**Translation section**

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Russian Offensive Campaign  
Assessment, September 6, 2025  
Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, Grace Mappes, Anna Harvey, Karolina Hird  
Toplines  
Ukrainian officials warned that the Russian military command is regrouping and reinforcing its troops in western Donetsk Oblast, likely ahead of a  
major offensive operation. Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Oleksiy Belskyi reported that the Russian military  
command is concentrating significant forces in Donetsk Oblast and that the most intense fighting is occurring in the Pokrovsk direction.[1] Belskyi  
stated that Russian forces are now accumulating significant numbers of drones and heavy armored vehicles in the area after failing to seize Pokrovsk  
and Myrnohrad during Summer 2025. The Ukrainian 7th Army Corps reported that the Russian military command recently redeployed experienced  
naval infantry units to the Pokrovsk direction, indicating that Russia is preparing to re-intensify assaults in the area.[2] The Ukrainian 7th Army Corps  
reported that Russian forces began leveraging infiltration tactics with small teams with the aim of getting as close as possible to Ukrainian drone and  
artillery positions, overextending Ukrainian forces, gaining footholds in forward positions, and expanding the contested “gray” zone. The Ukrainian 7th  
Army Corps noted that Russian forces intensified offensive operations on the flanks of Pokrovsk using armored and motorized vehicles in an effort to  
interdict ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and envelop Pokrovsk. The Ukrainian 7th Army Corps reported that the Russian military command  
remains committed to seizing Ukraine’s fortress belt, which consists of Slovyansk-Kramatorsk-Druzhkivka-Kostyantynivka and forms the backbone of  
Ukrainian forces’ defense in Donetsk Oblast. A senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction  
reported that Russian forces are conducting troop rotations in the area and that Ukrainian forces anticipate that Russian forces will soon conduct  
intensified offensive operations.[3] The NCO noted that the Russian military command is pressuring Russian units to advance during Fall 2025, given  
that Russian forces did not achieve their given objectives during Summer 2025. The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the  
Kramatorsk direction also reported that Russian forces are building up their force presence in preparation for future assault operations in the  
Kramatorsk area and that the Russian military command has deployed unspecified naval infantry units to the area.[4]  
A Ukrainian servicemember reported on September 5 that the Russian military command recently redeployed five to six unspecified naval infantry  
brigades to the Dobropillya direction alongside a tank regiment, an infantry regiment, and two motorized rifle brigades.[5] The Ukrainian  
servicemember reported that the Russian military command also recently redeployed elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division (18th Combined  
Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) to Chasiv Yar. A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of  
Forces claimed on September 6 that elements of the 76th VDV Division, including its 237th VDV Regiment, are redeploying from Sumy Oblast to an  
unspecified location.[6] ISW recently observed reports that the Russian military command redeployed several units from Kursk Oblast, including  
elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) to the Dobropillya area and elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet),  
177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), and 11th Separate VDV Brigade to unspecified areas of Donetsk Oblast.[7] ISW has also observed  
additional reports that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division from Kherson Oblast to Bakhmut,  
possibly to reinforce Russian offensive efforts near Kostyantynivka or Siversk.[8] The Russian military command’s reported decision to redeploy more  
forces to the Dobropillya area suggests that Russia may continue to focus on offensive efforts northeast of Pokrovsk.  
Russian forces are also attempting to interdict key Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in western Donetsk Oblast in order to  
complicate Ukrainian logistics and enable further Russian advances during future offensive efforts in Donetsk Oblast. The spokesperson of a  
Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on September 6 that Russian forces are attempting to interdict Ukrainian logistics in  
order to complicate Ukraine’s ability to defend and launch counterattacks along the frontline.[9] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are  
attempting to identify gaps in Ukraine’s defensive lines and exploit compromised Ukrainian positions. A senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a  
Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction stated that Russian drone operators have recently been loitering drones along Ukrainian GLOCs in  
the brigade’s area of responsibility (AoR) and waiting to strike Ukrainian personnel.[10] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian  
forces have intensified first person view (FPV) drone strikes against the E-40 Izyum-Slovyansk highway, presumably from positions in the Lyman  
direction, and are successfully disrupting Ukrainian logistics.[11] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces have struck 10 Ukrainian military  
vehicles traveling along the E-40 highway in the last few days and that Russian drone strikes may force Ukraine to pursue alternative logistics routes  
to supply Ukrainian positions along the fortress belt. Additional Russian milbloggers posted footage of damaged Ukrainian vehicles along the  
highway and claimed that Russian forces are also using Lancet drones to strike these vehicles.[12] Russian forces have previously leveraged  
interdiction efforts in order to create vulnerabilities in frontline Ukrainian positions that Russian forces can then exploit in infantry and mechanized  
assaults.[13] Russian forces have historically relied on glide bomb strikes, and now increasingly drone strikes, to raze frontline settlements and towns  
to the ground in order to destroy any possible Ukrainian defensive positions and force Ukrainian forces to retreat, enabling less costly Russian  
advances.[14]  
Recent geolocated footage indicates that Russian forces have likely advanced into northwestern Kupyansk following the Russian Ministry of  
Defense (MoD)’s efforts to falsely portray limited infiltrations as enduring advances. Geolocated footage published on September 5 shows a  
Ukrainian drone strike against a Russian position in a building in northwestern Kupyansk, indicating that Russian forces have likely established  
forward positions within northwestern Kupyansk.[15] This footage differs from recent footage that the Russian MoD released, attempting to lend  
legitimacy to inflated claims of Russian advances. The Russian MoD published footage on September 3 showing individual Russian soldiers out in the  
open and holding Russian flags at four points within northern, northwestern, and western Kupyansk, and the MoD claimed that Russian forces had  
seized about half of Kupyansk.[16] The footage did not show indications that Russian forces actually held any areas in Kupyansk. However, it  
indicated that these soldiers likely infiltrated the town to film this footage. The Russian MoD attempted to portray these limited and temporary  
infiltrations into Kupyansk as consolidated territorial gains, however.[17] Both Russian and Ukrainian sources rejected the MoD’s footage.[18]  
ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin appears to be attempting to exploit mapping methodologies used throughout the war to advance an  
ongoing informational effort intended to portray Russian victory in Ukraine as inevitable and push Ukraine to concede to Russia.[19] The September 5  
footage of the Ukrainian drone strike in northwestern Kupyansk is more consistent with the actual establishment of forward positions.[20] Russian  
forces typically send small fireteam sized groups of personnel on assaults in order to gain positions behind the Ukrainian frontline, after which they  
can accumulate larger groups and establish enduring positions for further assaults. The September 5 footage of Ukrainian forces conducting a drone  
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strike against a Russian-held building is consistent with this pattern of Russian advances and previous footage that ISW has routinely used to assess  
further Russian advances. ISW’s maps have distinguished between the Russian “forward line of own troops” (FLOT), which the US Army has defined  
as the most forward observed positions of forces in any operation at a specific time, and areas that Russian forces control.[21] ISW recently  
introduced a new feature — “Assessed Infiltration Events in Ukraine” — to help distinguish between areas where Russian or Ukrainian forces  
conducted assessed infiltration missions but have not advanced and do not control the territory. ISW will continue to monitor tactics and operations  
observed on the battlefield and refine its mapping methodology accordingly.  
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Key Takeaways  
1. Ukrainian officials warned that the Russian military command is regrouping and reinforcing its troops in western Donetsk Oblast, likely ahead of  
a major offensive operation.  
2. Russian forces are also attempting to interdict key Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in western Donetsk Oblast in order to  
complicate Ukrainian logistics and enable further Russian advances during future offensive efforts in Donetsk Oblast.  
3. Recent geolocated footage indicates that Russian forces have likely advanced into northwestern Kupyansk following the Russian Ministry of  
Defense (MoD)’s efforts to falsely portray limited infiltrations as enduring advances.  
4. Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Lyman, Pokrovsk, and Velykomykhailivka.  
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We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military  
operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military  
and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict  
and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  
Ukrainian Operations in The Russian Federation  
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Nothing Significant To Report.  
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis  
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of  
Sumy City  
Russian forces continued offensive operations in Sumy and Kursk oblasts on September 6 but did not advance.  
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Russian forces attacked within Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Novomykolaivka and northeast of Sumy City near  
Yunakivka, on September 5 and 6.[22] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka, Pershe Travnya, and  
Oleksiivka (all north of Sumy City).[23]  
A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on September 6 that elements of the Russian 106th  
Airborne (VDV) Division, including elements of the 119th Airborne Regiment, are taking over responsibility of the Yunakivka area from the 104th,  
234th, and 237th VDV regiments (all of the 76th VDV Division).[24] The milblogger claimed that the 237th VDV Regiment is withdrawing from the  
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Sumy direction to an unspecified location. The milblogger claimed that the 83rd and 11th separate airborne (VDV) brigades have been operating near  
Yunakivka in coordination with the 76th VDV Division.  
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during the 2022 partial reserve call up) are reportedly operating in  
the Sumy direction, and elements of the 83rd VDV Brigade reportedly continue to operate in Sumy Oblast.[25]  
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine  
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1  
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of  
Kharkiv City.  
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 6 but did not make confirmed advances.  
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Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) and on the south (left) bank  
of the Vovcha River.[26]  
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and toward Synelnykove on September 5 and 6.[27]  
The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on September 6 that Russian forces last used heavy  
equipment in this direction in mid-May 2025 and that Russian forces continue to attack in small fireteams of up to five infantry.[28] A Russian  
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milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on September 6 that Russian forces are concentrating  
personnel east of Vovchansk and in the forest near Synelnykove.[29]  
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne on September 6 but did not make confirmed  
advances.[30]  
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2  
Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkhiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast  
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Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.  
See topline text for information on Russian advances within Kupyansk.  
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Fyholivka, southeast of Petro-Ivanivka, and to eastern  
Novovasylivka (all northeast of Kupyansk).[31]  
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Russian forces continued ground attacks near Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Sobolivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanske and toward  
Novovasylivka; and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on September 5 and 6.[32]  
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking  
Ukrainian forces near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk).[33] Drone operators of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms  
Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions with Groza Leska fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones  
near Kupyansk.[34]  
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 9 but did not make confirmed advances.  
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Zelenyi Hai (east of Borova).[35]  
Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Borova near Kolisnykivka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka, Andriivka, and Druzhelyubivka, and  
toward Olhivka on September 5 and 6.[36]  
Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.  
Assessed Ukrainian advance: Geolocated footage published on September 5 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in western  
Zarichne (northeast of Lyman).[37]  
Assessed Russian advance: Geolocated footage published on September 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern  
Shandryholove (northwest of Lyman) and reached the east (left) bank of the Netryus River.[38] Russian forces likely seek to cross the Netryus River  
and force Ukrainian troops to withdraw to more defensible positions along the eastern bank of the Oskil River.  
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman) and northeast of Yampil  
(southeast of Lyman).[39]  
Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Lyman near Karpivka and Serednie and toward Derylove and Shandryholove; north of Lyman  
near Drobysheve; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on September 5 and 6.[40]  
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Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3  
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into  
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast  
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Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on September 6 but did not make confirmed advances.  
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on September 5 that Russian forces advanced to the eastern outskirts of Dronivka (northwest of  
Siversk).[41]  
Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka;  
south of Siversk near Pereizne; and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka and Bondarne on September 5 and 6.[42]  
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Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army  
Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in Pereizne.[43]  
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on September 6 but did not advance.  
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky; south of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka and toward Pleshchiivka; south of  
Druzhkivka near Katerynivka, Rusyn Yar, and Poltavka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka on September 5 and 6.[44]  
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shcherbynivka and Katerynivka.[45]  
Kostyantynivka City Military Administration Head Serhiy Horbunov stated that Russian forces launched five FAB-250 glide bombs against  
Kostyantynivka on the morning of September 6.[46]  
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Sever-V Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) and drone operators of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division  
are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[47] Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly  
coordinating Russian airstrikes east and northeast of Kostyantynivka.[48] Drone operators of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion  
(20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Rusyn Yar.[49]  
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on September 6 but did not advance.  
Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on September 6 that Ukrainian forces recently successfully  
counterattacked in the Dobropillya tactical area and advanced at least 2.5 kilometers in an unspecified location that is reportedly “sensitive” for  
Russian forces.[50]  
Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya near Rubizhne; east of Dobropillya near Vilne and Shakhove; and southeast of Dobropillya near  
Mayak and Zapodivne on September 5 and 6.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are trying to seize Zapovidne again after  
Ukrainian forces retook the settlement one week ago (around August 30).[52]  
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly  
striking Ukrainian forces near Shakhove.[53]  
Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.  
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Assessed Russian Advances: Geolocated footage published on September 6 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of  
Myrolyubivka (northeast of Pokrovsk) during a reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault.[54] Additional geolocated footage published on  
September 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[55]  
Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; toward the Pokrovsk Railway Station in central Pokrovsk; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske, Krasnyi  
Lyman, and Sukhetske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne, Mykolaivka, Myrolyubivka, and Promin; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad and  
Kozatske; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Novoukrainka, and Shevchenko; and southwest of  
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Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and Udachne and toward Molodetske on September 5 and 6.[56] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces  
counterattacked near Myrnohrad.[57]  
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are using less equipment and conducting  
fewer infantry assaults in the area, but that Russian forces have intensified their use of fiber optic drones.[58] The spokesperson stated that Russia  
has accumulated over 100,000 troops south of Pokrovsk in order to break through to Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[59] A Ukrainian source stated on  
September 6 that Russian forces are increasingly leveraging armored vehicles in the Pokrovsk direction in order to facilitate further advances as  
Russian infantry becomes increasingly degraded.[60]  
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on September 6 but did not advance.  
Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya; and southwest of  
Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai on September 5 and 6.[61] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the Zelenyi Hai-  
Andriivka-Klevtsove area (southwest of Novopavlika).[62]  
Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.  
Assessed Russian Advances: Geolocated footage published on September 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Sichneve  
(southeast of Velyomykhailivka).[63]  
Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne and Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka,  
Oleksandrohrad, and Novoselivka; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve, Sosnivka, Maliivka, Vorone, Khoroshe, and Komyshuvakha on  
September 5 and 6.[64]  
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District  
[EMD]) and of the 69th Separate Cover Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Vremivka (Velykomykhailivka) direction.[65]  
Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near  
Kalynivske (northwest of Velykomykhailivka).[66]  
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis  
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia  
City  
Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast northeast of Hulyaipole, near Obratne, Temyrivka, and Olhivske on  
September 5 and 6 but did not advance.[67]  
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are  
reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Hulyaipole, and elements of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA) are reportedly operating in  
Zaporizhia Oblast.[68]  
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 6 but did not advance.  
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Russian forces attacked south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk; and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske on  
September 5 and 6.[69] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Plavni (west of Orikhiv).[70]  
Russian milbloggers claimed on September 6 that Russian first-person view (FPV) drones are operating in Zaporizhzhia City, suggesting that Russian  
forces now hold positions within drone range of the city.[71] One of the milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are attempting to establish fire  
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control over Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in this direction and dislodge Ukrainian forces along the GLOCs between  
Stepnohirsk,Plavni, and Prymorske.  
Order of Battle: A Ukrainian servicemember reported that the Russian military command recently redeployed the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division and four  
“new” unspecified VDV regiments to the Zaporizhia direction, reportedly to advance as close as possible to consolidate positions near Zaporizhzhia  
City.[72]  
Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Kherson direction on September 5 and 6, but did not advance.[73]  
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A Russian milblogger claimed on September 5 that Russian forces will consider any moving vehicles and critical infrastructure on Karantynnyi Island  
(west of Kherson City) to be legitimate targets and advised civilians to evacuate the area.[74]  
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[75]  
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign  
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Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline  
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 5 and 6. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian  
forces launched 91 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-  
Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[76] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 68 drones and that 18 drones struck eight unspecified  
locations in Ukraine, and drone debris struck four unspecified locations. Ukrainian authorities reported that Russian strikes killed two civilians and  
injured six others in Kherson Oblast, damaged industrial infrastructure in Slovyansk, Donetsk Oblast, and damaged civilian infrastructure in Sumy  
Oblast.[77]  
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russia has used over 1,300 strike drones, nearly 900 guided bombs, and up to 50 various  
missiles in strikes against Ukraine since the beginning of September 2025.[78]  
Significant Activity in Belarus   
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks  
The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on September 6 that Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member states concluded  
the Interaction-2025 joint exercise at the Losvido training ground in Vitebsk Oblast, Belarus.[79] The Belarusian MoD stated that over 2,000 total  
military personnel and 450 total pieces of equipment and weapons participated in the Interaction-2025 exercise.[80]  
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,  
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media, as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for  
these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.  
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