For $0 \leq \delta \leq 1$ we write $\mu_\delta$ to denote the Bernoulli distribution where outcome 1 occurs with probability $\delta$ and 0 with probability $1 - \delta$. Moreover, we use $\mu_\delta^k$ to denote a probability distribution over $k$-tuples where each bit of a $k$-tuple is drawn independently according to $\mu_\delta$. Finally, let $u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k$ denote that a $k$-tuple $u$ is chosen according to $\mu_\delta^k$.

The protocol execution between two probabilistic algorithms $A$ and $B$ is denoted by $\langle A, B \rangle$. The output of $A$ in such a protocol execution is denoted by $\langle A, B \rangle_A$ and of $B$ by $\langle A, B \rangle_B$. Finally, let $\langle A, B \rangle_{trans}$ denote the transcript of communication between $A$ and $B$.

We define a *two phase circuit* $C := (C_1, C_2)$ as a circuit where in the first phase a circuit $C_1$ is executed and in the second phase a circuit $C_2$.

We say that an event happens *almost surely* or with *high probability* if it occurs with probability at least $1 - 2^{-n} poly(n)$.

**Definition 1.1 (Dynamic weakly verifiable puzzle.)** *A dynamic weakly verifiable puzzle (DWVP) is defined by a family of probabilistic circuits $\{P_n\}$. A circuit belonging to $\{P_n\}$ is called a problem poser. A problem solver $C := (C_1, C_2)$ for $P_n$ is a probabilistic two phase circuit. We write $P_n(\pi)$ to denote the execution of $P_n$ with the randomness fixed to $\pi \in \{0,1\}^n$, and $(C_1, C_2)(\rho)$ to denote the execution of both $C_1$ and $C_2$ with the randomness fixed to $\rho \in \{0,1\}^*$.*

*In the first phase, the poser $P_n(\pi)$ and the solver $C_1(\rho)$ interact. As the result of the interaction $P_n(\pi)$ outputs a verification circuit $\Gamma_V$ and a hint circuit $\Gamma_H$. The circuit $C_1(\rho)$ produces no output. The circuit $\Gamma_V$ takes as input $q \in Q$, an answer $y \in \{0,1\}^*$, and outputs a bit. We say that an answer $(q, y)$ is a correct solution if and only if $\Gamma_V(q, y) = 1$. The circuit $\Gamma_H$ on input $q \in Q$ outputs a hint such that $\Gamma_V(q, \Gamma_H(q)) = 1$.*

*In the second phase, $C_2$ takes as input $x := \langle P_n(\pi), C_1(\rho) \rangle_{trans}$, and has oracle access to $\Gamma_V$ and $\Gamma_H$. The execution of $C_2$ with the input $x$ and the randomness fixed to $\rho$ is denoted by $C_2(x, \rho)$. The queries of $C_2$ to $\Gamma_V$ and $\Gamma_H$ are called verification queries and hint queries respectively. The circuit $C_2$ succeeds if and only if it makes a verification query $(q, y)$ such that $\Gamma_V(q, y) = 1$, and it has not previously asked for a hint query on $q$.*

**Definition 1.2 ($k$-wise direct-product of DWVPs.)** *Let $g : \{0,1\}^k \to \{0,1\}$ be a monotone function and $P_n^{(1)}$ a problem poser as in Definition 1.1. The $k$-wise direct product of $P_n^{(1)}$ is a DWVP defined by a circuit $P_{kn}^{(g)}$. We write $P_{kn}^{(g)}(\pi^{(k)})$ to denote the execution of $P_{kn}^{(g)}$ with the randomness fixed to $\pi^{(k)} := (\pi_1, \ldots, \pi_k)$ where for each $1 \leq i \leq n : \pi_i \in \{0,1\}^n$. Let $(C_1, C_2)(\rho)$ be a solver for $P_{kn}^{(g)}$ as in Definition 1.1. In the first phase, the algorithm $C_1(\rho)$ sequentially interacts in $k$ rounds with $P_{kn}^{(g)}(\pi^{(k)})$. In the $i$-th round $C_1(\rho)$ interacts with $P_n^{(1)}(\pi_i)$, and as the result $P_n^{(1)}(\pi_i)$ generates circuits $\Gamma_V^i, \Gamma_H^i$. Finally, after $k$ rounds $P_{kn}^{(g)}(\pi^{(k)})$ outputs a verification circuit*

$$\Gamma_V^{(g)}(q, y_1, \ldots, y_k) := g(\Gamma_V^1(q, y_1), \ldots, \Gamma_V^k(q, y_k))$$

*and a hint circuit*

$$\Gamma_H^{(k)}(q) := (\Gamma_H^1(q), \ldots, \Gamma_H^k(q)).$$

If it is clear from a context, we omit the subscript $n$, and write $P(\pi)$ instead of $P_n(\pi)$ where $\pi \in \{0,1\}^n$.

A verification query $(q, y)$ of a solver $C$ for which a hint query on this $q$ has been asked before can not be a verification query that succeeds. Therefore, without loss of generality, we make the assumption that $C$ does not ask verification queries on $q$ for which a hint query has been asked before. Furthermore, we assume that once $C$ asked a verification query that succeeds, it does not ask any further hint or verification queries.

---

**Experiment** $Success^{P,C}(\pi, \rho)$

---

**Oracle:** A problem poser $P$, a solver $C = (C_1, C_2)$ for $P$.
**Input:** Bitstrings $\pi \in \{0,1\}^n$, $\rho \in \{0,1\}^*$.
**Output:** A bit $b \in \{0,1\}$.

---

**run** $\langle P(\pi), C_1(\rho) \rangle$
     $(\Gamma_V, \Gamma_H) := \langle P(\pi), C_1(\rho) \rangle_P$
     $x := \langle P(\pi), C_1(\rho) \rangle_{trans}$

**run** $C_2^{\Gamma_V, \Gamma_H}(x, \rho)$
     **if** $C_2^{\Gamma_V, \Gamma_H}(x, \rho)$ asks a verification query $(q, y)$ such that $\Gamma_V(q, y) = 1$ **then**
         **return** 1
**return** 0

---

We define the *success probability* of $C$ in solving a puzzle defined by $P$ as

$$\Pr_{\pi, \rho}[Success^{P,C}(\pi, \rho) = 1]. \tag{0.0.1}$$

Furthermore, we say that $C$ *succeeds* for $\pi$, $\rho$ if $Success^{P,C}(\pi, \rho) = 1$.

**Theorem 1.3 (Security amplification for dynamic weakly verifiable puzzles.)** *Let $P_n^{(1)}$ be a fixed problem poser as in Definition 1.1 and $P_{kn}^{(g)}$ a problem poser for the $k$-wise direct product of $P_n^{(1)}$. Furthermore, let $C$ be a problem solver for $P_{kn}^{(g)}$ asking at most $h$ hint queries and $v$ verification queries. There exists a probabilistic algorithm Gen with oracle access to a solver circuit $C$, a monotone function $g : \{0,1\}^k \to \{0,1\}$ and problem posers $P_n^{(1)}$, $P_{kn}^{(g)}$. Additionally, Gen takes as input parameters $\varepsilon$, $\delta$, $n$, $k$, $h$, $v$ and outputs a solver circuit $D$ for $P_n^{(1)}$ such that the following holds:*
*If $C$ is such that*

$$\Pr_{\substack{\pi^{(k)} \in \{0,1\}^{kn} \\ \rho \in \{0,1\}^*}} \left[ Success^{P_{kn}^{(g)}, C}(\pi^{(k)}, \rho) = 1 \right] \geq 16(h+v)\left( \Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[g(u) = 1] + \varepsilon \right)$$

*then $D$ satisfies almost surely*

$$\Pr_{\substack{\pi \in \{0,1\}^n \\ \rho \in \{0,1\}^*}} \left[ Success^{P_n^{(1)}, D}(\pi, \rho) = 1 \right] \geq (\delta + \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}).$$

*Additionally, $D$ requires oracle access to $g$, $P_n^{(1)}$, $C$, and asks at most $\frac{6k}{\varepsilon} \log\left(\frac{6k}{\varepsilon}\right) h$ hint queries and one verification query. Finally, $Size(D) \leq Size(C) \cdot \frac{6k}{\varepsilon}$ and $Time(Gen) = poly(k, \frac{1}{\varepsilon}, n, v, h)$.*

We call a function mapping values from $\mathcal{D}$ to values from $\mathcal{R}$ a *hash function*. We say that a family of hash functions $\mathcal{H}$ from $\mathcal{D}$ to $\mathcal{R}$ is *pairwise independent* if $\forall x \neq y \in \mathcal{D}$ and $\forall \alpha, \beta \in \mathcal{R}$, we have

$$\Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[hash(x) = \alpha \wedge hash(y) = \beta] = \frac{1}{|R|^2}, \tag{0.0.2}$$

where $hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}$ denotes that $hash$ is chosen from $\mathcal{H}$ uniformly at random.

Let $hash : Q \to \{0, 1, \ldots, 2(h+v) - 1\}$, the idea is to partition $Q$ such that the set of preimages of 0 for $hash$ contains $q \in Q$ on which $C$ is not allowed to ask hint queries, and the

first successful verification query $(q, y)$ of $C$ is such that $hash(q) = 0$. Therefore, if $C$ makes a verification query $(q, y)$ such that $hash(q) = 0$, then we know that no hint query is ever asked on this $q$.

We denote the $i$-th query of $C$ by $q_i$ if it is a hint query, and by $(q_i, y_i)$ if it is a verification query. We define now an experiment *CanonicalSuccess* in which we partition $Q$ using a function *hash*. We say that a solver circuit *succeeds* in the experiment *CanonicalSuccess* if it asks a successful verification query $(q_j, y_j)$ such that $hash(q_j) = 0$, and no hint query $q_i$ is asked before $(q_j, y_j)$ such that $hash(q_i) = 0$.

---

**Experiment** $CanonicalSuccess^{P,C,hash}(\pi, \rho)$

---

**Oracle:** A problem poser $P$, a solver circuit $C = (C_1, C_2)$ for $P$,
       a function $hash : Q \to \{0, \ldots, 2(h + v) - 1\}$.
**Input:** Bitstrings $\pi \in \{0, 1\}^n$, $\rho \in \{0, 1\}^*$.
**Output:** A bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$.

---

**run** $\langle P(\pi), C_1(\rho) \rangle$
    $(\Gamma_V, \Gamma_H) := \langle P(\pi), C_1(\rho) \rangle_P$
    $x := \langle P(\pi), C_1(\rho) \rangle_{trans}$

**run** $C_2^{\Gamma_V, \Gamma_H}(x, \rho)$
    **if** $C_2^{\Gamma_V, \Gamma_H}(x, \rho)$ does not succeed for any verification query **then**
        **return** 0
    Let $(q_j, y_j)$ be the first verification query of $C_2^{\Gamma_V, \Gamma_H}(x, \rho)$ such that $\Gamma_V(q_j, y_j) = 1$.

**if** $(\forall i < j : hash(q_i) \neq 0)$ **and** $(hash(q_j) = 0)$ **then**
    **return** 1
**else**
    **return** 0

---

We define the *canonical success probability* of a solver circuit $C$ for $P$ with respect to a function *hash* as

$$\Pr_{\pi, \rho}[CanonicalSuccess^{P,C,hash}(\pi, \rho) = 1]. \qquad (0.0.3)$$

For fixed *hash* and a problem poser $P$ a *canonical success* of $C$ for $\pi$, $\rho$ is a situation where $CanonicalSuccess^{P,C,hash}(\pi, \rho) = 1$.

We show that if a solver circuit $C$ for $P$ often succeeds in the experiment *Success*, then there exists a hash function such that $C$ also often succeeds in the experiment *CanonicalSuccess*.

**Lemma 1.4 (Success probability in solving DWVP with respect to a function hash.)**
*For fixed $P_n$ let $C$ be a solver for $P_n$ with success probability at least $\gamma$, asking at most $h$ hint queries and $v$ verification queries. Let $\mathcal{H}$ be the family of pairwise independent hash functions $Q \to \{0, 1, \ldots, 2(h + v) - 1\}$.[1] There exists a probabilistic algorithm FindHash that takes as input parameters $\gamma$, $n$, $v$, $h$, and has oracle access to $C$ and $P_n$. Furthermore, FindHash runs in time $poly(h, v, \frac{1}{\gamma}, n)$, and with high probability outputs a function hash $\in \mathcal{H}$ such that the canonical success probability of $C$ with respect to hash is at least $\frac{\gamma}{16(h+v)}$.*

---

[1]It is possible to implement a random function $hash : Q \to \{0, 1, \ldots, 2(h + v) - 1\}$ efficiently by for example building its function table on the fly.

**Proof.** We fix a problem poser $P$ and a solver $C$ for $P$ in the whole proof of Lemma 1.4. For all $k, l \in \{1, \ldots, (h+v)\}$ and $\alpha, \beta \in \{0, 1, \ldots, 2(h+v) - 1\}$ by the pairwise independence property, we have

$$\forall q_k, q_l \in Q, q_k \neq q_l : \Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[hash(q_k) = \alpha \mid hash(q_l) = \beta] = \Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[hash(q_k) = \alpha]$$

$$= \frac{1}{2(h+v)}. \qquad (0.0.4)$$

We define $\mathcal{P}_{Success}$ as a set containing all $(\pi, \rho)$ for which $Success^{P,C}(\pi, \rho) = 1$. Let us fix $(\pi^*, \rho^*) \in \mathcal{P}_{Success}$. We are interested in the probability over a choice of function $hash$ of the event $CanonicalSuccess^{P,C,hash}(\pi^*, \rho^*) = 1$. Let $(q_j, y_j)$ denote the first query such that $\Gamma_V(q_j, y_j) = 1$. We have

$$\Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}\left[CanonicalSuccess^{P,C,hash}(\pi^*, \rho^*) = 1\right]$$

$$= \Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[hash(q_j) = 0 \wedge (\forall i < j : hash(q_i) \neq 0)]$$

$$= \Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[\forall i < j : hash(q_i) \neq 0 \mid hash(q_j) = 0] \Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[hash(q_j) = 0]$$

$$\overset{(0.0.4)}{=} \frac{1}{2(h+v)} \left(1 - \Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[\exists i < j : hash(q_i) = 0 \mid hash(q_j) = 0]\right)$$

$$\overset{(*)}{\geq} \frac{1}{2(h+v)} \left(1 - \sum_{i<j} \Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[hash(q_i) = 0 \mid hash(q_j) = 0]\right)$$

$$\overset{(0.0.4)}{=} \frac{1}{2(h+v)} \left(1 - \sum_{i<j} \Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[hash(q_i) = 0]\right)$$

$$\overset{(0.0.4)}{\geq} \frac{1}{4(h+v)}, \qquad (0.0.5)$$

where in $(*)$ we used the union bound. Let us denote the set of those $(\pi, \rho)$ for which $CanonicalSuccess^{P,C,hash}(\pi, \rho) = 1$ by $\mathcal{P}_{Canonical}$. If for $\pi$, $\rho$ the circuit $C$ succeeds canonically, then for the same $\pi$, $\rho$ we also have $Success^{P,C}(\pi, \rho) = 1$. Hence, $\mathcal{P}_{Canonical} \subseteq \mathcal{P}_{Success}$, and we conclude

$$\Pr_{\substack{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H} \\ \pi, \rho}}\left[CanonicalSuccess^{P,C,hash}(\pi, \rho) = 1\right]$$

$$= \Pr_{\substack{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H} \\ \pi, \rho}}\left[CanonicalSuccess^{P,C,hash}(\pi, \rho) = 1 \mid (\pi, \rho) \in \mathcal{P}_{Success}\right] \Pr_{\pi, \rho}[(\pi, \rho) \in \mathcal{P}_{Success}]$$

$$+ \Pr_{\substack{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H} \\ \pi, \rho}}\left[CanonicalSuccess^{P,C,hash}(\pi, \rho) = 1 \mid (\pi, \rho) \notin \mathcal{P}_{Success}\right] \Pr_{\pi, \rho}[(\pi, \rho) \notin \mathcal{P}_{Success}]$$

$$= \Pr_{\substack{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H} \\ \pi, \rho}}\left[CanonicalSuccess^{P,C,hash}(\pi, \rho) = 1 \mid (\pi, \rho) \in \mathcal{P}_{Success}\right] \Pr_{\pi, \rho}[(\pi, \rho) \in \mathcal{P}_{Success}]$$

$$\geq \Pr_{\substack{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H} \\ \pi, \rho}}\left[CanonicalSuccess^{P,C,hash}(\pi, \rho) = 1 \mid (\pi, \rho) \in \mathcal{P}_{Success}\right] \cdot \gamma$$

$$= \mathbb{E}_{(\pi,\rho) \in \mathcal{P}_{Success}}\left[\Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[CanonicalSuccess^{P,C,hash}(\pi, \rho) = 1]\right] \cdot \gamma$$

$$\overset{(0.0.5)}{\geq} \frac{\gamma}{4(h+v)} \qquad (0.0.6)$$

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Algorithm FindHash(γ, n, h, v)                                           │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  Oracle: A problem poser P, a solver circuit C for P.                     │
│  Input: Parameters γ, n. The number of h hint and v verification queries. │
│  Output: A function hash : Q → {0, 1, . . . , 2(h + v) − 1}.              │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  for i := 1 to 32n(h + v)²/γ² do:                                         │
│      hash ← H                                                             │
│      count := 0                                                           │
│      for j := 1 to 32n(h + v)²/γ² do:                                     │
│          π ←$ {0, 1}ⁿ                                                      │
│          ρ ←$ {0, 1}*                                                      │
│          if CanonicalSuccessᴾ,ᶜ,ʰᵃˢʰ(π, ρ) = 1 then                        │
│              count := count + 1                                           │
│      if count ≥ (γ/12(h+v)) · (32(h+v)²/γ²) n then                         │
│          return hash                                                      │
│  return ⊥                                                                 │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

We show that FindHash chooses $hash \in \mathcal{H}$ such that the canonical success probability of $C$ with respect to $hash$ is at least $\frac{\gamma}{16(h+v)}$ almost surely. Let $\mathcal{H}_{Good}$ denote a family of functions $hash \in \mathcal{H}$ for which

$$\Pr_{\pi,\rho}\left[CanonicalSuccess^{P,C,hash}(\pi,\rho) = 1\right] \geq \frac{\gamma}{8(h+v)}, \tag{0.0.7}$$

and $\mathcal{H}_{Bad}$ be the family of functions $hash \in \mathcal{H}$ such that

$$\Pr_{\pi,\rho}\left[CanonicalSuccess^{P,C,hash}(\pi,\rho) = 1\right] \leq \frac{\gamma}{16(h+v)}. \tag{0.0.8}$$

Let $N$ denote the number of iterations of the inner loop of FindHash. For a fixed $hash$, we define independent, identically distributed binary random variables $X_1, \ldots, X_N$ such that

$$X_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if in the } i\text{-th iteration of the inner loop } count \text{ is increased} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

We show now that FindHash is unlikely to return $hash \in \mathcal{H}_{Bad}$. For $hash \in \mathcal{H}_{Bad}$ by (0.0.8) we have $\mathbb{E}_{\pi,\rho}[X_i] \leq \frac{\gamma}{16(h+v)}$. Therefore, for any fixed $hash \in \mathcal{H}_{Bad}$ using the Chernoff bound we get[2]

$$\Pr_{\pi,\rho}\left[\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} X_i \geq \frac{\gamma}{12(h+v)}\right] \leq \Pr_{\pi,\rho}\left[\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} X_i \geq (1 + \frac{1}{3})\mathbb{E}[X_i]\right] \leq e^{-\frac{\gamma}{16(h+v)}N/27} \leq e^{-\frac{2}{27}\frac{(h+v)}{\gamma}n} \leq e^{-\frac{2}{27}n}.$$

The probability that $hash \in \mathcal{H}_{Good}$, when picked, is not returned amounts

$$\Pr_{\pi,\rho}\left[\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} X_i \leq \frac{\gamma}{12(h+v)}\right] \leq \Pr_{\pi,\rho}\left[\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} X_i \leq (1 - \frac{1}{3})\mathbb{E}[X_i]\right] \leq e^{-\frac{\gamma}{8(h+v)}N/18} = e^{-\frac{2}{9}\frac{(h+v)}{\gamma}n} \leq e^{-\frac{2}{9}n},$$

where we once more used the Chernoff bound. We show now that the probability of picking $hash \in \mathcal{H}_{Good}$ is at least $\frac{\gamma}{8(h+v)}$. We prove this statement by contradiction. Let us assume that

$$\Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[hash \in \mathcal{H}_{Good}] < \frac{\gamma}{8(h+v)}. \tag{0.0.9}$$

---

[2]For independent, identically distributed binary random variables $X = \sum_{i=1}^{N} X_i$ and $0 < \delta \leq 1$ we use the Chernoff bounds in the form $\Pr[X \geq (1 + \delta)\mathbb{E}[X]] \leq e^{-\mathbb{E}[X]\delta^2/3}$ and $\Pr[X \leq (1 - \delta)\mathbb{E}[X]] \leq e^{-\mathbb{E}[X]\delta^2/2}$.

We have

$$\Pr_{\substack{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H} \\ \pi,\rho}}[CanonicalSuccess^{P,C,hash}(\pi,\rho) = 1]$$

$$= \Pr_{\substack{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H} \\ \pi,\rho}}[CanonicalSuccess^{P,C,hash}(\pi,\rho) = 1 \mid hash \in \mathcal{H}_{Good}] \Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[hash \in \mathcal{H}_{Good}]$$

$$+ \Pr_{\substack{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H} \\ \pi,\rho}}[CanonicalSuccess^{P,C,hash}(\pi,\rho) = 1 \mid hash \notin \mathcal{H}_{Good}] \Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[hash \notin \mathcal{H}_{Good}]$$

$$\leq \Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[hash \in \mathcal{H}_{Good}] + \Pr_{\substack{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H} \\ \pi,\rho}}[CanonicalSuccess^{P,C,hash}(\pi,\rho) = 1 \mid hash \notin \mathcal{H}_{Good}]$$

$$\overset{\substack{(0.0.7) \\ (0.0.9)}}{<} \frac{\gamma}{8(h+v)} + \frac{\gamma}{8(h+v)} = \frac{\gamma}{4(h+v)},$$

but this contradicts (0.0.6). Therefore, we know that the probability of choosing a $hash \in \mathcal{H}_{Good}$ amounts at least $\frac{\gamma}{8(h+v)}$ where the probability is taken over a choice of $hash$.

We show that FindHash picks in one of its iteration $hash \in \mathcal{H}_{Good}$ almost surely. Let $K$ be the number of iterations of the outer loop of FindHash and $Y_i$ be a random variable for the event that in the $i$-th iteration of the outer loop $hash \notin \mathcal{H}_{Good}$ is picked. We use $\Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[hash \in \mathcal{H}_{Good}] \geq \frac{\gamma}{8(h+v)}$ and $K \leq \frac{32(h+v)^2}{\gamma^2}n$, and conclude

$$\Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}\left[\bigcap_{1 \leq i \leq K} Y_i\right] \leq \left(1 - \frac{\gamma}{8(h+v)}\right)^{\frac{32(h+v)^2}{\gamma^2}n} \leq e^{-\frac{\gamma}{8(h+v)}\frac{32(h+v)^2}{\gamma^2}n} \leq e^{-\frac{4(h+v)}{\gamma}n} \leq e^{-n}. \qquad \square$$

We write $C_2^{(\cdot,\cdot)}$ to emphasize that $C_2$ does not obtain direct access to hint and verification circuits. Instead, all hint and verification queries are answered explicitly as in the code excerpt of the circuit $\widetilde{C}_2$.

---

**Circuit** $\widetilde{C}_2^{\Gamma_H,C_2,hash}(x,\rho)$

---

**Oracle:** A hint circuit $\Gamma_H$, a circuit $C_2$,
        a function $hash : Q \rightarrow \{0,1,\ldots,2(h+v)-1\}$.
**Input:** Bitstrings $x \in \{0,1\}^*$, $\rho \in \{0,1\}^*$.
**Output:** A pair $(q,y)$.

---

**run** $C_2^{(\cdot,\cdot)}(x,\rho)$
    **if** $C_2^{(\cdot,\cdot)}(x,\rho)$ asks a hint query on $q$ **then**
        **if** $hash(q) = 0$ **then**
            **return** $\perp$
        **else**
            answer the query of $C_2^{(\cdot,\cdot)}(x,\rho)$ using $\Gamma_H(q)$

    **if** $C_2^{(\cdot,\cdot)}(x,\rho)$ asks a verification query $(q,y)$ **then**
        **if** $hash(q) = 0$ **then**
            **return** $(q,y)$
        **else**
            answer the verification query of $C_2^{(\cdot,\cdot)}(x,\rho)$ with $0$
**return** $\perp$

Given $C = (C_1, C_2)$ we define a circuit $\widetilde{C} = (C_1, \widetilde{C}_2)$. Every hint query $q$ asked by $\widetilde{C}$ is such that $hash(q) \neq 0$. Furthermore, $\widetilde{C}$ asks no verification queries, instead it returns $\bot$ or $(q, y)$ such that $hash(q) = 0$.

We say that for a fixed $\pi$, $\rho$, $hash$ the circuit $\widetilde{C}$ succeeds if for $x := \langle P(\pi), C_1(\rho) \rangle_{trans}$, $(\Gamma_V, \Gamma_H) := \langle P(\pi), C_1(\rho) \rangle_P$, we have

$$\Gamma_V(\widetilde{C}_2^{\Gamma_H, C_2, hash}(x, \rho)) = 1.$$

**Lemma 1.5** *For fixed $P, C$ and $hash$ the following statement is true*

$$\Pr_{\pi, \rho}[CanonicalSuccess^{P,C,hash}(\pi, \rho) = 1] \leq \Pr_{\substack{\pi, \rho \\ x := \langle P(\pi), C_1(\rho) \rangle_{trans} \\ (\Gamma_V, \Gamma_H) := \langle P(\pi), C_1(\rho) \rangle_P}}[\Gamma_V(\widetilde{C}_2^{\Gamma_H, C_2, hash}(x, \rho)) = 1]$$

**Proof.** If for some fixed $\pi$, $\rho$ and $hash$ the circuit $C$ succeeds canonically, then for the same $\pi$, $\rho$ and $hash$ also $\widetilde{C}$ succeeds. Using this observation, we conclude that

$$\Pr_{\pi, \rho}\left[CanonicalSuccess^{P,C,hash}(\pi, \rho) = 1\right]$$

$$= \mathbb{E}_{\pi, \rho}\left[CanonicalSuccess^{P,C,hash}(\pi, \rho) = 1\right]$$

$$\leq \mathbb{E}_{\substack{\pi, \rho \\ x := \langle P(\pi), C_1(\rho) \rangle_{trans} \\ (\Gamma_V, \Gamma_H) := \langle P(\pi), C_1(\rho) \rangle_P}}\left[\Gamma_V(\widetilde{C}_2^{\Gamma_H, C_2, hash}(x, \rho)) = 1\right]$$

$$= \Pr_{\substack{\pi, \rho \\ x := \langle P(\pi), C_1(\rho) \rangle_{trans} \\ (\Gamma_V, \Gamma_H) := \langle P(\pi), C_1(\rho) \rangle_P}}\left[\Gamma_V(\widetilde{C}_2^{\Gamma_H, C_2, hash}(x, \rho)) = 1\right] \qquad \square$$

**Lemma 1.6 (Security amplification for dynamic weakly verifiable puzzles with respect to hash.)** *For fixed $P_n^{(1)}$ let $\widetilde{C} := (C_1, \widetilde{C}_2)$ have oracle access to a function $hash : Q \to \{0, 1, \ldots, 2(h + v - 1)\}$ and a solver circuit $C := (C_1, C_2)$ for $P_{kn}^{(g)}$ which asks at most $h$ hint queries and $v$ verification queries. There exists an algorithm Gen that takes as input parameters $\varepsilon$, $\delta$, $n$, $k$, has oracle access to $P_n^{(1)}$, $\widetilde{C}$ for $P_{kn}^{(g)}$, $hash$, $g : \{0,1\}^k \to \{0,1\}$, and outputs a solver circuit $D := (D_1, D_2)$ for $P^{(1)}$ such that the following holds:*
*If $\widetilde{C}$ is such that*

$$\Pr_{\substack{\pi^{(k)} \in \{0,1\}^{kn}, \rho \in \{0,1\}^* \\ x := \langle P^{(g)}(\pi^{(k)}), C_1(\rho) \rangle_{trans} \\ (\Gamma_H^{(k)}, \Gamma_V^{(g)}) := \langle P^{(g)}(\pi^{(k)}), C_1(\rho) \rangle_{P^{(g)}}}}[\Gamma_V^{(g)}(\widetilde{C}_2^{\Gamma_H^{(k)}, C_2, hash}(x, \rho)) = 1] \geq \Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[g(u) = 1] + \varepsilon,$$

*then $D$ satisfies almost surely*

$$\Pr_{\substack{\pi \in \{0,1\}^n, \rho \in \{0,1\}^* \\ x := \langle P^{(1)}(\pi), D_1^{\widetilde{C}}(\rho) \rangle_{trans} \\ (\Gamma_H, \Gamma_V) := \langle P^{(1)}(\pi), D_1^{P^{(1)}, \widetilde{C}}(\rho) \rangle_{P^{(1)}}}}[\Gamma_V(D_2^{P^{(1)}, \widetilde{C}, hash, g, \Gamma_H}(x, \rho)) = 1] \geq (\delta + \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}).$$

*Furthermore, $D$ asks at most $\frac{6k}{\varepsilon} \log\left(\frac{6k}{\varepsilon}\right) h$ hint queries and no verification queries. Finally, $Size(D) \leq Size(C)\frac{6k}{\varepsilon}$ and $Time(Gen) = poly(k, \frac{1}{\varepsilon}, n, v, h)$.*

Before we give a proof of Lemma 1.6 we define some additional algorithms. First, we are interested in the probability that for $u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k$ and a bit $b$ we have $g(b, u_2, \ldots, u_k) = 1$. The estimate of this probability is calculated by EstimateFunctionProbability.

> **Algorithm** EstimateFunctionProbability$^g(b, k, \varepsilon, \delta, n)$
>
> ---
>
> **Oracle:** A function $g : \{0,1\}^k \to \{0,1\}$.
> **Input:** A bit $b \in \{0,1\}$, parameters $k$, $\varepsilon$, $\delta$, $n$.
> **Output:** An estimate $\widetilde{g}_b$ of $\mathrm{Pr}_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[g(b, u_2, \ldots, u_k) = 1]$.
>
> ---
>
> **for** $i := 1$ **to** $\frac{64k^2}{\varepsilon^2}n$ **do:**
>      $u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k$
>      $g_i := g(b, u_2, \ldots, u_k)$
> **return** $\frac{\varepsilon^2}{64k^2n} \sum_{i=1}^{\frac{64k^2}{\varepsilon^2}n} g_i$

**Lemma 1.7** *The algorithm EstimateFunctionProbability$^g(b, k, \varepsilon, \delta)$ outputs an estimate $\widetilde{g}_b$ such that $|\widetilde{g}_b - \mathrm{Pr}_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[g(b, u_2, \ldots, u_k) = 1]| \leq \frac{\varepsilon}{8k}$ almost surely.*

**Proof.** We define independent, identically distributed binary random variables $K_1, K_2, \ldots, K_{64k^2n/\varepsilon^2}$ such that for each $1 \leq i \leq \frac{64k^2}{\varepsilon^2}n$ the random variable $K_i$ takes value $g_i$. We use the Chernoff bound to obtain[3]

$$\mathrm{Pr}\left[\left|\widetilde{g}_b - \mathrm{Pr}_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[g(b, u_2, \ldots, u_k) = 1]\right| \geq \frac{\varepsilon}{8k}\right]$$

$$= \mathrm{Pr}\left[\left|\left(\frac{\varepsilon^2}{64k^2n} \sum_{i=1}^{64k^2n/\varepsilon^2} K_i\right) - \mathbb{E}_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[g(b, u_2, \ldots, u_k)]\right| \geq \frac{\varepsilon}{8k}\right] \leq 2 \cdot e^{-n/3}. \qquad \square$$

The algorithm EvalutePuzzles$^{P^{(1)}, \widetilde{C}, hash}(\pi^{(k)}, \rho, n, k)$ evaluates which of $k$ puzzles of the $k$-wise direct product defined by $P^{(g)}$ are solved successfully by $\widetilde{C}(\rho) := (C_1, \widetilde{C}_2)(\rho)$. To decide whether the $i$-th puzzle of the $k$-wise direct product is solved successfully we need to gain access to the verification circuit for the puzzle generated in the $i$-th round of the interaction between $P^{(g)}$ and $\widetilde{C}$. Therefore, the algorithm EvalutePuzzles runs $k$ times $P^{(1)}$ to simulate the interaction with $C_1(\rho)$ each time with a fresh random bitstring $\pi_i \in \{0,1\}^n$ where $1 \leq i \leq n$. Let us introduce some additional notation. We denote by $\langle P^{(1)}(\pi_i), C_1(\rho) \rangle^i$ the execution of the $i$-th round of the sequential interaction. We use $\langle P^{(1)}(\pi_i), C_1(\rho) \rangle^i_{P^{(1)}}$ to denote the output of $P^{(1)}(\pi_i)$ in the $i$-th round. Finally, we write $\langle P^{(1)}(\pi_i), C_1(\rho) \rangle^i_{trans}$ to denote the transcript of communication in the $i$-th round. The $i$-th round of the interaction between $P^{(1)}$ and $C_1$ is well defined only if all previous rounds have been executed before.

To make the notation easier in the code excerpts of circuits $C_2$, $D_2$ and EvalutePuzzles we omit some oracle superscripts. Exemplary we write $\widetilde{C}_2^{\Gamma_H^{(k)}, hash}$ instead of $\widetilde{C}_2^{\Gamma_H^{(k)}, C, hash}$ where the superscript of the oracle circuit $C$ is omitted. We make sure that it is clear from a context which oracles are used.

> **Algorithm** EvaluatePuzzles$^{P^{(1)}, \widetilde{C}, hash}(\pi^{(k)}, \rho, n, k)$
>
> ---
>
> **Oracle:** A problem poser $P^{(1)}$, a solver circuit $\widetilde{C} = (C_1, \widetilde{C}_2)$ for $P^{(g)}$,
>        a function $hash : Q \to \{0, 1, \ldots, 2(h + v) - 1\}$.
> **Input:** Bitstrings $\pi^{(k)} \in \{0,1\}^{kn}$, $\rho \in \{0,1\}^*$, parameters $n$, $k$.
> **Output**: A tuple $(c_1, \ldots, c_k) \in \{0,1\}^k$.

---

[3]For independent Bernoulli distributed random variables $X_1, \ldots, X_n$ with $X := \sum_{i=1}^n X_i$ and $0 \leq \delta \leq 1$ we use the Chernoff bound in the form $\mathrm{Pr}[|X - \mathbb{E}[X]| \geq \delta\mathbb{E}[X]] \leq 2e^{-\mathbb{E}[X]\delta^2/3}$.

```
for i := 1 to k do:              //simulate k rounds of interaction
    (Γ_V^i, Γ_H^i) := ⟨P^(1)(π_i), C_1(ρ)⟩_{P^(1)}^i
    x_i := ⟨P^(1)(π_i), C_1(ρ)⟩_{trans}^i
x := (x_1, ..., x_k)
Γ_H^(k) := (Γ_H^1, ..., Γ_H^k)
(q, y_1, ..., y_k) := C̃_2^{Γ_H^(k), hash}(x, ρ)
if (q, y_1, ..., y_k) = ⊥ then
    return (0, ..., 0)
(c_1, ..., c_k) := (Γ_V^1(q, y_1), ..., Γ_V^k(q, y_k))
return (c_1, ..., c_k)
```

All puzzles used by EvalutePuzzles are generated internally. Thus the algorithm has access to hint circuit, and can answer itself all queries of $\widetilde{C}_2$.

We are interested in the success probability of $\widetilde{C}$ with the bitstring $\pi_1$ fixed to $\pi^*$ when the fact whether $\widetilde{C}$ succeeds in solving the first puzzle defined by $P^{(1)}(\pi_1)$ is neglected, and instead a bit $b$ is used. More formally, we define the surplus $S_{\pi^*,b}$ as

$$S_{\pi^*,b} = \Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}\left[g(b, c_2, \ldots, c_k) = 1 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*\right] - \Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}\left[g(b, u_2, \ldots, u_k) = 1\right]. \tag{0.0.10}$$

The algorithm EstimateSurplus returns an estimate $\widetilde{S}_{\pi^*,b}$ for $S_{\pi^*,b}$.

---

**Algorithm** EstimateSurplus$^{P^{(1)}, \widetilde{C}, g, hash}(\pi^*, b, k, \varepsilon, \delta, n)$

---

**Oracle:** A problem poser $P^{(1)}$, a circuit $\widetilde{C}$ for $P^{(g)}$, a function $g : \{0,1\}^k \to \{0,1\}$
        a function $hash : Q \to \{0, 1, \ldots, 2(h+v) - 1\}$.
**Input:** A bistring $\pi^* \in \{0,1\}^n$, a bit $b \in \{0,1\}$, parameters $k, \varepsilon, \delta, n$.
**Output:** An estimate $\widetilde{S}_{\pi^*,b}$ for $S_{\pi^*,b}$.

---

```
for i := 1 to (64k²/ε²)n do:
    (π_2, ..., π_k) ←$ {0,1}^{(k-1)n}
    ρ ←$ {0,1}^*
    (c_1, ..., c_k) := EvalutePuzzles^{P^(1), C̃, hash}((π^*, π_2, ..., π_k), ρ)
    s̃_{π^*,b}^i := g(b, c_2, ..., c_k)
g̃_b := EstimateFunctionProbability^g(b, k, ε, δ, n)
return ( (ε²/64k²n) Σ_{i=1}^{(64k²/ε²)n} s̃_{π^*,b}^i ) - g̃_b
```

---

**Lemma 1.8** *The estimate $\widetilde{S}_{\pi^*,b}$ returned by EstimateSurplus differs from $S_{\pi^*,b}$ by at most $\frac{\varepsilon}{4k}$ almost surely.*

**Proof.** We use the union bound and similar argument as in Lemma 1.7 which yields that $\frac{\varepsilon^2}{64k^2n} \sum_{i=1}^{\frac{64k^2}{\varepsilon^2}n} \widetilde{s}_{\pi^*,b}^i$ differs from $\mathbb{E}[g(b, c_2, \ldots, c_k)]$ by at most $\frac{\varepsilon}{8k}$ almost surely. Together, with Lemma 1.7 we conclude that the surplus estimate returned by EstimateSurplus differs from $S_{\pi^*,b}$ by at most $\frac{\varepsilon}{4k}$ almost surely. $\square$

We define now the following circuit $C' = (C_1', C_2')$, which is a solver for a $(k-1)$-wise direct product of $P^{(1)}$.

<div style="border:1px solid">

**Circuit** $C_1'^{\widetilde{C},P^{(1)}}(\rho)$

---

**Oracle:** A solver circuit $\widetilde{C} = (C_1, \widetilde{C}_2)$ for $P^{(g)}$, a poser $P^{(1)}$.
**Input:** A bitstring $\rho \in \{0,1\}^*$
**Hard-coded:** A bitstring $\pi^* \in \{0,1\}^n$

---

Simulate $\langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*), C_1(\rho) \rangle^1$
Use $C_1(\rho)$ for the remaining $k-1$ rounds of interaction.

</div>

<div style="border:1px solid">

**Circuit** $\widetilde{C}_2'^{\Gamma_H^{(k-1)},\widetilde{C},hash}(x^{(k-1)}, \rho)$

---

**Oracle:** A hint oracle $\Gamma_H^{(k-1)} := (\Gamma_H^2, \ldots, \Gamma_H^k)$, a solver circuit $\widetilde{C} = (C_1, \widetilde{C}_2)$ for $P^{(g)}$,
  a function $hash : Q \to \{0, 1, \ldots, 2(h+v) - 1\}$
**Input:** A tuple $x^{(k-1)} := (x_2, \ldots, x_k) \in \{0,1\}^*$, a bitstring $\rho \in \{0,1\}^*$
**Hard-coded:** A bitstring $\pi^* \in \{0,1\}^n$

---

Simulate $\langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*), C_1(\rho) \rangle^1$
  $(\Gamma_H^*, \Gamma_V^*) := \langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*), C_1(\rho) \rangle^1_{P^{(1)}}$
  $x^* := \langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*), C_1(\rho) \rangle^1_{trans}$
$\Gamma_H^{(k)} := (\Gamma_H^*, \Gamma_H^2, \ldots, \Gamma_H^k)$
$x^{(k)} := (x^*, x_2, \ldots, x_k)$
$(q, y_1, \ldots, y_k) := \widetilde{C}_2^{\Gamma_H^{(k)},hash}(x^{(k)}, \rho)$
**return** $(q, y_2, \ldots, y_k)$

</div>

We are ready to define the solver circuit $D = (D_1, D_2)$ for $P^{(1)}$ and the algorithm Gen.

<div style="border:1px solid">

**Circuit** $D_1^{\widetilde{C}}(r)$

---

**Oracle:** A solver circuit $\widetilde{C} = (C_1, \widetilde{C}_2)$ for $P^{(g)}$.
**Input:** A pair $r := (\rho, \sigma)$ where $\rho \in \{0,1\}^*$ and $\sigma \in \{0,1\}^*$.

---

Run the first round of interation with a problem poser $\langle P^{(1)}, C_1(\rho) \rangle^1$.
Let $x^* := \langle P^{(1)}, C_1(\rho) \rangle^1_{trans}$.

</div>

<div style="border:1px solid">

**Circuit** $D_2^{P^{(1)},\widetilde{C},hash,g,\Gamma_H^*}(x^*, r)$

---

**Oracle:** A poser $P^{(1)}$, a solver circuit $\widetilde{C} = (C_1, \widetilde{C}_2)$ for $P^{(g)}$,
  functions $hash : Q \to \{0, 1, \ldots, 2(h+v) - 1\}$, $g : \{0,1\}^k \to \{0,1\}$,
  a hint circuit $\Gamma_H^*$ for $P^{(1)}$.
**Input:** A communiation transcript $x^* \in \{0,1\}^*$, a bitstring $r := (\rho, \sigma)$
  where $\rho \in \{0,1\}^*$ and $\sigma \in \{0,1\}^*$
**Output**: A pair $(q, y^*)$.

---

**for** at most $\frac{6k}{\varepsilon} \log(\frac{6k}{\varepsilon})$ iterations **do:**
  $(\pi_2, \ldots, \pi_k) \leftarrow$ read next $(k-1) \cdot n$ bits from $\sigma$
  Use $x^*$ to simulate the first round of interiaction with $C_1(\rho)$
  **for** $i := 2$ **to** $k$ **do:**

</div>

---

**Algorithm** $\mathrm{Gen}^{P^{(1)}, \widetilde{C}, g, hash}(\varepsilon, \delta, n, v, h, k)$

---

**Oracle:** A poser $P^{(1)}$, a solver circuit $\widetilde{C}$ for $P^{(g)}$, functions $g : \{0,1\}^k \to \{0,1\}$,
  $hash : Q \to \{0, 1, ..., 2(h+v) - 1\}$.
**Input:** Parameters $\varepsilon$, $\delta$, $n$, $k$, the number of verification $v$ and hint $h$ queries.
**Output:** A circuit $D$.

---

**for** $i := 1$ **to** $\frac{6k}{\varepsilon}n$ **do:**
  $\pi^* \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^n$
  $\widetilde{S}_{\pi^*, 0} := \mathrm{EstimateSurplus}^{P^{(1)}, \widetilde{C}, g, hash}(\pi^*, 0, k, \varepsilon, \delta, n)$
  $\widetilde{S}_{\pi^*, 1} := \mathrm{EstimateSurplus}^{P^{(1)}, \widetilde{C}, g, hash}(\pi^*, 1, k, \varepsilon, \delta, n)$
  **if** $\exists b \in \{0, 1\} : \widetilde{S}_{\pi^*, b} \geq (1 - \frac{3}{4k})\varepsilon$ **then**
    Let $C_1'$ have oracle access to $\widetilde{C}$, and have hard-coded $\pi^*$
    Let $\widetilde{C}_2'$ have oracle access to $\widetilde{C}$, and have hard-coded $\pi^*$.
    $\widetilde{C}' := (C_1', \widetilde{C}_2')$
    $g'(b_2, ..., b_k) := g(b, b_2, ..., b_k)$
    **return** $\mathrm{Gen}^{P^{(1)}, \widetilde{C}', g', hash}(\varepsilon, \delta, n, v, h, k-1)$
// *all estimates are lower than $(1 - \frac{3}{4k})\varepsilon$*
**return** $D^{P^{(1)}, \widetilde{C}, hash, g}$

---

**Proof (Lemma 1.6).** First let us consider the case where $k = 1$. The function $g : \{0,1\} \to \{0,1\}$ is either the identity or a constant function. If $g$ is the identity function, then the circuit $D$ returned by *Gen* directly uses $\widetilde{C}$ to find a solution. From the assumptions of Lemma 1.6 we know that $\widetilde{C}$ succeeds with probability at least $\delta + \varepsilon$. Hence, $D$ trivially satisfies the statement of Lemma 1.6. If $g$ is a constant function the statement is vacuously true.

The general case is more involved. We distinguish two possibilities. If Gen manages to find in one of the iterations $\pi^*$ such that an estimate $\widetilde{S}_{\pi^*, b} \geq (1 - \frac{3}{4k})\varepsilon$, then we define a new monotone function $g'(b_2, ..., b_k) := g(b, b_2, ..., b_k)$ and a circuit $\widetilde{C}' = (C_1', \widetilde{C}_2')$ with oracle access to $\widetilde{C} := (C_1, \widetilde{C}_2)$. We know that one of the surplus estimates satisfies $\widetilde{S}_{\pi^*, b} \geq 1 - \frac{3}{4k}\varepsilon$, thus by Lemma 1.8 we conclude that $S_{\pi^*, b} \geq \widetilde{S}_{\pi^*, b} - \frac{\varepsilon}{4k} \geq \varepsilon - \frac{\varepsilon}{k}$ almost surely. Therefore, the circuit $\widetilde{C}'$ succeeds in solving the $(k-1)$-wise direct product of puzzles with probability at least $\Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^{(k-1)}}[g'(u_1, ..., u_{k-1})] + (1 - \frac{1}{k})\varepsilon$. We see that in this case $\widetilde{C}'$ satisfies the conditions of Lemma 1.6 for the $(k-1)$-wise direct product of puzzles, and we can call Gen recursively.

If all estimates are less than $(1 - \frac{3}{4k})\varepsilon$, then intuitively $C$ does not succeed on the remaining $k - 1$ puzzles with much higher probability than an algorithm that correctly solves each puzzle with probability $\delta$. However, from the assumptions of Lemma 1.6 we know that on all $k$ puzzles the success probability of $\widetilde{C}$ is higher. Therefore, it is likely that the first puzzle is correctly

solved unusually often. It remains to prove that this intuition is indeed correct. We fix the notation used in the code excerpt of the circuit $D_2$. Additionally, we define $c_1 := \Gamma_V^*(q, y^*)$, where $(q, y^*)$ is the output of $D_2$, and $\Gamma_V^*$ is a verification circuit generated by $D_1$ and $P^{(1)}$ in the first phase. Let $\mathcal{G}_b := \{b_1, b_2, \ldots, b_k : g(b, b_2, \ldots, b_k) = 1\}$ and $c = (c_1, c_2, \ldots, c_k)$. We note that these are equivalent

$$\Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[u \in \mathcal{G}_b] = \Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[g(b, u_2, \ldots, u_k) = 1]$$
$$\Pr_{\pi^{(k)}, \rho}[c \in \mathcal{G}_b] = \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}, \rho}[g(b, c_2, \ldots, c_k) = 1]. \tag{0.0.11}$$

We fix the randomness of the problem poser $P^{(1)}$ to $\pi^*$ and use (0.0.10), (0.0.11) to obtain

$$\Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[u \in \mathcal{G}_1] - \Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[u \in \mathcal{G}_0] = \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}, \rho}[c \in \mathcal{G}_1 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}, \rho}[c \in \mathcal{G}_0 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - (S_{\pi^*, 1} - S_{\pi^*, 0})$$
$$\tag{0.0.12}$$

Since $g$ is a monotone function we have $\mathcal{G}_0 \subseteq \mathcal{G}_1$. Therefore, we can write (0.0.12) as

$$\Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[u \in \mathcal{G}_1 \setminus \mathcal{G}_0] = \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}, \rho}[c \in \mathcal{G}_1 \setminus \mathcal{G}_0 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - (S_{\pi^*, 1} - S_{\pi^*, 0}). \tag{0.0.13}$$

Still fixing $\pi_1 = \pi^*$ we multiply both sides of (0.0.13) by

$$\Pr_{\substack{x^* := \langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*), D_1(r) \rangle_{trans} \\ (\Gamma_V, \Gamma_H) := \langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*), D_1(r) \rangle_{P^{(1)}}}}[\Gamma_V(D_2(x^*, r)) = 1] / \Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[u \in \mathcal{G}_1 \setminus \mathcal{G}_0].$$

which yields

$$\Pr_{\substack{x^* := \langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*), D_1(r) \rangle_{trans} \\ (\Gamma_V, \Gamma_H) := \langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*), D_1(r) \rangle_{P^{(1)}}}}[\Gamma_V(D_2(x^*, r)) = 1]$$

$$= \Pr_{\substack{x^* := \langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*), D_1(r) \rangle_{trans} \\ (\Gamma_V, \Gamma_H) := \langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*), D_1(r) \rangle_{P^{(1)}}}}[\Gamma_V(D_2(x^*, r)) = 1] \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}, \rho}[c \in \mathcal{G}_1 \setminus \mathcal{G}_0 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] \frac{1}{\Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[u \in \mathcal{G}_1 \setminus \mathcal{G}_0]}$$

$$- \Pr_{\substack{x^* := \langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*), D_1(r) \rangle_{trans} \\ (\Gamma_V, \Gamma_H) := \langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*), D_1(r) \rangle_{P^{(1)}}}}[\Gamma_V(D_2(x^*, r)) = 1](S_{\pi^*, 1} - S_{\pi^*, 0}) \frac{1}{\Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[u \in \mathcal{G}_1 \setminus \mathcal{G}_0]}. \tag{0.0.14}$$

We analyze the first summand of (0.0.14). First, we have

$$\Pr_{\substack{x^* := \langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*), D_1(r) \rangle_{trans} \\ (\Gamma_V, \Gamma_H) := \langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*), D_1(r) \rangle_{P^{(1)}}}}[\Gamma_V(D_2(x^*, r)) = 1]$$

$$= \Pr_{\substack{x^* := \langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*), D_1(r) \rangle_{trans} \\ (\Gamma_V, \Gamma_H) := \langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*), D_1(r) \rangle_{P^{(1)}}}}[\Gamma_V(D_2(x^*, r)) = 1 \mid D_2(x, r) \neq \bot] \Pr_{\substack{x^* = \langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*), D_1(r) \rangle_{trans}}}[D_2(x^*, r) \neq \bot]$$

$$\overset{(*)}{=} \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}, \rho}[c_1 = 1 \mid c \in \mathcal{G}_1 \setminus \mathcal{G}_0, \pi_1 = \pi^*] \Pr_{\substack{x^* = \langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*), D_1(r) \rangle_{trans}}}[D_2(x^*, r) \neq \bot], \tag{0.0.15}$$

where in $(*)$ we use the observation that $D_2(x^*, r) \neq \bot$ implies that the circuit $D_2(x^*, r)$ finds $\pi^{(k)}$ such that $c \in \mathcal{G}_1 \setminus \mathcal{G}_0$. Inserting (0.0.15) to the numerator of the first summand of (0.0.14)

yields

$$\Pr_{\substack{r \\ x^*:=\langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*),D_1(r)\rangle_{trans} \\ (\Gamma_V,\Gamma_H):=\langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*),D_1(r)\rangle_{P^{(1)}}}}[\Gamma_V(D_2(x^*,r))=1] \Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}[c \in \mathcal{G}_1 \setminus \mathcal{G}_0 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*]$$

$$= \Pr_{\substack{r \\ x^*=\langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*),D_1(r)\rangle_{trans}}}[D_2(x^*,r) \neq \bot] \Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}[c_1 = 1 \mid c \in \mathcal{G}_1 \setminus \mathcal{G}_0, \pi_1 = \pi^*] \Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}[c \in \mathcal{G}_1 \setminus \mathcal{G}_0 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*].$$

$$(0.0.16)$$

We consider the following two cases. If $\Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}[c \in \mathcal{G}_1 \setminus \mathcal{G}_0 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] \leq \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}$ then

$$\Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}[c_1 = 1 \mid c \in \mathcal{G}_1 \setminus \mathcal{G}_0, \pi_1 = \pi^*] \Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}[c \in \mathcal{G}_1 \setminus \mathcal{G}_0 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] \leq \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}. \qquad (0.0.17)$$

When $\Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}[c \in \mathcal{G}_1 \setminus \mathcal{G}_0 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] > \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}$ the circuit $D_2$ outputs $\bot$ if and only if it fails in all $\frac{6k}{\varepsilon} \log(\frac{6k}{\varepsilon})$ iterations to find $\pi^{(k)}$ such that $c \in \mathcal{G}_1 \setminus \mathcal{G}_0$ which happens with probability

$$\Pr_{\substack{r \\ x^*:=\langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*),D_1(r)\rangle_{trans}}}[D_2(x^*,\rho) = \bot] \leq (1 - \frac{\varepsilon}{6k})^{\frac{6k}{\varepsilon} \log(\frac{6k}{\varepsilon})} \leq \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}. \qquad (0.0.18)$$

We conclude that in both cases by (0.0.17) and (0.0.18) we have

$$\Pr_{\substack{r \\ x^*:=\langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*),D_1(r)\rangle_{trans}}}[D_2(x^*,r) \neq \bot] \Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}[c_1 = 1 \mid c \in \mathcal{G}_1 \setminus \mathcal{G}_0, \pi_1 = \pi^*] \Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}[c \in \mathcal{G}_1 \setminus \mathcal{G}_0 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*]$$

$$\geq \Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}[c_1 = 1 \mid c \in \mathcal{G}_1 \setminus \mathcal{G}_0, \pi_1 = \pi^*] \Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}[c \in \mathcal{G}_1 \setminus \mathcal{G}_0 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}$$

$$= \Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}[c_1 = 1 \wedge c \in \mathcal{G}_1 \setminus \mathcal{G}_0 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}$$

$$= \Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}[g(c) = 1 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - \Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}[c \in \mathcal{G}_0 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}$$

$$\overset{(0.0.10)}{=} \Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}[g(c) = 1 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - \Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^{(k)}}[u \in \mathcal{G}_0] - S_{\pi^*,0} - \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}. \qquad (0.0.19)$$

Using (0.0.14) and inserting (0.0.19) we obtain

$$\Pr_{\substack{r \\ x:=\langle P^{(1)}(\pi),D_1(r)\rangle_{trans} \\ (\Gamma_V,\Gamma_H):=\langle P^{(1)}(\pi),D_1(r)\rangle_{P^{(1)}}}}[\Gamma_V(D_2(x,r))=1] \geq \mathbb{E}_{\pi^*}\left[\frac{\Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}[g(c)=1|\pi_1=\pi^*] - \Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^{(k)}}[u \in \mathcal{G}_0] - \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}}{\Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^{(k)}}[u \in \mathcal{G}_1 \setminus \mathcal{G}_0]}\right]$$

$$- \mathbb{E}_{\pi^*}\left[\left(S_{\pi^*,0} + \Pr_{\substack{r \\ x^*:=\langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*),D_1(r)\rangle_{trans} \\ (\Gamma_V,\Gamma_H):=\langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*),D_1(r)\rangle_{P^{(1)}}}}[\Gamma_V(D_2(x^*,r))=1](S_{\pi^*,1} - S_{\pi^*,0})\right)\frac{1}{\Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[u \in \mathcal{G}_1 \setminus \mathcal{G}_0]}\right].$$

$$(0.0.20)$$

For the second summand of (0.0.20) we show that if we do not recurse, then the majority of estimates is low almost surely. Let us assume that

$$\Pr_{\pi,\rho}\left[\left(S_{\pi,0} \leq (1 - \frac{1}{2k})\varepsilon\right) \wedge \left(S_{\pi,1} \leq (1 - \frac{1}{2k})\varepsilon\right)\right] < 1 - \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}, \qquad (0.0.21)$$

then the algorithm Gen recurses almost surely. Therefore, under the assumption that Gen does not recurse, we have with high probability

$$\Pr_{\pi,\rho}\left[\left(S_{\pi,0} \leq (1 - \frac{1}{2k})\varepsilon\right) \wedge \left(S_{\pi,1} \leq (1 - \frac{1}{2k})\varepsilon\right)\right] \geq 1 - \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}. \qquad (0.0.22)$$

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Let us define a set

$$\mathcal{W} = \left\{ \pi : \left( S_{\pi,0} \le (1 - \frac{1}{2k})\varepsilon \right) \wedge \left( S_{\pi,1} \le (1 - \frac{1}{2k})\varepsilon \right) \right\} \tag{0.0.23}$$

and use $\mathcal{W}^c$ to denote the complement of $\mathcal{W}$. We bound the numerator of the second summand in (0.0.20)

$$\mathbb{E}_{\pi^*}[S_{\pi^*,0} + \Pr_r [\Gamma_V(D_2(x^*,r)) = 1](S_{\pi^*,1} - S_{\pi^*,0})]$$
$$\scriptstyle x^*:=\langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*),D_1(r)\rangle_{trans}$$
$$\scriptstyle (\Gamma_V,\Gamma_H):=\langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*),D_1(r)\rangle_{P^{(1)}}$$

$$= \mathbb{E}_{\pi^* \in \mathcal{W}^c}[S_{\pi^*,0} + \Pr_r [\Gamma_V(D_2(x^*,r) = 1](S_{\pi^*,1} - S_{\pi^*,0})]$$
$$\scriptstyle x^*:=\langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*),D_1(r)\rangle_{trans}$$
$$\scriptstyle (\Gamma_V,\Gamma_H):=\langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*),D_1(r)\rangle_{P^{(1)}}$$

$$+ \mathbb{E}_{\pi^* \in \mathcal{W}}[S_{\pi^*,0} + \Pr_r [\Gamma_V(D_2(x^*,r)) = 1](S_{\pi^*,1} - S_{\pi^*,0})]$$
$$\scriptstyle x^*:=\langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*),D_1(r)\rangle_{trans}$$
$$\scriptstyle (\Gamma_V,\Gamma_H):=\langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*),D_1(r)\rangle_{P^{(1)}}$$

$$\le \frac{\varepsilon}{6k} + \mathbb{E}_{\pi^* \in \mathcal{W}^c}[S_{\pi^*,0} + \Pr_r [\Gamma_V(D_2^{\widetilde{C}}(x^*,r)) = 1]((1 - \frac{1}{2k})\varepsilon - S_{\pi^*,0})]$$
$$\scriptstyle x:=\langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*),D_1(r)\rangle_{trans}$$
$$\scriptstyle (\Gamma_V,\Gamma_H):=\langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*),D_1(r)\rangle_{P^{(1)}}$$

$$\le \frac{\varepsilon}{6k} + 1 - \frac{\varepsilon}{2k} = 1 - \frac{\varepsilon}{3k}. \tag{0.0.24}$$

We observe that

$$\Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k} [g(u) = 1] = \Pr[u \in \mathcal{G}_0 \vee (u \in \mathcal{G}_1 \setminus \mathcal{G}_0 \wedge u_1 = 1)]$$

$$= \Pr[u \in \mathcal{G}_0] + \Pr[u \in \mathcal{G}_1 \setminus \mathcal{G}_0] \Pr[u_1 = 1]. \tag{0.0.25}$$

Finally, we insert (0.0.19) and (0.0.24) into equation (0.0.14) and use (0.0.25) to obtain

$$\Pr_{\pi^*,\rho} [\Gamma_V(D_2(x,\rho)) = 1] \ge \mathbb{E}_{\pi^*} \left[ \frac{\Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}[g(c) = 1 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - \Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[u \in G_0] - (1 - \frac{1}{6k})\varepsilon}{\Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[u \in \mathcal{G}_1 \setminus \mathcal{G}_0]} \right].$$
$$\scriptstyle x:=\langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*),D_1(\rho)\rangle_{trans}$$
$$\scriptstyle (\Gamma_V,\Gamma_H):=\langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*),D_1(\rho)\rangle_{P^{(1)}}$$

From the assumptions of Lemma 1.6 we know that $\Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}[g(c) = 1] \ge \Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^{(k)}}[g(u) = 1] + \varepsilon$, thus we get

$$\Pr_{\pi^*,\rho} [\Gamma_V(D_2(x,\rho)) = 1] \ge \frac{\Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[g(u) = 1] + \varepsilon - \Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[u \in \mathcal{G}_0] - (1 - \frac{1}{6k})\varepsilon}{\Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[u \in \mathcal{G}_1 \setminus \mathcal{G}_0]}$$
$$\scriptstyle x:=\langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*),D_1(\rho)\rangle_{trans}$$
$$\scriptstyle (\Gamma_V,\Gamma_H):=\langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*),D_1(\rho)\rangle_{P^{(1)}}$$

$$\ge \frac{\varepsilon + \delta \Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[u \in \mathcal{G}_1 \setminus \mathcal{G}_0] - (1 - \frac{1}{6k})\varepsilon}{\Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[u \in \mathcal{G}_1 \setminus \mathcal{G}_0]} \ge \delta + \frac{\varepsilon}{6k} \tag{0.0.26}$$
$$\square$$

**Proof (Theorem 1.3).** We define following circuits.

---

**Circuit** $\widetilde{D}_2^{D,P^{(1)},hash,g,\Gamma_V,\Gamma_H}(x,\rho)$

---

**Oracle:** A solver circuit $D$ for $P^{(1)}$, a problem poser $P^{(1)}$,
  functions $hash : Q \to \{0,1,\ldots,2(h+v)-1\}$, $g : \{0,1\}^k \to \{0,1\}$
  a verification oracle $\Gamma_V$, a hint oracle $\Gamma_H$.
**Input:** Bitstrings $x \in \{0,1\}^*$, $\rho \in \{0,1\}^*$.

---

$$(q, y) := D_2^{P^{(1)}, P^{(g)}, \widetilde{C}, hash, g, \Gamma_H}(x, \rho)$$
Make a verification query to $\Gamma_V$ using $(q, y)$

---

**Algorithm** $\widetilde{\text{Gen}}^{P^{(1)}, g, C}(n, \varepsilon, \delta, k, h, v)$

---

**Oracle:** A problem poser $P^{(1)}$, a function $g : \{0, 1\}^k \to \{0, 1\}$,
  a solver circuit $C$ for $P^{(g)}$.
**Input:** Parameters $n$, $\varepsilon$, $\delta$, $k$, $h$, $v$.

---

$hash := \text{FindHash}((h + v)\varepsilon, n, h, v)$
Let $\widetilde{C} := (C_1, \widetilde{C}_2)$ be as in Lemma 1.5 with oracle access to $C$, $hash$.
$D := Gen^{P^{(1)}, P^{(g)}, \widetilde{C}, hash, g}(\varepsilon, \delta, n, k)$
**return** $\widetilde{D} := (D_1, \widetilde{D}_2)$

---

We show that Theorem 1.3 follows from Lemma 1.4 and Lemma 1.6. We fix $P^{(1)}$, $g$, $P^{(g)}$. Given a solver circuit $C = (C_1, C_2)$ such that

$$\Pr_{\pi^{(k)}, \rho} \left[ Success^{P^{(g)}, C}(\pi^{(k)}, \rho) = 1 \right] \geq 16(h + v) \left( \Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k} [g(u) = 1] + \varepsilon \right)$$

we satisfy conditions of Lemma 1.4. Therefore, $\widetilde{\text{Gen}}$ can use the algorithm FindHash to find $hash$ such that

$$\Pr_{\pi^{(k)}, \rho} \left[ CanonicalSuccess^{P^{(g)}, C, hash}(\pi^{(k)}, \rho) = 1 \right] \geq \Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k} [g(u) = 1] + \varepsilon$$

almost surely. By Lemma 1.5 we know that it is possible to build $\widetilde{C} = (C_1, \widetilde{C}_2)$ such that

$$\Pr_{\substack{\pi, \rho \\ x := \langle P(\pi), C_1(\rho) \rangle_{trans} \\ (\Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(k)}) := \langle P(\pi), C_1(\rho) \rangle_P}} [\Gamma_V^{(g)}(\widetilde{C}_2^{\Gamma_H^{(k)}, C_2, hash}(x, \rho)) = 1] \geq \Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k} [g(u) = 1] + \varepsilon.$$

Now, we use Gen to obtain a circuit $D = (D_1, D_2)$, which by Lemma 1.6 satisfies

$$\Pr_{\substack{\pi, \rho \\ x := \langle P^{(1)}(\pi), D_1(\rho) \rangle_{trans} \\ (\Gamma_H, \Gamma_V) := \langle P^{(1)}(\pi), D_1(\rho) \rangle_{P^{(1)}}}} [\Gamma_V(D_2(x, \rho)) = 1] \geq (\delta + \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}) \tag{0.0.27}$$

almost surely. Finally, $\widetilde{\text{Gen}}$ outputs $\widetilde{D} = (D_1, \widetilde{D}_2$ that with high probability satisfies

$$\Pr_{\pi, \rho} \left[ Success^{P^{(1)}, \widetilde{D}}(\pi, \rho) = 1 \right] \geq (\delta + \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}).$$

Let $h$ and $v$ denote the number of hint and verification queries asked by the circuit $C$ The running time of FindHash is $poly(h, v, \frac{1}{\gamma}, n)$ and of Gen $poly(k, \frac{1}{\varepsilon}, n, h)$. Thus, the overall running time of $\widetilde{\text{Gen}}$ is $poly(k, \frac{1}{\gamma}, h, v, n)$. Furthmore, the circuit $\widetilde{D}$ asks at most $\frac{6k}{\varepsilon} \log(\frac{6k}{\varepsilon})h$ hint queries and one verification query. Finally, we have $Size\widetilde{D} \leq Size(C) \cdot \frac{6k}{\varepsilon}$. This ends the proof of Theorem 1.3. $\qquad \square$