

Candidate Filtering

The Strategic Use of Electoral Manipulations in Russia

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
Electoral Manipulation

Incumbents have many strategies for manipulating the electoral system


- Some obvious some not
 - Vote stealing
 - Ballot box stuffing
 - Electoral commission rejection
 - Candidate filtering
 - Carousels
 - Workplace mobilisation



Respondent anger over electoral integrity



Respondent likelihood of protesting




Results

- Less negative response to institutional manipulation
- Candidate filtering costs less and reduces elector vulnerability for incumbents
- Filtering at a subnational level in Russia is similar to other countries

Extra Analysis

Presidential popularity

- Can I find some explanatory variables for presidential popularity?
 - Gender
 - Age
 - Education
 - Employment status
 - Income
 - Internet usage



Results

```
multinom(putin_approval ~ male + age + edu + employed + income + internetusage, data = df_2)
```

	(Intercept)	male	age	edu	employed	income	internetusage
2	0.535667	0.596311	1.011819	1.005672	1.535667	1.000000	1.111327
3	2.922997	0.674314	1.008482	0.984797	1.537233	1.000004	0.881794
4	3.967811	0.589858	1.014544	0.860331	1.051904	1.000009	0.799908

Interpretation

- There is a change in the baseline odds that somebody will have level 4 support for Putin by 1.05 times when that person is employed (vs unemployed)
- There is a change in the baseline odds that somebody will have level 4 support for Putin by 0.8 times when that person has a higher internet usage.
- There is a change in the baseline odds that somebody will have level 4 support for Putin by 0.59 times when that person is male (vs female).