

CSCE 413: Software Security
Class 31: Strace

Demonstration Quickstart

A demonstration script `exploit.sh` has been included. This script will run both `1.bin` and `2.bin` with `strace`. For both of these programs, it will first run `strace` normally and then with parameters that expose how they actually work.

To run this demo,

1. Enter the `Class31` directory.
`cd Class31`
2. (*Optional*) If the script does not have execution permission, add such permissions.
`chmod +x ./exploit.sh`
3. Run the `exploit.sh` script.
`./exploit.sh`

What follows is a screenshot of the output of `exploit.sh`.

```
user@DESKTOP-HJPALP7:~/csce_413/class_31$ ls
1.bin 2.bin commented_logs exploit.sh fake_ptrace.c fake_ptrace.so strace
user@DESKTOP-HJPALP7:~/csce_413/class_31$ ./exploit.sh
1.bin: Running ./1.bin normally.
World
Hello

1.bin: Running ./1.bin with follow forks.
Hello
World

2.bin: Running ./2.bin normally.

2.bin: Running ./2.bin with a LD_PRELOAD and attaching.
Started ./2.bin with PID: 717
strace: Process 717 attached
strace: Process 721 attached
I'm a malware
user@DESKTOP-HJPALP7:~/csce_413/class_31$ ls
1.bin      1_strace_followforks.log  2_strace.log      commented_logs  fake_ptrace.c  strace
1_strace.log  2.bin                    2_strace_preload_attach.log  exploit.sh      fake_ptrace.so
user@DESKTOP-HJPALP7:~/csce_413/class_31$
```

Folder Contents

The submission for this assignment also includes a folder `commented_logs/`. This folder contains the logs generated by the `exploit.sh` script with brief comments explaining the important behaviors of the `*.bin` files.

We can run `2.bin` with `strace` using the simple command,

This will run strace and output everything to 2_strace.log.

It is seen that the output prints nothing when being run with strace. We will now inspect `2_strace.log`, lines 30-32,

It is seen here that the program is making a call to `ptrace`, a system call made to allow a parent process to trace the child. In this instance, the program is checking if it's parent can trace it, which it fails. Barring irregular behavior, this system call returns a -1 (fails) typically if there exists a program already tracing it. Since we are using `strace`, it follows that the program is already being traced. This could be an anti-analysis line, which will be further examined in the Analysis section.

We will run `1.bin` normally without the use of `strace`.

As seen here, the program outputs the same as before. We will attempt to find where the call made to print "World" is coming from in the Analysis section.

2.bin without Strace

We will run `2.bin` normally without the use of `strace`.

```
user@DESKTOP-HJPALP7:~/csce_413/class_31$ ./2.bin
I'm a malware

[1]+  Stopped                  ./2.bin
```

It is seen that the program printed "I'm a malware" and then stopped, which is different than the output seen in strace. This is most likely the purposeful stopping of the program if it is/is not being traced. This will be investigated further in the Analysis section.

Behavior Analysis

Analysis of 1.bin

It is seen that `1.bin` created a child process while running, and that the parent process did not have a print function for "World". It is most likely that the program is creating a child process that prints "World". We can use `strace -f` follow-forks flag to observe the output of its children,

```
strace -f -o 1_strace_followforks.log ./1.bin
```

This will create a log file `1_strace_followforks.log`.

[illegible]

We can analyze the contents of this log file, specifically lines 30-56.

```

1 4813 clone(child_stack=NULL, flags=CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID|CLONE_CHILD_SETTID|SIGCHLD, child_tidptr=0
    x7fe4931d7a10) = 4814
2 4814 set_robust_list(0x7fe4931d7a20, 24 <unfinished ...>
3 4813 fstat(1, <unfinished ...>
4 4814 <... set_robust_list resumed>) = 0
5 4813 <... fstat resumed>{st_mode=S_IFCHR|0620, st_rdev=makedev(0x88, 0), ...}) = 0
6 4813 getrandom(<unfinished ...>
7 4814 fstat(1, <unfinished ...>
8 4813 <... getrandom resumed>"\x78\x55\xa1\x76\xdd\xed\xed\xfd", 8, GRND_NONBLOCK) = 8
9 4814 <... fstat resumed>{st_mode=S_IFCHR|0620, st_rdev=makedev(0x88, 0), ...}) = 0
10 4813 brk(NULL <unfinished ...>
11 4814 getrandom(<unfinished ...>
12 4813 <... brk resumed>) = 0x28906000
13 4814 <... getrandom resumed>"\xff\x63\x34\xf4\xc2\x29\xb3\xeb", 8, GRND_NONBLOCK) = 8
14 4813 brk(0x28927000) = 0x28927000
15 4814 brk(NULL <unfinished ...>
16 4813 write(1, "Hello\n", 6 <unfinished ...>
17 4814 <... brk resumed>) = 0x28906000

```

```

18 4813 <... write resumed>                = 6
19 4814 brk(0x28927000 <unfinished ...>
20 4813 exit_group(0 <unfinished ...>
21 4814 <... brk resumed>)                  = 0x28927000
22 4813 <... exit_group resumed>           = ?
23 4814 write(1, "World\n", 6 <unfinished ...>
24 4813 +++ exited with 0 +++
25 4814 <... write resumed>                = 6
26 4814 exit_group(0)                      = ?
27 4814 +++ exited with 0 +++

```

It is seen that, on line 30 (line 1 in this instance), the parent process 4813 creates a child process 4814. Line 16 shows the parent process printing "Hello" and the child process writing "World" on line 23. Both parent and child processes terminate afterwards. It is seen that we have found the true behavior of `1.bin`- the process creates a child, the parent prints "Hello", the child prints "World", and then both terminate.

Analysis of 2.bin

We have seen that `2.bin` terminated when traced with `strace` and printed "I'm a malware" when ran normally. This behavior is caused by the system call made to `ptrace`. It follows that if `ptrace` did not detect that `strace` was being used to trace the program, we could continue analyzing its behavior. For this, I created a shared object file `fake_ptrace.c` that serves to act as a preloaded `ptrace` replacement.

```

1  #define _GNU_SOURCE
2  #include <stdio.h>
3  #include <dlfcn.h>
4  #include <sys/ptrace.h>
5  #include <errno.h>
6  #include <sys/types.h>
7  #include <stdarg.h>
8  #include <unistd.h>
9  const int WAIT_TIME = 1;
10 long (*orig_ptrace)(enum __ptrace_request request, ...) = NULL;
11 long ptrace(enum __ptrace_request request, ...) {
12     if (!orig_ptrace) {
13         orig_ptrace = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "ptrace");
14     }
15     va_list args;
16     va_start(args, request);
17     if (request == PTRACE_TRACEME) {
18         sleep(WAIT_TIME);
19         va_end(args);
20         return 0;
21     }
22     pid_t pid = va_arg(args, pid_t);
23     void* addr = va_arg(args, void*);
24     void* data = va_arg(args, void*);
25     va_end(args);
26     return orig_ptrace(request, pid, addr, data);
27 }

```

If `ptrace` is called with `PTRACE_TRACEME` (which `2.bin` does) it will falsify the output, always returning true.

After some experimentation, I also added a `sleep` call. This will give us some time to attach `strace` to the running program instead of running the program with `strace`. This will help further avoid anti-tampering features. This can be compiled with,

```
gcc -shared -fPIC -o fake_ptrace.so fake_ptrace.c -ldl
```

Now that we have created `fake_ptrace.so` such that it will return that the program is never being traced and will initialize a sleep long enough to attach `strace` to the it, we can run the following command;

`LD_PRELOAD=./fake_ptrace.so ./2.bin & pid=$! && strace -f -p $pid -o 2_strace_preload_attach.log`

This command will run `2.bin` with the fake `ptrace` preloaded. It will then capture the PID of this program and attach `strace`,

```
user@DESKTOP-HJPALP7:~/csce_413/class_31$ LD_PRELOAD=./fake_ptrace.so ./2.bin & pid=$! && strace -f -p $pid -o 2_strace_preload_attach.log
[2] 7450
strace: Process 7450 attached
strace: Process 7460 attached
I'm a malware
[2]- Done
LD_PRELOAD=./fake_ptrace.so ./2.bin
user@DESKTOP-HJPALP7:~/csce_413/class_31$ cat 2_strace_preload_attach.log
7450 restart_syscall(<... resuming interrupted read ...>) = 0
7450 clone(child_stack=NULL, flags=CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID|CLONE_CHILD_SETTID|SIGCHLD <unfinished ...>
7460 set_robust_list(0x7f321bbf1a20, 24 <unfinished ...>
7450 <... clone resumed>, child_tidptr=0x7f321bbf1a10) = 7460
7460 <... set_robust_list resumed> = 0
7450 wait4(-1, <unfinished ...>
7460 fstat(1, {st_mode=S_IFCHR|0620, st_rdev=makedev(0x88, 0), ...}) = 0
7460 getrandom("\x68\xd8\x3a\xd0\x68\x71\xd8\xf4", 8, GRND_NONBLOCK) = 8
7460 brk(NULL) = 0x5630313e6000
7460 brk(0x563031407000) = 0x563031407000
7460 write(1, "I'm a malware\n", 14) = 14
7460 exit_group(0) = ?
7460 +++ exited with 0 +++
7450 <... wait4 resumed>[{WIFEXITED(s) && WEXITSTATUS(s) == 0}], 0, NULL) = 7460
7450 --- SIGCHLD {si_signo=SIGCHLD, si_code=CLD_EXITED, si_pid=7460, si_uid=1000, si_status=0, si_ftime=0} ---
7450 exit_group(0) = ?
7450 +++ exited with 0 +++
```

As seen here, the program output "I'm a malware" and `strace` successfully produced a log of its system calls.

```

1 7450 restart_syscall(<... resuming interrupted read ...>) = 0
2 7450 clone(child_stack=NULL, flags=CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID|CLONE_CHILD_SETTID|SIGCHLD <unfinished
...>
3 7460 set_robust_list(0x7f321bbf1a20, 24 <unfinished ...>
4 7450 <... clone resumed>, child_tidptr=0x7f321bbf1a10) = 7460
5 7460 <... set_robust_list resumed> = 0
6 7450 wait4(-1, <unfinished ...>
7 7460 fstat(1, {st_mode=S_IFCHR|0620, st_rdev=makedev(0x88, 0), ...}) = 0
8 7460 getrandom("\x68\xd8\x3a\xd0\x68\x71\xd8\xf4", 8, GRND_NONBLOCK) = 8
9 7460 brk(NULL) = 0x5630313e6000
10 7460 brk(0x563031407000) = 0x563031407000
11 7460 write(1, "I'm a malware\n", 14) = 14
12 7460 exit_group(0) = ?
13 7460 +++ exited with 0 +++
14 7450 <... wait4 resumed>[{WIFEXITED(s) && WEXITSTATUS(s) == 0}], 0, NULL) = 7460
15 7450 --- SIGCHLD {si_signo=SIGCHLD, si_code=CLD_EXITED, si_pid=7460, si_uid=1000, si_status=0,
si_ftime=0, si_stime=0} ---
16 7450 exit_group(0) = ?
17 7450 +++ exited with 0 +++

```

The program created a child on line 2 with PID 7460, as seen on line 4. The child then prints "I'm a malware" on line 11 and terminates alongside the parent on lines 13 and 17. The true behavior of this program is that the parent process runs `ptrace` to check if it is being traced. If not, it creates a child process and prints "I'm a malware".