

ARTICLE TYPE

Love of Variety? An Experimental Study of Heterogeneous Responses to Foreign Brands in the Marketplace

Valentina Gonzalez-Rostani^{*†} and Jude C. Hays[‡]

[†]Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, 90007, CA, USA

[‡]Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, 15260, PA, USA

*Corresponding author. Email: gonzalez.rostani@usc.edu

Abstract

Do everyday encounters with foreign brands shape views on trade and politics? We argue that brand-origin cues act as symbolic primes that interact with national identity: nationalists react negatively to foreign brands, whereas cosmopolitans respond positively or not at all. We test this claim with an online shopping experiment in which U.S. participants compared three sport-utility vehicles randomly assigned to be American (control), European, or Asian (treatments), without explicit mention of brand origin. Exposure to foreign brands increased hostility toward trade and immigration and raised support for Donald Trump among nationalists, while cosmopolitans showed little or opposite movement. These effects are not reducible to partisanship, revealing divides within both major parties. Our findings show that subtle consumer experiences spill over into political preferences, creating a bottom-up channel of polarization that links nationalism and populism to support for neomercantilist and nativist policies.

Keywords: globalization, economic nationalism, populism

1. Introduction

In economies open to trade, consumers are exposed to imports on a regular basis. How do individuals respond to foreign brands in the marketplace? We might expect people, even free trade skeptics, to become more supportive of trade as they

experience the benefits of lower prices and greater product variety. However, these benefits are not easily observed by the average consumer because domestic producers match prices and adopt successful brand innovations from abroad. Take the US sport utility vehicle (SUV) market as an example. The consumer observes brands such as Ford, Volkswagen, and Toyota, that can be identified as foreign or domestic by name, but these companies offer very similar products at nearly identical prices. The US consumer does not observe (or even consider) the counterfactual marketplace in which only Ford SUVs are available.

Another possibility is that repeated exposure to foreign brands triggers and reinforces pre-existing attitudes toward trade. Rather than moderating extreme anti-trade attitudes, exposure to foreign brands may exacerbate them, and consequently contribute to social and political polarization over the international economy.

After decades of research, there is an emerging consensus that individual attitudes toward trade are highly malleable, subject to framing and priming effects, and driven more by cultural attachment, nationalism, and ethnocentrism than by material self-interest (Scheve and Slaughter 2000; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Margalit 2012; Naoi and Kume 2015; Mutz and Kim 2017; Ballard-Rosa, Goldstein, and Rudra 2024). Previous experimental research has examined mainly the influence of elite rhetoric in shaping individuals' perspectives. However, people may also update their beliefs based on their personal consumption experiences. These experiences, in turn, may influence which elite frames resonate with the broader public. We argue that exposure to foreign brands yields heterogeneous effects depending on whether individuals hold nationalists or cosmopolitans attitudes. Nationalism, distinct from simple patriotic pride, entails an expectation that leaders prioritize national interests even at

the expense of international cooperation, whereas cosmopolitans embrace global identities and favor openness.

To evaluate this argument, we designed a survey experiment to test whether subtle consumer cues—specifically, exposure to foreign versus domestic brands—activate these contrasting identities and produce divergent political responses. Participants were asked to evaluate and consider purchasing SUVs, with the brand sets randomly assigned to be domestic, European, or Asian. Our design is novel in two respects. First, it embeds the treatment in a realistic shopping task, simulating everyday consumption experiences with well-known brands. Second, it moves beyond individual home bias (e.g., Bankert, Powers, and Sheagley 2022; Feng, Kerner, and Sumner 2021) to test whether exposure to foreign brands reinforces nationalists' preferences for neomercantilist policies and leaders who espouse them. In doing so, we shift attention from elite rhetoric to everyday consumer experiences as a source of polarization over the international economy (e.g., Mutz 2021; Ballard-Rosa, Goldstein, and Rudra 2024).

Turning to the evidence, our analysis yields three main insights. First, pre-treatment nationalists exposed to foreign SUVs expressed more negative evaluations of trade, greater support for restrictive immigration policies, and increased willingness to endorse Donald Trump for president compared to nationalists exposed to domestic SUVs. Second, cosmopolitans showed either the opposite pattern or no response at all. Third, these heterogeneous effects are not reducible to partisanship: our results reveal a nationalist–cosmopolitan divide within both major U.S. parties. Together, the findings demonstrate that subtle encounters with foreign brands can activate identity-based predispositions and contribute to political polarization.

Our study extends Autor et al.'s account of "importing political polarization" by

showing that trade-related consumption experiences, not just labor market shocks or elite frames, can fuel grassroots polarization. We shift the focus from top-down rhetoric to bottom-up consumer cues, demonstrating that brand origin shapes political attitudes through identity-conditioned responses. In doing so, we highlight an important channel linking nationalism and cosmopolitanism to support for neomercantilist and nativist policies. These results suggest that the politics of globalization may be shaped as much by everyday consumer encounters as by labor market shocks or elite discourse.

The remainder of the article situates our study within the literature on the populist backlash against economic globalization, develops our theoretical framework, and presents the experimental design and results. We conclude by reflecting on the broader significance of our findings.

2. Economic Globalization and the Populist Backlash

If free trade maximizes national welfare, why do governments impose tariffs? This puzzle has animated political-economic research for decades. The conventional answer is that trade produces both winners and losers; although the aggregate gains may outweigh the losses, politically powerful losers can mobilize to restrict trade. More recently, scholars have extended this framework to explain the rise and electoral success of right-wing populist parties and candidates worldwide (Colantone and Stanig 2018; Ballard-Rosa, Scheve, and Jensen 2021). Opposition to free trade—and economic nationalism more broadly—is a core element of right-wing populist platforms. Individuals and regions harmed by import competition may therefore gravitate toward the neomercantilist foreign economic policy positions of these actors.

In comparative politics, the rise of right-wing populist parties is often interpreted as part of a broader realignment in advanced democracies. Häusermann et al. (2025) describe this shift in terms of a universalism–particularism cleavage, while Zakaria (2024) characterizes it as an open–closed divide. We use the language of cosmopolitanism and nationalism, which captures the same underlying dimension: cosmopolitans (or universalists) support openness, international cooperation, and cultural diversity, while nationalists (or particularists) prioritize closure, sovereignty, and cultural homogeneity. The growing electoral strength of nationalist, right-wing populist parties—whose platforms emphasize economic protectionism, immigration restriction, and cultural closure—has restructured political conflict over globalization and identity alongside the traditional left–right dimension. In international relations, the ascent of these parties, and their more protectionist and nativist policy stances, is widely seen as a direct challenge to the post–World War II liberal international economic order (Lake, Martin, and Risse 2021).

Do trade losers tend to favor right-wing populist parties and candidates? Evidence indicates that regions experiencing significant import shocks show increased aggregate support for these parties and candidates, yet the evidence at the individual level is less compelling (Colantone and Stanig 2019). An alternative hypothesis, which has garnered significant attention, suggests that people’s political responses to trade shocks are more sociotropic—concerned with society at large—rather than egocentric, focusing on personal impact (Mansfield and Mutz 2009). Nonetheless, support for this sociotropic explanation remains limited. For example, Hays, Lim, and Spoon (2019) find that individuals living in regions that experience large import shocks are more optimistic about the overall state of the economy than others.

A comprehensive body of research in both political science and economics has traditionally highlighted the negative effects of imports on domestic economic production, especially employment, while taking the consumption benefits of trade—such as lower prices and a broader range of products—for granted. These advantages are extensively discussed in seminal works by Krugman (1979, 1980), which introduce general equilibrium trade models based on monopolistic competition. These models underscore the importance of product variety in international trade. Krugman argues that countries benefit from trade by importing new varieties of goods, attributing this gain to consumers’ “love of variety.” This perspective was bolstered by Broda and Weinstein (2004), who empirically show how an increase in global product varieties, primarily attributed to the introduction of new imported goods, has significantly enhanced welfare at the country level.

Building on the perspective of “love of variety,” Baker (2005) finds that individuals who heavily consume imported goods tend to be more supportive of trade. Related experimental research suggests that these identities are malleable. In a survey experiment conducted in Japan, Naoi and Kume (2011) present evidence of “producer projection”: respondents exposed to visual cues emphasizing production—pictures of a white-collar office, car factory, and rice field—were more likely to support restrictions on agricultural imports, irrespective of their own industry of employment, especially when job insecurity was high. Similarly, Naoi and Kume (2015) demonstrate that priming individuals with consumer-related cues increases their support for free trade. Yet more recent large-scale evidence from economics finds little to no effect of consumer-focused primes and strong sensitivity to employment-loss frames: in 18 Latin American countries, positive framing that stresses lower prices and greater variety leaves support for trade unchanged, while

negative framing about job losses sharply lowers it (Rodríguez Chatruc, Stein, and Vlaicu 2021); in the United States, prompting respondents to think of themselves as consumers has little effect, whereas priming them to consider their own job risk reduces support (Stantcheva 2023).

This debate leaves three questions unresolved. First, do voters consistently evaluate trade more positively when thinking as consumers than as producers, or are these identities weak cues compared to labor-market concerns? Second, how malleable are consumer and producer identities in practice, given the mixed evidence across contexts? Third, and most importantly for our purposes, how do deeper predispositions such as nationalism and cosmopolitanism condition these responses? Existing studies largely examine consumer and producer cues in isolation, but we argue that individuals interpret even everyday marketplace experiences through the lens of national identity. This perspective motivates our analysis of how exposure to foreign brands interacts with nationalism to polarize trade and political attitudes.

3. The Argument: Trade, Nationalism, and Foreign Brands

Existing research shows that nationalism conditions how individuals respond to trade. For example, Carnegie and Gaikwad (2022) and Mansfield and Pevehouse (2022) demonstrate that the effect of trade agreements depends on whether publics and governments are nationalist or populist, while Guisinger (2017) and Margalit (2012) show that national identity and cultural concerns moderate responses to trade. Mutz and Kim (2017) interpret such heterogeneity as evidence of in-group favoritism, and Feng, Kerner, and Sumner (2021) find that support for domestic investment is strongest among those high in nationalism. What remains underexplored, however, is whether these moderating effects extend beyond explicitly po-

litical or economic primes. Prior studies rely on cues such as ally–adversary frames, relative gains, cultural threat primes, or investment origin. Our approach shifts the focus to everyday consumer experiences, asking whether exposure to foreign brands in a realistic shopping context can activate nationalist versus cosmopolitan identities and, in turn, polarize attitudes toward trade and international economic policy. This matters because if subtle, nonpolitical stimuli, including product choices that do not name a country of origin, can elicit neomercantilist reactions, then greater global market integration may widen social divides and intensify polarization.

Marketing research provides complementary evidence. The literature on *consumer ethnocentrism*—a construct closely related to nationalism and patriotism—shows that ethnocentric consumers are less willing to purchase foreign products (Herche 1994; Zeugner-Roth, Žabkar, and Diamantopoulos 2015). Moreover, such predispositions manifest not only in self-reported preferences but also in neural processing of brand stimuli: individuals high in consumer ethnocentrism exhibit activation patterns consistent with risk aversion when evaluating foreign brands (Casado-Aranda et al. 2021; Huang et al. 2020). Yet marketing studies stop at the point of purchase, leaving unexplored whether these consumer reactions generalize into the political domain. Our study addresses this gap by embedding foreign brand exposure in a realistic shopping task and assessing downstream political consequences.

Political behavior research shows how seemingly nonpolitical cues can shape political attitudes when they activate underlying identities. For example, Rhodes-Purdy, Navarre, and Utych (2021) demonstrate that economic crises can elicit anger that translates into populist political attitudes, while Gonzalez-Rostani (2025) shows that exposure to automation risks triggers nostalgia, with implications for political preferences. Pre-existing predispositions condition these effects: Taber and

Lodge (2006) and Utych, Navarre, and Rhodes-Purdy (2022) show that strong prior attitudes filter new information, ensuring that external stimuli reinforce rather than overturn identity-congruent evaluations. We extend this logic to the nationalist–cosmopolitan divide.

We argue that nationalists and cosmopolitans hold different conceptions of “foreignness.” In cognitive psychology, foreignness functions as a *schema*: an organized knowledge structure with affective and cognitive elements that guides attention, interpretation, and recall (Bartlett 1932; Rumelhart 1980; Markman and Gentner 2001). Once activated, such schemas bias information processing toward identity-congruent evaluations (Forgas 2008), promote recall of supporting information, and shape interpretations in ways that reinforce prior attitudes. Because schemas are portable across domains, an identity triggered in one setting (e.g., shopping) can influence responses in another (e.g., politics). We theorize that foreign brands operate as *symbolic primes* that activate these schemas.

For *nationalists*, the schema is typically *threat-laden*, evoking cultural, material, and intergroup threats and generating negative affect that spills over into trade and immigration attitudes.¹ For *cosmopolitans*, the schema is generally *benefit-laden*, linking foreignness to enrichment, diversity, and opportunity. Activation here parallels the logic of intergroup contact, where exposure—even symbolic—reduces threat and encourages openness (Allport 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006).

Our framework yields two predictions:

Hypothesis 1 (Nationalists) *Nationalists exposed to foreign brands will be more likely to support neomercantilist and nativist policies, as well as right-wing populist candidates,*

1. These threats correspond to the three appraisal routes of Integrated Threat Theory (ITT) (Stephan and Stephan 2000).

compared to those exposed to domestic brands.

Hypothesis 2 (Cosmopolitans) *Cosmopolitans exposed to foreign brands will be less (or no more) likely to support neomercantilist and nativist policies, as well as right-wing populist candidates, compared to those exposed to domestic brands.*

In short, prior studies demonstrate that nationalism moderates responses to political and economic cues about globalization. We extend this logic to the consumer domain, showing that even subtle marketplace encounters can activate schemas of foreignness and polarize political attitudes. This perspective identifies a novel, bottom-up channel through which globalization in the marketplace fuels political polarization.

4. Experimental Design and Procedures

Our experimental design combines political science aims with methods from marketing and consumer behavior research. Unlike typical political science experiments that rely on explicit informational cues about trade, national identity, or politics, we embedded our treatment in a realistic consumer task. Drawing inspiration from audit studies and research on consumer ethnocentrism, participants engaged in an online shopping simulation for SUVs with well-known brands, without any mention of brand origin.² This design enhanced ecological validity, maximized realism, and minimized demand characteristics: participants believed the study was about shopping, thanks to a carefully constructed cover story and filler tasks.³

2. As in audit studies that use distinctively Black names to study discrimination (Fryer Jr and Levitt 2004; Butler and Broockman 2011), we expect participants to attribute national identities to distinctively foreign brand names.

3. Previous studies in political science have used this type of cover story as a way to improve ecological validity (Lelkes and Westwood 2017; Gonzalez-Rostani 2025).

We conducted our survey in the United States using CloudResearch. The survey involved 3,299 US adults and was carried out in October–November 2022.⁴ All participants were told the study examined “*big-ticket purchase decisions and online shopping habits.*” This cover story provided a plausible context for the tasks to follow and helped mask the true experimental intent. Respondents were unaware that they were participating in an experiment until they were debriefed at the end of the survey. Incomplete disclosure about the study’s purpose was used to prevent biasing the results. Figure 1 presents the survey flow.




Figure 1. Experimental Flow: Car Shopping Task and Follow-Up

One potential concern is that our introductory statement, which framed the study as a marketing survey, may have drawn a connection between brands and politics. Importantly, all respondents received the same introduction, so this cannot account for any treatment–control differences that we observe. Rather, it reflects a tradeoff between realism and priming. We prioritized ecological validity by embedding the treatment in an active consumer task with a plausible cover story, which better mirrors how individuals encounter brands in real life. At the same time, we minimized priming by never explicitly labeling the brands as foreign or domestic.

4. We chose this platform because previous research has shown that CloudResearch or Prolific yields better results than using Mturk, undergraduate students, or Qualtrics (Douglas, Ewell, and Brauer 2023; Hauser et al. 2022; Litman et al. 2021). Additionally, this platform incorporates quality control measures, permitting only selected respondents with an approval rate above 95% to participate and preventing multiple survey responses from the same IP address. Respondents are paid \$1.50 for a completed survey.

We focused on automobiles due to their significant role in both domestic production and imports. Automobiles are economically salient and symbolically charged goods—with broad consumer interest and visibility—making them an ideal domain. Because trade in automobiles delivers lower prices and greater diversity, love of variety is likely to be especially pronounced, which makes this a hard test for our argument.⁵ Participants were randomly assigned to one of the following brand-origin conditions:

- **American Brands (Control):** Participants in this condition viewed three American SUV models – specifically, the Ford Explorer, Chevrolet Traverse (Chevy Traverse LS), and GMC Acadia.
- **European Brands (Treated):** Participants viewed three European SUV models – the Mercedes-Benz GLA 250, Volkswagen Atlas, and Volvo XC40.
- **Asian Brands (Treated):** Participants viewed three Asian (East Asian) SUV models – the Hyundai Palisade, Toyota Highlander, and Mazda CX-9.

Models were comparable in type (mid-size crossover/SUV), base price (about \$34k to \$38k), and overall quality/features. We did not flag brand origin in any way. The American set of SUVs provides a domestic baseline, and the Asian and European sets provide exposure to foreign brands. We did not include a pure no-shopping control group – asking people nothing at all about products – because that would break the cover story and provide no meaningful point of comparison given our interests.

5. The key question is whether nationalists value or even perceive these benefits. Automobile markets provide a clear illustration of the link between trade, prices, and variety. Autos are a leading U.S. import (8.3% of total imports in 2018), and the industry and its suppliers account for over 3% of U.S. GDP. Trade has been particularly consequential in this sector: in China, tariff reductions following WTO entry produced sustained price declines and a marked increase in model availability, while in the United States, recent tariffs have raised average vehicle prices by 2–3% per month, with projected increases of \$3,000–\$10,000 depending on brand origin (Hall 2025).

Respondents were asked to consider purchasing an SUV. For each assigned model, the survey displayed the make and model and linked to the official website in a new tab; click-throughs were recorded. Participants reviewed all three pages in their set. [Figure 2](#) displays screenshots of these SUV webpages. Each site had a similar layout and content, ensuring a consistent user experience across conditions. The key here is that participants were actively engaging in a realistic consumer choice exercise – comparing product options – rather than passively reading a prompt. This task kept the participants immersed in a consumer mindset rather than a political one.




Figure 2. Screenshots of the Website at the moment of fielding the experiment

We collected pre-treatment demographic data (age, gender, occupation, employment status, income band, ZIP code), as well as measures of partisanship and ideology. Because we are interested in the heterogeneous effects of nationalism, we also included pre-treatment questions on nationalist attitudes. These items asked about the importance of being born in the United States, pride in the country, and preference for U.S. citizenship over any other, among others. We then constructed

a nationalism index from five Likert-scale items used in prior work (see Appendix for internal validity checks and index construction details, subsection A.7). Respondents were categorized into low, medium, or high levels of nationalism, with those in the lower two categories (below the 66th percentile) labeled as “cosmopolitan.”

After viewing the three SUVs, participants chose the one they would prefer to buy and indicated their reasons (price, fuel economy, safety, etc.), with multiple options provided and text box for any reasons not listed. These questions served two purposes: (i) to gather data on any perceived differences in the cars by condition, and (ii) to act as filler tasks supporting the cover story (so that the survey genuinely felt like it was about consumer preferences). At this stage, respondents were still thinking in terms of product attributes and personal taste, with no mention of politics whatsoever.

We then asked a series of policy and political questions, presented as part of the “customer profile” section of the survey to maintain the consumer-task cover story. Immigration preferences were measured on a 5-point Likert scale, asking whether the federal government should increase or decrease the number of immigrants allowed into the United States. Trade attitudes were assessed both on a 5-point Likert scale, capturing whether imports should be expanded or restricted, and on a 100-point favorability battery evaluating whether trade has benefited various groups, including the American economy, workers, companies, consumers, and “you and your family.” To capture foreign policy nationalism beyond economic policy, we asked whether respondents support higher military spending and whether they support U.S. participation in the Paris Agreement on climate change, with the latter reverse-coded as opposition to international cooperation. We also asked respondents whether they would support Donald Trump in the 2024 presidential election.

Economic ethnocentrism was measured using established scales (Shimp and Sharma 1987; Aljukhadar, Boeuf, and Senecal 2021), including items on consumer ethnocentrism (preferences for purchasing American-made or American-branded products) and producer ethnocentrism (belief that American companies should always manufacture products domestically). Our main interest is whether exposure to foreign brands produces heterogeneous effects on these outcomes when comparing nationalists and cosmopolitans, as defined by our pre-treatment nationalism index.

The survey incorporated attention and manipulation checks to ensure data quality. Early in the survey, respondents completed an attention check requiring them to select a specific response option. At the end, they were asked to identify the product under study, with nearly all correctly selecting SUVs (Table A.3). Recognition of brand nationality was also high: between 90% and 98% of respondents correctly classified the assigned brands as either foreign or domestic (Table A.4). We also recorded whether participants clicked through to the brand websites. We use this information to define compliers as those who both visited the SUV websites and correctly identified the brands' foreign or domestic origin.⁶ Additional items measured brand familiarity (Table A.9) and perceived attributes such as luxuriousness, power, safety, and reliability (Table A.10). To mask the survey's focus on foreignness, respondents also answered domestic policy questions on taxation and healthcare.

In sum, the design tests whether brief exposure to foreign-brand products during a routine consumer task can activate nationalist dispositions and shift downstream policy views—without relying on explicit political cues. Drawing on methods from marketing research and embedding the treatment in a realistic shopping

6. See Appendices A.5 and A.5.1 for further details.

scenario, we sought to make respondents' experience as authentic as possible. At no point were participants directly primed with political or nationalistic rhetoric; any change in political attitudes had to stem from their implicit recognition of the products' foreignness within an ordinary consumption task. This approach moves beyond conventional political science experiments by enhancing ecological validity and reducing demand characteristics in the study of trade and identity.

5. Evidence About the Effects of Foreign Brands on Politics

5.1 Unconditional Effects of Exposure to Foreign Brands

We begin with simple OLS estimates of the effect of foreign-brand exposure on policy attitudes and candidate support. In the baseline unconditional specification ([Table 1](#), Model 1 (OLS); columns 1, 3, and 5), the treatment status indicators are not statistically significant for anti-immigration attitudes, anti-trade attitudes, or support for Trump. Point estimates are close to zero and statistically indistinguishable from zero at conventional levels. These null results align with our prior expectations, which anticipated heterogeneous effects by respondents' level of nationalism.

Table 1. Unconditional treatment effect of exposure to foreign brands.

	Anti-Immigration		Anti-Trade		Support Trump	
	OLS	ITT	OLS	ITT	OLS	ITT
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treated = Foreign	0.0245 (0.0169)	0.0439** (0.0220)	0.00839 (0.0171)	0.0562** (0.0227)	0.0198 (0.0162)	0.0463** (0.0213)
Baseline Mean	0.274*** (0.0138)	0.0640 (0.804)	0.299*** (0.0140)	0.949 (0.828)	0.242*** (0.0132)	0.0825 (0.779)
Controls		✓		✓		✓
N	3257	3257	3257	3257	3257	3257

Note: All variables are binary (0–1), with 1 indicating stronger support for the statement questions. Nationalism clusters are defined as follows: “high” includes respondents in the top third (top 33rd percentile) of the nationalism index, while “middle” and “low” categories are combined (bottom 66th percentile). The ITT model includes controls for age, gender, education, income, and state fixed effects, and incorporates weights.

Keep in mind that the OLS results based on the raw experimental data have several important limitations. First, our convenience sample is not nationally representative. Second, the analysis does not adjust for non-compliance. Finally, although random assignment ensures balance across treatment and control groups in expectation with respect to both observable and unobservable confounds, we can improve the efficiency of our estimated treatment effects by conditioning on observed covariates.

We address these concerns with a second model in [Table 1](#), Model 2 (ITT; columns 2, 4, and 6). To address noncompliance, we estimate local average treatment effects using random assignment as an instrument for actual exposure to our foreign brands treatment. We define compliers as respondents who both clicked through to the brands' websites and correctly recognized the brands' origin as foreign or domestic. These intent-to-treat (ITT) models, estimated with two-stage least squares, include the same pre-treatment controls and raked weights (constructed using the ACS benchmark on race/ethnicity, age, sex, education, the education-by-race interaction, and partisanship distribution).⁷

The IV/ITT estimates indicate modest but statistically significant effects on all three outcomes: among compliers, foreign-brand exposure increases anti-immigration responses by about **4.3 pp**, anti-trade responses by **5.6 pp**, and Trump support by **4.6 pp** relative to the domestic-brand condition. The fact that all three effects are of similar magnitude suggests a broad, general backlash against globalization and its perceived beneficiaries. At the same time, these average effects may conceal im-

7. Weights were computed with the *anesrake* R package ([Pasek 2018](#)), capped at 5 and then at 6, following DeBell and Krosnick ([2009](#)). This is consistent with prior applications in the social sciences ([Goldberg et al. 2019](#); [Zhang et al. 2020](#); [Penn, Petrolia, and Fannin 2023](#); [Wang et al. 2020](#)). Raking generates joint distributions and weights from known marginal distributions of covariates in the population.

portant heterogeneity across identity groups, a possibility we investigate next.

5.2 Heterogeneous Effects of Foreign Brand Exposure Among Nationalists and Cosmopolitans

To test whether responses vary systematically by identity, we interact the foreign-brand treatment with an indicator for cosmopolitans (respondents in the bottom two-thirds of the nationalism distribution; nationalists are the reference group). The results in [Table 2](#) reveal sharp differences between the two groups. The OLS estimates (Model 1; cols. 1, 3, 5) show that nationalists exposed to foreign brands become significantly more exclusionary and populist, shifting by about +8.2 pp on restrictive immigration policy, +5.6 pp on anti-trade attitudes, and +8.5 pp on Trump support. Cosmopolitans, by contrast, show slightly negative but substantively small and statistically insignificant effects. The ITT estimates (Model 2; cols. 2, 4, 6) amplify this divergence: among compliers, nationalists increase by roughly +13 pp on immigration, +8 pp on trade, and +13.8 pp on Trump, while cosmopolitans remain essentially unchanged. The bottom rows of [Table 2](#) clarify this pattern. They report, first, the estimated treatment effects within each subgroup, showing that nationalists move significantly toward restrictionist positions while cosmopolitans do not. They also report statistical tests of the interaction terms, which confirm that the nationalist–cosmopolitan difference is significant.

In short, the null average effects in [Table 1](#) mask polarization: foreign-brand exposure pushes nationalists toward restrictionist positions, while cosmopolitans remain stable or slightly more open. These findings are consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2: ordinary consumer cues, such as foreign-made products, can activate nationalist sentiment and shift preferences, primarily among those already inclined

Table 2. Treatment effect of exposure to foreign brands by nationalism level.

	Anti-Immigration		Anti-Trade		Support Trump	
	OLS	ITT	OLS	ITT	OLS	ITT
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treated = Foreign	0.0828*** (0.0279)	0.127*** (0.0347)	0.0561* (0.0299)	0.0829** (0.0376)	0.0853*** (0.0263)	0.138*** (0.0336)
Treated x Cosmopolitan	-0.0833** (0.0338)	-0.146*** (0.0438)	-0.0692* (0.0363)	-0.0466 (0.0475)	-0.0936*** (0.0320)	-0.161*** (0.0424)
Cosmopolitan	-0.285*** (0.0276)	-0.220*** (0.0283)	-0.0844*** (0.0296)	-0.0653** (0.0307)	-0.299*** (0.0261)	-0.235*** (0.0274)
Controls		✓		✓		✓
N	3257	3257	3257	3257	3257	3257
High Nationalism	0.083***	0.127***	0.056* -0.019	0.083** -0.013	0.085*** 0.036	0.138*** -0.008
Cosmopolitan	-0.000	-0.019	-0.013	0.036	-0.008	-0.023
Interaction Test: Nationalism	6.059**	11.097***	3.632*	0.962	8.575***	14.429***

Note: All variables are binary (0–1), with 1 indicating stronger support for the statement questions. Nationalism clusters are defined as follows: “high” includes respondents in the top third (top 33rd percentile) of the nationalism index, while “middle” and “low” categories are combined (bottom 66th percentile).

toward nationalism.

5.3 Nationalism versus Partisanship: A Potential Confound

A natural concern is that these nationalist effects may simply reflect partisan identity (Taber and Lodge 2006; Utych, Navarre, and Rhodes-Purdy 2022). To address this, we estimated models that (i) add party identification as a control, (ii) omit nationalism and interact the treatment with party, and (iii) fully interact the treatment with both nationalism and party.

Adding partisanship as a control leaves the nationalist effects intact (see Appendix Table A.20). When nationalism is excluded altogether (Table 3, Model 1; cols. 1, 4, 7), the treatment-by-party interactions are near zero and statistically insignificant. Thus, the observed heterogeneity cannot be explained by partisanship alone. This provides further evidence that nationalism—not party—is the key moderator.

5.4 Heterogeneous Effects by Nationalism and Partisanship

To probe the relationship between nationalism and partisanship more directly, Table 3 (Models 2–3, 5–6, and 8–9) fully interacts the treatment with both variables, estimating effects for nationalist Republicans, nationalist Democrats, cosmopolitan Republicans, and cosmopolitan Democrats. The results reinforce the primacy of nationalism while revealing interesting partisan nuances. Nationalists in both parties respond similarly: Republicans exposed to foreign brands become more anti-immigration (+11 pp ITT), more anti-trade (+8 pp), and more supportive of Trump (+13 pp), while Democrats show nearly identical increases of +11–13 pp on immigration and Trump and +13 pp on trade. Importantly, the anti-trade effect extends to cosmopolitan Democrats as well: although smaller in magnitude than among nationalist Democrats, they still become significantly more anti-trade (+6–7 pp). Thus, within the Democratic coalition both subgroups move in the same (protectionist) direction, with nationalism amplifying rather than reversing the effect.

Cosmopolitans diverge more sharply within the Republican Party. Cosmopolitan Republicans move strongly in the opposite direction on two outcomes, becoming 18 pp less likely to favor restrictive immigration and 21.5 pp less likely to support Trump, while their trade attitudes remain flat or slightly negative but not significant. Cosmopolitan Democrats, by contrast, are distinctive in shifting only on trade: they remain essentially unchanged on immigration and Trump but become modestly more anti-trade when exposed to foreign brands.

Table 3. Treatment effect of exposure to foreign brands by nationalism level and partisanship.

	Anti-Immigration			Anti-Trade			Support Trump		
	OLS	OLS	ITT	OLS	OLS	ITT	OLS	OLS	ITT
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Treated = Foreign	0.0216	0.0571*	0.0705*	0.0219	0.0791**	0.0369	0.0109	0.0781***	0.193***
	(0.0268)	(0.0337)	(0.0411)	(0.0308)	(0.0393)	(0.0484)	(0.0217)	(0.0274)	(0.0346)
Treated x Democrat	-0.00966	-0.00765	0.0968	-0.0244	-0.0784	0.0971	-0.00524	-0.0853**	-0.186***
	(0.0320)	(0.0514)	(0.0649)	(0.0368)	(0.0599)	(0.0764)	(0.0259)	(0.0417)	(0.0546)
Democrat	-0.488***	-0.411***	-0.502***	-0.172***	-0.103**	-0.204***	-0.645***	-0.576***	-0.549***
	(0.0263)	(0.0415)	(0.0421)	(0.0302)	(0.0484)	(0.0495)	(0.0212)	(0.0337)	(0.0354)
Treated x Cosmopolitan		-0.101*	-0.252***		-0.151**	-0.133*		-0.182***	-0.408***
		(0.0542)	(0.0675)		(0.0632)	(0.0794)		(0.0440)	(0.0567)
Treated x Cosmopolitan x Democrat	0.0606	0.104		0.149*	0.0657		0.201***	0.422***	
	(0.0693)	(0.0884)		(0.0808)	(0.104)		(0.0562)	(0.0743)	
Cosmopolitan	-0.0865*	-0.0312		0.0449	0.0326		-0.0188	0.0639*	
	(0.0445)	(0.0461)		(0.0519)	(0.0543)		(0.0361)	(0.0388)	
Democrat x Cosmopolitan	-0.0542	-0.0146		-0.109*	-0.0300		-0.0781*	-0.133***	
	(0.0562)	(0.0584)		(0.0656)	(0.0687)		(0.0456)	(0.0491)	
Controls			✓			✓			✓
N	3257	3257	3257	3257	3257	3257	3257	3257	3257
Rep High Nationalism	0.022	0.057*	0.070*	0.022	0.079**	0.037	0.011	0.078***	0.193***
Dem High Nationalism	0.012	0.049	0.167***	-0.003	0.001	0.134**	0.006	-0.007	0.008
Rep Cosmopolitan		-0.044	-0.182***		-0.072	-0.096		-0.104***	-0.215***
Dem Cosmopolitan		0.009	0.019		-0.001	0.067**		0.012	0.022
Interaction test: Partisanship	0.091	0.499	15.070***	0.442	1.169	6.859*	0.041	5.952***	46.920***
Interaction test: Nationalism		1.495	23.350***		1.922	3.862		7.343***	67.412***

Note: All variables are binary (0–1), with 1 indicating stronger support for the statement questions. The ITT model includes controls for age, gender, education, income, and state fixed effects, and incorporates weights.

Joint Wald tests confirm that nationalism significantly moderates the effects of foreign-brand exposure on immigration and Trump support, with weaker but still meaningful evidence for trade. The bottom rows of [Table 3](#) report these joint Wald test statistics, indicating whether the treatment effects differ significantly across subgroups defined by nationalism and party. Party differences matter most within the cosmopolitan subgroup, producing the striking reversal for cosmopolitan Republicans and the unexpected alignment of nationalist and cosmopolitan Democrats on trade.

Taken together, these results show that unconditional average effects are misleading: the null in [Table 1](#) masks substantial polarization in [Table 2](#) and [Table 3](#). Nationalists in both parties consistently move toward exclusionary, protectionist, and pro-Trump positions when exposed to foreign brands. Cosmopolitans, by contrast, diverge by party: Republicans shift in the opposite direction on immigration and Trump, while Democrats remain stable on those outcomes but become modestly more protectionist on trade. Everyday consumer encounters with foreign brands thus activate identity-based predispositions in ways that spill over into political attitudes, reinforcing polarization along the nationalist–cosmopolitan divide and revealing unexpected cross-pressures within partisan coalitions.

6. Conclusion

This article asks a straightforward but overlooked question: how do everyday encounters with foreign brands shape political attitudes toward globalization? Using a subtle and ecologically valid shopping experiment, we find null or modest effects in the pooled sample. Yet these averages conceal sharp heterogeneity. Once we account for nationalism, clear patterns emerge: nationalists exposed to foreign

SUVs become more supportive of neomercantilist and nativist policies, and more supportive of the populist right-wing candidate Donald Trump—while cosmopolitans remain stable or, if anything, move modestly in the opposite direction. These dynamics are not reducible to partisanship. Indeed, the sharpest divergence occurs within parties: high-nationalist Republicans and Democrats converge in their exclusionary responses, while cosmopolitan Republicans move in the opposite direction by lowering support for restrictive immigration and Trump. Cosmopolitan Democrats, by contrast, shift modestly toward greater trade skepticism, though less strongly than their nationalist co-partisans.

These findings challenge the assumption that consumer framings alone can mitigate backlash against globalization (Naoi and Kume 2011, 2015). Trade is not interpreted solely through producer or consumer identities. For nationalists, the economic benefits of trade—lower prices and greater product variety—are overshadowed by identity-based concerns. Cosmopolitans, by contrast, remain open to globalization’s consumption gains and sometimes react by softening exclusionary stances. Our results align with recent economic studies showing that consumption frames rarely boost support for trade, while employment-loss frames sharply reduce it (Rodríguez Chatruc, Stein, and Vlaicu 2021; Stantcheva 2023). We extend this work by showing that average null effects mask these divergent identity-conditioned responses.

The implications are clear: even mundane interactions with foreign products can activate nationalist schemas and spill over into exclusionary policy preferences. Everyday exposure to foreign goods may thus reinforce support for right-wing populists and deepen polarization over globalization. By contrast, cosmopolitans remain stable or respond with modest openness. Our study complements elite-

centric accounts of backlash (e.g., Mutz 2021; Ballard-Rosa, Goldstein, and Rudra 2024) by identifying a bottom-up mechanism: individual consumption experiences can also shape political preferences and fuel polarization.

For policymakers, these results highlight the limits of emphasizing only economic benefits. Messages about lower prices or greater variety resonate with cosmopolitans but do little for nationalists. Addressing nationalist resistance may require reframing trade in terms of national strength, fairness, or reciprocity, rather than cosmopolitan openness. In short, persuasion strategies must be identity-sensitive: what reassures cosmopolitans may only harden nationalist opposition.

At the same time, our findings raise important scope conditions. Foreign brand effects are likely to vary across contexts, product categories, and periods when national identity is more or less salient. Extending this design to goods with different symbolic content, to industries tied to national security, and across multiple countries would clarify when consumer cues are most politically consequential. Future research should also test mechanisms directly—for example, by manipulating xenophobic or egocentric beliefs through double randomization—and refine consumption framings to ensure that only the intended treatment cue (brand origin) is activated, avoiding inadvertent priming of unrelated identities or attitudes.

Finally, this study advances methodological debates by embedding experimental treatments in realistic consumer tasks. Our approach shows how designs that mimic everyday experiences can uncover subtle but politically consequential effects of globalization. By linking foreign brand exposure to downstream attitudes, we identify a new channel through which international economic integration reshapes domestic politics: not only through labor markets or elite discourse, but also through the everyday choices people make as consumers.

Conflict of interest The authors declare none.

Data Availability Statement Replication data and code will be found in Harvard Dataverse upon publication.

Ethical Standards The research meets all ethical guidelines. IRB approval at the University of Pittsburgh was obtained on August 12, 2022.

AI Contributions to Research Content The authors acknowledge the use of AI tools limited to basic proofreading tasks.

References

- Aljukhadar, Muhammad, Benjamin Boeuf, and Sylvain Senecal. 2021. Does consumer ethnocentrism impact international shopping? A theory of social class divide. *Psychology & Marketing* 38 (5): 735–744.
- Allport, Gordon W. 1954. *The nature of prejudice*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Autor, David, David Dorn, Gordon Hanson, and Kaveh Majlesi. 2020. Importing political polarization? The electoral consequences of rising trade exposure.
- Baker, Andy. 2005. Who Wants to Globalize? Consumer Tastes and Labor Markets in a Theory of Trade Policy Beliefs. *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (4): 924–938.
- Ballard-Rosa, Cameron, Judith L. Goldstein, and Nita Rudra. 2024. Trade as Villain: Belief in the American Dream and Declining Support for Globalization. *The Journal of Politics* 86 (1): 274–290.
- Ballard-Rosa, Cameron, Kenneth Scheve, and Amelie Jensen. 2021. Economic Decline, Social Identity, and Authoritarian Values in the United States.
- Bankert, Alexa, Ryan Powers, and Geoffrey Sheagley. 2022. Trade politics at the checkout lane: ethnocentrism and consumer preferences. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 1–8.

- Bartlett, Frederic C. 1932. *Remembering: a study in experimental and social psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Broda, Christian, and David E Weinstein. 2004. Variety Growth and World Welfare. *American Economic Review* 94 (2): 139–144.
- Butler, Daniel M., and David E Broockman. 2011. Do politicians racially discriminate against constituents? a field experiment on state legislators. *American Journal of Political Science* 55 (3): 463–477.
- Carnegie, Allison, and Nikhar Gaikwad. 2022. Public Opinion on Geopolitics and Trade: Theory and Evidence. *World Politics* 74 (2): 167–204.
- Casado-Aranda, Luis-Alberto, Juan Sánchez-Fernández, José-Ángel Ibáñez-Zapata, and F. J. Liébana-Cabanillas. 2021. How consumer ethnocentrism modulates neural processing of domestic and foreign products: A neuroimaging study. *Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services* 53:101961.
- Colantone, Italo, and Piero Stanig. 2018. The trade origins of economic nationalism: Import competition and voting behavior in Western Europe. *American Journal of Political Science* 62 (4): 936–953.
- . 2019. The Surge of Economic Nationalism in Western Europe. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 33 (4): 128–151.
- DeBell, Matthew, and Jon A. Krosnick. 2009. Computing weights for American national election study survey data. *nes012427*. Ann Arbor, MI, Palo Alto, CA: ANES Technical Report Series.
- Douglas, Benjamin D., Patrick J. Ewell, and Markus Brauer. 2023. Data quality in online human-subjects research: Comparisons between MTurk, Prolific, CloudResearch, Qualtrics, and SONA. *PLOS ONE* 18 (3): e0279720.
- Feng, Yilang, Andrew Kerner, and Jane L. Sumner. 2021. Quitting globalization: trade-related job losses, nationalism, and resistance to FDI in the United States. *Political Science Research and Methods* 9 (2): 292–311.
- Forgas, Joseph P. 2008. Affect and cognition. *Perspectives on psychological science* 3 (2): 94–101.

- Fryer Jr, Roland G, and Steven D Levitt. 2004. The causes and consequences of distinctively black names. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 119 (3): 767–805.
- Goldberg, Matthew H., Dr Sander van der Linden, Matthew T. Balow, Seth A. Rosenthal, and Anthony Leiserowitz. 2019. *Convenient but biased? The reliability of convenience samples in research about attitudes toward climate change*.
- Gonzalez-Rostani, Valentina Gonza. 2025. From Automation to “Make It Great Again”: The Cultural Path to Right-Wing Populism.
- Guisinger, Alexandra. 2017. *American Opinion on Trade: Preferences without Politics*. Oxford University Press. ISBN: 978-0-19-065185-5.
- Hainmueller, Jens, and Michael J. Hiscox. 2006. Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes Toward International Trade. *International organization* 60 (2): 469–498.
- Hall, Hall. 2025. US car prices higher in April after tariffs hit | Reuters.
- Hauser, David J., Aaron J. Moss, Cheskie Rosenzweig, Shalom N. Jaffe, Jonathan Robinson, and Leib Litman. 2022. Evaluating CloudResearch’s Approved Group as a solution for problematic data quality on MTurk. *Behavior Research Methods*.
- Häusermann, Silja, Simon Bornschier, Delia Zollinger, and Marco Steenbergen. 2025. Realignment within the right field: competition between the mainstream right and the far right. *West European Politics*.
- Hays, Jude, Junghyun Lim, and Jae-Jae Spoon. 2019. The path from trade to right-wing populism in Europe. *Electoral Studies* 60:102038.
- Herche, Joel. 1994. Ethnocentric Tendencies, Marketing Strategy and Import Purchase Behaviour. *International marketing review* 11 (3): 4–16.
- Huang, Jianping, Xiaoang Wan, Kaiping Peng, and Jie Sui. 2020. Grey matter volume and amplitude of low-frequency fluctuations predicts consumer ethnocentrism tendency. *Neuroscience letters* 732:135053–135053.

- Krugman, Paul. 1979. Increasing returns, monopolistic competition, and international trade. *Journal of International Economics* 9 (4): 469–479.
- . 1980. Scale economies, product differentiation, and the pattern of trade. *The American Economic Review* 70 (5): 950–959.
- Lake, David A., Lisa L. Martin, and Thomas Risse. 2021. Challenges to the Liberal Order: Reflections on International Organization. *International organization* 75 (2): 225–257.
- Lelkes, Yphtach, and Sean J. Westwood. 2017. The Limits of Partisan Prejudice. *The Journal of Politics* 79 (2): 485–501.
- Litman, Leib, Aaron Moss, Cheskie Rosenzweig, and Jonathan Robinson. 2021. *Reply to MTurk, Prolific or panels? Choosing the right audience for online research*. SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY.
- Mansfield, Edward D., and Jon C W Pevehouse. 2022. Nationalism, Populism, and Trade Agreements. *International Studies Review* 24 (2): viac016.
- Mansfield, Edward D., and Diana C. Mutz. 2009. Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety. *International Organization* 63 (3): 425–457.
- Margalit, Yotam. 2012. Lost in Globalization: International Economic Integration and the Sources of Popular Discontent1: Lost in Globalization. *International Studies Quarterly* 56 (3): 484–500.
- Markman, Arthur B., and Dedre Gentner. 2001. Thinking. *Annual review of psychology* 52 (1): 223–247.
- Mutz, Diana C., and Eunji Kim. 2017. The Impact of In-group Favoritism on Trade Preferences. *International Organization* 71 (4): 827–850.
- Mutz, Diana Carole. 2021. *Winners and losers : the psychology of foreign trade*. Princeton studies in political behavior. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. ISBN: 0-691-20302-4.
- Naoi, Megumi, and Ikuo Kume. 2011. Explaining Mass Support for Agricultural Protectionism: Evidence from a Survey Experiment During the Global Recession. *International Organization* 65 (4): 771–795.

- . 2015. Workers or Consumers? A Survey Experiment on the Duality of Citizens' Interests in the Politics of Trade. *Comparative Political Studies* 48 (10): 1293–1317.
- O'Rourke, Kevin H., and Richard Sinnott. 2001. The Determinants of Individual Trade Policy Preferences: International Survey Evidence [with Comments and Discussion]. *Brookings trade forum* 2001 (1): 157–206.
- Pasek, Josh. 2018. *Anesrake: ANES Raking Implementation*.
- Penn, Jerrod M., Daniel R. Petrolia, and J. Matthew Fannin. 2023. Hypothetical bias mitigation in representative and convenience samples. *Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy* 45 (2): 721–743.
- Pettigrew, Thomas F., and Linda R. Tropp. 2006. A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 90 (5): 751–783.
- Rhodes-Purdy, Matthew, Rachel Navarre, and Stephen M Utych. 2021. Populist psychology: economics, culture, and emotions. *The Journal of Politics* 83 (4): 1559–1572.
- Rodríguez Chatruc, Marisol, Ernesto Stein, and Razvan Vlaicu. 2021. How issue framing shapes trade attitudes: Evidence from a multi-country survey experiment. *Journal of International Economics* 129:103428.
- Rumelhart, David E. 1980. Schemata: the building blocks of cognition. In *Theoretical issues in reading comprehension: perspectives from cognitive psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence, and education*, edited by Rand J. Spiro, Bertram C. Bruce, and William F. Brewer, 33–58. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Scheve, Kenneth F., and Matthew J. (Matthew Jon) Slaughter. 2000. *Globalization and the perceptions of American Workers*. Globalization balance sheet series. Washington, DC: Institute For International Economics. ISBN: 0-88132-295-4.
- Shimp, Terence A., and Subhash Sharma. 1987. Consumer Ethnocentrism: Construction and Validation of the CETSCALE. *Journal of Marketing Research* 24 (3): 280–289.

- Stantcheva, Stefanie. 2023. *Understanding of trade*. Technical report. National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Stephan, Walter G., and Cookie White Stephan. 2000. An integrated threat theory of prejudice. In *Reducing prejudice and discrimination*, edited by Stuart Oskamp, 23–45. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Taber, Charles S., and Milton Lodge. 2006. Motivated skepticism in the evaluation of political beliefs. *American journal of political science* 50 (3): 755–769.
- Utych, Stephen M, Rachel Navarre, and Matthew Rhodes-Purdy. 2022. Fear or loathing: affect, political economy, and prejudice. *Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics* 7 (3): 505–525.
- Wang, Yan, Yilan Huang, Kathy Phipps Di Xiong, Steve Y. Lee, Jie Shen, Abrey Daniel, Maritza Cabezas, James J. Crall, and Honghu Liu. 2020. Enhancing sampling weights using ranking method. *JSM Proceedings, Survey Research Methods Section. American Statistical Association* 202:136–143.
- Zakaria, Fareed. 2024. *Age of revolutions: progress and backlash from 1600 to the present*. W. W. Norton & Company.
- Zeugner-Roth, Katharina Petra, Vesna Žabkar, and Adamantios Diamantopoulos. 2015. Consumer Ethnocentrism, National Identity, and Consumer Cosmopolitanism as Drivers of Consumer Behavior: A Social Identity Theory Perspective. *Journal of International Marketing* 23 (2): 25–54.
- Zhang, Baobao, Matto Mildenberger, Peter D. Howe, Jennifer Marlon, Seth A. Rosenthal, and Anthony Leiserowitz. 2020. Quota sampling using Facebook advertisements. *Political Science Research and Methods* 8 (3): 558–564.

Appendix 1. Online Appendix

Contents

Contents	1
A.1 Survey Questions	1
A.2 Survey Flow	1
A.3 IRB and Registration	2
A.4 Descriptive Statistics	3
A.5 Manipulation Checks	4
A.5.1 Compliance Proxy	5
A.6 Additional Results	7
A.6.1 Main Specification Additional Outcomes	7
A.6.2 Main Specification with Additional Control Variables	9
A.6.3 OLS Regression (without incorporating compliance ITT)	14
A.6.4 No Weights and OLS Regression (without incorporating compliance ITT)	15
A.6.5 The Role of Partisanship on the Treatment Effect	16
A.7 Nationalism Further Explored	17
A.7.1 Internal Consistency and Dimensionality	17
A.7.2 Main Specification: Additive Nationalism Index	17
A.7.3 Exploring Dimensionality via PCA	18
A.7.4 Robustness: Main Results Using PCA-Based Classification	18

A.1 Survey Questions

You can find our survey questions in our pre-analysis plan <https://osf.io/y8nrm>, pages 22–43.

A.2 Survey Flow

A summary of the survey design and flow is provided in Table A.1.

Table A.1. Summary of Survey Design and Flow

Sequence of subject screens	Content	Function
1	Consent Form	Inform subjects of study's purpose and confirms their willingness to participate.
2	Eligibility	Screen subjects based on their citizenship and age.
3	Pre-treatment demographics	Assess representativeness of sample. Includes questions on gender, race, income, education, employment, occupation, zip code.
4	Pre-treatment politics and nationalism	Pre-treatment political questions about ideology and partisanship. Several questions on nationalism, cosmopolitanism, and ethnocentrism.
5	Treatment Screen	Information about SUVs and their respective webpages are displayed. Questions about price reasonableness, quality and comparative rankings.
6	Attention Check	We incorporate a simple attention check to make sure the respondents are paying attention. If they fail this attention check they will be moved to the end of the survey. We tell them: "This is an attention check. Please click "Moderately Likely".
7	Post-treatment questions	Questions about economic ethnocentrism, vote intentions, and public policy preferences.
8	Manipulation Check	Assess whether respondents were aware that the brands were American, European or Asian, and able to identify the type of products that they were asked to evaluate from a set of options such as chocolates, clothes, etc. SUVs being the right answer.
9	Thanks and subjects ID	We thank the respondents for their participation, debrief them about the experiment, and provide IDs for payment. We repeat contact information in case respondents have any questions.
10	End of the survey	

A.3 IRB and Registration

Our design was reviewed and granted an exemption by the IRB at the University of Pittsburgh on August 12, 2022.

Our study was pre-registered at <https://osf.io/y8nrm>.

A.4 Descriptive Statistics

Table A.2. Descriptive statistics.

	Mean	Median	N	SD	Min	Max
Anti-Immigration	.2904513	0	3257	.4540404	0	1
Anti-Trade	.3045748	0	3257	.4602978	0	1
Support Trump	.2551428	0	3257	.4360084	0	1
Cons. Ethnoc	.3610685	0	3257	.4803841	0	1
Prod. Ethnoc	.5566472	1	3257	.496857	0	1
Anti-Trade (you/family)	.4844949	0	3257	.4998363	0	1
Anti-Offshoring	.8624501	1	3257	.3444798	0	1
Anti-Climate	.2410193	0	3257	.4277677	0	1
Turnout	.8722751	1	3257	.3338345	0	1
Likely Buying	.9118821	1	3257	.2835098	0	1
Age (add 18)	26.62112	24	3257	12.64586	2	70
Female (dummy)	.5201105	1	3257	.4996721	0	1
High Income (dummy)	.079214	0	3257	.2701139	0	1
Low Income (dummy)	.1793061	0	3257	.3836673	0	1
High Education (dummy)	.7172244	1	3257	.4504174	0	1
Treated = Foreign (Complier)	.5191894	1	3257	.4997083	0	1
Treated = Foreign (Random Assignment)	.6662573	1	3257	.4716215	0	1
Democrat	.6963463	1	3257	.4599055	0	1
Low/Mid Nationalism	.6806877	1	3257	.4662818	0	1
Low/Mid Nationalism PCA	.6674854	1	3257	.4711866	0	1

Note: Variables with '(dummy)' indicate binary indicators (0 or 1). 'Age (add 18)' refers to the age variable adjusted; to be interpreted, you should add 18 (i.e., minimum is 2+18, and maximum 70+18). N denotes the number of non-missing observations for each variable.




Figure A.1. Weighted ZIP Code Coverage




Figure A.2. Weighted State Coverage

A.5 Manipulation Checks

This section presents descriptive statistics for the manipulation checks used to assess whether respondents correctly processed the treatment. These measures are used to construct a compliance indicator, which informs a two-stage intent-to-treat (ITT) analysis in the main results.

Manipulation Check 1 asked respondents to identify the type of good displayed in the advertisement. As shown in Table A.3, nearly all participants correctly recognized the product as a SUV, with only a small fraction selecting other categories such as cosmetics, computers, or cellphones. This high level of correct identification indicates that the visual stimulus clearly conveyed the nature of the product and that respondents, across experimental conditions, generally understood the item being presented.

Manipulation Check 2 assessed whether respondents correctly identified the SUV's brand origin as either foreign or domestic. In the overall distribution (Table A.4), 60.68% reported seeing a foreign SUV and 39.32% reported seeing a domestic one. The cross-tabulation with treatment assignment (Table A.5) provides a clearer picture of recognition accuracy. Among those assigned to the domestic control condition, 98.42% correctly identified the SUV as domestic, while only 1.58% misclassified it as foreign. In the foreign treatment condition, 90.33% correctly rec-

Table A.3. Distribution of Manipulation Check 1 - Type of Good

	N	Share
Cosmetics	4	0.12
Computers	14	0.43
Cellphones	7	0.21
Sports Utility Vehicles	3230	99.17
Chocolates	1	0.03
Canned Food	1	0.03
Total	3257	100.00

Note: This table shows the distribution of responses to Manipulation Check 1, confirming whether participants correctly identified the type of good. Nearly all respondents (99.17%) recognized the good as a Sports Utility Vehicle, indicating successful manipulation.

ognized the SUV as foreign, and 9.67% misclassified it as domestic. These results indicate a high level of recognition accuracy in both groups, though slightly lower in the foreign treatment condition, and confirm that most participants processed the intended information regarding the vehicle's origin.

Table A.4. Distribution of Manipulation Check 2

	N	Share
Foreign	1960	60.68
Domestic	1270	39.32
Total	3230	100.00

Note: This table shows the number of respondents who identified seeing a Foreign or Domestic SUV.

A.5.1 Compliance Proxy

We define a compliance indicator based on behavioral engagement with the stimulus. Participants were randomly assigned to view a website featuring either a domestic or a foreign SUV, but only those who clicked on the link were fully exposed to the treatment content. To capture effective exposure, we combine click behavior with responses to the second manipulation check—which asked whether the SUV was foreign or domestic, indicating whether the brand origin was recognized.

The compliance variable is coded as follows: a participant is considered a complier if (1) they were assigned to the foreign treatment, clicked the link, and correctly identified the SUV as foreign; or (2) they were assigned to the domestic

Table A.5. Distribution of Manipulation Check 2 and Treatments

	N	Share
Domestic_Control		
Foreign_recognized	17	1.58
Domestic_recognized	1062	98.42
Total	1079	100.00
Foreign_Treated		
Foreign_recognized	1943	90.33
Domestic_recognized	208	9.67
Total	2151	100.00
Total		
Foreign_recognized	1960	60.68
Domestic_recognized	1270	39.32
Total	3230	100.00

Note: This table reports the distribution of responses to Manipulation Check 2, showing whether respondents correctly recognized the SUV's brand of origin across treatment conditions.

Table A.6. Clicked by Foreign Assignment

Treated = Foreign	No		Yes		Total	
	N	Share (%)	N	Share (%)	N	Share (%)
Domestic Assigned	173	15.92	914	84.08	1,087	100.00
Foreign Assigned	330	15.21	1,840	84.79	2,170	100.00
Total	503	15.44	2,754	84.56	3,257	100.00

Note: This table reports the number of respondents (N) and row percentages (Share %) who clicked or did not click on the website, split by treatment assignment (Domestic or Foreign). Row percentages sum to 100% within each treatment group.

condition and identified the SUV as foreign, regardless of whether they clicked the link.

This proxy for compliance is used in the first stage of a two-stage ITT analysis, where random assignment serves as an instrument for actual treatment receipt. This approach allows us to account for variation in exposure due to differences in clicking behavior, while avoiding direct conditioning on post-treatment variables.

A.6 Additional Results

A.6.1 Main Specification Additional Outcomes

This subsection presents the results of the main models from the main text, re-estimated for alternative outcome proxies:

- **Anti-Trade (you/family):** Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent rated trade as less than the median in terms of being favorable for themselves and their family.
- **Anti-Offshoring:** Dummy variable equal to 1 if, on a 4-point scale, the respondent expressed some degree of support for the statement, *The federal government should penalize American companies that offshore jobs to foreign countries.*
- **Anti-Climate:** Dummy variable equal to 1 if, on a 4-point scale, the respondent expressed some degree of opposition to the statement, *The U.S. should participate in the Paris Agreement to prevent climate change.*
- **Likely Buying (Not):** Dummy variable equal to 1 if, when asked *If you were in the market for a sports utility vehicle, which of these would you purchase?*, the respondent selected “None of them.”
- **Producer Ethnocentrism:** Dummy variable equal to 1 if, on a 4-point scale, the respondent expressed some degree of agreement with the statement, *American industries should always buy produce from the U.S.*
- **Turnout:** Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent indicated they planned to participate in the 2024 elections.

Table A.7. Treatment effect of exposure to foreign brands by nationalism level.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Anti-Trade (you/family)	Anti-Offshoring	Anti-Climate	Likely Buying	Prod. Ethnec	Turnout
Treated = Foreign	0.0907** (0.0403)	0.0463 (0.0293)	-0.00232 (0.0330)	-0.0231 (0.0224)	-0.0151 (0.0393)	-0.0161 (0.0280)
Treated x Cosmopolitan	-0.0734 (0.0508)	-0.101*** (0.0370)	-0.0356 (0.0417)	0.0825*** (0.0283)	-0.0636 (0.0496)	0.0274 (0.0354)
Cosmopolitan	0.00687 (0.0329)	0.0685*** (0.0239)	-0.264*** (0.0269)	-0.0626*** (0.0183)	-0.147*** (0.0321)	-0.111*** (0.0229)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	3257	3257	3257	3257	3257	3257
High Nationalism	0.091**	0.046	-0.002	-0.023	-0.015	-0.016
Cosmopolitan	0.017	-0.054**	-0.038	0.059***	-0.079***	0.011
Interaction test: Nationalism	2.084	7.403***	0.730	8.494***	1.644	0.599

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: All variables are binary (0-1), with 1 indicating stronger support for the statement questions. The nationalism clusters are categorized as follows: high (top 33rd percentile scores in the nationalism index), middle and low have been pooled together (bottom 66th percentile). This analysis includes the full sample, meaning that the European and Asian treatments have been pooled together. The model is an ITT with controls (age, gender, education, income, and FE by state) and weights. The weights were calculated using raking, with the ACS as the benchmark. The variables used for weighting were education, partisanship share at the state level, age, sex, race, Hispanic ethnicity, and the interaction between education and race.

Table A.8. Treatment effect of exposure to foreign brands by nationalism level and Partisanship.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Anti-Trade (you/family)	Anti-Offshoring	Anti-Climate	Likely Buying	Prod. Ethnec	Turnout
Treated = Foreign	0.126** (0.0522)	0.0786** (0.0379)	-0.00170 (0.0373)	-0.0378 (0.0292)	-0.0953* (0.0509)	-0.0345 (0.0365)
Treated x Cosmopolitan	-0.210** (0.0856)	-0.125** (0.0621)	-0.0849 (0.0612)	0.0546 (0.0478)	0.0555 (0.0835)	-0.0299 (0.0598)
Treated x Democrat	-0.0931 (0.0824)	-0.0676 (0.0598)	-0.0465 (0.0589)	0.0343 (0.0460)	0.180** (0.0804)	0.0400 (0.0576)
Treated x Cosmopolitan x Democrat	0.218* (0.112)	0.0570 (0.0814)	0.108 (0.0802)	0.0180 (0.0627)	-0.227** (0.109)	0.0540 (0.0784)
Cosmopolitan	0.0695 (0.0585)	0.0684 (0.0424)	-0.169*** (0.0419)	-0.0266 (0.0327)	-0.241*** (0.0571)	-0.110*** (0.0409)
Democrat	-0.0767 (0.0534)	0.155*** (0.0387)	-0.534*** (0.0382)	-0.0228 (0.0298)	-0.253*** (0.0521)	-0.0854** (0.0373)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	3257	3257	3257	3257	3257	3257
Rep High Nationalism	0.126**	0.079**	-0.002	-0.038	-0.095*	-0.034
Dem High Nationalism	0.033	0.011	-0.048	-0.003	0.085	0.005
Rep Cosmopolitan	-0.084	-0.046	-0.087*	0.017	-0.040	-0.064
Dem Cosmopolitan	0.041	-0.057**	-0.025	0.069***	-0.087***	0.030
Interaction test: Partisanship	7.433*	2.759	35.309***	3.076	11.793***	9.006**
Interaction test: Nationalism	9.847**	6.833*	36.057***	5.890	13.140***	5.890

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: All variables are binary (0-1), with 1 indicating stronger support for the statement questions. The nationalism clusters are categorized as follows: high (top 33rd percentile scores in the nationalism index), middle and low have been pooled together (bottom 66th percentile). This analysis includes the full sample, meaning that the European and Asian treatments have been pooled together. The model is an ITT with controls (age, gender, education, income, and FE by state) and weights. The weights were calculated using raking, with the ACS as the benchmark. The variables used for weighting were education, partisanship share at the state level, age, sex, race, Hispanic ethnicity, and the interaction between education and race.

A.6.2 Main Specification with Additional Control Variables

Main Specification with Additional Control Variables - Familiarity and Product Characteristics As part of the post-treatment questionnaire, we included additional questions to capture participants' familiarity with the SUVs shown (group of three) and to elicit the word that best described them. This question was asked only of a subsample of 2,145 respondents. [Table A.9](#) reports the distribution of responses to the familiarity question by treatment status, coded as a binary indicator for being "very familiar" with the brand (1) versus not (0). [Table A.10](#) presents the distribution of descriptive word choices—Luxurious, Powerful, Safe, Reliable, and Other—by treatment status.

To assess whether familiarity with the SUVs or specific descriptive perceptions influenced the policy preferences expressed in our main outcomes, we re-estimated all models adding: (1) a dummy variable for familiarity, and (2) a set of dummy variables for each descriptive category (with "Other" omitted as the reference category).

These variables were included as controls to account for the possibility that respondents with prior familiarity or particular perceptions of the SUVs might have been more or less likely to endorse a given policy position.

The inclusion of these controls does not substantively change the main results. The direction, magnitude, and significance of the treatment effects remain consistent with those reported in the main text, indicating that the observed patterns are not driven by baseline familiarity or differences in descriptive perceptions of the SUVs.

Table A.9. Very familiar with brand by Treatment Status

Treated	0	1	Total
Domestic	358	360	718
	49.86	50.14	100.00
Foreign	866	561	1,427
	60.69	39.31	100.00
Total	1,224	921	2,145
	57.06	42.94	100.00

Note: The table shows how often each group of SUVs description was chosen by treatment and control groups, with counts and percentages.

Table A.10. Word that best describes the SUV by Treatment Status

Treated	Luxurious	Powerful	Safe	Reliable	Other	Total
Domestic	52	81	296	252	37	718
	9.34	57.86	37.56	42.64	53.62	33.47
Foreign	505	59	492	339	32	1,427
	90.66	42.14	62.44	57.36	46.38	66.53
Total	557	140	788	591	69	2,145
	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Note: The table shows how often each group of SUVs description was chosen by treatment and control groups, with counts and percentages.

Table A.11. Treatment effect of exposure to foreign brands by nationalism level with additional control variables.

	Anti-Immigration		Anti-Trade		Support Trump	
	Pool	Interacted	Pool	Interacted	Pool	Interacted
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Anti-Immigration						
Treated = Foreign	0.123*** (0.0433)	0.0719 (0.0484)	0.0460 (0.0462)	-0.0486 (0.0569)	0.0834** (0.0416)	0.176*** (0.0415)
Treated x Cosmopolitan	-0.178*** (0.0534)	-0.317*** (0.0802)	0.0326 (0.0569)	0.0989 (0.0942)	-0.139*** (0.0513)	-0.439*** (0.0688)
Cosmopolitan	-0.199*** (0.0342)	-0.000959 (0.0534)	-0.0979*** (0.0365)	-0.116* (0.0628)	-0.251*** (0.0329)	0.0692 (0.0458)
Very familiar with brand	0.000393 (0.0202)	0.0178 (0.0183)	-0.0331 (0.0215)	-0.0292 (0.0215)	-0.0157 (0.0194)	0.00948 (0.0157)
Luxurious	0.0432 (0.0517)	0.00290 (0.0469)	-0.170*** (0.0551)	-0.189*** (0.0551)	0.00435 (0.0496)	-0.0298 (0.0402)
Powerful	-0.0147 (0.0594)	-0.00961 (0.0538)	-0.196*** (0.0633)	-0.198*** (0.0631)	-0.0967* (0.0571)	-0.0806* (0.0461)
Safe	0.0516 (0.0504)	0.00638 (0.0457)	-0.113** (0.0537)	-0.130** (0.0537)	-0.0277 (0.0484)	-0.0744* (0.0392)
Reliable	0.0512 (0.0512)	0.0123 (0.0464)	-0.138** (0.0545)	-0.153*** (0.0545)	-0.0510 (0.0491)	-0.0904** (0.0398)
Treated x Democrat		0.200** (0.0780)		0.266*** (0.0916)		-0.154** (0.0669)
Treated x Cosmopolitan x Democrat		0.0620 (0.107)		-0.222* (0.126)		0.439*** (0.0917)
Democrat		-0.578*** (0.0493)		-0.284*** (0.0579)		-0.543*** (0.0423)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	2145	2145	2145	2145	2145	2145
High Nationalism	0.123***		0.046		0.083**	
Cosmopolitan	-0.055		0.079**		-0.056*	
Rep High Nationalism		0.072		-0.049		0.176***
Dem High Nationalism		0.271***		0.218***		0.022
Rep Cosmopolitan		-0.245***		0.050		-0.263***
Dem Cosmopolitan		0.017		0.095**		0.022
Interaction test: Partisanship	11.098***	21.470***	0.328	9.519**	7.360***	32.877***
Interaction test: Nationalism	31.790***		4.047			48.576***

Note: All variables are binary (0-1), with 1 indicating stronger support for the statement questions. The nationalism clusters are categorized as follows: high (top 33rd percentile scores in the nationalism index), middle and low have been pooled together (bottom 66th percentile). This analysis includes the full sample, meaning that the European and Asian treatments have been pooled together. The model is an ITT with controls (age, gender, education, income, and FE by state) and weights. The weights were calculated using raking, with the ACS as the benchmark. The variables used for weighting were education, partisanship share at the state level, age, sex, race, Hispanic ethnicity, and the interaction between education and race.

Main Specification with Additional Control Variables — Reasons Not to Buy This subsection examines whether the results are driven by perceptions of product quality rather than by the treatment itself. After the choice task, respondents indicated their reason for buying one of the SUVs shown or for *not* buying any of them. We coded four binary control variables:

- **Overpriced:** 1 if the respondent selected “overpriced.”
- **Design:** 1 if the respondent selected “design.”
- **Efficiency:** 1 if the respondent selected “efficiency.”
- **Other:** 1 if the respondent selected “other.”

We first present the distribution of these reasons by treatment status in [Table A.12](#). Shares are small and balanced across treatment arms. We then re-estimate all main outcomes, adding the four reason dummies as controls (with “buying” as the baseline category).

Including these quality-related controls leaves the treatment estimates essentially unchanged in sign, magnitude, and statistical significance (see [Table A.13](#)). This suggests that the main effects are not attributable to perceived product quality.

Table A.12. Reasons for Not Buying by Treatment Status

Treatment	Likely Buying		Overpriced		Design		Efficiency		Other		
	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	
Domestic	N	122	965	1,063	24	1,073	14	1,045	42	1,087	0
	%	11.22	88.78	97.79	2.21	98.71	1.29	96.14	3.86	100.00	0.00
Foreign	N	165	2,005	2,092	78	2,140	30	2,115	55	2,119	51
	%	7.60	92.40	96.41	3.59	98.62	1.38	97.47	2.53	97.65	2.35

Note: Table shows counts (N) and row shares (%) for each item by treatment assignment (Domestic=0, Foreign=1). “Likely Buying” is the original choice outcome (1 = would buy one of the SUVs). Reason dummies equal 1 if the respondent selected that reason for not buying.

Table A.13. Treatment effect of exposure to foreign brands by nationalism level with additional control variables: Reasons not to Buy.

	Anti-Immigration		Anti-Trade		Support Trump	
	Pool	Interacted	Pool	Interacted	Pool	Interacted
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Anti-Immigration						
Treated = Foreign	0.119*** (0.0349)	0.0720* (0.0412)	0.0818** (0.0379)	0.0343 (0.0485)	0.135*** (0.0338)	0.201*** (0.0346)
Treated x Cosmopolitan	-0.143*** (0.0438)	-0.254*** (0.0673)	-0.0447 (0.0475)	-0.131* (0.0793)	-0.162*** (0.0424)	-0.414*** (0.0566)
Cosmopolitan	-0.218*** (0.0283)	-0.0281 (0.0461)	-0.0687** (0.0307)	0.0296 (0.0544)	-0.232*** (0.0274)	0.0703* (0.0388)
Not buying: Overpriced	0.00645 (0.0487)	0.0381 (0.0446)	0.0553 (0.0529)	0.0639 (0.0525)	0.00924 (0.0472)	0.0622* (0.0375)
Not buying: Design	-0.0215 (0.0773)	-0.0426 (0.0706)	-0.0766 (0.0840)	-0.0849 (0.0831)	0.182** (0.0749)	0.158*** (0.0593)
Not buying: Efficiency	-0.178*** (0.0450)	-0.123*** (0.0412)	0.0637 (0.0489)	0.0822* (0.0485)	-0.105** (0.0436)	-0.0333 (0.0346)
Not buying: Other	0.0194 (0.0539)	-0.0291 (0.0492)	0.0386 (0.0585)	0.0235 (0.0580)	-0.00334 (0.0522)	-0.0690* (0.0414)
Treated x Democrat		0.0874 (0.0649)		0.104 (0.0764)		-0.196*** (0.0546)
Treated x Cosmopolitan x Democrat		0.111 (0.0884)		0.0622 (0.104)		0.429*** (0.0743)
Democrat		-0.493*** (0.0421)		-0.211*** (0.0496)		-0.542*** (0.0354)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	3257	3257	3257	3257	3257	3257
High Nationalism	0.119***		0.082**		0.135***	
Cosmopolitan	-0.023		0.037		-0.028	
Rep High Nationalism		0.072* 0.159**		0.034 0.139**		0.201*** 0.004
Rep Cosmopolitan		-0.182*** 0.017		-0.097 0.070**		-0.213*** 0.020
Interaction test: Partisanship	10.631***	14.207***	0.884	7.387*	14.622***	46.340***
Interaction test: Nationalism		22.777***		3.891		67.751***

Note: All variables are binary (0-1), with 1 indicating stronger support for the statement questions. The nationalism clusters are categorized as follows: high (top 33rd percentile scores in the nationalism index), middle and low have been pooled together (bottom 66th percentile). This analysis includes the full sample, meaning that the European and Asian treatments have been pooled together. The model is an ITT with controls (age, gender, education, income, and FE by state) and weights. The weights were calculated using raking, with the ACS as the benchmark. The variables used for weighting were education, partisanship share at the state level, age, sex, race, Hispanic ethnicity, and the interaction between education and race.

Main Specification with Additional Control Variables — Reason Buying To assess whether the estimated treatment effects could be explained by differences in the motivations for buying rather than by the treatment itself, we re-estimate the main models adding a set of binary indicators for specific reasons respondents gave for their purchase choice (baseline not buying). After the choice task, respondents who selected one of the SUVs indicated which factors influenced their decision. We code a dummy variable equal to 1 for each of the following reasons: **Safety**, **Price**, **Efficiency**, **Capacity**, **Design**, and **Other**. Respondents were prompted to select up to two reasons.

Table A.14 reports the distribution of these reasons by treatment status. The shares are broadly similar across the domestic and foreign brand conditions. We then include these reason indicators as additional control variables in the main specification (Table A.15). The inclusion of these buying-reason controls leaves the treatment effect estimates essentially unchanged in sign, magnitude, and statistical significance. This suggests that the observed effects are not driven by differences in

the motivations respondents reported for purchasing a given SUV.

Table A.14. Buying Reasons by Treatment Status

	Treated	Safety		Price		Efficiency		Capacity		Design		Other	
		0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1
Domestic	N	745	342	654	433	582	505	951	136	650	437	1,019	68
	%	68.54	31.46	60.17	39.83	53.54	46.46	87.49	12.51	59.80	40.20	93.74	6.26
Foreign	N	1,315	855	1,286	884	1,193	977	1,843	327	1,390	780	1,995	175
	%	60.60	39.40	59.26	40.74	54.98	45.02	84.93	15.07	64.06	35.94	91.94	8.06

Note: Table shows counts (N) and row percentages (%) for each buying reason by treatment status (Domestic=0, Foreign=1).

Table A.15. Treatment effect of exposure to foreign brands by nationalism level with additional control variables: Reasons Buy.

	Anti-Immigration		Anti-Trade		Support Trump	
	Pool		Interacted		Pool	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Anti-Immigration	Anti-Immigration	Anti-Trade	Anti-Trade	Support Trump	Support Trump
Treated = Foreign	0.137*** (0.0346)	0.0740* (0.0410)	0.0713* (0.0376)	0.0303 (0.0482)	0.152*** (0.0334)	0.191*** (0.0344)
Treated x Cosmopolitan	-0.164*** (0.0437)	-0.259*** (0.0674)	-0.0312 (0.0475)	-0.121 (0.0792)	-0.181*** (0.0421)	-0.412*** (0.0565)
Cosmopolitan	-0.207*** (0.0283)	-0.0293 (0.0461)	-0.0749** (0.0308)	0.0329 (0.0542)	-0.217*** (0.0273)	0.0650* (0.0387)
Buying: Safety	0.0247 (0.0187)	0.0181 (0.0171)	-0.0123 (0.0203)	-0.0145 (0.0201)	0.0127 (0.0180)	0.00166 (0.0143)
Buying: Price	0.0605*** (0.0186)	0.0271 (0.0171)	-0.0544*** (0.0202)	-0.0652** (0.0201)	0.0728*** (0.0179)	0.0239* (0.0144)
Buying: Efficiency	-0.00342 (0.0180)	0.00625 (0.0164)	-0.0433** (0.0195)	-0.0406** (0.0193)	-0.0287* (0.0173)	-0.0154 (0.0138)
Buying: Capacity	0.0411* (0.0244)	0.0113 (0.0224)	-0.0670** (0.0265)	-0.0781*** (0.0263)	0.120*** (0.0235)	0.0707*** (0.0188)
Buying: Design	-0.00896 (0.0182)	-0.00867 (0.0166)	-0.00952 (0.0198)	-0.00924 (0.0195)	0.00502 (0.0175)	0.00559 (0.0140)
Buying: Other	0.0822*** (0.0312)	0.0772** (0.0286)	-0.0198 (0.0339)	-0.0231 (0.0336)	0.0334 (0.0301)	0.0273 (0.0240)
Treated x Democrat		0.100 (0.0650)		0.0801 (0.0764)		-0.165*** (0.0545)
Treated x Cosmopolitan x Democrat		0.0978 (0.0884)		0.0829 (0.104)		0.408*** (0.0742)
Democrat		-0.501*** (0.0420)		-0.199*** (0.0494)		-0.555*** (0.0353)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	3257	3257	3257	3257	3257	3257
High Nationalism	0.137***		0.071*		0.152***	
Cosmopolitan	-0.027		0.040		-0.029	
Rep High Nationalism		0.074* 0.174***		0.030 0.110*		0.191*** 0.026
Dem High Nationalism						
Rep Cosmopolitan		-0.185***		-0.091		-0.222***
Dem Cosmopolitan		0.013		0.072**		0.021
Interaction test: Nationalism	14.145***	25.460***	0.432	2.683	18.464***	69.885***
Interaction test: Partisanship		15.102***		6.357*		46.867***

Note: All variables are binary (0-1), with 1 indicating stronger support for the statement questions. The nationalism clusters are categorized as follows: high (top 33rd percentile scores in the nationalism index), middle and low have been pooled together (bottom 66th percentile). This analysis includes the full sample, meaning that the European and Asian treatments have been pooled together. The model is an ITT with controls (age, gender, education, income, and FE by state) and weights. The weights were calculated using raking, with the ACS as the benchmark. The variables used for weighting were education, partisanship share at the state level, age, sex, race, Hispanic ethnicity, and the interaction between education and race.

A.6.3 OLS Regression (without incorporating compliance ITT)

Table A.16. Treatment effect of exposure to foreign brands by nationalism level.

	(1) Anti-Immigration	(2) Anti-Trade	(3) Support Trump
Treated = Foreign	0.0989*** (0.0276)	0.0652** (0.0297)	0.108*** (0.0263)
Treated x Cosmopolitan	-0.113*** (0.0342)	-0.0380 (0.0368)	-0.125*** (0.0326)
Cosmopolitan	-0.220*** (0.0285)	-0.0638** (0.0307)	-0.235*** (0.0272)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
N	3257	3257	3257
High Nationalism	0.099***	0.065**	0.108***
Cosmopolitan	-0.014	0.027	-0.017
Interaction test: Nationalism	11.007***	1.064	14.678***

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: All variables are binary (0-1), with 1 indicating stronger support for the statement questions. The nationalism clusters are categorized as follows: high (top 33rd percentile scores in the nationalism index), middle and low have been pooled together (bottom 66th percentile). This analysis includes the full sample, meaning that the European and Asian treatments have been pooled together. The model is an OLS with controls (age, gender, education, income, and FE by state) and weights. The weights were calculated using raking, with the ACS as the benchmark. The variables used for weighting were education, partisanship share at the state level, age, sex, race, Hispanic ethnicity, and the interaction between education and race.

Table A.17. Treatment effect of exposure to foreign brands by nationalism level and Partisanship.

	(1) Anti-Immigration	(2) Anti-Trade	(3) Support Trump
Treated = Foreign	0.0567* (0.0333)	0.0301 (0.0392)	0.155*** (0.0276)
Treated x Cosmopolitan	-0.206*** (0.0554)	-0.108* (0.0652)	-0.330*** (0.0459)
Treated x Democrat	0.0678 (0.0502)	0.0705 (0.0590)	-0.148*** (0.0415)
Treated x Cosmopolitan x Democrat	0.0952 (0.0696)	0.0564 (0.0818)	0.339*** (0.0576)
Cosmopolitan	-0.0308 (0.0464)	0.0330 (0.0545)	0.0613 (0.0384)
Democrat	-0.501*** (0.0419)	-0.203*** (0.0493)	-0.552*** (0.0347)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
N	3257	3257	3257
Rep High Nationalism	0.057* (0.0464)	0.030 (0.0545)	0.155*** (0.0384)
Dem High Nationalism	0.125*** (0.0419)	0.101** (0.0493)	0.007 (0.0347)
Rep Cosmopolitan	-0.150*** (0.0419)	-0.078 (0.0493)	-0.175*** (0.0347)
Dem Cosmopolitan	0.014 (0.0419)	0.049** (0.0493)	0.015 (0.0347)
Interaction test: Partisanship	5.093*** (0.0419)	2.122* (0.0493)	16.935*** (0.0347)
Interaction test: Nationalism	7.666*** (0.0419)	1.290 (0.0493)	22.540*** (0.0347)

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: All variables are binary (0-1), with 1 indicating stronger support for the statement questions. The nationalism clusters are categorized as follows: high (top 33rd percentile scores in the nationalism index), middle and low have been pooled together (bottom 66th percentile). This analysis includes the full sample, meaning that the European and Asian treatments have been pooled together. The model is an OLS with controls (age, gender, education, income, and FE by state) and weights. The weights were calculated using raking, with the ACS as the benchmark. The variables used for weighting were education, partisanship share at the state level, age, sex, race, Hispanic ethnicity, and the interaction between education and race.

A.6.4 No Weights and OLS Regression (without incorporating compliance ITT)

Table A.18. Treatment effect of exposure to foreign brands by nationalism level.

	(1) Anti-Immigration	(2) Anti-Trade	(3) Support Trump
Treated = Foreign	0.0876*** (0.0279)	0.0596** (0.0300)	0.0841*** (0.0265)
Treated x Cosmopolitan	-0.0867** (0.0339)	-0.0701* (0.0364)	-0.0905*** (0.0321)
Cosmopolitan	-0.266*** (0.0278)	-0.0618** (0.0298)	-0.294*** (0.0263)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
N	3257	3257	3257
High Nationalism	0.088***	0.060**	0.084***
Cosmopolitan	0.001	-0.010	-0.006
Interaction test: Nationalism	6.553**	3.716*	7.968***

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: All variables are binary (0-1), with 1 indicating stronger support for the statement questions. The nationalism clusters are categorized as follows: high (top 33rd percentile scores in the nationalism index), middle and low have been pooled together (bottom 66th percentile). This analysis includes the full sample, meaning that the European and Asian treatments have been pooled together. The model is an OLS with controls (age, gender, education, income, and FE by state).

Table A.19. Treatment effect of exposure to foreign brands by nationalism level and Partisanship.

	(1) Anti-Immigration	(2) Anti-Trade	(3) Support Trump
Treated = Foreign	0.0604* (0.0339)	0.0841** (0.0395)	0.0730*** (0.0276)
Treated x Cosmopolitan	-0.101* (0.0545)	-0.154** (0.0635)	-0.172*** (0.0444)
Treated x Democrat	-0.00795 (0.0514)	-0.0816 (0.0599)	-0.0828** (0.0419)
Treated x Cosmopolitan x Democrat	0.0575 (0.0696)	0.153* (0.0811)	0.194*** (0.0567)
Cosmopolitan	-0.0824* (0.0450)	0.0606 (0.0524)	-0.0341 (0.0366)
Democrat	-0.409*** (0.0418)	-0.0958** (0.0488)	-0.580*** (0.0341)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
N	3257	3257	3257
Rep High Nationalism	0.060* 0.052	0.084** 0.002	0.073*** -0.010
Rep Cosmopolitan	-0.041	-0.070	-0.099***
Dem Cosmopolitan	0.009	0.002	0.012
Interaction test: Partisanship	0.405	1.196	5.903***
Interaction test: Nationalism	1.488	1.959	7.036***

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: All variables are binary (0-1), with 1 indicating stronger support for the statement questions. The nationalism clusters are categorized as follows: high (top 33rd percentile scores in the nationalism index), middle and low have been pooled together (bottom 66th percentile). This analysis includes the full sample, meaning that the European and Asian treatments have been pooled together. The model is an OLS with controls (age, gender, education, income, and FE by state).

A.6.5 The Role of Partisanship on the Treatment Effect

Table A.20. Treatment effect of exposure to foreign brands by nationalism level controlled by Party.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Anti-Immigration	Anti-Trade	Support Trump
Treated = Foreign	0.111*** (0.0316)	0.0775** (0.0373)	0.116*** (0.0267)
Treated x Cosmopolitan	-0.130*** (0.0399)	-0.0412 (0.0471)	-0.139*** (0.0337)
Cosmopolitan	-0.0719*** (0.0263)	-0.0138 (0.0311)	-0.0272 (0.0223)
Democrat	-0.428*** (0.0163)	-0.148*** (0.0193)	-0.600*** (0.0138)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
N	3257	3257	3257
High Nationalism	0.111***	0.077**	0.116***
Cosmopolitan	-0.019	0.036	-0.023
Interaction test: Nationalism	10.700***	0.765	17.055***

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: All variables are binary (0-1), with 1 indicating stronger support for the statement questions. The nationalism clusters are categorized as follows: high (top 33rd percentile scores in the nationalism index), middle and low have been pooled together (bottom 66th percentile). This analysis includes the full sample, meaning that the European and Asian treatments have been pooled together. The model is an ITT with controls (partisanship, age, gender, education, income, and FE by state) and weights. The weights were calculated using raking, with the ACS as the benchmark. The variables used for weighting were education, partisanship share at the state level, age, sex, race, Hispanic ethnicity, and the interaction between education and race.

Table A.21. Treatment effect of exposure to foreign brands by Party (Nationalism Omitted).

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Anti-Immigration	Anti-Trade	Support Trump
Treated = Foreign	0.0320 (0.0334)	0.0320 (0.0385)	0.0133 (0.0273)
Treated x Democrat	-0.0157 (0.0408)	-0.0323 (0.0470)	-0.00741 (0.0333)
Democrat	-0.477*** (0.0265)	-0.156*** (0.0305)	-0.644*** (0.0216)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
Republican	3257	3257	3257
Democrat	0.032	0.032	0.013
Interaction test: Partisanship	0.016	-0.000	0.006
InteractionTest	0.149	0.471	0.050

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: All variables are binary (0-1), with 1 indicating stronger support for the statement questions. This analysis includes the full sample, meaning that the European and Asian treatments have been pooled together. The model is an ITT with controls (partisanship, age, gender, education, income, and FE by state).

Table A.22. Treatment effect of exposure to foreign brands by nationalism level and Partisanship.

	(1) Anti-Trade (you/family)	(2) Anti-Offshoring	(3) Anti-Climate	(4) Likely Buying	(5) Prod. Ethnoc	(6) Turnout
Treated = Foreign	0.126** (0.0522)	0.0786** (0.0379)	-0.00170 (0.0373)	-0.0378 (0.0292)	-0.0953* (0.0509)	-0.0345 (0.0365)
Treated x Cosmopolitan	-0.210** (0.0856)	-0.125** (0.0621)	-0.0849 (0.0612)	0.0546 (0.0478)	0.0555 (0.0835)	-0.0299 (0.0598)
Treated x Democrat	-0.0931 (0.0824)	-0.0676 (0.0598)	-0.0465 (0.0589)	0.0343 (0.0460)	0.180** (0.0804)	0.0400 (0.0576)
Treated x Cosmopolitan x Democrat	0.218* (0.112)	0.0570 (0.0814)	0.108 (0.0802)	0.0180 (0.0627)	-0.227** (0.109)	0.0540 (0.0784)
Cosmopolitan	0.0695 (0.0585)	0.0684 (0.0424)	-0.169*** (0.0419)	-0.0266 (0.0327)	-0.241*** (0.0571)	-0.110*** (0.0409)
Democrat	-0.0767 (0.0534)	0.155*** (0.0387)	-0.534*** (0.0382)	-0.0228 (0.0298)	-0.253*** (0.0521)	-0.0854** (0.0373)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	3257	3257	3257	3257	3257	3257
Rep High Nationalism	0.126**	0.079**	-0.002	-0.038	-0.095*	-0.034
Dem High Nationalism	0.033	0.011	-0.048	-0.003	0.085	0.005
Rep Cosmopolitan	-0.084	-0.046	-0.087*	0.017	-0.040	-0.064
Dem Cosmopolitan	0.041	-0.057**	-0.025	0.069***	-0.087***	0.030
Interaction test: Partisanship	7.433*	2.759	35.309***	3.076	11.793***	9.006**
Interaction test: Nationalism	9.847**	6.833*	36.057***	5.890	13.140***	5.890

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: All variables are binary (0-1), with 1 indicating stronger support for the statement questions. The nationalism clusters are categorized as follows: high (top 33rd percentile scores in the nationalism index), middle and low have been pooled together (bottom 66th percentile). This analysis includes the full sample, meaning that the European and Asian treatments have been pooled together. The model is an ITT with controls (age, gender, education, income, and FE by state) and weights. The weights were calculated using raking, with the ACS as the benchmark. The variables used for weighting were education, partisanship share at the state level, age, sex, race, Hispanic ethnicity, and the interaction between education and race.

A.7 Nationalism Further Explored

The nationalism battery includes six items designed to measure national pride and identity among U.S. respondents:

1. It is important to me to have been born in the US.
2. I feel a great pride for my country.
3. The fact that I am American is an important part of my identity.
4. I would rather be a citizen of the United States than of any other country in the world.
5. People should support their country even if it is in the wrong.
6. The United States should follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflicts with other nations.

A.7.1 Internal Consistency and Dimensionality

We first assessed the internal consistency of the six items using Cronbach's alpha. The resulting reliability coefficient is 0.899, indicating a high degree of internal consistency and supporting the use of these items as a unified scale.

A.7.2 Main Specification: Additive Nationalism Index

Our main specification relies on an additive nationalism index constructed by summing responses to the six items listed above. Because each item is measured on the

Table A.23. Cronbach's Alpha for Nationalism Battery

Statistic	Value
Number of items	6
Average inter-item covariance	0.970
Cronbach's alpha	0.899

same scale, the sum provides a straightforward measure of overall nationalist orientation. Higher values reflect stronger expressions of national pride and identity.

To facilitate subgroup analysis, we dichotomize the index at the 66th percentile of its distribution. Respondents at or below this threshold are coded as having *low* or *moderate* nationalism, while those above it are classified as *high* nationalism. The resulting binary variable is used in our main heterogeneous treatment effects models.

A.7.3 Exploring Dimensionality via PCA

As a robustness check, we applied Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to the same six items to assess whether a single latent dimension captures the core variation in nationalist attitudes. The first principal component explains a substantial share of the variance and is interpreted as a general nationalism factor. [Table A.24](#) reports the component loadings for each item.

Table A.24. Principal Component Loadings for Nationalism Battery

	L[1]	L[2]	L[3]	L[4]	L[5]	L[6]
Important to be born in the US	.4075023	-.3382625	.2009731	.7398117	.3596971	-.0492632
Pride in country	.4468878	-.2079112	-.0864819	-.2587684	-.2299424	-.7935682
American identity is important	.4293954	-.3007114	-.0254482	-.0048864	-.6737439	.5201826
Prefer US citizenship over others	.4256922	-.1824394	-.0223256	-.580566	.594761	.3069301
Support country even if it's wrong	.3730647	.5538668	-.7079732	.2154376	.0582102	.0550127
Prioritize US interests, even if it causes conflict	.3598079	.6417721	.6706404	-.0471532	-.0817595	.0004607

We extracted the first component and created a continuous score (`pca_nationalism`). This variable was then divided into terciles using the 33rd and 66th percentiles. A binary indicator was created to identify respondents in the bottom or middle terciles—mirroring the categorization used in our main specification.

A.7.4 Robustness: Main Results Using PCA-Based Classification

We re-estimated our main model using the PCA-based indicator in place of the additive index. The results, shown in [Table A.25](#), are consistent with those of our main specification. The direction, magnitude, and statistical significance of the

treatment effects remain unchanged, underscoring the robustness of our findings to alternative definitions of nationalism.

Table A.25. Treatment effect of exposure to foreign brands by nationalism level with PCA on Nationalism.

	Anti-Immigration		Anti-Trade		Support Trump	
	Pool	Interacted	Pool	Interacted	Pool	Interacted
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Anti-Immigration			Anti-Trade		Support Trump	
Treated = Foreign	0.138*** (0.0337)	0.0687* (0.0407)	0.0670* (0.0365)	0.0253 (0.0479)	0.149*** (0.0326)	0.176*** (0.0342)
Treated x Cosmopolitan	-0.164*** (0.0434)	-0.263*** (0.0682)	-0.0215 (0.0470)	-0.107 (0.0801)	-0.181*** (0.0419)	-0.381*** (0.0573)
Cosmopolitan	-0.199*** (0.0281)	-0.0147 (0.0464)	-0.0709** (0.0304)	0.0198 (0.0545)	-0.221*** (0.0272)	0.0524 (0.0390)
Treated x Democrat		0.101 (0.0628)		0.0755 (0.0738)		-0.142*** (0.0528)
Treated x Cosmopolitan x Democrat		0.109 (0.0878)		0.0827 (0.103)		0.362*** (0.0738)
Democrat		-0.504*** (0.0410)		-0.200*** (0.0481)		-0.565*** (0.0344)
Constant	0.273 (0.762)	0.596 (0.695)	1.023 (0.826)	1.152 (0.817)	0.314 (0.737)	0.690 (0.584)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	3257	3257	3257	3257	3257	3257
High Nationalism	0.138***		0.067*		0.149***	
Cosmopolitan	-0.027		0.046		-0.032	
Rep High Nationalism		0.069*		0.025		0.176***
Dem High Nationalism		0.170***		0.101*		0.034
Rep Cosmopolitan		-0.194***		-0.082		-0.205***
Dem Cosmopolitan		0.017		0.077**		0.014
Interaction test: Partisanship	14.386***	15.653***	0.209	5.965	18.687***	36.339***
Interaction test: Nationalism		24.941***		2.195		57.458***

Note: All variables are binary (0-1), with 1 indicating stronger support for the statement questions. We derived a three-level measure of nationalism using PCA on nationalism items and then created a binary indicator equal to 1 for individuals in the bottom or middle terciles of the PCA score distribution (i.e., lower and moderate nationalism), and 0 for those in the top tercile (higher nationalism). This analysis includes the full sample, meaning that the European and Asian treatments have been pooled together. The model is an ITT with controls (age, gender, education, income, and FE by state) and weights. The weights were calculated using raking, with the ACS as the benchmark. The variables used for weighting were education, partisanship share at the state level, age, sex, race, Hispanic ethnicity, and the interaction between education and race.