# Using simulation models to infer ecological mechanisms

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**Abstract:** ch1 of my dissertation in paper form

#### 1 Introduction

- Earth's ecosystems are immensely variable—they are the emergent result of biological processes
- that exist across spatial, temporal, and organizational scales (Levin 1992). These processes en-
- 4 able, influence and compound on one another, resulting in the immense diversity of functions
- 5 and forms of life on Earth. There has been a longstanding debate if there is any *generality*, or bet-
- 6 ter universality, to these processes (Lawton1999?). Answering this question, even in abstract,
- 7 proves difficult. How can we determine if there is some set of universal rules or mechanisms
- that underlie systems driven by many factors which interact in nonlinear and probabilistic ways
- <sup>9</sup> across separate organizational scales? We propose that this problem can be split into two parts:
- 1) deciding on the best spatial, temporal, and organizational scale at which to model an ecosys-
- tem process, and 2) after a particular scale has been chosen, determining the best model at that
- scale and associated parameters that explain a particular dataset.
- 13 The first question is to determine the proper scale to model a given system. Innumerable bi-
- ological mechanisms have been posited at various spatial, temporal, and organizational scales
- 15 (fig. 1). How does one decide the best scale at which to model a processes, or at what scale it is
- best to look for universality?

#### 17 (LevinsLewontin?) write

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- The problem for science is to understand the proper domain of explanation of each
- abstraction rather than become its prisoner.
- The second question is, after a given scale is selected, to select the best model from a set of
- 21 competing models at that scale. This question is primarily implicated with prediction—that is,
- what model best predicts ecological systems at a particular scale? This has applied need as
- forecasting is an imperative in ecology. Some scales are more predictable than others.

#### [Figure 1 about here.]

- (Lawton1999?) argues that as an organizational scale, the ecology community is frought with
- 6 too many "contingencies" in order to find universality. Partially in response to Lawton's pa-

- per, the metacommunity framework (Leibold2003MetCom?) sought to address the inherently
- spatial nature of metacommunity processes. Vellend (2010) posits four fundamental processes,
- 29 analogous to evolutionary genetics. (Poisot2015BeySpe?) also notes the importance of varia-
- 30 tion in traits and abundance. Necessary additional spatial and temporal dimension to community
- processes. The scales at which we propose mechanisms are subject to selection bias based on
- the data we can collect—looking for lost keys where the light is better.
- 33 The data we collect from ecological systems is inherently noisy. This data contains information
- produced by a combination of the amalgamation of "true" ecological and evolutionary mecha-
- nisms (interacting in unknown ways) compounded by sampling biases.
- 36 What is in this paper? We argue that advances in computational resources and methods for
- likelihood-free inference put us in the place where simulation models can enable us to test more
- complex interaction mechanisms (Cranmer, Brehmer, and Louppe 2020). We present a concep-
- tual framework for determining the best model from a set of competing simulation models. We
- then present an example where we fit data from LTER wisconsin fish to both individual-species
- level and community level simulation models to determine which provides better predictions
- about occupancy over time. ScientificML (Rackauckas et al. 2020).

### A state-space perspective on ecological mechanisms

- 44 In order to present the conceptual framework for simulation-based inference, we first need to
- propose some definitions. This conceptual framework is based around consider the *dynamics*
- of a metacommunity system by considering the *geometry* of how that system changes in *state*-
- 47 space.
- 48 Dynamical systems is the subfield of mathematics related to systems that change over time.
- Often by applying a geometric perspective to state-space. What is state space?
- 50 What is an ecological mechanism? A mechanism describes how the state of a system changes
- 51 from one timestep to the next.
- A mapping between low dimensional latent/parameter space and information space.

- 53 Why is simulation necessary in ecology? They allow us to produce data that encodes explicit
- mechanism (Crutchfield 1992).
- 55 Metacommunity states and mechanisms Within this abstraction, a metacommunity state is a set
- of measurements for species across locations at a single point in time, which can be represented
- 57 as a matrix: a grid of measurements where each row corresponds to location and each column
- to species.

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- 59 Metacommunity dynamics and tensors Across timepoints, a set of states form trajectories which
- 60 can be represented as a a tensor.

[Figure 2 about here.]

### 2 Using simulation to infer mechanisms in ecology

- Simulation models have a long history in ecology. cite some examples.
- Still, fitting simulation models to data is difficult. ^what does this mean to someone who doesn't
- 65 know what fitting means
- 66 No likelihood function. General problem of high-dimensional model, compounded by little data.
- 67 What is enabling this now? computational capacity and methods for optimization parameter
- estimation. More data.

[Figure 3 about here.]


## Case study: species versus community level occupancy models

- In this section we use data from LTER Minnesota lakes for five fish species. We look at the occu-
- pancy dynamics of five species (list species) across NS sites for each year from 198something-
- 73 200something. We fit two simulation models via likelihood-free inference: first where each
- <sub>74</sub> species exhibit independent occupancy dynamics, and second where each species has the same
- c and e value.

- 76 Independent Species Model We simulate dynamics where each species i has a colonization
- probability  $c_i$  and an extinction probability  $e_i$ . These are assumed to be a fixed value for each
- 78 species which does not vary over time.
- 79 *Unified Model* The colonization for each species i is c, extinction probability is e.
  - [Figure 4 about here.]
- 81 Results figure Panel A: AUC-ROC for single species prediction Panel B: AUC-ROC for unified
- prediction Panel C: Mean error for proportion occupancy for each model.
- 83 Assessing fit

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Prior



- <sup>84</sup> Test it on simulated data to see if it works.
- 85 We need to talk about summary statistics

- 86 Is proportion more "predictable" than individual occupancy?
- Which ones make effective predictions? What models do we use to fit empirical data to simulated
- 88 (generative adversarial networks, MCMC-ABC methods, etc.)
- 89 Caveats on more complex models for this simple example. Refer to up-to-date resources on
- 90 model fitting an assessment.

### Predictive ecology as a scientific epistemology

- What scales are inherently more predictable.
- Here we propose that simulation models have the potential to infer This results in the question:
- what are the mechanisms best describe a set of data?
- 95 Science is fundamentally a theory of epistemology: a methodology and set of principles to make
- 96 justified claims about the world. Descriptive claims about the world (the Earth goes around the
- 97 sun, more species are found near the equator than far from it) are considered justified if they
- 98 make predictions that agree with observed reality.

describes, it must be rather simple.

- The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to interpret, they mainly make models. By a model is meant a mathematical construct which, with the addition of certain verbal interpretations, describes observed phenomena. The justification of such a mathematical construct is solely and precisely that it is expected to work that is correctly to describe phenomena from a reasonably wide area. Furthermore, it must satisfy certain esthetic criteria that is, in relation to how much it
- John Von Neumann

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- The electron is a theory we use; it is so useful in understanding the way nature works
- that we can almost call it real.
- Richard P. Feynman

- The whole idea of searching for "laws" (Lawton) rests on an assumption that there are universal
- All models are wrong is not just about statistical models.
- In order to determine if a descriptive claim agrees with reality, it must be translated into a quanti-
- tative model that makes predictions about things that can be measured. These quantitative mod-
- els take many forms. A subclass of these models, mechanistic models, represent latent processes
- that can not be observed or measured, either inherently or due to technological limitations.
- Different levels of conceptual abstraction have proven successful in predicting how biological
- systems change over time.
- 118 Still, predicting how ecosystems will change in the future remains a fundamental goal of ecology.
- There is variation in the what scales are best for prediction (Brodie et al. 2021), and some forms
- of dynamics are intrinsically complex enough to avoid effective prediction at all (Pennekamp et
- al. 2019; Beckage, Gross, and Kauffman 2011; Chen, Angulo, and Liu 2019).

### 22 Conclusion

- What does is mean for a model to be correct? Take the logistic model, for example. Although
- logistic growth is observed in many model and to some degree non-model systems, it is hard to
- say there is some intrinsic truth to this—i.e. that logistic growth is an ecological "law." The phe-
- nomena of population dynamics are the result of individual organisms being born, reproducing,
- and dying at a lower level of organization, but the logistic model is a useful abstraction under
- 128 some circumstances.
- 129 It is useful the notion that a model represents some "truth" about the world, instead models have
- vary in their usefulness, predictive accuracy is one measure of this usefulness. The problem is
- you cannot tell the difference —Hume and the induction problem.
- 132 If a simulation makes data the looks like real data, does it represent the "true" world? Does it
- matter? Newtonian Gravity was "right," until GR was more right. Different models at different
- levels of abstract provide varying levels of predictive accuracy. Mechanisms that are incorrect
- that produce information that shares statistical properties with empirical data can still be useful.

- What are the limitations of the utility of mechanistic simulations. There are limits to the scope of simulation models. How do we know when they are appropriate, versus a ML/non-mechanistic 137
- model? Need for flexible set of tools to do this, setting up the next chapter.

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


Figure 1: Conceptual space with three axes.




Figure 2: A mechanism is a flow on the state space.





Figure 3: Likelihood free inference for metacommunity ecology



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Figure 4: here's the fit as of now for individual species