

draft-moura-dnsop-authoritative-recommendations-03

Giovane C. M. Moura^{1,2}, Wes Hardaker³,
John Heidemann³, Marco Davids¹

DNSOP – IETF 104
Prague, CZ
2019-03-26

¹SIDN Labs, ²TU Delft, ³USC/ISI

Draft History

- This is an **Informational** draft
- **Today:** first time presented at DNSOP
- Versions and mailing list discussion:
 - **-03 (2019-03-11):** (minor changes from -02)
 - **-02 (2019-03-08):** [link list thread \(no responses\)](#)
 - **-01 (2018-12-20):** [link list thread \(no responses\)](#)
 - **-00 (2018-11-28):** [link list thread](#)
- Github link:
 - <https://github.com/gmmoura/draft-moura-dnsop-authoritative-recommendations>

- 13 people that have had 5 research papers:
 - Draft authors + Ricardo de O Schmidt, Wouter B. de Vries, Moritz Müller, Lan Wei, Cristian Hesselman, Jan Harm Kuipers, Pieter-Tjerk de Boer and Aiko Pras.
- Relevant papers with *recommendations* backed by large-scale, Internet-wide measurements:
 - 4x ACM IMC
 - 1x PAM
- However, papers tend to be *long, detailed* – they explain *why*

This draft:

```
papers = []
papers.append(Moura16b)
papers.append(Mueller17b)
papers.append(Schmidt17a)
papers.append(Vries17b)
papers.append(Moura18b)


for p in papers:
    recommendations = TLDR(p) #great filter :-)
    print(recommendations)
```

- Tangible, direct recommendations to OP folks on *what* to do
- With references to papers to know *why*
- **Target group:** large authoritative DNS ops, with global traffic

Recommendations in a nutshell


- R1: Use equally strong IP anycast in every authoritative server to achieve even load distribution [1]
- R2: Routing Can Matter More Than Locations [2]
- R3: Collecting Detailed Anycast Catchment Maps Ahead of Actual Deployment Can Improve Engineering Designs [3]
- R4: When under stress, employ two strategies [4]
- R5: Consider longer time-to-live values whenever possible [5]
- R6: Shared Infrastructure Risks Collateral Damage During Attacks [4]

R1: Use equally strong IP anycast in every authoritative server to achieve even load distribution



- **Resolvers** will query **ALL** authoritatives [1]
 - (conclusions drawn from Ripe Atlas, **.nl** and the Roots data)
- However, nearby authoritative servers will receive more queries

R1: Use equally strong IP anycast in every authoritative server to achieve even load distribution



- For OPs: latency of *all* Auth servers matter
- Unicast, by definition, cannot deliver good global performance
- [1] recommends: use anycast at *all* Auth servers
 - equally strong in peering and capacity; and phase out unicast.
- This recommendation has been deployed at [.nl](#).

R2: Routing Can Matter More Than Locations

- When evaluating an anycast DNS provider, people always ask: “how many sites/instances” do you have?
- Assumption: more instances → lower latency
- [2] shows that this is not always true:
 - c-root: 8 instances.
 - k-root: 33 instances
 - l-root: 144 instances
 - Their **median RTT: 30–32 ms** to 7.9k Atlas probes

F

- In other words, similar latency values for different deployments

R2: Routing Can Matter More Than Locations

- Why? BGP is agnostic to geographical distance
 - A client in California may be answered by a instance near NRT
 - even though there is a closer instance in SFO
- [2] thus recommends carefully considering **routing** and **connectivity** when engineering DNS anycast services
 - 12 sites is enough to provide good global latency
 - However, more instances may be helpful in case of DDoS [4]


R3: Collecting Detailed Anycast Catchment Maps Ahead of Actual Deployment Can Improve Engineering Designs

- Say you run an anycast service with n instances
- Say you want to add 1 more instance in LAX
- How will that affect traffic among your other locations?
 - **Very hard** to predict without measurement

R3: Collecting Detailed Anycast Catchment Maps Ahead of Actual Deployment Can Improve Engineering Designs


- Solution:
 - measure anycast catchments *ahead* of deployment
 - create anycast maps from these measurements
- [3] presents an ICMP-based tool (Verfploeter) for this solution
 - <https://github.com/Woutifier/verfploeter>
- Applied to b-root to **predict** query load on LAX:
 - Predicted: **81.6%**
 - Actual: **81.4%**.
- Current deployments:
 1. Anycast testbed (<http://anycast-testbed.nl>)
 2. B-root
 3. Large unnamed operator

R4: When under stress, employ two strategies




- BGP will map traffic to locations
- Best course of action?
 1. **Do nothing and let LAX become a degraded absorber**
 2. **Withdraw/prepend routes to shift traffic**
- Best option depends on attack and NS specifics

R4: When under stress, employ two strategies




- BGP will map traffic to locations
- Best course of action?
 1. **Do nothing and let LAX become a degraded absorber**
 2. **Withdraw/prepend routes to shift traffic**
- Best option depends on attack and NS specifics

R4: When under stress, employ two strategies



- BGP will map traffic to locations
- Best course of action?
 1. **Do nothing and let LAX become a degraded absorber**
 2. **Withdraw/prepend routes to shift traffic**
- Best option depends on attack and NS specifics

R4: When under stress, employ two strategies



- BGP will map traffic to locations
- Best course of action?
 1. **Do nothing and let LAX become a degraded absorber**
 2. **Withdraw/prepend routes to shift traffic**
- Best option depends on attack and NS specifics

R5: Consider longer TTL values whenever possible

- TTLs set how long queries should remain in resolver's cache
 - Sort of “ephemeral replication”
- [5] emulates DDoS attacks (50-100% packet loss)




Figure 1: TTL: 1h; 100% Packet loss after $t = 10\text{min}$

R5: Consider longer TTL values whenever possible

- Caching is a *key* component of DNS resilience
- Resolver's retries as well
 - they may even “hammer” authoritative servers
- As such, [5] recommend longer TTLs whenever possible

R6: Shared Infrastructure Risks Collateral Damage During Attacks

- Be careful when engineering DNS services:
 - co-location implies you share (parts of the) infrastructure
- [4] found that when the Root DNS was attacked, some `.nl` co-located instances also went down
- Dyn 2016 Attack shows similar results
 - multiple zones were only partially reachable when NSes were attacked
- Conclusion: be aware of shared infrastructure risk

Questions?

- R1: Use equally strong IP anycast in every authoritative server to achieve even load distribution [1]
- R2: Routing Can Matter More Than Locations [2]
- R3: Collecting Detailed Anycast Catchment Maps Ahead of Actual Deployment Can Improve Engineering Designs [3]
- R4: When under stress, employ two strategies [4]
- R5: Consider longer time-to-live values whenever possible [5]
- R6: Shared Infrastructure Risks Collateral Damage During Attacks [4]

Thanks reviewers of draft versions

[https://github.com/gmmoura/
draft-moura-dnsop-authoritative-recommendations](https://github.com/gmmoura/draft-moura-dnsop-authoritative-recommendations)

References I

- [1] M. Müller, G. C. M. Moura, R. de O. Schmidt, and J. Heidemann, “Recursives in the wild: Engineering authoritative DNS servers,” in *Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference*, London, UK, 2017, pp. 489–495. [Online]. Available: <http://www.isi.edu/%7ejohnh/PAPERS/Mueller17b.html>
- [2] R. d. O. Schmidt, J. Heidemann, and J. H. Kuipers, “Anycast latency: How many sites are enough?” in *Proceedings of the Passive and Active Measurement Workshop*. Sydney, Australia: Springer, Mar. 2017, p. to appear, awarded Best Paper. [Online]. Available: <http://www.isi.edu/%7ejohnh/PAPERS/Schmidt17a.html>

- [3] W. B. de Vries, R. de O. Schmidt, W. Hardaker, J. Heidemann, P.-T. de Boer, and A. Pras, “Verfploeter: Broad and load-aware anycast mapping,” in *Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference*, London, UK, 2017. [Online]. Available: <http://www.isi.edu/%7ejohnh/PAPERS/Vries17b.html>
- [4] G. C. M. Moura, R. de O. Schmidt, J. Heidemann, W. B. de Vries, M. Müller, L. Wei, and C. Hesselman, “Anycast vs. DDoS: Evaluating the November 2015 root DNS event,” Nov. 2016. [Online]. Available: <https://www.isi.edu/%7ejohnh/PAPERS/Moura16b.html>

- [5] G. C. M. Moura, J. Heidemann, M. Müller, R. de O. Schmidt, and M. Davids, “When the dike breaks: Dissecting DNS defenses during DDoS,” in *Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference*, Oct. 2018. [Online]. Available: <https://www.isi.edu/%7ejohnh/PAPERS/Moura18b.html>