

Definition 1.1 (*Dynamic weakly verifiable puzzle (non interactive version)*)

A dynamic weakly verifiable puzzle (DWVP) is defined by a probabilistic algorithm $P(\pi)$, called a problem poser, that takes as input chosen uniformly at random bitstring $\pi \in \{0,1\}^l$. The algorithm $P(\pi)$ produces circuits Γ_V , Γ_H and a puzzle $x \in \{0,1\}^*$. The circuit Γ_V takes as its input $q \in Q$ and an answer y . An answer y is a correct solution for q if and only if $\Gamma_V(q, y) = 1$. The circuit Γ_H on input q provides a hint such that $\Gamma_V(q, \Gamma_H(q)) = 1$. The algorithm S , called a solver, has oracle access to Γ_V and Γ_H . The calls to Γ_V are verification queries, the calls to Γ_H are hint queries. The solver S can ask at most h hint queries, v verification queries, and successfully solves a DWVP if and only if it makes a verification query (q, r) such that $\Gamma_V(q, r) = 1$, when it has not previously asked for a hint query on this q .

Experiment $B^{P^{(1)}, D}(\pi)$

Solving a dynamic weakly verifiable puzzle

Oracle: Problem poser for a single instance of DWVP $P^{(g)}$, a solver circuit D .

Input: A random bitstring $\pi \in \{0,1\}^l$.

$(x, \Gamma_V, \Gamma_H) := P^{(1)}(\pi)$

Run $D^{(\cdot)(\cdot)}(x)$ with oracle access to Γ_V and Γ_H

Let (\tilde{q}, y) be the first verification query of $D^{\Gamma_H, \Gamma_V}(x)$ such that $\Gamma_V(\tilde{q}, y) = 1$

Define $Q_{Hint} := \{q : D^{\Gamma_H, \Gamma_V}(x) \text{ asked a hint query on } q\}$

If $q \notin Q_{Hint}$

return 1

else

return 0

Definition 1.2 (*k-wise direct product of dynamic weakly verifiable puzzles*)

Let $g : \{0,1\}^k \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ denote a monotone function, and $P^{(1)}$ an algorithm used to generate an instance of DWVP. A k -wise direct product of dynamic weakly verifiable puzzles is defined by an algorithm $P^{(g)}(\pi_1, \dots, \pi_k)$, where $(\pi_1, \dots, \pi_k) \in \{0,1\}^{kl}$ are chosen uniformly at random. The algorithm $P^{(g)}(\pi_1, \dots, \pi_k)$ sequentially generates k independent instances of dynamic weakly verifiable puzzles, where in the i -th round $P^{(g)}$ runs $P^{(1)}(\pi_i)$ and obtains $(x_i, \Gamma_V^{(i)}, \Gamma_H^{(i)})$. Finally, $P^{(g)}$ outputs a verification circuit

$$\Gamma_V^{(g)}(q, r_1, \dots, r_k) := g(\Gamma_V^{(1)}(q, r_1), \dots, \Gamma_V^{(k)}(q, r_k)),$$

a hint circuit

$$\Gamma_H^{(g)}(q) := (\Gamma_H^{(1)}(q), \dots, \Gamma_H^{(k)}(q)),$$

and a puzzle $x^{(k)} = (x_1, \dots, x_k)$.

Experiment $A^{P^{(g)}, C^{(\cdot)(\cdot)}}(\pi^{(k)})$

Solving k-wise direct product of dynamic weakly verifiable puzzles.

Oracle: Problem poser for k-wise direct product $P^{(g)}$, a solver circuit $C^{(\cdot)(\cdot)}$ with oracle access to hint and verification circuits.

Input: Random bitstring $\pi^{(k)} \in \{0,1\}^{lk}$.

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 $(x^{(k)}, \Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(g)}) := P^{(g)}(\pi^{(k)})$ 
Run  $C^{(\cdot)(\cdot)}(x)$  with oracle access to  $\Gamma_V$  and  $\Gamma_H$ 
  Let  $(\tilde{q}, y)$  be the first verification query of  $C^{\Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(g)}}(x)$  such that  $\Gamma_V^{(g)}(\tilde{q}, y_1, \dots, y_k) = 1$ 
  Define  $Q_{Hint} := \{q : D^{\Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(g)}}(x^{(k)}) \text{ asked a hint query on } q\}$ 
If  $q \notin Q_{Hint}$ 
  return 1
else
  return 0

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Theorem 1.3 Security amplification of a dynamic weakly verifiable puzzle.

Fix a problem poser $P^{(1)}$. There exists an algorithm $Gen(C, g, \varepsilon, \delta, n, v, h)$ which takes as input a circuit C , a monotone function g , parameters ε, δ , a security parameter n , number of verification v , and hint h queries asked by C , and outputs a circuit D such that following holds: If C is such that

$$\Pr_{(\pi_1, \dots, \pi_k) \in \{0,1\}^{lk}} [A^{P^{(g)}, C}(\pi_1, \dots, \pi_k) = 1] \geq \Pr_{\mu \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k} [g(\mu) = 1] + \varepsilon$$

then D satisfies almost surely

$$\Pr_{\pi \in \{0,1\}^l} [B^{P^{(1)}, D}(\pi) = 1] \geq (\delta + \frac{\varepsilon}{6k})$$

and $Size(D) \leq Size(C) \frac{6k}{\varepsilon}$ and $Time(Gen) = poly(k, \frac{1}{\varepsilon}, n, v, h)$.

Experiment $E^{P^{(g)}, C^{(\cdot)(\cdot)}, Hash}(\pi_1, \dots, \pi_k)$

Solving k -wise direct product with respect to the set P_{hash}

Oracle: Problem poser for k -wise direct product $P^{(g)}$

Solver circuit $C^{(\cdot)(\cdot)}$ with oracle access to hint and verification circuits

Function $Hash : Q \leftarrow \{0, \dots, 2(h+v) - 1\}$

Input: Random bitstring $(\pi_1, \dots, \pi_k) \in \{0,1\}^{lk}$

$\pi^{(k)} := (\pi_1, \dots, \pi_k)$

$(x^k, \Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(g)}) := P^{(g)}(\pi^k)$

Run $C^{\Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(g)}}(x^{(k)})$

Let $(q_j, y_j^{(k)})$ be the first successful verification query if $C^{\Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(g)}}$ succeeds or an arbitrary verification query when it fails.

If $(\forall i < j : Hash(q_i) \neq 0)$ and $(Hash(q_j) = 1 \wedge \Gamma_V^{(g)}(q_j, y_j^{(k)}) = 1)$

return 1

else

return 0

Lemma 1.4 Fix $P^{(1)}$ and let C be a circuit that succeeds in solving the k -wise direct product of DWVP produced by $P^{(1)}$ with probability ε making h hint and v verification queries. Then there exists a probabilistic algorithm, with oracle access to C , that runs in time $O((h+v)^4/\varepsilon^4)$ and with high probability outputs a function $Hash : Q \leftarrow \{0, 2(h+v) - 1\}$ such that success probability of C in random experiment E with respect to set P_{Hash} is at least $\frac{\varepsilon}{8(h+v)}$.

Lemma 1.5 For a fixed dynamic weakly verifiable puzzle $P^{(1)}$ there exists an algorithm $Gen(C, g, \varepsilon, \delta, n, v, h, Hash)$, which takes as input a circuit C , a monotone function g , a function $Hash : Q \leftarrow \{0, 2(h + v) - 1\}$, parameters ε, δ, n , number of verification v , and hint h queries asked by C , and outputs a circuit D such that following holds:
If C is such that

$$\Pr_{(\pi_1, \dots, \pi_k)} [A^{P^{(g)}, C, Hash}(\pi_1, \dots, \pi_k)] \geq \Pr_{\mu \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k} [g(\mu) = 1] + \varepsilon$$

then D satisfies almost surely

$$\Pr[B^{P^{(1)}, D, Hash}(\pi) = 1] \geq (\delta + \frac{\varepsilon}{6k})$$

and $Size(D) \leq Size(C) \frac{6k}{\varepsilon}$ and $Time(Gen) = poly(k, \frac{1}{\varepsilon}, n, v, h)$.

Random experiment $B^{P^{(1)}, C, Hash}(\pi)$

Oracle: A circuit C , a function $Hash$ and a dynamic weakly verifiable puzzle $P^{(1)}$

Input: A random bitstring π of length at most $Time$?

$(x, \Gamma_v, \Gamma_H) := P^{(1)}(\pi)$

Run $D^{\Gamma_v, \Gamma_H}(x)$

Let $(\tilde{q}_j, \tilde{r}_j)$ be the first successful verification query if $D^{\Gamma_v, \Gamma_H}(x)$ succeeds or an arbitrary verification query when it fails.

If $(\forall i < j : Hash(q_i) \neq 0)$ and $Hash(q_j) = 1$

return 1

else

return 0

Random experiment $F^{Hash}(\pi_1, \dots, \pi_k)$

Oracle: A function $Hash$

Input: A random bitstring π of length at most $Time$?

For $i = 1$ to k

$(x, \Gamma_V^{(i)}, \Gamma_H^{(i)}) = P^{(1)}(\pi_i)$ **End** Let $\Gamma_V^{(g)}$ be a circuit computing $g(\Gamma_V^{(1)}(q, r_1), \dots, \Gamma_V^{(k)}(q, r_k))$

Let $\Gamma_H^{(g)}$ be a circuit computing $(\Gamma_V^{(1)}(q, r_1), \dots, \Gamma_V^{(k)}(q, r_k))$

$(q, \tilde{r}) = \tilde{C}^{\Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(g)}, Hash}(x_1, \dots, x_k)$

If $(q, \tilde{r}) = \perp$ then **return** \perp

For $i = 1$ to k

$c_i = \Gamma_V^{(i)}(q, r_i)$

End

Return (c_1, \dots, c_k)