

CSCI 7000-001 Distributed Systems Verification

Lec 1: Introduction



CU Programming Languages
& Verification

Introductions

- **About me:** Gowtham Kaki



- Assistant Professor, Dept. of Computer Science
- New to CU Boulder - Joined Fall 2020
- PhD from Purdue University, 2019.
 - Thesis: Automatic Reasoning Techniques for Non-Serializable Data-Intensive Applications
- Research: Programming Languages and Formal Methods. Applications in Concurrent and Distributed Systems.
- Best known for Quelea (PLDI 2015) and MRDTs (OOPSLA 2019).
- Enjoy reading pop-science books (recent: Emperor of All Maladies) and biographies/memoirs (recent: Hillbilly Elegy). Amateur cartoonist and racquetball player. Maker of terrible puns.

- **About you?**

- Name
- Academic program
- Research interests
- Other interests


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- Key learning objective is to appreciate and internalize **a scientific approach to building and reasoning about distributed systems.**
- We shall learn formal mathematics to reason about distributed systems, and apply it to design novel systems.
- Why do we need formal mathematics?

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


Leslie Lamport

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Leslie Lamport

- Distributed systems are complex beasts.
 - Sloppy thinking is easy.
 - Sloppy thinking → terrible systems.



Course structure

- Seminar-style course:
 - Part 1: Instructor-led lectures (10-12).
 - Part 2: Student-led paper presentations and discussions ($\geq 2 \times \# \text{students}$).
- Lectures review the foundations of distributed systems; introduce relevant formal methods & tools.

• Asynchronicity	• Safety and Liveness	• State transition systems	• TLA+/PlusCal
• Logical Time & Vector Clocks	• FLP & CAP Impossibilities	• Temporal Logic of Actions	• Ivy
• Consensus	• Paxos, Raft etc	• Inductive reasoning	
• Fault tolerance	• Byzantine faults	• Program Logics	
		• Refinement Proof Technique	
- Papers presentations review the state-of-the-art in scientific approach to building distributed systems.
 - Tentative list of papers is posted on the course website. List evolves as the semester progresses.

Grading

Item	Weight
Programming assignment (TLA/PlusCal or IVy)	25%
Research paper presentations	30%
Exploratory project based on a research paper	30%
Contributing to paper discussions	15%

Grading


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- Important: the intent of grading is *not* to evaluate you, but to incentivize learning.
- Partial credit shall be awarded wherever possible.
- Efforts to think creatively and try something new shall be rewarded even if the outcome is not a total success.
- Let's learn together and have fun!

Introduction to distributed systems & formal reasoning


Distributed System

- System of interconnected computers coordinating to execute a computational task.



Distributed System


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- In an ideal world:
 - Nodes never crash.
 - Network never fails (latency is finite and known).
 - No message is ever lost or corrupted.

Distributed System


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- Characterized by partial failures
 - Sub-components can fail independently.
 - Worse: It's impossible to reliably detect failures!

Distributed System

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
* Sub component may fail.
because internal error
* Network may fail.
* Network may lose the message.

How to handle failures?


Non answer: terminate the program on every failure.

How to handle failures?

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


Failure scenarios accumulate



```
for(i=2; i<5; i++) {  
    resp[i] = send(R[i], msg[i]);  
    //....  
}
```

Failure scenarios accumulate




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Scenarios:


- $\text{send}(R_2, \dots)$ fails.
- $\text{send}(R_2, \dots)$ succeeds, but $\text{send}(R_3, \dots)$ fails
- $\text{send}(R_2, \dots)$ and $\text{send}(R_3, \dots)$ succeed, but $\text{send}(R_4, \dots)$ fails.

$\cancel{x^5}$
 $\cancel{x^5}$
IS failure scenario

Failure scenarios multiply



Failure scenarios multiply



Failure scenarios multiply

- Exhaustively testing a non-trivial distributed system is practically impossible!

Failure scenarios multiply

- Exhaustively testing a non-trivial distributed system is practically impossible!
- Debugging is nightmarish!

From Leesatapornwongsa et al, OSDI'14:

ZooKeeper Bug #335: (1) Nodes A, B, C start with latest txid #10 and elect B as leader, (2) *B crashes*, (3) Leader election re-run; C becomes leader, (4) Client writes data; A and C commit new txid-value pair {#11:X}, (5) *A crashes before* committing tx #11, (6) C loses quorum, (7) *C crashes*, (8) *A reboots* and *B reboots*, (9) A becomes leader, (10) Client updates data; A and B commit a new txid-value pair {#11:Y}, (11) *C reboots after* A's new tx commit, (12) C synchronizes with A; C notifies A of {#11:X}, (13) A replies to C the “diff” starting with tx 12 (excluding tx {#11:Y}!), (14) Violation: permanent data inconsistency as A and B have {#11:Y} and C has {#11:X}.

14 steps!

Testing vs Formal Verification

- E.g., “slow” multiplication.

```
// Assume m>=0 and n>=0
int slow_multiply(int m, int n) {
    int s = 0, i = 0;
    while(i<n){
        s = s + m;
        i = i + 1;
    }
    return s;
}
```

- $\text{slow_multiply}(m, n) = mxn$


32 bits
 $2^{32} \times 2^{32} = 2^{64}$
18 quintillion
Combinations of unique test inputs!

Testing vs Formal Verification

- E.g., “slow” multiplication.

We assume $m \& n$ are non-negative to begin with


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Let's use a Control-Flow Automaton (CFA) as a mathematical model of the program. We would like to prove that in the final state, $\underline{s = mxn}$

Testing vs Formal Verification




Let's use a Control-Flow Automaton (CFA) as a mathematical model of the program. We would like to prove that in the final state, $s = m \times n$


Final state has two incoming transitions. If we know the values of s & i before each transition, we can then assert something about their values after the transition. However, we only know the values at initial state, so we can only do this for 1 transition directly.

Testing vs Formal Verification

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Testing vs Formal Verification



What about the other transitions?


Unfortunately, here we don't know the precise values of S & i in the pre-state. The values are defined "recursively" in terms of themselves.

For proof to work, we have to "untangle" this recursion and come up with a formula Φ s.t. Φ is true as long as the control is at the intermediate state (pre-state for final transition; circled in blue)

I claim $\Phi = i \leq n \wedge S = m \times i$

How did I come up with this Φ ? purely based on the intuition, but there are automatic methods for this (lookup research on "inductive invariant inference").

Testing vs Formal Verification



Can be replaced by
 $i \leq n \wedge S = m \times i$

with the intermediate state replaced

by formula $\varphi = i \leq n \wedge S = m \times i$, let's see
if we can now reason about second transition.

For the second transition:

$m \geq 0 \wedge n \geq 0$ (pre condition)

$i \leq n \wedge S = m \times i$: (property of pre-state)

$i \geq n$ (transition condition)


$\Rightarrow i = n \Rightarrow S = m \times n$

Testing vs Formal Verification

- E.g., “slow” multiplication.

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```

- Prove $\text{slow_multiply}(m, n) = mxn$



(1) Base Case : $m \geq 0 \wedge n \geq 0 \wedge s \geq 0 \wedge i = 0 \wedge i \leq n$
 (yellow transition)

$$\Rightarrow i \leq n \wedge s = mx^i$$

(2) Inductive Case . $i \leq n \wedge s = mx^i \wedge i \leq n$
 (red transition)



$$\Rightarrow i+1 \leq n \wedge s + m = mx^{(i+1)}$$

Formal Verification for Distributed Systems

- How do we formalize a distributed system/program?

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
Formal Verification for Distributed Systems

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- What are the properties of interest? How are they specified?

LTV, wanting to fol,

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slow_multiply(m,n) = mxn




Formal Verification for Distributed Systems

- How do we formalize a distributed system/program?
- What are the properties of interest? How are they specified?
- How do we prove those properties (automatically)?

*we hand-wrote informal manual proof of correctness for slow-mul.
we don't want to do this for complex distributed programs. How do we automate the reasoning?*

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Induction



```
resp = send(R[2],msg);
switch (resp->errno) {
    case SEND_FAILED:
        // R2 never got the msg.
        case TIMEOUT:
        // R2 may or may not have received the msg.
        case RETRY:
        // R2 got the msg, but could not respond
        // due to a transient internal error.
        case INVALID_REQ:
        // R2 received corrupt or invalid msg.
        case INVALID_RES:
        // R2's response is corrupt or invalid.
        case SUCCESS:
        // msg sent and response received
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Formal Verification for Distributed Systems

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 - What are the properties of interest? How are they specified?
 - How do we prove those properties (automatically)?
- +
- Effective testing strategies
 - Design principles
 - Domain-specific reasoning techniques

This course!

