


Grant Ujifusa



REDRESS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT



JAPANESE AMERICAN NATIONAL MUSEUM





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JAPANESE AMERICAN NATIONAL MUSEUM



Japanese American National Museum, Los Angeles, California

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*Cover images*

(top row, left to right)

The Nishi Hongwanji Buddhist Temple (currently the National Museum's Historic Building) as Japanese Americans are subjected to forced removal and incarceration, 1942. Photo by Jack Iwata. Gift of Jack and Peggy Iwata (93.102.102).

Two friends bidding farewell at Rohwer, Arkansas concentration camp, May 9, 1944. Gift of the Walter Muramoto Family (97.293.25).

Fred Korematsu, Gordon Hirabayashi, Michi Weglyn, William Hohri, Aiko Herzig-Yoshinaga, and Harry Ueno on the steps of the U.S. Supreme Court in Washington, D.C., April 20, 1987. Collection of William Hohri (NRC.1998.532.2).

(bottom row, left to right)

Educating students about the wartime incarceration of Japanese Americans, San Francisco, California, ca. 1980s. Collection of Isago Isao Tanaka (NRC.1998.226.10).

Harold N. Ouye (age 74) of Sacramento giving testimony before the House Reparations Committee at hearings, Golden Gate University, San Francisco, California, August 12, 1981. Collection of Isago Isao Tanaka (NRC.1998.226.4).

Ondo at Manzanar Pilgrimage, ca. 1980s. Courtesy of Visual Communications (NRC.1998.533.2).

*Title page images*

(top row, left to right)

President Ronald Reagan signing the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, August 10, 1988. Gift of Norman Y. Mineta (96.370.16A).

Elderly couple looking out of window of train, ca. 1942. Collection of Lucile Fessenden Dandelet (93.5.6). Kiyoshi Yamashita holding a letter of apology and redress check of \$20,000 issued by the U.S. government, 1988. Collection of Isago Isao Tanaka (NRC.1998.226.18).

(bottom row, left to right)

Redress first check ceremony, Hau Dairiki in the foreground, Mamoru Eto (107 years old) on the left and "Sox" Kitashima on the right, October 9, 1990. Gift of Tsuyako "Sox" Kitashima (98.152.17).

Baggage belonging to evacuees just arrived from the assembly center at Puyallup, Washington, August 1942. U.S.B.R. Photograph, Courtesy of the Tajitsu/Nash Family (NRC.1998.249.3).

Mitchell Maki interviews The Honorable William Marutani, Media, Pennsylvania, August 27, 1998. Photo by John Esaki, Japanese American National Museum Redress Files.

## Redress Oral History Project (1998-1999)

### Project Overview

This project documents the lives of eleven significant players who spent countless hours educating the Japanese American community and the larger American public about the unjust incarceration of Japanese Americans during World War II. The combined efforts of these individuals, along with pressure from key community organizations, led to the passage of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which granted a governmental apology and monetary reparations for inmates. These interviews address the different community organizations' approaches to redress—whether it be legislative or judicial struggles—and reflect each individual's personal commitment and sacrifice to achieve redress for World War II inmates.


### Interviews

May 7, 1998	Phillip Shigekuni
May 22, 1998	Hitoshi Harry Kajihara
June 1, 1998	Fred Hirasuna
June 12, 1998	William Hohri
July 1-2, 1998	Clifford Uyeda
August 26, 1998	Aiko Herzig-Yoshinaga & Jack Herzig
August 27, 1998	William Marutani
August 28, 1998	Grayce Uyehara
August 30, 1998	Grant Ujifusa
September 24, 1999	Carole Hayashino

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*But it turned out that the commission idea as everyone now knows was very important and that galvanized people. That's sort of what got me into it. I knew nothing about it all through the '70s. I never heard of anything and so I saw these old people crying and so that made me cry . . . the whole community cried.*



## GRANT UJIFUSA

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Grant Ujifusa, a third-generation Japanese American, was born on January 4, 1942. Ujifusa was raised on his family's sugar beet farm in a small town in northern Wyoming where only a handful of Japanese American families had settled before the war. Both his father, Tom Ujifusa, and his mother, Mary Takayo Ujifusa, were active in the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) of northern Wyoming during the 1940s and 1950s.

Unlike other Japanese Americans living in West Coast regions, Ujifusa's family was not placed in a concentration camp during World War II. Ujifusa's family continued to farm and visited friends who were incarcerated at nearby Heart Mountain concentration camp.

An all-league quarterback in high school, Ujifusa was accepted on a full scholarship to Harvard University. He graduated in 1965, and did graduate work in American history and literature at Brandeis and Brown universities.

Soon after, Ujifusa, along with friend Michael Barone, authored the *Almanac of American Politics*, a comprehensive review of the presidency, Congress, and state governors. The first *Almanac of American Politics*, published in 1972, was an enormous success and served as an important source of information for every politician in Washington. Ujifusa then worked at the company that published the *Almanac*, Gambit Publishing House, as a publicity director. He subsequently worked at various publishing companies: Houghton Mifflin, Random House, and Macmillan.

Ujifusa first learned of redress in 1981 when Min Yasui—a prominent attorney from Denver, Colorado, and longtime family friend—visited Ujifusa, then working in New York, to discuss the need for Sansei participation in the redress effort. Ujifusa soon

became involved in the fight for redress, and attended the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC) hearings held on the East Coast.

In 1985, Ujifusa was elected legislative strategy chair for the Legislative Education Committee of JACL (JACL LEC). Ujifusa's strategy of framing the issue as a constitutional violation of equal opportunity and property rights rather than special interest politics enabled him to secure support from key Republican congressmen such as Dick Cheney, Jack Kemp, and Newt Gingrich. Most importantly, working with Governor Tom Kean of New Jersey, Ujifusa had access to President Ronald Reagan whose Justice Department under Ed Meese had taken position against H.R. 442. Ujifusa and Kean were able to reverse the Department's stand, and convinced the President himself to sign the Japanese American redress bill.

Today Ujifusa continues to manage his grandfather's sugar beet farm in northern Wyoming and lives with his wife Amy, a social worker, and adopted son Juan in Chappaqua, New York. Their two older sons, Steven and Andrew, both recently graduated from Harvard University. Ujifusa serves on the Board of Governors of the Japanese American National Museum and on the Board of Directors of the Japanese American National Memorial Foundation. He is also an honorary member of Company K of the 442<sup>nd</sup> Regimental Combat Team.

## **GRANT UJIFUSA**

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*Grant Ujifusa discusses his childhood experiences growing up on his grandfather's sugar beet farm in Worland, Wyoming. As a child, Ujifusa was impacted by his grandfather's visits to Heart Mountain concentration camp, and also his grandfather's postwar struggle to gain citizenship through the McCarran-Walter Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952. Ujifusa also reflects on his undergraduate memories as a small-town student studying at the prestigious Harvard University in the early 1960s.*

*Ujifusa discusses his personal meetings with key legislators and politicians to gain their support for Japanese American redress causes in the early 1980s. He further elaborates on his strategy for framing the issue for redress: as a constitutional issue involving the violation of fundamental equal opportunity and property rights. Ujifusa was interviewed by Mitchell Maki and Darcie Iki, accompanied by videographer John Esaki, at his home in Chappaqua, New York, on August 30, 1998.*

*Tape 1, Side A*

DI: We [Mitchell Maki and Darcie Iki] are here interviewing with Grant Ujifusa on August [30], 1998 at his home in Chappaqua, New York. [Also present is Videographer John Esaki.] Thank you Mr. Ujifusa for meeting with us today to do this interview for the Japanese American National Museum's Redress Oral History Project.

GU: It's a pleasure.

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DI: Before we start getting into your involvement in the Redress Movement, I want to get a sense of your background, some of the early influences in your life that led you to the Redress Movement. Can you tell me a little about your family background?

GU: I grew up on a sugar beet farm in northern Wyoming near a town called Worland, population about five thousand. It was mostly a farming community. So in some ways I had an idyllic childhood in a small town. People felt that how the local high school football team did was the most important thing in the world. I wasn't subject to very much prejudice growing up. Although I think [for] my father who grew up in the same town a generation earlier and went through the same school system, the experience of Worland was very different. But by the time I came along in the '50s, going to grammar school [and] high school, things were pretty much okay.

On the other hand, what I recall from my childhood as it pointed toward redress, I remember my mother would talk a lot about how difficult it was for her growing up in the '30s. In another small town in southern Colorado, she was the class valedictorian of a class of 150. It was 1939, and the school board decided that since this Jap had become valedictorian, this was not something that they could allow. So she was not allowed to speak. This was something that I remembered. You carry these things with you as part of your life.

My father was typically a Nisei<sup>1</sup> male—never said very much, but I think that his experiences in the '30s were not especially pleasant either, even in what became for me an idyllic small town in northern Wyoming.

DI: How does your family end up in Wyoming?

GU: Do you want the long version or the short version?

DI: The long version, we've got all day. (laughs)

GU: I don't know how much of this is apocryphal and how much is factual, but this is how I understand it. My great-grandfather in Japan, Okayama-ken,<sup>2</sup> had a small holding. It was maybe two acres, which would have been considered rather large—but maybe an acre of it was not arable. This was in the mountains. During the late Meiji Period, the oligarchs who controlled the government in Tokyo wanted to create an impression in the West that Japan was modernizing and democratizing, which it was to some extent. So one of the things that they did, as I understand, was establish village councils. People could say what they thought. This was a public affairs forum [in] local government. It was mostly for show, I think, because they didn't really have much power. Most of the power

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<sup>1</sup> Second-generation Japanese Americans

<sup>2</sup> Okayama prefecture

was concentrated in Tokyo or at the prefectural level. Anyway, my great-grandfather, who was never a very good farmer, got very much involved in all this stuff. He got so involved and so interested that his farm went to hell. So he told my grandfather and later my grandfather's younger brother, "You'd better get on the boat, because I've lost [the farm]." My grandfather was the elder of the two brothers, and he left for the U.S. and became very sick on the way—diarrhea of some sort. And the people who had contracted this labor, of course, didn't want him to infect the other men so they threw him off the boat in Honolulu. He was twenty and otherwise very healthy.

The first thing you do, of course, is you find someone from Okayama-*ken* because there is a sense of geographical obligation. Someone helped him and [gave him] *okai*.<sup>3</sup> He recovered in about a month or two, got on another boat, and went to San Francisco. [He] got off after having made three or four really good friends on that leg of the journey.

At the base of the gangway—and this is one of the oldest immigrant stories in the world whether it be New York or Philadelphia or Boston—there was a Japanese guy saying in effect, "Welcome to America, the land of opportunity. Are you boys looking for work?" And my grandfather and his buddies said "Yeah, of course. I mean, that's why we are here." So the guy says, "Well, how much money do you have?" And they said they had about five dollars among them. He said, "Give me the money and show up about here at six in the morning sharp." They said "okay" and went off to the Japantown. They showed up at six and he didn't of course. And they'd lost their money.

A couple of days later, my grandfather sees him in Japantown. He spots this guy. He grabs him and he says, "You goddamn cheat. You stole our money! I want it back." The guy looks at him and says, "You must be crazy. Who are you?" My grandfather who was kind of a big man—he was about 5' 7", 145 pounds, which is pretty big for an Issei<sup>4</sup>—shoves him in the alley and beats the hell out of him. I don't know if he beat the hell out of him, but he beat him up.

Grandpa goes back to the boarding house and he tells his buddies, "I found this guy on the street. I didn't get the money back, but I did get some satisfaction. I beat him up." And one of his buddies says, "You did what, you dumb bastard?" And grandpa says, "You know I just kind of roughed him up a little bit." And his buddy said, "You know these guys are organized. This is a little criminal operation. So there are going to be reprisals." Grandpa said, "What! I better go see this elder, Mr. Hayashi," who was also from Okayama-*ken*. He asked him what he should do and [Mr. Hayashi] said, "Well, you just better get your ass out of town." The Southern Pacific [Railroad] was hiring. So he got himself on the Southern Pacific and worked his way to Denver. Then he thinned beets outside of

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<sup>3</sup> Rice gruel

<sup>4</sup> The first generation of immigrant Japanese Americans

*Redress Oral History Project*

Denver. And then there was some Boston money out of the Forbes family, running some track down from Billings, Montana, to Denver through Wyoming, and so he got onto that gang. [He] was in northern Wyoming in 1904 and 1905 when they were just opening it up.

Not being much of a reader, he didn't know that Frederick Jackson Turner some twenty years earlier had said the frontier was closed. He didn't know that so he broke out some farmland there in 1913 and stayed. Then [he] brought his wife over after a wait of ten years and then my dad came along a couple of years later and I showed up after that and I grew up there. Many of the people who were working the rails there of course went back to Seattle or San Francisco if not to Japan itself, but my grandfather stayed. In part, I think, because he was always afraid to go back. In 1953, I remember him going back to Japan. And he made sure that the travel agent booked his flight through Seattle, not through San Francisco. (laughs) We were out there because that was a nice place to be if you wanted to avoid reprisals in Japantown.

DI: (laughs) So what kind of farming did he do in Wyoming?

GU: It's the kind of farming that's done on marginal land all over the world. It's only viable in this country now because the government supports sugar beet farming. In the time of Columbus, of course, sugar was a luxury only for aristocrats. But then as time went on it became a commodity. It's now sold for a dime or less per pound on the world market. We still receive something like twenty-three cents a pound because the government restricts imports. But it is backbreaking work. I think there's still some sugar beet farming done in California. It's done in Idaho. It's done in Poland. It's also done in Russia. It's a very tough way to make a living. But an easier way to make a living than putting down railroad tracks. We still own the farm and we have a tenant who farms it. He still does mostly sugar beets along with malting barley and pinto beans. I like to think about the farm. I manage it and I talk to the farmer and I go back once a year and I kick tires and pretend—

DI: So you are responsible for managing the farm?

GU: Yeah, right. But it's interesting, for me anyway, because I was only given responsibility for managing this small farm five years after I did redress. So I was responsible in many ways for doing redress, thinking about redress, and doing the lobbying and so on. So I was competent to do that, according to my parents, but I was not yet competent to manage the farm. So I do it and I enjoy it. I like to think about harvest time. I like to think about cattle. My grandfather used to run some cattle. [He] was once offered a ten thousand acre spread in Manchuria by the Counsel General in San Francisco because he knew cattle and very few Japanese knew cattle. He was almost ready to go and he didn't. But I like cattle.

*Grant Ujifusa*

And so of course anywhere you grow up, that's where home is. I think about it a lot. But it's not California. It's not Seattle. It's not Spokane. It's not Stockton. It's a place in northern Wyoming, which I will add, gratuitously, helped redress. Because when I parachuted into redress from the outside, thanks to Min Yasui<sup>5</sup> and Mike Masaoka,<sup>6</sup> Mike said, "This will be good because you can avoid a lot of the politics of JACL.<sup>7</sup> Because there's no way they can get at you. You're an unknown. You're coming in from Mars. Usually the way you try to control someone in a Japanese organization is you get to his family and you say, "Well, do you realize what your son is doing? He's doing this, that, and the other thing." I came from Wyoming and nobody had ever heard of a Japanese American from Wyoming. Mike said, "This is good, but I'll have to coach you in some of the politics of the organization," which he did. So the fact that I was from the way in the *naka*, just utter *inaka*,<sup>8</sup> in some ways helped I guess.

DI: So I'm assuming there weren't a lot of Japanese Americans in the community where you lived.

GU: No, there weren't. There was my grandfather's brother's family and my grandfather's sister's family. Some people who were in Heart Mountain<sup>9</sup> chose to settle around there—maybe three or four families. We also used to have picnics with people from southern Montana and northern Wyoming. I can remember them as a child and there may have been 125 people from a radius of maybe 200 miles. Within the local area, there may have been twelve families and we knew them all well.

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<sup>5</sup> Minoru "Min" Yasui (1916-1987) was a prominent attorney and a leader of the Japanese American community in Denver, Colorado. Yasui challenged a curfew order passed on March 24, 1942, and was arrested for breaking the curfew law. In doing this, he became the first Japanese American to challenge the orders of General John L. DeWitt, commander of the Fourth Army during World War II. The matter went to trial; Yasui's trial became one of the four landmark World War II cases challenging the forced removal and/or detention of all West Coast Japanese Americans.

<sup>6</sup> Mike Masaru Masaoka (1915-1991) was a Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) official, lobbyist, and community leader. Masaoka played a decisive role in shaping the history of the Japanese American community during World War II and the resettlement years. He was one of the prime supporters for Nisei participation in the armed forces, and viewed military service as the best way to demonstrate the loyalty of Japanese Americans. In fact, Masaoka was the first Nisei to volunteer for the all-Nisei 442<sup>nd</sup> Regimental Combat Team. As a lobbyist, he was instrumental in securing legislative support for the Japanese American Evacuation Claims Act of 1948 and the McCarran-Walter Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952. While Masaoka was initially not supportive of redress, in 1975 he later came out in support of individual payments and urged lump sum payments. For Masaoka, reparations offered a chance for the JACL to provide leadership and to unify organizational support.

<sup>7</sup> The Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) is the largest, and arguably the most influential, Japanese American civil rights organization. While boasting a large membership, the JACL, throughout its history, has been controversial within the Japanese American community, having both avid supporters and ardent opponents. Nevertheless, the JACL's considerable political influence and lobbying strategies, combined with the efforts of other key organizations and individuals, helped Japanese Americans obtain redress.

<sup>8</sup> *Naka* and *inaka* translate into country.

<sup>9</sup> Heart Mountain, Wyoming, was one of ten concentration camps created by the War Relocation Authority (WRA) to detain persons of Japanese descent forcibly removed from the West Coast during World War II.

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Sometimes it became very difficult because if you were feuding with a family, it's not as if the network was especially wide. (laughs) You were confined to these twelve families. I lived with my grandfather and grandmother because my father was the eldest son, growing up bilingual until I was maybe six. And I can still understand conversational Japanese. As I like to say to Mitch and others, I regard myself as the world's youngest Issei. (laughs) I should be in a circus. (laughs)

DI: (laughs) So what happens to your family during the war? They're not on the West Coast in the military zone. So what happens to them? Are they affected at all by the war?

GU: They were affected to some extent. There was a local history written about the period, which I read. I think one of the nice things about being from Wyoming—tourists notice that people of Wyoming are really very friendly and I think one of the reasons that they're friendly is because many of them are from Midwestern stock or from Texas. They drove cattle up into Wyoming. That's the original culture. It's not Puritan. It's Midwestern and Southern and very friendly. The other reason I think is economic, which is to say if there are not very many people around, you value the people who are there. So grandpa was there and it's not as if he was a big agricultural threat, as were the Japanese farmers in California or Washington. He was a customer at the local hardware store and the local grocery store. So he escaped the life of stigma and prejudice experienced by Japanese farmers in California.

On the other hand, when Pearl Harbor happened, the local bank did freeze our assets. And the curious thing was that there were a number of so-called Russian Germans who had come into this part of Wyoming and North Dakota after World War I. They were in Russia having immigrated from Germany in the late eighteenth century. They were there for about 125 years. And when Lenin came in, he threw all the ethnic Germans out of the Volga Valley, and they ended up in places like Wyoming and Siberia. During the First World War, if you were German, you were regarded suspiciously, right? The way my father tells it, the only problem locally that we had came from these Germans, very strange, ironic stuff.

DI: In what way?

GU: Well, they could have said, "You know it could be that Sam"—my grandfather's English name, "is a spy. Maybe we should watch him a little more carefully now." And then the Midwestern types in town would say, "Sam's not a spy, for God's sake. I mean he was here before any of us. He's not a spy." We didn't have to go to camp and we didn't lose the farm. We continued to farm through the war even though Heart Mountain was only ninety miles away. Grandpa

during the wintertime would go up there and I think got involved in some of the disputes, including the no-no boys.<sup>10</sup>

DI: Really?

GU: I don't know what side he was on, but he was up there a lot. Here he's been out in Wyoming for thirty-five years. Then they set up a camp and 12,000 Japanese people show up. He said two things about camp experience. He would leave at 4:30 in the afternoon saying he had to go home and milk. And this Japanese guy that qualified racially to be in camp would just leave—would get into his car and leave, waving goodbye to the guards in the watchtower. Which is very bizarre, isn't it?

He said, "Number one, if you wait long enough the Mountain will come to Mohammed." And he'd been cut off and all of a sudden, twelve thousand people came to him. (laughs) I met a number of people while doing redress who remembered grandpa and he was very nice to them. He provided leave time for people in the camp and they would come to our house. Steve Doi from San Francisco was one of them as a kid. And the other thing Grandpa would say to me as a child, in Japanese, was that we had to be very careful, or I had to be very careful, because I came from a very dumb family. I would say, "Grandpa, how can you say something like that?" And he would say, "Well, look at it this way. I voluntarily chose to settle in the part of the world to which 12,000 or 13,000 people were involuntarily removed."

DI: (laughs)

GU: The farm country in northern Wyoming was not a desolate as Heart Mountain, but it is pretty desolate. In fact so desolate that they used parts of Wyoming to train the first astronauts to go to the moon. (laughs) It was terrain in the country most resembling the moon, so you can imagine what Heart Mountain was like.

So that's where I grew up. I have to say that five years out of Harvard I felt that I would be involved in something like redress. Because there was this unsettled business and I remember thinking, when none of this was part of any kind of discussion, that hmm...the first *Almanac* was pretty successful.<sup>11</sup> I remember

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<sup>10</sup> A misnomer that refers to individuals, both male and female, who either refused to answer the infamous U.S. government 1943 loyalty questionnaire, or answered in the negative. No-no boys were stigmatized as being "disloyal" to the United States and labeled "troublemakers" by the War Relocation Authority, the administrators in charge of the concentration camps. Once identified, they were segregated to the Tule Lake Segregation Center to prevent "corruption" of the "loyal" internees. For more information, see *Japanese American History: An A-to-Z Reference from 1868 to the Present*, edited by Brian Niiya.

<sup>11</sup> Since 1972, Grant Ujifusa and Michael Barone have continued to author *The Almanac of American Politics*, which has often been referred to as "the Bible of American politics." This book provides descriptions for every state and congressional district in America, plus new census data, voting trends, and updated maps as well as in-depth profiles and photographs of all 50 governors and 535 members of Congress.

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having thought shortly after that, maybe [the *Almanac*] would come into play somehow. It was weird. And I talked about this with a classmate of mine at one point.

DI: What year was this?

GU: Let's see the first *Almanac* came out in '72, so it would have been '72 or '73. And I suppose all along from the time people went to camp, there were others who obviously had this inkling that someday we're going to make this right and so we did. So what I am saying [is] it's not an experience unique to me, but I remember having thought this little thought in 1973 when I was just out of college.

DI: You mentioned that growing up in Wyoming you sort of had an idyllic childhood.

GU: Yeah, yeah.

DI: Can you describe to me what it was like? What your childhood was like?

GU: Well, I did say that it was idyllic and in some ways it was and in many ways it wasn't. But the ways in which it was idyllic was that it was small and you could get your hands around it. You didn't have to be that great a student to be regarded as a really good student. You didn't have to be that great an athlete to play varsity on the high school [team]. I had a lot of very close friends growing up and they would come out to the farm and we would swim in the irrigation canals.

The only thing that seemed to matter was that this little small town was the center of the universe. And we didn't have evidence to the contrary, which is what you would have if you grew up in a suburb of Los Angeles or New York. You would know that your little world is not the center of the universe. So it was idyllic in the sense that it was bounded and protected. There was no evidence whatever that your understanding of this small world would ever be challenged. And of course it was—later.

But I have to say that I was lying to you when I said it was completely idyllic, because life on the farm was hard. And sometimes you looked at crops that did not produce the way they should have produced. So there was a fair amount of economic anxiety from time to time. But my parents were very good to me, protecting me from a lot of that.

DI: Tell me about your parents. What were they like and what kinds of influences did they have on you?

GU: We all lived in the same household. Anthropologists refer to this as a stem family—not an extended family or Chinese clan—but the ideal Japanese family traditionally is grandpa, grandma, oldest son, his wife, and the grandchildren, okay? And this is the traditional Japanese peasant family that we had.

My grandfather was a huge influence on me. I like to think about him. He was a brilliant guy. Not much for books or for education, but he was very shrewd, and imaginative, and very entertaining. He would have been a political leader had he been born in a different time. So he was always there. My mother was very intense, very much concerned about how well I did in school, so very typically Japanese in that way. [She] never went to college, was absolutely determined that her two children would. My younger sister went to Wellesley. My father was exceedingly hard working, also typical in Japanese families. He didn't say much, but you knew what he was thinking and you knew that he was always there and when he did say something you listened.

But I think I got my redress—my sense of my need to do redress—from my mother, because she always took offense at small things and some things not so small. There was a swimming pool in a hot springs town, an *onsen* town about thirty miles south called Thermopolis. They had a couple of commercial swimming pools there, one of which excluded Japanese Americans. She just went crazy about that and fought these people and shamed them into opening the pool. So through those kinds of experiences a parent obviously becomes part of who you are and you feel the same outrage. So that becomes part of who you are.

My grandmother was also part of the household. She was not the typical mother-in-law who gives the daughter-in-law a bad time. She was utterly sweet. Unlike her grandson, namely me, she possessed a (sighs) kind of—I am not familiar with how it works in Japan, but if Buddhism is a source of serenity, diligence, attention to detail, and love toward family, children, chickens, and cats, that's who she was. But I don't regard myself that way. I am not especially serene. I suppose if I were to describe myself in terms of family I see myself as somewhere between my grandfather and my mother, who didn't get along very well actually.

DI: They didn't get along very well?

GU: No, they didn't get along very well, but maybe I shouldn't say that—

DI: So it sounds like you had a lot of influences in the home. You were lucky enough to have your grandparents there—a network where you could learn about your Japanese heritage, culture, and language, etc. The outside community was largely—

GU: Midwestern. Yeah, Midwestern and Southern white.

DI: So how did you see yourself and your identity?

GU: I guess I felt split and I still feel split. On the one hand, here's an example of a conflict between my mother and my grandfather. My mother went to *nihongo gakko*<sup>12</sup> for twelve or thirteen years during the summer and she's fluent. She can read and write and knows a lot of *kanji*.<sup>13</sup> My mother's side of the family was much more traditional, much more Japanese and they felt for a long time that they were all going to go back to Japan. They were going to return. In fact, my mother's brother did return and became a Japanese ice cream magnate, helping to found the Nissei Company based in Osaka. Because life was not good here for them, and they were very Japanese, very Japanese oriented. I can remember visiting my maternal grandmother in Colorado during Christmas. I didn't like Japanese food and I couldn't use chopsticks very well. And my maternal grandmother was really quite severe and said I had grave shortcomings because of these deficiencies.

Whereas my grandfather with whom I lived said, "No chopsticks in this house. In this house only silverware or, in our case, stainless steel—knives, forks, [and] spoons." He wore a cowboy hat, considered himself a rancher, which he sort of was. There was a scholar at UCLA named Professor Wagamatsu and I described my grandfather. I thought he was a unique person, but he said, no, there was a general phenomenon called Meiji individualism and rural entrepreneurship. And he was part of that. You hear stories of Issei saying, "Well, we're here and what we are going to do is to dig for silver in Nevada." And off they went. That attitude in life—which was something maybe bachelors could do—but certainly not the attitude that eventually came to typify the Nisei or for that matter the Sansei. But Grandpa was very American, even in some ways a Texan. Maybe there is some sort of Faulknerian conflict going on in my head between a grandpa who wears a cowboy hat and a mother who knows all this *kanji*.

But there was a feeling that my grandfather had that I never knew about until the early '50s when Issei became eligible for citizenship.<sup>14</sup> We wanted to know whether grandpa was going to apply for it. And he said, "To hell with them! I was here before any of the white people. I contributed more to the building of this valley than any of these bastards and they want to give me a piece of paper." He didn't think it was such a wonderful thing that they were offering him this piece of paper.

Toward the end just before he died, he said, "Well, maybe I should do it." It was 1965 and I had just graduated from Harvard and had come back. And I said,

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<sup>12</sup> Japanese-language school

<sup>13</sup> *Kanji* are Chinese characters used in Japanese language.

<sup>14</sup> The Immigration Act and Nationality Act of 1952, also known as the Walter-McCarren Act, made all races eligible for naturalization and eliminated race as a bar to immigration. Issei who were previously ineligible for citizenship could finally become naturalized. This is not to say, however, that the act was not discriminatory. The act established a national origins quota system, and racial ancestry determined the quota area to which a person was chargeable for the purposes of immigration.

"Why do you want to do this grandpa after all these years?" He said, "Because unless I do it, maybe it'll hurt your future." And I said, "It's not going to do that." He said, "But I still want to do it." But then he added, "Well, I'm not going to study for it either. I mean all these Issei women studying these books, to hell with that. I'm just going to go in there." So I go in there with him to meet with this INS guy. And the INS guy asked him question one and grandpa didn't know the answer. He asked him question two and I tried to translate a little bit. Grandpa didn't know the answer. We went through five questions and he didn't know any of the answers. We get to the sixth question, the sixth question I remember was, "Who was the first president of the United States?" Grandpa looks at me and says, "*Are wa Washington.*"<sup>15</sup> And the INS guy says, "Right! You pass!" (laughs) So grandpa was that kind of guy. Who knows, it could probably only be explored maybe someday novelistically. He was a brave guy, high profile, but subject to profound insecurities as well. I knew they were there. But I loved growing up with him. And he was a big influence on me. So I was lucky that way.

DI: He sounds like a really interesting man.

GU: He was an interesting man, very thoughtful. Also a little bit of a ladies' man, which created problems, but we won't talk about that. (laughs)

DI: So what about the influence of your Mom and the Japanese side? Or do you see yourself as a Japanese growing up at that time?

GU: Yes, I do. She used to always say you have to be really proud of being Japanese. And I would say "okay." But I wasn't entirely. I suppose I was more bookish than I otherwise would have been. One of the ways that the bookishness came out is that I have read a fair amount of Japanese history. So I know a little bit about the Meiji Restoration, the Ashikaga *shogunate*, under what circumstances *Genji* was written and why it was the world's first symbolic psychological novel. And I used to kid my colleagues at Random House, saying, "Well, when my ancestors were writing modernist novels, your ancestors were running around Europe in fucking bearskins." I suppose that's my mother's influence, although my mother would never use that kind of language. I do though. I would have never gotten involved in redress had it not been for the way Mom felt about life. And the outrage, she would just get madder than hell, very un-Japanese. She had a temper. The temper was not just confined to things that happened in the family or private life, but things that happened publicly like this swimming pool. And she would just get very upset. So, you know, that's part of who I am.

DI: Okay so you're growing up in Wyoming. You are a football player.

GU: Yeah.

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<sup>15</sup> "That is Washington."

DI: What position did you play?

GU: Well, I was a quarterback. I want to tell you a shaggy dog story about this. We won the state championship that year. We had just a tremendous team. It was composed of oil workers' sons and ranchers' and farmers' sons and they were big and some of them were really quite talented. One of them played for the Houston Oilers for a while. He was the big star of the team. And (laughs) so we had that championship season.

DI: And you were the lead quarterback—the first-string quarterback?

GU: I was the quarterback of the team, yeah. In fact, I was all-league, and this is one of the reasons I got in Harvard. They didn't have such a great scouting effort. But, some alumni had heard and I had high SAT scores. They didn't realize I was 143 pounds, you see. Maybe a little bit more than 143, closer to maybe 150. But anyway—

DI: You got recruited to play?

GU: No, I didn't get recruited. Ivy League schools claim to be innocent and they don't do any open recruiting, but they actually do recruit. The story is they will admit four full football teams per class. So if you make a 600 in Math and a 600 in Verbal, but you're really very good as a high school linebacker or something, they'll let you in maybe. But at that point, my class at Harvard had eight Asians. There was presumably a quota—four Japanese Americans and four Chinese Americans. This is before the big Asian influx. The effect of the 1924 cutoff of Asian immigration was eight's enough. That's about right. So I was one of the four Japanese Americans.

DI: So this was in the '60s?

GU: Yes. I graduated from Harvard in '65. Let me fast forward. I was doing something that was on C-SPAN. This is a football story, a personally devastating football story. I was on C-SPAN and I don't know what it was about, I think it was about the Asian campaign finance scandal. And for some reason they reran it a lot. The guy who was my offensive backfield coach—Clarence Daniels—saw the program and he wrote me a letter. I tracked him down in Texas. And I said, "What have you been up to?" He had gone from coaching our football team to University of Wyoming where the head football coach was Bob Devaney. The high school head coach ended up as the offensive line coach for the New York Jets and then for [the] New Orleans Saints [in the National Football League]. Coach Daniels had ended up in Iowa and Naval Academy and then with the Edmonton Eskimos [in the Canadian Football League]. And I said, "You did? You were up there when Tommy Wilkinson was quarterback?" He was from the town north of us. He was probably the finest athlete that this part of Wyoming had ever

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produced—tremendous jock. I think [he was] kind of an asshole personally, but a tremendous athlete. When he was fourteen years old, he was the first-string quarterback on the varsity team. He could throw a ball with a beautiful spiral fifty yards straight down field. And he ended up playing for the [University of] Wyoming Cowboys. They have a very good program. He then went to the Toronto Argonauts [in the Canadian Football League] and ends up at Edmonton and wins the Grey Cup with Coach Daniels.

So we talk about this and then Daniels says, "Well, Grant you know Head Coach Hewgley and I, we never thought very much of your physical skills." And I thought, "Oh God, love me for my body, Coach." (laughs) Because you know every year that passes you get better and better and I was ready to go into [the Football Hall of Fame at] Canton, Ohio. But the guy who really knew me best said he never really thought much of my physical skills. And then he said, "But you know you never made a mental mistake." I wanted to say but didn't, "That's no good. Love me for my body." So then I asked him, "What about Tommy?" He said, "He's still up there and he's kind of a local hero. And he's got a big gut now." Then he said, "Yeah. Tommy was up there when I was up there and then Warren Moon showed up." Warren Moon then went to the NFL [National Football League]. And I asked Coach, "Well, how good is someone like Warren Moon?" And he says, "Well, the first year Warren was out of college he and Tommy kind of split the time half and half, but the next year it was clear that Warren Moon was so much better than Tommy." And I said, "He was better than Tommy Wilkinson? I can't believe that." And he said, "Yeah." And I said, "Well, how good does that make Warren Moon?" And he says his second devastating thing, "Well, Tommy Wilkinson's skills compared to Warren Moon's is something like your skills compared to Tommy's." This makes Warren Moon a Greek god and I'm just this worm crawling around the ground. And I said to him, "Uh, well, Coach, I get the idea."

This was a devastating conversation. I thought it was going to be nostalgic and warm. And he meant it to be. So, the answer is that as I was saying earlier, that one of the things that made my experience growing up in northern Wyoming idyllic is that you didn't have to be that good to be a varsity football player.

- DI: That's probably one phone call you wished you didn't make.
- GU: Yeah, right. It sort of depressed me actually for awhile.
- DI: Can't quite look back on those high school years the same.
- GU: Yeah, not quite. I guess it's going to take another thirty years before I build myself back up to the great player that I once was.
- DI: (laughs) So how do you end up at Harvard?

GU: Well, (sighs)—

DI: Did you always know you wanted to go to Harvard?

GU: No, I didn't. There is in some states an American Legion program called Boys State. [President Bill] Clinton makes a big deal of, you know, when he shook the hand of Jack Kennedy at Boys Nation. Boys Nation is an extension of Boys State. So I went to Boys State and you have a week to get elected to these various offices and it is hard to establish yourself. But I was visibly different. And so when I ran for governor, they said, "Well, we know that guy. He's not like the twelve other guys." So I became Boys State governor for a week. Then they sent you off to Washington with another kid. So there were a hundred of us there. Toward the end of this experience there was this kid from Colorado whose name was John Purvis. And he says, "Well, as long as I'm all the way out here. I am going to go up and see Brown and Dartmouth." I had vaguely heard of these places.

But as I was telling Mitch and you at lunch, "What kind of a name for college is Brown?" You know, a color. Why can't they do something respectable and geographical? You know, like the University of Michigan, right? Which is someplace, like it is obviously in Michigan. Where is Brown? Why would they want to call it Brown? And I had never heard of their football team. What good is it? So the conversation would go on in these rooms. "John," I said, "Why would you want to visit them?" He said, "Well, these Ivy League schools are very prestigious." I said, "Really?" I was sixteen or seventeen when I thought to myself, "Well, I'm a pretty prestigious farm boy. I am quite a prestigious person myself—maybe this is a place for me to go." (laughter) This is true. So I went back to Wyoming and I wrote and they sent me this stuff, you know, from Harvard and Yale, and places like that.

I didn't apply to Brown. Brown, it's a strange name—a color. The color of shit, too. (laughter) In fact, there used to be a joke at Brown—these guys at Brown knew that they were full of shit up to their eyes. But in any case, I wrote back to these places. They sent me the material and I would read it. I remember the one from Harvard saying, "You know, we're really rich and we're a national university. We like to have diversity and we can afford to have all kinds of people." So I thought, "I bet I am one of those. I bet I am one of those." I had enough detachment on myself to know that I was [a] Japanese American in Wyoming and I lived on a sugar beet farm. So I wrote back and they sent me all this stuff to apply and I did and I got in. They gave me a whole lot of money. It was cheaper to go there than it would be, not [to] the University of Wyoming, but University of Denver or [to the] University of Colorado.

I also got into Yale and, as I was telling you yesterday, I'd never been to either of these two places. Mitch asked me why I chose Harvard over Yale, and I said, "It just sounded better." So I went, and for a while it was difficult. I didn't know what the hell was going on, but I figured it out after a while. That's where I met

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Michael Barone at the newspaper *The Crimson*, and we started our little business, *The Almanac of American Politics*, [a] couple of years after we both graduated.

- DI: That one decision turned out to be a pretty important one in terms of the course of your life.
- GU: Yes, it was. Harvard's known among Japanese and it's known among Afghan tribesman. You learn about abstractions like the rule of law. But a whole lot of real life also depends on relationships and who you know and who you trust. It's very important. I met Michael there and later people, who were then liberal who became conservative, like Bill Bennett and others whom I could go to twenty five or thirty years later and say, "This whole thing—redress—is legit just in the same way when we were playing touch football it was legit." This redress thing is legit. Take it from me! Help! And that came from people that I got to know as a kid in Cambridge.
- DI: What are some of your overall impressions of your four years at Harvard?
- GU: (laughs) Two memories. These two graduate student types were talking about their summer in Europe. I overheard them. They were using dependent and subjunctive clauses in ordinary conversation. Not having been to London anytime during the summer, I asked myself, "Why don't they speak English?" The only time that you see dependent clauses like that is when you diagram them in sixth grade. You diagram a sentence like that. You don't use it in real life. So I thought that this is weird. I didn't get it.

Then the other thing that was new to me was super preppies. I don't think they have them quite so much anymore. But in my time, they still had them. They still had half coming from prep schools and half public schools. In Jack Kennedy's time, I think it was something like 90/10 private schools. There would be these guys in khakis. In those days you had to wear a jacket and tie in order to go into the dining hall. In fact one guy, three years before I showed up, said, "Okay, jacket and tie." He wore a jacket and tie to the dining hall and nothing else. (laughs) And they threw him out for a year.

But they were so tall and many of them were so blond. They were so clean looking. This guy Ralph Lauren kind of ripped off that whole look. But it was a look that I had never seen before. And then Ralph Lauren sort of made it into a mass-market thing. But in those days it was: Jesus Christ, what is this? And they're also gorgeous guys, you know, really good-looking. I used to think to myself, how did they get to be so clean? Are they born to it? Do they achieve it? Is it thrust upon them? And a lot of them were assholes to—not all of them, but some.

I think before the '60s, and the '60s didn't really start until '65, at least out East, there were a lot of very smart guys who I knew that had preppy envy. Which I

don't think is a phenomenon that you see anymore, there or anywhere else. But I didn't understand what that was. I didn't know who these guys were. I really didn't know who the really smart Jewish kids were from New York. I had never been around those guys. And the women at Radcliffe were absolutely brilliant. So I suppose one word to describe it was that it was very intimidating, and that's what happens when you choose a college because the name sounds good. After a while I sort of caught on, but my kid Steven is there now and he doesn't have any of these problems. [Andrew, my younger son, started Harvard in 2000]. So it's a generational thing. Steven feels completely comfortable there, but he didn't grow up the way I did.

DI: Was it more do you think just coming from Wyoming or coming from a farm town, or was it you were Japanese American?

GU: Yeah, I think it's both too. I remember recently I went back up to Cambridge [and] I went into Eliot House, which used to be where I lived. The house the preppies built. You know, Theodore Roosevelt the Fourth and the Paynes, and the Rockefellers, and the Whitneys, and so on. But half of us were just ordinary guys.

I remember this one guy was an aspiring preppy. The preppies kind of invited him to join them. I haven't thought about this for a long time. He was a scholarship kid. He couldn't afford anything. He became a New York model but was murdered in the Village long ago, a tragic story. His name was Bruce Pshorr, and the preppies liked him. And he didn't have any money and so he would go into this place called Max Keezer's, which was where the preppies would dump all their last year's clothes. And Bruce knew how to sew. He'd sew all this stuff into this year's fashion. During exam periods, 7:30 in the morning and at breakfast, Bruce was dressed to kill.

So that was part of what it was like in Eliot House in the early '60s. I go back there now and I'm in the dining hall and you know what it looks like? It looks like downtown Shanghai (laughs), all the Asians there. You know, and that's a positive. Can you imagine being in math class with those guys? (groan) Can you imagine being in French class with the Asian women there? Uh, they would murder you. So that's how it has changed and I think it has changed for the better.

DI: So who did you mostly hang out with?

GU: Let's see my best friend was a kid from Salt Lake City. There was an Italian kid who went to Boston Latin from Boston. A kid from St. Louis, actually he went to Exeter, but he was not a super preppie. A lot of people at the *Crimson* who were Jewish. They didn't like the preppies. The ink-stained wretches at the *Crimson*, sort of defiantly Democratic if not radical, but not really radical as it became in

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the late '60s, but very un-preppy. The preppies were not part of my life, except in the dining hall of the house where I lived, where they were very visible.

You know these were kids, and I was a kid. And I remember reading the *Harvard Crimson* after I graduated in 1969 and we were working on the first *Almanac*. But I remember reading that the president of the Porcellian Club, which is the absolute epitome club, the club that wouldn't let FDR in. So for FDR to get even he had to become president. He was not of a sufficient social pedigree to be let into the Porcellian. So the president of the Porcellian Club in 1969 was the co-president of SDS, you know Students for a Democratic Society, which was the radical '60s student group—Tom Hayden and others. So what this was about in the certain sense was what's fashionable and what isn't. It's like what are kids wearing at local high schools. What kind of sneakers are they wearing? Who's in, who's out? These were just kids, but I didn't know that then. I'd run into some of them from time to time. They're fine. They're just trying to make a living. They never asked to be born preppies or clubbies, as we knew them.

But I guess I bring this up because there was such a vast chasm between playing football in Worland and being on top of the world and looking at these guys and saying, "Who are they?" And a lot of them were really smart too. So you couldn't say they may be privileged, but they're stupid. No, they were privileged and often quite brilliant too. So anyway that's long in the past and something that I came to understand as I grew older. Some of them even helped in redress.

*Tape 1, Side B*

GU: If you think about it, it's really a great thing, because here is this kid who comes from basically nowhere. Even though Worland was the center of my universe, it is absolutely nowhere to New Yorkers. And Harvard said, we'll let you in and we want you to experience what this is. I remember reading that the grandson of Samuel Eliot Morison, the great WASP historian of Boston, they didn't let him in my year. Why did they let me in? You know I am grateful and I suppose, to that extent, you say somewhere in the back of your mind as a kid, well, this is not a bad country, is it? So I suppose then emotionally down the road you make the association, you say, well, they let me in and, you know, maybe we can do redress too.

I mean, this is not such a shitty country. At Harvard to this day many say, this is really a shitty country. So we got to deconstruct everything because it is all shit. Well, that's not true. The final answer, at least for me, is if this is such a shitty country, then how come we got redress done? No, we didn't have the white establishment against us. Believe me, Newt Gingrich is not part of any establishment. He was just a history professor from Podunk College in Georgia. I mean he feels as out of it as anybody. He feels that the *New York Times* is the establishment. Which is what goes on in this country. People think that the

other guy is part of the establishment, that the other guy has the power. You talk to that other guy and he says, "Well, we think you have the power." If nobody has the power, where is it? It's diffused. Some of it's in Texas and some of it's in New York, but people in New York figure that the people in Texas have it.

In any case, I was pretty fortunate to go to Harvard. I think they did it consciously. Some of my classmates are part of the administration at Harvard now. They say, "It is just terrific that Harvard let you in and you helped to do redress. That's what Harvard is about." Now, I think that's true. I think that is part of the way to look at. If you are Marxist you can look at it another way, which is also I think partially true. Marxists ask, why did they let this kid in—this really bright kid in from nowhere? If you're sitting on top in Cambridge, you say, "We have to co-op people who might give us some trouble down the road." So if we let Grant in we can sort of have him join us. And so thirty years from now, he will be inside the tent pissing out rather than outside the tent pissing in.

But I am grateful to Harvard and I met people including, most importantly, Michael Barone. We did the *Almanac*, a book very important to how redress happened. That's my own partial view anyway. So it kind of worked out the way Harvard thought it would work out, that down the road we let this kid in and who knows what will happen. He might make three hundred million dollars and give us twenty million or he might do something like redress. We approve of both. And that's why Harvard exists and that's why we let kids like him in. I think that's great. I think that's America. And I am pleased to have been there. So I don't want to sound like some snot-nosed kid saying, "I needed no help from anybody." Harvard helped in a big way.

DI: Did you have any idea of what you were going to study when you got there?

GU: No, no.

DI: What did you study?

GU: I studied American History and some psychology, some sociology. All the stuff that eventually ends up in the way the *Almanac* approaches politics. It's history. It's sociology. It's some social psychology. It's the settlement of our country as understood through ethnic patterns—the result and the effect of those patterns of settlement on the politics of the country. In some ways, for example, you can regard the Scots Irish who settled the mountains of the South as a separate ethnic group. [They], in some instances, for example, opposed slavery and did not like the sort of Anglican, Methodist, lowland English, who controlled plantation life in places like South Carolina. And yet these Scots Irish—some later to be called hillbillies—ended up the foot soldiers in the Confederate army. So even things that don't appear to be ethnic are in fact ethnic. I studied some of that stuff and it's in the *Almanac*.

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DI: Why don't we talk about the *Almanac* as the key thing in your life that helped with the redress movement. How did that whole project come about?

GU: When you choose to do a book, it's like starting a business, except you have a publisher. Your publisher is your banker and your business partner. He prints the book. He promotes the book. He or she distributes the book. But what starts that process off is that you have to have an idea. This was 1969. I was supposed to be writing a Ph.D. thesis at Brown in American history. I was married for a couple of months. I was basically hanging around the house in my underwear trying to write this thesis and I couldn't write it.

Then [President Richard] Nixon invaded Cambodia. And the kids were just going crazy. I read the newspaper that kids were out in New Jersey trying to unseat a guy named Ed Patten, as I recall, P-A-T-T-E-N. He was an ethnic machine politician, an Irish machine politician. They're not going to get him out, and so why were they wasting their efforts to get him out I thought. You know, it's stupid. Why don't they try to do some political organizing in some district where they had a real chance at unseating a hawk. So I had that idea, and I called Michael. He's out in Detroit at that time, clerking for a federal district judge. He had been out of Yale Law School a couple years. I said, "You want to do a book, a quickie, in which we write up fifty vulnerable hawks? You lay it all out to create some sort of focus for anti-war activists. Put energy where you might be able to do some good." And he said, "Yeah, I'd kind of like to do that."

I went down to New York and visited ten publishers and said, "This is the idea." They said, "Well, you know, you don't realize how long it takes to put together a paperback book, you don't understand how long it takes to distribute it. And besides, we don't think it will sell anyway."

DI: Did you pitch it that way as something for the anti-war market?

GU: Yeah, that would be the market. And they said, you know, when you come right down to it, political books don't sell very much; very rarely do they. People in this country are not interested in politics. They're interested in their careers. They're interested in their cooking or gardening, but they're not really interested in politics. Probably because most issues political in this country are already settled. [Redress was one thing that was not settled]. We have the perfect Constitution. We don't need to screw with that. That's the attitude the average person has. And in many ways I think it's correct.

If you read about politics all the time, it's like living in Russia in the 1950s or Guatemala in the 1960s and Nicaragua in the 1980s. Why? You had to think about politics all the time, because if you made the wrong political decision and you supported the wrong political candidate or you chose to do something incorrect politically, you could end up in jail or you could get killed or your kid

wouldn't go to college or you couldn't eat. You had to always think about what's going on politically. In this country people don't do that, because you don't have to. That's why the Founding Fathers set it up the way they did. That's why [President Thomas] Jefferson is such a hero. You don't have to worry about this shit because they're not going to come and get you. Mostly they don't, but one time they did—and that was us.

Anyway, I go back to Boston and I say, "It's not going to work." I remember I was in the kitchen of my former wife's house. It was a beautiful house in Weston, Mass[achusetts]. My then father-in-law was a professor at the Harvard Business School and he was very nice, although he initially opposed my marriage to this very New England woman, his daughter. So I was in the kitchen and I was talking to my mother-in-law, also a lovely person, and it came to me. I said, "We can't do fifty districts for 1970, but we can do all four hundred and thirty five for 1972." We're not just going to cover anti-war candidates. No, this is going to be a general reference for everybody in '72.

So I wrote that up in a proposal of about six or seven pages. I went back to New York and I saw ten publishers again and they said, "You don't understand that people are not interested in this stuff, goodbye." So I got back into the car and I drove back to Boston. Earlier in 1968, I was involved in an anti-war congressional campaign. A man named Thomas Boylston Adams was the direct descendant of the second and sixth presidents of the United States, and I got along very well with him. I called him up and said, "Tom, here's this book idea that I have." He is a super Boston Brahmin, and he said, "Grant, [with a very long and broad "a"], I have a friend whose name is Lovell Thompson and he's just started up a small publishing house. He was editor-in-chief at Houghton Mifflin for many, many years. He retired and had all this money and started this little publishing house called Gambit, which is in a Beacon Hill townhouse." It was kind of like a doll's house publishing house. In fact, my second wife, Amy, worked there before I did, which was really coincidence. I never met her there.

So I took the idea into him. Boston book publishing was made up of a couple of places: Houghton Mifflin, Little Brown, and then this little tiny place. I showed it to Lovell and then about ten days later I called him and asked, "What do you think?" He was another Boston Brahmin, big bushy eyebrows. Tom Adams put me onto one of his buddies, who said, "I like it and I want to do it." So he did. This was the book.

In 1972 was Nixon versus McGovern and the election was November '72. We came out in March of 1972. So there was only (counting)—March, April, May, June, July, August, September, October—about seven months before that Congress was kaput. That's seven months of shelf time.

The reason it worked was because '72 was the big McGovern year. All the college kids were interested in politics and the paperback sold for \$4.95 and people just

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went crazy over it. There was a huge piece about the book in the *New York Times*, then in two sections. The story was on the second section, front page. And it said, here's an example of a project that got turned down at ten New York publishing houses and now it's a great success and it's selling like crazy in Washington."

A guy named Bob Reinholt wrote the story. Up to then, we had sold about ten thousand, twelve thousand copies. The next day there were orders for about fifteen thousand copies. So it just, you know, really took off, and became the handbook of the McGovern campaign. Gary Hart used it and endorsed it. And a guy named Ed Rollins, Reagan's campaign manager in 1984, told me later, when Reagan would travel, Ed would be sitting next to him. One time Ed said they were going to go into Pocatello for a campaign appearance in 1984. Before the plane landed Ed would show him these Xeroxed pages of the Idaho write-up. Reagan would read those and it would look as though he knew more about Idaho than he actually did. The *Almanac* has a lot of uses that way. It didn't stay a McGovern document, but became a general document and the price went from \$4.95 paperback to something like \$56 bucks now. So it's become a Washington insider's book—an expense account book.

DI: So how often do you have to revise it?

GU: Every two years we do it, yeah. You don't have to think of a new idea, though, because it's the same thing.

DI: You mentioned that you were involved in anti-war demonstrations.

GU: No, I was never a demonstrator and I didn't feel comfortable doing that. There were some kids in the *Crimson* who were among the very first down in Mississippi and I admired them. It's very hard to imagine that in the late '50s and early '60s when I was a kid no one figured that the system of Southern segregation would ever be broken. They just figured that's how it was going to be. This system began to crack and there were some kids that I knew who went down there and were part of it. I didn't quite understand what it was because I was from Wyoming and I was not familiar with the system in the South. And I said, "Oh, that's what it is. Oh, that's terrible." But I never really got into [the Civil Rights Movement] very much. It was a heroic, splendid thing.

DI: So what are you doing in terms of your career after you graduate in the '60s?

GU: I graduated in '65. I was at Brandeis for two years and did a master's in American history and then I went to Brown to do more American history. I did everything but a thesis at Brown. After the *Almanac* was published, I went to work for the very publishing house that published it as a publicity director. So I got to push my own book. The book was published by Gambit, but was distributed by the Houghton Mifflin sales force. So I would go to Houghton Mifflin, which was not

very far away, and I would make presentations and so on. They liked me and hired me as an editor there. I worked as a book editor of general interest books at Houghton Mifflin for four years. I left Houghton Mifflin and went to work as a book editor at Random House in New York in 1977. I was there for eight years. Then I went to work for Macmillan for four years in a division called Free Press which published serious nonfiction. Then I went to the Digest in '88. So I was doing book publishing and magazine publishing.

DI: So you actually broke down and went to Brown, huh?

GU: I did. Yeah.

DI: (laughs)

GU: It's a very nice place actually. In fact if I had to do it over again I'd go there because it's smaller and less overpowering and intimidating. So it's the difference between, I don't know, the difference between Santa Cruz and Berkeley. You know Santa Cruz is comprehensible, but Berkeley, my God, is so big.

DI: So when do you first start getting involved in JACL?

GU: Well, there was a JACL chapter in Worland, Wyoming, during the '50s and '60s, but it went out of business. But I do remember going to JACL meetings. My mother was very active in this. So there was that when I was young. Then I just left it altogether. And in '81 or thereabouts, Min Yasui made a visit to New York and came to see me. He said, "This is what I am up to doing" and I said, "What?" I said, "Min, you are an old man, don't do it." And he said, "This is something I have to do." And I said, "Well, okay." Then he put me onto John Tateishi<sup>16</sup> and I said, "Let's do an oral history with some of these people who went to camp." So I got hooked into national JACL that way. He continued to see me, Min did. He said, "You really should get involved" I said, "No." He came up to our country place with [his wife] True and I said to myself, "This is a strange visit." He kind of beat around the bush a little bit. And the story came out that he had this titular position on redress but the Sanseis didn't let him have any power. They kind of pushed him off to one side. I said, "Oh boy, that really pisses me off. They can't do that to Min." So what he was saying in a funny kind of way was, "I want you to come in and help me fight these Sanseis who pushed me out." And I said, [slaps the table] "By god, I'll do that. These bastards can't do that to you."

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<sup>16</sup>John Tateishi (b. 1939) was appointed chair of the JACL National Redress Committee in 1978. It was during his chairmanship that the idea of forming a study commission to investigate the wartime removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans was first conceived. Tateishi was instrumental in urging the JACL to draft guidelines that outlined the organization's position on redress at the 1978 Salt Lake City convention. In 1985, amid increasing opposition within the JACL over operational differences, Tateishi left his staff position and the organization.

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DI: How did you know Min?

GU: He lived in Denver with his family and he would come up to Wyoming from time to time. He would take his family up to Yellowstone and come to visit our family. He would come around and kind of check to see if we were alright. So I knew him as a child. He visited me later when I was grown and working in New York. He asked me to help. I got sucked into the internal politics of it initially and then not too much later, they had the New York Commission [on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians] hearings.<sup>17</sup> I was powerfully moved by that and I was in tears. I said, "Boy, I better get involved." All of the bells began to ring.

I was down in Washington. Min and Mike took me out to lunch at a Japanese restaurant. Mike understood what the Almanac was and how it could create access, something that Min did not quite understand. But they said, "We are the traditional elders of the Japanese American community and we're asking you to help and we think you better do it." So I did. My impression of these people came from my childhood. Then I learned some of the Left in the Japanese community and some of the JACL haters thought Mike is shit. They just hate Mike. So I said, "How could you hate Mike?" He did have some problems, sort of egotistical and so on, but that son of a bitch was really smart. He was an absolutely brilliant guy. He did all this stuff in Washington virtually single-handed, like the Issei citizenship thing. Some little Japanese guy running around on the Hill by himself and I really admired that. He really did understand how Washington worked. For me, he is our greatest leader. Without him, there would have been no Senate seats for Dan [Inouye]<sup>18</sup> and Sparky [Matsunaga].<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Signed into law (Public Law 96-317) by President Jimmy Carter on July 31, 1980, the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC) was a congressional commission charged with studying the mass removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans during World War II. Commission members were appointed by the president and both houses of Congress. Originally a seven-member commission, it was later expanded by President Ronald Reagan to include two additional commissioners. This nine-member commission included Chair Joan Z. Bernstein, Dr. Arthur S. Flemming, Judge William Marutani, Arthur J. Goldberg, Representative and Commission Vice-Chair Daniel Lungren, former Senators Edward W. Brooke and Hugh B. Mitchell, Reverend Robert F. Drinan, and Father Ishmael Vincent Gromoff.

<sup>18</sup> Daniel Ken Inouye (b. 1924), U.S. senator and representative from Hawai'i, was first elected as a Democratic representative to the Eighty-sixth Congress on August 21, 1959, when Hawai'i was admitted into the Union. Since first elected to the U.S. Senate on January 3, 1969, Inouye has been reelected in 1968, 1974, 1980, 1986, 1992, and again in 1998 for the term ending January 3, 2005. Inouye has served on many senate and congressional committees, including the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Indian Affairs, the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, and is perhaps best known for his participation on congressional investigative committees for the Watergate and Iran/Contra scandals. Inouye's assistance in congress was especially crucial in securing funding appropriation for redress payments. Through his experience and influence redress payments were made an entitlement, and guaranteed funding.

<sup>19</sup> Spark Masayuki Matsunaga (1916-1990), U.S. senator and representative from Hawai'i, was first elected as a Democratic representative to the Eighty-eighth Congress in 1962. Thereafter Matsunaga was reelected to the six succeeding congresses, and in 1976, he was elected to the United States Senate. Reelected in

And if Mike was such a horrible person, why did Sparky regard him as his best friend?

My getting into redress was like a Grade B Japanese movie where you're the young guy and you go back into the community and into JACL and make it right for Min and Mike. So that was sort of the personal side of it.

DI: So this was probably around early '80s?

GU: Yeah, it's early.

DI: Had you heard very much about redress during the '70s?

GU: No. First I heard of it was when Min showed up in '80, '81. I told him to forget it. Then they had the Commission [on the Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians] hearings and then I got Mike—

DI: Do you have any impressions of the commission hearings?

GU: Yeah, they were in New York. I suppose what happens to me and a lot of East Asian people is that there is a kind of veneration of the old. And so I saw these old people up there and they were crying and they made me cry. I remember that and so I said, "I better do it." (becomes emotional) Sorry . . . anyway I suppose it's non-Western—the elders say you better do it and I sort of didn't want to, but I ended up doing it.

But as you know I didn't especially like Dan Inouye during redress because I am a Sparky person. Dan used to play mind games with Sparky. I didn't like it, though we get along great now. In fact he asked me very late when we were trying to get the money for the twenty thousand people who didn't have it. He said, "How much money are the guys who are dead pushing up daisies in France, how much are they getting. And when is all this going to stop anyway?" I said, "They're not getting anything. And I don't know when it's all going to stop." Philosophically I think he was saying, "You know, I'm a vet and money is not what this was about." So philosophically it's an entirely legitimate position which is why I was myself not at first especially enthusiastic about redress.

One of the things Dan did earlier was say, "Well, let's do a commission." Because when you do these commissions, they hold some hearings and then they do some paperwork and then it sits up on a shelf somewhere and gathers dust. But it turned out that the commission idea, as everyone now knows, was very important and galvanized people. That's sort of what got me into it. I knew nothing about it all through the '70s. Then I saw these old people crying and that made me cry.

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1982 and again in 1988, Matsunaga served until his death on April 15, 1990. His tireless lobbying efforts helped gain strong Senate support of redress, and ultimate passage of the redress bill.

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I guess the whole community cried. (becomes emotional) It turned out that maybe Dan knew all along that this was what would happen. Whether he knew it or not, he was right and he should be given credit for that, even though I didn't personally like him then.

DI: I think this is a good place for us to stop. Mitch and you can get into the nitty-gritty of redress. Thank you very much.

GU: Okay, yeah.

MM: So Grant in the early '80s you were brought onto the LEC [Legislative Education Committee]<sup>20</sup> board. But the LEC didn't really get activated until 1985 when you became the strategy chair.

GU: Correct.

MM: What were your early thoughts at that point to 1985 as you were brought on as strategy chair?

GU: I always believed that it could be done. I always believed that redress was something that was achievable, like raising artichokes. You really believe at the beginning of the season that at the end of the season you are going to harvest your artichokes and someone is going to pay you money for them. So I felt it as a practical matter that it was do-able. And I felt that way even though some didn't, because I understood, perhaps unlike some others, the Reagan conservative Republican ideology, because I grew up with it in Wyoming. There were some who felt that we're going to get it through Congress if we could somehow get it by Sam Hall. Then it was going to go down when it reached the White House. But I felt the whole thing could be done, so that was one initial thought I had.

The problem of course was that in '85 Sam Hall—a conservative Democrat—controlled the sub-committee to which our bill had been referred. He had the bill blocked. On the Senate side, Bill Roth had jurisdiction on Government Operations and that didn't look so good. Roth was in fact more of an opponent, as it turned out, than the Reagan White House. Roth was very much of a Republican deficit hawk heavily influenced by a wife who was a federal judge. The Senate side did not look great. But then in '86 the Democrats regained control and Glenn replaced Roth as Chairman of Government Operations and things began to look pretty good. After the '86 elections, I was absolutely confident we could do it.

MM: What were some of your strategies in terms of approaching the issue of redress?

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<sup>20</sup> The Legislation Education Committee (LEC), a committee within the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), was formed to galvanize support and lobby for appropriate legislation concerning redress.

GU: What is politically possible is a function of the American consensus about the rules of the game. But if you read the newspapers you think, my God, there is such a chasm that separates conservative Republicans from liberal Democrats: Jesse Jackson from Jesse Helms. In some instances, there are great differences—for example, healthcare. Hillary Care went down because she was unable to forge a consensus. The drug companies were able to convince people that you're just creating a big government program, providing work for bureaucrats, taking healthcare out of the hands of doctors, and giving it to the government. People didn't want that. What I am trying to say is that you don't want to have your issue defined that way. You don't want to give openings to the likes of drug companies to define your issue that way.

For me redress boiled down to getting the support of conservatives. One responsibility was getting conservative members of the House and selected conservative and Republican members of the Senate. But primarily, my job was the White House. So you ask yourself, "How can you get someone with Reagan's beliefs to back something like this?" You could call a giraffe a horse and the Democrats are going to buy in. But if you call a giraffe a horse maybe Reagan won't buy in. So you say, "We're going to call it a horse" and if you call it a horse then everybody's on board and everybody agrees that this is a horse. Republicans think the Democratic party is a coalition of special interests, particularly blacks, labor unions, and women, and probably Japanese Americans, because all four Japanese Americans on the Hill at that point were Democrats. You can't have them define redress in anyway as a special interest bill.

You ask, "What are the fundamental ground rules of the country?" The fundamental ground rules of the country basically come out of Britain—John Locke and Adam Smith. You are free to be on your own and you do the best you can for yourself and your family. When you're on the farm producing artichokes, you're not on welfare. Japanese Americans were not then and not now asking for welfare. We're on the farm working and we're not asking for any kind of special treatment. We're not here for any kind of affirmative action. We just want what everybody else always had, but at a certain point in our history it was taken away from us. So that's what was violated—fundamental ground rules. It didn't matter whether you're black, white, yellow, or in-between.

In short, number one, we are not asking for welfare or affirmative action of any sort. Number two, we're not asking for a subsidy for the strawberries we are raising. We just wanted the market price. We wanted a buck a basket. Had you given us a buck a basket we would have been happy, but you took us into camp and we couldn't raise free market strawberries anymore for the free market.

And in fact, to put it another way anecdotally, I was interviewing with the editor-in-chief at *Forbes Magazine* for a job I didn't want to take. He was a crotchety, brilliant, conservative man about seventy-eight years old named Jim Michaels. So we're talking about my experience doing redress and he said, "Well, Grant you

have to understand I was about twenty years old when Pearl Harbor happened. I was alive. I knew how much hysteria there was. I understand." And I said two things, "Mr. Michaels, number one, yeah it was hysterical, but it was still a mistake, would you grant that?" He said, "Yeah, I would." Then I said, "Sir, we weren't just talking about constitutional rights. We're talking about property that we lost." [He said,] "You mean you lost property? Well then I feel differently about it." So if you frame it in those terms then people will say, "I get it. This is something beyond politics. This speaks to the meaning of the country and I get it. I can imagine myself late at night when there is a lock at the door. This is America and this is not Nazi Germany and then all of a sudden you are in a camp and you can't raise strawberries anymore. I get it."

So, that's where you want to put the issue. If you put it another way you're going to get immediate resistance if you are someone like Ronald Reagan or Newt Gingrich. If you say, "I want to tell you something: this is a fucking racist country. I don't know why I am still living here because I think it really stinks. The only reason I'm here is because I am trying to heroically change it from the inside, but it is fundamentally, thoroughly corrupt. And now give us redress please." They're not going to buy it. So without compromising your position and indeed if you are an Issei farmer at the time, that's what he wanted to do. He wanted to raise strawberries and bring them to the market and sell them for the market price. That's all he wanted to do and he wanted to put his kids through college. That's all he wanted to do. Most of the time he wasn't reading political treatises and contemplating how corrupt and racist the country was, although it was indeed racist. But that's not what the issue in my judgement really was and so you speak to what the issue really was. And the issue was the fundamental understanding of the rules, the sort of basic rules that people followed. They're very simple. They are like shaking the hands. You do certain things and you are free to go about doing your business. And if that understanding of life that is beyond politics is taken away from you, then the entire country collapses because it loses its legitimacy. Like with slavery. It took a hugely bloody war to get rid of it—necessary because slavery violated our fundamental understanding of things. Slavery made our country illegitimate. Same with internment.

MM: You often talked about framing the issue in the terms you are talking about here. How do you frame the issue in a way that liberal Democrat and a conservative Republican both come together on redress?

GU: You know I wrote about this a little. I spoke about this a bit at your conference. What you want to do is you want to find common ground. And they are fundamental I think throughout our history beginning with Jefferson and Hamilton. You know Hamilton's view of government was expansive powers. Jefferson felt that if the government had expansive powers it would lead to

tyranny. So if you take a guy like Barney Frank,<sup>21</sup> he would represent in this instance oddly the Hamiltonian view of all the good things the government could do. But Barney is also a civil libertarian—there are lots of things that the government shouldn't do. Mostly Reagan thought that the government shouldn't do very much and that the government should mostly leave people alone. Where Barney and Reagan come together is on what government shouldn't do and what government shouldn't do is violate basic rights. These issues are beyond politics and are constitutional, but even beyond constitutional, part of the fabric of our lives. If they are violated then the legitimacy of government and indeed our entire way of life is subverted. All these things are not even conscious. I think they're unconscious. That's what you appeal to.

If Barney Frank shows up at the door here and wants to know how much I paid for our green couch. I said, "Barney get the fuck out of here. It's none of your business." Similarly if the government shows up and says we want to know how much you paid for your green couch, and we want you in a horse stall in twenty-four hours. You say, "You must be kidding me." On fundamental propositions about life, neither Ronald Reagan or Barney Frank have a right to ask me how much I paid for our green couch and to move me into a horse stall for no real reason. About 99 percent of the American public would agree with that and so you frame the issue that way. You don't frame the issue on, you know, this is a rotten country, and you screwed us, and we are bitter, now give me my money.

MM: Grayce Uyehara<sup>22</sup> was the executive director of LEC and legislative chair. How did you two work together, what was the working relationship?

GU: It was great, it was great for a long time. We had a little bit of a falling out in the end, but it was a wonderful experience for me. I was in New York. She was in Washington. She'd commute from Philadelphia. In fact, I think she would commute maybe once or twice a week and she spent five days down there and abandoned her husband for five days and came back to Philadelphia for two. I had no standing or visibility in the community and she had a lot and that was one division of labor. The other division of labor was, I like to think, I understood how Washington worked and thought. That wasn't her great strength. She was added full time, so if for example we said, "We need to get some mail into Joe Jones," a Congressman from West Virginia, then she would go about doing that. And one of the things that I could do was because I did the *Almanac*, I could get

<sup>21</sup> Congressman Barney Frank from Massachusetts was first elected as a Democrat to the Ninety-seventh Congress in 1981, and has continued to the present to serve in the U.S. House of Representatives.

<sup>22</sup> Grayce Uyehara (b. 1919) is one of the featured narrators in the Japanese American National Museum's Redress Oral History Project. She was appointed to acting director of the JACL LEC in 1985. Uyehara also served as the JACL's eastern district redress chair and is known for her involvement in social service, civil rights, labor and religious organizations. As acting director of the JACL LEC, Uyehara served as the organization's liaison, disseminating information to the Nikkei legislators about the climate of congressional redress support and keeping the Japanese American community abreast of legislative developments.

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into the office of Joe Jones from West Virginia and the three of us could sit down and talk for maybe a half an hour.

MM: Why was the *Almanac* so important or so instrumental in getting you access?

GU: That's weird, but it's obvious. This is a book that provides statistics and description and analysis of every Congressional district in the country and every state in the country, all 535 constituencies in fact. We even do Guam, Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, all 50 states, so there's a 100 senators and all 435 voting representatives. And what happens if you represent a constituency in New Mexico and you are dealing with somebody who represents a district in Maryland? You have no idea of how that guy in Maryland thinks or where he comes from or how many blacks may live there or if you got any steel mills in that place, what the local economy is, what the local history is.

But the *Almanac* does all of that in a very shorthand fashion. So the reason the book has buyers is that it brings all of what is outside the Beltway inside the Beltway. Now if you're a Congressman or a Senator, you know the *Almanac* because you use it. From the book the national media takes its cues about a bewildering array of local politicians and you care about what it says about you. If we intimate that the Joe Jones from New Mexico is a little bit sleazy, it gets picked up by the national media. So if I call you up and I say, "I'd like to see you." You are not going to say, "Well, I don't want to see you." Because that would not be smart.

The *Almanac* is both national and local. It's used by staff, bureaucrats, lobbyists, and so on. It was sort of unfair to have used that because it violates the custom of a member of the press lobbying Congress and the White House. Only one person ever brought that up, however. Nobody else. As I said earlier or may have said earlier, why did Mike want me to come on? Because we had no access into the Reagan White House without the *Almanac*—we had no access to Republican members of Congress.

MM: The person who brought it up in terms of the violation about you using the press was he in very strenuous opposition to it?

GU: No, it wasn't but it was noted. The guy was Tom Kindness of Ohio. He defended the internment policy, and was a friend of Karl Bendetsen.

MM: Let's talk about a couple of the people who you were able to influence.

GU: Yeah.

MM: Let's start first with the House and as you mentioned good things were happening in the House starting with the 100<sup>th</sup> Congress, Barney Frank. But Pat

Swindall<sup>23</sup> was also on that subcommittee who was a conservative Republican from Stone Mountain, Georgia. What was your role with him? What was your—

GU: I went into see Barney after he took over as Chairman of the subcommittee once headed by Sam Hall. I said, "Barney, we're going to make this happen, aren't we?" He said, "Yes, we are." I would have hoped that he would have said at that point, just leave it to me. But he didn't and he said, "We need Pat Swindall." Pat Swindall was the ranking Republican on Barney's subcommittee. Someone ideologically and personally as distant from Barney as you can imagine—a tall skinny guy. Even though he was a born again, ultimately went to jail after all of that. He embezzled some money, but this came later.

He came from a district that was interesting. It was part of high income East Atlanta and some very affluent suburbs to the east of the city. And before Pat won, it was held by a guy named Elliot Levitas, who was a Jewish guy. Elliot was quite liberal and Pat was very born-again Christian conservative. We had to have him. But how are we going to get him? And this was one of those districts that was balanced between born-again white Christians and liberal Jews. It may have been the *Driving Miss Daisy* district actually. That may have been the district.

Anyway so Barney says, "Go get him." Gene Doi was somebody who was his constituent and Grayce handled that part. Dave Brodie<sup>24</sup> was the lobbyist for B'nai B'rith and I went into talk to him. We should honor him sometime. He's now retired. Maybe he's dead. I hope not. I tried to reach him maybe six months ago and no one called back. But on his desk he had a little award from the JACL. It is twenty years old. He says, "Well, look, I know Pat really well and I also know this other guy on the subcommittee named Howard Coble from North Carolina really well." He's another Republican, very fiscally conservative. We went into see Coble, but didn't get him. So we went into see Pat. Pat showed up that day with his very beautiful, tall blonde wife and his little baby daughter, because he wanted to make nice to Brodie and the guy who does the *Almanac*. So we talked about things and he said, "I have an assistant who is half-Japanese and she's for redress." I think she's also born-again. I talked to her on the phone a couple of times. I don't remember her name. But Pat says I could probably support the bill and I was just floored.

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<sup>23</sup> Representative Patrick L. Swindall from Stone Mountain, Georgia, was a self-avowed conservative and strict constructionalist, who began to view the exclusion and incarceration of Japanese Americans as the government's impingement upon individual rights without due process and equal protection under the law. For more information, please see *Achieving the Impossible Dream: How Japanese American Obtained Redress*, by Mitchell T. Maki, Harry H. L. Kitano, and S. Megan Berthold.

<sup>24</sup> David Brodie was the chief lobbyist for the B'nai B'rith in Washington D.C. and strongly supported redress and agreed to help obtain Representative Swindall's vote. As a professional lobbyist, Brodie knew Swindall well and they shared a mutually beneficial working relationship. For more information, please see *Achieving the Impossible Dream: How Japanese American Obtained Redress*, by Mitchell T. Maki, Harry H. L. Kitano, and S. Megan Berthold.

Dave Brodie took me into see Pat and Dave knew what he was doing. Both were part of a network in Washington where there's an alliance between the supporters of Israel and born-again Christians, who feel that unless Israel is safe and set up properly the Messiah will not return. They're among the greatest supporters of Israel. Dave flew Pat and some other people to Israel a couple of times. So we owe Pat Swindall to Dave Brodie as far as I am concerned.

MM: So there's a connection between being born-again and the Jewish connection as well as having constituents like Gene Doi who come up and ask for—

GU: Yeah, but if Dave Brodie says, I want you to do this Pat, guess what, Pat's going to do it.

MM: Any other representatives you can call in favor of support at the authorization level.

GU: At the authorization level, Newt Gingrich. Newt had just divorced his first wife. He had then an apartment behind the Supreme Court building on Maryland Avenue. What he used to like to do in those days to keep his weight down was at 6 o'clock in the morning he would go for a walk from a point behind the Supreme Court building all the way around the Washington Monument and back. Okay? So he says, I want you to meet me out front of my apartment building at 6 in the morning and my press aide whose name was Sheila da-da, Sheila Ward, something like that, will also be there.

He comes down in his shorts and Sheila is there with a tape recorder and the three of us start walking. I start pitching and selling and Newt's listening. In his understanding of the American ideals there's no consciousness of race, which among other things means he's against affirmative action. But in any case, there was then a sort of a Republican outreach towards Asians, and there probably still is. So that was part of it.

But in any case, if you sell the blue Ford—negative government, what things government should not do—then Newt might buy in. So that was the framing of the issue. The way it was framed would be acceptable to both Barney and Newt and Newt bought in. I didn't talk about the 1940s issue of national security justification for internment. Republicans tend to defend an issue framed in national security terms. By the time we had come back to his apartment; in fact, he invited up to his apartment which you knew was a bachelor's quarters because there's no furniture. He had become a minority whip at that point, "Do you have any advice for me about how I can make the transition from bomb throwing outsider to House insider." I said, "You got me, Newt." He didn't do such a good job at making that transition after he became Speaker. But he did support us.

Why did you want to see Newt? Well, you wanted to see Newt because he was in effect the leader of the Republicans in the House at that point, even though he was not minority leader. I think at that point, Bob Michel was still minority leader. Michel voted against. He's from Peoria. He thought our issue was a Japanese issue. Both Caterpillar and the UAW were anti-Japan. You wanted Newt if things got crummy, if some of the conservative Republicans in the House began to say, "Well, this is really a bad idea. These are all these politically correct people coming down in Washington and trying to rub the country's sins in its face. We got to put a stop to it because I hear the Reagan Justice Department doesn't like the bill. We think that these are a bunch of left wing Asian radicals just like Hayakawa<sup>25</sup> has been saying."

I didn't want that kind of sentiment to get started among House Republicans because then it would start cascading perhaps back to the White House and reinforce the position of the Reagan Justice Department and the Hayakawa influence on Ed Meese: "These are the bad guys. These are the people who don't vote for us. These are the radical people who are saying that Reagan is a fascist. I yanked the speaker away from these guys at San Francisco State in the 60s." Okay, so if that perception had developed and then adopted by House Republicans and then on into the Senate and into the White House, then we're screwed. So what Newt could do is, if that sentiment started to develop, pick up the phone and say, "That's not the story, guys, that's not what's going on here. Redress us a middle-class Asian American effort, not a way left thing."

MM: Let's stop for a second and talk about Richard Willard at the Reagan White House, because he was with the Attorney Justice. He used the same strategy as—

Tape 2, Side A

MM: Let's talk a little bit more about the strategy that you employed, in essence, redefining who the people were who wanted it. You mentioned that you did this with the House of Representatives, but you also played the same strategy with the Assistant Attorney General Richard Willard in the Reagan Justice Department.

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<sup>25</sup> Canadian-born Samuel Ichijo Hayakawa (1906-1992) grew up in Vancouver, British Columbia. He authored the book *Language in Action* (1941), which not only became a standard college text, but also firmly established his academic reputation as a semanticist. In 1955, Hayakawa became the first Japanese American faculty member, and later the president of San Francisco State University (1968-1972). His college presidency came at a time of growing student unrest for curriculum reform that stressed the need for multicultural programs and courses. Hayakawa led the college's conservative element, and became its spokesman. In defense of his views, Hayakawa instantly earned iconic status for anti-activism—physically severing the wires of the protesters' loudspeakers—and a curiously mixed reputation as a heroic, as well as repressive leader. After retiring as SFSU president in 1972, Hayakawa successfully ran as a Republican for the U.S. Senate in 1976. While many remember his Senate years for his habit of falling asleep, he is best known among Japanese Americans for his vigorous opposition to the Redress Movement.

GU: Yeah. Dick Willard was Assistant Attorney General in the Civil Division, and why he had this issue, I don't know, because it should have been in the Civil Rights Division, but it was in the Civil Division. You have to be consistent—reasonably consistent. And as I said, if you define this as a constitutional issue of negative government—the "thou shalt not" aspects of the Constitution, that's where everybody can come together. So, Dick Willard had testified before, I think, Barney subcommittee, and he said, "We don't like the bill, and we don't like it for all the reasons that Dan Lundgren<sup>26</sup> doesn't like it. Can't find the people. It's old. We've already done it." Wooh! Tough nut. Mike was there at the subcommittee hearing, and Grayce and S.I. Hayakawa was there. Dick Willard's conclusion at the end of his testimony was, "So, if the bill came up to the White House, we would in the Justice Department would recommend to the President that veto the bill." [Mumbles exclamation]. So, then, Grayce went up to him and was talking to him after he finished his testimony, and Mike says, "Well, she shouldn't have that. You should go in and see him."

So, I went in to see him maybe two weeks later. He had an assistant named Will Balentine. He was a very nice guy. Mike later tried to find him a job in the State Department. So, I'm in talking to Dick. His whole take on it was that he was a strong advocate of tort reform, and he felt that corporations—if you burn your legs with a hot cup of McDonald's coffee, and you get fifteen million dollars, it's just outrageous. So, he's very much that way—very anti-tort lawyer, anti-plaintiff's bar, anti-Ralph Nader. This was his thing, and he's part of the Civil Division, so this would be a concern of his. And he felt that what was going on here was in fact something like a tort action against the deep pockets of the government by a special interest group. That was his take.

It turned out that at that very time that I was in Washington, I was seeing a possible writer for Free Press. His name is Peter Huber, and Peter Huber is a conservative theorist who has a Ph.D. in engineering from M.I.T. and a Harvard Law School degree. He's a principal theorist who then and now argues for radical reform of tort law in this country. He really wants to do away with this stuff. He really wants to gut all the trial lawyers and the ambulance chasers. So, I said, "You know, I was talking to Peter Huber the other day." Peter Huber is one of the great theoretical heroes for Dick Willard. So, we got on to Peter Huber, and then we got on to what his real problem was. It's not just the bad guys who want it—the bad guys who hate Reagan and who never voted for him. None of them will ever vote for a conservative Republican of any sort. That's just what he thinks is happening, and that's S.I.'s view, and thanks to S.I.'s close friendship with Meese and S.I.'s lobbying, that became Meese's view, the Justice Department's view, and Willard's view, although Willard wouldn't put it that

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<sup>26</sup> Representative Daniel Lungren (R-CA), was appointed by the U.S. House of Representatives to the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC). The only commission appointee who was also an active member of Congress, Lungren served as CWRIC vice chair. He was also the sole commission member to oppose monetary redress payments, instead, favoring a national apology.

way. He would say, "As a matter of principle, we have to oppose this blah, blah...." But actually, the arguments were essentially political. To jump ahead, to get redress signed, we had to beat Ed Meese inside the White House, and Ed Meese was one of Reagan's closest advisors and personal friends.

So, I said, "No, no. That's not what is going on, Mr. Willard. What's going on here is...you have to understand that many Asians are in fact quite conservative and da-da-da-da, and so on and so forth. And the Asians are much more conservative if you want to take them all together and not just listen to their presumed spokespeople in Washington. They actually vote much more conservative than an average white person." He said, "Really?" And so, then we went from that to the blue Taurus—the "thou shalt nots" of the Constitution. And then we went from that to the fact that the assistant rector in his Episcopal Church in Virginia was a rector in Worland, Wyoming who was also my high school debate coach. This was a guy named Bruce Cooke. So, we started talking about Bruce Cooke, and how we both loved him, and how Bruce Cooke helped to steer me out of the small confines of Worland, Wyoming. And by the time we were finished, maybe an hour later, we were friends. And we had Bruce Cooke as someone whom we knew in common.

MM: When you talked to Assistant Attorney General Willard about who the people were that were supporting this, and you talked specifically about Asian/Pacifics and some of the values that Asian/Pacifics have, and how they were similar to Republican party. Do you remember some of the values that you talked about?

GU: Well, sure. I mean, some of the themes that Reagan used were, "family, hard work, technology, optimism, children, education of the children." And these are—let's call them for the sake of discussion—"family values." And these are Confucian themes and they are also for some, reactionary Confucian themes. And for some in this country, Reagan's family values are reactionary values. Well, it turns out that there is a very nice fit here. And so, what was violated in 1942 were not the property rights of people who were going to vote against Reagan forty years later. Or even the constitutional rights that people were going to be voting against Reagan, but he family values that hold this country together and by inference maybe even Asian American people who did vote for Reagan. But Willard said, "Well, gee. All the people that testified at Frank's subcommittee hearing, they were all the table-pounding left." I said, "No, no, no. That's not representative of the rank and file Asian blah, blah, blah." And at that point and till this day, the Asian vote is up for grabs. It's not like the blacks where 90 percent will vote Democratic. In 1992, Bush did 51 percent among Asians.

MM: How much was Willard's stance influenced by his superiors?

GU: I don't know for sure. What Willard told me anyway was there's some people in the Justice Department who—I also saw them, like Terry Eastland, and there was another guy—who were more ideological and political. And they were the ones

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that felt that, "These are the bad guys. Don't give the bad guys anything." What Willard told me was, "Look Grant," after we had become friends, he said, "I didn't want this issue." There were all these assistant attorney generals, maybe ten of them. And he says, "Well, here's this issue. Who wants it?" And there were ten guys standing there, and nine guys stepped back, and here I was. I got it. I don't want this issue. So, before I left, he says, "Well, what do you want me to do?" And I said, "Well, take it back. Take back what you said." And he said, "I can't do that." (chuckles) So, then I said, "Well, you know, it's going to the floor of the House, and then, it's going over to the White House. And why don't you just not oppose it so much." And he said, "Okay. I won't oppose it any. I'll just not do anything."

MM: Let's go back to the Senate. You also talk to several Senators Simpson. . . .

GU: Yeah. But Spark had most of that locked up. But anyway, go on. He just sort of, as far as I'm concerned, did that single-handedly, but anyway.

MM: Talk a little bit about Spark and his commitment to redress.

GU: (sighs) Well, this was something he was utterly committed to any time he had a free moment. He was a little short guy, Spark. He used to wear these big boots with thick soles and heels to boost his height up about this much. So, anytime he caught any Senator at a free moment, he'd button-hole him. He's like a Grayce Uyehara. All she could think about is redress, and anybody she would talk to—with a schoolteacher, with somebody in a checkout line at the supermarket, the gas station attendant. This is the way Spark was. Anytime he had a chance, he would do this. And it became clear that this was absolutely and utterly important to him. The other Senators whom he button-holed figured that redress is something that Spark really wanted. "The bill is something Spark really wants. We love Spark. We're going to give it to him." So, that's essentially how it happened.

MM: You talked about being a Sparky person. What was it about Senator Matsunaga that won your loyalty?

GU: (coughs) Well, I suppose, the fact that number one, he was absolutely committed to redress, when he didn't have to be. He was from Hawai'i. We absolutely needed him, because we had to pick the people off one at a time on the House side and it was hard. And then, we figured we're going to have to pick them off one at a time on the Senate side, because basically, we only had twenty-seven co-sponsors, and it didn't look like it was going anywhere. But by the time we got over to the Senate's side, Sparky had something like sixty-nine co-sponsors or seventy co-sponsors. We came over to the Senate's side, and we were pretty much exhausted, but we didn't have to work very hard. And the other thing about him is that he's just a really good person. And it belies the notion that nice guys finish last. He's a nice guy who finished first.

MM: Tell us about your interactions with your two senators from Wyoming.

GU: Oh, yeah. I talked to Al Simpson.<sup>27</sup> Al was easy because he knew about the camps, growing up not far from Heart Mountain. As a kid, he had first-hand experience. He was a Cub Scout with Norm. Like Alan Cranston, Simpson had first-hand experience. Alan Cranston actually saw camp, so did Alan Simpson—saw camp right outside of Cody. He (sighs) . . . Al liked the idea of the apology, but he didn't like the idea of the money. And if you look at the four, five votes that he cast on this issue on the Senate floor, on a couple of occasions he voted against the money, but in the last important round, he said, "Yeah, I'm on board." He was someone who used to watch me play high school football in Wyoming, so we had a big bond there. Al is a character. We owe him a lot. A little thin-skinned, but so am I. And it was a very good relationship. He was then the number two Republican in the Senate and it was important that we had him. And we also had Dole, but Spark got Dole.

The other guy was Malcolm Wallop, and I went in to see him, because I was afraid that either Malcolm Wallop or Jesse Helmes would filibuster the thing and then we'd lose. Spark had a filibuster—proof numbers it turned out, but I thought that we might lose because of a filibuster. I went in to see Malcolm, and he was very interested in defense policy, so we started talking about—what were we talking about? We were talking about land-based ICBMs for some reason. I forget what the controversy was at that point, but there was some controversy about ICBMs and the land-based missiles—the third leg of our nuclear strategy. And then I said, "Well, now I want to talk about Japanese American redress." And he just exploded. He started screaming at me, and he must have screamed for thirty seconds. It felt like about five minutes. And what came out of that was, "Look, why should we give you people anything when the Northern Cheyenne and all the other Native American tribes are getting nothing?" And I said, "Well, da-da-da. . . ." And by that point, I was sort of speechless, and I left the office. I was depressed. I was genuinely personally depressed by this. I was sort of scared.

And later the irony of this situation is that Malcolm Wallop is a descendent—is vaguely related to Queen Elizabeth, and his great grandfather was in Wyoming. His great grandfather was the duke of the da-da and went back to England when some of his older brothers had died. He was actually a duke, so he's part of the English aristocracy. The problem is that part of Wyoming was where Malcolm's ranch is. . . . They used to train polo horses there. There's a polo field on his ranch. Why? Because in the old days, they sold horses to the British cavalry, and the British cavalry's war horses doubled as polo horses. They shipped some to South Africa. Okay? So, he was really tied into old England. Well, how did

<sup>27</sup> Al Simpson wrote an article for Mike Mackey's anthology, *Remembering Heart Mountain: Essays on Japanese American Internment in Wyoming* (Powell, Wyoming: Western History Publications, 1998).

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they get that land? They took it from the Northern Cheyenne, and the Northern Cheyenne comes up in this discussion that I had with Malcolm. And I'm not a Freudian, but he's saying, "Well, I feel real shitty about taking this land away from the Northern Cheyenne, and I'm going to take it out on you."

The other thing that happened with Malcolm was that apparently there was an old veteran in Wyoming who was a friend of Malcolm's and just had a kind of Lillian Baker bee in his bonnet about—I think he's a Pacific War veteran—about this issue clear back into the '70s. Before I even heard of redress, the vet was on to this thing, and he had been talking to Malcolm for years and years about it, and gotten Malcolm all huffy. So, by the time I showed up, Malcolm was just fit to be tied. But that was the only such experience in which I was yelled at.

MM: You win some and you lose some.

GU: That was one we lost, but by the time that I had seen Malcolm, Spark had a . . . Well, I told Spark about this, and this is typically Spark. This is to me an essential Spark in his goodness. He says, "Yeah, Malcolm Wallop. Yeah. You know, Grant, he's the only senator who doesn't even say 'hi' to me." (chuckles) Sparky says "hi" to everybody, and to say "hi" back is common courtesy. But, "Here's a guy who doesn't say 'hi' to me." (chuckles) So, at that point, we both knew why.

MM: September 17, 1987, the H.R. 442 passes the House. Do you remember your feelings at that point?

GU: Yeah. Aah . . . I was sitting in the gallery with—actually a really great woman—a beautiful woman too. Not as beautiful as Darcie, but quite beautiful. Her name is—she's married to Mufi Hannemann. Her name is Gail Mukaihata. She grew up in Torrance. She used to work in an Interior Department subcommittee on these islands out on the Pacific, because her boyfriend Mufi was from Samoa. So, I'm sitting next to her and watching this thing, and my feelings were those of Gail's. She had her fists clenched, and she said, "Okay. All right." And then there was another little speech, and she said, "Get on with it. Come on. Come on." And then, 210, 211, (coughs) 217, 218—218 is a majority. So, that was—but we knew we had it. But still, it was great to sit and that's just sort of . . . When you go to the floor it's like the locker room after you won. I'm not saying it was a huge surprise, but my attitude was like Gail's, "Now we're at 210, 211, 218." So, it was a great day.

MM: April 1988, it passes the Senate. You knew that it was pretty locked up at that point, because of the efforts that you mentioned of Senator Matsunaga's and some of the co-sponsors and so forth.

GU: Yeah.

MM: And the last hurdle would, of course, be the president's signature. When did you first get an indication that the president was leaning towards signing it?

GU: Well, after it passed the House, we had a series of meetings in Spark's office. And the indications that I got from some people in the Reagan administration—you say from the "White House." That's pompous talk. Come on. The White House is a fucking building. Don't say you got a call from the "White House." It's a building. Anyway, I talked to some people over there, and they said, "No, we don't like the bill." And so, Mike and I and Spark were talking about it. And after it all—this is October of '87, I said, "Spark, you better not bring this up right away, because if you bring it up and we send it all over the White House, it's going to get vetoed." So, I said, "Just hold back. Don't . . ." That's why it didn't come up until April—from September to April. And then in the interim, we worked on the White House. The answer was "no." They hadn't changed the Ed Meese-Dick Willard-Hayakawa position. And there were other people who were closer to the president than Dick Willard who were saying "no." I later learned it was Ed Meese.

So, we went to work on Reagan, and that was when Tom Kean started the work in October, November, and December of '87. And then, I had heard back from Tom that he was in this limo with chief of staff Ken Duberstein and the president in Jersey. And then he sent my three letters down, and Tom heard back, and redress was going to happen.

MM: Let's back up a second. Who was Tom Kean and what is your relationship with him?

GU: Sure. Tom was then the governor of New Jersey, in fact, a liberal Republican governor of New Jersey—wonderful man. And I was editing his book. Something called "The Politics of Inclusion," which is quite apt. In other words, I had a professional relationship with him, and I didn't know whether I wanted to break that professional relationship and say, "Would you do something political for me?" But at that point, we didn't have any real access, so I said, "Will you do it, Tom?" Actually I asked a fellow named Steve Provost, his number one aide. And Steve asked him, and Steve came back to me and said, "Yeah, he'd be happy to do it." I think, Tom was well to the left of Reagan, but personally they got along very well, and they respected each other. They liked each other, because Tom is an exceedingly likable person. So, Tom did that, and Tom was a conduit through which we got letters in to Reagan about redress, and got the Kaz Masuda connection established. We used Tom. And Tom had direct access into Reagan. So, that's who Tom was.

MM: What written letters did you send via Tom to President Reagan?

GU: Well, the truth of the matter is that I wrote these letters. I wrote three letters. I wrote one letter on the behalf of myself. These all went down to the president.

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The first letter was explaining—I wrote this letter presumably to. . . . How did this happen? To Tom or was it to the president? I said, "Look . . ." Tom had heard from the president himself that Reagan thought that this might have been protective custody. He didn't have this thing straight. So, I wrote a letter, either addressed to the president or to Tom saying, "No, it wasn't protective custody." And then, I wrote another letter under June Masuda Goto's name saying, "Remember Kaz...." Did I write another letter maybe from under Tom's signature? Gee. I think I wrote three. I can't remember what I said through Tom.

MM: Three letters did go to the Reagan White House?

GU: Yeah, via a special channel reserved for Republican governors like Tom.

MM: You're unclear as to whether—

GU: No, I wrote three of them. One of them was from Kean to the president. One of them was from me to Tom explaining that the president was wrong. It was not protective custody. The other letter that I wrote was under June Matsuda Goto's name saying, "Remember Kaz, my brother? Do you remember Kaz? Please sign the bill."

MM: Why was that an important story to Ronald Reagan?

GU: Well, no one can ask him now, but it was my guess that because Reagan was an actor, he was an artist, he was not a political scientist or a lawyer, he thought in terms of stories and scenes and personalities and people. He did not think in terms of abstractions like the Second or Third or Fourth or Fifth Amendment or Supreme Court rulings. He was not going to be influenced by the injustice of Yasui and Hirabayashi. That sort of stuff doesn't touch him. What touches him are people that he's seen and places that he's been to. And one place where he was at one point was in Orange County where he said, "You ought to let this boy be buried in this cemetery." And they did. He remembered that.

So, this was for him [coughs], I think, at that point, what had happened was that this wasn't even about a blue Taurus and the Constitution. [See Ujifusa's remark at the UCLA redress conference].<sup>28</sup> The blue Taurus became the 442<sup>nd</sup>, became Kaz. And so, what is redress about? Redress is not about all this shit—about politics, about Asians and radicals, this and that. This whole thing is about Kaz. The question was, "Am I about to vote for Kaz? Or am I going to vote against Kaz?" In other words, the way you wanted it presented to Reagan and I think

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<sup>28</sup> In September 1997, Mitchell T. Maki, Harry H.L. Kitano, and S. Megan Berthold, authors of *Achieving the Impossible Dream: How Japanese Americans Obtained Redress*, convened a conference at the University of California, Los Angeles. This conference, titled "Voices of Japanese American Redress" brought together about seventy redress activists and provided an opportunity for reflection on the lessons of the redress movement.

this is accurate is, "Do you want to veto Kaz or not?" "Well, of course, I don't want to veto Kaz." So, it became like a—you know, he's a human being like anybody else. So, the issue became a human issue in the end—not everything political comes down to this, but many things do. You know, he's the president. People elected him. We elected him to make all these human judgments. One of the judgments that we elected him to make was whether he was going to veto Kaz or not. Well, he chose not to. He voted for Kaz. So, we needed to get one white male vote in the White House, and we got him. And he voted—I suppose one way to put it is that: *in Reagan's mind, I had hoped to frame it in terms of either Kaz or not Kaz.*

MM: You mentioned Richard Willard. You mentioned Tom Kean from the Governor of New Jersey. Who were your other ins into the Reagan White House? Who were some of the other people that you had potential inroads into the presidency?

GU: Yeah. The guy you see on TV a lot has become Mr. Virtue-crat, namely Bill Bennett. He was then Secretary of Education. I went in to see him. I used to play touch football with him. Was it college? No, he didn't go to Harvard College. He went to Williams. He was at the Harvard Law School. And there were some guys I knew—a pretty wild bunch in those days. I wasn't, but the guys he ran with were a pretty wild (chuckles) bunch. And we used to play touch football, and I got to know Bill there long ago in the late '60s, early '70s.

I went into to see him. He was Secretary of Education, and he liked the *Almanac*, and his number one aide is the guy that in some ways supplanted him, a guy named Bill Kristol. So, we talked about the Asian politics of this, and we then saw Bennett. And Bill said, "I'm for it. The next time I see the president, I'll tell him that I'm for this thing and they should sign the bill." And then Bill put me on to someone that he had become—he's moved very far to the right now. His name is Gary Bauer. Gary Bauer was then Domestic Policy Advisor. So, I went in to see him. And Gary said that he would help. I don't know how much influence either of these two men had, but they may have had some.

The guy who ran Reagan's '84 campaign, which was a landslide, was Ed Rollins, who was from California, and he knew the story, and he was very fond, he said, of a Nisei East Bay guy who ran an ice company. And Ed used to work for him during the summertime. He said he loved the Nisei guy because he was never bitter about camp. He's going to see Reagan about it, and this is going to happen because of that Nisei guy in Oakland, and also because Asians would soon constitute more than 10 percent of the voting population in California. I don't think Ed ever did anything.

Richard Wirthlin was Reagan's pollster, and a very nice man and a personal friend. But Dick called me at one point after House passage and said, "They don't want it at the White House. Give it up for a session." We couldn't do that. So, the guy who really put himself out and made it work was Tom.

MM: What about Burton Pines?

GU: Yeah, one of the things that I was trying to do. . . . Burton Pines is very conservative who was then president of the Heritage Foundation. What I wanted with Burton Pines and—who were some of the other guys? Ed Feulner, maybe, who was number two at the Heritage, and then there was another guy, who's name was—I forget—another conservative think tank. And I wanted those guys to sign on. And I said, "Well, please say something, get something into the White House that you support the bill." And what I wanted was I wanted protection on the right. So, if we had someone like Malcolm Wallop starting to break out, starting to have a lot of influence in the Republican ranks and then into the White House, we didn't want that. So, if you had someone with absolute perfect conservative bona fides like Burton Pines saying, "Cut it out. We're for the bill," then, that's a potential fire wall. That was a fire wall protection.

MM: What was your relationship like with Ken Duberstein?

GU: Well, I didn't have much of a relationship with him. I saw him once. The story on Duberstein is that he's a guy from Brooklyn or Queens. He did not come from an affluent background and started working on Jake Javits' staff. Javits was a Republican senator from New York, a liberal Republican. Javits was absolutely brilliant. Like you give him some kind of complex legislation like the War Powers Act, and it had ninety-one provisions and thirty-six sub-sections and so on, and Javits is sort of the guy who can rattle them all off mechanically. He's the kind of guy you hate, because he's so smart, but you don't really hate them. I was kidding. Ken Duberstein is like that. He's the sort of person who could keep thirty balls in the air at one time and understand the relationship of number five ball to six others. He's a genius. He was brought in after Don Regan had kind of screwed up on Iran Contra. They brought in Howard Baker, and they then brought in Ken Duberstein. Duberstein for a while was number two, under Baker. And Duberstein toward the very end of Reagan's term was the chief of staff.

So, here we are in February of '88 and we've gone through this exercise with Tom Kean, getting all the letters into Reagan. And I wanted to find out where we were. So, I made an appointment to see Duberstein. And I went into to see him on Valentine's Day in 1988. It was February 14. Is that Valentine's Day?

MM: Um-hm.

GU: And I had this hoked up question to ask him, which was, "Well, I'm here to tell you that—" "Why are you seeing me?" "Well, I'm seeing you, because I'm worried about this possible objection that OMB [Office of Management and Budget] may have to the bill." So, I put that question to Ken. Actually, what happened before that, he was sitting there and he had this little machine and it

was running. He's a smoker, and it was one of these ashtrays like a vacuum cleaners. And Ken had a guy there named Will Ball, a nice guy, who became Navy Secretary for maybe six months, his number one aide. We're sitting there, and I sort of went into my shtick. I was lobbying this thing, well beyond the point that was needed. And I start talking about the (coughs) 442<sup>nd</sup> guys, and I kind of choked up. And it was sort of an embarrassing thirty seconds of silence. And they were both very good about it. And then, I asked my hoked-up question, "You know, can you tell me about what's going on at OMB? I hear that . . . "So, Duberstein says, "Well, look, Grant." He didn't know that I had been responsible for the Kean letters. I didn't want to tell him, and he didn't know. So, he says, "Grant, look, this whole issue has been talked about at levels much higher than anybody at OMB. *I want to tell you it's going to happen.*" (coughs) I knew then that Reagan was going to sign it, on February 14th, 1988. Who knows when Reagan decided he was going to sign it. He probably decided after Christmas or right around the New Year, but I learned from Duberstein on February 14, 1988. So, that explains April for Senate passage.

MM: What's your recollection about when the bill passed, when Reagan signed the bill?

GU: I wasn't there, because as I may have said to you, I was out on vacation when . . . There was a JACL convention in Seattle, and I was out there. And a couple of guys from the press office called, and they said, "We want to have a signing ceremony." I said, "I thought you guys didn't want to have one, because you didn't want to have a signing ceremony for Japanese Americans who some important people in your administration still feel are the bad guys." They said, "No, we want to have one. We want to have the publicity." But I couldn't fly back and leave my family. There were other people who flew back, but I didn't see it. For me, the signing was February 14, 1988, when Ken Duberstein told me that the president was going to sign it, and I floated back up Connecticut Avenue towards the JACL Washington office.

MM: That was your signing.

GU: That was my signing. At that point I was the only one outside of Duberstein and Reagan who knew that it was going to be signed.

MM: After the signing, the community learned very quickly the difference between an authorization bill and appropriations.

GU: Yeah, right.

MM: For the next two years, we're fighting over trying to get some money out of the Reagan/Bush administration. Eventually, as we know, it became an entitlement. Dan Inouye gets a great deal of credit for coming up with the idea and then

pushing that idea through. What's your take on this? And you also had a role in bringing about the entitlement issue.

GU: Yeah. Well, Reagan left office, as you know, in '88, so here it is '89....I think it was unfair when people said, "Well, in the Reagan budget for the next fiscal year, there was only ten million dollars for redress, and that shows you what an asshole he was." Look, all we wanted from him was for him to sign it. He was not going to be around when the appropriations process kicked in. He could have said, "A dollar," it wouldn't have mattered. He could have said, "Ten billion," it wouldn't have mattered. Give the guy a break. He signed the bill. Had he not signed the bill, we wouldn't have it. You may not like him, but he signed the bill. Leave him alone now. It couldn't have happened without him, you see? Just sort of step back, be left-wing, but clinical about it. No escaping what the civics books say, "A bill's got to go through both Houses, and signed by the president." Now we have this appropriations process.

And let's see...what was the chronology? I go in to see Dan, and Dan says, "We're going to do it, and it's going to happen, because Fritz Hollings, who's chairman of that sub-committee on appropriations came in the same time as I did, and we were to flip a coin." "But I said, 'Let's not flip a coin for seniority. You can have it.'" That's why Fritz was chairman of that committee, and Dan, after all these years, was not a subcommittee chairman, or was not the chair of that particular subcommittee. So, he said, "This is going to happen. We're going to get it." The entitlement thing.

Now, was this the first part of '89? So, time is passing, and this whole process is grinding to a halt, and appropriation bill have to go through before a certain date in the fall—I think, October 1 when a new fiscal year starts. (coughs) Time is passing. Time is passing.

So then, Spark calls me early in the spring, and he says, "Well, what's happening to the appropriation bill, this entitlement thing?" And I said, "I don't know. I haven't seen Dan since the winter, who said, it's going to happen." And Spark says, "I just talked to Fritz Hollings. Fritz Hollings has never even heard of entitlement." I said, "What?" "Well, everybody's got to leave town before we can get it done." I may have this chronology screwed up. In any case, I get this call from Spark. That's what he says. And then what happens is I called Marie Blanco, a wonderful person and Inouye's redress staff person. And she says, "Well, start writing these letters to the other members of the subcommittee, like Warren Rudman of New Hampshire." I said, "We don't have Japanese Americans in New Hampshire. And Warren Rudman is going to support us anyway, blah, blah." I gave up and said, "Okay. Thanks very much."

So, then what I decided to do—because I didn't like this approach, because if you go public, all you do is get people upset and you get all the people watching on local TV who are against us stirred up. [In 2003, only 25% of Americans favored

redress for Japanese American internment.] I didn't like going into the vernaculars or on ordinary white TV. But, I decided I was going in vernaculars. I write a press release saying, "Here's the problem with appropriations, and it's not happening. And we need people to write to Warren Rudman and to *Dan Inouye*." All right? A couple of days after that runs in the *Rafu Shimpo*<sup>29</sup> and these other vernaculars, Marie calls me and says, "Why are you asking people to write to Dan Inouye? Don't people know that Dan is already with you?" And I said, "Well, you know . . ." And the answer was, "Put pressure on Dan." That made Dan think that the *katonks*<sup>30</sup> didn't think he was doing the job only he could.

MM: Because he was the only one who could make it happen?

GU: Oh, yeah.

MM: And he wasn't making it happen?

GU: He wasn't making it happen. Not if Hollings told Spark that he had never heard of entitlement. So, then, this little release in the *Rafu Shimpo* and other places kicked old Dan in the butt. I respect Dan. I think Dan early on didn't really want to go with redress, in part, because I think for a long time he felt redress was a loser and he pushed Spark off onto it. And if the long shot was going to go down, it's going to down with Spark, not him. Okay? I mean, that's politics, but it's still sort of shitty. The other thing is more admirable, as I said before, and that is that Dan felt that redress was putting a money value on the experience, and like a lot of the vets, he felt initially that this was sort of cheapening everything. So, Dan sort of dragged his feet for awhile. But he didn't in the end. He didn't, and redress money really happened.

MM: And then he came through in the end, and the entitlement became part of the redress?

GU: Yes. Otherwise, we would still have been arguing every year in the appropriations process, and we would still be looking for money, and all the old people would be dead. Okay? So, it was great. I would have never thought of entitlement in a million years, probably not Spark. But Dan understands how government money gets to people, and he did think of entitlement. It was a very good thing that happened.

MM: What's the legacy of redress?

<sup>29</sup> The *Rafu Shimpo* is a Los Angeles-based Japanese American daily newspaper that began publishing in 1903. During the World War II eviction of West Coast Japanese Americans, it temporarily ceased production. With the return of West Coast Japanese Americans in 1945, the *Rafu Shimpo* resumed publication with the January 1, 1946 issue.

<sup>30</sup> Mainland Japanese Americans

GU: (pause) Well, I suppose, in one sense you can take the universal view and you'd say—and there's legitimacy in this—that you want to make sure that under our system something like this never happens again. And I think people do remember, and I see continual references to the experience of Japanese American internment. By the way, I agree with Bob Matsui when he says we should use the term "internment," and not "concentration camp," because when we say, "concentration camp," we say, "Well, it's a sort of level-two concentration camp." But it's a level-one internment camp. But that's another issue. I think that's part of it, but the legacy for me is more tribal than personal, which is to say that in many ways blood is thicker than water—redress made right something that hurt people who are like me. But the two dimensions are not mutually contradictory. It's both. And I think that one thing that perhaps, unfortunately the legacy of redress is not, and that is that it was not an experience of a political success that leads to the political galvanizing of the Japanese American community or the Asian American community.

I watch C-SPAN, and you see Asian American groups saying, "We're so powerless, and we're so marginal. We've never done anything. We can't do anything. We can't get Bill Lann Lee confirmed, da-da-da-da-da. And we're going to be forever this way, unless we contribute money. And when we gave money, they nail us for it." And I resent that, because you have to ask, "You're powerless"? "The Asian American community is powerless"? Well, in 1988, we got redress passed and enacted. We did that. What is that? Chopped liver? But I don't think it's the source of any kind of galvanizing political experience that pushes Asian Americans forward into bigger and better political things at the national level.

MM: How did redress affect your life personally?

GU: Well, it was the deepest and best and most wonderful thing that ever happened to me. I think there were also bad things that happened. Here's a way of looking at it. I have some friends who went down to Mississippi and were part of the civil rights revolution in the South—a great wonderful thing that happened, but there was some negative personal fallout. And the negative personal fallout comes when you give yourself over this cause—you don't have a personal life. In some ways you don't want a personal life, because there are bad things in your personal life, and you don't want to face them, so you do this great crusade. Right? That's not good, and to a certain extent, I think, that happened to me. There are certain things I should have dealt with. And another negative thing is that I was at Random House, and I was in big time book publishing in Manhattan, and I kind of neglected that. And there was an office coup that maybe I could have survived had I spent more time behind my desk and less time in Washington. But I probably would have not survived it anyway, but you wonder sometimes. And so that's a negative.

MM: So, there are certain prices you paid for your involvement?

*Redress Oral History Project*

GU: Oh, yeah. Anybody who was involved in this had a price to pay—an emotional price to pay, but that's sort of nothing. Look at the huge price Mike and Min paid. The downside is insignificant compared to the upside. I would not give up my experience for all the money in the world. It's just so important to me.

MM: Thank you Grant for your time today.

End of interview

## Afterword

### PROJECT HISTORY

The Japanese American National Museum initiated the Redress Oral History Project in 1998 under the leadership of Darcie Iki, then curator of life history, and Mitchell Maki, former assistant professor of social welfare at the University of California, Los Angeles School of Public Policy and now acting dean at California State University, Los Angeles. The Redress Oral History Project was girded by the desire to capture the first-person perspectives of individuals who influenced the Redress Movement and whose experiences represented the diversity and complexity of this far-reaching movement. Hence, the eleven narrators that comprised the project represent a range of organizational affiliations, geography, generations, and gender. The Civil Liberties Public Education Fund, which was established by the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, provided the seed money to initiate the project.

From May 1998 to September 1999, Darcie Iki, Mitchell Maki, and videographer John Esaki, traversed the country to capture these stories, which were documented on digital video. At the Japanese American National Museum, the long process from videotape to final transcription required the active participation of the narrators. The final edited transcripts, as well as the original digital video, have been deeded by the narrators to the Japanese American National Museum's permanent collection and are accessible to the public through the National Museum's Hirasaki National Resource Center.

### ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This project would not have been possible without the support and dedication of many individuals and organizations. Dale Shimasaki and Martha Watanabe of the Civil Liberties Public Education Fund foresaw the need to record the stories of individuals involved in this important chapter of American history. Once the interviews were finished, numerous staff members of the Japanese American National Museum made the final process from tape to transcript possible: Emily Anderson, Nikki Chang, Max Chang, Bryan Hasegawa, Lloyd Inui, Tami Kaneshiro, Kristine Kim, Sojin Kim, Allison Kochiyama, Kaleigh Komatsu, Masaki Miyagawa, Grace Murakami, Cynthia Togami, and Karen Yonemoto. The timely intervention of James Hirabayashi and Harry Honda helped to secure the completion of the final drafts. Akemi Kikumura-Yano and Karin Higa provided continual support and feedback. Arthur A. Hansen spent countless hours listening to each of the tapes and editing the final drafts, and also provided continual support and guidance to the project.

Finally, this project would not have been possible without the narrators themselves. These dedicated individuals worked tirelessly in government archives, community offices, and organizational meetings. They extensively spoke and wrote about the injustices of the incarceration and exclusion in order to educate the community and the larger

American public and to ensure that this chapter in our nation's history would never be forgotten.

Annual members and donors to the National Museum provide annual financial support, which makes projects like this possible. We are grateful for their commitment.

Thank you to the narrators and their families for graciously sharing their stories and for allowing the Japanese American National Museum to preserve their unforgettable experiences and memories.

LISA M. ITAGAKI  
Assistant Curator and Project Coordinator

## Redress Oral History Project Narratives

**Carole Hayashino** discusses her experience in organizing the first Day of Remembrance, working for National Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) in the 1980s, attending multiple Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC) hearings, and campaigning for California State Assembly in 2000. Carole Hayashino's interview was conducted by Mitchell Maki and Darcie Iki at San Francisco State University in California, on September 24, 1999. Videographer: John Esaki. Approximate length of interview: 1 hour, 15 minutes.

**Aiko Herzig-Yoshinaga & Jack Herzig** made a significant contribution to the Redress Movement through their discovery of archival documentation that would aid the National Coalition for Japanese American Redress (NCJAR) class-action lawsuit, the *coram nobis* cases, and the CWRIC hearings. They relate the months of tedious research they conducted at the National Archives and recount key victories in obtaining missing and/or confidential government and military files. The Herzigs' interview was conducted by Mitchell Maki and Darcie Iki in Falls Church, Virginia, on August 26, 1998. Videographer: John Esaki. Approximate length of interview: 3 hours.

**Fred Hirasuna**, an active member of the JACL and former president of the JACL Fresno Chapter, reflects on his strategies for getting support from key Republican legislators in California, including Senator Pete Wilson and Representative Charles "Chip" Pashayan. Hirasuna's interview was conducted by Mitchell Maki and Darcie Iki in Fresno, California, on June 1, 1998. Approximate length of interview: 1 hour, 45 minutes.

**William Hohri** was NCJAR's spokesperson. Under his leadership, NCJAR filed a class-action lawsuit against the government for twenty-seven billion dollars. Hohri explains the importance of the judicial approach, which held the government legally accountable for the damages incurred as a result of incarceration. He also discusses the role of the lawsuit in compelling the government to "settle" the case through passage of a legislative bill. William Hohri's interview was conducted by Mitchell Maki and Darcie Iki in Lomita, California, on June 12, 1998. Videographer: John Esaki. Approximate length of interview: 3 hours, 30 minutes.

**Hitoshi (Harry) Kajihara** was National JACL's president (1988-89) when the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 was passed. He recounts raising funds to finance the redress effort as the president of the National Redress Campaign and his leadership ensured that redress was the number one priority of the National JACL. Harry Kajihara's interview was conducted by Mitchell Maki and Darcie Iki in Oxnard, California, on May 22, 1998. Videographer: John Esaki. Approximate length of interview: 3 hours, 10 minutes.

**William Marutani**, a judge and civil rights attorney, served as the only Japanese American member of the CWRIC. He speaks of his role as a commissioner and the challenge he faced maintaining objectivity during the hearings. He also shares his early involvement in civil rights cases. In particular, he discusses his role in *Loving v. Virginia*, a case that dismantled anti-miscegenation laws. Judge Marutani's interview was conducted by Mitchell Maki and Darcie Iki in Media, Pennsylvania, on August 27, 1998. Videographer: John Esaki. Approximate length of interview: 2 hours.

**Phillip Shigekuni**, a community activist, was involved in the campaign to rescind Executive Order 9066, the San Fernando JACL Chapter, and the National Coalition of Redress/Reparations (NCRR). He recalls his role in the grassroots efforts to obtain redress and recounts the importance of the testimonies of the CWRIC hearings in 1981. Phillip Shigekuni's interview was conducted by Mitchell Maki and Darcie Iki in Los Angeles, California, on May 7, 1998. Videographer: John Esaki. Approximate length of interview: 2 hours.

**Grant Ujifusa**, a key legislative strategist for the JACL Legislative Education Committee (JACL LEC), was responsible for gaining support for redress from conservative Republicans in Congress. He relates his strategy of framing the issue as a constitutional one involving equal opportunity and property rights, rather than as an issue based on special interest politics, which enabled him to secure support from key Republican congressmen including Newt Gingrich and Vin Weber. Grant Ujifusa's interview was conducted by Mitchell Maki and Darcie Iki in Chappaqua, New York, on August 30, 1998. Videographer: John Esaki. Approximate length of interview: unknown.

**Clifford Uyeda** provided leadership from the early stages of the Redress Movement. He reflects on his multiple roles as chair of the JACL committee for pardoning Iva Toguri in the mid-1970s, president of National JACL from 1977-80, and committee chair for the National Committee for Redress from 1977-78. His leadership helped ensure that redress was the number one priority of the JACL. Dr. Uyeda's interview was conducted by Mitchell Maki and Darcie Iki in San Francisco, California, on July 1-2, 1998. Videographer: John Esaki. Approximate length of interview: 2 hours, 40 minutes.

**Grayce Uyehara**, chief legislative lobbyist for the JACL LEC, recounts her memories of organizing a national lobbying effort and disseminating weekly "Action Alerts" to keep the Japanese American community informed. She describes the nationwide effort of Japanese Americans to influence members of congress to support the bill. Grayce Uyehara's interview was conducted by Mitchell Maki and Darcie Iki in Medford, New Jersey, on August 28, 1998. Videographer: John Esaki. Approximate length of interview: 2 hours, 15 minutes.