

# Byzantine Generals Problem

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Math 479

- A. All loyal generals decide upon the same plan of action.
- B. A small number of traitors cannot cause the loyal generals to adopt a bad plan.

- Condition A is met by having the generals use the same method of decision making.

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- . Condition B is met by having the generals use a robust decision making method.

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Condition 1 can be rewritten as:

- 1'. For every  $i$ , any two loyal generals use the same value of  $v_i$ .



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IC1. All loyal lieutenants obey the same order.

IC2. If the commander is loyal, then every loyal lieutenant obeys the order they sends.

- . Loyal generals cannot take a value  $v_i$  at face value.

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Introduction

Three  
Generals

Oral Solution

Signed  
Solution

Missing Com-  
munication  
Path

Conclusion

- Loyal generals cannot take a value  $v_i$  at face value.
- Condition 1' and Condition 2 are both contingent on a single  $v_i$  sent by the  $i^{th}$  general.

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