



# SPYWOLF

## Security Audit Report



Audit prepared for  
**Signum**

Completed on  
**November 26, 2024**

@SPYWOLFNETWORK



@SPYWOLFNETWORK



SPYWOLF.CO





# OVERVIEW

This goal of this report is to review the main aspects of the project to help investors make an informative decision during their research process.

You will find a a summarized review of the following key points:

- ✓ Contract's source code
- ✓ Owners' wallets
- ✓ Tokenomics
- ✓ Team transparency and goals
- ✓ Website's age, code, security and UX
- ✓ Whitepaper and roadmap
- ✓ Social media & online presence

“

*The results of this audit are purely based on the team's evaluation and does not guarantee nor reflect the projects outcome and goal*

- SPYWOLF Team -

”






# TABLE OF CONTENTS

---

Project Description	01
Contract 1 Information & Results	02-04
Contract 2 Information & Results	05-06
Contract 3 Information & Results	07-08
Contract 4 Information & Results	09-10
Contract 5 Information & Results	11-12
Contract 6 Information & Results	13-14
Contract 7 Information & Results	15-16
Website Analysis & Score	17
Social Media Review & Score	18
About SPYWOLF	19
Disclaimer	20





# Autopay Contract

Token Name  
Unavailable

Symbol  
Unavailable

Contract Address  
Unavailable

Network  
Unavailable

Language  
Solidity

Deployment Date  
Not deployed yet

Contract Type  
Tipping/Rewards

Total Supply  
Unavailable

Decimals  
Unavailable

## TAXES

Buy Tax  
**0%**

Sell Tax  
**0%**

## Our Contract Review Process

The contract review process pays special attention to the following:

- ✓ Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon vulnerabilities
- ✓ Assessing the codebase to ensure compliance with current best practices and industry standards.
- ✓ Ensuring contract logic meets the specifications and intentions of the client.
- ✓ Cross referencing contract structure and implementation against similar smart contracts produced by industry leaders.
- ✓ Thorough line-by-line manual review of the entire codebase by industry experts.

### Blockchain security tools used:

- OpenZeppelin
- Mythril
- Solidity Compiler
- Hardhat



# VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

ID	Title	
SWC-100	Function Default Visibility	Passed
SWC-101	Integer Overflow and Underflow	Passed
SWC-102	Outdated Compiler Version	Passed
SWC-103	Floating Pragma	Passed
SWC-104	Unchecked Call Return Value	Passed
SWC-105	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	Passed
SWC-106	Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	Passed
SWC-107	Reentrancy	Passed
SWC-108	State Variable Default Visibility	Passed
SWC-109	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	Passed
SWC-110	Assert Violation	Passed
SWC-111	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	Passed
SWC-112	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	Passed
SWC-113	DoS with Failed Call	Passed
SWC-114	Transaction Order Dependence	Passed
SWC-115	Authorization through tx.origin	Passed
SWC-116	Block values as a proxy for time	Passed
SWC-117	Signature Malleability	Passed
SWC-118	Incorrect Constructor Name	Passed



# VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

ID	Title	
SWC-119	Shadowing State Variables	Passed
SWC-120	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	Passed
SWC-121	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	Passed
SWC-122	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	Passed
SWC-123	Requirement Violation	Passed
SWC-124	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	Passed
SWC-125	Incorrect Inheritance Order	Passed
SWC-126	Insufficient Gas Griefing	Passed
SWC-127	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	Passed
SWC-128	DoS With Block Gas Limit	Passed
SWC-129	Typographical Error	Passed
SWC-130	Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E)	Passed
SWC-131	Presence of unused variables	Passed
SWC-132	Unexpected Ether balance	Passed
SWC-133	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments	Passed
SWC-134	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	Passed
SWC-135	Code With No Effects	Passed
SWC-136	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	Passed



# VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

## NO ERRORS FOUND



# FOUND THREATS

## High Risk

No high risk-level threats found in this contract.

## Medium Risk

No medium risk-level threats found in this contract.

## Low Risk

No low risk-level threats found in this contract.





# Governance Contract

Token Name  
Unavailable

Symbol  
Unavailable

Contract Address  
Unavailable

Network  
Unavailable

Language  
Solidity

Deployment Date  
Not deployed yet

Contract Type  
Governance

Total Supply  
Unavailable

Decimals  
Unavailable

## TAXES

Buy Tax  
**0%**

Sell Tax  
**0%**

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- ✓ Thorough line-by-line manual review of the entire codebase by industry experts.

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- OpenZeppelin
- Mythril
- Solidity Compiler
- Hardhat



# FOUND THREATS

## High Risk

No high risk-level threats found in this contract.

## Medium Risk

No medium risk-level threats found in this contract.

## Low Risk

No low risk-level threats found in this contract.



# FOUND THREATS

## Informational

'teamMultisig' address can change the 'privateFactoryAddress'.

```
function updatePrivateFactoryAddress(address _privateFactoryAddress) external {  
    require(msg.sender == teamMultisig, "only the team can update the factory deploy address");  
    privateFactoryAddress = _privateFactoryAddress;  
  
    emit PrivateFactoryUpdated(_privateFactoryAddress);  
}
```

'privateFactoryAddress' can add addresses to the  
'privateOracleAddresses' mapping

```
function addPrivateOracle(address _privateOracleAddress) external {  
    require(msg.sender == privateFactoryAddress, "only the factory can add oracles to be governed");  
    privateOracleAddresses[_privateOracleAddress] = true;  
  
    emit PrivateOracleAdded(_privateOracleAddress);  
}
```



# FOUND THREATS

## Informational

Private disputes can be opened only by addresses mapped as 'privateOracleAddresses'.

```
function beginDisputePrivate(IOracle _oracle, bytes32 _queryId, uint256 _timestamp) external {
    require(privateOracleAddresses[address(_oracle)], "Oracle address must be a private signum oracle.");
    // Ensure value actually exists
    address _reporter = _oracle.getReporterByTimestamp(_queryId, _timestamp);
    require(_reporter != address(0), "no value exists at given timestamp");
    bytes32 _hash = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(_queryId, _timestamp));
    // Push new vote round
    uint256 _disputeId = voteCount + 1;
    uint256[] storage _voteRounds = voteRounds[_hash];
    _voteRounds.push(_disputeId);

    // Create new vote and dispute
    Vote storage _thisVote = voteInfo[_disputeId];
    Dispute storage _thisDispute = disputeInfo[_disputeId];

    // Initialize dispute information - query ID, timestamp, value, etc.
    _thisDispute.queryId = _queryId;
    _thisDispute.timestamp = _timestamp;
    _thisDispute.disputedReporter = _reporter;
    // Initialize vote information - hash, initiator, block number, etc.
    _thisVote.identifierHash = _hash;
    _thisVote.initiator = msg.sender;
    _thisVote.blockNumber = block.number;
    _thisVote.startDate = block.timestamp;
    _thisVote.voteRound = _voteRounds.length;
    disputeIdsByReporter[_reporter].push(_disputeId);
    .....
}
```



# SignumFlex PrivateFactory

Token Name  
Unavailable

Symbol  
Unavailable

Contract Address  
Unavailable

Network  
Unavailable

Language  
Solidity

Deployment Date  
Not deployed yet

Contract Type  
Factory

Total Supply  
Unavailable

Decimals  
Unavailable

## TAXES

Buy Tax  
**0%**

Sell Tax  
**0%**

## Our Contract Review Process

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- Hardhat



# FOUND THREATS

## High Risk

No high risk-level threats found in this contract.

## Medium Risk

No medium risk-level threats found in this contract.

## Low Risk

No low risk-level threats found in this contract.



# FOUND THREATS

## Informational

Owner can set creation fee and fee receiver.

```
function updateFeeSettings(uint256 _creationFee, address _feeReceiver) external onlyOwner {  
    creationFee = _creationFee;  
    feeReceiver = _feeReceiver;  
}
```

Owner can set 'stakeAmount' up to 75,000 tokens and 'stakeLockTime' up to 10 years.

These variables are read and used by the SignumFlexPrivate contracts.

```
function updateStakeRequirements(uint256 _stakeAmount, uint256 _stakeLockTime) external onlyOwner {  
    stakeAmount = _stakeAmount;  
    stakeLockTime = _stakeLockTime;  
    require(stakeAmount <= 75000e18, "75K Max");  
    require(stakeLockTime <= 315360000, "10 Year max.");  
    emit StakeRequirementsUpdated(_stakeAmount, _stakeLockTime);  
}
```



# FOUND THREATS

## Informational

Users can deploy new SignumFlexPrivate contracts. SignumFlexPrivate contracts are added in 'privateOracleAddresses' mapping in the governance contract, allowing them to use the 'beginDisputePrivate' functionality.

```
function deploySignumFlexPrivate() external payable returns (address newContractAddress) {
    // Transfer creationFee
    if (creationFee > 0) {
        IERC20(feeToken).transferFrom(msg.sender, feeReceiver, creationFee);
    }

    // Deploy a new instance of the SignumFlexPrivate contract
    SignumFlexPrivate newContract = new SignumFlexPrivate(address(this));

    // Store the address of the new contract in the deployedContracts array
    deployedContracts.push(address(newContract));
    isPrivateOracle[address(newContract)] = true;
    governance.addPrivateOracle(address(newContract));

    // Emit the ContractDeployed event
    emit PrivateOracleDeployed(address(newContract), msg.sender);

    // Return the address of the newly deployed contract
    return address(newContract);
}
```





# FOUND THREATS

## Informational

Users can deploy new SignumFlexPrivate contracts. SignumFlexPrivate contracts are added in 'privateOracleAddresses' mapping in the governance contract, allowing them to use the 'beginDisputePrivate' functionality.

```
function deploySignumFlexPrivate() external payable returns (address newContractAddress) {
    // Transfer creationFee
    if (creationFee > 0) {
        IERC20(feeToken).transferFrom(msg.sender, feeReceiver, creationFee);
    }

    // Deploy a new instance of the SignumFlexPrivate contract
    SignumFlexPrivate newContract = new SignumFlexPrivate(address(this));

    // Store the address of the new contract in the deployedContracts array
    deployedContracts.push(address(newContract));
    isPrivateOracle[address(newContract)] = true;
    governance.addPrivateOracle(address(newContract));

    // Emit the ContractDeployed event
    emit PrivateOracleDeployed(address(newContract), msg.sender);

    // Return the address of the newly deployed contract
    return address(newContract);
}
```

# SignumFlex Private

Token Name  
Unavailable

Symbol  
Unavailable

Contract Address  
Unavailable

Network  
Unavailable

Language  
Solidity

Deployment Date  
Not deployed yet

Contract Type  
Factory

Total Supply  
Unavailable

Decimals  
Unavailable

## TAXES

Buy Tax  
**0%**

Sell Tax  
**0%**

## Our Contract Review Process

The contract review process pays special attention to the following:

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# FOUND THREATS

## ⚠ Medium Risk

If `_lockedBalance` is higher than `IFactory(factory).stakeAmount()` overflow will occur, causing the transaction to revert.

Overflow might also occur if factory's 'stakeAmount' state variable is changed to inappropriate number.

```
function slashReporter(address _reporter)
    external
    returns (uint256 _slashAmount)
{
    .....

    uint256 factoryStakeAmount = IFactory(factory).stakeAmount();
    else if (_lockedBalance + _stakedBalance >= factoryStakeAmount) {
        uint256 remainder = factoryStakeAmount - _lockedBalance;

        // Ensure there won't be an underflow
        require(remainder <= _stakedBalance, "invalid staked balance for slashing");

        _slashAmount = factoryStakeAmount;

        _updateStakeAndPayRewards(
            _reporter,
            _stakedBalance - remainder
        );
        toWithdraw -= _lockedBalance;
        _staker.lockedBalance = 0;
    }
    .....
}
```

*Fail scenario given that 3 contracts are deployed via the factory with default stakeAmount of 200:*

In 2 of the contracts there is user which `_lockedBalance` is 100.

In 1 of the contracts there is user which `_lockedBalance` is 50.

Administrator of the factory contract changes the stakeAmount to 70.

Now tx will revert for the user which `_lockedBalances` is 100, because the equation will be  $70 - 100 = -30$ , resulting in negative number, causing the uint256 to overflow (prevented by the compiler after solidity v0.8).

Tx will go through for the 3rd contract because the equation will be  $70 - 50 = 20$ . Require statement won't be reached when overflow occurs.

- Recommendation:
  - When changing stakeAmount variable in factory contract, ensure that there are no users which `_lockedBalances` surpass the newly set value in the derived flexPrivate contracts to prevent overflow for these users.



# FOUND THREATS

## Informational

Owner can whitelist reporter addresses to submit specific data set. Eligible reporters can submit new data records to the contract. Once set, the data that whitelisted reporter can submit cannot be changed.

```
function updateWhitelist(address _reporter, bytes32 _queryId, bool _status) external {
    require(msg.sender == owner, "only owner can update whitelist");
    whitelist[_reporter] = _status;

    if (stakerDetails[_reporter].reporterQueryId == 0) {
        stakerDetails[_reporter].reporterQueryId = _queryId;
    }

    emit WhitelistUpdated(_reporter, _status);
}
```



# FOUND THREATS

## Informational

Governance address can remove reported data (nullify already created reports).

```
function removeValue(bytes32 _queryId, uint256 _timestamp) external {
    require(msg.sender == governance, "caller must be governance address");
    Report storage _report = reports[_queryId];
    require(!_report.isDisputed[_timestamp], "value already disputed");
    uint256 _index = _report.timestampIndex[_timestamp];
    require(_timestamp == _report.timestamps[_index], "invalid timestamp");
    _report.valueByTimestamp[_timestamp] = "";
    _report.isDisputed[_timestamp] = true;
    emit ValueRemoved(_queryId, _timestamp);
}
```



# SignumPresale Contract

Token Name  
Unavailable

Symbol  
Unavailable

Contract Address  
Unavailable

Network  
Unavailable

Language  
Solidity

Deployment Date  
Not deployed yet

Contract Type  
Factory

Total Supply  
Unavailable

Decimals  
Unavailable

## TAXES

Buy Tax  
**0%**

Sell Tax  
**0%**

## Our Contract Review Process

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### Blockchain security tools used:

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- Hardhat



# FOUND THREATS

## Low Risk

Owner can withdraw contract's native currency balances (ETH, BNB, etc.). Function may not be used if the owner is multi sig wallet which fallback/receive functionality requires more than 30,000 gas.

```
function withdraw() public onlyOwner {  
    uint256 balance = address(this).balance;  
    payable(msg.sender).call{value: balance, gas: 30000}("");  
}
```

*If multi sig wallet usage is desired ensure its receive/fallback won't consume more than 30,000 gas.*

## Low Risk

Owner can add purchase rounds.

**Beware for token's decimals** when `_tokenCost` is set, depending on each chain. This may cause undesired misspricing and/or revert in `buy()` functionality.

```
function addRound(uint256 _tokensAvailable, uint256 _tokenCost) public onlyOwner {  
    rounds.push(Round(_tokensAvailable, _tokenCost));  
}
```

*Example: USDT stable coin is with 6 decimals in Ethereum mainnet but with 18 decimals in Binance smart chain mainnet.*





# FOUND THREATS

## ⚠ Low Risk

Owner can set payment token that will be used to purchase the presale tokens.

Beware for payment token's decimals. If token that have inappropriate decimals (different than 18), this may result in mispricing delivered from the ExchangeHelper contract.

Overflow may also occur if token's decimals are above 18 in ExchangeHelper's `getRateFromDex()` functionality.

```
function setPaymentToken(address _paymentToken, bool _allowed) public onlyOwner {
    paymentTokens[_paymentToken] = _allowed;
}

function getRateFromDex(address _tokenAddress) public view returns (uint256) {
    PriceRecord storage priceRecord = priceRecords[_tokenAddress];
    if (priceRecord.active) {
        uint256 rawTokenAmount = IERC20Extended(priceRecord.token).balanceOf(
            priceRecord.lpToken
        );
        uint256 tokenDecimalDelta = 18 -
            uint256(IERC20Extended(priceRecord.token).decimals());
        uint256 tokenAmount = rawTokenAmount.mul(10**tokenDecimalDelta);

        uint256 rawBaseTokenAmount = IERC20Extended(priceRecord.baseToken)
            .balanceOf(priceRecord.lpToken);
        uint256 baseTokenDecimalDelta = 18 -
            uint256(IERC20Extended(priceRecord.baseToken).decimals());
        uint256 baseTokenAmount = rawBaseTokenAmount.mul(
            10**baseTokenDecimalDelta
        );

        // Fetch the base token price using the getBaseTokenPrice function
        uint256 baseTokenPrice = getBaseTokenPrice();

        // Calculate the token price based on the fetched base token price
        uint256 tokenPrice = baseTokenPrice.mul(baseTokenAmount).div(tokenAmount);

        return tokenPrice;
    } else {
        return 0;
    }
}
```





# FOUND THREATS

## Informational

Owner can withdraw any ERC20 token from the contract.

```
function withdrawTokens(address _tokenAddress, uint256 _amount)
    public
    onlyOwner
{
    require(
        _amount <= IERC20(_tokenAddress).balanceOf(address(this)),
        "Insufficient token balance in contract."
    );

    IERC20(_tokenAddress).transfer(address(msg.sender), _amount);
}
```

Owner can set presale's start and end time.

```
function setStartAndStopTime(uint32 _startTime, uint32 _stopTime) public onlyOwner {
    require(_stopTime > _startTime, "Stop time must be after startTime.");
    startTime = _startTime;
    stopTime = _stopTime;
}
```

Owner can set minimum and maximum amount of tokens that can be purchased by user.

```
function setMinAndMaxAmount(uint256 _minAmount, uint256 _maxAmount) public onlyOwner {
    minAmount = _minAmount;
    maxAmount = _maxAmount;
}
```



# FOUND THREATS

## Informational: 2

Owner can set payment tokens receiver.

```
function setReceiver(address _newReceiver) public onlyOwner {  
    receiver = _newReceiver;  
}
```

### *General information:*

When users participate in the presale with the buy() function, no actual tokens are distributed. Their buy share is saved into 'totalBoughtByuser' mapping.

# ExchangeHelper Contract

Token Name  
Unavailable

Symbol  
Unavailable

Contract Address  
Unavailable

Network  
Unavailable

Language  
Solidity

Deployment Date  
Not deployed yet

Contract Type  
Factory

Total Supply  
Unavailable

Decimals  
Unavailable

## TAXES

Buy Tax  
**0%**

Sell Tax  
**0%**

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# FOUND THREATS

## ⚠ Low Risk

Owner can set new record for a token.

**Beware** for the newly set token's **decimals** as overflow will occur in 'getRateFromDex()' if the token have more than 18 decimals.

```
function setDexPriceRecord(
    address _token,
    address _baseToken,
    address _lpToken
) external onlyAdmin {
    PriceRecord storage priceRecord = priceRecords[_token];
    priceRecord.token = _token;
    priceRecord.baseToken = _baseToken;
    priceRecord.lpToken = _lpToken;
    priceRecord.active = true;
    emit PriceRecordUpdated(_token, _baseToken, _lpToken);
}

function getRateFromDex(address _tokenAddress) public view returns (uint256) {
    PriceRecord storage priceRecord = priceRecords[_tokenAddress];
    if (priceRecord.active) {
        uint256 rawTokenAmount = IERC20Extended(priceRecord.token).balanceOf(
            priceRecord.lpToken
        );
        uint256 tokenDecimalDelta = 18 -
            uint256(IERC20Extended(priceRecord.token).decimals());
        uint256 tokenAmount = rawTokenAmount.mul(10**tokenDecimalDelta);

        uint256 rawBaseTokenAmount = IERC20Extended(priceRecord.baseToken)
            .balanceOf(priceRecord.lpToken);
        uint256 baseTokenDecimalDelta = 18 -
            uint256(IERC20Extended(priceRecord.baseToken).decimals());
        uint256 baseTokenAmount = rawBaseTokenAmount.mul(
            10**baseTokenDecimalDelta
        );

        // Fetch the base token price using the getBaseTokenPrice function
        uint256 baseTokenPrice = getBaseTokenPrice();

        // Calculate the token price based on the fetched base token price
        uint256 tokenPrice = baseTokenPrice.mul(baseTokenAmount).div(tokenAmount);

        return tokenPrice;
    } else {
        return 0;
    }
}
```



# FOUND THREATS

## Informational

Admin can set exchange rate price for a token.

```
function setDirectPrice(address _token, uint256 _price) external onlyAdmin {  
    emit DirectPriceUpdated(_token, assetPrices[_token], _price);  
    assetPrices[_token] = _price;  
}
```

Admin can transfer authorization to another address.

```
function setAdmin(address newAdmin) external onlyAdmin {  
    address oldAdmin = admin;  
    admin = newAdmin;  
  
    emit NewAdmin(oldAdmin, newAdmin);  
}
```



# Signum TestToken

Token Name	Symbol
Signum Test Token	STT
Contract Address	
Unavailable	
Network	Language
Unavailable	Solidity
Deployment Date	Contract Type
Not deployed yet	Standard token
Total Supply	Decimals
Assigned at deployment	18

## TAXES



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- Hardhat



# FOUND THREATS

## Low Risk

Owner can self destruct the contract.  
Depending on the EVM version, this may render the contract unusable/unreadable.

```
function selfDestruct() external onlyOwner {  
    selfdestruct(payable(owner));  
}
```



# FOUND THREATS

## Informational

'\_EIP\_SLOT' variable does not match the hash from keccak256(abi.encodePacked(\_EIP\_SLOT)) value.

```
bytes32 constant _EIP_SLOT =  
    0x7050c9e0f4ca769c69bd3a8ef740bc37934f8e2c036e5a723fd8ee048ed3f8c3;
```





# WEBSITE

**Website URL:**  
Unavailable

**Domain Registry**  
<https://www.godaddy.com>

**Domain Expiration**  
Unavailable

**Technical SEO Test**  
Passed

**Security Test**  
Passed. SSL certificate present

**Design**  
Unavailable

**Content**  
Unavailable

**Whitepaper**  
Unavailable

**Roadmap**  
Unavailable

**Mobile-friendly?**  
Unavailable



**Under Construction**





# SOCIAL MEDIA

Social Score: 0%



## ANALYSIS

Unavailable



Twitter:

Unavailable



Discord

Unavailable



Telegram:

Unavailable



Medium

Unavailable



# SPYWOLF

## CRYPTO SECURITY

Audits | KYCs | dApps  
Contract Development

# ABOUT US

We are a growing crypto security agency offering audits, KYCs and consulting services for some of the top names in the crypto industry.

- ✓ OVER 700 SUCCESSFUL CLIENTS
- ✓ MORE THAN 1000 SCAMS EXPOSED
- ✓ MILLIONS SAVED IN POTENTIAL FRAUD
- ✓ PARTNERSHIPS WITH TOP LAUNCHPADS, INFLUENCERS AND CRYPTO PROJECTS
- ✓ CONSTANTLY BUILDING TOOLS TO HELP INVESTORS DO BETTER RESEARCH

To hire us, reach out to  
[contact@spywolf.co](mailto:contact@spywolf.co) or  
[t.me/joe\\_SpyWolf](https://t.me/joe_SpyWolf)

## FIND US ONLINE



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# Disclaimer

This report shows findings based on our limited project analysis, following good industry practice from the date of this report, in relation to cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in the framework and algorithms based on smart contracts, overall social media and website presence and team transparency details of which are set out in this report. In order to get a full view of our analysis, it is crucial for you to read the full report.

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No applications were reviewed for security. No product code has been reviewed.

