



Automotive Cybersecurity Webinar

 @VectorVCS

V1.0 | 2019-03-17

Agenda

1. Welcome
2. Challenge Cybersecurity
3. Practical Guidance and Vector Experiences
4. Case Study
5. Conclusions and Outlook

Why Vector Consulting Services?

- ▶ **Vector Group** is global market leader in automotive software and engineering toolchain with over 2,700 employees
- ▶ **Vector Consulting Services** is supporting clients worldwide
 - ▶ Product development, IT
 - ▶ Trainings, coaching, processes, tools, interim support
 - ▶ Cybersecurity, safety, ASPICE, requirements engineering, etc.
 - ▶ Agile transformation and change

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Automotive



Aerospace



IT & Finance



Digital Transformation




Medical



Transport

Vector Offers the most Complete Portfolio for Security/Safety




www.vector.com/security

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Challenge Cybersecurity


Vector Client Survey 2019: The Fight of Two Forces



Vector Client Survey 2019.
Details: www.vector.com/trends.
Horizontal axis shows short-term challenges;
vertical axis shows mid-term challenges.
Sum > 300% due to 5 answers per question. Strong
validity with 4% response rate of 2000 recipients from
different industries worldwide.

Vector provides tailored consulting solutions to keep OEM and suppliers competitive:
Efficiency – Quality – Competences

ACES (Autonomy, Connectivity, e-Mobility, Services) ► Cyberattacks ► Hazards



Automotive cybersecurity will be the major liability risk in the future.
Average security gap is detected in 70% of cases by a third party – and will be exploited.

Combined Safety and Security Need Holistic Systems Engineering



Liability → Risk management → Holistic systems engineering

Standards Demand Risk-Oriented Approach

Functional Safety (IEC 61508, ISO 26262, ISO 21448)



- ▶ Hazards and risk mitigation
- ▶ Increasing focus on SOTIF and compliance
- ▶ Safety engineering and culture

ISO 26262 ed.2 refers to shared methods, e.g. TARA

+ Security (ISO 27001, ISO 15408, ISO 21434, SAE J3061)

- ▶ Threat and risk mitigation
- ▶ Abuse, misuse, confuse cases
- ▶ Security engineering

Security and Safety are interacting and demand holistic systems engineering



For **(re) liable** and **efficient ramp-up** connect security to safety governance

Standard ISO 21434: Automotive Cybersecurity


Planning

- ▶ Kickoff - 17.10.2016
- ▶ Currently: Committee Draft
- ▶ Release: 2020 (most probably)

Approach

Risk-oriented approach following the Vector method for the whole lifecycle of the product, i.e.:


- ▶ Concept/design phase
- ▶ Product development
- ▶ Production (roll out)
- ▶ Operation
- ▶ Decommissioning (roll over)



Focus on governance. ISO 21434 does NOT prescribe any technology or solutions

Vector SecurityCheck with COMPASS

COMPASS information: www.vector.com/compass




Vector SecurityCheck facilitates

- ▶ **Systematic risk assessment and mitigation**
- ▶ **Traceability and Governance** with auditable risk and measure list
- ▶ **Heuristic checklists** with continuously updated threats and mitigation

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
Security Engineering Starts with Systematic TARA




Threat & Risk Analysis:

- 1) Identify **assets** of value and **threats** caused by potential attackers.
- 2) Rate **impact** and **likelihood** of attacks against assets to define their **security level**.

Concept of Combined Threat/Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment



Specific automotive asset categories




Example: Identified threats

- ▶ **Safety**
 - ▶ Injuries because of malfunctioning Passive Entry
- ▶ **Financial**
 - ▶ Extra cost due to call-back and law-suits
- ▶ **Operational Performance**
 - ▶ Car cannot be started, doors cannot be opened
- ▶ **Privacy/Legislation**
 - ▶ Theft of personal data


Consider specific automotive assets derived from CIAAG (Confidentiality, Integrity, Authenticity, Availability, Governance) scheme

Security Engineering

**SecurityCheck & Requirements:**



- 1) Derivation of Security Goals from threats
- 2) Refinement of Security Goals to Functional Security Requirements (FSR)

Apply a Systematic Threat and Risk Assessment




Determine Necessary Security Level with TARA Results

Asset ID	Asset / Vehicle Function	CIAAG	Attack vector	Potential effect of attack	Threat ID	Threat	Expertise	Expertise numerical	Window of Opportunity	WinO numerical	Equipment / Effort	Effort numerical	Threat numerical	Threat level (high=4, low=1)	Safety	Financial	Operational	Privacy	Impact Level	SGID
Ast 01	Safety-Mechanisms	Avail	Availability: Attacker floods CAN-Bus and thereby tries to disable vehicle primary functions.	Attacker disables engine control during an overtaking maneuver if system can impact safety-critical functions.	Th1-1	Not further considered on advice of client because the HU is rated QM with respect to ISO 26262.	Layman	0	Critical	0	Standard	0	0	4	No injury	No impact	No impact	No effect	No impact	n/a


Security Level (SL)	Impact Level (IL)					
		0	1	2	3	4
Threat Level (TL)	0	QM	QM	QM	QM	Low
	1	QM	Low	Low	Low	Medium
	2	QM	Low	Medium	Medium	High
	3	QM	Low	Medium	High	High
	4	Low	Medium	High	High	Critical

Security Requirements Engineering




"Security out of context" does not work. Establish OEM-supplier interface, similar to DIA.
 OEM: system security concept, key management
 Tier 1: security concept, assumptions to OEM


Security Requirements and Traceability




Security Engineering



Security Mechanisms allocated in Reference Architecture



Security Engineering



Security by Design: Secure Coding

► Goal

- Avoid design and code errors which can lead to security exploits

► Approach

- **Use a hardened OS with secure partitioning**
Avoid embedded Linux due to its complexity and rapid change and thus many security gaps, (e.g. NULL function pointer dereferences, which allow hackers to inject executable code).
- **Deploy secure boot strategy**
Starting with first-stage ROM loader with a pre-burned cryptographic key, the next levels are verified before executing to ensure authenticity of each component of the boot
- **Apply rigorous static code analysis**
Tools like Coverity, Klocwork or Bauhaus allow security checks, such as NULL pointer dereferences, memory access beyond allocated area, reads of uninitialized objects, buffer and array underflows, resource leaks etc.
- **Use modified condition/decision coverage (MC/DC)**
Detect backdoors



Security by Design: Hardware-Based Security


Goal:

Separate security privileged functions from the applications of the ECU by hardware


Approach:

Secure Hardware Extension

- On-chip extension to microcontroller
- Secure Boot directly triggered by hardware upon start
- Pre-shared cryptographic key
- Memory for secure storage of (cryptographic) data
- Hardware extension for cryptographic primitives




Safety and Security by Design: MICROSAR 4.3ff and FBL



¹ Extensions for AUTOSAR

Security Engineering




Safety and Security by Design: Implementation, Verification and Validation

► Design

- Defensive coding, e.g. memory allocation, avoid injectable code, least privileges
- Selected programming rules such as MISRA-C, CERT
- High cryptographic strength in line with performance needs
- Key management and HW-based security
- Awareness and governance towards social engineering

► V&V Methods and Tools

- Static / dynamic code analyzer
- Unit test with focused coverage, e.g. MCDC
- Interface scanner, layered fuzzing tester, encryption cracker, vulnerability scanner
- Penetration testing, starting with TARA concept



Classic coverage test is not sufficient anymore. Test for the known – and for the unknown.
Ensure automatic regression tests are running with each delivery.

Test Methodology

► PSIRT Collaboration (Product Security Incident Response Team)

- Handover, task assignments and distribution

► Pen Testing

- Vector Grey-Box PenTest based on TARA
- DoS, Replay, Mutant/Generated Messages
- Development of misuse, abuse and confuse cases

► Fuzz Testing

- Fuzzing the Application SW, Grey box analysis
- Brute-force CAN Fuzzer

► Code Analysis


- CQA, Coverage (e.g., VectorCAST)
- Design, architecture, (opt) defect analysis

► Processes

- Testing, development, customer care

► Competences

- Inhouse capabilities, person/teams etc.



Vector Grey-Box PenTesting

Asset select	CIAAG	Attack Vector select	Threat select	Expertise	Window...	Equipment ...	Threat
AST16: Bootloader Software 17	Integrity	AV1: Compromise bootloader SW (Integrity) 2	THR6: - 7	Layman	Critical	Tailored	High
AST17: Flash and RAM 18	Confidentiality	AV31: Physical access to the board and Access to the HW details (Confidentiality) 32	THR3: - 4	Layman	Critical	Standard	Very High


By taking our TARA as input, We put our focus into the Flash asset and with physical access to the board we initiate an attack to read the contents of the flash during runtime

30	82	06	C7	30	82	05	AF	A0	03	02	01	02	08	6C
46	AA	97	94	9D	8C	1B	30	0D	06	09	2A	86	48	F7
04	06	13	02	55	53	31	10	30	0E	06	03	55	04	08
07	41	72	69	7A	6F	6E	61	31	13	30	11	06	03	55
07	13	0A	53	63	6F	74	74	73	64	61	6C	65	31	1A
18	06	03	55	04	0A	13	11	47	6F	44	61	64	64	79
63	6F	6D	2C	20	49	6E	63	2E	31	2D	30	2B	06	03
04	0B	13	24	68	74	74	70	3A	2F	2F	63	65	72	74
2E	67	6F	64	61	64	64	79	2E	63	6F	6D	2F	72	65
6F	73	69	74	6F	72	79	2F	31	33	30	31	06	03	55
03	13	2A	47	6F	20	44	61	64	64	79	20	53	65	63
72	65	20	43	65	72	74	69	66	69	63	61	74	65	20
75	74	68	6F	72	69	74	79	20	2D	20	47	32	30	1E
0D	31	38	30	36	31	39	31	33	32	36	33	33	5A	17
32	30	30	38	31	38	31	38	34	34	33	38	5A	30	44
21	30	1F	06	03	55	04	0B	13	18	44	6F	6D	61	69
20	43	6F	6E	74	72	6F	6C	20	56	61	6C	69	64	61
6E	66	6F	73	65	63	69	6E	73	74	69	74	75	74	65
63	6F	6D	30	82	01	22	30	0D	06	09	2A	86	48	F7

After analyzing the data dump we got from the flash we can read the root certificate and the ECU key in clear text

Rather than brute force PenTest, we use in our test labs grey-box PenTesting based on TARA, misuse cases and broad Vector networking competences

Deploy Security for Service and Operations: OTA



Ensure that each deployment satisfies security requirements

- Governance: Safety/security documentation is updated and validated
- Data encryption: Protection of intellectual property by encryption
- Authorization: Protection against unauthorized ECU access
- Validation: Safeguarding of data integrity in the flash memory
- Authentication: Verification of authenticity through signature methods

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


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Case Study


Advanced Driver Assistance System – Overview

ADAS Basic Functions (simplified use cases)

- ▶ Warn driver when vehicle is getting too close to preceding vehicle
- ▶ Warn driver if vehicle is leaving the driving lane
- ▶ Perform action such as counter-steering or braking to mitigate risk of accident



ADAS – Step 1: Assets



Step 1: Agree assets to be protected

- ▶ A1: Network messages received or send by ADAS
- ▶ A2: ADAS Software, including safety mechanisms
- ▶ A3: Security keys
- ▶ A4: Driving history and recorded data

ADAS – Step 2: Threat and Risk Analysis (TARA)

Assessment

- ▶ Assess attack potential (Vector SecurityCheck, STRIDE, etc.)
consider expertise required, window of opportunity, equipment required
- ▶ Use external (!) expert judgment
- ▶ Identify attacks without taking into account potential security mechanisms

Attacks

- ▶ A1-AT1: Messages for braking are blocked.
- ▶ A1-AT2: Messages are replayed.
- ▶ A2-AT1: Safety mechanism, no lane keeping during manual take-over, compromised and not working.

Threats

- ▶ A1-AT1-T1: Vehicle does not brake although the driver presses the braking pedal.
(Possible injuries in case failure of braking leads to an accident.)
- ▶ A1-AT2-T1: Display of warning messages with high frequency and without reason.
(Replay of warning messages at critical situations can lead to erroneous behavior and massive driver distraction.)
- ▶ A2-AT1-T1: Lane is kept during manual take-over.
(Heavy injuries because of failed take-over.)

A ... Asset
AT ... Asset Attack
T ... Threat



ADAS – Step 3: Security Goals




Asset/Function	Attack	Threat	Threat Level	Impact Level	Risk
Messages received (e.g. steering angle, lane information) or send by the ADAS-System (warning message, counter steering request)	Confidentiality: Attacker overhears messages including risky overtaking maneuvers.	Information about driver's behavior is forwarded to insurance agency that increases insurance fees for the driver.	Medium	Very High	High
Messages received (e.g. steering angle, lane information) or send by the ADAS-System (warning message, counter steering request)	Authenticity: Messages are replayed.	Display of warning messages with high frequency and without reason.	Medium	Medium	Medium
Software of the ADAS-System (including safety mechanisms)	Availability: Safety mechanism, no lane keeping during manual take-over, compromised and not working.	Vehicle stays on opposite lane during manual take-over although driver wants to return to his lane.	Medium	Very High	High


ADAS – Step 3: Security Requirements




Security goals are high level security requirements



ADAS – Step 4: Security Mechanisms (1/3)



ADAS – Step 4: Security Mechanisms (2/3)



ADAS – Step 4: Security Mechanisms (3/3)



Secure Diagnostics

- No Keys on Diagnostic Tool
- Secure Access with organizational access management and guidelines

Secure Internal Communication

- Efficient encryption and message authentication (e.g., H-MAC)
- Rationality Checks (e.g., Vehicle speed < 10 km/h)

Secure Download

- PKI with RSA-2048
- Closing Programming Interface

Secure Implementation

(e.g. Standard Architecture, Design Rules, Coding Guidelines, Process Rules, etc)




Reduce likelihood of attack

Resulting Risk		Consequence				
		very low	low	medium	high	very high
Likelihood	very high	medium	high	high	very high	very high
	high	low	medium	high	high	very high
	medium	low	low	medium	high	high
	low	very low	low	low	medium	high
	very low	very low	very low	low	low	medium

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Safety and Security Must Cover the Entire Life-Cycle



Needs for safety and security along the life-cycle:

- Systems and service engineering methods for embedded and IT
- Scalable techniques for design, upgrades, regressions, services
- Multiple modes of operation (normal, attack, emergency, etc.)

Value - Supporting you in choosing the right technique

Security Techniques	Cost	Benefit
Quick Wins		
Vector SafetyCheck and Vector SecurityCheck for risk assessment and implementation guidance	Low	Medium
Virtual Security Manager for fast ramp-up and consistency	Medium	High
Safety and Security Training and compliance audits	Low	High
Technology		
IDS/IPS, Firewall with adjusted policies	Medium	Medium
Secure boot, encrypted communication, storage	High	High
Secure run-time (e.g. CFI, DFI, MACs)	High	High
Process and Governance		
Development for safety and security	Medium	High
Defensive and robust design, static analysis	Medium	High
Test strategy, e.g. Fuzz Testing, Penetration Testing etc.	Medium	High
Secure Key Management	High	Medium
Security task force and response team (internal or virtual)	Medium	High

Grow Your Competences in Risk-Oriented Development

COMPASS information: www.vector.com/compass

Trainings

- ▶ Open trainings: www.vector.com/consulting-training
- ▶ Worldwide in-house trainings tailored to your needs
- ▶ Automotive Cybersecurity: www.vector.com/training-security
- ▶ Functional Safety: www.vector.com/training-safety

Webinars and Podcasts

- ▶ Further webinars and recordings
www.vector.com/webinar-security
www.vector.com/webinar-safety

Free white papers etc.

- ▶ www.vector.com/media-consulting



Vector Cybersecurity Symposium 2019

▶ Date

- ▶ 3. April 2019

▶ Event location

- ▶ Stuttgart, Germany
- ▶ Free registration:
https://consulting.vector.com/vc_events_detail_en,,,1695056,detail.html

▶ Topics

- ▶ Experiences in security projects with cybersecurity at OEMs and TIER1s
- ▶ Interaction between functional safety and cybersecurity
- ▶ COMPASS practical demo
- ▶ Trends and guidance: PenTesting, test, cryptography and security standards
- ▶ Networking, exhibition and discussion with Vector product specialists



Thank you for your attention.
For more information please contact us.

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