Definition 1.1 (Dynamic weakly verifiable puzzle) A dynamic weakly verifiable puzzle (DWVP) is defined by a protocol between probabilistic algorithms (P,S). The algorithm P is called a problem poser and S a problem solver. The problem poser P produces as output a circuit Γ_V and a circuit Γ_H . The problem solver does not produce any output. The circuit Γ_V takes as its input $q \in Q$ and an answer $r \in R$. An answer r is a correct solution for q if and only if the circuit Γ_V on input (q,r) evaluates to true. The circuit Γ_H on input q provides a hint $r \in R$ such that $\Gamma_V(q,r) = 1$. The solver S has oracle access to both circuits Γ_V and Γ_H . The calls to the circuit Γ_V are called verification queries. The calls to the circuit Γ_H are hint queries. The solver S asks at most h hint queries, v verification queries, and successfully solves a DWVP Π if and only if it makes a verification query (q,r) such that $\Gamma_V(q,r) = 1$, when it has not previously asked for a hint query on this q.

Suppose that $g:\{0,1\}^k \to \{0,1\}$ is a monotone function, and $\left(P^{(1)},S^{(1)}\right)$ is a dynamic weakly verifiable puzzle. Then $(P^{(g)},S^{(g)})$ is a dynamic weakly verifiable puzzle $\Pi^{(g)}$, for which in the first phase the problem poser $P^{(g)}$ and solver $S^{(g)}$ sequentially create k instances of a puzzle $\left(P^{(1)},S^{(1)}\right)$. The problem poser $P^{(g)}$ produces as it output circuits $\Gamma_V^{(g)}$ and $\Gamma_H^{(g)}$. The hint queries for a puzzle $\Pi^{(g)}$ are answered by a circuit $\Gamma_H^{(g)}(q) = \left(\Gamma_H^{(1)}(q), \dots, \Gamma_H^{(k)}\right)$, and the verification queries by a circuit $\Gamma_V^{(g)}(q,r_1,\dots,r_k) = g\left(\Gamma_V^{(1)}(q,r_1),\dots,\Gamma_V^{(k)}(q,r_k)\right)$.

Let $hash: Q \to \{0, 2(h+v)-1\}$ be a function and P_{hash} a set that contains elements $q \in Q$ for which hash(q) = 0. A canonical success, with respect to a set P_{hash} in a random experiment defined by the protocol between $P^{(g)}$ and $S^{(g)}$, is a situation when a first successfully verification query made by $S^{(g)}$ is in P_{hash} , and all previous hint or verification queries are not in P_{hash} .

Theorem 1.2 (Security amplification for DWVP (non unifrom version)). Let $g: \{0,1\}^k \to \{0,1\}$ be a monotone function, and hash $: Q \to \{0,2(h+v)-1\}$ a function such that the probability of a canonical success, with respect to P_{hash} , is at least $\frac{\varepsilon}{8(v+h)}$. If there exists a circuit C that makes at most v verification queries, h hint queries, and succeeds with probability

$$\Pr[\Gamma_V^{(g)}(\langle P^{(g)}, C \rangle_C) = 1] \ge \Pr_{\mu \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[g(u) = 1] + \varepsilon, \tag{0.0.1}$$

where the probability is over randomness of $P^{(g)}$, then there exists a probabilistic algorithm $Gen(C, g, \varepsilon, \delta, n, hash)$ which takes as input: a circuit C, a function g, a function hash, parameters ε, δ, n , and produces a circuit D of size at most $size(C) \frac{6k}{\varepsilon} \log(\frac{6k}{\varepsilon})$ such that with high probability it satisfies

$$\Pr[\Gamma_V^{(1)}\left(\langle P^{(1)}, D\rangle_D\right) = 1] \ge \frac{1}{8(h+v)}\left(\delta + \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}\right) \tag{0.0.2}$$

where the probability is taken over random coins of P. Additionally, the circuit D and the algorithm Gen only require oracle access to functions g and hash.