


Hardness Amplification for Weakly Verifiable Cryptographic Primitives

Grzegorz Mąkosa

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
Hardness Amplification

- Is solving parallel repetition of problems substantially harder than a single instance?




Hardness Amplification

- Weak one-way function \implies strong one-way function



Hardness Amplification


- Weak one-way function \implies strong one-way function
- What about MAC, signature schemes, CAPTCHAs?



Agenda

- Setting and Type of Problems
 - Threshold and Monotone Functions
 - Weakly Verifiable Puzzles
 - Dynamic Weakly Verifiable Puzzles
 - Interactive Weakly Verifiable Puzzles
- Previous Works
- My Results
- Discussion and Questions


Threshold and Monotone Functions



Threshold and Monotone Functions

Threshold function

$$f_K(b_1, \dots, b_n) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \sum_{i=1}^n b_i \geq K \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$




Threshold and Monotone Functions

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
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Monotone function


$$f(b_0, \dots, b_n) : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$$



Weakly Verifiable Puzzles - CAPTCHA




Weakly Verifiable Puzzles - CAPTCHA



- Small solutions space.


Weakly Verifiable Puzzles - CAPTCHA



- Small solutions space.
- Solver cannot efficiently verify correctness of solutions.


Dynamic Weakly Verifiable Puzzles

- Game-based security definition of MAC.



- Set of messages \mathcal{Q}
- Hint - solution for $q \in \mathcal{Q}$
- Set of hint indices $\mathcal{H} \subseteq \mathcal{Q}$
- Verification query solution for $q \in \mathcal{Q} \setminus \mathcal{H}$.
- Number of hint and verification queries limited.

Interactive puzzle - commitment protocols



Hardness amplification results

- Weakly verifiable puzzles e.g. CAPTCHA, [CHS05]

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- Weakly verifiable puzzles e.g. CAPTCHA, [CHS05]
- Dynamic weakly verifiable puzzles + threshold functions e.g. MAC, [DIJK09]
- Interactive weakly verifiable puzzles + monotone function e.g. commitment protocols, [HS11]

Goal

- Define puzzle that generalize MAC, CAPTCHA, bit commitments.
- Amplify hardness by parallel repetition.

Monotone
functions

+

Dynamic weakly
verifiable puzzles

+

Interactive
weakly verifi-
able puzzles

Reduction

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- Given a good solver C for parallel repetition

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- Reduce C to a solver for single puzzle

Reduction

- Given a good solver C for parallel repetition
- Reduce C to a solver for single puzzle
- A - solving a single puzzle is hard
- B - solving parallel repetition is hard

$$\neg B \implies \neg A$$

$$A \implies B$$

Conflicting hint queries


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- Use hash function to partition query domain [DIJK09].




$$\text{hash} \leftarrow \mathcal{H}$$

$$\text{hash} : \mathcal{Q} \rightarrow \{0, 1, \dots, 2(h + v) - 1\}$$

$$\mathcal{Q}_{\text{verification}} := \{q \in \mathcal{Q} : \text{hash}(q) = 0\}$$

Conflicting hint queries

- The solver C can be run multiple times.
- Hint queries prevent verification queries from succeeding.
- Use hash function to partition query domain [DIJK09].
- Substantial success probability for partitioned domain.




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Approach overview



Verifying solutions



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Verifying solutions

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- Possible for generated puzzles.


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


Verifying solutions

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- Possible to generalize for monotone functions [HS11].



Result

Given a solver for parallel repetition of puzzles that satisfies

$$\geq \delta^k + \varepsilon,$$

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$$\geq \Pr[g(u_1, \dots, u_k) = 1] + \varepsilon$$

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More generally using a monotone function

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where $\Pr[u_i = 1] = \delta$.

We devise a solver for a single puzzle that satisfies (with high probability)

$$\geq \frac{1}{16(h+v)} \left(\delta + \frac{\varepsilon}{6k} \right).$$

Discussion

- Not clear whether it is possible to improve the result

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- Is it optimal?

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Questions

Bibliography



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