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Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation



National Institute of Standards
and Technology
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Methods and Techniques

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COMPUTER SECURITY



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National Institute of Standards and Technology
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Abstract

This recommendation defines six modes of operation for use with an underlying symmetric key block cipher algorithm. Five of the modes are confidentiality modes: Electronic Codebook (ECB), Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), Cipher Feedback (CFB), Output Feedback (OFB), and Counter (CTR). This recommendation also defines an authentication mode based on the CBC mode (CBC-MAC). Used with an underlying block cipher algorithm that is approved in a Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS), the modes in this recommendation can provide cryptographic protection for sensitive, but unclassified, computer data.

KEY WORDS: Authentication, computer security; cryptography; data security; block cipher; encryption; Federal Information Processing Standard; mode of operation.

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1 Purpose

This publication provides recommendations regarding modes of operation to be used with symmetric key block cipher algorithms.

2 Authority

This document has been developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in furtherance of its statutory responsibilities under the Computer Security Act of 1997 (Public Law 100-235) and the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, specifically 15 U.S.C. 278 g-3(a)(5). This is not a guideline within the meaning of (15 U.S.C. 278 g-3 (a)(5).

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3 Introduction

This recommendation specifies six modes of operation for symmetric key block cipher algorithms, such as the algorithm specified in the proposed Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [2]. The cryptographic key controls the functioning of the block cipher and, thus, by extension, controls the modes. Because the specification of the block cipher itself is typically made available to the public, cryptographic security depends on the secrecy of the cryptographic key, at a minimum.

The modes in this recommendation are intended for use with any symmetric key block cipher algorithm that is approved by a Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS). The size of the input blocks to the block cipher algorithm must be the same as the size of the output blocks. A secret cryptographic key must be entered into the device implementing the block cipher algorithm prior to the execution of the mode of operation.

This recommendation specifies five modes that can provide data confidentiality, and one mode that can provide data authentication. The confidentiality modes are the Electronic Codebook (ECB), Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), Cipher Feedback (CFB), Output Feedback (OFB), and Counter (CTR) modes. The authentication mode is the Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code (CBC-MAC) mode.

This recommendation builds on three FIPS publications that approve modes of operation of two particular FIPS-approved block cipher algorithms. FIPS Pub. 81 [4] specifies the ECB, CBC, CFB, and OFB modes of the Data Encryption Standard (DES). Modes that are essentially equivalent to the CBC-MAC mode of the DES are specified both in the appendix of FIPS Pub. 81 and in FIPS Pub. 113 [5]. FIPS Pub. 46-3 [3] approves the seven modes that are specified in ANSI X9.52 [1]. Four of these modes are equivalent to the ECB, CBC, CFB, and OFB modes with the Triple DES algorithm (TDEA) as the underlying block cipher; the other three modes in ANSI X9.52 are variants of the CBC, CFB, and OFB modes of Triple DES that use interleaving or pipelining.

4 Definitions, Abbreviations, and Symbols

4.1 Definitions and Abbreviations

Authentication Mode	A mode that is used to determine that a message has not been changed since leaving its point of origin. The authentication mode in this recommendation is the CBC-MAC mode.
Bit	A binary digit: 0 or 1.
Bit Error	The substitution of a '0' bit for a '1' bit, or vice versa.
Bit String	An ordered sequence of 0's and 1's.
Block Cipher	A family of functions and their inverse functions that is parameterized by cryptographic keys; the functions map bit strings of a fixed length to bit strings of the same length.
Block Size	The number of bits in an input (or output) block of the block cipher.
CBC	Cipher Block Chaining.
CBC-MAC	Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code
CFB	Cipher Feedback.
Ciphertext	Encrypted data.
Confidentiality Mode	A mode that is used to encipher plaintext and decipher ciphertext. The confidentiality modes in this recommendation are the ECB, CBC, CFB, OFB, and CTR modes.
CTR	Counter
Cryptographic Key	A parameter used in the block cipher algorithm that determines the forward cipher operation and the inverse cipher operation.
Data Block (Block)	A sequence of bits whose length is the block size of the block cipher.
Data Segment (Segment)	In the CFB mode, a sequence of bits whose length is a parameter that does not exceed the block size.

Decryption (Deciphering)	The routine of a confidentiality mode that transforms the ciphertext into the plaintext.
ECB	Electronic Codebook
Encryption (Enciphering)	The routine of a confidentiality mode that transforms the plaintext into the ciphertext.
Exclusive-OR	The bitwise addition, modulo 2, of two bit strings of equal length.
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard.
Forward Cipher Function (Forward Cipher Operation)	One of the two functions of the block cipher algorithm that is selected by the cryptographic key.
Initialization Vector (IV)	A data block independent of the key and the plaintext that is a parameter for the CBC, CFB, and OFB modes.
Input Block	A data block that is an input to either the forward cipher function or the inverse cipher function of the block cipher algorithm.
Inverse Cipher Function (Inverse Cipher Operation)	The function that reverses the transformation of the forward cipher function when the same cryptographic key is used.
Least Significant Bit(s)	The right-most bit(s) of a bit string.
Message Authentication Code (MAC)	The output of an authentication mode of operation.
Mode of Operation (Mode)	An algorithm for the cryptographic transformation of data that features a symmetric key block cipher algorithm.
Most Significant Bit(s)	The left-most bit(s) of a bit string.
Nonce	A value that is used only once.
Octet	A group of eight binary digits.
OFB	Output Feedback.

Output Block	A data block that is an output of either the forward cipher function or the inverse cipher function of the block cipher algorithm.
Plaintext	Usable data.

4.2 Symbols

4.2.1 Variables

b	The block size, in bits.
j	The index to a sequence of data blocks or data segments ordered from left to right.
n	The number of data blocks or data segments in the plaintext.
s	The number of bits in a data segment.
t	The number of bits in a truncated MAC.
u	The number of bits in a partial plaintext or ciphertext block.
C_j	The j^{th} ciphertext block or ciphertext segment.
\tilde{C}_n	A partial ciphertext block.
I_j	The j^{th} input block.
IV	The initialization vector.
K	The secret key.
O_j	The j^{th} output block.
P_j	The j^{th} plaintext block or plaintext segment.
\tilde{P}_n	A partial plaintext block.
T_j	The j^{th} counter that is used in the CTR mode.

4.2.2 Operations and Functions

$X \mid Y$	The concatenation of two bit strings X and Y .
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$X \oplus Y$	The bitwise exclusive-OR of two bit strings X and Y of the same length.
$CIPH_K(X)$	The forward cipher function of the block cipher algorithm under the key K applied to the data block X .
$CIPH_K^{-1}(X)$	The inverse cipher function of the block cipher algorithm under the key K applied to the data block X .
$LSB_x(X)$	The bit string consisting of the x least significant bits of the bit string X .
$MSB_x(X)$	The bit string consisting of the x most significant bits of the bit string X .
$[x]_2$	The binary representation of the non-negative integer x , in a given number of bits.

5 Block Cipher Modes of Operation

The mathematical specifications of the six modes are given in Sections 3.1-3.6, along with descriptions, illustrations, and comments on the potential for parallel processing.

This recommendation assumes that a FIPS-approved symmetric key block cipher algorithm has been chosen as the underlying algorithm, and that a secret, random key, denoted K , has been established for processing the data. The input and output blocks of the block cipher algorithm are assumed to have the same length, called the block size.

A confidentiality mode of operation of the block cipher algorithm consists of two routines that are inverses of each other, encryption and decryption. Encryption is the transformation of a usable message, called the plaintext, into an unreadable form, called the ciphertext; decryption is the transformation that recovers the plaintext from the ciphertext.

For any given key, the underlying block cipher algorithm of the mode also consists of two functions that are inverses of each other. These two functions are often called encryption and decryption, but in this recommendation, those terms are reserved for the routines of the confidentiality modes. Instead, as part of the choice of the block cipher algorithm, one of the two functions is designated as the forward cipher function, denoted $CIPH_K$; the other function is then called the inverse cipher function, denoted $CIPH_K^{-1}$. The inputs and outputs of both functions are called input blocks and output blocks.

For all of the modes in this recommendation except the CFB mode, the plaintext is represented as a sequence of bit strings called data blocks, whose length is the block size. For the CFB mode, the plaintext is represented as a sequence of bit strings called data segments, whose length is a predetermined parameter that does not exceed the block size. The formatting of the plaintext, including any padding bits that are appended to form complete data blocks or data segments, is outside the scope of this recommendation; see Appendix A for a brief discussion of padding.

For the confidentiality modes in this recommendation, the encryption process transforms each data block or segment of the plaintext into a corresponding data block or segment of the ciphertext. Thus, the ciphertext is a sequence of data blocks or segments. Let n represent the number of data blocks, or, for the CFB mode, the number of data segments, in the plaintext. In the specifications of the modes, the plaintext blocks (or segments) are denoted P_1, P_2, \dots, P_n , and the corresponding ciphertext blocks (or segments) are denoted C_1, C_2, \dots, C_n .

The authentication mode in this recommendation, CBC-MAC, is applied to the entire plaintext to produce a single value called the message authentication code (MAC), denoted MAC .

Some of the modes require, in addition to the plaintext, a data block called an initialization vector (IV), denoted IV . The IV does not have to be secret.

The concatenation operation on bit strings is denoted $|$; for example, $001 | 10111 = 00110111$.

The functions LSB_s and MSB_s return the s least significant bits and the s most significant bits of

their arguments. For example, $LSB_3(111011010) = 010$, and $MSB_4(111011010) = 1110$.

Given bit strings of equal length, the exclusive-OR operation, denoted \oplus , specifies the addition, modulo 2, of the bits in each bit position, without carries. For example, $10011 \oplus 10101 = 00110$.

Given a non-negative (decimal) integer x , the binary representation of x in a given number of bits is denoted by $[x]_2$. For example, as an 8 bit string, $[45]_2 = 00101101$.

5.1 The Electronic Codebook Mode

The Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode is a confidentiality mode that is defined as follows:

$$\text{ECB Encryption:} \quad C_j = \text{CIPH}_k(P_j) \quad \text{for } j = 1 \dots n.$$

$$\text{ECB Decryption:} \quad P_j = \text{CIPH}^{-1}_k(C_j) \quad \text{for } j = 1 \dots n.$$

In ECB encryption, the forward cipher function is applied directly, and independently, to each block of the plaintext. The resulting sequence of output blocks is the ciphertext.

In ECB decryption, the inverse cipher function is applied directly, and independently, to each block of the ciphertext. The resulting sequence of output blocks is the plaintext.




Figure 1: The ECB Mode

In ECB encryption and ECB decryption, multiple forward cipher functions and inverse cipher functions can be computed in parallel.

In the ECB mode, under a given key, a given plaintext block always gets encrypted as the same

ciphertext block. If this property is undesirable in a particular application, the ECB mode should not be used.

The ECB mode is illustrated in Figure 1.

5.2 The Cipher Block Chaining Mode

The Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode is a confidentiality mode that requires an IV whose integrity should be protected, as discussed in Appendix D. The CBC mode is defined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{CBC Encryption:} \quad C_1 &= \text{CIPH}_k(P_1 \oplus IV); \\ C_j &= \text{CIPH}_k(P_j \oplus C_{j-1}) \quad \text{for } j = 2 \dots n. \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{CBC Decryption:} \quad P_1 &= \text{CIPH}_k^{-1}(C_1) \oplus IV; \\ P_j &= \text{CIPH}_k^{-1}(C_j) \oplus C_{j-1} \quad \text{for } j = 2 \dots n. \end{aligned}$$

In CBC encryption, the first input block is formed by exclusive-ORing the first block of the plaintext with the IV. The forward cipher function is applied to the first input block, and the resulting output block is the first block of the ciphertext. This output block is also exclusive-ORed with the second plaintext data block to produce the second input block, and the forward cipher function is applied to produce the second output block. This output block, which is the second ciphertext block, is exclusive-ORed with the next plaintext block to form the next input block. All of the successive plaintext blocks are “chained” in this way with the previous output/ciphertext blocks to produce the input blocks. The forward cipher function is applied to each input block to produce the ciphertext blocks.

In CBC decryption, the inverse cipher function is applied to the first ciphertext block, and the resulting output block is exclusive-ORed with the initialization vector to recover the first plaintext block. The inverse cipher function is also applied to the second ciphertext block, and the resulting output block is exclusive-ORed with the first ciphertext block to recover the second plaintext block. In general, to recover any plaintext block (except the first), the inverse cipher function is applied to the corresponding ciphertext block, and the resulting block is exclusive-ORed with the previous ciphertext block.

In CBC encryption, the input block to each forward cipher operation (except the first) depends on the result of the previous forward cipher operation, so the forward cipher operations cannot be performed in parallel. In CBC decryption, however, the input blocks for the inverse cipher function, i.e., the ciphertext blocks, are immediately available, so that multiple inverse cipher operations can be performed in parallel.

In the CBC mode under a given key, if a fixed IV is used to encrypt two plaintexts in which the initial blocks P_1, P_2, \dots, P_j are equal, for any integer j , then the corresponding ciphertext blocks will also be equal. If this property is undesirable in a particular application, then one remedy is to use unique IVs; another remedy is to incorporate a unique string for each message, such as a message identifier, into the first plaintext block.




Figure 2: The CBC Mode

The CBC mode is illustrated in Figure 2.

5.3 The Cipher Feedback Mode

The Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode is a confidentiality mode that requires an IV and an integer parameter, denoted s , such that $1 \leq s \leq b$. In this mode, each plaintext segment (P_j) and ciphertext segment (C_j) consists of s bits. The value of s is sometimes incorporated into the name of the mode, as in the following three examples: the 1-bit CFB mode, the 8-bit CFB mode, and the s -bit CFB mode. The CFB mode is defined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{CFB Encryption:} \quad & I_j = IV; \\
 & I_j = \text{LSB}_{b-s}(I_{j-1}) \parallel C_{j-1} && \text{for } j = 2 \dots n; \\
 & O_j = \text{CIPH}_K(I_j) && \text{for } j = 1, 2 \dots n; \\
 & C_j = P_j \oplus \text{MSB}_s(O_j) && \text{for } j = 1, 2 \dots n.
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{CFB Decryption:} \quad & I_j = IV; \\
 & I_j = \text{LSB}_{b-s}(I_{j-1}) \parallel C_{j-1} && \text{for } j = 2 \dots n; \\
 & O_j = \text{CIPH}_K(I_j) && \text{for } j = 1, 2 \dots n; \\
 & P_j = C_j \oplus \text{MSB}_s(O_j) && \text{for } j = 1, 2 \dots n.
 \end{aligned}$$

In CFB encryption, the first input block is the IV, and the forward cipher operation is applied to the IV to produce the first output block. The first ciphertext segment is produced by exclusive-

ORing the first plaintext segment with the segment of the s most significant bits of the first output block. (The remaining $b-s$ bits of the first output block are discarded.) The $b-s$ least significant bits of the IV are then concatenated with the s bits of the first ciphertext segment to form the second input block. An alternative description of the formation of the second input block is that the bits of the first input block circularly shift s positions to the left, and then the ciphertext segment replaces the s least significant bits of the result.

The process is repeated with the successive input blocks until a ciphertext segment is produced from every plaintext segment. In general, each successive input block is enciphered to produce an output block. The segment of the s most significant bits of each output block is exclusive-ORed with the corresponding plaintext segment to form a ciphertext segment. Each ciphertext segment (except the last one) is “fed back” into the least significant bits of the previous input block, as described above, to form a new input block. The feedback can be described in terms of the individual bits in the strings as follows: if $i_1 i_2 \dots i_b$ is the j th input block, and $c_1 c_2 \dots c_s$ is the j th ciphertext, then the $(j+1)^{\text{th}}$ input block is $i_{s+1} i_{s+2} \dots i_b c_1 c_2 \dots c_s$.

In CFB decryption, the IV is the first input block, and each successive input block is formed as in CFB encryption, by concatenating the $b-s$ least significant bits of the previous input block with the s most significant bits of the previous ciphertext. The *forward cipher* function is applied to each input block to produce the output blocks. The segments of the s most significant bits of the output blocks are exclusive-ORed with the corresponding ciphertext segments to recover the plaintext segments.




Figure 3: The CFB Mode

In CFB encryption, like CBC encryption, the input block to each forward cipher function (except the first) depends on the result of the previous forward cipher function; therefore, multiple forward cipher operations cannot be performed in parallel. In CFB decryption, the required forward cipher operations can be performed in parallel, if the input blocks are first constructed (in series) from the IV and the ciphertext.

In the CFB mode under a given key, if a fixed IV is used to encrypt two plaintexts in which the initial segments P_1, P_2, \dots, P_j are equal, for any integer j , then the corresponding ciphertext segments will also be equal. If this property is undesirable in a particular application, then one remedy is to use unique IVs; another remedy is to incorporate a unique string for each message, such as a message identifier, into the first plaintext block.

The CFB mode is illustrated in Figure 3.

5.4 The Output Feedback Mode

The Output Feedback (OFB) mode is a confidentiality mode that requires a unique IV for every message that is ever encrypted under the given key. The OFB mode is defined as follows:

$$\begin{array}{ll}
 \text{OFB Encryption:} & \begin{array}{ll}
 I_1 = IV; & \\
 I_j = O_{j-1} & \text{for } j = 2 \dots n; \\
 O_j = CIPH_K(I_j) & \text{for } j = 1, 2 \dots n; \\
 C_j = P_j \oplus O_j & \text{for } j = 1, 2 \dots n.
 \end{array} \\
 \\
 \text{OFB Decryption:} & \begin{array}{ll}
 I_1 = IV; & \\
 I_j = O_{j-1} & \text{for } j = 2 \dots n; \\
 O_j = CIPH_K(I_j) & \text{for } j = 1, 2 \dots n; \\
 P_j = C_j \oplus O_j & \text{for } j = 1, 2 \dots n.
 \end{array}
 \end{array}$$

In OFB encryption, the IV is transformed by the forward cipher function to produce the first output block. The first output block is exclusive-ORed with the first plaintext block to produce the first ciphertext block. The first output block is then transformed by the forward cipher function to produce the second output block. The second output block is exclusive-ORed with the second plaintext block to produce the second ciphertext block, and the second output block is transformed by the forward cipher function to produce the third output block. Thus, the successive output blocks are produced from enciphering the previous output blocks, and the output blocks are exclusive-ORed with the corresponding plaintext blocks to produce the ciphertext blocks.

In OFB decryption, the IV is transformed by the *forward cipher* function to produce the first output block. The first output block is exclusive-ORed with the first ciphertext block to recover the first plaintext block. The first output block is then transformed by the forward cipher function to produce the second output block. The second output block is exclusive-ORed with the second ciphertext block to produce the second plaintext block, and the second output block is also transformed by the forward cipher function to produce the third output block. Thus, the

successive output blocks are produced from enciphering the previous output blocks, and the output blocks are exclusive-ORed with the corresponding ciphertext blocks to recover the plaintext blocks.




Figure 4: The OFB Mode

In both OFB encryption and OFB decryption, each forward cipher function (except the first) depends on the results of the previous forward cipher function; therefore, multiple forward cipher functions cannot be performed in parallel. However, if the IV is known, the output blocks can be generated prior to the availability of the plaintext or ciphertext data.

The OFB mode requires a unique IV for every message that is ever encrypted under the given key. If, contrary to this requirement, the same IV is used for the encryption of more than one message, then the confidentiality of those messages may be compromised. In particular, if a plaintext block of any of these messages is known, say, the j th plaintext block, then the j th output of the forward cipher function can be determined easily from the j th ciphertext block of the message. This information allows the j th plaintext block of any other message that is encrypted using the same IV to be easily recovered from the j th ciphertext block of that message.

Confidentiality may similarly be compromised if *any* of the input blocks to the forward cipher function for the encryption of a message is used as the IV for the encryption of another message under the given key.

The OFB mode is illustrated in Figure 4.

5.5 The Counter Mode

The Counter (CTR) mode is confidentiality mode that requires a sequence of blocks, called counters, with the property that each block in the sequence is different than every other block. This condition is not restricted to a single message: across all of the messages that are encrypted under the given key, all of the counters must be distinct. In this recommendation, the counters are denoted T_1, T_2, \dots, T_n . Methods for generating counters are discussed in Appendix B. Given a sequence of counters, T_1, T_2, \dots, T_n , the CTR mode is defined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{CTR Encryption:} \quad & O_j = \text{CIPH}_K(T_j) && \text{for } j = 1, 2 \dots n; \\ & C_j = P_j \oplus O_j && \text{for } j = 1, 2 \dots n. \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{CTR Decryption:} \quad & O_j = \text{CIPH}_K(T_j) && \text{for } j = 1, 2 \dots n; \\ & P_j = C_j \oplus O_j && \text{for } j = 1, 2 \dots n. \end{aligned}$$

In CTR encryption, the counters are each transformed by the forward cipher function, and the resulting blocks are exclusive-ORed with the corresponding plaintext blocks to produce the ciphertext blocks.

In CTR decryption, the counters are each transformed by the *forward cipher* function, and the resulting blocks are exclusive-ORed with the corresponding ciphertext blocks to recover the plaintext blocks.




Figure 5: The CTR Mode

In both CTR encryption and CTR decryption, the forward cipher functions can be performed in parallel; similarly, the plaintext block that corresponds to any particular ciphertext block can be recovered independently from the other plaintext blocks, if the corresponding counter block can be determined. Moreover, the forward cipher functions can be applied to the counters prior to the availability of the plaintext or ciphertext data.

The CTR mode is illustrated in Figure 5.

5.6 The Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code Mode

The Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code (CBC-MAC) mode is an authentication mode that requires a secret key that is distinct from any key used for encryption. Moreover, every plaintext that is authenticated using the CBC-MAC mode under a given key should consist of the same number of blocks, n ; the value of n may vary for different keys. The CBC-MAC mode is defined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{CBC-MAC Generation:} \quad & O_1 = \text{CIPH}_K(P_1); \\ & O_j = \text{CIPH}_K(P_j \oplus O_{j-1}) \quad \text{for } j = 2 \dots n; \\ & \text{MAC} = O_n. \end{aligned}$$




Figure 6: The CBC-MAC Mode

In CBC-MAC generation, output blocks corresponding to each plaintext block are generated in essentially the same manner as the ciphertext blocks in CBC encryption, described in Section 3, omitting the IV (equivalently, the IV can be considered to be the “zero block”, consisting of all ‘0’ bits). The MAC is the final output block.

For CBC-MAC verification, the verifying party generates the CBC-MAC as described above,

and then compares the result to the received MAC value. If the MAC values are the same, then the verification is successful, and the data is considered to be authentic; a limitation of this conclusion is discussed in Appendix C. If the MAC values do not match, then the verification is unsuccessful.

As in the case of CBC encryption, defined in Section 3.2, the CBC-MAC mode does not allow the forward cipher operations to be performed in parallel, because the input block to any forward cipher operation depends on the results of the previous operation.

For some applications, it may be desirable to truncate the output, O_n , of the CBC-MAC mode, so that its length in bits, denoted t , is less than the block length. To obtain the truncated MAC, the above definition of MAC is replaced with the following: $MAC = MSB_t(O_n)$. In general, this recommendation requires that $b/2 \leq t \leq b$. For some applications, discussed in Appendix C, the restriction on t may be relaxed to $32 \leq t \leq b$.

The CBC-MAC mode is illustrated in Figure 6.

Appendix A: Padding

The following formatting size requirement applies to each mode in this recommendation: the plaintext must be a sequence of complete data blocks (or, for CFB mode, data segments). In other words, the total number of bits in the data string that represents the formatted message must be an integer multiple of the block (or segment) size. Any partial data block (or segment) will require special handling within each particular application.

For the OFB and CTR modes, the special handling can be achieved by a straightforward modification of the mode. In particular, suppose that a message consists of $n-1$ full plaintext blocks, P_1, P_2, \dots, P_{n-1} , followed by a partial plaintext block, denoted \tilde{P}_n , that consists of u bits, where $1 \leq u < b$. The specifications of both OFB and CTR encryption are modified by replacing the formula for the last ciphertext block C_n with the following formula for a partial ciphertext block, denoted \tilde{C}_n , that also consists of u bits: $\tilde{C}_n = \tilde{P}_n \oplus MSB_u(O_n)$; the rest of the specifications are unchanged. The specifications of both OFB and CTR decryption are modified by replacing the formula for P_n with the following formula: $\tilde{P}_n = \tilde{C}_n \oplus MSB_u(O_n)$. The rest of the specifications for OFB and CTR decryption are unchanged.

If the application permits the number of bits in the message to expand, then the special handling may be to append extra bits, called padding, to complete the block (or segment). Three examples of padding methods are presented in this appendix. Under each of the methods, the padding bits can be removed unambiguously, provided the receiver can determine that the message is indeed padded. One way to ensure that the receiver does not mistakenly remove bits from an unpadded message is to require the sender to pad every message, including messages that already satisfy the formatting size requirement. For such messages, an entire block (or segment) of padding is appended. Alternatively, such messages can be sent without padding, if, for every message, the existence of padding is communicated in some way.

In the first method, the data string is padded at the trailing end with the complement of the trailing bit of the unpadded message: if the trailing bit is '1,' then '0' bits are appended, and if the trailing bit is '0,' then '1' bits are appended. As few bits are added as are necessary to meet the formatting size requirement.

In the second method, the data string is padded at the trailing end with a single '1' bit, and the resulting string is padded at the trailing end by as few '0' bits (possibly none) as are necessary to meet the formatting size requirement.

In the third method, taken from RFC 2630 [6], there is redundancy in the padding. Let B be the number of octets in the data blocks (or segments) and let L be the number of octets in the data string. The data string is padded at the trailing end with $B-(L \bmod B)$ octets, each of which is the binary representation of $B-(L \bmod B)$. In other words, the input is padded at the trailing end with one of the following strings:

00000001

if $L \bmod B = B-1$

00000010 00000010	if $L \bmod B = B - 2$
00000011 00000011 00000011	if $L \bmod B = B - 3$
00000100 00000100 00000100 00000100	if $L \bmod B = B - 4$
⋮	
$[B-1]_2$ $[B-1]_2$... $[B-1]_2$ ($B-1$ octets)	if $L \bmod B = 1$
$[B]_2$ $[B]_2$... $[B]_2$ $[B]_2$ (B octets)	if $L \bmod B = 0$,

where $[B]_2$ and $[B-1]_2$ are the binary representations of B and $B-1$ as octets. There are two conditions for using this method: the data blocks (or segments) and the data string must be expressible in octets, i.e., their lengths in bits are a multiple of 8, and B must satisfy $2 \leq B \leq 256$.

Appendix B: Generation of Counter Blocks

The specification of the CTR mode requires a unique counter block for each plaintext block that is ever encrypted under a given key, across all messages. If, contrary to this requirement, a counter block is used repeatedly, then the confidentiality of all of the plaintext blocks corresponding to that counter block may be compromised. In particular, if any plaintext block that is encrypted using a given counter block is known, then the output of the forward cipher function can be determined easily from the associated ciphertext block. This output allows any other plaintext blocks that are encrypted using the same counter block to be easily recovered from their associated ciphertext blocks.

There are two aspects to satisfying the uniqueness requirement. First, an incrementing function for generating the counter blocks from any initial counter block can ensure counter blocks do not repeat within a given message. Second, the initial counter blocks, T_i , must be chosen to ensure that counters are unique across all messages that are encrypted under the given key.

B.1 The Standard Incrementing Function

In general, given the initial counter block for a message, the successive counter blocks are derived by applying an incrementing function. Let n be the number of blocks in the given plaintext message, and b is the number of bits in the block.

The standard incrementing function can apply either to an entire block or to a part of a block. Let m be the number of bits in the specific part of the block to be incremented, so that m is a positive integer such that $m \leq b$. Any string of m bits can be regarded as the binary representation of a non-negative integer x that is strictly less than 2^m . The standard incrementing function takes $[x]_2$, the binary representation of x in m bits, and returns $[x+1 \bmod 2^m]_2$, the binary representation in m bits of the following integer, $x+1$, modulo 2^m .

For example, let the standard incrementing function apply to the five least significant bits of eight bit blocks, so that $b=8$ and $m=5$ (unrealistically small values); let * represent each unknown bit in this example, and let ***11110 represent a block to be incremented. The following sequence of blocks results from four applications of the standard incrementing function:

```
***11110
***11111
***00000
***00001
***00010.
```

Counter blocks in which a given set of m bits are incremented by the standard incrementing function satisfy the uniqueness requirement *within the given message* provided that $n \leq 2^m$. Whether the uniqueness requirement for counter blocks is satisfied across all messages that are encrypted under a given key then depends on the choices of the initial counter blocks for the messages, discussed in the next section.

This recommendation permits the use of any other incrementing function that generates n unique strings of m bits in succession from the allowable initial strings. For example, if the initial string of m bits is not the “zero” string, i.e., if it contains at least one ‘1’ bit, then an incrementing function can be constructed from a linear feedback shift register that is specialized to ensure a sufficiently large period; see Ref. [7] for information about linear feedback shift registers.

B.2 Choosing Initial Counter Blocks

The initial counter blocks, T_1 , for each message that is encrypted under the given key must be chosen in a manner that ensures the uniqueness of all the counter blocks across all the messages. Two examples of approaches to choosing the initial counter blocks are given in this section.

In the first approach, for a given key, all plaintext messages are encrypted sequentially. Within the messages, the same fixed set of m bits of the counter block is incremented by the standard incrementing function. The initial counter block for the initial plaintext message may be any string of b bits. The initial counter block for any subsequent message can be obtained by applying the standard incrementing function to the fixed set of m bits of the final counter block of the latest message. In effect, all of the plaintext messages that are ever encrypted under the given key are concatenated into a single message; consequently, the total number of plaintext blocks must not exceed 2^m . Procedures should be established to ensure the maintenance of the state of the final counter block of the latest encrypted message, and to ensure the proper sequencing of the messages.

A second approach to satisfying the uniqueness property across messages is to assign to each message a unique string of $b/2$ bits (rounding up, if b is odd), in other words, a message nonce, and to incorporate the message nonce into every counter block for the message. The leading $b/2$ bits (rounding up if b is odd) of each counter block would be the message nonce, and the standard incrementing function would be applied to the remaining m bits to provide an index to the counter blocks for the message. Thus, if N is the message nonce for a given message, then the j th counter block is given by $T_j = N \parallel [j]_2$, where $[j]_2$ is the binary representation of j in m bits, for $j = 1 \dots n$. The number of blocks, n , in any message must satisfy $n < 2^m$. A procedure should be established to ensure the uniqueness of the message nonces.

This recommendation allows other methods and approaches for achieving the uniqueness property. Validation that an implementation of the CTR mode conforms to this recommendation will typically include an examination of the procedures for assuring the uniqueness of counter blocks within messages and across all messages that are encrypted under a given key.

Appendix C: A Limitation of MAC Algorithms

The successful CBC-MAC verification of a MAC does not completely guarantee that the accompanying message is authentic: there is a chance that a source with no knowledge of the key can present a purported MAC on the plaintext message that will pass the verification procedure. For example, an arbitrary purported MAC of t bits on an arbitrary plaintext message may be successfully verified with an expected probability of $(1/2)^t$. This limitation is inherent in any MAC algorithm.

The limitation is magnified if an application permits a given inauthentic message to be repeatedly presented for verification with different purported MACs. Each individual trial succeeds only with a small probability, $(1/2)^t$; however, for repeated trials, the probability increases that, eventually, one of the MACs will be successfully verified. Similarly, if an application permits a given purported MAC to be presented with different inauthentic messages, then the probability increases that, eventually, the MAC will be successfully verified for one of the messages.

Therefore, in general, if the MAC is truncated, then its length, t , should be chosen as large as is practical, with at least half as many bits as the block size, b . The minimum value for t is relaxed to 32 bits for applications in which the two types of repeated trials that are described in the previous paragraph are sufficiently restricted. For example, the application, or the protocol that controls the application, may monitor all of the plaintext messages and MACs that are presented for verification, and permanently reject any plaintext message or any MAC that is included in sufficiently many unsuccessful trials. Another example occurs when the bandwidth of the communications channel is low enough to preclude sufficiently many trials, of either type.

Appendix D: Error Properties

A bit error is the substitution of a '0' bit for a '1' bit, or vice versa. This appendix contains a discussion of the effects of bit errors in ciphertext blocks (or segments), counter blocks, and IVs on the modes in this recommendation. Insertion or deletion of bits into ciphertext blocks (or segments) is also discussed.

For any confidentiality mode, if there are any bit errors in a single ciphertext block (or segment), then the decryption of that ciphertext block (or segment) will be incorrect, i.e., it will differ from the original plaintext block (or segment). In the CFB, OFB, and CTR modes, the bit error(s) in the decrypted ciphertext block (or segment) occur in the same bit position(s) as in the ciphertext block (or segment); the other bit positions are not affected. In the ECB and CBC modes, a bit error may occur, independently, in any bit position of the decrypted ciphertext block, with an expected error rate of fifty percent, depending on the strength of the underlying block cipher.

For the ECB, OFB, and CTR modes, bit errors within a ciphertext block do not affect the decryption of any other blocks. In the CBC mode, any bit positions that contain bit errors in a ciphertext block will also contain bit errors in the decryption of the succeeding ciphertext block; the other bit positions are not affected. In the CFB mode, bit errors in a ciphertext segment affect the decryption of the next b/s (rounded up to the nearest integer) ciphertext segments. A bit error may occur, independently, in any bit position in the decrypted segments, with an expected error rate of fifty percent.

Similarly, for the CTR mode, if there is a bit error in a counter block, then a bit error may occur, independently, in any bit position of the decryption of the corresponding ciphertext, with an expected error rate of fifty percent.

Bit errors in IVs also affect the decryption process. In the OFB mode, bit errors in the IV affect the decryption of every ciphertext block. In the CFB mode, bit errors in the IV affect, at a minimum, the decryption of the first ciphertext segment, and possibly successive ciphertext segments, depending on the bit position of the rightmost bit error in the IV. (In general, a bit error in the i th most significant bit position affects the decryptions of the first i/s (rounding up) ciphertext segments.) For both the OFB and CFB modes, a bit error may occur, independently, in any bit position of the affected ciphertext blocks (or segments), with an expected error rate of fifty percent. In the CBC mode, if bit errors occur in the IV, then the first ciphertext block will be decrypted incorrectly, and bit errors will occur in exactly the same bit positions as in the IV; the decryptions of the other ciphertext blocks are not affected.

Consequently, for the CBC mode, the decryption of the first ciphertext block is vulnerable to the (deliberate) introduction of bit errors in specific bit positions of the IV if the integrity of the IV is not protected. Similarly, for the OFB and CTR modes, the decryption of any ciphertext block is vulnerable to the introduction of specific bit errors into that ciphertext block if its integrity is not protected. The same property also holds for the ciphertext segments in the CFB mode; however, for every ciphertext segment except the last one, the existence of such bit errors may be detected by their randomizing effect on the decryption of the succeeding ciphertext segment.

Table D.1 summarizes the effects of bit errors in a ciphertext block or IV on the decryption of the ciphertext for each of the five confidentiality modes.

Table D.1: Summary of Effect of Bit Errors on Decryption

Mode	Effect of Bit Errors in C_j	Effect of Bit Errors in the IV
ECB	RBE in the decryption of C_j	Not applicable
CBC	RBE in the decryption of C_j SBE in the decryption of C_{j+1}	SBE in the decryption of C_1
CFB	SBE in the decryption of C_j RBE in the decryption of $C_{j+1}, \dots, C_{j+b/s}$	RBE in the decryption of C_1, C_2, \dots, C_j for some j between 1 and b/s
OFB	SBE in the decryption of C_j	RBE in the decryption of C_1, C_2, \dots, C_n
CTR	SBE in the decryption of C_j	Not applicable *

RBE: random bit errors, i.e., bit errors occur independently in any bit position with an expected probability of $1/2$.

SBE: specific bit errors, i.e., bit errors occur in the same bit position(s) as the original bit error(s).

* Bit errors in the j th counter block, T_j , result in RBE in the decryption of C_j .

The deletion or insertion of bits into a ciphertext block (or segment) spoils the synchronization of the block (or segment) boundaries; in effect, bit errors may occur in the bit position of the inserted or deleted bit, and in every subsequent bit position. Therefore, the decryptions of the subsequent ciphertext blocks (or segments) will almost certainly be incorrect until the synchronization is restored. When the 1-bit CFB mode is used, then the synchronization is automatically restored $b+1$ positions after the inserted or deleted bit. For other values of s in the CFB mode, and for the other confidentiality modes in this recommendation, the synchronization must be restored externally.

In the CBC-MAC mode, the MAC verification will fail if there are any bit errors in the received MAC.

Appendix E: Modes of Triple DES

FIPS Pub 46-3 [FIPS 46-3] specifies the Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm and approves its three-fold, compound operation that is specified in ANSI X9.52 [1]: the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA). Essentially, the TDEA consists of the application of the forward DES algorithm, i.e., DES encryption, under one key, followed by the application of the inverse DES algorithm, i.e., DES decryption, under a second key, followed by the application of the forward DES algorithm under a third key. The TDEA is often called Triple DES.

FIPS Pub 46-3 also approves the seven modes of operation of Triple DES that are specified in ANSI X9.52. Four of those modes are equivalent to modes in this recommendation with the TDEA as the underlying block cipher. In particular, the TECB, TCBC, and TOFB modes in ANSI X9.52 are equivalent to the ECB, CBC, and OFB modes in this recommendation, with the TDEA as the underlying block cipher; the TCFB mode in ANSI X9.52 is equivalent to the CFB mode in this recommendation, with the TDEA as the underlying block cipher, provided that the possible choices of the parameter s (the segment size) are restricted to three values: 1, 8, and 64. The remaining three modes in ANSI X9.52 are TCBC-I, TCFB-P, and TOFB-I; they are mode variants that allow for interleaving or pipelining; this recommendation does not provide analogues of these three modes.

The Triple DES *modes* in ANSI X9.52 should not be used as the underlying block cipher algorithm for the modes in this recommendation. However, the Triple DES *algorithm*, i.e., TDEA, as described above, may be used as the underlying block cipher algorithm for the six modes in this recommendation. Two of the resulting modes of Triple DES are new, i.e., not specified in ANSI X9.52: the CTR mode of the TDEA, and the CBC-MAC mode of the TDEA.

Appendix F: Example Vectors for Modes of Operation of the AES

In this appendix, three examples are provided for each of the modes in this recommendation with the AES [2] as the underlying block cipher: one example is given for each of the allowed key sizes (128, 192, and 256 bits). Some intermediate results are presented. For the five confidentiality modes, examples are provided for both encryption and decryption. Examples are provided for 1-bit, 8-bit, and 128 bit CFB. The plaintext for all but two of these examples is equivalent to the following string of hexadecimal characters, formatted into four 128 bit blocks:

```
6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710.
```

For the example of 1-bit CFB, the plaintext is the first 16 bits in the above string; for the example of 8-bit CFB, the plaintext is the first 18 octets in the above string. All strings are presented in hexadecimal notation, except in the example of 1-bit CFB, where the plaintext and ciphertext segments are single bits.

F.1 ECB Example Vectors

F.1.1 ECB-AES128-Encrypt

Key	2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c
Block #1	
Plaintext	6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Input Block	6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Output Block	3ad77bb40d7a3660a89ecaf32466ef97
Ciphertext	3ad77bb40d7a3660a89ecaf32466ef97
Block #2	
Plaintext	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Input Block	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Output Block	f5d3d58503b9699de785895a96fdbaaaf
Ciphertext	f5d3d58503b9699de785895a96fdbaaaf
Block #3	
Plaintext	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Input Block	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Output Block	43b1cd7f598ece23881b00e3ed030688
Ciphertext	43b1cd7f598ece23881b00e3ed030688
Block #4	
Plaintext	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710
Input Block	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710
Output Block	7b0c785e27e8ad3f8223207104725dd4
Ciphertext	7b0c785e27e8ad3f8223207104725dd4

F.1.2 ECB-AES128-Decrypt

Key	2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c
Block #1	
Ciphertext	3ad77bb40d7a3660a89ecaf32466ef97
Input Block	3ad77bb40d7a3660a89ecaf32466ef97

Output Block	6bclbee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Plaintext	6bclbee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Block #2	
Ciphertext	f5d3d58503b9699de785895a96fdbaaaf
Input Block	f5d3d58503b9699de785895a96fdbaaaf
Output Block	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Plaintext	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Block #3	
Ciphertext	43b1cd7f598ece23881b00e3ed030688
Input Block	43b1cd7f598ece23881b00e3ed030688
Output Block	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Plaintext	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Block #4	
Ciphertext	7b0c785e27e8ad3f8223207104725dd4
Input Block	7b0c785e27e8ad3f8223207104725dd4
Output Block	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710
Plaintext	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710

F.1.3 ECB-AES192-Encrypt

Key	8e73b0f7da0e6452c810f32b809079e562f8ead2522c6b7b
Block #1	
Plaintext	6bclbee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Input Block	6bclbee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Output Block	bd334f1d6e45f25ff712a214571fa5cc
Ciphertext	bd334f1d6e45f25ff712a214571fa5cc
Block #2	
Plaintext	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Input Block	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Output Block	974104846d0ad3ad7734ecb3ecee4eef
Ciphertext	974104846d0ad3ad7734ecb3ecee4eef
Block #3	
Plaintext	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Input Block	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Output Block	ef7afd2270e2e60adce0ba2face6444e
Ciphertext	ef7afd2270e2e60adce0ba2face6444e
Block #4	
Plaintext	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710
Input Block	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710
Output Block	9a4b41ba738d6c72fb16691603c18e0e
Ciphertext	9a4b41ba738d6c72fb16691603c18e0e

F.1.4 ECB-AES192-Decrypt

Key	8e73b0f7da0e6452c810f32b809079e562f8ead2522c6b7b
Block #1	
Ciphertext	bd334f1d6e45f25ff712a214571fa5cc
Input Block	bd334f1d6e45f25ff712a214571fa5cc
Output Block	6bclbee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Plaintext	6bclbee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Block #2	
Ciphertext	974104846d0ad3ad7734ecb3ecee4eef
Input Block	974104846d0ad3ad7734ecb3ecee4eef
Output Block	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Plaintext	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51

Block #3	
Ciphertext	ef7afd2270e2e60adce0ba2face6444e
Input Block	ef7afd2270e2e60adce0ba2face6444e
Output Block	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Plaintext	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Block #4	
Ciphertext	9a4b41ba738d6c72fb16691603c18e0e
Input Block	9a4b41ba738d6c72fb16691603c18e0e
Output Block	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710
Plaintext	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710

F.1.5 ECB-AES256-Encrypt

Key	603deb1015ca71be2b73aef0857d7781 1f352c073b6108d72d9810a30914dff4
Block #1	
Plaintext	6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Input Block	6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Output Block	f3eed1bdb5d2a03c064b5a7e3db181f8
Ciphertext	f3eed1bdb5d2a03c064b5a7e3db181f8
Block #2	
Plaintext	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Input Block	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Output Block	591ccb10d410ed26dc5ba74a31362870
Ciphertext	591ccb10d410ed26dc5ba74a31362870
Block #3	
Plaintext	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Input Block	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Output Block	b6ed21b99ca6f4f9f153e7b1beafed1d
Ciphertext	b6ed21b99ca6f4f9f153e7b1beafed1d
Block #4	
Plaintext	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710
Input Block	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710
Output Block	23304b7a39f9f3ff067d8d8f9e24ecc7
Ciphertext	23304b7a39f9f3ff067d8d8f9e24ecc7

F.1.6 ECB-AES256-Decrypt

Key	603deb1015ca71be2b73aef0857d7781 1f352c073b6108d72d9810a30914dff4
Block #1	
Ciphertext	f3eed1bdb5d2a03c064b5a7e3db181f8
Input Block	f3eed1bdb5d2a03c064b5a7e3db181f8
Output Block	6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Plaintext	6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Block #2	
Ciphertext	591ccb10d410ed26dc5ba74a31362870
Input Block	591ccb10d410ed26dc5ba74a31362870
Output Block	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Plaintext	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Block #3	
Ciphertext	b6ed21b99ca6f4f9f153e7b1beafed1d
Input Block	b6ed21b99ca6f4f9f153e7b1beafed1d
Output Block	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Plaintext	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef

Block #4	
Ciphertext	23304b7a39f9f3ff067d8d8f9e24ecc7
Input Block	23304b7a39f9f3ff067d8d8f9e24ecc7
Output Block	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710
Plaintext	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710

F.2 CBC Example Vectors

F.2.1 CBC-AES128-Encrypt

Key	2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c
IV	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Block #1	
Plaintext	6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Input Block	6bc0bce12a459991e134741a7f9e1925
Output Block	7649abac8119b246cee98e9b12e9197d
Ciphertext	7649abac8119b246cee98e9b12e9197d
Block #2	
Plaintext	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Input Block	d86421fb9f1a1eda505ee1375746972c
Output Block	5086cb9b507219ee95db113a917678b2
Ciphertext	5086cb9b507219ee95db113a917678b2
Block #3	
Plaintext	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Input Block	604ed7ddf32efdf7020d0238b7c2a5d
Output Block	73bed6b8e3c1743b7116e69e22229516
Ciphertext	73bed6b8e3c1743b7116e69e22229516
Block #4	
Plaintext	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710
Input Block	8521f2fd3c8eef2cdc3da7e5c44ea206
Output Block	3ff1caa1681fac09120eca307586e1a7
Ciphertext	3ff1caa1681fac09120eca307586e1a7

F.2.2 CBC-AES128-Decrypt

Key	2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c
IV	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Block #1	
Ciphertext	7649abac8119b246cee98e9b12e9197d
Input Block	7649abac8119b246cee98e9b12e9197d
Output Block	6bc0bce12a459991e134741a7f9e1925
Plaintext	6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Block #2	
Ciphertext	5086cb9b507219ee95db113a917678b2
Input Block	5086cb9b507219ee95db113a917678b2
Output Block	d86421fb9f1a1eda505ee1375746972c
Plaintext	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Block #3	
Ciphertext	73bed6b8e3c1743b7116e69e22229516
Input Block	73bed6b8e3c1743b7116e69e22229516
Output Block	604ed7ddf32efdf7020d0238b7c2a5d
Plaintext	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Block #4	
Ciphertext	3ff1caa1681fac09120eca307586e1a7
Input Block	3ff1caa1681fac09120eca307586e1a7

Output Block 8521f2fd3c8eef2cdc3da7e5c44ea206
Plaintext f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710

F.2.3 CBC-AES192-Encrypt

Key 8e73b0f7da0e6452c810f32b809079e562f8ead2522c6b7b
IV 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Block #1
Plaintext 6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Input Block 6bc0bce12a459991e134741a7f9e1925
Output Block 4f021db243bc633d7178183a9fa071e8
Ciphertext 4f021db243bc633d7178183a9fa071e8
Block #2
Plaintext ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Input Block e12f97e55dbfcfa1efcf7796da0fffb9
Output Block b4d9ada9ad7dedf4e5e738763f69145a
Ciphertext b4d9ada9ad7dedf4e5e738763f69145a
Block #3
Plaintext 30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Input Block 8411b1ef0e2109e5001cf96f256346b5
Output Block 571b242012fb7ae07fa9baac3df102e0
Ciphertext 571b242012fb7ae07fa9baac3df102e0
Block #4
Plaintext f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710
Input Block a1840065cdb4e1f7d282fbd7db9d35f0
Output Block 08b0e27988598881d920a9e64f5615cd
Ciphertext 08b0e27988598881d920a9e64f5615cd

F.2.4 CBC-AES192-Decrypt

Key 8e73b0f7da0e6452c810f32b809079e562f8ead2522c6b7b
IV 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Block #1
Ciphertext 4f021db243bc633d7178183a9fa071e8
Input Block 4f021db243bc633d7178183a9fa071e8
Output Block 6bc0bce12a459991e134741a7f9e1925
Plaintext 6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Block #2
Ciphertext b4d9ada9ad7dedf4e5e738763f69145a
Input Block b4d9ada9ad7dedf4e5e738763f69145a
Output Block e12f97e55dbfcfa1efcf7796da0fffb9
Plaintext ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Block #3
Ciphertext 571b242012fb7ae07fa9baac3df102e0
Input Block 571b242012fb7ae07fa9baac3df102e0
Output Block 8411b1ef0e2109e5001cf96f256346b5
Plaintext 30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Block #4
Ciphertext 08b0e27988598881d920a9e64f5615cd
Input Block 08b0e27988598881d920a9e64f5615cd
Output Block a1840065cdb4e1f7d282fbd7db9d35f0
Plaintext f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710

F.2.5 CBC-AES256-Encrypt

Key 603deb1015ca71be2b73aef0857d7781

IV	1f352c073b6108d72d9810a30914dff4 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Block #1	
Plaintext	6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Input Block	6bc0bce12a459991e134741a7f9e1925
Output Block	f58c4c04d6e5f1ba779eabfb5f7bfbd6
Ciphertext	f58c4c04d6e5f1ba779eabfb5f7bfbd6
Block #2	
Plaintext	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Input Block	5ba1c653c8e65d26e929c4571ad47587
Output Block	9cfc4e967edb808d679f777bc6702c7d
Ciphertext	9cfc4e967edb808d679f777bc6702c7d
Block #3	
Plaintext	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Input Block	ac3452d0dd87649c8264b662dc7a7e92
Output Block	39f23369a9d9bacfa530e26304231461
Ciphertext	39f23369a9d9bacfa530e26304231461
Block #4	
Plaintext	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710
Input Block	cf6d172c769621d8081ba318e24f2371
Output Block	b2eb05e2c39be9fcda6c19078c6a9d1b
Ciphertext	b2eb05e2c39be9fcda6c19078c6a9d1b

F.2.6 CBC-AES256-Decrypt

Key	603deb1015ca71be2b73aef0857d7781 1f352c073b6108d72d9810a30914dff4
IV	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Block #1	
Ciphertext	f58c4c04d6e5f1ba779eabfb5f7bfbd6
Input Block	f58c4c04d6e5f1ba779eabfb5f7bfbd6
Output Block	6bc0bce12a459991e134741a7f9e1925
Plaintext	6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Block #2	
Ciphertext	9cfc4e967edb808d679f777bc6702c7d
Input Block	9cfc4e967edb808d679f777bc6702c7d
Output Block	5ba1c653c8e65d26e929c4571ad47587
Plaintext	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Block #3	
Ciphertext	39f23369a9d9bacfa530e26304231461
Input Block	39f23369a9d9bacfa530e26304231461
Output Block	ac3452d0dd87649c8264b662dc7a7e92
Plaintext	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Block #4	
Ciphertext	b2eb05e2c39be9fcda6c19078c6a9d1b
Input Block	b2eb05e2c39be9fcda6c19078c6a9d1b
Output Block	cf6d172c769621d8081ba318e24f2371
Plaintext	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710

F.3 CFB Example Vectors

F.3.1 CFB1-AES128-Encrypt

Key	2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c
IV	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f

Segment #1	
Input Block	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Output Block	50fe67cc996d32b6da0937e99bafec60
Plaintext	0
Ciphertext	0
Segment #2	
Input Block	00020406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1e
Output Block	19cf576c7596e702f298b35666955c79
Plaintext	1
Ciphertext	1
Segment #3	
Input Block	0004080c1014181c2024282c3034383d
Output Block	59e17759acd02b801fa321ea059e331f
Plaintext	1
Ciphertext	1
Segment #4	
Input Block	0008101820283038404850586068707b
Output Block	71f415b0cc109e8b0faa14ab740c22f4
Plaintext	0
Ciphertext	0
Segment #5	
Input Block	00102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f6
Output Block	3fb76d3d1048179964597a0f64d5adad
Plaintext	1
Ciphertext	1
Segment #6	
Input Block	0020406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1ed
Output Block	4c943b4bac54ab974e3e52326d29aaa1
Plaintext	0
Ciphertext	0
Segment #7	
Input Block	004080c1014181c2024282c3034383da
Output Block	c94da41eb3d3acf1993a512ab1e8203f
Plaintext	1
Ciphertext	0
Segment #8	
Input Block	008101820283038404850586068707b4
Output Block	e07f5e98778f75dbb2691c3f582c3953
Plaintext	1
Ciphertext	0
Segment #9	
Input Block	0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f68
Output Block	02ef5fc8961efcce8568bc0731262dc7
Plaintext	1
Ciphertext	1
Segment #10	
Input Block	020406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1ed1
Output Block	9f5a30367065efbe914b53698c8716b7
Plaintext	1
Ciphertext	0
Segment #11	
Input Block	04080c1014181c2024282c3034383da2
Output Block	d018cfb81d0580edbff955ed74d382db
Plaintext	0

Ciphertext	1
Segment #12	
Input Block	08101820283038404850586068707b45
Output Block	81272ab351e08e0b695b94b8164d86f4
Plaintext	0
Ciphertext	1
Segment #13	
Input Block	102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f68b
Output Block	094d33f856483d3fa01ba94f7e5ab3e7
Plaintext	0
Ciphertext	0
Segment #14	
Input Block	20406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1ed16
Output Block	609900ad61923c8c102cd8d0d7947a2c
Plaintext	0
Ciphertext	0
Segment #15	
Input Block	4080c1014181c2024282c3034383da2c
Output Block	9e5a154de966ab4db9c88b22a398134e
Plaintext	0
Ciphertext	1
Segment #16	
Input Block	8101820283038404850586068707b459
Output Block	7fe16252b338bc4de3725c4156dfed20
Plaintext	1
Ciphertext	1

F.3.2 CFB1-AES128-Decrypt

Key	2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c
IV	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Segment #1	
Input Block	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Output Block	50fe67cc996d32b6da0937e99bafec60
Ciphertext	1
Plaintext	1
Segment #2	
Input Block	00020406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1e
Output Block	19cf576c7596e702f298b35666955c79
Ciphertext	1
Plaintext	1
Segment #3	
Input Block	0004080c1014181c2024282c3034383c
Output Block	a2649ba8269a035054a912fbf728afd5
Ciphertext	1
Plaintext	0
Segment #4	
Input Block	00081018202830384048505860687078
Output Block	4811bbd0b48ef8f9d31ce7a81de70ac5
Ciphertext	1
Plaintext	1
Segment #5	
Input Block	00102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f0
Output Block	b577ed00e35432951e2f6e82cbe27177

Ciphertext	0
Plaintext	1
Segment #6	
Input Block	0020406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1e0
Output Block	172bab79e88b8254ca524c40ae1b158b
Ciphertext	1
Plaintext	1
Segment #7	
Input Block	004080c1014181c2024282c3034383c0
Output Block	6a9bc53e544274d56fd9e15f61078362
Ciphertext	0
Plaintext	0
Segment #8	
Input Block	00810182028303840485058606870780
Output Block	2e0393c31566500d821f04b526f279ea
Ciphertext	1
Plaintext	1
Segment #9	
Input Block	0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f00
Output Block	85245ba7606b7724be43073e058c7b0d
Ciphertext	1
Plaintext	0
Segment #10	
Input Block	020406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1e00
Output Block	f6ba291e57d98a764b163f0fdb9bc03d
Ciphertext	0
Plaintext	1
Segment #11	
Input Block	04080c1014181c2024282c3034383c00
Output Block	ed21502740fd4bb2721279903cc997f7
Ciphertext	0
Plaintext	1
Segment #12	
Input Block	08101820283038404850586068707800
Output Block	ca7686df42c363918b0d89135775393a
Ciphertext	0
Plaintext	1
Segment #13	
Input Block	102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f000
Output Block	105627283843864d76961df0ae1dd54d
Ciphertext	1
Plaintext	1
Segment #14	
Input Block	20406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1e000
Output Block	7b1d44a99bd81911842950361ebc92c9
Ciphertext	1
Plaintext	1
Segment #15	
Input Block	4080c1014181c2024282c3034383c000
Output Block	3bb975e7ae014c574dc9f9b4795c91fd
Ciphertext	0
Plaintext	0
Segment #16	
Input Block	81018202830384048505860687078000

Output Block 0d4ee5a3754b72b9d47b6912e01462e9
Ciphertext 0
Plaintext 0

F.3.3 CFB1-AES192-Encrypt

Key 8e73b0f7da0e6452c810f32b809079e562f8ead2522c6b7b
IV 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Segment #1
Input Block 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Output Block a609b38df3b1133dddf2718ba09565e
Plaintext 0
Ciphertext 1
Segment #2
Input Block 00020406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1f
Output Block a0e2bee6eb1734379bd4908be6a991a0
Plaintext 1
Ciphertext 0
Segment #3
Input Block 0004080c1014181c2024282c3034383e
Output Block b1a1766bedec7ee3ba9cd3f34fbed4c6
Plaintext 1
Ciphertext 0
Segment #4
Input Block 0008101820283038404850586068707c
Output Block b294ae5f393ae0179e6d3d8c45a7a4b9
Plaintext 0
Ciphertext 1
Segment #5
Input Block 00102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f9
Output Block f0f703ff5d0634aa8aee7f1e26aafca3
Plaintext 1
Ciphertext 0
Segment #6
Input Block 0020406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1f2
Output Block 4d67df426abdb8c89e7de9fb3069d8be
Plaintext 0
Ciphertext 0
Segment #7
Input Block 004080c1014181c2024282c3034383e4
Output Block 30bc892338dfa10664118b9f4ba348d2
Plaintext 1
Ciphertext 1
Segment #8
Input Block 008101820283038404850586068707c9
Output Block 763ad8c63ed78d66452bb44c8bb7a8c8
Plaintext 1
Ciphertext 1
Segment #9
Input Block 0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f93
Output Block bfc36f5cfbc1306859b48f8fa62a43df
Plaintext 1
Ciphertext 0
Segment #10

Input Block	020406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1f26
Output Block	16e27adac112a0bf6a69c95cbdf584a3
Plaintext	1
Ciphertext	1
Segment #11	
Input Block	04080c1014181c2024282c3034383e4d
Output Block	1e9d21c3da3de9186251160045756ce0
Plaintext	0
Ciphertext	0
Segment #12	
Input Block	08101820283038404850586068707c9a
Output Block	b836e0f661b51d8bd38c448e0e5a11bb
Plaintext	0
Ciphertext	1
Segment #13	
Input Block	102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f935
Output Block	c5efcdd09dbb92d1faada8f6c9bab052
Plaintext	0
Ciphertext	1
Segment #14	
Input Block	20406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1f26b
Output Block	7c99710018d88e40bd4ac8f1b2bf4dbb
Plaintext	0
Ciphertext	0
Segment #15	
Input Block	4080c1014181c2024282c3034383e4d6
Output Block	173bcd8b4dad60ae6646813fdbc81f5b
Plaintext	0
Ciphertext	0
Segment #16	
Input Block	8101820283038404850586068707c9ac
Output Block	09844c6d2272d148d5af1c7bf01bb439
Plaintext	1
Ciphertext	1

F.3.4 CFB1-AES192-Decrypt

Key	8e73b0f7da0e6452c810f32b809079e562f8ead2522c6b7b
IV	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Segment #1	
Input Block	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Output Block	a609b38df3b1133dddf2718ba09565e
Ciphertext	1
Plaintext	0
Segment #2	
Input Block	00020406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1e
Output Block	8cfec04cb8667eaa3b37c247f5c9f4b8
Ciphertext	1
Plaintext	0
Segment #3	
Input Block	0004080c1014181c2024282c3034383c
Output Block	c288e4824cda4702aa8766ff00e6d66b
Ciphertext	1
Plaintext	0

Segment #4	
Input Block	00081018202830384048505860687078
Output Block	2c736f16d080d7a28f820743e997d1a9
Ciphertext	1
Plaintext	1
Segment #5	
Input Block	00102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f0
Output Block	da148720ccb3fda00c0fdd06865fcbb9
Ciphertext	0
Plaintext	1
Segment #6	
Input Block	0020406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1e0
Output Block	7a71fe25563592025df9c14cd48d04ff
Ciphertext	1
Plaintext	1
Segment #7	
Input Block	004080c1014181c2024282c3034383c0
Output Block	651297ea510458130ca54ba44d40bf49
Ciphertext	0
Plaintext	0
Segment #8	
Input Block	00810182028303840485058606870780
Output Block	c838c426a3ee613550ee42a11f5baeed
Ciphertext	1
Plaintext	0
Segment #9	
Input Block	0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f00
Output Block	3df5c1ca8bd6927017a5d826a822ce52
Ciphertext	1
Plaintext	1
Segment #10	
Input Block	020406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1e00
Output Block	f12cc25f528e9fc8bdee2b6aefbfabf28
Ciphertext	0
Plaintext	1
Segment #11	
Input Block	04080c1014181c2024282c3034383c00
Output Block	6e3acbc4c3f3c90a860885c96439ce0d
Ciphertext	0
Plaintext	0
Segment #12	
Input Block	08101820283038404850586068707800
Output Block	bff6fd7e4923ebafd903d1db3e6fbccc
Ciphertext	0
Plaintext	1
Segment #13	
Input Block	102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f000
Output Block	53ae042b1a8365eed5699ae5d6129765
Ciphertext	1
Plaintext	1
Segment #14	
Input Block	20406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1e000
Output Block	8e60ef82a372ed19734c12f462fd9143
Ciphertext	1

Plaintext	0
Segment #15	
Input Block	4080c1014181c2024282c3034383c000
Output Block	e4dafa7b2acf6acc09e37d3fc46d86fc
Ciphertext	0
Plaintext	1
Segment #16	
Input Block	81018202830384048505860687078000
Output Block	d6ea60e79c876b9459320616f734f517
Ciphertext	0
Plaintext	1

F.3.5 CFB1-AES256-Encrypt

Key	603deb1015ca71be2b73aef0857d7781 1f352c073b6108d72d9810a30914dff4
IV	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Segment #1	
Input Block	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Output Block	b7bf3a5df43989dd97f0fa97ebce2f4a
Plaintext	0
Ciphertext	1
Segment #2	
Input Block	00020406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1f
Output Block	ee93d380e0f01117fffd78017599514a
Plaintext	1
Ciphertext	0
Segment #3	
Input Block	0004080c1014181c2024282c3034383e
Output Block	857749898b3602aad91e699911de89b0
Plaintext	1
Ciphertext	0
Segment #4	
Input Block	0008101820283038404850586068707c
Output Block	dce81c80810e2ba343a6bb402716b7a8
Plaintext	0
Ciphertext	1
Segment #5	
Input Block	00102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f9
Output Block	e5517bfcdccea00501350a601f754823
Plaintext	1
Ciphertext	0
Segment #6	
Input Block	0020406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1f2
Output Block	15799c7f4081a78cc41f29955349c5a0
Plaintext	0
Ciphertext	0
Segment #7	
Input Block	004080c1014181c2024282c3034383e4
Output Block	84d246bdb391f6a7979ff5ccb8467262
Plaintext	1
Ciphertext	0
Segment #8	

Input Block	008101820283038404850586068707c8
Output Block	bb9e05db9855a9e7e3837a648dd4c3b0
Plaintext	1
Ciphertext	0
Segment #9	
Input Block	0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f90
Output Block	a413c5714f70287dfcd943004bf7ac8e
Plaintext	1
Ciphertext	0
Segment #10	
Input Block	020406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1f20
Output Block	a7310abf87610d66edf6c892a84460d5
Plaintext	1
Ciphertext	0
Segment #11	
Input Block	04080c1014181c2024282c3034383e40
Output Block	8aec6712d89bd147c83b51d787b11399
Plaintext	0
Ciphertext	1
Segment #12	
Input Block	08101820283038404850586068707c81
Output Block	2ff05b620f68134f4ba92deffbf93b2
Plaintext	0
Ciphertext	0
Segment #13	
Input Block	102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f902
Output Block	819208afd5284316065a76bead028ad3
Plaintext	0
Ciphertext	1
Segment #14	
Input Block	20406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1f205
Output Block	1914ed64b2115167ce2ca4c813da5245
Plaintext	0
Ciphertext	0
Segment #15	
Input Block	4080c1014181c2024282c3034383e40a
Output Block	638abae8724a954ae9e1e2e119deb6e1
Plaintext	0
Ciphertext	0
Segment #16	
Input Block	8101820283038404850586068707c814
Output Block	2b4f488a3f958c52a3f1db2da938360e
Plaintext	1
Ciphertext	1

F.3.6 CFB1-AES256-Decrypt

Key	603deb1015ca71be2b73aef0857d7781 1f352c073b6108d72d9810a30914dff4
IV	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Segment #1	
Input Block	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Output Block	b7bf3a5df43989dd97f0fa97ebce2f4a
Ciphertext	1

Plaintext	0
Segment #2	
Input Block	00020406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1e
Output Block	a7ald29d8ce5c9750213c37b440dfab7
Ciphertext	1
Plaintext	0
Segment #3	
Input Block	0004080c1014181c2024282c3034383c
Output Block	081fe4556193c970ff608e22cbccdb23
Ciphertext	1
Plaintext	1
Segment #4	
Input Block	00081018202830384048505860687078
Output Block	6b069b526b3756bd7e89e8e34f0dffcf7
Ciphertext	1
Plaintext	1
Segment #5	
Input Block	00102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f0
Output Block	6152072fc81b5b3f23c2abf1a5522d7b
Ciphertext	0
Plaintext	0
Segment #6	
Input Block	0020406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1e0
Output Block	391b45a90d81cc1bf90d81fce5ba2e43
Ciphertext	1
Plaintext	1
Segment #7	
Input Block	004080c1014181c2024282c3034383c0
Output Block	db800d9073e7ec4b5d2b2266b28b5eae
Ciphertext	0
Plaintext	1
Segment #8	
Input Block	00810182028303840485058606870780
Output Block	8ec52fba3727e6099299ff1b2af07996
Ciphertext	1
Plaintext	0
Segment #9	
Input Block	0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f00
Output Block	579055fc8ec967fbdfa86524539405f6
Ciphertext	1
Plaintext	1
Segment #10	
Input Block	020406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1e00
Output Block	2995ec971cc403c80591f1f60c6600fb
Ciphertext	0
Plaintext	0
Segment #11	
Input Block	04080c1014181c2024282c3034383c00
Output Block	ff62f51f320e3df22c3a49a98090d1fa
Ciphertext	0
Plaintext	1
Segment #12	
Input Block	08101820283038404850586068707800
Output Block	00873895f1ffd7b9b23be6c30d524490

Ciphertext	0
Plaintext	0
Segment #13	
Input Block	102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f000
Output Block	30f133351528979e2024f12579439d94
Ciphertext	1
Plaintext	1
Segment #14	
Input Block	20406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1e000
Output Block	f20a64dd1a604557702ea261a65a2fa4
Ciphertext	1
Plaintext	0
Segment #15	
Input Block	4080c1014181c2024282c3034383c000
Output Block	ac938e0b407b170697f872112174fc31
Ciphertext	0
Plaintext	1
Segment #16	
Input Block	81018202830384048505860687078000
Output Block	2ac5bbc22ee57b9b911ff7d4105fb263
Ciphertext	0
Plaintext	0

F.3.7 CFB8-AES128-Encrypt

Key	2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c
IV	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Segment #1	
Input Block	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Output Block	50fe67cc996d32b6da0937e99bafec60
Plaintext	6b
Ciphertext	3b
Segment #2	
Input Block	0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f3b
Output Block	b8eb865a2b026381abb1d6560ed20f68
Plaintext	c1
Ciphertext	79
Segment #3	
Input Block	02030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f3b79
Output Block	fce6033b4edce64cbaed3f61ff5b927c
Plaintext	be
Ciphertext	42
Segment #4	
Input Block	030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f3b7942
Output Block	ae4e5e7ffe805f7a4395b180004f8ca8
Plaintext	e2
Ciphertext	4c
Segment #5	
Input Block	0405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f3b79424c
Output Block	b205eb89445b62116f1deb988a81e6dd
Plaintext	2e
Ciphertext	9c
Segment #6	
Input Block	05060708090a0b0c0d0e0f3b79424c9c

Output Block	4d21d456a5e239064fff4be0c0f85488
Plaintext	40
Ciphertext	0d
Segment #7	
Input Block	060708090a0b0c0d0e0f3b79424c9c0d
Output Block	4b2f5c3895b9efdc85ee0c5178c7fd33
Plaintext	9f
Ciphertext	d4
Segment #8	
Input Block	0708090a0b0c0d0e0f3b79424c9c0dd4
Output Block	a0976d856da260a34104d1a80953db4c
Plaintext	96
Ciphertext	36
Segment #9	
Input Block	08090a0b0c0d0e0f3b79424c9c0dd436
Output Block	53674e5890a2c71b0f6a27a094e5808c
Plaintext	e9
Ciphertext	ba
Segment #10	
Input Block	090a0b0c0d0e0f3b79424c9c0dd436ba
Output Block	f34cd32ffed495f8bc8adba194eccb7a
Plaintext	3d
Ciphertext	ce
Segment #11	
Input Block	0a0b0c0d0e0f3b79424c9c0dd436bace
Output Block	e08cf2407d7ed676c9049586f1d48ba6
Plaintext	7e
Ciphertext	9e
Segment #12	
Input Block	0b0c0d0e0f3b79424c9c0dd436bace9e
Output Block	1f5c88a19b6ca28e99c9aeb8982a6dd8
Plaintext	11
Ciphertext	0e
Segment #13	
Input Block	0c0d0e0f3b79424c9c0dd436bace9e0e
Output Block	a70e63df781cf395a208bd2365c8779b
Plaintext	73
Ciphertext	d4
Segment #14	
Input Block	0d0e0f3b79424c9c0dd436bace9e0ed4
Output Block	cbcfe8b3bcf9ac202ce18420013319ab
Plaintext	93
Ciphertext	58
Segment #15	
Input Block	0e0f3b79424c9c0dd436bace9e0ed458
Output Block	7d9fac6604b3c8c5b1f8c5a00956cf56
Plaintext	17
Ciphertext	6a
Segment #16	
Input Block	0f3b79424c9c0dd436bace9e0ed4586a
Output Block	65c3fa64bf0343986825c636f4a1efd2
Plaintext	2a
Ciphertext	4f
Segment #17	

Input Block	3b79424c9c0dd436bace9e0ed4586a4f
Output Block	9cff5e5ff4f554d56c924b9d6a6de21d
Plaintext	ae
Ciphertext	32
Segment #18	
Input Block	79424c9c0dd436bace9e0ed4586a4f32
Output Block	946c3dc1584cc18400ecd8c6052c44b1
Plaintext	2d
Ciphertext	b9

F.3.8 CFB8-AES128-Decrypt

Key	2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c
IV	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Segment #1	
Input Block	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Output Block	50fe67cc996d32b6da0937e99bafec60
Ciphertext	3b
Plaintext	6b
Segment #2	
Input Block	0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f3b
Output Block	b8eb865a2b026381abb1d6560ed20f68
Ciphertext	79
Plaintext	c1
Segment #3	
Input Block	02030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f3b79
Output Block	fce6033b4edce64cbaed3f61ff5b927c
Ciphertext	42
Plaintext	be
Segment #4	
Input Block	030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f3b7942
Output Block	ae4e5e7ffe805f7a4395b180004f8ca8
Ciphertext	4c
Plaintext	e2
Segment #5	
Input Block	0405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f3b79424c
Output Block	b205eb89445b62116f1deb988a81e6dd
Ciphertext	9c
Plaintext	2e
Segment #6	
Input Block	05060708090a0b0c0d0e0f3b79424c9c
Output Block	4d21d456a5e239064fff4be0c0f85488
Ciphertext	0d
Plaintext	40
Segment #7	
Input Block	060708090a0b0c0d0e0f3b79424c9c0d
Output Block	4b2f5c3895b9efdc85ee0c5178c7fd33
Ciphertext	d4
Plaintext	9f
Segment #8	
Input Block	0708090a0b0c0d0e0f3b79424c9c0dd4
Output Block	a0976d856da260a34104d1a80953db4c
Ciphertext	36
Plaintext	96

Segment #9	
Input Block	08090a0b0c0d0e0f3b79424c9c0dd436
Output Block	53674e5890a2c71b0f6a27a094e5808c
Ciphertext	ba
Plaintext	e9
Segment #10	
Input Block	090a0b0c0d0e0f3b79424c9c0dd436ba
Output Block	f34cd32ffed495f8bc8adba194eccb7a
Ciphertext	ce
Plaintext	3d
Segment #11	
Input Block	0a0b0c0d0e0f3b79424c9c0dd436bace
Output Block	e08cf2407d7ed676c9049586f1d48ba6
Ciphertext	9e
Plaintext	7e
Segment #12	
Input Block	0b0c0d0e0f3b79424c9c0dd436bace9e
Output Block	1f5c88a19b6ca28e99c9aeb8982a6dd8
Ciphertext	0e
Plaintext	11
Segment #13	
Input Block	0c0d0e0f3b79424c9c0dd436bace9e0e
Output Block	a70e63df781cf395a208bd2365c8779b
Ciphertext	d4
Plaintext	73
Segment #14	
Input Block	0d0e0f3b79424c9c0dd436bace9e0ed4
Output Block	cbcf8b3bcf9ac202ce18420013319ab
Ciphertext	58
Plaintext	93
Segment #15	
Input Block	0e0f3b79424c9c0dd436bace9e0ed458
Output Block	7d9fac6604b3c8c5b1f8c5a00956cf56
Ciphertext	6a
Plaintext	17
Segment #16	
Input Block	0f3b79424c9c0dd436bace9e0ed4586a
Output Block	65c3fa64bf0343986825c636f4a1efd2
Ciphertext	4f
Plaintext	2a
Segment #17	
Input Block	3b79424c9c0dd436bace9e0ed4586a4f
Output Block	9cff5e5ff4f554d56c924b9d6a6de21d
Ciphertext	32
Plaintext	ae
Segment #18	
Input Block	79424c9c0dd436bace9e0ed4586a4f32
Output Block	946c3dc1584cc18400ecd8c6052c44b1
Ciphertext	b9
Plaintext	2d

F.3.9 CFB8-AES192-Encrypt

Key	8e73b0f7da0e6452c810f32b809079e562f8ead2522c6b7b
IV	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Segment #1	
Input Block	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Output Block	a609b38df3b1133dddf2718ba09565e
Plaintext	6b
Ciphertext	cd
Segment #2	
Input Block	0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0fcd
Output Block	63c82e99e7289617c49e6851e082142a
Plaintext	c1
Ciphertext	a2
Segment #3	
Input Block	02030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0fcda2
Output Block	ec40a5497264bfb4d6820aaae73f75af
Plaintext	be
Ciphertext	52
Segment #4	
Input Block	030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0fcda252
Output Block	fc011a96afe968c32bae6495173a9154
Plaintext	e2
Ciphertext	1e
Segment #5	
Input Block	0405060708090a0b0c0d0e0fcda2521e
Output Block	de019e09ac995ba46a42916ef77d8fe5
Plaintext	2e
Ciphertext	f0
Segment #6	
Input Block	05060708090a0b0c0d0e0fcda2521ef0
Output Block	e980477efb7f896e07c4a2d527e7b537
Plaintext	40
Ciphertext	a9
Segment #7	
Input Block	060708090a0b0c0d0e0fcda2521ef0a9
Output Block	9a9a77b11709b36e08e9321ae8b1e539
Plaintext	9f
Ciphertext	05
Segment #8	
Input Block	0708090a0b0c0d0e0fcda2521ef0a905
Output Block	5cald192a780fbca1471e10588593c7c
Plaintext	96
Ciphertext	ca
Segment #9	
Input Block	08090a0b0c0d0e0fcda2521ef0a905ca
Output Block	addb26efd21de4d002474c7748e0bc1d
Plaintext	e9
Ciphertext	44
Segment #10	
Input Block	090a0b0c0d0e0fcda2521ef0a905ca44
Output Block	f0c410ad6512c5177a5ee40a60de01b8
Plaintext	3d
Ciphertext	cd

Segment #11	
Input Block	0a0b0c0d0e0fcda2521ef0a905ca44cd
Output Block	7bbf71f2b4f5cf68f3c0c1b9235dbd53
Plaintext	7e
Ciphertext	05
Segment #12	
Input Block	0b0c0d0e0fcda2521ef0a905ca44cd05
Output Block	6dafb26e3c63b350811394b382e14d69
Plaintext	11
Ciphertext	7c
Segment #13	
Input Block	0c0d0e0fcda2521ef0a905ca44cd057c
Output Block	ccd6e25255a80e9bdbec9fbc26e5fad6
Plaintext	73
Ciphertext	bf
Segment #14	
Input Block	0d0e0fcda2521ef0a905ca44cd057cbf
Output Block	9e33550f6d47bda77f4f3108181ab21c
Plaintext	93
Ciphertext	0d
Segment #15	
Input Block	0e0fcda2521ef0a905ca44cd057cbf0d
Output Block	50b3eae29a6623fbef6d726dbda675a8
Plaintext	17
Ciphertext	47
Segment #16	
Input Block	0fcda2521ef0a905ca44cd057cbf0d47
Output Block	8a2a57d1b9158539ef7ff42b33bf0a4a
Plaintext	2a
Ciphertext	a0
Segment #17	
Input Block	cda2521ef0a905ca44cd057cbf0d47a0
Output Block	c94e9102ac731d2f127b657d810ef5a8
Plaintext	ae
Ciphertext	67
Segment #18	
Input Block	a2521ef0a905ca44cd057cbf0d47a067
Output Block	a765ed650568fbe386660def5f8d491d
Plaintext	2d
Ciphertext	8a

F.3.10 CFB8-AES192-Decrypt

Key	8e73b0f7da0e6452c810f32b809079e562f8ead2522c6b7b
IV	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Segment #1	
Input Block	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Output Block	a609b38df3b1133dddf2718ba09565e
Ciphertext	cd
Plaintext	6b
Segment #2	
Input Block	0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0fcd
Output Block	63c82e99e7289617c49e6851e082142a
Ciphertext	a2

Plaintext	c1
Segment #3	
Input Block	02030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0fcda2
Output Block	ec40a5497264bfb4d6820aaae73f75af
Ciphertext	52
Plaintext	be
Segment #4	
Input Block	030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0fcda252
Output Block	fc011a96afe968c32bae6495173a9154
Ciphertext	1e
Plaintext	e2
Segment #5	
Input Block	0405060708090a0b0c0d0e0fcda2521e
Output Block	de019e09ac995ba46a42916ef77d8fe5
Ciphertext	f0
Plaintext	2e
Segment #6	
Input Block	05060708090a0b0c0d0e0fcda2521ef0
Output Block	e980477efb7f896e07c4a2d527e7b537
Ciphertext	a9
Plaintext	40
Segment #7	
Input Block	060708090a0b0c0d0e0fcda2521ef0a9
Output Block	9a9a77b11709b36e08e9321ae8b1e539
Ciphertext	05
Plaintext	9f
Segment #8	
Input Block	0708090a0b0c0d0e0fcda2521ef0a905
Output Block	5ca1d192a780fbca1471e10588593c7c
Ciphertext	ca
Plaintext	96
Segment #9	
Input Block	08090a0b0c0d0e0fcda2521ef0a905ca
Output Block	addb26efd21de4d002474c7748e0bc1d
Ciphertext	44
Plaintext	e9
Segment #10	
Input Block	090a0b0c0d0e0fcda2521ef0a905ca44
Output Block	f0c410ad6512c5177a5ee40a60de01b8
Ciphertext	cd
Plaintext	3d
Segment #11	
Input Block	0a0b0c0d0e0fcda2521ef0a905ca44cd
Output Block	7bbf71f2b4f5cf68f3c0c1b9235dbd53
Ciphertext	05
Plaintext	7e
Segment #12	
Input Block	0b0c0d0e0fcda2521ef0a905ca44cd05
Output Block	6dafb26e3c63b350811394b382e14d69
Ciphertext	7c
Plaintext	11
Segment #13	
Input Block	0c0d0e0fcda2521ef0a905ca44cd057c
Output Block	ccd6e25255a80e9bdbec9fbc26e5fad6

Ciphertext	bf
Plaintext	73
Segment #14	
Input Block	0d0e0fcda2521ef0a905ca44cd057cbf
Output Block	9e33550f6d47bda77f4f3108181ab21c
Ciphertext	0d
Plaintext	93
Segment #15	
Input Block	0e0fcda2521ef0a905ca44cd057cbf0d
Output Block	50b3eae29a6623fbef6d726dbda675a8
Ciphertext	47
Plaintext	17
Segment #16	
Input Block	0fcda2521ef0a905ca44cd057cbf0d47
Output Block	8a2a57d1b9158539ef7ff42b33bf0a4a
Ciphertext	a0
Plaintext	2a
Segment #17	
Input Block	cda2521ef0a905ca44cd057cbf0d47a0
Output Block	c94e9102ac731d2f127b657d810ef5a8
Ciphertext	67
Plaintext	ae
Segment #18	
Input Block	a2521ef0a905ca44cd057cbf0d47a067
Output Block	a765ed650568fbe386660def5f8d491d
Ciphertext	8a
Plaintext	2d

F.3.11 CFB8-AES256-Encrypt

Key	603deb1015ca71be2b73aef0857d7781 1f352c073b6108d72d9810a30914dff4
IV	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Segment #1	
Input Block	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Output Block	b7bf3a5df43989dd97f0fa97ebce2f4a
Plaintext	6b
Ciphertext	dc
Segment #2	
Input Block	0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0fdc
Output Block	ded5faadb1068af80e774684b9f84870
Plaintext	c1
Ciphertext	1f
Segment #3	
Input Block	02030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0fdc1f
Output Block	a41e327e5273366ce9403cdbdb92c1cc
Plaintext	be
Ciphertext	1a
Segment #4	
Input Block	030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0fdc1f1a
Output Block	67938ae7d34df4ec2c0aec33eb98318f
Plaintext	e2
Ciphertext	85
Segment #5	

Input Block	0405060708090a0b0c0d0e0fdc1f1a85
Output Block	0e8f2e31efff615d3c93946609808c37
Plaintext	2e
Ciphertext	20
Segment #6	
Input Block	05060708090a0b0c0d0e0fdc1f1a8520
Output Block	e648bb37a95c94c72784162a79dfe306
Plaintext	40
Ciphertext	a6
Segment #7	
Input Block	060708090a0b0c0d0e0fdc1f1a8520a6
Output Block	d278f3147290fc5dd0b7d2e82764a1fd
Plaintext	9f
Ciphertext	4d
Segment #8	
Input Block	0708090a0b0c0d0e0fdc1f1a8520a64d
Output Block	2388d255a3e8a8059675e3a7de19dceb
Plaintext	96
Ciphertext	b5
Segment #9	
Input Block	08090a0b0c0d0e0fdc1f1a8520a64db5
Output Block	b6b8008f6c6dc2d6144641ed2023f0f5
Plaintext	e9
Ciphertext	5f
Segment #10	
Input Block	090a0b0c0d0e0fdc1f1a8520a64db55f
Output Block	f18f88a7aa3e3a6167dd93fb1137713a
Plaintext	3d
Ciphertext	cc
Segment #11	
Input Block	0a0b0c0d0e0fdc1f1a8520a64db55fcc
Output Block	f46c5e67bff7c070b26c0318c52d0ccd
Plaintext	7e
Ciphertext	8a
Segment #12	
Input Block	0b0c0d0e0fdc1f1a8520a64db55fcc8a
Output Block	d4dceae622f8f21d27375d8c2c5f9fba
Plaintext	11
Ciphertext	c5
Segment #13	
Input Block	0c0d0e0fdc1f1a8520a64db55fcc8ac5
Output Block	27e9e0d0a016709cd3ae0b5a9a242e31
Plaintext	73
Ciphertext	54
Segment #14	
Input Block	0d0e0fdc1f1a8520a64db55fcc8ac554
Output Block	17f69d50ce64ba0d085de70b9030bbb2
Plaintext	93
Ciphertext	84
Segment #15	
Input Block	0e0fdc1f1a8520a64db55fcc8ac55484
Output Block	59106ee400d18e104337669628c33cdd
Plaintext	17
Ciphertext	4e

Segment #16	
Input Block	0fdc1f1a8520a64db55fcc8ac554844e
Output Block	a29c6ac87e2245ec0796772c1f5312a8
Plaintext	2a
Ciphertext	88
Segment #17	
Input Block	dc1f1a8520a64db55fcc8ac554844e88
Output Block	397b98fa2ec0ff8cc0cd821909551c9e
Plaintext	ae
Ciphertext	97
Segment #18	
Input Block	1f1a8520a64db55fcc8ac554844e8897
Output Block	2d2d6fe9aef72f7b914b623a9c7abd54
Plaintext	2d
Ciphertext	00

F.3.12 CFB8-AES256-Decrypt

Key	603deb1015ca71be2b73aef0857d7781 1f352c073b6108d72d9810a30914dff4
IV	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Segment #1	
Input Block	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Output Block	b7bf3a5df43989dd97f0fa97ebce2f4a
Ciphertext	dc
Plaintext	6b
Segment #2	
Input Block	0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0fdc
Output Block	ded5faadb1068af80e774684b9f84870
Ciphertext	1f
Plaintext	c1
Segment #3	
Input Block	02030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0fdc1f
Output Block	a41e327e5273366ce9403cdbdb92c1cc
Ciphertext	1a
Plaintext	be
Segment #4	
Input Block	030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0fdc1f1a
Output Block	67938ae7d34df4ec2c0aec33eb98318f
Ciphertext	85
Plaintext	e2
Segment #5	
Input Block	0405060708090a0b0c0d0e0fdc1f1a85
Output Block	0e8f2e31efff615d3c93946609808c37
Ciphertext	20
Plaintext	2e
Segment #6	
Input Block	05060708090a0b0c0d0e0fdc1f1a8520
Output Block	e648bb37a95c94c72784162a79dfe306
Ciphertext	a6
Plaintext	40
Segment #7	
Input Block	060708090a0b0c0d0e0fdc1f1a8520a6
Output Block	d278f3147290fc5dd0b7d2e82764a1fd

Ciphertext	4d
Plaintext	9f
Segment #8	
Input Block	0708090a0b0c0d0e0fdc1f1a8520a64d
Output Block	2388d255a3e8a8059675e3a7de19dceb
Ciphertext	b5
Plaintext	96
Segment #9	
Input Block	08090a0b0c0d0e0fdc1f1a8520a64db5
Output Block	b6b8008f6c6dc2d6144641ed2023f0f5
Ciphertext	5f
Plaintext	e9
Segment #10	
Input Block	090a0b0c0d0e0fdc1f1a8520a64db55f
Output Block	f18f88a7aa3e3a6167dd93fb1137713a
Ciphertext	cc
Plaintext	3d
Segment #11	
Input Block	0a0b0c0d0e0fdc1f1a8520a64db55fcc
Output Block	f46c5e67bff7c070b26c0318c52d0ccd
Ciphertext	8a
Plaintext	7e
Segment #12	
Input Block	0b0c0d0e0fdc1f1a8520a64db55fcc8a
Output Block	d4dceae622f8f21d27375d8c2c5f9fba
Ciphertext	c5
Plaintext	11
Segment #13	
Input Block	0c0d0e0fdc1f1a8520a64db55fcc8ac5
Output Block	27e9e0d0a016709cd3ae0b5a9a242e31
Ciphertext	54
Plaintext	73
Segment #14	
Input Block	0d0e0fdc1f1a8520a64db55fcc8ac554
Output Block	17f69d50ce64ba0d085de70b9030bbb2
Ciphertext	84
Plaintext	93
Segment #15	
Input Block	0e0fdc1f1a8520a64db55fcc8ac55484
Output Block	59106ee400d18e104337669628c33cdd
Ciphertext	4e
Plaintext	17
Segment #16	
Input Block	0fdc1f1a8520a64db55fcc8ac554844e
Output Block	a29c6ac87e2245ec0796772c1f5312a8
Ciphertext	88
Plaintext	2a
Segment #17	
Input Block	dc1f1a8520a64db55fcc8ac554844e88
Output Block	397b98fa2ec0ff8cc0cd821909551c9e
Ciphertext	97
Plaintext	ae
Segment #18	
Input Block	1f1a8520a64db55fcc8ac554844e8897

Output Block	2d2d6fe9aef72f7b914b623a9c7abd54
Ciphertext	00
Plaintext	2d

F.3.13 CFB128-AES128-Encrypt

Key	2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c
IV	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Segment #1	
Input Block	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Output Block	50fe67cc996d32b6da0937e99bafec60
Plaintext	6bclbee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Ciphertext	3b3fd92eb72dad20333449f8e83cfb4a
Segment #2	
Input Block	3b3fd92eb72dad20333449f8e83cfb4a
Output Block	668bcf60beb005a35354a201dab36bda
Plaintext	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Ciphertext	c8a64537a0b3a93fcde3cdad9f1ce58b
Segment #3	
Input Block	c8a64537a0b3a93fcde3cdad9f1ce58b
Output Block	16bd032100975551547b4de89daea630
Plaintext	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Ciphertext	26751f67a3cbb140b1808cf187a4f4df
Segment #4	
Input Block	26751f67a3cbb140b1808cf187a4f4df
Output Block	36d42170a312871947ef8714799bc5f6
Plaintext	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710
Ciphertext	c04b05357c5d1c0eeac4c66f9ff7f2e6

F.3.14 CFB128-AES128-Decrypt

Key	2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c
IV	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Segment #1	
Input Block	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Output Block	50fe67cc996d32b6da0937e99bafec60
Ciphertext	3b3fd92eb72dad20333449f8e83cfb4a
Plaintext	6bclbee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Segment #2	
Input Block	3b3fd92eb72dad20333449f8e83cfb4a
Output Block	668bcf60beb005a35354a201dab36bda
Ciphertext	c8a64537a0b3a93fcde3cdad9f1ce58b
Plaintext	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Segment #3	
Input Block	c8a64537a0b3a93fcde3cdad9f1ce58b
Output Block	16bd032100975551547b4de89daea630
Ciphertext	26751f67a3cbb140b1808cf187a4f4df
Plaintext	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Segment #4	
Input Block	26751f67a3cbb140b1808cf187a4f4df
Output Block	36d42170a312871947ef8714799bc5f6
Ciphertext	c04b05357c5d1c0eeac4c66f9ff7f2e6
Plaintext	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710

F.3.15 CFB128-AES192-Encrypt

Key	8e73b0f7da0e6452c810f32b809079e562f8ead2522c6b7b
IV	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Segment #1	
Input Block	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Output Block	a609b38df3b1133dddf2718ba09565e
Plaintext	6bclbee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Ciphertext	cdc80d6fddf18cab34c25909c99a4174
Segment #2	
Input Block	cdc80d6fddf18cab34c25909c99a4174
Output Block	c9e3f5289f149abd08ad44dc52b2b32b
Plaintext	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Ciphertext	67ce7f7f81173621961a2b70171d3d7a
Segment #3	
Input Block	67ce7f7f81173621961a2b70171d3d7a
Output Block	1ed6965b76c76ca02d1dcef404f09626
Plaintext	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Ciphertext	2e1e8aldd59b88b1c8e60fed1efac4c9
Segment #4	
Input Block	2e1e8aldd59b88b1c8e60fed1efac4c9
Output Block	36c0bbd976ccd4b7ef85cec1be273eef
Plaintext	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710
Ciphertext	c05f9f9ca9834fa042ae8fba584b09ff

F.3.16 CFB128-AES192-Decrypt

Key	8e73b0f7da0e6452c810f32b809079e562f8ead2522c6b7b
IV	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Segment #1	
Input Block	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Output Block	a609b38df3b1133dddf2718ba09565e
Ciphertext	cdc80d6fddf18cab34c25909c99a4174
Plaintext	6bclbee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Segment #2	
Input Block	cdc80d6fddf18cab34c25909c99a4174
Output Block	c9e3f5289f149abd08ad44dc52b2b32b
Ciphertext	67ce7f7f81173621961a2b70171d3d7a
Plaintext	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Segment #3	
Input Block	67ce7f7f81173621961a2b70171d3d7a
Output Block	1ed6965b76c76ca02d1dcef404f09626
Ciphertext	2e1e8aldd59b88b1c8e60fed1efac4c9
Plaintext	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Segment #4	
Input Block	2e1e8aldd59b88b1c8e60fed1efac4c9
Output Block	36c0bbd976ccd4b7ef85cec1be273eef
Ciphertext	c05f9f9ca9834fa042ae8fba584b09ff
Plaintext	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710

F.3.17 CFB128-AES256-Encrypt

Key	603deb1015ca71be2b73aef0857d7781 1f352c073b6108d72d9810a30914dff4
IV	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f

Segment #1	
Input Block	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Output Block	b7bf3a5df43989dd97f0fa97ebce2f4a
Plaintext	6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Ciphertext	dc7e84bfda79164b7ecd8486985d3860
Segment #2	
Input Block	dc7e84bfda79164b7ecd8486985d3860
Output Block	97d26743252b1d54aca653cf744ace2a
Plaintext	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Ciphertext	39ffed143b28b1c832113c6331e5407b
Segment #3	
Input Block	39ffed143b28b1c832113c6331e5407b
Output Block	efd80f62b6b9af8344c511b13c70b016
Plaintext	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Ciphertext	df10132415e54b92a13ed0a8267ae2f9
Segment #4	
Input Block	df10132415e54b92a13ed0a8267ae2f9
Output Block	833ca131c5f655ef8d1a2346b3ddd361
Plaintext	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710
Ciphertext	75a385741ab9cef82031623d55b1e471

F.3.18 CFB128-AES256-Decrypt

Key	603deb1015ca71be2b73aef0857d7781 1f352c073b6108d72d9810a30914dff4
IV	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Segment #1	
Input Block	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Output Block	b7bf3a5df43989dd97f0fa97ebce2f4a
Ciphertext	dc7e84bfda79164b7ecd8486985d3860
Plaintext	6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Segment #2	
Input Block	dc7e84bfda79164b7ecd8486985d3860
Output Block	97d26743252b1d54aca653cf744ace2a
Ciphertext	39ffed143b28b1c832113c6331e5407b
Plaintext	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Segment #3	
Input Block	39ffed143b28b1c832113c6331e5407b
Output Block	efd80f62b6b9af8344c511b13c70b016
Ciphertext	df10132415e54b92a13ed0a8267ae2f9
Plaintext	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Segment #4	
Input Block	df10132415e54b92a13ed0a8267ae2f9
Output Block	833ca131c5f655ef8d1a2346b3ddd361
Ciphertext	75a385741ab9cef82031623d55b1e471
Plaintext	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710

F.4 OFB Example Vectors

F.4.1 OFB-AES128-Encrypt

Key	2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c
IV	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Block #1	
Input Block	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f

Output Block	50fe67cc996d32b6da0937e99bafec60
Plaintext	6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Ciphertext	3b3fd92eb72dad20333449f8e83cfb4a
Block #2	
Input Block	50fe67cc996d32b6da0937e99bafec60
Output Block	d9a4dada0892239f6b8b3d7680e15674
Plaintext	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Ciphertext	7789508d16918f03f53c52dac54ed825
Block #3	
Input Block	d9a4dada0892239f6b8b3d7680e15674
Output Block	a78819583f0308e7a6bf36b1386abf23
Plaintext	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Ciphertext	9740051e9c5fecf64344f7a82260edcc
Block #4	
Input Block	a78819583f0308e7a6bf36b1386abf23
Output Block	c6d3416d29165c6fcb8e51a227ba994e
Plaintext	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710
Ciphertext	304c6528f659c77866a510d9c1d6ae5e

F.4.2 OFB-AES128-Decrypt

Key	2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c
IV	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Block #1	
Input Block	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Output Block	50fe67cc996d32b6da0937e99bafec60
Ciphertext	3b3fd92eb72dad20333449f8e83cfb4a
Plaintext	6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Block #2	
Input Block	50fe67cc996d32b6da0937e99bafec60
Output Block	d9a4dada0892239f6b8b3d7680e15674
Ciphertext	7789508d16918f03f53c52dac54ed825
Plaintext	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Block #3	
Input Block	d9a4dada0892239f6b8b3d7680e15674
Output Block	a78819583f0308e7a6bf36b1386abf23
Ciphertext	9740051e9c5fecf64344f7a82260edcc
Plaintext	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Block #4	
Input Block	a78819583f0308e7a6bf36b1386abf23
Output Block	c6d3416d29165c6fcb8e51a227ba994e
Ciphertext	304c6528f659c77866a510d9c1d6ae5e
Plaintext	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710

F.4.3 OFB-AES192-Encrypt

Key	8e73b0f7da0e6452c810f32b809079e562f8ead2522c6b7b
IV	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Block #1	
Input Block	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Output Block	a609b38df3b1133dddf2718ba09565e
Plaintext	6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Ciphertext	cdc80d6fddf18cab34c25909c99a4174
Block #2	
Input Block	a609b38df3b1133dddf2718ba09565e

Output Block	52ef01da52602fe0975f78ac84bf8a50
Plaintext	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Ciphertext	fcc28b8d4c63837c09e81700c1100401
Block #3	
Input Block	52ef01da52602fe0975f78ac84bf8a50
Output Block	bd5286ac63aabd7eb067ac54b553f71d
Plaintext	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Ciphertext	8d9a9aeac0f6596f559c6d4daf59a5f2
Block #4	
Input Block	bd5286ac63aabd7eb067ac54b553f71d
Output Block	9b00044d8885f729318713303fc0fe3a
Plaintext	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710
Ciphertext	6d9f200857ca6c3e9cac524bd9acc92a

F.4.4 OFB-AES192-Decrypt

Key	8e73b0f7da0e6452c810f32b809079e562f8ead2522c6b7b
IV	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Block #1	
Input Block	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Output Block	a609b38df3b1133dddf2718ba09565e
Ciphertext	cdc80d6fddf18cab34c25909c99a4174
Plaintext	6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Block #2	
Input Block	a609b38df3b1133dddf2718ba09565e
Output Block	52ef01da52602fe0975f78ac84bf8a50
Ciphertext	fcc28b8d4c63837c09e81700c1100401
Plaintext	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Block #3	
Input Block	52ef01da52602fe0975f78ac84bf8a50
Output Block	bd5286ac63aabd7eb067ac54b553f71d
Ciphertext	8d9a9aeac0f6596f559c6d4daf59a5f2
Plaintext	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Block #4	
Input Block	bd5286ac63aabd7eb067ac54b553f71d
Output Block	9b00044d8885f729318713303fc0fe3a
Ciphertext	6d9f200857ca6c3e9cac524bd9acc92a
Plaintext	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710

F.4.5 OFB-AES256-Encrypt

Key	603deb1015ca71be2b73aef0857d7781 1f352c073b6108d72d9810a30914dffa
IV	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Block #1	
Input Block	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Output Block	b7bf3a5df43989dd97f0fa97ebce2f4a
Plaintext	6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Ciphertext	dc7e84bfda79164b7ecd8486985d3860
Block #2	
Input Block	b7bf3a5df43989dd97f0fa97ebce2f4a
Output Block	e1c656305ed1a7a6563805746fe03edc
Plaintext	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Ciphertext	4febdcc6740d20b3ac88f6ad82a4fb08d
Block #3	

Input Block	e1c656305ed1a7a6563805746fe03edc
Output Block	41635be625b48afc1666dd42a09d96e7
Plaintext	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Ciphertext	71ab47a086e86eedf39d1c5bba97c408
Block #4	
Input Block	41635be625b48afc1666dd42a09d96e7
Output Block	f7b93058b8bce0fffea41bf0012cd394
Plaintext	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710
Ciphertext	0126141d67f37be8538f5a8be740e484

F.4.6 OFB-AES256-Decrypt

Key	603deb1015ca71be2b73aef0857d7781 1f352c073b6108d72d9810a30914dff4
IV	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Block #1	
Input Block	000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Output Block	b7bf3a5df43989dd97f0fa97ebce2f4a
Ciphertext	dc7e84bfda79164b7ecd8486985d3860
Plaintext	6bclbee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Block #2	
Input Block	b7bf3a5df43989dd97f0fa97ebce2f4a
Output Block	e1c656305ed1a7a6563805746fe03edc
Ciphertext	4febdc6740d20b3ac88f6ad82a4fb08d
Plaintext	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Block #3	
Input Block	e1c656305ed1a7a6563805746fe03edc
Output Block	41635be625b48afc1666dd42a09d96e7
Ciphertext	71ab47a086e86eedf39d1c5bba97c408
Plaintext	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Block #4	
Input Block	41635be625b48afc1666dd42a09d96e7
Output Block	f7b93058b8bce0fffea41bf0012cd394
Ciphertext	0126141d67f37be8538f5a8be740e484
Plaintext	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710

F.5 CTR Example Vectors

F.5.1 CTR-AES128-Encrypt

Key	2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c
Init. Counter	f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff
Block #1	
Input Block	f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff
Output Block	ec8cdf7398607cb0f2d21675ea9eale4
Plaintext	6bclbee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Ciphertext	874d6191b620e3261bef6864990db6ce
Block #2	
Input Block	f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdff00
Output Block	362b7c3c6773516318a077d7fc5073ae
Plaintext	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Ciphertext	9806f66b7970fdff8617187bb9fffdff
Block #3	
Input Block	f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdff01
Output Block	6a2cc3787889374fbbeb4c81b17ba6c44

Plaintext	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Ciphertext	5ae4df3edbd5d35e5b4f09020db03eab
Block #4	
Input Block	f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdff02
Output Block	e89c399ff0f198c6d40a31db156cabfe
Plaintext	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710
Ciphertext	1e031dda2fbe03d1792170a0f3009cee

F.5.2 CTR-AES128-Decrypt

Key	2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c
Init. Counter	f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff
Block #1	
Input Block	f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff
Output Block	ec8cdf7398607cb0f2d21675ea9eale4
Ciphertext	874d6191b620e3261bef6864990db6ce
Plaintext	6bclbee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Block #2	
Input Block	f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdff00
Output Block	362b7c3c6773516318a077d7fc5073ae
Ciphertext	9806f66b7970fdff8617187bb9fffdff
Plaintext	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Block #3	
Input Block	f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdff01
Output Block	6a2cc3787889374fbeb4c81b17ba6c44
Ciphertext	5ae4df3edbd5d35e5b4f09020db03eab
Plaintext	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Block #4	
Input Block	f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdff02
Output Block	e89c399ff0f198c6d40a31db156cabfe
Ciphertext	1e031dda2fbe03d1792170a0f3009cee
Plaintext	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710

F.5.3 CTR-AES192-Encrypt

Key	8e73b0f7da0e6452c810f32b809079e562f8ead2522c6b7b
Init. Counter	f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff
Block #1	
Input Block	f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff
Output Block	717d2dc639128334a6167a488ded7921
Plaintext	6bclbee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Ciphertext	1abc932417521ca24f2b0459fe7e6e0b
Block #2	
Input Block	f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdff00
Output Block	a72eb3bb14a556734b7bad6ab16100c5
Plaintext	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Ciphertext	090339ec0aa6faefd5ccc2c6f4ce8e94
Block #3	
Input Block	f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdff01
Output Block	2efeae2d72b722613446dc7f4c2af918
Plaintext	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Ciphertext	1e36b26bd1ebc670d1bd1d665620abf7
Block #4	
Input Block	f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdff02

Output Block	b9e783b30dd7924ff7bc9b97beaa8740
Plaintext	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710
Ciphertext	4f78a7f6d29809585a97daec58c6b050

F.5.4 CTR-AES192-Decrypt

Key	8e73b0f7da0e6452c810f32b809079e562f8ead2522c6b7b
Init. Counter	f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff
Block #1	
Input Block	f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff
Output Block	717d2dc639128334a6167a488ded7921
Ciphertext	1abc932417521ca24f2b0459fe7e6e0b
Plaintext	6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Block #2	
Input Block	f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdff00
Output Block	a72eb3bb14a556734b7bad6ab16100c5
Ciphertext	090339ec0aa6faefd5ccc2c6f4ce8e94
Plaintext	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Block #3	
Input Block	f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdff01
Output Block	2efeae2d72b722613446dc7f4c2af918
Ciphertext	1e36b26bd1ebc670d1bd1d665620abf7
Plaintext	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Block #4	
Input Block	f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdff02
Output Block	b9e783b30dd7924ff7bc9b97beaa8740
Ciphertext	4f78a7f6d29809585a97daec58c6b050
Plaintext	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710

F.5.5 CTR-AES256-Encrypt

Key	603deb1015ca71be2b73aef0857d7781 1f352c073b6108d72d9810a30914dff4
Init. Counter	f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff
Block #1	
Input Block	f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff
Output Block	0bdf7df1591716335e9a8b15c860c502
Plaintext	6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Ciphertext	601ec313775789a5b7a7f504bbf3d228
Block #2	
Input Block	f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdff00
Output Block	5a6e699d536119065433863c8f657b94
Plaintext	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Ciphertext	f443e3ca4d62b59aca84e990cacaf5c5
Block #3	
Input Block	f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdff01
Output Block	1bc12c9c01610d5d0d8bd6a3378eca62
Plaintext	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Ciphertext	2b0930daa23de94ce87017ba2d84988d
Block #4	
Input Block	f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdff02
Output Block	2956e1c8693536b1bee99c73a31576b6
Plaintext	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710
Ciphertext	dfc9c58db67aada613c2dd08457941a6

F.5.6 CTR-AES256-Decrypt

Key	603deb1015ca71be2b73aef0857d7781 1f352c073b6108d72d9810a30914dff4
Init. Counter	f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff
Block #1	
Input Block	f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff
Output Block	0bdf7df1591716335e9a8b15c860c502
Ciphertext	601ec313775789a5b7a7f504bbf3d228
Plaintext	6bclbee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Block #2	
Input Block	f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdff00
Output Block	5a6e699d536119065433863c8f657b94
Ciphertext	f443e3ca4d62b59aca84e990cacaf5c5
Plaintext	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Block #3	
Input Block	f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdff01
Output Block	1bc12c9c01610d5d0d8bd6a3378eca62
Ciphertext	2b0930daa23de94ce87017ba2d84988d
Plaintext	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Block #4	
Input Block	f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdff02
Output Block	2956e1c8693536b1bee99c73a31576b6
Ciphertext	dfc9c58db67aada613c2dd08457941a6
Plaintext	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710

F.6 CBC-MAC Example Vectors

F.6.1 CBC-MAC-AES128-Generation

Key	628aed2a6abf71588092b7e151cf4f3c
Block #1	
Plaintext	6bclbee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Input Block	6bclbee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Output Block	48b8d0735af5545ae4ef7b394e316a04
Block #2	
Plaintext	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Input Block	e6955a2444f6f8c67a5814950b9ee455
Output Block	2874500d0dc57c9c96aca96423a7e287
Block #3	
Plaintext	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Input Block	18bc4c4bae99988d7357687d39adb068
Output Block	194f777ab00a91c3a8204d5cfa3753ca
Block #4	
Plaintext	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710
Input Block	efd0533f6f450ad4050b0c271c5b64da
Output Block	6ff0e65f9906b6e9c54cb7097bb14c55
MAC	6ff0e65f9906b6e9c54cb7097bb14c55

F.6.2 CBC-MAC-AES192-Generation

Key	810f32b809079e562f8ead2528e73b0f7da0e6452c2c6b7b
Block #1	
Plaintext	6bclbee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Input Block	6bclbee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a

Output Block	f69c93961e79b7edab606e6586e34671
Block #2	
Plaintext	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Input Block	58b119c1007a1b7135d701c9c34cc820
Output Block	1b3c07cb72b240246de91f0caeb2a19a
Block #3	
Plaintext	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Input Block	2bf41b8dd1eea4358812de15b4b8f375
Output Block	7f46e8445f571f5c890178827dcf2f87
Block #4	
Plaintext	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710
Input Block	89d9cc018018844b242a39f99ba31897
Output Block	99fb958c4e73cc7a58a2b3869978b5cb
MAC	99fb958c4e73cc7a58a2b3869978b5cb

F.6.3 CBC-MAC-AES256-Generation

Key	ef0857d77811f352c073b6108d72d981 0a30603deb1015ca71be2b73a914dff4
Block #1	
Plaintext	6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Input Block	6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a
Output Block	9908c748d82fd323f0b551f57d9cbe79
Block #2	
Plaintext	ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51
Input Block	37254d1fc62c7fbf6e023e5938333028
Output Block	e53c303416b2444c347de0b8eb17be8d
Block #3	
Plaintext	30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef
Input Block	d5f42c72b5eea05dd18621a1f11dec62
Output Block	e1856ebbcf8bf1e70eeb3d330785812c
Block #4	
Plaintext	f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710
Input Block	171a4afe10c46af0a3c07c48e1e9b63c
Output Block	76ff7d0d89b224d767cdb5256f3837c3
MAC	76ff7d0d89b224d767cdb5256f3837c3

Appendix G: References

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