

Education, Civic Engagement and Youth Support for Violence in Fragile States: Evidence from Somaliland*

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Abstract

We examine whether opportunities for civic engagement mediate the effect of access to education on political violence. In fragile states solely providing access to education may be necessary but not sufficient to reduce violence because it can generate unintended political and economic grievances against the government. We argue that further providing opportunities for civic participation should help youths to learn to use and trust nonviolent channels contribute productively to their communities and address their grievances, minimizing the risk of violence. To test our argument, we leverage a unique education program implemented in partnership with the Government of Somalia and original data from a survey of 800 young people and qualitative interviews. The results provide support for our hypotheses and offer new empirical evidence that civic engagement opportunities can mediate the impact of government provision of education in promoting political stability in fragile states.

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Government investment in education is widely believed to promote peace in fragile states (Assembly, 1948; Collier et al., 2003; Winthrop and Matsui, 2013).¹ However, some studies also suggest that education can provoke unintended grievances that can exacerbate violence (Huntington, 1968; Choucri, 1974; Goldstone, 2001; Urdal, 2006; Lia, 2007). Surprisingly, there is a dearth of evidence on the conditions under which education can motivate aggrieved individuals to prefer the use of nonviolent channels for political action. We investigate one such condition: skills and opportunities for civic engagement, which involves a heightened sense of working with others to build one's community and raising concerns with local and national authorities through nonpolitical and political processes (Ehrlich, 2000; Jacoby et al., 2009).

Building post-conflict states and economies takes time and substantial resources. Thus, in the immediate run, the provision of education can boost citizens' perceptions of their government's legitimacy and responsiveness (Aoki et al., 2002), promote economic development and social equality (Thyne, 2006; Winthrop and Matsui, 2013), and, consequently, reduce grievances in society that can forestall political violence (Ted, 1970; Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013). Education can also increase optimism for future employment and increase an individual's cost of participating in violent collective action (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Barakat and Urdal, 2009), undermining the recruitment efforts of violent organizations. Furthermore, schools can provide opportunities to build new ties and communities, generating a sense of belonging and reducing the allure to join violent groups (Borum, 2014).²

However, exposure to ideas about educational standards and economic opportunities in advanced societies through schooling implies that citizens may perceive government provision of education as inadequate (i.e., poor quality) or come to expect jobs that cannot be met in the short run, increasing grievances among the youths (Urdal, 2006). In the absence of the skills and

¹In 2011, one-third of the world's 60 million out-of-school adolescents of lower secondary school age lived in fragile states (UNESCO, 2013).

²Some scholars have also emphasized the content of education as an important mediating factor. Our focus is on access to schooling.

opportunities to use nonviolent channels through they can assume a productive role in building their society and express their frustrations, aggrieved youth may turn to violence (Walter, 2004; Aksoy and Carter, 2014). Moreover, the argument that those with access to education may prefer nonviolent approaches to addressing such grievances (Huntington, 1968; Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Hegre, 2003) assumes that such channels exist and that individuals can use them.

We argue that while fragile states may not be able to immediately satisfy citizens' demands for high quality education and jobs, complementing access to schooling with opportunities for civic engagement should help individuals to build the skills to use nonviolent institutional channels to raise their concerns with their local authorities to affect change. Such opportunities should increase an individual's sense of agency and trust in the efficacy of nonviolent methods of addressing their grievance, reducing the risk of violence.

We test our argument in Somaliland—an autonomous region in the fragile state of Somalia. Our study leverages a unique education program implemented under the auspices of the Government of Somalia by Mercy Corps, a global humanitarian agency working in fragile states experiencing natural disasters, economic collapse, or conflict.³ The program was aimed at improving access to secondary education and promoting civic engagement across the three regions of Somalia (Somaliland, Puntland and South Central Somalia).⁴ The government rolled out the provision of secondary schools to all target communities, but gradually added the program to provide opportunities for civic engagement in Somaliland. The staggered implementation of the civic engagement component of the program produced two types of localities where the youths either had: access to secondary schools only or access to secondary schools as well as opportunities for civic engagement. In each of these settings, young people decided whether to sign up for the program or not.

³The program was funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

⁴We evaluate the impact of the program in one region, Somaliland because the program had not been rolled out in the other two regions at the time of our study.

The empirical analysis relies on original survey data collected from 802 young people in sampled communities. We used survey methods robust to soliciting truthful answers to measure respondents' attitudes regarding support for or involvement in violence to reduce social desirability bias. We address potential selection bias by employing statistical matching techniques to create comparable groups of individuals who, on average, only differ in their participation given their observable theoretically important characteristics to improve causal inference.

The results provide support for our hypothesis that opportunities for civic engagement conditions the effect of education on violence. Specifically, we find that compared to out-of-school youths, in-school individuals in communities that benefited from both access to education and civic engagement programs were less likely to express support (16 percentage points decrease) and willingness for political violence (14 percentage points decrease) — a substantively large effect that is robust to a variety of theoretically important controls. In contrast, while in-school youths in communities that only had access to schools were less likely (15 percentage points decrease) to participate in violence, they were more likely (a 11 percentage points increase) to express support for political violence compared to their out-of-school counterparts. Also, using quantitative and qualitative data, we find evidence for our claims that opportunities for civic engagement generate a sense of agency and belief in the efficacy nonviolent institutional means to address grievances that the sole provision of education cannot generate in fragile settings.

In addition to contributing original empirical evidence to the literature on whether and how education influences individuals' propensities to pick up arms, we break new grounds to consider the conditions under which schooling may reduce political violence in fragile states. Specifically, our study goes beyond the current literature on the impact of schooling on political violence that focuses on the level, expansion, inequality, and content of education (see Østby and Urdal, 2011) to consider how access to education may interact with skills to civically engage at the individual level. In this regard, our study uniquely combines a seemingly disjoint strands of literature on political violence, education and civic or political institutions, and thus contributes to the growing

empirical work on the effect of political institutions on conflicts (Hegre, 2003; Windsor, 2003; Aksoy and Carter, 2014; Piazza, 2015). Also, current research on civic engagement or associational life focuses on its potential impact on government performance and economic development (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1994; Boix and Posner, 1996; Beugelsdijk and Van Schaik, 2005). Our study highlights the role of civic engagement or cultivating associational life in peace-building efforts in post-conflict societies.

1 Theoretical expectations

1.1 Access to higher education and participation in violence

Scholars argue that access to higher education provides opportunities for economic and social advancement for the youth, which reduces their willingness to participate in violence (Becker, 1968; Hamermesh and Soss, 1974).⁵ The prospects of gainful employment that access to higher education provides can discourage young people from supporting or engaging in political violence.⁶ Thus, the lack of incentive for the highly educated to rebel against the state may be explained by what they stand to lose in a destabilized society or economy. Researchers have found that local violent extremist movements often appeal to vulnerable youth who lack opportunities for educational and livelihood advancement. For example, Onuoha (2014) suggests that most recruits who joined Boko Haram—a group more similar to Al Shabaab than transnational terrorist organizations—were either unskilled or uneducated. Similarly, Lyall, Blair and Imai (2013) find that support for the Taliban in Afghanistan falls with years of government education.

⁵The United Nations Development Program emphasizes *income* and *education* as two important measures of deprivation.

⁶We note here, however, that empirical support for the relationship between poverty, unemployment and violence is scant and often contrary to the stated expectation (Krueger and Laitin, 2008). For example, studies conducted by Mercy Corps based on opinion poll data in Afghanistan and Somalia found no link between employment and propensity towards political violence while research in Pakistan found that individuals from middle income households were more likely than those from low-income households to support violent insurgent groups (Blair et al., 2013). Also, at the cross-national level, while economic factors such as poverty (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), and unemployment (Sage-man, 2004) have been linked to the onset of terrorism and violence within countries, these effects tend to disappear when taking into account country-specific characteristics such as levels of political freedom (Abadie, 2004).

Young people are also more likely to perceive governments that can provide access to education as legitimate, which reduces their propensity to support or participate in violence against public officials. Research shows that a government's ability to provide schooling and other public services improves perceptions of its legitimacy (Richards, 2002; Grynkewich, 2008; Magouirk, 2008). At the same time, the ability of states to provide these services makes it harder for insurgent terrorist groups to emerge (Newman, 2007; Grynkewich, 2008). For example, scholars have found a strong relationship between a lack of infrastructure (including schools) in communities in the Niger Delta and an individual's willingness to participate in violent rebellion, suggesting that people in areas with, presumably, more government services, are less likely to engage in violent insurgency (Oyefusi, 2008). If the absence of government services creates a physical void and deficit of state legitimacy through which violent groups can gain traction by providing for community needs (Magouirk, 2008), then inversely, the existence of reliable and satisfactory government services — including the provision of education — may create a buffer from violent extremist groups. Accordingly, access to education should boost perceptions of legitimacy of governments among the youth.

Another pathway connecting access to education and violence is generating a sense of group belonging among the youth. Specifically, some scholars have argued that the need for community and group membership catalyzes youths who feel social exclusion and isolation to join violent groups. First, empirical research shows that individuals tend to join violent organizations if they have kin or peer connections to members of such groups (Sageman, 2004; Bakker, 2006). Second, for some youth, joining a violent extremist group provides them with a sense of belonging, connectedness and affiliation (Borum, 2014). This is particularly true for youth who lack a sense of social acceptance and group affiliation, which occurs mostly among young people who are socially isolated and marginalized, such as Muslim immigrants in Western countries (see Allan et al., 2015). To the extent that being in school reduces isolation by allowing students to form positive social bonds with peers, teachers and others in their community or by giving them social standing

and acceptance, access to education may undermine the recruitment and participation of the youth in violence.

In light of the above, we expect that *access to higher education should decrease an individual's support for or participation in violence (H1)*. To the extent that education generates a sense of future economic prospects, increase perceptions of government's legitimacy and responsiveness, and increase a sense of belonging among the youth, we expect that access to higher education would reduce support for or participation in violence.

However, the education-as-opportunity theory may also engender negative implications for vulnerability to violent extremism. If youths increase their expectations of career opportunities but such beliefs are not met, they risk disillusionment, which could be a push factor for supporting or, even, participation in violent extremism. That education could lead to an increase in support or involvement in violence is similar to how Angrist (1995) describes the deterioration of economic opportunities for highly educated youth leading to the outbreak of civil unrest in Palestine in the late 1980s. This argument builds on evidence that decisions to support or engage in violent extremism are driven less by objective condition than by perceptions and expectations that are based on individual psychology. For instance, Fair et al. (2013) demonstrate that inducing perceptions of relative poverty can induce support for insurgency. It is the perception of injustice induced by relative deprivation, more than the objective conditions of want that can fuel violence. Accordingly, if access to education raises awareness of injustices and creates a gap between expectations and reality, it may increase (rather than decrease) an individual's propensity to engage in violence against the state.

1.2 Access to education and civic engagement, and participation in violence

That access to higher education in itself may exacerbate an individual's grievance, and, in turn, increase their support or participation in violence suggests that scholars and policymakers should consider when the provision of learning opportunities would decrease youths involvement in vi-

olence. Our review of the literature above suggests that governments may have to augment the provision of higher education with, for example, real economic opportunities to meet the expectations of the youth. However, in post-conflict settings the reconstruction of societies and economies can be challenging and take a long time. Accordingly, scholars need to consider what effective intermediate interventions can augment social and economic empowerment programs. We argue that providing youths with nonviolent channels to participate productively in their society and build the skills to raise their concerns to local authorities and contribute to policy decision may mitigate their tendencies to support or use violence to address potential political and economic grievances that higher learning can generate. Our reasons are twofold.

First, we argue that the ability to engage civically cultivates an individual's sense of agency or empowerment in building their communities and working peacefully with authorities to bring change, decreasing their propensity resort to violence. Where individuals feel alienated from the political processes and believe that they cannot influence government decisions, they are more likely to use violence to express their frustrations. However, opportunities to engage in civic life, can help individuals develop democratic attitudes such as a sense of mutual trust, reciprocity, and shared responsibility (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1994; Jacoby et al., 2009). Furthermore, citizens who engage in associational life experience things such as tolerance, compromise, and solidarity; all of which are deemed to be prerequisites for peaceful political expression. Indeed, based on this logic, many interventions aimed at countering violent extremism (CVE) are designed to foster civic participation. Some empirical research lends support to these approaches by showing a correlation between the repression of nonviolent means of participation and increased terrorism (Piazza, 2015), bolstering the notion that civic engagement and participation in civil society are effective ways to counter violent extremism (Kaldor, 2008).

Relatedly, a second mechanism through which civic engagement can reduce support and participation in violence is generating a belief among the youths that they can change things through nonviolent actions. The logic is that, through civic engagement activities, individuals

internalize civic and political beliefs that underlie nonviolent behaviors. Some empirical research corroborates this claim. Mercy Corps' study among youths in Kenya demonstrates that youth who were civically engaged and took action to try to address local or national governance problems were less likely to engage in or support political violence (Krutz, 2011). The study concludes that when youth have more avenues to express themselves peacefully and believe they can make a difference through nonviolent actions, they are less likely to be drawn to political violence, including violent extremism.

In sum, we hypothesize that *access to education and opportunities for civic engagement would reduce support for or participation in violence (H2)*. While education can induce unintended discontent in society, opportunities for civic engagement can develop an individual's sense of agency and appreciation of the efficacy of nonviolent channels to expressing grievance and shaping their future. To the extent that opportunities civic engagement fosters a sense of agency and a belief in the efficacy of civic engagement, we expect it to reduce individual support and participation in violence.

2 Setting: Somaliland

We test our theory in Somaliland, an autonomous region of Somalia in the Horn of Africa. Freedom House ranks Somaliland's government as partly democratic.⁷ Since 2003, the region has held three competitive and democratic presidential elections with one leading to a peaceful transition of power in 2010.⁸ Somaliland is an ideal setting for our study on effective responses to violent extremism for a number of reasons. While Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in 1991 following the overthrow of Somali military dictator Siad Barre and has remained relatively

⁷ The region of Somaliland shares borders with Djibouti to the West, Ethiopia to the South, Somalia to the East and the Gulf of Aden to the North.

⁸ Somaliland's 2001 Constitution provides for a separation of powers between the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary. The president is elected using plurality rule and can serve a maximum of two five-year terms. (See <http://africanelections.tripod.com/somaliland.html>)

stable compared to the other regions of Somalia, a number of factors make the region's youth vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremist groups such as Al Shabaab. Somaliland remains unrecognized by the international community, which dampens the region's ability to progress economically. While the region has fairly functional government institutions, youth who constitute about 75 percent of the country's 3.5 million population (2017 estimate) have limited access to education, are largely poor, and lack employment opportunities.⁹ In 2015, the World Bank reported that more than half of the population have no access to formal education and the level of poverty in rural and urban areas in Somaliland was 37 and 30 percent, respectively. At the same time, only 26 percent and 32.7 percent of 15 to 55 year olds in rural and urban Somaliland were wage- or self-employed.¹⁰

As part of the geographic reach of Somalia, conflict and instability have plagued the region for the past three decades. Lawlessness and the disintegration of the Somali state have made it possible for violent extremist groups, like Al Shabaab (formally known as “Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen”, which translates to the “Young Jihadi Movement”) to emerge and take control of large parts of the country. Al Shabaab recruits from Somaliland have been implicated in recent attacks, including the Daallo Airline and African Union base attacks in 2016.¹¹ In response, the Government has arrested suspected Al Shabaab cell members in Somaliland and has cracked down on radical clerics who promote the use of violence, concerned that disgruntled youth may heed these calls to take up arms.¹² In addition to the threat of extremist violence, clan based grievances over resources and governance have at times been exploited by clan leaders to foment violence, presenting another threat to stability.

⁹BBC Somaliland Profile, accessed April 16, 2017.

¹⁰World Bank's “Somaliland: Poverty Assessment”, June 2015.

¹¹See, Ismail Akwei, “Al-Shabaab Says Former Somali MP Was Suicide Bomber in Tuesday's Attack,” All Africa News, July 27, 2016. Also, see, Morgan Winsor, “Somalia Daallo Airlines Explosion: Suspected Suicide Bomber Meant to Be on Turkish Airlines Flight,” International Business Tribune, February 8, 2016.

¹²See “Somaliland Police Arrest Cleric for Inciting Violence,” Hiiraan Online, May 4, 2016, and “Somaliland Captures Al-Shabaab Suspects Sneaking into Haregeisa,” Somali Update, July 12, 2015.

Policy makers have suggested several approaches — ranging from military actions to economic, social and institutional responses — to deal with the threat of violent extremism in Somaliland and Somalia more generally (see UNDP, 2015). What is often missing, however, is an understanding of the drivers of and antidotes to violence, particularly for Somali youth.

In 2016, as part of a broad effort to counter and prevent violent extremism, the Government of Somalia noted the importance of reducing the incentives of the youth to join extremist organizations. Specifically, the Government of Somalia has invested in opportunities to help youth gain the skills they need to become positive and productive citizens with an underlying objective of also countering violent extremism. Chief among these investments has been formal education. For example, the Government of Somalia’s new National Strategy and Action Plan for Countering and Preventing Violent Extremism states that “education is an essential part of preventing violent extremism” and calls for more educational programs to help youth resist radicalization.¹³ Moreover, in recent years, the Government of Somalia, with support from international donors, has undertaken an ambitious program to increase access to secondary education for youth through programs such as the Somali Youth Leaders Initiative (SYLI).¹⁴ Unfortunately, empirical evidence on what policies and programs work to address these drivers remains sparse. Our study contributes to filling the research gap.

3 Research Design

We leverage a youth-focused peace and stability program implemented by Mercy Corps in close collaboration with the Somaliland Regional Government to examine the impact of education and civic engagement on violence. The program that we study provides a unique avenue to examine not only the effects of providing secondary education but also whether incorporating civic engagement

¹³“National Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism,” Federal Republic of Somalia, 27 June 2016, 12.

¹⁴This program is funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and implemented by Mercy Corps.

activities further reduces the propensity for young people to engage in violence. In this section, we describe the intervention and detail our research strategy.

3.1 Interventions: secondary education and civic engagement

The Somalia Youth Leaders Initiative (SYLI) was rolled out in 2011 as part of USAID's broad strategy to promote stability in Somalia. SYLI targets young people between ages 15 and 24 years in Somaliland, Puntland and South Central Somalia. The twin objective of the program is to provide quality secondary education to Somali youth, hoping to benefit more than 150,000 young people directly, and to provide opportunities for civic engagement for enrolled students. Accordingly, the program had two components. The first, which we refer to as *Secondary Education*, aims to increase access to secondary education. The second, which we refer to as *Education and Civic Engagement*, in addition to education provides opportunities for enrolled youths to engage in civic activities.

The secondary education arm was provided in all the project communities in Somaliland. At the time of the survey, the second component had only been implemented in a handful of education units.¹⁵ We leverage the staggered implementation of the second component to investigate the effect of education only and education plus civic engagement. Note that because the civic engagement component was designed to complement the secondary schooling of the youths, we are unable to examine its independent effects of violence. The details of the interventions are as follows:

- *Secondary education*: In Somaliland, the program had constructed or rehabilitated 22 schools, which had enrolled about 11,370 youth as of June 2016.¹⁶ To improve the quality of education that these schools provide, SYLI also provided training to teachers on curriculum development, pedagogical skills, and supports teachers to complete a two-year teaching diploma.

¹⁵Mercy Corps' plan was that by the end of the program, all of the schools would have civic engagement activities.

¹⁶The SYLI program plans to construct or rehabilitate 60 secondary schools in Somaliland, Puntland and South Central Somalia.

The program also equipped these schools with teaching and learning materials, desks and other necessary supplies and equipment. By the government's policy, access to these schools is open to all eligible youth within these communities. Nevertheless, attending these schools is voluntary.

- *Education and civic engagement*: This component of the program focuses on helping youth in schools to be leaders in their community through skills building and organizing community action campaigns. The program first identified groups of youth leaders in each of the treated schools to serve as peer trainers and mobilizers. SYLI trained these youth leaders in the areas of conflict analysis, peace building, team building, and leadership. Applying these skills, they mobilized their peers to plan together and carry out student-led community action projects. These activities included, for example: 1) constructing small gardens, cleaning compounds, and planting trees to beautify school areas; 2) organizing over 200 people during International Peace Day to discuss issues affecting youth, peace and importance of civic responsibility; and 3) sensitization campaign in communities to discourage risky, illegal migration. Local officials attended some of these events to help and discuss relevant issues with the youth. The projects are aimed to highlight the value of civic participation and civic responsibility, and model the principles of good governance and peaceful action. These exercises exposed students in these schools to first-hand experiences on how to identify, plan and execute projects working with the wider community for a social impact.

3.2 Sample

To assess the impact of the two interventions, we selected 7 out of the 22 schools. Of these 7 schools, 3 had implemented the civic engagement component. These schools were selected to allow for a mix of respondents (in and out of schools) living within these communities who in principal have the opportunity to enroll in the schools to access either secondary education or

education and civic engagement. We also selected these schools to get a mix of students located in rural and urban areas. Given the preponderance of work in urban areas in Somaliland, five schools in urban areas and two in the countryside were selected to provide a representative view of the participants in Somaliland.

Once we identified these schools, we randomly selected students within these schools and out of school youth located in the same communities, to serve as comparison groups.¹⁷ In total, we surveyed 802 respondents in the target group, including 513 in-school youth and 289 out of school youth. Among those enrolled in schools, 265 had access to only the secondary education treatment while 248 were in schools that also implemented civic engagement activities. Table 1 shows the distribution of respondents across the different conditions in the full sample, across regions, and location (rural and urban places). None of the schools that implemented the civic engagement program is located in a rural area, which limits the generalizability of our findings on civic engagement to city dwellers.

Table 1: Number of respondents across interventions by region and by location

Condition	Full sample	Burao	Region		Location	
			Hargeisa	Sanaag	Rural	Urban
Out of school (control)	289	65	143	81	81	208
Education only	265	0	150	115	114	151
Education and civic engagement	248	167	81	0	0	248

3.3 Data

Our focus is to examine the impact of these interventions on the attitudes of Somali youth towards violence. We employ survey-based outcomes to measure the propensity of young people to support or participate in violence. Given the sensitive nature of the questions, which touched on

¹⁷In each school a number of students were randomly selected from each class to form part of the sample. Outside of the schools, we randomly selected youth in the vicinity outside of the schools.

issues of individuals' support and participation in political violence, social desirability bias presented a concern. To avoid this problem, we employed a random response technique, to evaluate attitudes in an indirect way (Blair, Imai and Zhou, 2015). This approach asks respondents to use a randomized device (in our case, a spinner) whose outcome is unobserved by our enumerators. By introducing random noise, the method conceals individual responses and thus protects respondent privacy, increasing the chance that individuals report their true beliefs or actions on sensitive issues. Specifically, we employed a forced-response design that uses a randomization device to direct respondents to either automatically answer "yes" or "no," or respond sincerely to the sensitive questions. The approach provides plausible deniability to respondents because a "yes" or "no" may be a truthful answer or it may indicate that the respondent rolled a forced response. Because the probability of spinning a forced "yes" or "no" is known by us *ex ante* (here, 1/6), we can recover the actual proportion of the population that hold a particular view. In spite of the sensitivity of these attitudes, we nonetheless also asked direct questions to compare our estimates.

For our indirect questions (random response questions), we asked our respondents to provide answers to the following:

1. *In the past 12 months have you had a violent dispute with another person?*
2. *Do you support the use of violence for a political cause?*

As we described above, for these questions, we asked respondents to spin a spinner. If the handle landed on "answer yes" or "answer no," they were supposed to answer "yes" or "no", respectively, irrespective of their true answers. If the handle fell on "answer truthfully," respondents were to provide their true answers. To ensure that respondents understood the rules, we provided an initial mock question and later asked whether they understood the question. Also, about 87 percent of our respondents said they believed that the method helped to hide their true answers.

For our direct questions, we asked our respondents the following:

3. Which of the following is closest to your view? *Statement 1: The use of violence is never justified in politics today. Statement 2: In this country, it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause.*

4. *Have you used force or violence for a political cause?*

To examine the possible mechanisms that may explain the effect of secondary education, and education and civic engagement on attitudes on violence, we also collected survey-based outcomes on respondents' assessments of government responsiveness, employment prospects, and their perception of their personal role in society.¹⁸

Finally, since we did not have background characteristics of individuals ahead of our survey, we also collected these data during the interviews. Specifically, we collected information on age, gender, marital status, indicators of poverty, the number of children, type of housing, and experience with violent attacks. We also asked respondents whether they belonged to any social or political group and were interested in politics. Because we did not randomize individuals' participation in the two interventions (i.e. secondary education, and education and civic engagement), we employ these background variables to help us create comparable groups (i.e., treatments and control) of individuals who are similar, on average, on all these dimensions except for their access to the programs, which have been suggested in the literature to possibly influence participation in violence (see Allan et al., 2015). Specifically, we employ a quasi-experimental design (matching) to help estimate possible causal effects of these programs among participants (see section 4.1).

4 Analysis

To understand the impact of SYLI's interventions on violence, we compare average outcomes of our dependent variables (DVs) for young people who were enrolled in schools (re)constructed under the different treatment conditions. Table 2 shows the summary statistics of our DVs. Column

¹⁸We examine and discuss results of these measures in section 5.

(1) shows the mean and standard errors of the DVs in the full sample while Columns (2), (3), and (4) disaggregate the outcome for respondents out of school (control), who received secondary education only, and those who received the education and civic engagement treatments, respectively. Panels A and B of Table 2 groups our DVs under indirect and direct questions, respectively.

Table 2: Summary statistics of dependent variables

Variable	Intervention			
	Full sample (1)	Control (2)	Education (3)	Civic Engagement (4)
Panel A: Indirect questions				
Had violent dispute (in past twelve months)	0.393 (0.026)	0.456 (0.044)	0.401 (0.046)	0.312 (0.046)
Support use of violence for political cause	0.113 (0.023)	0.181 (0.040)	0.135 (0.040)	0.010 (0.036)
Panel B: Direct questions				
Sometimes force is necessary for just cause	0.312 (0.016)	0.322 (0.028)	0.351 (0.029)	0.258 (0.028)
Used force or violence in the past for political cause	0.175 (0.014)	0.254 (0.026)	0.175 (0.023)	0.086 (0.018)
<i>N</i>	802	289	265	248

In the full sample, we find that about 39 percent of the respondents say they have had a violent dispute with another person in the past twelve months. A little over one-tenth say they support the use of violence for a political cause. About a third (31 percent) of all respondents say it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support for a just cause in Somalia while 17.5 percent say they have used force or violence for a political cause. These results suggest a high prevalence of support for and participation in violence among Somali youth. However, when we disaggregate these estimates by our treatment conditions, we find that such prevalence in the support and participation in violence is highest amongst young people who are out of school (Column (2)) compared to those who received only secondary education (Column(3)) or received education and civic engagement (Column (4)). The exception is agreement with the statement that “force is sometimes necessary for a just cause,” which we find a slight increase (about 3 percent) among those who only received secondary education compared to those out of school. However, this drops drasti-

cally from 32.2 percent in the control to 25.8 percent among those also receiving the education and civic engagement treatment.

While these preliminary estimates show that these interventions, on average, reduce the *support* for and *participation* in violence and thus provide support for our primary hypotheses, they mask an important difference across these treatment groups that may mislead any causal interpretation of these differences. As we mentioned above, participation in these programs were voluntary. Accordingly, the differences we find may be explained by factors that induce school attendance in the first place. Indeed, people who choose to attend school and take part in nonviolent civic activities may also be less inclined to use violence in the first place (i.e., selection bias). In the next section, we employ a quasi-experimental technique to account for such possibilities.

4.1 Are the effects of secondary education, and education and civic engagement causal?

To account for potential confounders and facilitate an assessment of possible causal relationships between these interventions and our DVs, we employ matching on observed characteristics of our respondents. Specifically, we create treated and control groups that are, on average, similar based on their stabilized Inverse Probability of Treatment Weights (s-IPTW) of treatment estimated using respondents' measured characteristics (Hernán, Hernández-Díaz and Robins, 2004; Cole and Hernán, 2008).¹⁹ The s-IPTW for respondent i is her numerical score generated from her probability of being treated (similar to propensity scores) based on their observed covariates. For each of our analysis, we generate these estimates through pairwise comparison between the control units and each of the two treatment conditions.²⁰ Our use of s-IPTW allows us to mimic a randomized control trial. That is, it allows us to generate treated and control units that have similar probabilities of treatment conditional on our measured covariates. While we have endeavored to use available theoretically important variables in constructing our weights, because we cannot be sure we have

¹⁹Our use of s-IPTW helps to increase statistical efficiency and attain better coverage of confidence intervals.

²⁰Specifically, we generated two different dataset for our analysis: one for *Secondary Education* and another for *Education and Civic Engagement*.

all relevant covariates, we note that our estimates remain susceptible to unobserved confounders.²¹ Using these weights in Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions, we estimate the difference in means between treated and control groups. The difference-in-means estimates provides the average causal effect of the interventions on those who participation (i.e., average treatment effect on the treated (ATT)).

Tables 3 and 4 reports our results for our indirect and direct questions, respectively. In both tables, Columns (1)-(4) report the effects of secondary education on our DVs and Columns (5)-(8) reports that for education and civic engagement. For each dependent variable, we present two models. The first model reports the effect of the treatment on our outcomes of interest with no covariate adjustments while the second include as controls the variables used to generate the probability of treatment weights for each unit to improve the precision of our estimates and account for imbalance between treatment and control groups. To simplify, we use the adjusted estimates in our discussion of the results.

To examine our first hypothesis that higher education reduces support for or participation in violence, we report the impact of secondary education on attitudes and behaviors related to political violence using our direct and indirect (random response) questions. Our analysis produced mixed results across these outcomes. When examining direct violence questions, we find that secondary education decreased the likelihood of youth reporting participating in political violence by 15.8 percentage points while it had no impact on support for political violence (Table 4, Columns (1)-(4)). The indirect (random response) questions, however, suggest that youth's access to secondary education increased their support for the use of violence for a political cause by about 11 percentage points while having no statistically significant impact on having used violence against another person for reasons that might have been political, tribal, or other (Table 3, Columns (1)-(4)).²² In

²¹ See Appendix B for detail on our calculation of s-IPTW.

²² The latter finding is consistent with what Rebecca Wolfe and Jon Kurtz find in Somali in 2013 that youth who were in schools were more likely to express support for the use of political violence (see, "Examining the Links Between Youth Economic Opportunity, Civic Engagement, and Conflict," January 2013.)

section 5, we draw on our theories of possible mechanisms and empirical evidence to explain this seemingly counterintuitive finding that secondary education increase support for violence but may reduce the willingness of the youth to participate in it.

Table 3: Relationship between secondary education and civic engagement, and violence (indirect questions)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Had violent dispute		Support political violence		Had violent dispute		Support political violence	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Secondary education	0.062 (0.054)	0.025 (0.063)	0.102** (0.047)	0.108** (0.054)				
Secondary education and civic engagement					−0.001 (0.056)	−0.004 (0.056)	−0.146*** (0.044)	−0.155*** (0.044)
Constant	0.426*** (0.036)	0.422 (0.357)	0.214*** (0.031)	0.685** (0.308)	0.430*** (0.043)	0.045 (0.374)	0.283*** (0.034)	−0.879*** (0.293)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	346	346	346	346	322	322	322	322
R ²	0.004	0.097	0.013	0.137	0.00000	0.166	0.033	0.205
Adjusted R ²	0.001	0.050	0.011	0.092	−0.003	0.123	0.030	0.163

Note: For each dependent variable, the table shows the simple difference in weighted means and then include the set of covariates (including regional fixed effects) in the next column. Significance level indicated by *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table 4: Relationship between secondary education and civic engagement, and violence (direct questions)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Support political violence		Used political violence		Support political violence		Used political violence	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Secondary education	0.021 (0.052)	0.045 (0.062)	−0.100** (0.044)	−0.158*** (0.050)				
Secondary education and civic engagement					−0.202*** (0.053)	−0.201*** (0.056)	−0.132*** (0.035)	−0.136*** (0.034)
Constant	0.344*** (0.034)	0.090 (0.349)	0.257*** (0.029)	0.021 (0.285)	0.470*** (0.041)	0.213 (0.372)	0.190*** (0.027)	0.020 (0.227)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	346	346	346	346	322	322	322	322
R ²	0.0005	0.063	0.015	0.148	0.043	0.112	0.042	0.245
Adjusted R ²	−0.002	0.015	0.012	0.104	0.040	0.065	0.039	0.206

Note: For each dependent variable, the table shows the simple difference in weighted means and include the set of covariates (including regional fixed effects) in the next column. Significance level indicated by *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Turning to our analysis on adding civic engagement activities to access to secondary education, we find that such an intervention reduces both the support for and willingness to participate in political violence. Specifically, the combination of access to secondary education and these student-led community action projects decreased the probability of agreeing with that statement that political violence is “sometimes necessary” by 20 percentage points, and reduced the chances that a youth report *participating* in political violence by about 14 percentage points (Table 4 Columns (6) and (8), respectively). The indirect survey questions validate this positive impact on stability outcomes as reported in Column (8) of Table 3. Specifically, the combined interventions decreased the likelihood of youth supporting political violence by 16 percentage points. While we do not find that education and civic engagement reduce participation in past violent dispute (statistically and substantively), the sign on the estimate is in the hypothesized direction and consistent with results of our other indicators. These findings, thus, support our hypothesis that access to education and civic engagement reduce support and participation in violence($H2$).

5 Discussion

Our results show that the sole provision of higher education may produce divergent results on violence; increasing support for violence but reducing the chances of actual participation. However, when, in addition to higher education, young people are offered the opportunity to engage civically, it can reduce their support for and involvement in violence, all else being equal. While the latter result is consistent with our expectation, the former outcome that access to higher education alone increase support for but reduces actual participation seems puzzling. In this section, we employ both quantitative and qualitative information to shed light on the potential mechanisms that may explain these findings. For our qualitative data, we draw on open-ended interviews with twenty-five key informants, fifteen of whom were youth, involved in carrying out the project to understand how they perceived the project at its different phases of implementation.

5.1 Why higher education may increase support for and reduce participation in violence

In section 1, we argued that secondary education may reduce support for or participation in violence through three possible channels: (1) via an improvement in perceptions of government responsiveness; (2) via an increase in optimism about future employment prospects; and (3) via a reduction in isolation and exclusion. Therefore, to understand the mechanism that explains our results, we examine the relationship between secondary education and respondents' attitudes towards government service provision, their beliefs about job prospects, and feelings of isolation and exclusion from society. We use similar statistical method (i.e., matching on observable characteristics) described in our analysis section to estimate these relationships.

Table 5 shows our results on the first two channels. On our first mechanism, our findings suggest that while enrollment in higher education increases the youth's approval of government's services regarding the provision of water, electricity, and health care, it decreases their positive assessments of the government's provision of education. Specifically, we find that compared to out of school youth, more than a third (33.7 percent) of those in the SYLI school program were less likely to be satisfied with the government's provision of education (Columns (11) and (12)).

One reason why satisfaction with government provision of education is low is due to the poor quality of education. As one teacher from Burao put it "Access to education is not a problem but access to good quality education is the problem." A program like SYLI attempts to address education quality by training teachers in Somaliland. However, according to our key informants, low salaries for educators, the reluctance of teachers to being stationed in rural areas, and the phenomenon of "ghost" teachers (a situation where education officials take the salaries of teachers who do not show up to teach) continue to impede the quality of education. Thus, it is possible that continued dissatisfaction with the education system may fuel frustrations towards the government and contribute to support for violence among youth to pressure their leaders to improve the quality of schooling.

Table 5: Relationship between access to secondary education and favorability rating of government performance

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>													
	<i>Favorable ratings of government performance</i>													
	Water and electricity		Security		Unemployment		Corruption		Wages		Education		Healthcare	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Secondary Education	0.213* (0.122)	0.295** (0.136)	−0.226** (0.093)	−0.191* (0.105)	0.058 (0.110)	0.057 (0.130)	0.211 (0.137)	0.264 (0.162)	−0.266** (0.130)	−0.133 (0.147)	−0.334*** (0.103)	−0.337*** (0.120)	0.152 (0.115)	0.405*** (0.125)
Constant	1.800*** (0.082)	1.575** (0.709)	1.562*** (0.062)	2.266*** (0.549)	3.152*** (0.074)	2.745*** (0.677)	2.708*** (0.092)	4.005*** (0.842)	2.369*** (0.087)	4.734*** (0.768)	1.713*** (0.069)	3.101*** (0.623)	1.659*** (0.077)	2.037*** (0.653)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	281	281	281	281	281	281	281	281	281	281	281	281	281	281
R ²	0.011	0.258	0.021	0.240	0.001	0.169	0.008	0.179	0.015	0.242	0.037	0.218	0.006	0.291
Adjusted R ²	0.007	0.204	0.017	0.185	−0.003	0.109	0.005	0.119	0.011	0.186	0.033	0.161	0.003	0.240

Note: For each dependent variable, the table shows the simple difference in weighted means and then includes covariates (including regional fixed effects) in the next column. For each dependent variable, respondents rated the performance of government as *very bad*, *somewhat bad job*, *neither good nor bad*, *somewhat good job* and *very good*. For each DV we generate a dummy that takes 1 *somewhat good job* and *very good*, and 0 otherwise. Thus, we estimate the proportion of respondents who have favorable view of government performance. Significance level indicated by *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Regarding the second channel, Column (2) of Table 6 shows that youth who participated in SYLI-supported schools were 13 percentage points less likely to feel optimistic about future employment opportunities than out-of-school youth. Indeed, highly educated youth may be keenly aware of the grim prospect of jobs in their society. Moreover, they are also more likely to be mindful of the level of government's effort to address such challenges, which may increase their resentments. In qualitative interviews, many young people expressed fear and concern when describing the future. The leading cause of anxiety among youth was the possibility of not being able to realize one's goals because of limited opportunities to engage in economic and political life. In particular, the youth expressed concern that they may not be able to find a job or livelihood, with over 70 percent of those who were surveyed saying it was the biggest challenge in the country. Given the high rates of unemployment in Somaliland (some estimate as high as 75 percent), youth who are entering working age are faced with the reality that the odds of finding a job are not in their favor. The significance of employment in Somaliland is not only the financial security that comes with it but also the respect and status derived from being able to provide for oneself, one's family and one's broader community. Indeed, the lack of livelihood militates against the youth's ability to make the critical transition to adulthood and to reach their aspirations.

Young people's concerns about their inability to provide for themselves in the future can turn into a grievance leading to support for political violence if youth believe that their government is not doing enough to address their needs. In interviews with key informants, while many commended what the elected Government of Somaliland has done regarding development, they also expressed frustrations at unmet expectations. Many youths said that the government responds as much as it can to citizens' needs, but limited foreign investment related to the territory's contested status constrains the government. However, not everyone believes that the lack of recognition is the reason behind the slow development and limited opportunities. According to one young man, "The decision-makers are more concerned about their interests than by public concerns. And I don't think things are going to change anytime soon. It's about corruption." Whether substantiated

Table 6: Relationship between access to secondary education and optimism about job prospects and feeling of social exclusion

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Optimism about job prospects		Feel isolated and excluded	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Secondary education	−0.110** (0.050)	−0.131** (0.056)	−0.171*** (0.052)	−0.157** (0.063)
Constant	0.821*** (0.034)	0.099 (0.290)	0.335*** (0.035)	1.003*** (0.328)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	281	281	281	281
R ²	0.017	0.271	0.038	0.143
Adjusted R ²	0.013	0.218	0.034	0.081

Note: For each dependent variable, the table shows the simple difference in weighted means and then include the set of covariates (including regional fixed effects) in the next column. Significance level indicated by *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

by evidence of corruption, the more youth fail to see opportunities, particularly economic opportunities, the more likely it is that frustration against the government will increase. The same applies for support for armed opposition groups like Al Shabaab who offer youth economic and social benefits for joining.

Finally, our analysis of the effect secondary education on feelings of isolation and exclusion shows a positive relationship between high education and the sense of marginalization experienced by participating youth. Specifically, young people who attended in SYLI-supported schools are about 16 percentage points less likely to say they feel isolated and excluded in their communities compared to similar youth who are not in school (Table 6 Column (4)). As noted in the previous section, research shows that youth who are isolated and excluded tend to be pulled more easily into violent groups that can provide a sense of community and belonging. Because attending school

reduces this perceived isolation and exclusion, youth may be less likely to be allured by violent groups and engage in violence.

Taken together, these results help to clarify why education can both increase support for political violence and decrease participation in it. Essentially, in-school youth see a bleak future and expect the government to do more to address educational and employment concerns. These frustrations can help explain the increase in support for political violence, perhaps, to pressure the government to address their concerns. The youth may also support or sympathize with others who use force because they either see no formal nonviolent channels to express their grievances or, if they exist, unsure of how they operate or their efficacy. However, being in-school also appears to discourage the youth from actually acting on these frustrations because they feel less isolated and are less vulnerable to recruitment.

5.2 Why high education and civic engagement reduce youth propensity towards political violence

The civic engagement component of the SYLI program provides students with opportunities to engage positively, productively, and peacefully in their communities. In turn, we argued that it will increase participants' sense of agency over their future and reduce their support of violence. Both qualitative and quantitative data that we gathered provide support for our proposed mechanism. In our interviews with key informants, a student leader in Hargeisa claimed that "[...] civic engagement is one of the most fulfilling and personally rewarding activities that I [sic] was involved in. Our projects may be small, but they are meaningful. Now I see more than just my own self-interest and I feel that I become a whole-community member." Data from our survey buttress this point. We find that youth who took part in the civic engagement projects were 15 percentage points more likely than those in the control group to believe they have the power to make a positive difference in their community (see Column (2) of Table B.2). Similarly, the combination of the two com-

ponents of the program increased induced a sense of civic duty, the perception that youth have a responsibility to improve their community, by 17 percentage points (Column (4) of Table B.2).

Table 7: Relationship between education and civic engagement activities and the sense of agency among the youth

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Can make positive difference		Community improvement is my responsibility	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Secondary education and civic engagement	0.171*** (0.031)	0.151*** (0.035)	0.166*** (0.035)	0.166*** (0.039)
Constant	0.813*** (0.027)	0.773*** (0.238)	0.804*** (0.030)	0.937*** (0.271)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	274	274	274	274
R ²	0.098	0.235	0.078	0.164
Adjusted R ²	0.094	0.181	0.074	0.105

Note: For each dependent variable, the table shows the simple difference in weighted means and then include the set of covariates (including regional fixed effects) in the next column. Significance level indicated by *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Finally, another important mechanism through which civic engagement activities can help reduce support for political violence is by building young people's faith in the effectiveness of non-violent actions. Table 8 shows our results for the impact of education and civic engagement activities on such indicators. The results show that youth who were also involved in student-led community action projects were more likely than those who were not in school to believe in the effectiveness of lodging a complaint with local officials, raising an issue in a group, or discussing concerns with community leaders in bringing about a desired change. For example, youth in education and civic engagement treatments were 17 percentage points more likely to believe that lodging a complaint with a local official was an effective way of bringing about a desired change (Column (2) of Table 8). The program not only increased the perceptions that these nonviolent actions were effective but also the likelihood of youth actually used such channels.²³

²³See results in Table B.3 in the Appendix.

These findings indicate that participating in student-led community action projects can increase the belief that nonviolent alternatives to address concerns exist and are effective, reducing the likelihood of youth supporting and using political violence.

Table 8: Relationship between secondary education and civic engagement and faith in the effectiveness of non-violent actions

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	The following are effective ways to bring change:					
	Complaining to Local Officials	Raising an issue in a group	Discussion concerns with leaders			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Secondary education and civic engagement	0.128* (0.065)	0.173*** (0.062)	0.177*** (0.067)	0.366*** (0.057)	0.178*** (0.067)	0.287*** (0.058)
Constant	0.272*** (0.056)	−0.122 (0.426)	0.442*** (0.057)	0.771* (0.395)	0.292*** (0.057)	−0.009 (0.396)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	274	274	274	274	274	274
R ²	0.014	0.381	0.025	0.498	0.026	0.492
Adjusted R ²	0.010	0.337	0.021	0.462	0.022	0.456

Note: For each dependent variable, the table shows the simple difference in weighted means and then include the set of covariates (including regional fixed effects) in the next column. Significance level indicated by *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

6 Conclusion

This paper investigates the joint effect of access to education and opportunities for civic engagement on the support for and involvement in violence. While scholars agree that one of the key motivations for participating in violence is grievance, they diverge on the source of such discontent. Some scholars emphasize the lack of opportunities for economic advancement as the chief cause of grievance while others focus on alienation from political or decision-making process. Analysis of the impact of a rare education and civic engagement intervention in Somaliland allows us to test whether: 1) access to education reduces support for or participation in violence; and 2) access to education and opportunities for civic education jointly decrease support for or partici-

pation in violence. Our findings provide support for both channels of grievance and suggest that focusing solely on economic grievance may be counterproductive in some settings.

Specifically, we leverage a youth-focused stability program on reducing youth engagement in violence and improving stability through education and civic engagement implemented by Mercy Corps' under the auspices of the government of Somaliland. The program involved two components. The first component involved the building of schools and training teachers to provide access to education within communities. The second part began to roll out civic engagement opportunity programs in some of these schools. Drawing on unique data on attitudes of 806 youth in and out of school in communities that benefited from these interventions, we test the effects of improving access to education and civic engagement opportunities on young people's propensity toward political violence.

Our results show that when education is combined with student-led community action projects (civic engagement), it can promote stability more than just providing education. Schools play critical role in creating an environment where youth are engaged in learning, and feel less isolated and excluded. However, this by itself does not address young people's frustrations about being unable to realize their future aspirations and to make a positive difference in their communities. We found that the addition of civic engagement activities to formal education opportunities alleviates some of this frustration by giving youth opportunities to engage positively in their communities and increasing confidence in their ability to achieve change through nonviolent means. Hence, a combination of formal education and civic engagement activities that focus on community action projects appear to be effective pathways to support stability-related outcomes. Importantly, these interventions were found to reduce young people's vulnerability to being drawn into violent groups, as well as address their frustrations about not being able to make a difference in their communities and lives, which for some can be a motivator for supporting the use of political violence. However, owing to data limitations, we note that these findings may be limited to urban areas.

Also, the non-random assignment of participants to treatment suggest that we cannot entirely rule out potential confounding factors that may explain youths' participation in education and civic engagement and political violence. However, we believe we have considered many of the factors suggested by other scholars and that our study opens doors for future analysis.

Our study has policy implications from programs aimed at promoting stability and counter-ing violence extremism fragile and conflict-affected places. First, we have shown that the addition of civic engagement activities can amplify the benefits of educational and other youth-focused programs. Youth development programs can have greater impact on promoting stability by building young people's internal assets through formal and informal education and other skills-building programs while also providing them with opportunities to use these skills to be active and productive citizens. Essentially, to reduce violence youth development programs must address both the demand (lack of capacity, including knowledge and skills) and the supply (lack of opportunities, including for civic engagement) sides of challenges that face youth.

Second, our findings imply that citizens' perception about government performance in service provision is important for the effectiveness of state's policy initiative to build peace. One reason why access to SYLI-supported schools increased support for political violence may be because government was not credited for the improvements made in the education sector, as expected. In Somaliland and other comparable settings, visibility for the government in development projects is a way to gain legitimacy, thereby deterring support for political violence. However, visibility must always be linked to actual government investments and improvements in their capacities to fulfill essential functions in a transparent and equitable way.

Finally, our research shows that young people desire to be positively engaged in social, economic and political life. Expanding opportunities for young people to play a role in these key sectors — along the lines of the SYLI program model — may be fundamental to strengthening stability. Failing to do so, however, may lead this generation of youth to take desperate risks and use violence to be recognized.

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A Appendix

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Male	802	0.596	0.491	0	1
Age	802	17.911	1.732	15	21
Poverty index	711	3.302	4.415	0	17
Marital status (Single)	801	0.958	0.202	0	1
Number of children	802	0.092	0.627	0	9
Community violence index	686	2.343	2.684	0	10
Victim of violence	754	0.302	0.460	0	1
Safety at night	790	0.610	0.488	0	1
Experienced displacement	802	0.125	0.331	0	1
Number of persons in household	778	9.464	4.032	0	30
Housing(permanent)	789	0.820	0.384	0	1
Interested in politics	778	0.517	0.500	0	1
Group member	802	0.161	0.368	0	1

Table A.1: Summary statistics of respondents' characteristics

B Estimation approach

The s-IPTW is a propensity score approach to causal identification. Since we did not control assignment of subjects to treatment, on average, individuals in the treatment group are systematically different from those who did not receive the interventions (control group) on measured baseline characteristics. Our use of s-IPTW allows us to mimic a randomized control trial. That is, it allows us to generate treated and control units that have similar treatment probabilities conditional on a set of covariates.

To calculate the s-IPTW for each unit, we first use a logistic regression to estimate the probability of being treated (i.e., propensity scores). Each subject's score is based on the measured baseline covariates that are understood to influence treatment. For each subject, the s-IPTW is estimated as follows:

$$s - IPTW = \frac{P(D_i)}{P(D_i|X_i)} = \frac{D_i P(D_i = 1) + (1 - D_i)(1 - P(D_i = 1))}{D\pi_i + (1 - D)(1 - \pi_i)}$$

where $P(D_i)$ represents the probability of an individual being treated. $P(D_i)$ is estimated as the proportion of treated individuals in our sample assigned, and D_i is the treatment status of individual i . X_i is the set of covariates for individual i that we use to calculate the propensity scores. π_i represents the propensity scores for individual i estimated from the logistic regression. Covariate balance using the s-IPTW is shown in the Figure B.1 and B.2 below. We show balance before and after the s-IPTW weighting in Columns (1) and (2), respectively. Similarly, Table B.1 shows the balance before and after s-IPTW weighting. Once balance was achieved, to estimate the weighted difference-in-means (i.e., ATE) for our outcome variables, we use a linear regression model as follows:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 * Treatment + \sum B_j X_j + \epsilon_i$$

where Y_i is the outcome of interest (DV) and β_1 represents the treatment effect. We include X_j the set of covariates used in the estimation of our propensity scores to improve the efficiency of our estimates. In cases where we fail to achieve balance between treated and control units, the inclusion of X_j allow us to hold constant the influence of these possible confounders. We also include the regional fixed effects in our model to reduce omitted variable bias in our estimates. In our estimation, each unit is weighted by its s-IPTW, which allows us to interpret β_1 as the average treatment effect of the intervention on the treated (ATT).

	<i>Intervention</i>			
	Secondary education		Secondary education and civic engagement	
	<i>Unweighted</i>	<i>Weighted</i>	<i>Unweighted</i>	<i>Weighted</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Gender (Male=1)	−0.056 (0.053)	−0.005 (0.061)	−0.136*** (0.043)	−0.123** (0.062)
Age	0.043*** (0.013)	−0.0004 (0.015)	0.078*** (0.012)	−0.004 (0.016)
Poverty index	−0.028*** (0.006)	−0.005 (0.007)	−0.026*** (0.006)	0.003 (0.007)
Marital status (Single)	0.179 (0.173)	0.120 (0.191)	0.122 (0.142)	0.052 (0.231)
Number of children	0.098 (0.137)	0.046 (0.152)	0.055** (0.028)	0.059 (0.046)
Community violence index	−0.022** (0.010)	−0.003 (0.011)	−0.014 (0.010)	0.014 (0.012)
Victim of violence	0.074 (0.057)	0.022 (0.063)	0.090* (0.053)	−0.012 (0.069)
Safety at night	0.205*** (0.053)	0.054 (0.060)	0.242*** (0.048)	0.105* (0.062)
Experienced displacement	0.092 (0.074)	0.022 (0.088)	−0.004 (0.060)	0.052 (0.089)
# persons in household	0.003 (0.006)	−0.003 (0.007)	0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.007)
Housing(permanent)	0.228*** (0.062)	0.066 (0.072)	0.370*** (0.058)	0.320*** (0.088)
Interest in politics	−0.031 (0.051)	−0.023 (0.059)	0.110** (0.044)	−0.025 (0.060)
Group member	0.146** (0.068)	0.049 (0.079)	0.135** (0.058)	0.174** (0.081)
Constant	−0.658** (0.304)	0.300 (0.338)	−1.304*** (0.268)	0.265 (0.385)
Observations	346	346	322	322
R ²	0.225	0.011	0.487	0.091
Adjusted R ²	0.195	−0.028	0.465	0.053

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.1: Covariates balance statistics




Figure B.1: Distribution of propensity scores for selecting into schools that offered only secondary education




Figure B.2: Distribution of propensity scores for selecting into schools that offered secondary education and civic engagement

Table B.2: Relationship between secondary education and satisfaction with education provision in ones community

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Community education situation		Provider of education: Government		Satisfied with education system	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Secondary Education	0.112*** (0.039)	0.093** (0.045)	0.172*** (0.057)	0.049 (0.067)	0.101* (0.053)	0.145** (0.060)
Constant	0.823*** (0.027)	0.554** (0.232)	0.558*** (0.038)	−0.200 (0.349)	0.678*** (0.036)	−0.118 (0.312)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	281	281	281	281	281	281
R ²	0.028	0.259	0.032	0.198	0.013	0.256
Adjusted R ²	0.025	0.205	0.028	0.139	0.009	0.202

Note: Significance level indicated by *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table B.3: Association between secondary education and civic engagement, and the use of nonviolent political protest

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Complained to local officials		Joined others to raise an issue		Discussed concerns with local leaders	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Secondary education and civic engagement	0.076 (0.061)	0.047 (0.050)	0.385*** (0.063)	0.469*** (0.059)	0.208*** (0.063)	0.218*** (0.052)
Constant	0.225*** (0.052)	−0.874** (0.345)	0.143*** (0.054)	−0.067 (0.405)	0.170*** (0.054)	−0.890** (0.358)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	274	274	274	274	274	274
R ²	0.006	0.534	0.119	0.469	0.039	0.535
Adjusted R ²	0.002	0.501	0.116	0.431	0.035	0.502

Note: Table B.3 reports the average treatment effect of school attendance and civic education on the use of civic action. For each dependent variable, respondents are first asked if they have engaged in such civic activity in the past and then whether they thought such activity was effective. We report the treatment effect of the former in the odd numbered columns and the latter (follow up) even numbered column. DVs: 1) *Complaint to local leaders*: Complaint made to local government officials; 2) *Joined others to raise an issue*: joined others to raise an issue in school or community; and 3) *Discussed concerns with local leaders*: Discussed concerns with community leaders. Significance level indicated by *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.