We write $u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k$ to denote a tuple u of length k which each element is an independent Bernoulli-distributed random variable with the parameter δ. The protocol execution between probabilistic algorithms A and B is denoted by $\langle A, B \rangle$. Additionally, the output of A in such a protocol execution is denoted by $\langle A, B \rangle_A$, and a transcript of communication by $\langle A, B \rangle_{\text{trans}}$.

Definition 1.1 (Dynamic weakly verifiable puzzle.) *A dynamic weakly verifiable puzzle (DWVP) is defined by a probabilistic algorithm P called a problem poser. A problem solver $S := (S_1, S_2)$ for P is a probabilistic two phase algorithm. We write $P(\pi)$ to denote the execution of P with the randomness fixed to $\pi \in \{0,1\}^n$, and $(S_1, S_2)(\rho)$ to denote the execution of both S_1 and S_2 with the randomness fixed to $\rho \in \{0,1\}^*$.*

The poser $P(\pi)$ and the solver $S_1(\rho)$ interact. As the result of the interaction $P(\pi)$ outputs a verification circuit Γ_V and a hint circuit Γ_H. The algorithm $S_1(\rho)$ produces no output. The circuit Γ_V takes as input $q \in Q$, an answer $y \in \{0,1\}^*$, and outputs a bit. An answer (q, y) is a correct solution if and only if $\Gamma_V(q, y) = 1$. The circuit Γ_H on input $q \in Q$ outputs a hint such that $\Gamma_V(q, \Gamma_H(q)) = 1$.

In the second phase S_2 takes as input $x := \langle P(\pi), S_1(\rho) \rangle_{trans}$, and has oracle access to Γ_V and Γ_H. The execution of S_2 with the input x and the randomness fixed to ρ is denoted by $S_2(x, \rho)$. The queries of S_2 to Γ_V are called verification queries, and to Γ_H hint queries. The algorithm S_2 can ask at most h hint queries, v verification queries, and succeeds if and only if it makes a verification query (q, y) such that $\Gamma_V(q, y) = 1$, and it has not previously asked for a hint query on q.

Definition 1.2 (k-wise direct-product of DWVPs.) *Let $g : \{0,1\}^k \to \{0,1\}$ be a monotone function and $P^{(1)}$ a problem poser as in Definition 1.1. The k-wise direct product of $P^{(1)}$ is a DWVP defined by a probabilistic algorithm $P^{(g)}$. We write $P^{(g)}(\pi^{(k)})$ to denote the execution of $P^{(g)}$ with the randomness fixed to $\pi^{(k)} := (\pi_1, \ldots, \pi_k)$. Let $(S_1, S_2)(\rho)$ be a solver for $P^{(g)}$ as in Definition 1.1. The algorithm $S_1(\rho)$ sequentially interacts in k rounds with $P^{(g)}(\pi^{(k)})$. In the i-th round $S_1(\rho)$ interacts with $P^{(1)}(\pi_i)$, and as the result $P^{(g)}(\pi^{(k)})$ generates circuits Γ_V^i, Γ_H^i. Finally, after k rounds $P^{(g)}$ outputs a verification circuit*

$$\Gamma_V^{(g)}(q, y_1, \ldots, y_k) := g(\Gamma_V^1(q, y_1), \ldots, \Gamma_V^k(q, y_k))$$

and a hint circuit

$$\Gamma_H^{(k)}(q) := (\Gamma_H^1(q), \ldots, \Gamma_H^k(q)).$$

Let C be a random circuit that corresponds to a solver S as in Definition 1.1. Similarly as for two phase algorithm, we write $C(\pi) := (C_1, C_2)(\pi)$ to denote that the randomness used by C is fixed to π, and $C(\pi)$ in the first phase uses $C_1(\pi)$ and in the second phase $C_2(\pi)$. A verification query (q, y) of C for which a hint query on this q has been asked before can not be a successfully verification query. Therefore, without loss of generality, we make an assumption that C does not ask verification queries on q, for which a hint query has been asked before.

Experiment $Success^{P, C^{(\cdot,\cdot)}}(\pi, \rho)$

Oracle: A problem poser P, a solver circuit $C^{(\cdot,\cdot)}$.
Input: Bitstrings π, ρ.
Output: A bit $b \in \{0,1\}$.

Run $\langle P(\pi), C_1(\rho) \rangle$
    Let $(\Gamma_V, \Gamma_H) := \langle P(\pi), C_1(\rho) \rangle_P$
    Let $x := \langle P(\pi), C_1(\rho) \rangle_{\text{trans}}$

Run $C_2^{\Gamma_V,\Gamma_H}(x,\rho)$
    if $C_2^{\Gamma_V,\Gamma_H}$ asks a verification query (q,y) such that $\Gamma_V(q,y)=1$ **then**
        return 1
return 0

The success probability of C in solving a puzzle defined by P in the experiment *Success* is

$$\Pr_{\pi,\rho}[Success^{P,C^{(\cdot,\cdot)}}(\pi,\rho)=1]. \tag{0.0.1}$$

Theorem 1.3 (Security amplification for a dynamic weakly verifiable puzzle.) *Let $P^{(1)}$ be a fixed problem poser as in Definition 1.1, and $P^{(g)}$ be a poser for the k-wise direct product of $P^{(1)}$. There exists a probabilistic algorithm $Gen(C,g,\varepsilon,\delta,n,v,h)$ which takes as input: a solver circuit C for $P^{(g)}$, a monotone function $g:\{0,1\}^k\to\{0,1\}$, parameters ε,δ,n, the number of verification queries v, and hint queries h asked by C, and outputs a random circuit D such that the following holds:*
If C is such that

$$\Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}\left[Success^{P^{(g)},C}(\pi^{(k)},\rho)=1\right]\geq 8(h+v)\left(\Pr_{u\leftarrow\mu_\delta^k}[g(u)=1]+\varepsilon\right)$$

then D satisfies almost surely

$$\Pr_{\pi,\rho}\left[Success^{P^{(1)},D}(\pi,\rho)=1\right]\geq(\delta+\frac{\varepsilon}{6k}).$$

Additionally, Gen and D require oracle access to g, $P^{(1)}$,C. Furthermore, D requires also oracle access to Γ_V Γ_H, and asks at most $\frac{6k}{\varepsilon}\log\left(\frac{6k}{\varepsilon}\right)$ h hint queries and one verification query. Finally, $Size(D)\leq Size(C)\cdot\frac{6k}{\varepsilon}$ and $Time(Gen)=poly(k,\frac{1}{\varepsilon},n,v,h)$.

The Theorem 1.3 implies that if there is no good solver for a puzzle defined by $P^{(1)}$, then a good solver for a k-wise direct product of $P^{(1)}$ does not exist.

The idea of the algorithm *Gen* is to output a circuit D that solves the input puzzle often. We know that C has good success probability for a k-wise product of $P^{(1)}$. The algorithm *Gen* tries to find a puzzle such that when C runs with this puzzle fixed on the first position, and disregards whether this puzzle is correctly solved then the assumptions of Theorem 1.3 are true for a $k-1$-wise direct product. If it is possible to find such a puzzle then *Gen* could recurse and solve a smaller problem. In the optimistic case we can reach $k=1$, which means that we found a good circuit for solving a single puzzle by just fixing the initial puzzles of C.

Otherwise, when the first position is disregarded then the success probability of C is not substantially better. This is remarkable, as we know that C performs good for k-wise product, it means that the first position is important, in the sense that C solves the puzzle on that position unusually often. Therefore, it is reasonable to construct the circuit D using C by placing the input puzzle of D on that position, and then finding remaining $k-1$ puzzles. These $k-1$ remaining puzzles are generated by the circuit D, hence it is possible to check whether they are correctly solved by the circuit C. We know that circuit C has good success probability, and the puzzle on the first position is important. Therefore, if we are able to find a $k-1$ puzzles such that the fact whether the k-wise direct product is correctly solved depends on whether the puzzle on the first position is correctly solved then we can assume that C is often correct on this first position.

There are some problems with this approach, first we have to ensure that we can make a decision when the algorithm *Gen* should recurse and when not correctly with high probability.

Then, we have to show that it is possible to find a puzzles such that C is often correct on the first position. Finally, we also have to be sure that we do not ask a hint query, on the final verification query to the oracle. To satisfy the last requirement we split Q.

Let $hash : Q \to \{0, 1, \ldots, 2(h+v)-1\}$, then a set $P_{hash} \subseteq Q$, defined with respect to $hash$, is the set of preimages of 0 for $hash$. The idea is that P_{hash} contains $q \in Q$ on which C is not allowed to ask hint queries, and the first successful verification query (q, y) of C is such that $q \in P_{hash}$. Therefore, if C makes a verification query (q, y) such that $q \in P_{hash}$, then we know that no hint query is ever asked on this q. In the experiment $CanonicalSuccess$ a circuit C succeeds if and only if it asks a successful verification query (q, y) such that $q \in P_{hash}$, and no hint query is asked on $q \in P_{hash}$.

In the following experiment $CanonicalSuccess$ we denote the i-th query of C by q_i if it is a hint query, and by (q_i, y_i) if it is a verification query.

Experiment $CanonicalSuccess^{P,C^{(\cdot,\cdot)},hash}(\pi, \rho)$

Oracle: A problem poser P, a solver circuit $C^{(\cdot,\cdot)}$.
A function $hash : Q \to \{0, \ldots, 2(h+v)-1\}$.
Input: Bitstrings: π, ρ.
Output: A bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$.

Run $\langle P(\pi), C_1(\rho)\rangle$
$(\Gamma_V, \Gamma_H) := \langle P(\pi), C_1(\rho)\rangle_P$
$x := \langle P(\pi), C_1(\rho)\rangle_{\text{trans}}$

Run $C^{\Gamma_V,\Gamma_H}(x, \rho)$
(q_j, y_j) be the first verification query such that $C_2^{\Gamma_V,\Gamma_H}(q_j, y_j) = 1$, or an arbitrary verification query if C_2 does not succeed.

If $(\forall i < j : q_i \notin P_{hash})$ **and** $q_j \in P_{hash}$ **and** $\Gamma_V(q_j, y_j) = 1$ **then**
return 1
else
return 0

Similarly as for the experiment $Success$, we define the success probability of a solver C for P with respect to a function $hash$ in the experiment $CanonicalSuccess$ as

$$\Pr_{\pi,\rho}[CanonicalSuccess^{P,C^{(\cdot,\cdot)},hash}(\pi, \rho) = 1]. \tag{0.0.2}$$

For fixed $hash$ and $P^{(g)}$ a canonical success of C for $\pi^{(k)}, \rho$ is a situation when $CanonicalSuccess^{P^{(g)},C^{(\cdot,\cdot)},hash}(\pi^{(k)}, \rho) = 1$.

We show that if for a fixed $P^{(1)}$ a solver circuit C often succeeds in the experiment $Success$ for $P^{(g)}$, then it also often successful in the experiment $CanonicalSuccess$ for $P^{(g)}$.

Lemma 1.4 ***(Success probability in solving a k-wise direct product of $P^{(1)}$ with respect to a function*** $hash$***.)*** *For fixed $P^{(g)}$ let C succeed in the experiment Success for $P^{(g)}$ with probability γ, asking at most h hint queries and v verification queries. There exists a probabilistic algorithm **FindHash** that takes as input: parameters γ, n, the number of verification queries v and hint queries h, and has oracle access to C and $P^{(g)}$. Furthermore, **FindHash** runs in time $O((h+v)^4/\gamma^4)$, and with high probability outputs a function $hash \in \mathcal{H}$ such that success probability of C with respect to P_{hash} in the experiment CanonicalSuccess is at least $\frac{\gamma}{8(h+v)}$.*

Proof. We fix $P^{(g)}$ and a solver C for $P^{(h)}$ in the whole proof of Lemma 1.4. Let $\mathcal{H}$ be a family of pairwise independent hash functions $Q \to \{0, 1, \dots, 2(h+v)-1\}$. For all $i \neq j \in \{1, \dots, (h+v)\}$ and $k, l \in \{0, 1, \dots, 2(h+v)-1\}$ by pairwise independence property of $\mathcal{H}$, we have

$$\forall q_i, q_j \in Q : \Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[hash(q_i) = k \mid hash(q_j) = l] = \Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[hash(q_i) = k] = \frac{1}{2(h+v)}. \quad (0.0.3)$$

Let $\pi^{(k)}, \rho$ be fixed. We consider the experiment $CanonicalSuccess$ for $P^{(g)}$ and C in which we define a binary random variable X for the event that $hash(q_j) = 0$, and for every query q_i asked before q_j we have $hash(q_i) \neq 0$. Conditioned on the event $hash(q_i) = 0$, we get

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[X = 1] &= \Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[hash(q_j) = 0 \wedge (\forall i < j : hash(q_i) \neq 0)] \\ &= \Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[\forall i < j : hash(q_i) \neq 0 \mid hash(q_j) = 0] \Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[hash(q_j) = 0].\end{aligned}$$

Now we use (0.0.3) twice and obtain

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[X = 1] &= \frac{1}{2(h+v)} \left(1 - \Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[\exists i < j : hash(q_i) = 0 \mid hash(q_j) = 0]\right) \\ &= \frac{1}{2(h+v)} \left(1 - \Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[\exists i < j : hash(q_i) = 0]\right).\end{aligned}$$

Finally, we use union bound and the fact that $j \leq (h+v)$ to get

$$\Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[X = 1] \geq \frac{1}{2(h+v)} \left(1 - \sum_{i<j} \Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[hash(q_i) = 0]\right) \geq \frac{1}{4(h+v)}.$$

Let $\mathcal{P}_{Success}$ be the set of all $(\pi^{(k)}, \rho)$ for which C succeeds in the random experiment $Success$ for $P^{(g)}$. Furthermore, we denote the set of those $(\pi^{(k)}, \rho)$ for which $CanonicalSuccess^{P^{(g)}, C^{(\cdot,\cdot)}, hash}(\pi^{(k)}) = 1$ by $\mathcal{P}_{Canonical}$. For fixed $\pi^{(k)}$ and ρ if C succeeds canonically, then it also succeeds in the experiment $Success$ for $P^{(g)}$. Hence, $\mathcal{P}_{Canonical} \subseteq \mathcal{P}_{Success}$, and we conclude

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr_{\substack{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H} \\ \pi^{(k)}, \rho}} \left[CanonicalSuccess^{P^{(g)}, C^{(\cdot,\cdot)}, hash}(\pi^{(k)}, \rho) = 1\right] &= \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{(\pi^{(k)}, \rho) \in \mathcal{P}_{Success}} \left[\Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[X = 1]\right] \\ &\geq \frac{\gamma}{4(h+v)}. \quad (0.0.4)\end{aligned}$$

Algorithm: FindHash(h, v, γ, n)

Oracle: A solver circuit $C^{(\cdot,\cdot)}$ for the k-wise direct product of $P^{(1)}$.
Input: Parameters h, v, γ, n
Output: A function $hash : Q \to \{0, 1, \dots, 2(h+v) - 1\}$.

Let $\mathcal{H}$ be a family of pairwise independent hash functions $Q \to \{0, 1, \dots, 2(h+v) - 1\}$
for $i = 1$ **to** $32(h+v)^2/\gamma^2$ **do:**
  $hash \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{H}$
  $count := 0$
  for $j := 1$ to $32(h+v)^2/\gamma^2$ **do:**
    $\pi^{(k)} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{kn}$
    if $CanonicalSuccess^{P^{(g)}, C^{(\cdot,\cdot)}, hash}(\pi^{(k)}) = 1$ **then**
      $count := count + 1$
  if $\frac{\gamma^2}{32(h+v)^2} count \geq \frac{\gamma}{6(h+v)}$ **then**

    return *hash*
return $\perp$

We show that **FindHash** chooses *hash* such that the canonical success probability of C with respect to P_{hash} is at least $\frac{\gamma}{4(h+v)}$ almost surely. Let $\mathcal{H}_{Good}$ denote a family of functions $hash \in \mathcal{H}$ for which

$$\Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}\left[CanonicalSuccess^{P^{(g)},C^{(\cdot,\cdot)},hash}(\pi^{(k)},\rho)=1\right] \geq \frac{\gamma}{4(h+v)},$$

and $\mathcal{H}_{Bad}$ be the family of functions $hash \in \mathcal{H}$ such that

$$\Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}\left[CanonicalSuccess^{P^{(g)},C^{(\cdot,\cdot)},hash}(\pi^{(k)},\rho)=1\right] \leq \frac{\gamma}{8(h+v)}.$$

Additionally, for a fixed *hash*, we define binary random variables $X_1,\dots,X_N$ such that

$$X_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if in the } i\text{-th iteration variable } count \text{ is increased} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise .} \end{cases}$$

We first show that it is unlikely that **FindHash** returns $hash \in \mathcal{H}_{Bad}$. For $hash \in \mathcal{H}_{Bad}$ we have $\mathbb{E}_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}[X_i] < \frac{\gamma}{8(h+v)}$. Therefore, for any fixed $hash \in \mathcal{H}_{Bad}$ using the Chernoff bound we get

$$\Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}\left[\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} X_i \geq \frac{\gamma}{6(h+v)}\right] \leq \Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}\left[\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} X_i \geq (1+\frac{1}{3})\mathbb{E}[X_i]\right] \leq e^{-\frac{\gamma}{4(h+v)}N/27}.$$

The probability that $hash \in \mathcal{H}_{Good}$, when picked, is not returned amounts

$$\Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}\left[\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} X_i \leq \frac{\gamma}{6(h+v)}\right] \leq \Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}\left[\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} X_i \leq (1-\frac{1}{3})\mathbb{E}[X_i]\right] \leq e^{-\frac{\gamma}{4(h+v)}N/27}.$$

Finally, we show that **FindHash** picks in one of its iteration $hash \in \mathcal{H}_{Good}$ almost surely. Let Y_i be a binary random variable such that

$$Y_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if in the } i\text{-th iteration } hash \in \mathcal{H}_{Good} \text{ is picked} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise .} \end{cases}$$

From equation (0.0.4) we know that $\Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[Y_i = 1] = \mathbb{E}[Y_i] \geq \frac{\gamma}{4(h+v)}$, almost surely. Thus, we get

$$\Pr_{hash \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}\left[\sum_{i=1}^{K} Y_i = 0\right] \leq \left(1 - \frac{\gamma}{4(h+v)}\right)^K \leq e^{-\frac{\gamma}{4(h+v)}K}.$$

The bound stated in the Lemma 1.4 is achieved for $K = N = 32(h+v)^2/\gamma^2$. □

We define the following circuit $\widetilde{C}_2$:

Circuit $\widetilde{C}_2^{\Gamma_V^{(g)},\Gamma_H^{(g)},C_2,hash}(x,\rho)$

Oracle: $\Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(k)}, hash, C_2$
Input: A transcript x, a bitstring ρ.
Output: A tuple $(q, y_1, \dots, y_k)$ or $\perp$.

Run $C_2^{\Gamma_V^{(g)},\Gamma_H^{(k)}}(x,\rho)$
    if C_2 asks a hint query on q **then**

if $q \in P_{hash}$ **then**
return $\perp$
else
answer the query using $\Gamma_H^{(k)}(q)$

if C_2 asks a verification query $(q, y_1, \dots, y_k)$ **then**
if $q \in P_{hash}$ **then**
ask a verification query $(q, y_1, \dots, y_k)$
else
answer the verification query with 0

return $\perp$

We define a new solver circuit $\widetilde{C} = (C_1, \widetilde{C}_2)$ that in the first phase uses the circuit C_1 and in the second phase the circuit $\widetilde{C}_2$.

Lemma 1.5 *For fixed $P^{(g)}, C$ and hash the following statement is true*

$$\Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}[CanonicalSuccess^{P^{(g)},C,hash}(\pi^{(k)},\rho) = 1] \leq \Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}[CanonicalSuccess^{P^{(g)},\widetilde{C},hash}(\pi^{(k)},\rho) = 1]$$

Proof. We fix $\pi^{(k)}, \rho$. If C succeeds canonically then also $\widetilde{C}$ succeeds canonically. Using this observation, we conclude that

$$\begin{aligned}
&\Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}\left[CanonicalSuccess^{P^{(g)},C,hash}(\pi^{(k)},\rho) = 1\right] \\
&\quad= \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}\left[CanonicalSuccess^{P^{(g)},C,hash}(\pi^{(k)},\rho) = 1\right] \\
&\quad\leq \Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}\left[CanonicalSuccess^{P^{(g)},\widetilde{C},hash}(\pi^{(k)},\rho) = 1\right]
\end{aligned}$$

□

From a circuit C we can build a circuit $\widetilde{C}$ that asks at most one verification query $(q, y_1, \dots, y_k)$ such that $q \in P_{hash}$, and every hint query on q is such that $q \notin P_{hash}$. Furthermore, we write $(q, y_1, \dots, y_k) := \widetilde{C}_2(x, \rho)$ to denote the verification query $(q, y_1, \dots, y_k)$ asked by $\widetilde{C}_2$. If $\widetilde{C}_2$ does not ask a verification query we write $\perp := \widetilde{C}_2(x, \rho)$.

Lemma 1.6 ***(Security amplification of a dynamic weakly verifiable puzzle with respect to P_{hash}.)*** *For fixed $P^{(1)}$ there exists an algorithm Gen, with oracle access to: $P^{(1)}$, a monotone function $g : \{0,1\}^{(k)} \to \{0,1\}$, a solver circuit C for $P^{(g)}$ and a function $hash : Q \to \{0, \dots, 2(h+v)-1\}$. Additionally, Gen takes as input parameters ε, δ, n, the number of verification queries v and hint queries h asked by C, the number of puzzles to solve k, and outputs a solver circuit D for $P^{(1)}$ as in Definition 1.1 such that the following holds:*
If C is such that

$$\Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}\left[CanonicalSuccess^{P^{(g)},C,hash}(\pi^{(k)},\rho) = 1\right] \geq \Pr_{\mu \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[g(\mu) = 1] + \varepsilon,$$

then D satisfies almost surely

$$\Pr_{\pi,\rho}\left[CanonicalSuccess^{P^{(1)},D,hash}(\pi,\rho) = 1\right] \geq (\delta + \frac{\varepsilon}{6k})$$

Additionally, D requires oracle access to g, $P^{(1)}$, C, Furthermore, D asks at most $\frac{6k}{\varepsilon}\log\left(\frac{6k}{\varepsilon}\right) h$ hint queries and at most one verification query. Finally, $Size(D) \leq Size(C)\frac{6k}{\varepsilon}$ and $Time(Gen) = poly(k, \frac{1}{\varepsilon}, n, v, h)$.

Proof. First we define the following procedure that returns an estimate for the function g with the first bit set to $b \in \{0,1\}$.

EvaluateFunctionProbability$^g(b, \varepsilon, \delta)$

Oracle: A function g.
Input: A bit $b \in \{0,1\}$, parameters k, ε
Output: An estimate $\widetilde{g} \in [0,1]$.

For $i := 1$ to $\frac{16k^2}{\varepsilon^2}\log(n)$ **do:**
    $(b_2, \ldots, b_k) \leftarrow \mu_\delta^{(k-1)}$
    $g_i := g(b, b_2, \ldots, b_k)$ **then**
return $\frac{\varepsilon^2}{16k^2\log(n)} \sum_{i=1}^{\frac{16k^2}{\varepsilon^2}\log(n)} g_i$

Lemma 1.7 (Estimate of the function g.) *The procedure **EvaluteFunctionProbability** outputs an estimate $\widetilde{g}$ for the function $g : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}$ with the first bit fixed to $b \in \{0,1\}$ such that $|\widetilde{g} - \Pr_{(u_2,\ldots,u_k)\leftarrow\mu_\delta^k}[g(b, u_2, \ldots, u_k) = 1]\,| \le \frac{\varepsilon}{4k}$ almost surely.*

Proof. We define binary random variable K_i for the event that $g_i = 1$. By Chernoff bound we get

$$\Pr\left[\left|\frac{\varepsilon^2\log(n)}{16k^2}\sum_{i=1}^{\frac{16k^2}{\varepsilon^2}\log(n)}\widetilde{g}_i - \mathbb{E}[K_i]\right| \ge \frac{\varepsilon}{4k}\right] \le 2e^{\log(n)/3}. \qquad \square$$

Next we define a procedure **EvalutePuzzles**$(\pi^{(k)}, \rho)$ that outputs a tuple indicating puzzles are solved successfully in the random experiment $CanonicalSuccess^{P^{(g)},\widetilde{C},hash}(\pi^{(k)}, \rho)$.

EvaluatePuzzles$^{P^{(1)},\widetilde{C},hash}(\pi^{(k)}, \rho)$

Oracle: A circuit $\widetilde{C}$, an algorithm $P^{(1)}$, a function $hash$.
Input: Bitstrings $\pi^{(k)}$, ρ.
Output: A tuple $(c_1, \ldots, c_k)$.

Run $\langle P^{(g)}(\pi^{(k)}), C_1(\rho)\rangle$
    $(\Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(k)}) := \langle P(\pi^{(k)}), C_1(\rho)\rangle_{P^{(g)}}$
    $x := \langle P^{(g)}(\pi^{(k)}), C_1(\rho)\rangle_{\text{trans}}$

$(q, y^{(k)}) := \widetilde{C}_2^{\Gamma_V^{(g)},\Gamma_H^{(k)},C,hash}(x, \rho)$
for $i := 1$ to k **do:**   //simulate k rounds of sequential interaction
    $(\Gamma_V^i, \Gamma_H^i) := \langle P^{(1)}(\pi_i), C_1(\rho)\rangle_{P^{(1)}}$
for $i := 1$ to k **do:**
    $c_i := \Gamma_v^i(q, y_i)$
return $(c_1, \ldots, c_k)$

The procedure **EstimateSurplus** returns the estimate $\widetilde{S}_{\pi^*,b}$ for $S_{\pi^*,b}$. All puzzles used during obtaining the estimate are generated internally. Therefore, it is possible to answer all hint and verification queries, without calls to the verification oracles.

EstimateSurplus$^{P^{(1)},C,hash}(\pi^*, b)$

Oracle: An algorithm $P^{(1)}$, a circuit C, a function $hash$, a function g.
Input: A bistring π^*, a bit b, an integer k.
Output: A circuit D.

$\widetilde{g}_b :=$ **EvaluteFunctionProbability**$^g(b, \varepsilon, \delta)$
For $i := 1$ to $\frac{16k^2}{\varepsilon^2}\log(n)$ **do:**
$(\pi_{m+1}, \ldots, \pi_k) \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{(k-m-1)n}$
$\rho \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^*$
$(c_1, \ldots, c_k) :=$ **EvalutePuzzles**$^{P^{(1)},C,hash}(\pi_1, \ldots, \pi_m, \pi^*, \ldots, \pi_k, \rho)$
$\widetilde{s}^i_{\pi^*,b} := g(b, c_{m+1}, \ldots, c_k)$
return $\frac{\varepsilon^2 \log(n)}{16k^2} \sum_{i=1}^{\frac{16k^2}{\varepsilon^2}\log(n)} \widetilde{s}^i_{\pi^*,b} - \widetilde{g}_b$

Circuit $D = (D_1, D_2)(\sigma)$

Phase I $D_1^{P^{(1)},C}(\sigma)$

Oracle: A poser $P^{(1)}$, a circuit C, a function $hash$.
Input: A bitstring $\sigma \in \{0,1\}^*$.
Hard coded: Bitstrings $\pi_1, \ldots, \pi_{m-1}$.
Output: Transcripts $x_1, \ldots, x_{m-1}, x^*$.

---

for $i := 1$ to $m-1$ **do:**
Simulate $\langle P^{(1)}(\pi_i), C_1(\rho)\rangle$
Let $x_i := \langle P^{(1)}(\pi_i), C_1(\rho)\rangle_{\text{trans}}$
Let $(\Gamma^i_V, \Gamma^i_H) := \langle P^{(1)}(\pi_i), C_1(\rho)\rangle_{P^{(1)}}$

Interact with the problem poser using $C_1(\rho)$.
Let x^* be the transcript of the interaction
Let Γ^*_V, Γ^*_H be the verification and hint oracles output by the problem poser.

Let $\Gamma_V^{(m-1)} := (\Gamma^1_V, \ldots, \Gamma^{m-1}_V)$
Let $\Gamma_H^{(m-1)} := (\Gamma^1_H, \ldots, \Gamma^{m-1}_H)$
Let $x^{(m-1)} := (x_1, \ldots, x_{m-1})$

Phase II $D_2^{P^{(1)},C}(x^*, \sigma)$

Oracle: A poser $P^{(1)}$, a circuit C, a function $hash$, circuits Γ^*_V and Γ^*_H.
Input: A transcript x^*, a bitstring $\sigma \in \{0,1\}^*$.
Output: A circuit D.

Let $\Gamma_V^{(m-1)}, \Gamma_H^{(m-1)}$ and $x_1, \ldots, x_{k-1}$ be the same as in the **Phase I**.
for at most $\frac{6k}{\varepsilon}\log(\frac{6k}{\varepsilon})$ iterations **do:**
$\pi^{(k)} \leftarrow$ read $k \cdot n$ bits from σ
for $i := 1$ to $m-1$ **do:** // finish remaining simulation of puzzles

Simulate $\langle P^{(1)}(\pi_i), C_1(\rho)\rangle$
Let $x_i := \langle P^{(1)}(\pi_i), C_1(\rho)\rangle_{\text{trans}}$
Let $\Gamma_V^{(g)} := g(\Gamma_V^1, \ldots, \Gamma_V^{m-1}, \Gamma_V^*, \Gamma_V^{m+1}, \ldots, \Gamma_V^k)$
Let $\Gamma_H^{(k)} := (\Gamma_H^1, \ldots, \Gamma_H^{m-1}, \Gamma_H^*, \Gamma_H^{m+1}, \ldots, \Gamma_H^k)$
$(q, y_1, \ldots, y_{m-1}, y^*, \ldots, y_k) := \widetilde{C}^{\Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(k)}, C, hash}((x_1, \ldots, x_{m-1}, x^*, \ldots, x_k), \rho)$
if $g(1, c_{m+1}, \ldots, c_k) = 1 \wedge g(0, c_{m+1}, \ldots, c_k) = 0$ **then**
return (q, y^*)
return $\perp$

Algorithm $Gen^{C,P^{(1)},g,hash}(\varepsilon, \delta, n, v, h, k)$

Oracle: $P^{(1)}, C, g, hash$
Input: $\varepsilon, \delta, n, v, h, k$
Output: D

for $i := 1$ to $\frac{6k}{\varepsilon}\log(n)$ **do:**
$\pi^* \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^n$
$\widetilde{S}_{\pi^*,0} :=$ **EstimateSurplus**$^{P^{(1)},C,hash}(\pi^*, 0)$
$\widetilde{S}_{\pi^*,1} :=$ **EstimateSurplus**$^{P^{(1)},C,hash}(\pi^*, 1)$
if $\exists b \in \{0,1\} : \widetilde{S}_{\pi^*,b} \geq (1 - \frac{3}{4k})\varepsilon$ **then**
Let C_1' simulate first round of interaction between C_1 and $P^{(g)}$ using $P^{(1)}(\pi^*)$, then use C_1 for remaining $k-1$ rounds.
$C' := (C_1,', C_2)$
$g'(b_2, \ldots, b_k) := g(b, b_2, \ldots, b_k)$
return $Gen^{C',P^{(1)},g',hash}(\varepsilon, \delta, n, v, h, k-1)$
// all estimates are lower than $(1 - \frac{3}{4k})\varepsilon$
return D^C

For $k = 1$ the function $g : \{0,1\} \to \{0,1\}$ is either the identity or a constant function. If g is the identity function then the success probability of C in the random experiment $CanonicalSuccess$ is as least $\delta + \varepsilon$, and D simply uses the circuit $\widetilde{C}$. In case g is a constant function the statement is vacuously true.

For fixed $\pi^{(k)}, \rho$ let $(\Gamma_V^{(g)}, \Gamma_H^{(k)}) := \langle P^{(g)}(\pi^{(k)}), C_1(\rho)\rangle_{P^{(g)}}$ and $x := \langle P^{(g)}(\pi^{(k)}), C_1(\rho)\rangle_{\text{trans}}$. Additionally, let (Γ_V^i, Γ_H^i) be the verification and hint circuits generated in the i-th round of the interaction between $P^{(g)}(\pi^{(k)})$ and $C_1(\rho)$. Finally, for $(q, y_1, \ldots, y_k) := \widetilde{C}_2(x^{(k)}, \rho)$ we denote $c_i := \Gamma_V^i(q, y_i)$. We define the surplus:

$$S_{\pi^*,b} = \Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}[g(b, c_2, \ldots, c_k) = 1] - \Pr_{(u_2,\ldots,u_k)\leftarrow\mu^{(k)}}[g(b, u_2, \ldots, u_k) = 1] \qquad (0.0.5)$$

The surplus $S_{\pi^*,b}$ tells us how good $\widetilde{C}$ performs when the bitstring π_1 is fixed to π^*, and the fact whether $\widetilde{C}$ succeeds in solving the first puzzle defined by $P^{(1)}(\pi_1)$ is disregarded. Instead, the bit b is used as the input on the first position of the function g.

Lemma 1.8 *The estimate $\widetilde{S}_{\pi^*,b}$ returned by **EstimateSurplus** differs from $S_{\pi^*,b}$ by at most $\frac{\varepsilon}{2k}$ almost surely.*

Proof. We use union bound and similar argument as in Lemma 1.7 which yields that $\frac{\varepsilon^2 \log(n)}{16k^2} \sum_{i=1}^{\frac{16k^2}{\varepsilon^2}\log(n)} \widetilde{S}^i_{\pi^*,b}$ differs from $\mathbb{E}[g(b, c_2, \ldots, c_k)]$ by at most $\frac{\varepsilon}{4k}$ almost surely. Together, with Lemma 1.7 we conclude that the surplus estimate returned by **EstimateSurplus** differs from $S_{\pi^*,b}$ by at most $\frac{\varepsilon}{2k}$ almost surely. $\square$

From Lemma 1.8 we conclude that if $\widetilde{S}_{\pi^*,b} \geq (1 - \frac{3}{4k})\varepsilon$, then $S_{\pi^*,b} \geq (1 - \frac{1}{k})\varepsilon$ almost surely.

In case Gen manages to find an estimate that satisfies $\widetilde{S}_{\pi^*,b} \geq (1 - \frac{3}{4k})\varepsilon$ we define a monotone function $g'(b_2, \ldots, b_k) := g(b, b_2, \ldots, b_k)$, and a circuit $\widetilde{C}' = (C'_1, \widetilde{C}'_2)$, where C'_1 first simulates the interaction between C_1 and $P^{(1)}(\pi^*)$, and then interacts with $P^{(1)}$.

The circuit $\widetilde{C}$ satisfies the conditions of Lemma 1.6 for the remaining $k-1$ puzzles and we recurse using g' and $\widetilde{C}'$.

If all estimates are less than $(1 - \frac{3}{4k})\varepsilon$, then intuitively C does not perform much better on the remaining $k-1$ puzzles than an algorithm that solves each puzzle independent with probability δ. However, from the assumption we know that on all k puzzles $\widetilde{C}$ has higher success probability. Therefore, it is likely that the first puzzle is correctly solved with the probability higher than δ. We now show that this intuition is indeed correct. For a fixed π^* using (0.0.5), we get

$$\Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[g(1, u_2, \ldots, u_k) = 1] - \Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[g(0, u_2, \ldots, u_k) = 1] =$$
$$\Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}[g(1, c_2, \ldots, c_k) = 1 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - \Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}[g(0, c_2, \ldots, c_k) = 1 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - (S_{\pi^*,1} - S_{\pi^*,0}). \tag{0.0.6}$$

From the monotonicity of g we know that for any set of tuples $(b_1, \ldots, b_k)$ and sets $\mathcal{B}_0 = \{(b_1, b_2, \ldots, b_k) : g(0, b_2, \ldots, b_k) = 1\}$, $\mathcal{B}_1 = \{(b_1, b_2, \ldots, b_k) : g(1, b_2, \ldots, b_k) = 1\}$ we have $\mathcal{B}_0 \subseteq \mathcal{B}_1$. Hence, we can write (0.0.6):

$$\Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[g(1, u_2, \ldots, u_k) = 1 \wedge g(0, u_2, \ldots, u_k) = 0] =$$
$$\Pr_{\pi^{(k)},\rho}[g(1, c_2, \ldots, c_k) = 1 \wedge g(0, c_2, \ldots, c_k) = 0 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - (S_{\pi^*,1} - S_{\pi^*,0}). \tag{0.0.7}$$

Let $G_{u^{(k)}}$ denote the event $g(1, u_2, \ldots, u_k) = 1 \wedge g(0, u_2, \ldots, u_k) = 0$, and correspondingly $G_{\pi^{(k)}} := g(1, c_2, \ldots, c_k) = 1) \wedge (g(0, c_2, \ldots, c_k) = 0$. From (0.0.7) for $\pi = \pi^*$ fixed we obtain

$$\Pr_{\substack{\rho \\ (\Gamma_V, \Gamma_H) := \langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*), D_1(\rho)\rangle_{P^{(1)}} \\ x^* := \langle P^{(1)}(\pi^*), D_1(\rho)\rangle_{\text{trans}}}}[\Gamma_V(D_2(x^*, \rho)) = 1] = \frac{\Pr_\rho[\Gamma_V(D_2(x^*, \rho)) = 1 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] \Pr_\rho[G_\pi \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*]}{\Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[G_\mu]}$$
$$- \frac{\Pr_\rho[\Gamma_V(D_2(x^*, r)) = 1 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*](S_{\pi^*,1} - S_{\pi^*,0})}{\Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[G_\mu]} \tag{0.0.8}$$

We can write the first summand of (0.0.8) as

$$\Pr_\rho[\Gamma_V(D_2(x^*, \rho)) = 1 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[G_\pi \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] =$$
$$\Pr_\rho[D_2(x^*, \rho) \neq \perp \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[c_1 = 1 \mid G_\pi, \pi_1 = \pi^*] \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[G_\pi \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] \tag{0.0.9}$$

where we make use of the fact that the event G_π implies $D(x^*, r) \neq \perp$. We consider two cases. For $\Pr_{\pi^k}[g(1, c_2, \ldots, c_k) = 1 \wedge g(0, c_2, \ldots, c_k) = 0 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] \leq \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}$ then

$$\Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[c_1 = 1 \mid G_\pi, \pi_1 = \pi^*] \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[G_\pi \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] \leq \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}, \tag{0.0.10}$$

and when $\Pr_{\pi^k}[g(1, c_2, \dots, c_k) = 1 \wedge g(0, c_2, \dots, c_k) = 0] > \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}$ then circuit D outputs $\perp$ only if it fails in all $\frac{6k}{\varepsilon}\log(\frac{6k}{\varepsilon})$ iterations to find $\pi^{(k)}$ such that $g(1, c_2, \dots, c_k) = 1 \wedge g(0, c_2, \dots, c_k) = 0$ which happens with probability

$$\Pr_r[D(x^*, r) = \perp \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] \leq (1 - \frac{\varepsilon}{6k})^{\frac{6k}{\varepsilon}\log(\frac{\varepsilon}{6k})} \leq \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}. \tag{0.0.11}$$

We conclude that in both cases:

$$\begin{aligned}
&\Pr_r[D(x^*, r) \neq \perp \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[c_1 = 1 \mid G_\pi, \pi_1 = \pi^*] \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[G_\pi \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] \\
&\quad \geq \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[c_1 = 1 \mid G_\pi, \pi_1 = \pi^*] \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[G_\pi \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}.
\end{aligned} \tag{0.0.12}$$

Therefore, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
&\Pr_r[D(x^*, r) \neq \perp \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[c_1 = 1 \mid G_\pi, \pi_1 = \pi^*] \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[G_\pi \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] \\
&\quad = \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[c_1 = 1 \wedge g(1, c_2, \dots, c_k) = 1 \wedge g(0, c_2, \dots, c_k) = 0 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - \frac{\varepsilon}{6k} \\
&\quad = \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[g(c_1, c_2, \dots, c_k) = 1 \wedge g(0, c_2, \dots, c_k) = 0 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - \frac{\varepsilon}{6k} \\
&\quad = \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[g(c_1, c_2, \dots, c_k) = 1 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[g(0, c_2, \dots, c_k) = 0 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - \frac{\varepsilon}{6k},
\end{aligned}$$

and finally by (0.0.5)

$$\begin{aligned}
&\Pr_r[D(x^*, r) \neq \perp \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[c_1 = 1 \mid G_\pi, \pi_1 = \pi^*] \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[G_\pi \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] \\
&\quad = \Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[g(c_1, c_2, \dots, c_k) = 1 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - \Pr_{\mu_\delta^{(k)}}[g(0, \mu_2, \dots, \mu_k) = 0 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - S_{\pi^*,0} - \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}.
\end{aligned} \tag{0.0.13}$$

Inserting this result into the equation (0.0.8) yields

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pr_{r,\pi}[\Gamma_V(D(x, r)) = 1] &= \mathbb{E}_\pi\left[\Pr_r[D(x, r) = 1 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*]\right] \\
&= \mathbb{E}_\pi\left[\frac{\Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[g(c) = 1 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - \Pr_{\mu_\delta^{(k)}}[g(0, \mu_2, \dots, \mu_k) = 0 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}}{\Pr_{\mu_\delta^k}[G_\mu]}\right] \\
&\quad - \mathbb{E}_\pi\left[\frac{S_{\pi^*,0} + \Pr_r[\Gamma_V^{(g)}(D(x^*, r)) = 1 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*](S_{\pi^*,1} - S_{\pi^*,0})}{\Pr_{\mu_\delta^k}[G_\mu]}\right]
\end{aligned} \tag{0.0.14}$$

For the second summand we show that if we do not recurse, then almost surely majority of estimates is low. Let assume

$$\Pr_\pi\left[\left(S_{\pi,0} \leq (1 - \frac{1}{2k})\varepsilon\right) \wedge \left(S_{\pi,1} \leq (1 - \frac{1}{2k})\varepsilon\right)\right] < 1 - \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}, \tag{0.0.15}$$

then the algorithm recurses almost surely. Therefore, under the assumption that *Gen* does not recurse, we have almost surely

$$\Pr_\pi\left[\left(S_{\pi,0} \leq (1 - \frac{1}{2k})\varepsilon\right) \wedge \left(S_{\pi,1} \leq (1 - \frac{1}{2k})\varepsilon\right)\right] \geq 1 - \frac{\varepsilon}{6k}. \tag{0.0.16}$$

Let us define a set

$$\mathcal{W} = \left\{\pi : \left(S_{\pi,0} \leq (1 - \frac{1}{2k})\varepsilon\right) \wedge \left(S_{\pi,1} \leq (1 - \frac{1}{2k})\varepsilon\right)\right\} \tag{0.0.17}$$

and use $\mathcal{W}^c$ to denote the complement of $\mathcal{W}$. We bound the second summand in (0.0.14)

$$\begin{aligned}
&\mathbb{E}_\pi \left[S_{\pi^*,0} + \Pr_r[\Gamma_V^{(g)}(D(x^*,r)) = 1 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*](S_{\pi^*,1} - S_{\pi^*,0})\right] \\
&\quad = \mathbb{E}_{\pi\in\mathcal{W}^c} \left[S_{\pi^*,0} + \Pr_r[\Gamma_V^{(g)}(D(x^*,r)) = 1 \mid \pi = \pi^*](S_{\pi^*,1} - S_{\pi^*,0})\right] \\
&\qquad + \mathbb{E}_{\pi\in\mathcal{W}} \left[S_{\pi^*,0} + \Pr_r[\Gamma_V^{(g)}(D(x^*,r)) = 1 \mid \pi = \pi^*](S_{\pi^*,1} - S_{\pi^*,0})\right] && (0.0.18) \\
&\quad \leq \frac{\varepsilon}{6k} + \mathbb{E}_{\pi\in\mathcal{W}^c} \left[S_{\pi^*,0} + \Pr_r[\Gamma_V^{(g)}(D(x^*,r)) = 1 \mid \pi = \pi^*]((1-\frac{1}{2k})\varepsilon - S_{\pi^*,0})\right] && (0.0.19) \\
&\quad \leq \frac{\varepsilon}{6k} + 1 - \frac{\varepsilon}{2k} = 1 - \frac{\varepsilon}{3k} && (0.0.20)
\end{aligned}$$

Finally, we insert this result into equation (0.0.14) and make use of the fact

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pr[g(u)=1] &= \Pr[(g(0,\mu_2,\ldots,\mu_k)=1) \vee (g(1,\mu_2,\ldots,\mu_k)=1 \wedge g(0,\mu_2,\ldots,\mu_k)=0 \wedge \mu_1 = 1)] \\
&= \Pr[g(0,\mu_2,\ldots,\mu_k)=1] + \Pr[g(1,\mu_2,\ldots,\mu_k)=1 \wedge g(0,\mu_2,\ldots,\mu_k)=0]\Pr[\mu_1=1]
\end{aligned}$$

which yields

$$\Pr_{r,\pi}[D(x,r)=1] \geq \mathbb{E}_\pi \left[\frac{\Pr_{\pi^{(k)}}[g(c)=1 \mid \pi_1 = \pi^*] - \Pr_{\mu_\delta^{(k)}}[g(0,\mu_2,\ldots,\mu_k)=0] - (1-\frac{1}{6k})\varepsilon}{\Pr_{\mu_\delta^k}[G_\mu]}\right]$$

Using the assumptions of Lemma 1.6, we get

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pr_{r,\pi}[\Gamma_V(D(x,r))=1] &\geq \frac{\Pr_{\mu_\delta^{(k)}}[g(\mu)=1] + \varepsilon + \Pr_{\mu_\delta^{(k)}}[g(0,\mu_2,\ldots,\mu_k)=0] - (1-\frac{1}{6k})\varepsilon}{\Pr_{\mu_\delta^k}[G_\mu]} \\
&\geq \frac{\varepsilon + \delta\Pr_{\mu_\delta^{(k)}}[G_\mu] - (1-\frac{1}{6k})\varepsilon}{\Pr_{\mu_\delta^k}[G_\mu]} \geq \delta + \frac{\varepsilon}{6k} && (0.0.21)
\end{aligned}$$

□

Now, we can show that the Theorem 1.1 follows by Lemma 1.4 and Lemma 1.6. First we define the following circuit:

E

Oracle: Circuit D from Lemma 1.6
Input: A bitstring $\rho \in \{0,1\}^*$

Run circuit $(q,y) = D(\rho)$
if $(q,y) \neq \perp$ **then**
  make a verification query (q,y)

The circuit E is output by the following algorithm *Gen*.

Gen

Oracle: $C, P^{(1)}, g$
Input: $\varepsilon, \delta, n, h, v$

Let $\mathcal{H}$ be a set of pairwise independent hash functions $Q \to \{0,1,\ldots,2(h+v)-1\}$
$hash :=$ **FindHash**$(\mathcal{H}, h+v)$
$D := Gen(C, g, \varepsilon, \delta, n, h, v, hash)$
return $D^{P^1,C,hash}(\rho)$

From the assumptions of Theorem 1.3 we know that success probability of C is at least

$$8(h+v)\left(\Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[g(u)=1]+\varepsilon\right),$$

then by Lemma 1.4, the canonical success probability of $\widetilde{C}$ with respect to function *hash* is at least

$$\left(\Pr_{u \leftarrow \mu_\delta^k}[g(u)=1]+\varepsilon\right).$$

Then we apply Lemma 1.6 with respect to $\widetilde{C}$ and *hash* which yields a circuit D that outputs (q,y) such that

$$\Pr_{\substack{\pi,\sigma \\ (\Gamma_V,\Gamma_H):=\langle P^{(1)}(\pi),D(\rho)\rangle_{P^{(1)}} \\ x:=\langle P^{(1)}(\pi),D(\rho)\rangle_{\text{trans}}}}\left[\Gamma_V(D^{P^{(1)},C,\Gamma_V,\Gamma_H,hash}(x,\sigma))=1\right] \geq (\delta+\frac{\varepsilon}{6k}).$$

Hence, the probability that the verification query made by E is successful is at least $(\delta+\frac{\varepsilon}{6k})$.