In TLS 1.2, we still advertise and select (as the final preference) SHA-1 signature algorithms, rsa_pkcs1_sha1 and ecdsa_sha1. (In TLS 1.3 we reject them. In TLS 1.0 they are the only option.)
RFC 9155 made rejecting them a MUST, and we're overdue anyway.
I propose we implement RFC 9155 and remove support for SHA-1 signature algorithms in TLS 1.2.
The GODEBUG setting tlssha1=1 can be used to revert to the previous behavior.
/cc @golang/security
In TLS 1.2, we still advertise and select (as the final preference) SHA-1 signature algorithms, rsa_pkcs1_sha1 and ecdsa_sha1. (In TLS 1.3 we reject them. In TLS 1.0 they are the only option.)
RFC 9155 made rejecting them a MUST, and we're overdue anyway.
I propose we implement RFC 9155 and remove support for SHA-1 signature algorithms in TLS 1.2.
The GODEBUG setting
tlssha1=1can be used to revert to the previous behavior./cc @golang/security