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x/crypto/curve25519,x/crypto/ed25519: reject low order points #31846

FiloSottile opened this issue May 5, 2019 · 1 comment


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commented May 5, 2019

Rejecting low order points is not strictly necessary, but it helps root out behaviors that can come unexpected to protocol designers (like non-contributory DH, or signature:message:key not being 1:1:1). libsodium already does indiscriminately, and we should too.

This was suggested by Cas Cremers and Dennis Jackson as part of their upcoming work on revisiting small subgroup and invalid curve attacks.


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commented Jun 19, 2019

Change mentions this issue: crypto/tls: reject low-order Curve25519 points

gopherbot pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 20, 2019
crypto/tls: reject low-order Curve25519 points
The RFC recommends checking the X25519 output to ensure it's not the
zero value, to guard against peers trying to remove contributory

In TLS there should be enough transcript involvement to mitigate any
attack, and the RSA key exchange would suffer from the same issues by
design, so not proposing a backport.

See #31846

Change-Id: I8e657f8ee8aa72c3f8ca3b124555202638c53f5e
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <>

@andybons andybons modified the milestones: Go1.13, Go1.14 Jul 8, 2019

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