We write $u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k$ to denote a tuple u of length k which each element is independently drawn from the Bernoulli distribution with parameter δ. The protocol execution between probabilistic algorithms A and B is denoted by $\langle A, B \rangle$. Additionally, the output of A in such protocol execution is denoted by $\langle A, B \rangle_A$, and the transcript of the communication by $\langle A, B \rangle_{\text{trans}}$.

Definition 1.1 (Dynamic weakly verifiable puzzle.) *A dynamic weakly verifiable puzzle (DWVP) is defined by a probabilistic algorithm P called a problem poser. A problem solver $S := (S_1, S_2)$ for P is a probabilistic two phase algorithm. We write $P(\pi)$ to denote the execution of P with the randomness fixed to $\pi \in \{0,1\}^n$, and $(S_1, S_2)(\rho)$ to denote the execution of S with the randomness fixed to $\rho \in \{0,1\}^*$. The poser $P(\pi)$ and the solver $S_1(\rho)$ interact. We denote by x the transcript of the interaction. As the result of the interaction $P(\pi)$ outputs a verification circuit Γ_V and a hint circuit Γ_H. The algorithm $S_1(\rho)$ produces no output. The circuit Γ_V takes as input $q \in Q$, an answer $y \in \{0,1\}^*$, and outputs a bit. An answer (q, y) is a correct solution if and only if $\Gamma_V(q, y) = 1$. The circuit Γ_H on input $q \in Q$ outputs a hint such that $\Gamma_V(q, \Gamma_H(q)) = 1$.*

In the second phase S_2 takes as input x, and has oracle access to Γ_V and Γ_H. The execution of S_2 with the input x and the randomness fixed to ρ is denoted by $S_2(x, \rho)$. The queries of S_2 to Γ_V are called verification queries, and to Γ_H hint queries. The algorithm S_2 can ask at most h hint queries, v verification queries, and succeeds if and only if it makes a verification query (q, y) such that $\Gamma_V(q, y) = 1$, and it has not previously asked for a hint query on q.

Definition 1.2 (k-wise direct-product of DWVPs.) *Let $g : \{0,1\}^k \to \{0,1\}$ be a monotone function and $P^{(1)}$ a problem poser as in Definition 1.1. The k-wise direct product of $P^{(1)}$ is a DWVP defined by a probabilistic algorithm $P^{(g)}$. We write $P^{(g)}(\pi^{(k)})$ to denote the execution of $P^{(g)}$ with the randomness fixed to $\pi^{(k)} := (\pi_1, \ldots, \pi_k)$. Let $(S_1, S_2)(\rho)$ be a solver for $P^{(g)}$ as in Definition 1.1. The algorithm $S_1(\rho)$ sequentially interacts in k rounds with $P^{(g)}(\pi^{(k)})$. In the i-th round $S_1(\rho)$ interacts with $P^{(1)}(\pi_i)$, and as the result $P^{(g)}(\pi^{(k)})$ generates circuits Γ_V^i, Γ_H^i. Finally, $P^{(g)}$ outputs a verification circuit*

$$\Gamma_V^{(g)}(q, y_1, \ldots, y_k) := g(\Gamma_V^1(q, y_1), \ldots, \Gamma_V^k(q, y_k))$$

and a hint circuit

$$\Gamma_H^{(k)}(q) := (\Gamma_H^1(q), \ldots, \Gamma_H^k(q)).$$

Let C be a random circuit that corresponds to a solver S as in Definition 1.1. Similarly as for two phase algorithm, we write $C := (C_1, C_2)$ to denote that C in the first phase uses C_1, and in the second phase C_2. A verification query (q, y) of C for which a hint query on this q has been asked before can not be a successfully verification query. Therefore, without loss of generality, we make an assumption that C does not ask verification queries on $q \in Q$, for which a hint query has been asked before.

Experiment $Success^{P, C^{(\cdot, \cdot)}}(\pi, \rho)$

Oracle: A problem poser P, a solver circuit $C^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ for P.
Input: Bitstrings π, ρ.
Output: A bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$.

Run $\langle P(\pi), C_1(\rho) \rangle$
    Let $(\Gamma_V, \Gamma_H) := \langle P(\pi), C_1(\rho) \rangle_P$
    Let $x := \langle P(\pi), C_1(\rho) \rangle_{\text{trans}}$

Run $C_2^{\Gamma_V, \Gamma_H}(x, \rho)$

The success probability of C in solving a puzzle defined by P in the experiment *Success* is

$$\Pr_{\pi,\rho}[Success^{P,C^{(\cdot,\cdot)}}(\pi, \rho) = 1]. \tag{0.0.1}$$

Theorem 1.3 (Security amplification for a dynamic weakly verifiable puzzle.) *Let $P^{(1)}$ be a fixed problem poser as in Definition 1.1, and $P^{(g)}$ be the poser for the k-wise direct product of $P^{(1)}$. There exists a probabilistic algorithm $Gen(C, g, \varepsilon, \delta, n, v, h)$ which takes as input: a solver circuit C for $P^{(g)}$, a monotone function $g : \{0,1\}^k \to \{0,1\}$, parameters ε, δ, n, the number of verification queries v, and hint queries h asked by C, and outputs a random circuit D such that the following holds:*
If C is such that

$$\Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}\left[Success^{P^{(g)},C}(\pi^{(k)}, \rho) = 1\right] \geq 8(h+v)\left(\Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[g(u) = 1] + \varepsilon\right)$$

then D satisfies almost surely

$$\Pr_{\pi,\rho}\left[Success^{P^{(1)},D}(\pi, \rho) = 1\right] \geq (\delta + \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}).$$

Additionally, Gen and D require oracle access to g, $P^{(1)}$, C. Furthermore, D requires also oracle access to Γ_V Γ_H, and asks at most $\frac{6k}{\varepsilon} \log\left(\frac{6k}{\varepsilon}\right) h$ hint queries and one verification queries. Finally, $Size(D) \leq Size(C) \cdot \frac{6k}{\varepsilon}$ and $Time(Gen) = poly(k, \frac{1}{\varepsilon}, n, v, h)$.

The Theorem 1.3 implies that if there is no good solver for a puzzle defined by $P^{(1)}$, then a good solver for a k-wise direct product of $P^{(1)}$ does not exist.

Let $hash : Q \to \{0, 1, \ldots, 2(h+v) - 1\}$, then a set $P_{hash} \subseteq Q$, defined with respect to $hash$, is the set of preimages of 0 for $hash$. The idea is that P_{hash} contains $q \in Q$ on which C is not allowed to ask hint queries, and the first successful verification query (q, y) of C is such that $q \in P_{hash}$. Therefore, if C makes a verification query (q, y) such that $q \in P_{hash}$, then we know that no hint query is ever asked on this q. In the experiment *CanonicalSuccess* a circuit C succeeds if and only if it asks a successful verification query (q, y) such that $q \in P_{hash}$, and no hint query is asked on $q \in P_{hash}$.

In the following experiment *CanonicalSuccess* we denote the i-th query of C by q_i if it is a hint query, and by (q_i, y_i) if it is a verification query.

Experiment $CanonicalSuccess^{P,C^{(\cdot,\cdot)},hash}(\pi, \rho)$

Oracle: A problem poser P, a solver circuit $C^{(\cdot,\cdot)}$ for P.
         A function $hash : Q \to \{0, \ldots, 2(h+v) - 1\}$.
Input: Bitstrings: π, ρ.
Output: A bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$.

Run $\langle P(\pi), C_1(\rho) \rangle$
    Let $(\Gamma_V, \Gamma_H) := \langle P(\pi), C_1(\rho) \rangle_P$
    Let $x := \langle P(\pi), C_1(\rho) \rangle_{\text{trans}}$

Run $C^{\Gamma_V, \Gamma_H}(x, \rho)$

> Let (q_j, y_j) be the first verification query such that $C_2^{\Gamma_V, \Gamma_H}(q_j, y_j) = 1$, or an arbitrary verification query if C_2 does not succeed.
>
> **If** $(\forall i < j : q_i \notin P_{hash})$ **and** $q_j \in P_{hash}$ **and** $\Gamma_V(q_j, y_j) = 1$ **then**
>   **return** 1
> **else**
>   **return** 0

Similarly as for the experiment *Success*, we define the success probability of a solver C for P with respect to a function *hash* in the experiment *CanonicalSuccess* as

$$\Pr_{\pi, \rho}[CanonicalSuccess^{P, C^{(\cdot, \cdot)}, hash}(\pi, \rho) = 1]. \tag{0.0.2}$$

For fixed *hash* and $P^{(g)}$ a canonical success of C for $\pi^{(k)}, \rho$ is a situation when $CanonicalSuccess^{P^{(g)}, C^{(\cdot, \cdot)}, hash}(\pi^{(k)}, \rho) = 1$. We show that if for a fixed $P^{(1)}$ a solver circuit C often succeeds in the experiment *Success* for $P^{(g)}$, then it also often successful in the experiment *CanonicalSuccess* for $P^{(g)}$.

Lemma 1.4 (Success probability in solving a k-wise direct product of $P^{(1)}$ with respect to a function *hash***.)** *For fixed $P^{(g)}$ let C succeed in the experiment Success for $P^{(g)}$ with probability γ, asking at most h hint queries and v verification queries. There exists a probabilistic algorithm* **FindHash** *that takes as input: a set $\mathcal{H}$ of pairwise independent hash functions $Q \to \{0, 1, \ldots, 2(h + v) - 1\}$, parameters γ, n, the number of verification queries v and hint queries h, and has oracle access to C and $P^{(g)}$. Furthermore,* **FindHash** *runs in time $O((h + v)^4 / \gamma^4)$, and with high probability outputs a function hash $\in \mathcal{H}$ such that success probability of C with respect to P_{hash} in the experiment CanonicalSuccess is at least $\frac{\gamma}{8(h+v)}$.*

Proof. We fix $P^{(g)}$ and a solver C for $P^{(h)}$ in the whole proof of Lemma 1.4. Let $\mathcal{H}$ be a family of pairwise independent hash functions $Q \to \{0, 1, \ldots, 2(h+v) - 1\}$. For all $i \neq j \in \{1, \ldots, (h+v)\}$ and $k, l \in \{0, 1, \ldots, 2(h + v) - 1\}$ by pairwise independence property of $\mathcal{H}$, we have

$$\forall q_i, q_j \in Q : \Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[hash(q_i) = k \mid hash(q_j) = l] = \Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[hash(q_i) = k] = \frac{1}{2(h + v)}. \tag{0.0.3}$$

Let $\pi^{(k)}, \rho$ be fixed. We consider the experiment *CanonicalSuccess* for $P^{(g)}$ and C in which we define a binary random variable X for the event that $hash(q_j) = 0$, and for every query q_i asked before q_j we have $hash(q_i) \neq 0$. Conditioned on the event $hash(q_i) = 0$, we get

$$
\begin{aligned}
\Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[X = 1] &= \Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[hash(q_j) = 0 \wedge (\forall i < j : hash(q_i) \neq 0)] \\
&= \Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[\forall i < j : hash(q_i) \neq 0 \mid hash(q_j) = 0] \Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[hash(q_j) = 0].
\end{aligned}
$$

Now we use (0.0.3) twice and obtain

$$
\begin{aligned}
\Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[X = 1] &= \frac{1}{2(h + v)} \left(1 - \Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[\exists i < j : hash(q_i) = 0 \mid hash(q_j) = 0]\right) \\
&= \frac{1}{2(h + v)} \left(1 - \Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[\exists i < j : hash(q_i) = 0]\right).
\end{aligned}
$$

Finally, we use union bound and the fact that $j \leq (h + v)$ to get

$$\Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[X = 1] \geq \frac{1}{2(h + v)} \left(1 - \sum_{i < j} \Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[hash(q_i) = 0]\right) \geq \frac{1}{4(h + v)}.$$

Let $\mathcal{P}_{Success}$ be the set of all $(\pi^{(k)}, \rho)$ for which C succeeds in the random experiment $Success$ for $P^{(g)}$. Furthermore, we denote the set of those $(\pi^{(k)}, \rho)$ for which $CanonicalSuccess^{P^{(g)}, C^{(\cdot, \cdot)}, hash}(\pi^{(k)}) = 1$ by $\mathcal{P}_{Canonical}$. For fixed $\pi^{(k)}$ and ρ if C succeeds canonically, then it also succeeds in the experiment $Success$ for $P^{(g)}$. Hence, $\mathcal{P}_{Canonical} \subseteq \mathcal{P}_{Success}$, and we conclude

$$\Pr_{\substack{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H} \\ \pi^{(k)}, \rho}} \left[CanonicalSuccess^{P^{(g)}, C^{(\cdot, \cdot)}, hash}(\pi^{(k)}, \rho) = 1 \right] = \mathbb{E}_{(\pi^{(k)}, \rho) \in \mathcal{P}_{Success}} \left[\Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[X = 1] \right]$$

$$\geq \frac{\gamma}{4(h + v)}. \tag{0.0.4}$$

Algorithm: FindHash$(\mathcal{H}, h, v, \gamma, n)$

Oracle: A solver circuit $C^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ for the k-wise direct product of $P^{(1)}$.
Input: A set $\mathcal{H}$, $parameters h, v, \gamma, n$
Output: A function $hash \in \mathcal{H}$.

---

for $i = 1$ **to** $32(h + v)^2/\gamma^2$
    $hash \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{H}$
    $count := 0$
    for $j := 1$ **to** $32(h + v)^2/\gamma^2$
        $\pi^{(k)} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{kn}$
        if $CanonicalSuccess^{P^{(g)}, C^{(\cdot, \cdot)}, hash}(\pi^{(k)}) = 1$ **then**
            $count := count + 1$
    if $\frac{\gamma^2}{32(h+v)^2} count \geq \frac{\gamma}{6(h+v)}$
        return $hash$
return $\perp$

We show that **FindHash** chooses $hash$ such that the canonical success probability of C with respect to P_{hash} is at least $\frac{\gamma}{4(h+v)}$ almost surely. Let $\mathcal{H}_{Good}$ denote a family of functions $hash \in \mathcal{H}$ for which

$$\Pr_{\pi^{(k)}, \rho} \left[CanonicalSuccess^{P^{(g)}, C^{(\cdot, \cdot)}, hash}(\pi^{(k)}, \rho) = 1 \right] \geq \frac{\gamma}{4(h + v)},$$

and $\mathcal{H}_{Bad}$ be the family of functions $hash \in \mathcal{H}$ such that

$$\Pr_{\pi^{(k)}, \rho} \left[CanonicalSuccess^{P^{(g)}, C^{(\cdot, \cdot)}, hash}(\pi^{(k)}, \rho) = 1 \right] \leq \frac{\gamma}{8(h + v)}.$$

Additionally, for a fixed $hash$, we define binary random variables $X_1, \ldots, X_N$ such that

$$X_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if in the } i\text{-th iteration variable } count \text{ is increased} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise .} \end{cases}$$

We first show that it is unlikely that **FindHash** returns $hash \in \mathcal{H}_{Bad}$. For $hash \in \mathcal{H}_{Bad}$ we have $\mathbb{E}_{\pi^{(k)}, \rho}[X_i] < \frac{\gamma}{8(h+v)}$. Therefore, for any fixed $hash \in \mathcal{H}_{Bad}$ using the Chernoff bound we get

$$\Pr_{\pi^{(k)}, \rho} \left[\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} X_i \geq \frac{\gamma}{6(h + v)} \right] \leq \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}, \rho} \left[\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} X_i \geq (1 + \frac{1}{3}) \mathbb{E}[X_i] \right] \leq e^{-\frac{\gamma}{4(h+v)} N/27}.$$

The probability that $hash \in \mathcal{H}_{Good}$, when picked, is not returned amounts

$$\Pr_{\pi^{(k)}, \rho}\left[\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} X_i \leq \frac{\gamma}{6(h+v)}\right] \leq \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}, \rho}\left[\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} X_i \leq (1-\frac{1}{3})\mathbb{E}[X_i]\right] \leq e^{-\frac{\gamma}{4(h+v)}N/27}.$$

Finally, we show that **FindHash** picks in one of its iteration $hash \in \mathcal{H}_{Good}$ almost surely. Let Y_i be a binary random variable such that

$$Y_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if in the } i\text{-th iteration } hash \in \mathcal{H}_{Good} \text{ is picked} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise .} \end{cases}$$

From equation (0.0.4) we know that $\Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[Y_i = 1] = \mathbb{E}[Y_i] \geq \frac{\gamma}{4(h+v)}$, almost surely. Thus, we get

$$\Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}\left[\sum_{i=1}^{K} Y_i = 0\right] \leq \left(1 - \frac{\gamma}{4(h+v)}\right)^K \leq e^{-\frac{\gamma}{4(h+v)}K}.$$

The bound stated in the Lemma 1.4 is achieved for $K = N = 32(h+v)^2/\gamma^2$. $\qquad \square$

We define the following solver circuit $\widetilde{C}$.

Circuit $\widetilde{C}^{\Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(g)}, C, hash}(x, \rho)$

Oracle: $\Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(k)}, hash, C$
Input: A transcript x, a bitstring ρ.
Output: A tuple $(q, y_1, \ldots, y_k)$ or $\perp$.

Run $C_2^{\Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(k)}}(x, \rho)$
    if C_2 asks a hint query on q **then**
        if $q \in P_{hash}$ **then**
            return $\perp$
        else
            answer the query using $\Gamma_H^{(k)}(q)$

    if C_2 asks a verification query $(q, y_1, \ldots, y_k)$ **then**
        if $q \in P_{hash}$ **then**
            return $(q, y_1, \ldots, y_k)$
        else
            answer the verification query with 0
  return $\perp$

Lemma 1.5 *For fixed $P^{(g)}, C$ and hash the following statement is true*

$$\Pr_{\pi^{(k)}, \rho}[CanonicalSuccess^{P^{(g)}, C, hash}(\pi^{(k)}, \rho) = 1]$$

$$\leq \Pr_{\substack{\pi^{(k)}, \rho \\ (\Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(k)}):=\langle P^{(g)}(\pi^{(k)}), S(\rho)\rangle_{P^{(g)}} \\ x:=\langle P^{(g)}(\pi^{(k)}), S(\rho)\rangle_{trans}}}\left[\Gamma_V^{(g)}(\widetilde{C}^{\Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(k)}, hash}(x, \rho)) = 1\right].$$

Proof. We fix $\pi^{(k)}, \rho$. Then for $(\Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(g)}) := \langle P^{(g)}(\pi^{(k)}), C_1(\rho) \rangle_{P^{(g)}}$ and $x := \langle P^{(g)}(\pi^{(k)}), C_1(\rho) \rangle_{\mathrm{trans}}$, $C(\rho)$ succeeds canonically, if and only if

$$\Gamma_V^{(g)}(\widetilde{C_2}^{\Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(g)}, hash}(x, \rho)) = 1.$$

Using this observation, we conclude that

$$\Pr_{\pi^{(k)}, \rho} \left[CanonicalSuccess^{P^{(g)}, C, hash}(\pi^{(k)}, \rho) = 1 \right]$$

$$= \mathbb{E}_{\pi^{(k)}, \rho} \left[\Pr \left[CanonicalSuccess^{P^{(g)}, C, hash}(\pi^{(k)}, \rho) = 1 \right] \right]$$

$$= \Pr_{\substack{\pi^{(k)}, \rho \\ \left(\Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(k)} \right) := \langle P^{(g)}(\pi^{(k)}), C_1(\rho) \rangle_{P^{(g)}} \\ x := \langle P^{(g)}(\pi^{(k)}), C_1(\rho) \rangle_{\mathrm{trans}}}} [\Gamma_V^{(g)}(\widetilde{C}^{\Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(k)}, hash}(x, \rho)) = 1].$$

$\square$

Therefore, from a circuit C we can build a circuit $\widetilde{C}$ that outputs $\perp$ or $(q, y_1, \ldots, y_k)$ such that $q \in P_{hash}$. Furthermore, the circuit $\widetilde{C}$ asks no verification queries, and every hint query on q is such that $q \notin P_{hash}$.

Lemma 1.6 (Security amplification of a dynamic weakly verifiable puzzle with respect to P_{hash}.) *For fixed $P^{(1)}$ there exists an algorithm Gen, which takes as input a solver circuit C for $P^{(g)}$, a monotone function $g : \{0,1\}^{(k)} \to \{0,1\}$, a function $hash : Q \to \{0, \ldots, 2(h+v) - 1\}$, parameters ε, δ, n, number of verification queries v and hint queries h asked by C, and outputs a circuit D such that the following holds:*
If C is such that

$$\Pr_{\pi^{(k)}, \rho} \left[CanonicalSuccess^{P^{(g)}, C, hash}(\pi^{(k)}, \rho) = 1 \right] \geq \Pr_{\mu \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[g(\mu) = 1] + \varepsilon,$$

then D satisfies almost surely

$$\Pr_{\substack{\pi, \sigma \\ (\Gamma_V, \Gamma_H) := \langle P^{(1)}(\pi), D(\rho) \rangle_{P^{(1)}} \\ x := \langle P^{(1)}(\pi), D(\rho) \rangle_{\mathrm{trans}}}} \left[\Gamma_V(D^{P^{(1)}, C, \Gamma_V, \Gamma_H, hash}(x, \sigma)) = 1 \right] \geq (\delta + \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}).$$

Additionally, Gen and D requires oracle access to g, $P^{(1)}$ and C. Furthermore, D requires also oracle access to Γ_V and Γ_H, and asks at most $\frac{6k}{\varepsilon} \log \left(\frac{6k}{\varepsilon} \right) h$ hint queries and no verification queries. Finally, $Size(D) \leq Size(C) \frac{6k}{\varepsilon}$ and $Time(Gen) = poly(k, \frac{1}{\varepsilon}, n, v, h)$.

Proof. The following procedure estimates the function g with the first bit set to $b \in \{0,1\}$.

EvaluateFunctionProbability$^g(b, \varepsilon, \delta)$

Oracle: A function g.
Input: A bit $b \in \{0,1\}$, an integer k, ε
Output: A number $\widetilde{g} \in [0,1]$.

For $i := 1$ to $\frac{16k^2}{\varepsilon^2} \log(n)$ **do:**
    $(b_2, \ldots, b_k) \leftarrow \mu_\delta^{(k-1)}$

6

$$\widetilde{g}_i := g(b, b_2, \ldots, b_k) \textbf{ then}$$

$$\textbf{return } \frac{\varepsilon^2}{16k^2 \log(n)} \sum_{i=1}^{\frac{16k^2}{\varepsilon^2} \log(n)} g_i$$

Lemma 1.7 (Estimate of function g.) *The procedure **EvaluteFunctionProbability** outputs an estimate $\widetilde{g}$ for the function $g : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}$ with the first bit fixed to $b \in \{0,1\}$ such that $\left| \widetilde{g} - \Pr_{(u_2, \ldots, u_k) \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k} [g(b, u_2, \ldots, u_k) = 1] \right| \le \frac{\varepsilon}{4k}$ almost surely.*

Proof. We define binary random variable K_i for the event that $g_i = 1$ and set $N = \frac{\varepsilon}{4k} \log(n)$. By Chernoff bound we get

$$\Pr \left[\left| \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \widetilde{g}_i - \mathbb{E}[X] \right| \ge \frac{\varepsilon}{4k} \right] \le 2e^{\log(n)/3}. \qquad \square$$

We define helper procedures **EvalutePuzzles** and **EvaluateSurplus**.

EvaluatePuzzles$^{P^{(1)}, C, hash}(\pi^{(k)}, \rho)$

Oracle: A circuit C, an algorithm $P^{(1)}$, a function $hash$.
Input: Bitstrings $\pi^{(k)}$, ρ.
Output: A tuple $(c_1, \ldots, c_k)$.

Run $\langle P^{(g)}(\pi^{(k)}), C_1(\rho) \rangle$
$\qquad (\Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(g)}) := \langle P(\pi^{(k)}), C_1(\rho) \rangle_{P^{(g)}}$
$\qquad x := \langle P^{(g)}(\pi^{(k)}), C_1(\rho) \rangle_{\text{trans}}$

$(q, y^{(k)}) := \widetilde{C}^{\Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(k)}, C, hash}(x, \rho)$
for $i := 1$ to k **do:** $\qquad\qquad$ //simulate k rounds of sequential interaction
$\qquad (\Gamma_V^i, \Gamma_H^i) := \langle P^{(1)}(\pi_i), C_1(\rho) \rangle_{P^{(1)}}$
for $i := 1$ to k **do:**
$\qquad c_i := \Gamma_v^i(q, y_i)$
return $(c_1, \ldots, c_k)$

EvaluateSurplus$^{P^{(1)}, C, hash}(\pi^*, b)$

Oracle: An algorithm $P^{(1)}$, a circuit C, a function $hash$, a function g.
Input: A bistring π^*, a bit b, an integer k.
Output: A circuit D.

$\widetilde{g}_b := \textbf{EvaluteFunctionProbability}^g(b, \varepsilon, \delta)$
For $i := 1$ to $\frac{16k^2}{\varepsilon^2} \log(n)$ **do:**
$\qquad (\pi_{m+1}, \ldots, \pi_k) \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{(k-m-1)n}$
$\qquad \rho \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^*$
$\qquad (c_1, \ldots, c_k) := \textbf{EvaluatePuzzles}^{P^{(1)}, C, hash}(\pi_1, \ldots, \pi_m, \pi^*, \ldots, \pi_k, \rho)$
$\qquad \widetilde{s}_{\pi^*, b}^i := g(b, c_{m+1}, \ldots, c_k)$

$$\textbf{return } \frac{\varepsilon^2 \log(n)}{16k^2} \sum_{i=1}^{\frac{16k^2}{\varepsilon^2} \log(n)} \widetilde{s}^i_{\pi^*,b} - \widetilde{g}_b$$

Circuit $D = (D_1, D_2)(\sigma)$

Phase I $D_1^{P^{(1)},C}(\sigma)$

Oracle: A poser $P^{(1)}$, a circuit C, a function *hash*.
Input: A bitstring $\sigma \in \{0,1\}^*$.
Hard coded: Bitstrings $\pi_1, \ldots, \pi_{m-1}$.
Output: Transcripts $x_1, \ldots, x_{m-1}, x^*$.

---

for $i := 1$ to $m-1$ **do:**
    Simulate $\langle P^{(1)}(\pi_i), C_1(\rho) \rangle$
    Let $x_i := \langle P^{(1)}(\pi_i), C_1(\rho) \rangle_{\text{trans}}$
    Let $(\Gamma_V^i, \Gamma_H^i) := \langle P^{(1)}(\pi_i), C_1(\rho) \rangle_{P^{(1)}}$

Interact with the problem poser using $C_1(\rho)$.
    Let x^* be the transcript of the interaction
    Let Γ_V^*, Γ_H^* be the verification and hint oracles output by the problem poser.

Let $\Gamma_V^{(m-1)} := (\Gamma_V^1, \ldots, \Gamma_V^{m-1})$
Let $\Gamma_H^{(m-1)} := (\Gamma_H^1, \ldots, \Gamma_H^{m-1})$
Let $x^{(m-1)} := (x_1, \ldots, x_{m-1})$

Phase II $D_2^{P^{(1)},C}(x^*, \sigma)$

Oracle: A poser $P^{(1)}$, a circuit C, a function *hash*, circuits Γ_V^* and Γ_H^*.
Input: A transcript x^*, a bitstring $\sigma \in \{0,1\}^*$.
Output: A circuit D.

Let $\Gamma_V^{(m-1)}, \Gamma_H^{(m-1)}$ and $x_1, \ldots, x_{k-1}$ be the same as in the **Phase I**.
for at most $\frac{6k}{\varepsilon} \log(\frac{6k}{\varepsilon})$ iterations **do:**
    $\pi^{(k)} \leftarrow$ read $k \cdot n$ bits from σ
    for $i := 1$ to $m-1$ **do:**   // finish remaining simulation of puzzles
        Simulate $\langle P^{(1)}(\pi_i), C_1(\rho) \rangle$
        Let $x_i := \langle P^{(1)}(\pi_i), C_1(\rho) \rangle_{\text{trans}}$
    Let $\Gamma_V^{(g)} := g(\Gamma_V^1, \ldots, \Gamma_V^{m-1}, \Gamma_V^*, \Gamma_V^{m+1}, \ldots, \Gamma_V^k)$
    Let $\Gamma_H^{(k)} := (\Gamma_H^1, \ldots, \Gamma_H^{m-1}, \Gamma_H^*, \Gamma_H^{m+1}, \ldots, \Gamma_H^k)$
    $(q, y_1, \ldots, y_{m-1}, y^*, \ldots, y_k) := \widetilde{C}^{\Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(k)}, C, hash}((x_1, \ldots, x_{m-1}, x^*, \ldots, x_k), \rho)$
    if $g(1, c_{m+1}, \ldots, c_k) = 1 \wedge g(0, c_{m+1}, \ldots, c_k) = 0$ **then**
        return (q, y^*)
return $\perp$

Algorithm $Gen(C, g, \varepsilon, \delta, n, v, h, hash)$

Oracle: $P^{(1)}, C, g, hash$
Input: $\varepsilon, \delta, n, v, h$
Output: A circuit D

Let m be the recursion depth of Gen.
for $i := 1$ to $\frac{6k}{\varepsilon} \log(n)$
    $\pi^* \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$
    $\widetilde{S}_{\pi^*, 0} := \textbf{EvaluateSurplus}^{P^{(1)}, C, hash}(\pi^*, 0)$
    $\widetilde{S}_{\pi^*, 1} := \textbf{EvaluateSurplus}^{P^{(1)}, C, hash}(\pi^*, 1)$
    if $\exists b \in \{0, 1\} : \widetilde{S}_{\pi^*, b} \geq (1 - \frac{3}{4k})\varepsilon$
        Let $\widetilde{C}'$ be a circuit that first simulates interaction with $P^{(1)}, C_1$
        Fix $\pi_1 := \pi^*$
        $g'(b_2, \ldots, b_k) := g(b, b_2, \ldots, b_k)$
        $m := m + 1$
        return $Gen(\widetilde{C}, g', \varepsilon, \delta, n, v, h, hash)$

// all estimates are lower than $(1 - \frac{3}{4k})\varepsilon$
Hard code $\pi_1, \ldots, \pi_{m-1}$ into the circuit D.
return $D^{\widetilde{C}}$

For $k = 1$ the function $g : \{0, 1\} \to \{0, 1\}$ is either the identity or a constant function. If g is the identity function then the success probability of C in the random experiment $CanonicalSuccess$ is as least $\delta + \varepsilon$, and D runs circuit C to obtain (q, y). In case g is a constant function the statement is vacuously true.

For fixed $\pi^{(k)}, \rho$ let $(\Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(k)}) := \langle P^{(g)}(\pi^{(k)}), C_1(\rho) \rangle_{P^{(g)}}$ and $x := \langle P^{(g)}(\pi^{(k)}), C_1(\rho) \rangle_{\text{trans}}$. Additionally, for the i-th round of interaction between $P^{(g)}(\pi^{(k)})$ and $C_1(\rho)$ let us denote $(\Gamma_V^i, \Gamma_H^i) := \langle P^{(1)}(\pi_i), C_1(\rho) \rangle$, and $x_i := \langle P^{(1)}(\pi_i), C_1(\rho) \rangle$. Finally, for $(q, y_1, \ldots, y_k) := \widetilde{C}(x^{(k)}, \rho)$ let $c_i := \Gamma_V^i(q, y_i)$. We define the surplus:

$$S_{\pi^*, b} = \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}} [g(b, c_2, \ldots, c_k) = 1] - \Pr_{\mu^{(k)}} [g(b, u_2, \ldots, u_k) = 1] \quad (0.0.5)$$

The surplus $S_{\pi^*, b}$ tells us how good $\widetilde{C}$ performs when the first randomness π_1 of the poser is fixed, and the fact whether $\widetilde{C}$ succeeds in solving the puzzle defined by $P^{(1)}(\pi_1)$ is disregarded. Instead, the bit b is used as the first input to g.

The procedure **EvaluateSurplus** returns the estimate $\widetilde{S}_{\pi^*, b}$ for $S_{\pi^*, b}$. All puzzles used during obtaining the estimate are generated internally. Therefore, it is possible to answer all hint and verification queries, without calls to the verification oracles.

Lemma 1.8 *The estimate $\widetilde{S}_{\pi^*, b}$ returned by EvaluteEstimate differs from $S_{\pi^*, b}$ by at most $\frac{\varepsilon}{2k}$ almost surely.*

Proof. First we define a random variable K_i for the event that $\widetilde{s}_{\pi^*, b}^i = 1$. Then using union bound and similar argument as in Lemma 1.7 we obtain that $\frac{\varepsilon^2 \log(n)}{16k^2} \sum_{i=1}^{\frac{16k^2}{\varepsilon^2} \log(n)} \widetilde{s}_{\pi^*, b}^i$ differs from $\mathbb{E}[g(b, c_2, \ldots, c_k)]$ by at most $\frac{\varepsilon}{4k}$ almost surely. Together, with Lemma 1.7 we conclude that the surplus estimate returned by **EstimateSurplus** differs from $S_{\pi^*, b}$ by at most $\frac{\varepsilon}{2k}$, almost surely. $\qquad\square$

From Lemma 1.8 we conclude that if $\widetilde{S}_{\pi^*, b} \geq (1 - \frac{3}{4k})\varepsilon$, then $S_{\pi^*, b} \geq (1 - \frac{1}{k})\varepsilon$ almost surely.

Let us assume that Gen manages to find an estimate that satisfies $\widetilde{S}_{\pi^*,b} \geq (1-\frac{3}{4k})\varepsilon$. In this case we define a new monotone function $g'(b_2,\ldots,b_k) := g(b,b_2,\ldots,b_k)$, and fix the m-th randomness used by problem poser to π_m. The circuit $\widetilde{C}$ satisfies the conditions of Lemma 1.6 for the remaining $k-1$ puzzles and we recurse using g'.

If all estimates are less than $(1-\frac{3}{4k})\varepsilon$, then intuitively C does not perform much better on the remaining $k-1$ puzzles than an algorithm that solves each puzzle independent with probability δ. However, from the assumption we know that on all k puzzles $\widetilde{C}$ has higher success probability. Therefore, it is likely that the first puzzle is correctly solved with the probability higher than δ. We now show that this intuition is indeed correct. For a fixed π^* using (0.0.5), we get

$$\Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[g(1,u_2,\ldots,u_k) = 1] - \Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[g(0,u_2,\ldots,u_k) = 1] =$$
$$\Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}[g(1,c_2,\ldots,c_k) = 1 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - \Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}[g(0,c_2,\ldots,c_k) = 1 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - (S_{\pi^*,1} - S_{\pi^*,0}).$$
$$(0.0.6)$$

From the monotonicity of g we know that for any set of tuples $(b_1,\ldots,b_k)$ and sets $\mathcal{B}_0 = \{(b_1,b_2,\ldots,b_k) : g(0,b_2,\ldots,b_k) = 1\}$, $\mathcal{B}_1 = \{(b_1,b_2,\ldots,b_k) : g(1,b_2,\ldots,b_k) = 1\}$ we have $\mathcal{B}_0 \subseteq \mathcal{B}_1$. Hence, we can write (0.0.6):

$$\Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[g(1,u_2,\ldots,u_k) = 1 \wedge g(0,u_2,\ldots,u_k) = 0] =$$
$$\Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}[g(1,c_2,\ldots,c_k) = 1 \wedge g(0,c_2,\ldots,c_k) = 0 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - (S_{\pi^*,1} - S_{\pi^*,0}). \qquad (0.0.7)$$

Let $G_{u^{(k)}}$ denote the event $g(1,u_2,\ldots,u_k) = 1 \wedge g(0,u_2,\ldots,u_k) = 0$, and correspondingly $G_{\pi^{(k)}} := g(1,c_2,\ldots,c_k) = 1) \wedge (g(0,c_2,\ldots,c_k) = 0$. From (0.0.7) for $\pi = \pi^*$ fixed we obtain

$$\Pr_{\substack{\rho \\ (\Gamma_V,\Gamma_H):=\langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*),D_1(\rho)\rangle_{P^{(1)}} \\ x^*:=\langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*),D_1(\rho)\rangle_{\text{trans}}}}[\Gamma_V(D_2(x^*,\rho)) = 1] = \frac{\Pr_{\rho}[\Gamma_V(D_2(x^*,\rho)) = 1 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*]\Pr_{\rho}[G_\pi \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*]}{\Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[G_\mu]}$$

$$- \frac{\Pr_{\rho}[\Gamma_V(D_2(x^*,r)) = 1 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*](S_{\pi^*,1} - S_{\pi^*,0})}{\Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[G_\mu]}$$
$$(0.0.8)$$

We can write the first summand of (0.0.8) as

$$\Pr_{\rho}[\Gamma_V(D_2(x^*,\rho)) = 1 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*]\Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[G_\pi \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] =$$
$$\Pr_{\rho}[D_2(x^*,\rho) \neq \bot \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*]\Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[c_1 = 1 \mid G_\pi,\pi_1 = \pi^*]\Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[G_\pi \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] \qquad (0.0.9)$$

where we make use of the fact that the event G_π implies $D(x^*,r) \neq \bot$. We consider two cases. For $\Pr_{\pi^k}[g(1,c_2,\ldots,c_k) = 1 \wedge g(0,c_2,\ldots,c_k) = 0 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] \leq \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}$ then

$$\Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[c_1 = 1 \mid G_\pi,\pi_1 = \pi^*]\Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[G_\pi \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] \leq \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}, \qquad (0.0.10)$$

and when $\Pr_{\pi^k}[g(1,c_2,\ldots,c_k) = 1 \wedge g(0,c_2,\ldots,c_k) = 0] > \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}$ then circuit D outputs $\bot$ only if it fails in all $\frac{6k}{\varepsilon}\log(\frac{6k}{\varepsilon})$ iterations to find $\pi^{(k)}$ such that $g(1,c_2,\ldots,c_k) = 1 \wedge g(0,c_2,\ldots,c_k) = 0$ which happens with probability

$$\Pr_{r}[D(x^*,r) = \bot \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] \leq (1 - \frac{\varepsilon}{6k})^{\frac{6k}{\varepsilon}\log(\frac{\varepsilon}{6k})} \leq \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}. \qquad (0.0.11)$$

We conclude that in both cases:

$$\Pr_r[D(x^*, r) \neq \perp \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[c_1 = 1 \mid G_\pi, \pi_1 = \pi^*] \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[G_\pi \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*]$$

$$\geq \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[c_1 = 1 \mid G_\pi, \pi_1 = \pi^*] \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[G_\pi \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}. \tag{0.0.12}$$

Therefore, we have

$$\Pr_r[D(x^*, r) \neq \perp \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[c_1 = 1 \mid G_\pi, \pi_1 = \pi^*] \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[G_\pi \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*]$$

$$= \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[c_1 = 1 \wedge g(1, c_2, \ldots, c_k) = 1 \wedge g(0, c_2, \ldots, c_k) = 0 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}$$

$$= \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[g(c_1, c_2, \ldots, c_k) = 1 \wedge g(0, c_2, \ldots, c_k) = 0 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}$$

$$= \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[g(c_1, c_2, \ldots, c_k) = 1 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[g(0, c_2, \ldots, c_k) = 0 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - \frac{\varepsilon}{6k},$$

and finally by (0.0.5)

$$\Pr_r[D(x^*, r) \neq \perp \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[c_1 = 1 \mid G_\pi, \pi_1 = \pi^*] \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[G_\pi \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*]$$

$$= \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[g(c_1, c_2, \ldots, c_k) = 1 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - \Pr_{\mu_\delta^{(k)}}[g(0, \mu_2, \ldots, \mu_k) = 0 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - S_{\pi^*,0} - \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}. \tag{0.0.13}$$

Inserting this result into the equation (0.0.8) yields

$$\Pr_{r,\pi}[\Gamma_V(D(x, r)) = 1] = \mathbb{E}_\pi \left[\Pr_r[D(x, r) = 1 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] \right]$$

$$= \mathbb{E}_\pi \left[\frac{\Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[g(c) = 1 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - \Pr_{\mu_\delta^{(k)}}[g(0, \mu_2, \ldots, \mu_k) = 0 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}}{\Pr_{\mu_\delta^k}[G_\mu]} \right]$$

$$- \mathbb{E}_\pi \left[\frac{S_{\pi^*,0} + \Pr_r[\Gamma_V^{(g)}(D(x^*, r)) = 1 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*](S_{\pi^*,1} - S_{\pi^*,0})}{\Pr_{\mu_\delta^k}[G_\mu]} \right] \tag{0.0.14}$$

For the second summand we show that if we do not recurse, then almost surely majority of estimates is low. Let assume

$$\Pr_\pi \left[\left(S_{\pi,0} \leq (1 - \frac{1}{2k})\varepsilon \right) \wedge \left(S_{\pi,1} \leq (1 - \frac{1}{2k})\varepsilon \right) \right] < 1 - \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}, \tag{0.0.15}$$

then the algorithm recurses almost surely. Therefore, under the assumption that *Gen* does not recurse, we have almost surely

$$\Pr_\pi \left[\left(S_{\pi,0} \leq (1 - \frac{1}{2k})\varepsilon \right) \wedge \left(S_{\pi,1} \leq (1 - \frac{1}{2k})\varepsilon \right) \right] \geq 1 - \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}. \tag{0.0.16}$$

Let us define a set

$$\mathcal{W} = \left\{ \pi : \left(S_{\pi,0} \leq (1 - \frac{1}{2k})\varepsilon \right) \wedge \left(S_{\pi,1} \leq (1 - \frac{1}{2k})\varepsilon \right) \right\} \tag{0.0.17}$$

and use $\mathcal{W}^c$ to denote the complement of $\mathcal{W}$. We bound the second summand in (0.0.14)

$$\mathbb{E}_\pi \left[S_{\pi^*,0} + \Pr_r[\Gamma_V^{(g)}(D(x^*,r)) = 1 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*](S_{\pi^*,1} - S_{\pi^*,0}) \right]$$

$$= \mathbb{E}_{\pi \in \mathcal{W}^c} \left[S_{\pi^*,0} + \Pr_r[\Gamma_V^{(g)}(D(x^*,r)) = 1 \mid \pi = \pi^*](S_{\pi^*,1} - S_{\pi^*,0}) \right]$$

$$+ \mathbb{E}_{\pi \in \mathcal{W}} \left[S_{\pi^*,0} + \Pr_r[\Gamma_V^{(g)}(D(x^*,r)) = 1 \mid \pi = \pi^*](S_{\pi^*,1} - S_{\pi^*,0}) \right] \qquad (0.0.18)$$

$$\leq \frac{\varepsilon}{6k} + \mathbb{E}_{\pi \in \mathcal{W}^c} \left[S_{\pi^*,0} + \Pr_r[\Gamma_V^{(g)}(D(x^*,r)) = 1 \mid \pi = \pi^*]((1 - \frac{1}{2k})\varepsilon - S_{\pi^*,0}) \right] \quad (0.0.19)$$

$$\leq \frac{\varepsilon}{6k} + 1 - \frac{\varepsilon}{2k} = 1 - \frac{\varepsilon}{3k} \qquad (0.0.20)$$

Finally, we insert this result into equation (0.0.14) and make use of the fact

$$\Pr[g(u) = 1] = \Pr[(g(0, \mu_2, \ldots, \mu_k) = 1) \vee (g(1, \mu_2, \ldots, \mu_k) = 1 \wedge g(0, \mu_2, \ldots, \mu_k) = 0 \wedge \mu_1 = 1)]$$

$$= \Pr[g(0, \mu_2, \ldots, \mu_k) = 1] + \Pr[g(1, \mu_2, \ldots, \mu_k) = 1 \wedge g(0, \mu_2, \ldots, \mu_k) = 0] \Pr[\mu_1 = 1]$$

which yields

$$\Pr_{r,\pi}[D(x,r) = 1] \geq \mathbb{E}_\pi \left[\frac{\Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[g(c) = 1 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - \Pr_{\mu_\delta^{(k)}}[g(0, \mu_2, \ldots, \mu_k) = 0] - (1 - \frac{1}{6k})\varepsilon}{\Pr_{\mu_\delta^k}[G_\mu]} \right]$$

Using the assumptions of Lemma 1.6, we get

$$\Pr_{r,\pi}[\Gamma_V(D(x,r)) = 1] \geq \frac{\Pr_{\mu_\delta^{(k)}}[g(\mu) = 1] + \varepsilon + \Pr_{\mu_\delta^{(k)}}[g(0, \mu_2, \ldots, \mu_k) = 0] - (1 - \frac{1}{6k})\varepsilon}{\Pr_{\mu_\delta^k}[G_\mu]}$$

$$\geq \frac{\varepsilon + \delta \Pr_{\mu_\delta^{(k)}}[G_\mu] - (1 - \frac{1}{6k})\varepsilon}{\Pr_{\mu_\delta^k}[G_\mu]} \geq \delta + \frac{\varepsilon}{6k} \qquad (0.0.21)$$

$\square$

Now, we can show that the Theorem 1.1 follows by Lemma 1.4 and Lemma 1.6. First we define the following circuit:

E

Oracle: Circuit D from Lemma 1.6
Input: A bitstring $\rho \in \{0,1\}^*$

Run circuit $(q, y) = D(\rho)$
if $(q, y) \neq \bot$ **then**
    make a verification query (q, y)

The circuit E is output by the following algorithm Gen.

Gen

Oracle: $C, P^{(1)}, g$
Input: $\varepsilon, \delta, n, h, v$

Let $\mathcal{H}$ be a set of pairwise independent hash functions $Q \to \{0, 1, \ldots, 2(h + v) - 1\}$
$hash := \mathbf{FindHash}(\mathcal{H}, h + v)$
$D := Gen(C, g, \varepsilon, \delta, n, h, v, hash)$
return $D^{P1, C, hash}(\rho)$

From the assumptions of Theorem 1.3 we know that success probability of C is at least

$$8(h+v)\left(\Pr_{u\leftarrow\mu_\delta^k}[g(u)=1]+\varepsilon\right),$$

then by Lemma 1.4, the canonical success probability of $\widetilde{C}$ with respect to function $hash$ is at least

$$\left(\Pr_{u\leftarrow\mu_\delta^k}[g(u)=1]+\varepsilon\right).$$

Then we apply Lemma 1.6 with respect to $\widetilde{C}$ and $hash$ which yields a circuit D that outputs (q,y) such that

$$\Pr_{\substack{\pi,\sigma \\ (\Gamma_V,\Gamma_H):=\langle P^{(1)}(\pi),D(\rho)\rangle_{P^{(1)}} \\ x:=\langle P^{(1)}(\pi),D(\rho)\rangle_{\text{trans}}}}\left[\Gamma_V(D^{P^{(1)},C,\Gamma_V,\Gamma_H,hash}(x,\sigma))=1\right]\geq(\delta+\frac{\varepsilon}{6k}).$$

Hence, the probability that the verification query made by E is successful is at least $(\delta+\frac{\varepsilon}{6k})$.