

# ENDLESS GUNFIRE IN SOUTH KOREA

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## WHO WE ARE



Senior security researcher @ GReAT Malware research / Threat Intelligence hacked beautiful lady father of one sun

I'm sorry he can't join the SAS ⊜




#### Donghee Lee

Incident responder @ SK Infosec Malware researcher Security developer




## **OUR STORY**






## SOUTH KOREA THREAT LANDSCAPE





## **OVERVIEW OF KOREA MND BREACHED**

- When?
  - Published by Korea MND on Dec, 2016
  - Attack was on-going from Aug, 2016
- Confirmed Victim?
  - Lots of division of Korea military
- Damage?
  - Not sure
  - Some confidential data was leaked




## TIMELINE OF ATTACK






## ARSENAL OF MND BREACHED



## ARSENAL OF MND BREACHED



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Hex dump

12 12 12 12 34 34 34

30 30 30 30 34 44 44

79 6D 6F 75 73 3F 31 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

## ATTRIBUTION OF MALWARE

#### File naming


File name	S/W vendor in SK	Function of S/W
hncupdate.exe	Hancom	Word processor
fasoo.exe	Fasoo	DRM S/W
markany.exe	Markany	DRM S/W
v3log.exe	Ahnlab	Anti-virus


#### Language of Resource

Number of PE reso	ources by language			
KOREAN	1			
ENGLISH US	1			
■ PE resources				
f8bed2bce51189bbf68acc3ece4960d079d176cd959274c7555bb7558d9e56ce		data	RT_VERSION	KOREAN
49a60be4b95b6d30da355a0c124af82b35000bce8f24f957d1c09ead47544a1e		ASCII text	RT_MANIFEST	ENGLISH US

## **CONNECTION WITH OLD OPERATION**

#### String de-obfuscation of Type B backdoor






Security *i* 


## **CONNECTION WITH OLD OPERATION**

#### **Decryption routine of Type A/C backdoor**


```
[0x403f70]
mov bl, byte [edi + esi]
xor bl. al
xor bl. cl
mov byte [esi], bl
mov bl. al
xor bl. cl
and bl, dl
mov dl, al
and dl. cl
xor bl. dl
mov edx, dword [esp + arg 10h]
mov cl. bl
lea ebx, [edx*8];[b]
and ebx, 0x7f8
shl ebx. 0x14
or edx, ebx
lea ebx, [eax + eax] :[b]
xor ebx, eax
shl ebx. 4
mov ebp, eax
and ebx, 0xffffff80
shl ebp, 7
shl ebx. 0x11
shr eax. 8
or eax, ebx
sub dword [esp + arg_14h], 1
mov dword [esp + arg 10h], edx
ine 0x403f70 :[c]
```



## **CONNECTION WITH OLD OPERATION**



## CONNECTION WITH EMERGING OPERATION



Approximately > 60 ATM infected Same model from one vendor

#### Retrieve specific file from hard-coded path

```
push offset aDFilejnl; "D:\\FILEJNL"
lea eax, [ebp+var_208]
push offset aSJ02dD02d02d_j; "%s\\j%02d\\%d%02d%02d.jnl"
push eax ; char *
call _sprintf
```


#### **Archive files and send it pre-configured FTP server**

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## CONNECTION WITH EMERGING OPERATION

SECUMULARY **Code Similarity** ----- Same C&C Server Same Keylogger (NHCKeySafe.exe) IVIIVU Breached

## LET'S PUT THEM TOGETHER



## WHO IS THEM?



	Target	Intention
Operation	Big enterprises	Intellectual property
Gh0stRat	(including defense company)	Military intelligence
MND	National defense	Political profit
Breached		Military intelligence
ATM	ATM machine	Financial profit
Breached	Ordinary people	



## **THANK YOU**

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