

Definition 1.1 *Dynamic weakly verifiable puzzle*

A dynamic weakly verifiable puzzle (DWVP) is defined by a protocol between probabilistic algorithms $P(\pi)$ and $S(\rho)$. The algorithm P , called a problem poser, takes as input chosen uniformly at random bitstring π . The problem solver S takes as input a uniform random bitstring ρ . As the result of the protocol execution between P and S , P produces circuits Γ_V , Γ_H and a puzzle $x \in \{0,1\}^*$, S produces no output. The circuit Γ_V takes as input $q \in Q$ and an answer $y \in \{0,1\}^*$. If $\Gamma_V(q, y) = 1$ then y is a correct solution of a puzzle x for q . The circuit Γ_H on input q provides a hint such that $\Gamma_V(q, \Gamma_H(q)) = 1$. The solver S receives a puzzle x , and has oracle access to Γ_V and Γ_H . The calls of S to Γ_V are verification queries and to Γ_H are hint queries. The solver S can ask at most h hint queries, v verification queries, and successfully solves DWVP if and only if it makes a verification query (q, y) such that $\Gamma_V(q, y) = 1$, when it has not previously asked for a hint query on this q .

TODO: Requirements on g (we calculate $\Pr(g(b_1, \dots, b_k) = 1)$).

Definition 1.2 *k-wise direct product of dynamic weakly verifiable puzzles*

Let $g : \{0,1\}^k \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ be a monotone function and $P^{(1)}$ a problem poser used to generate an instance of DWVP. A k -wise direct product of dynamic weakly verifiable puzzles is defined by a protocol between a probabilistic algorithms $P^{(g)}(\pi^{(k)})$ and $S(\rho)$, where $\pi^{(k)} := (\pi_1, \dots, \pi_k)$ and every $\pi_i \in \{0,1\}^l$ for $1 \leq i \leq k$ and ρ are chosen uniformly at random. The protocol execution generates sequentially k independent instances of DWVP, where the i -th instance $(x_i, \Gamma_V^i, \Gamma_H^i)$ is produced by $S(\rho)$ interacting with $P^{(1)}(\pi_i)$. Finally, $P^{(g)}$ outputs a verification circuit

$$\Gamma_V^{(g)}(q, y_1, \dots, y_k) := g(\Gamma_V^1(q, y_1), \dots, \Gamma_V^k(q, y_k)),$$

a hint circuit

$$\Gamma_H^{(k)}(q) := (\Gamma_H^1(q), \dots, \Gamma_H^k(q)),$$

and a puzzle $x^{(k)} := (x_1, \dots, x_k)$.

The solver S receives puzzles (x_1, \dots, x_k) , has oracle access to $\Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(k)}$, and can ask at most v verification queries to $\Gamma_V^{(g)}$, h hint queries to $\Gamma_H^{(k)}$, and successfully solves the puzzle $x^{(k)}$ if and only if it asks a verification query $(q, y^{(k)}) := (q, y_1, \dots, y_k)$ such that $\Gamma_V^{(g)}(q, y^{(k)}) = 1$, and has not previously asked for a hint query on this q .

TODO: We abuse the notation using, when the protocol is executed $C(\rho)$, and in the second phase when the puzzles are solved $C^{\Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(k)}}(x^{(k)}, \rho)$.

Experiment $A^{P^{(k)}, C^{(\cdot, \cdot)}}(\pi^{(k)}, \rho)$

Solving a k -wise direct product of DWVP

Oracle: A problem poser $P^{(k)}$, a solver circuit $C^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$.

Input: Bitstrings $\pi^{(k)}, \rho$.

$$(x^{(k)}, \Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(k)}) := \langle P^{(k)}(\pi^{(k)}), C(\rho) \rangle_{P^{(k)}}$$

Run $C^{\Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(k)}}(x^{(k)}, \rho)$

Let $Q_{Solved} := \{q : C^{\Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(k)}} \text{ asked a verification query } (q, y^{(k)}) \text{ and } \Gamma_V^{(g)}(q, y^{(k)}) = 1\}$

Let $Q_{Hint} := \{q : C^{\Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(k)}} \text{ asked a hint query on } q\}$

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If  $\exists q \in Q_{solved} : q \notin Q_{Hint}$  then
    return 1
else
    return 0

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Theorem 1.3 Security amplification for a dynamic weakly verifiable puzzle.

For a fixed problem poser $P^{(1)}$ there exists a probabilistic algorithm $Gen(C, g, \varepsilon, \delta, n, v, h)$ which takes as input a solver circuit C for a k -wise direct product of DWVP, a monotone function g , parameters ε, δ, n , the number of verification v , and hint h queries asked by C , and outputs a circuit D such that following holds:

If C is such that

$$\Pr_{\pi^{(k)}, \rho} [A^{P^{(g)}, C}(\pi^{(k)}, \rho) = 1] \geq 8(h + v) \left(\Pr_{\mu \leftarrow \mu_{\delta}^k} [g(\mu) = 1] + \varepsilon \right)$$

then D satisfies almost surely

$$\Pr_{\pi, \rho} [A^{P^{(1)}, D}(\pi, \rho) = 1] \geq (\delta + \frac{\varepsilon}{6k})$$

Additionally, D and Gen require only oracle access to g and C . Furthermore, D asks at most h hint queries, v verification queries and $Size(D) \leq Size(C) \cdot \Theta(\frac{6k}{\varepsilon})$ and $Time(Gen) = poly(k, \frac{1}{\varepsilon}, n, v, h)$.

Experiment $E^{P^{(g)}, C^{(\cdot, \cdot)}, hash}(\pi^{(k)}, \rho)$

Oracle: A problem poser $P^{(g)}$ for a k -wise direct product.

A solver circuit $C^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ for a k -wise direct product.

A function $hash : Q \rightarrow \{0, \dots, 2(h + v) - 1\}$.

Input: Random bitstrings: $\pi^{(k)}, \rho$.

$$(x^{(k)}, \Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(k)}) := \langle P^{(g)}(\pi^{(k)}), C(\rho) \rangle$$

Run $C^{\Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(k)}}(x^{(k)}, \rho)$

Let $(q_j, y_j^{(k)})$ be the first successful verification query if $C^{\Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(k)}}$ succeeds or an arbitrary verification query when it fails.

If $(\forall i < j : q_i \notin P_{hash}) \wedge q_j \in P_{hash} \wedge \Gamma_V^{(g)}(q_j, y_j^{(k)}) = 1$

return 1

else

return 0

Algorithm: FindHash

Oracle: A solver circuit $C^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ for a k -wise direct product of DWVP.

A problem poser $P^{(g)}$ for a k -wise direct product.

Input: A set \mathcal{H} .

For $i = 1$ to $32(h + v)^2 / \gamma^2$

$hash \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{H}$

$count := 0$

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For  $j := 1$  to  $32(h+v)^2/\gamma^2$ 
   $\pi^{(k)} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{kl}$ 
   $\rho \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^*$ 
  If  $E^{P^{(g)}, C^{(\cdot, \cdot)}, hash}(\pi^{(k)}, \rho) = 1$  then
     $count := count + 1$ 
If  $\frac{\gamma^2}{32(h+v)^2} count \geq \frac{\gamma}{6(h+v)}$ 
  return  $hash$ 
return  $\perp$ 

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Circuit $\tilde{C}^{\Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(g)}, hash, C}(x_1, \dots, x_k)$
 Circuit \tilde{C} has good canonical success probability.

Oracle: $\Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(k)}, hash, C$
Input: k -wise direct product of puzzles (x_1, \dots, x_k)

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Run  $C^{(\cdot, \cdot)}(x_1, \dots, x_k, \rho)$ 
If  $C$  asks a hint query  $q$  then
  If  $q \in P_{hash}$  then
    return  $\perp$ 
  else
    return  $\Gamma_H^{(k)}(q)$  to  $C$ 

If  $C$  asks a verification query on  $(q, y_1, \dots, y_k)$  then
  If  $q \in P_{hash}$  then
    return  $(q, y_1, \dots, y_k)$ 
  else
    answer the verification query with 0
return  $\perp$ 

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Algorithm $Gen(C, g, \varepsilon, \delta, n, v, h, hash)$

Oracle: C, g
Input: $\varepsilon, \delta, n, v, h$
Output: A circuit $D, hash$

If the number of puzzles to solve equals one **then**
return \tilde{C}

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For  $i := 1$  to  $\frac{6k}{\varepsilon} \log(n)$ 
   $\pi^* \leftarrow \{0,1\}^l$ 
   $\tilde{S}_{\pi^*,0} := EvaluateSurplus(\pi^*, 0)$ 
   $\tilde{S}_{\pi^*,1} := EvaluateSurplus(\pi^*, 1)$ 
  If  $\tilde{S}_{\pi^*,0} \geq (1 - \frac{3}{4k})\varepsilon$  or  $\tilde{S}_{\pi^*,1} \geq (1 - \frac{3}{4k})\varepsilon$ 
     $\tilde{C}' := \tilde{C}$  with the first input fixed on  $\pi^*$ 
    return  $Gen(\tilde{C}', g, \varepsilon, \delta, n)$ 
// all estimates are lower than  $(1 - \frac{3}{4k})\varepsilon$ 
return  $D^{\tilde{C}}$ 

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EvaluateSurplus(π^*, b)

For $i := 1$ to N_k
 $(\pi_2, \dots, \pi_k) \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{(k-1)l}$
 $(c_1, \dots, c_k) := \text{EvaluatePuzzles}(\pi^*, \pi_2, \dots, \pi_k)$
 $\tilde{S}_{\pi^*, b}^i := g(b, c_2, \dots, c_k) - \Pr_{(u_2, \dots, u_k)} [g(b, u_2, \dots, u_k) = 1]$
return $\frac{1}{N_k} \sum_{i=1}^{N_k} \tilde{S}_{\pi^*, b}^i$

EvalutePuzzles($\pi^{(k)}$)

$(x^{(k)}, \Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(k)}) := P^{(g)}(\pi^{(k)})$
For $i := 1$ to k
 $(x_i, \Gamma_V^i, \Gamma_H^i) := P^{(1)}(\pi_i)$
 $(q, y^k) := \tilde{C}^{\Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(k)}}(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k)$
For $i := 1$ to k
 $c_i := \Gamma_v^i(q, y_i)$
return (c_1, \dots, c_k)

Circuit $D^{\tilde{C}, P^{(1)}}$

Oracle: A circuit \tilde{C} with the first n puzzles fixed, $P^{(1)}$

Input: A puzzle x^* , a random bitstring $r \in \{0, 1\}^*$

For $i := 1$ to $\frac{6k}{\varepsilon} \log(\frac{6k}{\varepsilon})$
 $\pi^{(k)} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{(k-n-1)l}$ // read bits from r
 $(c_1, \dots, c_{k-n-1}) := \text{EvaluatePuzzles}(\pi^{(k-n-1)})$
If $g(1, c_2, \dots, c_k) = 1 \wedge g(0, c_2, \dots, c_k) = 0$
For $i := 1$ to $k - n - 1$
 $(x_i, \Gamma_V^i, \Gamma_H^i) := P^{(1)}(\pi_i)$
 $(q, y_1, \dots, y_{k-n-1}) := \tilde{C}(x^*, x_2, \dots, x_{k-n-1})$
return y_1
return \perp