

ξ PLN: A Correct and Complete Foundation for Probabilistic Logic Networks (DRAFT)

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Abstract

Probabilistic Logic Networks (PLN) couples logical structure with uncertain inference. In practice, however, many PLN presentations mix distinct layers: (i) a probabilistic semantic model, (ii) an evidence/weight plumbing model, and (iii) operational truth-value views (strength, confidence, interval bounds). This leads to “semantic drift”: algebraic operators are treated as if they were the logic itself, and link-level inference attempts to propagate correlation-sensitive quantities without carrying the information required to do so correctly.

We present ξ PLN, a complete PLN foundation designed to be (a) mathematically correct and (b) extensible to tractable sublayers. The core move is to make the complete layer a *posterior-state calculus*: the proof object is a revisable world-model posterior state, and all link/event truth values are obtained by querying that state. We give a reference complete instance as a Dirichlet posterior over complete worlds (`JointEvidence`), prove that evidence extraction commutes with revision, and formalize a no-go theorem showing that complete link evidence cannot, in general, be computed from local per-link evidence alone. We then explain how Bayesian-network-style sublayers arise as restricted but tractable world-model classes, keeping PLN’s operational rules as compiled tactics with explicit assumptions.

1 Motivation and Context

PLN, as described by Goertzel, Iklé et al. [6], represents uncertain judgments using truth values such as *strength* (a probability-like estimate) and *confidence* (a reliability-like quantity). Modern *nuPLN* work (Nil Geisweiller, draft and v1) makes the key step explicit: a complete grounding requires a global probabilistic semantics—a world model with a joint distribution over possible worlds and a Bayesian update story. We treat *vPLN* as the probabilistic reference layer and extend it in ξ PLN by (i) making posterior states the proof objects, (ii) separating

evidence algebra from probability views, and (iii) connecting the complete layer to tractable Bayesian-network sublayers and Heyting-valued foundations [1].

Our experience formalizing PLN in Lean is that correctness failures almost always come from mixing layers:

- treating operational truth-value operators (interval bounds, confidence heuristics) as if they were the logic; or
- trying to compute complete posteriors for derived links from local link truth values without carrying the correlation information needed to do so.

ξ PLN is a response: it isolates a *complete* core calculus and makes all fast PLN rules live as derived/compiled approximations relative to declared model classes.

2 Three Semantic Layers (and Why They Must Not Be Conflated)

We distinguish three layers.

2.1 Layer 1: World-model posterior states (complete semantics)

The complete layer carries a posterior state in some explicit class of world models. Conceptually: *a distribution or structured distribution* that can answer any query by conditioning/marginalization (or by exact inference within the chosen model class).

In the Lean prototype, this layer is represented by `JointEvidence`:

$$\text{JointEvidence}(n) := \text{Fin}(2^n) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^\infty$$

interpreted as Dirichlet pseudo-counts over the 2^n complete worlds for n propositional atoms. Revision is pointwise addition of pseudo-counts.

2.2 Layer 2: Evidence algebra (quantale / Heyting structure)

PLN uses an evidence carrier `Evidence` as a compositional algebra of observations. In our formalization, `Evidence` is the 2D count object (n^+, n^-) with:

- parallel aggregation \oplus (“revision”): add counts componentwise;
- order (information ordering): coordinatewise \leq ;
- rich lattice structure (complete lattice; Heyting operators exist).

This layer is *not* itself the complete probabilistic semantics; it is an algebraic semantics for evidence aggregation and logical structure. It is particularly important for FO/HO extensions, where truth values are naturally Heyting-valued (cf. the `SatisfyingSet` construction in the codebase).

2.3 Layer 3: Operational views (strength, weight, confidence, bounds)

Strength/weight/confidence/intervals are *views* extracted from evidence. They are indispensable operationally, but they should not be used as if they were complete semantic state. ξ PLN adopts the mantra:

Probability is what you query; evidence is what you carry.

3 ξ PLN Core: World-model Revision + Query

The complete core calculus is intentionally simple: it is the calculus of revising posterior states plus a query interface.

3.1 World-model interface

In Lean, we isolate a minimal interface `WorldModel` (posterior state + query projections):

```
inductive PLNQuery (Atom : Type*) where
| prop : Atom -> PLNQuery Atom
| link : Atom -> Atom -> PLNQuery Atom
| linkCond : List Atom -> Atom -> PLNQuery Atom

class WorldModel (State : Type*) (Query : Type*) [EvidenceType State]
  where
  evidence : State -> Query -> Evidence
  evidence_add : forall W1 W2 q, evidence (W1 + W2) q = evidence W1 q +
    evidence W2 q
```

Here `EvidenceType` means: revision is an additive commutative monoid on `State`. Standard PLN event/link queries are represented by `PLNQuery Atom`; all truth-value quantities are derived by mapping extracted `Evidence` to strength/weights. See `Mettapedia/Logic/PLNWorldModel.lean`.

3.2 Reference complete instance: Dirichlet over worlds

For finite propositional scope (atoms `Fin n`), we instantiate `WorldModel` with the Dirichlet world-table `JointEvidence`:

- `evidence(E, prop(A))` sums world counts where an atom is `true` vs `false`;
- `evidence(E, link(A,B))` sums world counts where A is true and B true vs false.
- `evidence(E, linkCond([A,B],C))` sums world counts where both A,B hold and C holds vs fails.

Crucially, extraction commutes with revision:

revising joint evidence and then extracting a query is equal to extracting and revising at the query-evidence level.

Formally, the Lean prototype proves:

$$\text{evidence}(E_1 + E_2, q) = \text{evidence}(E_1, q) \oplus \text{evidence}(E_2, q)$$

for all queries q . See `Mettapedia/Logic/PLNJointEvidence.lean`.

3.3 Probability views

From `Evidence` we obtain posterior-mean probabilities (improper-prior strength):

$$P(A) = \frac{\#(A)}{\#(\top)}, \quad P(B | A) = \frac{\#(A \wedge B)}{\#(A)}$$

where $\#(\cdot)$ is a world-count sum in `JointEvidence`. The Lean file `Mettapedia/Logic/PLNJointEvidenceProbability.lean` proves the exact ratio forms for these views.

4 A Sequent-Calculus View: World Models and Links

We present ξPLN as a sequent-style system with two contexts:

- an *evidence context* Γ , a finite multiset of posterior fragments (elements of a world-model state type `State`); and
- a *side-condition context* Σ containing structural assumptions about the chosen world-model class (e.g. a BN DAG, positivity, d-separation facts).

4.1 Judgments

We use two judgment forms.

1. **World-model judgment:** $\Sigma; \Gamma \vdash_{wm} W$ meaning “from the evidence pieces in Γ , we can construct the revised posterior state W ”.
2. **Query judgment:** $\Sigma; \Gamma \vdash q \Downarrow e$ meaning “querying the revised posterior state derived from Γ yields evidence e for query q ”.

In the Lean prototype, the world-model judgment is deterministic: if `State` is an additive commutative monoid, then the constructed posterior is simply the revision sum $W := \sum \Gamma$. The query judgment is then obtained by extraction via `WorldModel`:

$$e := \text{evidence}(W, q).$$

4.2 Core rules

Let `State` be an `EvidenceType` (revision \oplus with unit 0), and let `WorldModel` provide evidence : `State` \rightarrow `Query` \rightarrow `Evidence`. The complete core calculus is:

$$\frac{}{\Sigma; \emptyset \vdash_{wm} 0} (\text{WM-Unit}) \quad \frac{}{\Sigma; \{W\} \vdash_{wm} W} (\text{WM-Ev}) \quad \frac{\Sigma; \Gamma \vdash_{wm} W \quad \Sigma; \Delta \vdash_{wm} W'}{\Sigma; \Gamma \uplus \Delta \vdash_{wm} (W + W')} (\text{WM-Rev})$$

$$\frac{\Sigma; \Gamma \vdash_{wm} W}{\Sigma; \Gamma \vdash q \Downarrow \text{evidence}(W, q)} (\text{Q-Extract})$$

The key algebraic law is commutation of extraction with revision:

$$\text{evidence}(W_1 + W_2, q) = \text{evidence}(W_1, q) \oplus \text{evidence}(W_2, q),$$

which makes the following *query-revision* rule admissible:

$$\frac{\Sigma; \Gamma \vdash q \Downarrow e \quad \Sigma; \Delta \vdash q \Downarrow e'}{\Sigma; \Gamma \uplus \Delta \vdash q \Downarrow (e \oplus e')} (\text{Q-Rev})$$

Links are queries. In this view, a PLN “link” $A \Rightarrow B$ is not an object-level connective; it is a query `link(A, B)` against the revised world model. The calculus does not propagate links directly; it revises world models and answers link queries.

4.3 Derived link calculus: classic PLN rules as admissible rewrites

Classic PLN rules (deduction/abduction/induction) become *compiled tactics* or *admissible query rewrites* relative to a world-model class with explicit side conditions Σ . Intuitively, they are ways to answer some link queries using other link/event queries, without pretending to compute complete link evidence in full generality.

Example: deduction strength admissibility (BN case). Let $\text{strength}(W, q)$ denote the posterior-mean view extracted from evidence:

$$\text{strength}(W, q) := \text{toStrength}(\text{evidence}(W, q)).$$

For a BN world-model class, if Σ entails the screening-off equalities needed by the general PLN deduction theorem (conditional independence of C from A given B and given $\neg B$, plus positivity), then one may rewrite a hard query `linkCond([A, B], C)` into smaller ones:

$$\text{strength}(W, \text{linkCond}([A, B], C)) = \text{plnDeductionStrength}\left(\text{strength}(W, \text{link}(A, B)), \text{strength}(W, \text{link}(B, C)), \text{strength}(W, \text{link}(A, C))\right)$$

Lean status. Mettapedia/Logic/PLNBayesNetFastRules.lean proves this admissibility in the simplest nontrivial BN instance, the chain $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C$: the theorem `chainBN_plnDeductionStrength_exact` shows the PLN deduction strength formula computes the exact $P(C | A)$ in the chain BN under explicit positivity side conditions. The general BN-facing rewrite layer uses the query-level screening-off form

$$\text{linkCond}([A, B], C) = \text{link}(B, C)$$

under explicit semantic obligations (see Mettapedia/Logic/PLNBNCompilation.lean).

Admissible link-rule schema (strength view). Let $\text{strength}(e)$ denote the posterior-mean view extracted from evidence e . Then, for any world-model class where Σ entails the screening-off conditions, the following rule is admissible:

$$\frac{\Sigma \vdash \text{ScreenOff}(A, B, C) \quad \Sigma; \Gamma \vdash \text{link}(A, B) \Downarrow e_{AB} \quad \Sigma; \Gamma \vdash \text{link}(B, C) \Downarrow e_{BC} \quad \Sigma; \Gamma \vdash \text{prop}(B) \Downarrow e_B \quad \Sigma; \Gamma \vdash \text{prop}(C) \Downarrow e_C}{\Sigma; \Gamma \vdash \text{linkCond}([A, B], C) \Downarrow e_{AC}}$$

with the side-condition that

$$\text{strength}(e_{AC}) = \text{plnDeductionStrength}(\text{strength}(e_{AB}), \text{strength}(e_{BC}), \text{strength}(e_B), \text{strength}(e_C)).$$

This is a *strength-level* rewrite: the evidence e_{AC} itself is still obtained by querying the world model, unless an explicit evidence-flow law is available for the given model class.

5 A No-Go Theorem: “Complete” Link Inference Cannot Be Local

One might hope for a sequent-calculus-like system that takes local per-link evidence (`Evidence` for $A, B, C, A \Rightarrow B, B \Rightarrow C$) and computes complete evidence for $A \Rightarrow C$. ξ PLN asserts that this is impossible in general without extra assumptions: correlations live in the joint state.

Theorem 1 (No local complete deduction rule). *There is no function*

$$f : \text{Evidence}^5 \rightarrow \text{Evidence}$$

that, for all joint evidence states E , computes the exact link evidence for $A \Rightarrow C$ from only the local premises `Evidence(A), Evidence(B), Evidence(C), Evidence(A \Rightarrow B), Evidence(B \Rightarrow C)`.

The Lean proof constructs two different joint evidence states on three atoms that agree on all these premises but disagree on the conclusion `linkEvidence(A, C)`. See Mettapedia/Logic/PLNJointEvidenceNoGo.lean.

Interpretation. This theorem is the formal core of “you must carry correlations”. It does not make fast PLN useless; it tells us exactly what fast PLN *cannot* claim: completeness for arbitrary world models without structural assumptions.

6 Tractable Sublayers: Bayesian Networks as Restricted World Models

The complete world-table `JointEvidence` is exponential in n . To scale, we restrict the world-model class while preserving correctness *relative to that class*.

The next natural step is a Bayesian-network-style world model:

- a DAG structure specifying factorization;
- local conditional tables with Dirichlet evidence (counts) per CPT row;
- revision = add local Dirichlet counts (conjugate update);
- query = exact inference by variable elimination / junction tree, with complexity controlled by treewidth.

Lean status. We have implemented the *evidence plumbing* part of this sublayer:

- a Boolean BN CPT query type `CPTQuery` (node + parent configuration),
- a CPT posterior state `CPTState` storing `Evidence` per CPT entry, and
- an additive projection from `JointEvidence` to CPT evidence by marginalization (summing compatible worlds), which commutes with revision.

See `Mettapedia/Logic/PLNBayesNetWorldModel.lean`.

We have also begun the “fast rule exactness” bridge in the simplest nontrivial case: `Mettapedia/Logic/PLNBayesNetFastRules.lean` sets up the chain BN $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C$, proves the required sink-factorization and normalization lemmas, derives the screening-off hypotheses, and applies `PLNDerivation.pln_deduction_from_total_probability` to obtain an *exactness theorem*: in the chain BN, the standard PLN deduction strength formula computes the correct conditional probability $P(C | A)$ (under the explicit positivity side-conditions).

Exact BN query answering (variable elimination / junction tree) is the next step: it will provide tractable evaluation of probabilities for larger query languages, while preserving correctness relative to the declared BN model class.

PLN spirit preserved. Classic PLN link rules (deduction/abduction/induction) become:

- compiled tactics that propose BN queries, or

- conditionally-sound lemmas under explicit assumptions (e.g. conditional independence),

rather than pretending to be globally complete link-level operators.

7 Factor Graphs: Semantic Factorization vs Operational Control

PLN has long used factor-graph and message-passing intuition for efficient inference. The recent MORK/MM2+ notes make this explicit by proposing a *Quantale-Annotated PLN Factor Graph* encoding in Atomspace (variables = formulas with truth values; factors = rule instances/potentials; messages combined with \oplus and \otimes) [5, 4]. This is the right operational substrate, but ξ PLN separates two distinct roles:

7.1 (A) Semantic factor graphs (world-model factorization)

Here factors *are* the model: the world-model posterior state is represented by a factorization of a joint distribution (BN or MRF). In this case:

- factors are genuine conditional / clique potentials;
- variable elimination / junction tree gives exact query answers (treewidth controls complexity);
- belief propagation is exact on trees and approximate on loopy graphs.

Thus a factor graph is a *world-model representation*, and correctness is relative to the declared model class.

Positive example (semantic). A BN with edges $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C$ yields factors $P(A)$, $P(B | A)$, $P(C | B)$. If the model class is fixed to this DAG, variable elimination returns the exact $P(C | A)$ and the PLN deduction strength formula is admissible as a query rewrite.

7.2 (B) Operational factor graphs (inference control)

Here factors are *rule schemas* (deduction, induction, revision, etc.) whose local “potentials” are truth-value update formulas. This aligns with the PLN chainer and MORK PathMap indexing [5, 3]. However, unless each factor can be justified as a true conditional or likelihood factor in a world model, this structure should be viewed as *inference control*: it proposes which queries to ask and which rewrites to attempt, but it does not itself constitute the semantics.

Negative example (operational). A graph whose factors are “deduction” or “abduction” update formulas on STVs is useful for search, but it is not automatically a probabilistic model: unless each factor corresponds to a conditional/likelihood in some WM class, message passing is a heuristic scheduler rather than an exact semantics.

7.3 Alignment: when the two coincide

The two notions align when rule factors are *compiled* from a world-model class: each rule corresponds to a conditional or likelihood factor, and message passing implements the same queries that the world-model semantics would answer. This is exactly the intended “fast PLN rules as compiled tactics” story: the factor graph becomes a *query plan* whose correctness is discharged by explicit side conditions (Σ) such as d-separation or Markov properties.

Evidence accounting and control. Geodesic inference control suggests a decentralized evidence ledger to prevent double counting during message passing and chaining [2]. This is naturally compatible with the `WorldModel` interface: evidence is revised at the world-model layer, while factor-graph message passing is used to schedule or approximate queries, with provenance tracking guarding independence assumptions.

8 Knuth–Skilling and Heyting Foundations

Knuth–Skilling foundations of inference [7] provide axioms for valuation schemes on logical lattices, extending Cox-style plausibility calculi. In ξ PLN, this plays two roles:

1. *Probability as a valuation/view.* At the world-model layer, probabilities arise as valuations on the Boolean algebra of subsets of worlds. This is the classical Kolmogorov story [8] instantiated for finite spaces, and it underwrites the ratio theorems proved in `PLNJointEvidenceProbability`.
2. *Evidence as Heyting-valued semantics.* At the evidence/algebraic layer, `Evidence` forms a rich (non-Boolean) lattice. K&S-style valuation rules persist but Boolean equalities can weaken to inequalities; see `Mettapedia/Logic/EvidenceIntuitionisticProbability.lean`.

We also bridge K&S additive regraduations to valuation-algebra factor graphs, so `VE` can be run end-to-end on KS-valued factors without assuming probability normalization; see `Mettapedia/ProbabilityTheory/KnuthSkilling/Bridges/ValuationAlgebra.lean` and `Mettapedia/ProbabilityTheory/BayesianNetworks/KSFactorGraph.lean`.

An important cautionary fact—the “totality gate”—is already formalized: because `Evidence` has incomparable elements, it admits no faithful order-embedding into the reals. Thus one should not expect a single real-valued map to capture all evidence information. See `Mettapedia/Logic/PLN_KS_Bridge.lean`.

9 Roadmap and Deliverables

The core Lean artifacts supporting ξ PLN are:

- `Mettapedia/Logic/PLNWorldModel.lean`: the world-model interface and derived views;
- `Mettapedia/Logic/PLNJointEvidence.lean`: the reference complete instance and revision-commutes-with-extraction;
- `Mettapedia/Logic/PLNBayesNetWorldModel.lean`: BN-style CPT evidence states and the additive projection from `JointEvidence`;
- `Mettapedia/Logic/PLNBayesNetFastRules.lean`: chain BN proof that the PLN deduction strength formula is exact in $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C$;
- `Mettapedia/Logic/PLNJointEvidenceProbability.lean`: posterior-mean probability views (ratio theorems);
- `Mettapedia/Logic/PLNBNCompilation.lean`: BN query compilation, `linkCond` queries, and Σ -guarded screening-off rewrites;
- `Mettapedia/ProbabilityTheory/BayesianNetworks/VariableElimination.lean`: exact VE engine;
- `Mettapedia/ProbabilityTheory/BayesianNetworks/ValuationAlgebra.lean`: valuation-algebra semantics + VE correctness spine;
- `Mettapedia/ProbabilityTheory/BayesianNetworks/VEBridge.lean`: joint-measure VE probability bridge;
- `Mettapedia/ProbabilityTheory/KnuthSkilling/Bridges/ValuationAlgebra.lean`: KS \rightarrow valuation-algebra bridge;
- `Mettapedia/Logic/PLNJointEvidenceNoGo.lean`: the local-completeness no-go theorem.

Next implementation milestones:

1. implement exact BN query answering (variable elimination first) for prop/link queries over the BN/factor-graph world-model layer;
2. generalize chain exactness to arbitrary BNs via d-separation/Markov properties so screening-off obligations are discharged structurally;
3. add a compilation layer: PLN rule patterns \Rightarrow BN query plans with explicit Σ side-conditions.
4. extend query language beyond atoms to formulas/events, enabling FO/HO semantics via `SatisfyingSets` while keeping probability views as world-model queries.

10 Conclusion

ξ PLN formalizes the slogan “pass distributions, not just truth values” in a way that is precise enough to support soundness/completeness claims and flexible enough to support tractable sublayers. The complete layer is not a competing “second PLN”; it is the reference semantics that operational PLN rules approximate, under explicit assumptions, within declared model classes.

References

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