

Wasefire

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– Google

Firmware security issues are still too frequent

The image shows two overlapping web pages. The background page is the CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) website. It features a navigation bar with links like 'CVE List', 'CNA's', 'WG's', 'Board', and 'About'. Below the navigation bar, there's a search bar and a table of search results. The search results table has two columns: 'Name' and 'Description'. The first row shows 'CVE-2023-5746' with a description about a vulnerability in the cgi component. The second row shows 'CVE-2023-5409' with a description about a potential security vulnerability in HP t430 and t638 Thin Client PCs. The third row shows 'CVE-2023-5288' with a description about a remote unauthorized attacker. The fourth row shows 'CVE-2023-4929' with a description about a vulnerability in the NPort 5000 Series. The fifth row shows 'CVE-2023-4692' with a description about an out-of-bounds write flaw. The sixth row shows 'CVE-2023-45194' with a description about a vulnerability in MR-GM2 firmware. The seventh row shows 'CVE-2023-43627' with a description about a path traversal vulnerability. The eighth row shows 'CVE-2023-43478' with a description about a fake_upload.cgi on the Telstra Smart Mo. The ninth row shows 'CVE-2023-43477' with a description about a ping from parameter of ping tracer. The foreground page is a Google Security Blog article titled 'Advisory: Security Issue with Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) Titan Security Keys'. The article is dated May 15, 2019, and is posted by Christiaan Brand, Product Manager, Google Cloud.

CVE Website Search Results:

Name	Description
CVE-2023-5746	A vulnerability regarding use of externally-controlled format string is found in the cgi component. This allows remote attack following models with Synology Camera Firmware versions before 1.0.5-0185 may be affected: BC500 and TC500.
CVE-2023-5409	HP is aware of a potential security vulnerability in HP t430 and t638 Thin Client PCs. These models may be susceptible to a system firmware using a publicly disclosed private key. HP is providing recommended guidance for customers to reduce exposure.
CVE-2023-5288	A remote unauthorized attacker may connect to the SIM1012, interact with the device and change configuration settings. This is a new firmware version to the device.
CVE-2023-4929	All firmware versions of the NPort 5000 Series are affected by an improper validation of integrity check vulnerability. This vulnerability, potentially allowing malicious users to manipulate the firmware and gain control of devices.
CVE-2023-4692	An out-of-bounds write flaw was found in grub2's NTFS filesystem driver. This issue may allow an attacker to present a specific metadata corruption. In some circumstances, the attack may also corrupt the UEFI firmware heap metadata. As a result, a crash may be achieved.
CVE-2023-45194	Use of default credentials vulnerability in MR-GM2 firmware Ver. 3.00.03 and earlier, and MR-GM3 (-D/-K/-S/-DK/-DKS/-M/-M) unauthenticated attacker to intercept wireless LAN communication, when the affected product performs the communication configuration.
CVE-2023-43627	Path traversal vulnerability in ACERA 1330 firmware ver. 01.36 and earlier, and ACERA 1310 firmware ver. 01.36 and earlier. Information such as system files by sending a request to the firmware ver. 01.36 and earlier.
CVE-2023-43478	fake_upload.cgi on the Telstra Smart Mobile app, which could allow them to alter the app's data.
CVE-2023-43477	The ping from parameter of ping tracer.

Google Security Blog
The latest news and insights from Google on security and safety on the Internet

Advisory: Security Issue with Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) Titan Security Keys


May 15, 2019

Posted by Christiaan Brand, Product Manager, Google Cloud


Common security issues



Memory corruption




Default credentials



Side channel
attacks




Manual or
no updates




We need a **secure platform** that takes care of the security **on behalf of the developer**

Introducing Wasefire



Agenda



Goals and properties




Architecture and design




Existing solutions




Current state and future work



Wasefire for you



Goals and properties



Secure by default

Secure by default



Hardened platform

Built with side-channel attacks and
fault injections in mind

Secure by default



Hardened platform

Built with side-channel attacks and fault injections in mind



Sandboxed applets

Applets need specific API permissions to interact with the platform (and hardware)

Secure by default




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All upgradable

Platform and applets are upgradable by design

For all software engineers

For all software engineers



Language agnostic

Developers can use the language,
IDE, and workflow they are most
comfortable with

For all software engineers



Language agnostic

Developers can use the language, IDE, and workflow they are most comfortable with



Hardware independent


Development can be done on a desktop machine without special hardware

For all software engineers



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

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


Open source

Hardware vendors can provide proprietary platforms



Architecture and design




WebAssembly virtual machine

From the WebAssembly specification:


WebAssembly (abbreviated Wasm [\[1\]](#)) is a *safe, portable, low-level code format* designed for efficient execution and compact representation. Its main goal is to enable high performance applications on the Web, but *it does not make any Web-specific assumptions* or provide Web-specific features, so it can be employed in other environments as well.

We use it in embedded environment for its safe (sandboxing), portable, and compact format.


WebAssembly virtual machine




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
WebAssembly virtual machine



WebAssembly virtual machine



WebAssembly virtual machine



Applet and board APIs



Communication

GPIO, LED, buttons, UART, SPI, USB, BLE, ...



Cryptography

TRNG, DRBG, AES, SHA, HMAC, ECC, PQC, ...




Foundational toolkit

Debug output, perf. measurements, timers, storage, ...



Existing solutions



Existing solutions are either



Not secure

Existing solutions are not always
secure by default

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Wasefire is secure by design

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Existing solutions target embedded developers

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Wasefire targets software engineers

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Not portable

Existing solutions have at best source-level portability

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Not secure

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Wasefire is secure by design



Not accessible

Existing solutions target embedded developers

Wasefire targets software engineers



Not portable

Existing solutions have at best source-level portability

Wasefire provides binary-level portability

But in comparison, Wasefire is



Not as performant

WebAssembly interpretation is 10x
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Will improve with CHERI, Pulley,
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Couple supported boards, missing features, reduced API

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Wasefire is still an experimental research project at this point

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
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
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Stability will come as the user base grows



Current state and future work



Where we are

Boards

Nordic nRF52840, internal SE, OpenTitan
Host with web UI

Applet Languages

Rust and AssemblyScript (low-level API only)

Scheduler

Currently limited to running 1 applet on 1 core
Multi-applets and multi-core support to be added

Platform

Upgradability and applet management
Hardening coming soon



Already being used!



Used internally

Two internal projects




2 research projects with universities

Improving hardware performance and security



Ongoing work for a commercial device

Result will be a hardware device powered by Wasefire



Wasefire for you



Optimal use-cases




No embedded background

Engineers can write firmware like software



Light interactive logic

Wasm applets cannot run heavy batch computations



Resource constrained device

Linux might be preferable otherwise



Assistance



Adding support for a
new language




Adding support for a
new board



Extending the applet
API



Implementing
security features



**Documentation, tutorial
and code available here:**
<https://google.github.io/wasefire/>

Takeaways



Wasefire is still under active development but is already used

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Contributions and collaborations are welcome

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Looking to onboard an industrial use case in 2025

— Questions ? —