| IO Age | -0.011 | -0.004 | 0.032 |
|  | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) |
| Member Similarity | -0.027 | -4.971 | 3.169 |
|  | (2.83) | (3.26) | (3.16) |
| Member Conflict | -0.362 | 0.000 | 0.806\* |
|  | (0.26) | (.) | (0.36) |
| Latin America | 0.000 | 2.452 | 4.220\*\* |
|  | (.) | (1.98) | (1.28) |
| Middle East | -0.899 | 0.000 | 1.172 |
| North Africa | (1.23) | (.) | (1.08) |
| Asia | -2.617\* | 2.362 | 2.301 |
|  | (1.09) | (1.95) | (1.18) |
| North America- | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Caribbean | (.) | (.) | (.) |
| Africa | -0.201 | 2.696 | -2.080 |
|  | (2.51) | (2.70) | (2.08) |
| Constant | -4.304 | -3.457 | 4.603 |
|  | (6.26) | (8.85) | (6.35) |
| χ2 | 52.708 | 11.127 | 41.400 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.492 | 0.339 | 0.408 |
| Log likelihood | -167.450 | -100.023 | -201.050 |
| N | 490 | 477 | 524 |

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