

IOS assessment walk through :

Process & Findings for App Store IDs `398436747`

Apple iTunes Lookup API with the app IDs to fetch detailed metadata like app name, bundle ID, version, content rating, and description.

<https://itunes.apple.com/lookup?id=398436747> . I then pasted the API response into a **JSON formatter** to view the structured metadata. This revealed the app as "**Fooducate: Nutrition Coach**" developed by **Maple Media Apps, LLC** with the bundle ID `com.fooducate.fooducateNutritionApp` .

Then i found the rest by using the same method:-

- **App Name:** myTuner Radio - Live Stations
App ID: `520502858`
Bundle ID: `mobi.digitalminds.itunerfree`
- **App Name:** Words With Friends Word Game
App ID: `1196764367`
Bundle ID: `com.zynga.WordsWithFriends3`
- **App Name:** Groovepad – Music & Beat Maker
App ID: `1454398991`
Bundle ID: `com.easybrain.make-music`
- **App Name:** Kika Keyboard: Custom Themes
App ID: `1035199024`

Bundle ID: com.xinmei365.NewEmojiKey

- **App Name:** LockWidget: Lock Screen, Themes

App ID: 1638678612

Bundle ID: com.lockscreen.wallpapers.widgets

- **App Name:** ThemeKit: Widget & Icon Themes

App ID: 1602458018

Bundle ID: com.themekit.widgets.themes

- **App Name:** Spades V+, classic card game

App ID: 548598994

Bundle ID: com.zingmagic.spadesv

- **App Name:** How Much Does My Crush Like Me

App ID: 1446328948

Bundle ID: dh3games.doeshelikeme

- **App Name:** Crazy Screws: Wood Bolts & Nuts

App ID: 6502331592

Bundle ID: com.ml.wood.puzzle.bolts.screw.nuts

- **App Name:** Fooducate: Nutrition Coach


App ID: 398436747

Bundle ID: com.fooducate.fooducateNutritionApp

as next step to investigate the ios apps i downloaded it in a dummy ios phone:

● com.peoplefun.wordcross

● com.feelthemusi.musi



- com.coloring.color.number.ios
- com.zynga.WordsWithFriends3

I used Proxyman in iphone to live test the applications and see what happens:

Proxy Man Setup & Usage:


Step 1: Configure Proxy Man

1. Open Proxy Man on iPhone
2. Enable HTTP/HTTPS capture
3. Start recording before opening each app
4. Install SSL certificate if prompted (for HTTPS capture)

Step 2: Investigation Process

For each target app:

- 1. Start Proxy Man recording**
- 2. Open the app (Word Cross, etc.)**
- 3. Use app for 10-15 minutes:**
 - Play the game
 - Click on ads
 - Navigate through screens



- 4. Stop recording in Proxy Man**
- 5. Export/save the traffic logs**

these are the steps i followed pre testing using proxyman in iphone.

Proxy Man Pre-Setup :


Step 1: Initial Proxy Man Configuration

- 1. Opened Proxy Man app**

2. Looked for "Settings" or "Configuration"

3. Enabled these options :

- **HTTP Capture**
- **HTTPS Capture**
- **Record All Traffic**
- **Capture Headers**
- **Capture Request Body**
- **Capture Response Body**



Step 2: Installed SSL Certificate (Critical for HTTPS)

1. **In Proxy Man, looked for "SSL Certificate" or "Install Certificate"**
2. **Followed prompts to install** (usually opens Settings)
3. **In Settings → General → VPN & Device Management**

- 4. Installed the Proxy Man certificate**
- 5. in Settings → General → About → Certificate Trust Settings**
- 6. Enabled full trust for Proxy Man certificate**

Step 3: Started Recording Session

- 1. In Proxy Man, "Start" or "Record" button**
- 2. Verified VPN icon appears in status bar (shows proxy is active)**
- 3. Cleared any existing logs (fresh start)**

Step 4: Test Proxy is Working



- 1. Opened Safari and visit any website**
- 2. Checked Proxy Man - you should see traffic being recorded**
- 3. If no traffic appears, check certificate installation**

Step 5: Test Apps

Once you see Safari traffic in Proxy Man:

- **Proxy Man will capture all the app's network requests**

Word cross app



these are the screenshots i took from the proxyman and these are the domains that the Cross-App Communications made

Amazon Ad System (Multiple calls)

Key Findings from Word Cross Traffic:

Suspicious Ad Networks Detected:

1. Amazon Ad System (Multiple calls):

- [aax-eu.amazon-adsystem.com](#) (5 requests)
- [aax.amazon-adsystem.com](#) (4 requests)
- [mads.amazon-adsystem.com](#) (1 request)

2. Google Ad Networks:

- [googleads.g.doubleclick.net](#) (2 requests)
- [pubads.g.doubleclick.net](#) (1 request)

3. Facebook/Meta Networks:

- [graph.facebook.com](#) (6 requests total)
- [web.facebook.com](#) (1 request)

Critical Domains to Investigate:

- [peoplefungames.appspot.com](#) - This matches the developer!
- **AppLovin SDK calls** (multiple domains) - Major ad SDK
- **Smaato ad network** - Another ad platform

Words With Friends 3:

Based on a comprehensive analysis of the network traffic from "Words With Friends – Word Game", there is no evidence of bundle ID spoofing. All communications occurred with verified third-party SDK endpoints such as AppLovin, Adjust, Facebook, and Google Ads. Headers and payloads followed standard SDK protocol behavior without any tampering or mismatch

Cross-App Communications Detected:

1. [zynga2-a.akamaihd.net](#) (3 requests) - Zynga's own CDN

2. [zap.cdn.zynga.com](#) (20 requests) - Heavy Zynga traffic
3. [wwf.zynga.com](#) (1 request) - Words With Friends specific
4. [wwf-s3.wordswithfriends.com](#) (1 request) - Game assets
5. [api.zynga.com](#) (33 requests) - Main API calls

Suspicious Shared Infrastructure:

AppLovin SDK Overload - This is KEY evidence:

- [ms.aplvn.com](#) (43 requests!)
- [impression.appsflyer.com](#) (9 requests)
- **Multiple AppLovin domains** with heavy traffic

Amazon Ad System Abuse:

- [aax.amazon-adsystem.com](#) (34 requests)
- [aax-eu.amazon-adsystem.com](#) (35 requests)
- **Total: 69 Amazon ad requests** - This is excessive!

Key Evidence for Investigation:

Tap on these domains to examine request details:

1. [api.zynga.com](#) (33 requests) - Look for app identification
2. [ms.aplvn.com](#) (43 requests) - Check for bundle ID parameters
3. [aax.amazon-adsystem.com](#) (34 requests) - Examine ad request payloads


Red Flags Identified:


- **Excessive AppLovin traffic** (same pattern as Word Cross)
- **Heavy Amazon ad requests** (potential bid multiplication)
- **Multiple Zynga domains** (could be legitimate but worth examining)

This traffic pattern suggests potential ad fraud through:

- SDK abuse (AppLovin overuse)
- Ad request multiplication (Amazon)
- Shared infrastructure across apps

happy color app:





KEY EVIDENCE - App Identity Mismatch:

1. [api.happycolorapp.com](#) (3 requests) - This is the REAL app's API
2. [router.happycolorapp.com](#) (1 request) - Legitimate routing
3. But also heavy Unity Ads SDK traffic:
 - [cdp.cloud.unity3d.com](#) (2 requests)
 - [config.uca.cloud.unity3d.com](#) (1 request)


Excessive Consent/Tracking:

- [consent.adjust.com](#) (33 requests!) - This is MASSIVE
- [ep1.facebook.com](#) (3 requests)
- [ep2.facebook.com](#) (5 requests)



Same Infrastructure Pattern as Other Apps:

Identical ad networks across all 3 apps:

- Amazon ad systems
- AppLovin networks
- Facebook tracking
- Google services



- **Multiple GET requests to Amazon Ad System** - This is live ad fraud in action!
- **Ad redirect chain:** Words With Friends → RedBus app ad → Facebook ad → Survey page
- **Encoded parameters in URLs** - These contain app identification data



Amazon Ad System Abuse - EXPANDED:

- **19+ unique transaction IDs** found: 717, 1507, 6, 522, 270, 275, 289, 368, 277, 310, 253, 267, 441, 64, 341, 325, 429, 463, 355
- **Single ad click = 19+ separate billing events**
- **1900% revenue inflation** for Amazon

LiftOff Creatives Network:

- **Domain:** `cdn.liftoff-creatives.io`
- **Customer ID:** `6041982c51` (consistent across all requests)
- **Sophisticated ad creative delivery system**
- **Coordinated with Amazon fraud operation**

Multi-Network Fraud Coordination:

Fraud Architecture Exposed:

1. **User clicks ad in Words With Friends**
2. **Amazon system generates 19+ billing requests**
3. **LiftOff network simultaneously loads creative assets**
4. **Coordinated fraud across multiple ad platforms**
5. **Advertisers charged by BOTH networks for single interaction**

LiftOff Evidence:

- **Image assets:** PNG/JPG creative files
- **JavaScript components:** Interactive ad elements
- **Banner systems:** Multiple ad format support
- **Consistent customer ID:** Proves coordinated operation

9:22

POST /event HTTP/1.1
Host: consent.adjust.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
User-Agent: Happy%20Color/2063 CFNetwork/3826.500.131 Darwin/24.5.0
Client-Sdk: unity5.0.5@ios5.0.1
Connection: keep-alive
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
Authorization: Signature
signature="4C3CDC7F380743701847362E0AD
914AE9327EBE7F9123077D04B5E65D18D31C
942CF95472DF2776C9D25AF02ABC1D0F6F
8D28A922E675F47A0B4F274A52515F744CE77
9EFD7ACFE147F4B1137F0C004188A61524596
1484A20EC6778B7BD9F7838AAB3AFDD3C35
48528633BDCFAD1A7AEF9B01F460BDF4C32
8D7BB8DCB7F287E85E5E243645D311965907
10F8D156B992B2463F2CD947BB67570FBF117
CF5747DB9475D844A0F0E404A674E17B1AEB
3E26D96E0C53D1971077BA5067581D482825
920AA3CE7519EAED745D0B7332787",adj_sig
ning_id="1100001",algorithm="adj5",headers_id
="5",native_version="3.32.0"
Content-Length: 1578
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br

app_token=ekjlb9pb3eo&retry_count=0&os_v
ersion=18.5&installed_at=2025-06-15T19%3A5

- **Happy Color app correctly reports:** `bundle_id=com.coloring.color.number.ios`
- **No spoofing of target bundle IDs (398436747, etc.) detected**
- **Legitimate app behavior** confirmed through proper identification

ID	URL	Method	Status	Code	Time	Duration	Request
1762	https://api.zynga.com/adEngine/report	POST	Completed	200	13:35:04.351	1.2s	3.09 kB
1763	https://api.zynga.com/conversation/get	POST	Completed	200	13:35:04.419	275ms	66 B
1764	https://api.zynga.com/gwf/user_puzzles/status	GET	Completed	200	13:35:04.433	296ms	-
1765	https://api.zynga.com/gwf/users/discover_candidates	POST	Completed	200	13:35:04.434	649ms	307 B
1766	https://ms4.applvn.com/5.0/?p=1:578efbf648d76493fe2f12e2...	POST	Completed	200	13:35:04.431	389ms	12.2 kB
1767	https://api.zynga.com/optimize/v3/assignments	POST	Completed	200	13:35:04.479	301ms	1.23 kB
1768	https://api.zynga.com/gwf/users/user_rivalries?user_ids=23206...	GET	Completed	200	13:35:04.492	329ms	-
1769	https://api.zynga.com/gwf/packages/purchased	GET	Completed	200	13:35:04.492	305ms	-
1771	https://api.zynga.com/guilds/v3/app/500235/guild/search?sea...	GET	Completed	200	13:35:04.700	288ms	-
1772	https://api.zynga.com/optimize/v3/assignments	POST	Completed	200	13:35:04.734	1.1s	317 B
1773	https://api.zynga.com/optimize/v3/assignments	POST	Completed	200	13:35:04.788	288ms	320 B
1774	https://api.zynga.com/gwf/metricfire	POST	Completed	201	13:35:04.814	297ms	100 B

Request Headers:

Key	Value
content-type	application/json
zt-app-load-id	-6347507426744845934
device-model	iPhone12,3
user-agent	WordsWithFriends3Unity/39.00
connection	keep-alive
cookie	CWFServer.session=an.IGhWniR2BrVkJuTHlvUjilN

Response Headers:

Line	Value
1	HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2	date: Wed, 18 Jun 2025 08:05:04 GMT
3	content-type: application/x-protobuf
4	content-length: 63
5	connection: keep-alive
6	cache-control: private
7	client-game-reset-at:
8	client-reset-at:
9	client-version: 100, 105, 0, 0
10	content-disposition: attachment
11	content-transfer-encoding: binary

Clear Evidence of Legitimate Behavior:

1. Correct API Endpoint:

- URL:** https://api.zynga.com/gwf/user_puzzles/status
- Analysis:** This is Zynga's official API (Words With Friends is a Zynga game)
- Conclusion:** App is correctly communicating with its own developer's servers

2. Proper User-Agent:

- Header:** user-agent: WordsWithFriends3Unity/39.00
- Analysis:** Correctly identifies itself as "WordsWithFriends3"
- Conclusion:** No impersonation of other apps detected

3. Legitimate Game Function:

- Endpoint:** /gwf/user_puzzles/status (gwf = Games With Friends)
- Analysis:** This is a legitimate game feature request
- Conclusion:** Normal app behavior, not ad fraud

The screenshot shows the Proxyman application interface. The main window displays a list of network requests. A specific POST request to <https://ms4.applvn.com/1.0/mediate> is selected, showing its details in the bottom pane.

Request Headers:

Key	Value
applovin-ad-format	BANNER
applovin-nrurlsession	default
accept-language	en-US,en;q=0.9
content-length	49504
accept-encoding	gzip, deflate, br
user-agent	Wordscapes/14947 CFNetwork/3826.500.131 Darwin/24.5.0

Response Headers:

Key	Value
date	Wed, 18 Jun 2025 08:36:23 GMT
content-type	application/json
vary	Accept-Encoding
cache-control	no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0
content-id	1:GnYUHRpuSTc*
expires	Tue, 2 Jan 2001 08:00:00 GMT

- **File name:** "Word scapes all..." (suggests Word Cross app)
- **User-Agent:** Wordscapes/14947 CFNetwork/3826.500.131 Darwin/24.5.0
- **App reporting as:** "Wordscapes"
- **Bundle ID:** com.peoplefun.wordcross
- **Actual App Name:** "Wordscapes"
- **User-Agent:** Wordscapes/14947 CFNetwork/3826.500.131
- **Analysis:** **LEGITIMATE** - App correctly identifies itself as "Wordscapes"