



# DISTRIBUTED SECURE CHANNEL

Daniel Smullen  
Jonathan Gillett  
Joseph Heron



# BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM

Existing approaches use centralized infrastructure.

- TLS (used for HTTPS)
- Certificate Authorities

Other common methods use a single symmetric key for everyone.

- JGroups
- BitTorrent
- That's fine, but we can't tell you from someone else.
- No facility for issuing new keys, validating signatures to ensure integrity, providing authentication.



# NOMENCLATURE

ECC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography	A very hard computational problem that allows cryptographers to generate keys that cannot be easily solved.
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm	Used to digitally sign an entity.
Stream Cipher	Cryptography Term	Generates a stream of random data used to encrypt a message.
Grain128	Cryptographic Algorithm	A new, high performance and secure stream cipher.
IV	Initialization Vector	Used to ensure a message is never encrypted the same way twice.
CSPRNG	Cryptographically Secure Pseudorandom Number Generator	A secure random number generator for cryptographic applications.
ISAAC	Cryptographic Algorithm	A stream cipher used to generate a highly secure random number stream. Finding a pattern is almost impossible.
SHA-256	Hashing Algorithm	A secure 256-bit cryptographic hashing algorithm.
MD5	Hashing Algorithm	A secure 128-bit cryptographic hashing algorithm.
MAC	Message Authentication Code	Used to validate the integrity of a message to ensure it hasn't been altered.



# CORE CONCEPTS I

## Secure Channel

- Send messages securely over an insecure network so nobody can overhear you or tamper with messages (without someone knowing).

## Public Key Verification

- Need to have a way of verifying someone's public key (to make sure it's them).
- Uses challenge/response authentication.

## Public Key Signing

- Provide a way of guaranteeing the authenticity of a key.
- Just like a signature on paper – only you can sign it.



# CORE CONCEPTS II

## **Authenticated Node Announcement**

- Make sure every other node on the network knows when a new node's identity has been verified.

## **Joining the Network (Authentication)**

- Requesting the encryption key from the available nodes.
- Now we can view messages on the network.

## **Stream Cipher**

- What actually encrypts and decrypts the data?

## **Relay Chat**

- We need an application for the DSC network. Why not IRC?



# CRYPTOGRAPHIC COMPONENTS

Public Key  
Cryptography

Symmetric Key Cryptography (Stream Cipher)

Public and  
Private  
Keys

Signing and  
Verification

Stream  
Cipher

Initialization Vectors

CSPRNG

Hash Functions

MAC

ECC

ECDSA

Grain128

Each node  
generates  
their own  
IV.

IVs are  
generated  
randomly  
using  
CSPRNG.

ISAAC


SHA-256

MD5

Each  
transaction  
signed  
using  
ECDSA.



# AUTHENTICATION PROCEDURE





# 1:1 KEY EXCHANGE PROCEDURE

You've been authenticated, but you don't have your symmetric key yet.



Client sends a request for a key exchange.



An already authenticated client checks your authenticity.



If you're authenticated, he'll encrypt the symmetric key (using your public key) and send it to you.






Now you have the symmetric key, and a trust relationship is created with that member.





# A SIMPLE KEY EXCHANGE



Starring: Alice and Bob  
Featuring: Jim






















# HIGH LEVEL SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE





# SYSTEM STATES

## Untrusted

Requesting Authentication

Receiving Authentication Acknowledgement

Sending Key Exchange Request

Receiving Key Exchange

## Trusted

Receiving Authentication Request

Authentication Decision

Receiving Authentication Acknowledgement

Sending Authentication Acknowledgement

Awaiting Key Exchange Request

Sending Key Exchange

Receiving Message


Sending Message



# WHY USE THIS SYSTEM?

Why not just use public key cryptography for everything?

- How do I know the node providing me a public key is really the node it says it is?
  - Man in the middle attack vulnerability.
- If you have  $n$  nodes, the number of key exchanges that are required must form a complete graph of exchanges.
- The overhead for each client must be done  $n-1$  times.
  - Huge computational overhead.





# WHY USE THIS SYSTEM?

Why not just hard-code a symmetric key, like JGroups?

- This solution is insecure.
- No way of authenticating new nodes who want to join.
- Reprogramming/redistributing the key is problematic.
  - Cannot be deterministic.
  - Should be generated by CSPRNG.

```
34 # This is used for encrypting packets every network
35 # should have its own unique key.
36 network_key = 'password987access!'
37
38 # This is the name of the "hub" which is seen by the user
```



# WHY USE THIS SYSTEM?

## Why not just use WPA?

- WPA is designed for a single or multi-point access node that is centralized.
- WPA requires a fixed password.
- If you need to cycle the password, it's impossible to propagate to new nodes which use the old password.






# INTERESTING EXTENSIONS/FUTURE WORK

A new cluster can be created at any time (even within a cluster), the initial nodes that create the cluster are the signing authority unless they add new signing authorities.

This cluster would have it's own unique symmetric key, and other *a priori* info required to join the network.

# DEMO 1


Main Demonstration





# DEMO 2

Denying an Attacker




# DEMO 3

Diminishing Access



# DIMINISHING ACCESS



jon@jon-laptop: ~/Source/github/distributed-secure-channel/bin

```
anonymous> /nick  
> Enter a nickname: alice  
> Nickname changed to alice  
alice> 
```

```
anonymous> /nick  
> Enter a nickname: bob  
> Nickname changed to bob  
bob> 
```

```
anonymous> /nick  
> Enter a nickname: daniel  
> Nickname changed to daniel  
daniel> 
```

```
anonymous> /nick  
> Enter a nickname: mallory  
> Nickname changed to mallory  
mallory> 
```