


LAELIUS DE AMICITIA
M. TULLII CICERONIS



EDITED BY

A. SIDGWICK, M.A.

Assistant-Master at Rugby School, and late Fellow of Trinity College,
Cambridge

Rivingtons

Waterloo Place, London

Oxford and Cambridge

MDCCCLXXVIII

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PREFACE

In preparing this little edition of the "De Amicitia" I have kept in mind the requirements of the students who enter for the University Local examinations; and at the same time have endeavoured to make it suitable for those who read it in schools, or with a view to Matriculation examinations.

In the Introduction I have tried to explain fully the circumstances, object, and drift of the treatise; and in the notes to leave no allusion or grammatical difficulty unnoticed, and at the same time to help the learner to a suitable translation of the more difficult phrases. The difficulty of translating Cicero seldom lies in the meaning, which to any but a beginner is usually clear; but the phrases are often hard to render aptly in English. It has been my endeavour to meet all the needs of those who wish to read and understand fully the treatise, possessing only a dictionary and grammar.

The scheme of the subjunctive, I have been induced to add, from my experience both of schoolboys and also students reading by themselves for the Local examinations, whom I have occasionally assisted. Such readers often find themselves lost in the multiplicity of uses of this mood in Latin, and cannot spare the time to hunt, often without success, each usage in the grammar. The result is a most slipshod and vague notion of the subjunctive, which makes them miss innumerable points in the Latin.

At first sight many of the notes may appear too elementary. I venture to anticipate, however, that this view is more likely to be taken by critics than by teachers and if so, I shall be satisfied. In any case it is easy to omit such notes as are superfluous.

The following books have been used in the preparation of this edition; and to them my best acknowledgments are due:

- Laelius De Amicitia, ed. Madvig, Copenhagen, 1835.
- Laelius De Amicitia, ed. Nauck, Berlin, 1875.
- Laelius De Amicitia, ed. Lahmeyer, Leipzig, 1875.
- Laelius De Amicitia, ed. Koch, Hanover, 1852.
- Cicero De Republica, ed. Angelo Mai, Rome, 1823.
- Cicero Select Letters, ed. Watson, Oxford, 1874.

With the text I have not had very much to do, as the differences are very slight between the various editions. Madvig, though he published his text forty years ago, has shown his usual acumen and great knowledge of Latin; and I have compared his text all through, and taken note of all his comments. The best MS., however (P. or the Paris text) was not known at the time of his edition; and this forms the base of Nauck's and Lahmeyer's text, to which I have mainly trusted, as well as of Halm's and Baiter's recensions, which I have carefully considered.

The chief points I have given at the end of the notes. Mai's edition of the *Republic* has been useful for the speakers in the dialogue and the Scipionic circle; and Watson for the facts about Cicero, and the dates of his compositions.

I have endeavoured to profit by recent improvements in the accuracy of Latin spelling, to which increasing attention has been paid in England ever since Mr. Munro published his Lucretius. On this head I owe thanks to an excellent little edition of Cicero's *Pro Archia*, published by Mr. J.S. Reid, of Christ's College, Cambridge. It is scarcely

necessary to mention such works as Middleton's *Cicero*, and Mommsen's *History of Rome*: the latter of which I have consulted constantly.

INTRODUCTION

TIME AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DIALOGUE.

The *De Amicitia* was written in B.C.44, a few months after the assassination of Julius Caesar. Cicero had joined Pompey before Pharsalia, and after the overthrow of the Pompeian party had been pardoned by Caesar and returned to Rome. Finding not much further scope for his oratorical abilities in the senate or courts, and no further political work or scheming open to him, now that the "condition of the country" (to use his own words, *Nat. Deor.* i. 4, 7) "was such that it had to be guided by the diligence and judgment of one man", he betook himself to the composition of works on philosophical subjects and literary essays. The rapidity with which he worked (even if we admit, as we must, that the philosophical value of these writings is not great, and that most of the lighter treatises are but dull reading), is still most extraordinary. In this last year but one of his life (he was killed by order of Antony in December 43), he wrote besides lesser works the *De Natura Deorum*, *De Divinatione*, *De Gloria*, *De Officiis*, *De Senectute*, *De Amicitia* a large number of letters, and the first four Philippic speeches against Antony; and he finished and published the long dialogue called the *Tusculanae Disputationes*.

DEDICATION

The *De Amicitia* is addressed to Cicero's most intimate friend T. Pomponius Atticus, a worthy recipient of a work on that subject. He was a Roman eques of Cicero's own age, who was so thoroughly familiar with Greek literature and had lived so long at Athens as to earn the name Atticus, or "the Athenian". Amid the unhappiness, perplexities, and vacillations of Cicero's public life, it is pleasant to think of the constant affection which united him to Atticus, and the great solace it was to him. The correspondence between them (of

which 396 letters from Cicero to Atticus are preserved) lasted from B.C.68 to 44, with but few gaps of any length; and is one of the most interesting and instructive memorials of antiquity.

SCHEME OF THE DIALOGUE

The essay on Friendship is thrown into the form of a dialogue; and the circumstances he explains to his readers in the dedication to Atticus, which is prefixed to the work.

He says that he remembers, when quite young, hearing Q.Mucius Scaevola the augur, who was son-in-law of Laelius, relate to him a conversation about friendship, held some forty years before between Laelius and his two sons-in-law, Scaevola himself, and Fannius. The occasion on which Scaevola repeated this conversation was *à propos* of the rupture between two persons who had been great friends, Sulpicius Rufus and Q.Pompeius, in the year 88. Cicero was then a youth of 18. The conversation itself is supposed to have taken place a few days after the death of Scipio Africanus, i.e. in 129. Cicero, writing in 44, professes to remember "the drift" or "thoughts" of this dialogue, as reported by Scaevola; but to have dramatised it, in order to make it less tiresome to the reader. It is pretty clear that there is more of Cicero than of Laelius in this treatise. Laelius spoke of friendship in 129. Forty-one years later Scaevola related the dialogue to Cicero. Forty-four years later again Cicero dramatises it for Atticus and the world.

In many of his philosophical works Cicero adopts the dialogue form, no doubt in imitation of Plato. The imitation is, however, a good way from the original. It is not merely that Plato is a consummate master of irony, playfulness, variety, and vivacity of dialogue, in fact, a dramatic writer of the highest genius; and that Cicero is neither humorous nor dramatic. But in Plato the interchange of question and answer, and the investigation of truth by that means, is the very essence of the Socratic method. Somebody states or defines something; and the truth is then found, or rather sought, by cross-examining this statement or definition¹. In Cicero it is quite otherwise. The dialogue is a mere artificial setting. The interlocutors are lay-

¹ It is true that in the later dialogues the dramatic element becomes very secondary: they are no longer a search for truth, but an exposition of a system. But this does not make the case for Cicero any better. If he was to imitate Plato, why not Plato at his best?

figures, who make a few remarks at the beginning, or in the pauses: while the main disquisition soon falls into the hands of the leading personage, who delivers a long harangue on the subject, and ends with a peroration.

The merits of the *De Amicitia* as of all Cicero's philosophic works or essays, lie mainly in the style. Cicero founded the "Latin prose style": and the treatise before us is a good example of it. The treatment of his subject may be not very original or profound; but the style is varied, and easy, and bright; and the expression all through is marked by the orator's rich and discriminating vocabulary, his neatness of structure, his balance of period, and his delicate ear for sound. It is for these reasons chiefly that Cicero has been read so much: and for these reasons he deserves, and will doubtless continue, to be read.

CHARACTERS OF THE DIALOGUE: THE SCIPIONIC CIRCLE

"Discourses of this kind" says Cicero (*Amic. i. 4*), "seem somehow to come with more force when they are put into the mouth of distinguished men of old times"; and it will be well to give a short account of the extremely distinguished company, of whom Laelius was one, and who were gathered round the younger Scipio, from about 170-130 B.C. They included philosophers and politicians, poets and dramatists, generals and orators, Romans and foreigners. They were thoroughly versed in the Greek speech and literature, and while they rather tended to discourage any native literary movement, their influence was strong in the direction of truer criticism, higher culture, and, in particular, the purification of the idiom and style of the Latin language. Cicero himself had a great admiration for them on many grounds, political as well as literary. He introduces a whole company of them in the work *De Republica* written about ten years before the treatise on "friendship". And in this book, besides the prominence given to Scipio's sayings and doings, several others of the Scipionic circle are mentioned; and Laelius, the main speaker, was a leading personage of the group. So that it will enable the reader to understand the book better if a short account is given of the principal persons among them.

[Scipio Aemilianus Africanus](#). — First comes Scipio himself. His full name was *L.Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus Numantinus*; and

he was the most prominent Roman of his age. He was son of Aemilius Paulus, victor of Pydna, and had been adopted a Scipio by the son of the great Africanus who ended the 2nd Punic war. [See Pedigree of the Scipios in the following]. He was born about 185, distinguished himself as military tribune in Spain, 151, and again in Africa, in the 3rd Punic war; was elected consul by acclamation, though under age, in 147, and in the next year, 146, took and destroyed Carthage. When the war in Spain had dragged on unsuccessfully for some years, Scipio was again called to the consulship, and in 133 captured Numantia. Politically, Scipio belonged to the moderate aristocratic or senatorial party. He felt the evils which moved Tiberius Gracchus (his brother-in-law) to his bold attempt at reform in 133, but did not side with him; and when Gracchus had been slain in the riot, Scipio on his return from Spain expressed cold approval of his fate. The agrarian law of Gracchus was still, however, in force: and at first Scipio helped to get it efficiently administered. Later, in 129, he thought it had gone far enough, and mainly through his influence it was shelved. A few days later, after a *great day* (§12) when Scipio had been escorted home by large crowds of senators and Latins, he was found dead in his bed. He, was murdered, most probably by some enraged democrat (§12, 41).

Not merely was he “the first general and statesman of his age” (Momms. iii. 104), but, himself a man of the highest culture and no mean orator, he gathered round him a most remarkable society of men of thought and men of letters.

Laelius. — The eldest of the group was Laelius himself, whose friendship with Scipio Cicero constantly mentions as an illustrious example of what friendship should be. He was rather the elder of the two (§15), being born about 190. In 146, Laelius fought under Scipio in Africa, and was praetor 145, consul 140 (§96). He distinguished himself against Viriathus in Spain in 145. He was, however, more a man of thought than action, and was devoted to philosophy, being an adherent of the Stoic school. In politics, he plainly followed Scipio.

There are also the two younger speakers in the dialogue, Scaevola and Fannius, sons-in-law of Laelius, and both speakers in the dialogue *De Republica*.

Scaevola. — *Quintus Mucius Scaevola*, the Augur (who must be carefully distinguished from the younger and greater *Quintus Mucius Scaevola*, the Pontifex Maximus, probably his cousin's son: both being

mentioned here in §1). He was learned in the law, and published some books on the subject: so is always spoken of with respect.

Fannius. — Caius Fannius is mentioned by Cicero as the author of a not inelegant history, and is praised for his gift of expression. Not much is known about him. He was the elder of the two sons-in-law (Amicit. §32).

Polybius. — Among the earliest of Scipio's friends was Polybius, the gifted Greek historian, who came, 167, as one of a thousand Achaean hostages sent to Rome. Scipio, then 18 years old, got leave for Polybius to live at his father's house, and became his intimate friend. The Greek lived 17 years at Rome, and accompanied Scipio on all his expeditions. He is, however, not mentioned in the *De Amicitia*.

Philus. — Younger than Scipio was *L. Furius Philus* (§14, 69, 101). He was consul 136, see note on §14. He was like the rest a cultivated man, is said by Cicero (Brut. 28) to have been "an excellent speaker, remarkable for the purity of his style"; and from the *De Republica* we learn that he was acquainted with astronomy. Like Laelius, he is one of the speakers in the *De Republica*.

Mummius. — *Spurius Mummius* (§ 69, 101), the brother of L. Mummius, the conqueror of Corinth, was a student of Stoicism, and a man (says Cicero) of moderate eloquence. From Cicero (Att. xiii. 6) we learn that he wrote amusing verses. He is also a speaker in the *De Republica*.

Tubero. — *Q. Aelius Tubero*, nephew of Scipio by his sister Aemilia, a Stoic philosopher, and learned in the law. Cicero (Brut. 31) says he was a man of strict life (severus), inferior as a speaker, but learned in philosophy. He also calls him a "man of principle and character" (fortis et constans), by which he probably means a firm supporter of the nobility. He is mentioned here (§ 37 and 101) as a friend of Laelius from his early youth, and an opponent of Ti. Gracchus. He, again, is one of the company in the *De Republica* and was clearly one of the younger members of the circle (See also Pedigree of the Scipios).

Rutilus Rufus. — Another of the youthful members was P. Rutilus Rufus, called by Laelius (§ 101) "a very young man". He was evidently a very cultivated man, learned in the law and in philosophy, an orator and writer. He was also a man of firm and incorruptible character (see note on (§ 101).

Two other remarkable men are mentioned as friends of Scipio: though one died when Scipio was a youth, the other was a youth when Scipio died. Neither of them is mentioned here.

Terence, 195-159. — The poet *P. Terentius Afer* was a Carthaginian slave who was educated and freed by his master, and took to writing comedies. His first play excited the admiration of Scipio (who was ten years younger, a boy of 17), and Terence became a friend of him and of Laelius. But the friendship only lasted a few years, as Terence left Rome, and died at the age of 36. His six comedies are extant; and he is quoted here in §89, and again §93.


Lucilius, 148-103. — The other was *C. Lucilius*, the inventor of satire, or at least the first Roman satirist of mark, well-known by Horace's references to him as a rough-and-ready composer and unsparing in censure. He is said to have been an intimate friend of Laelius and Scipio, but it must be borne in mind that he was only 19 when Scipio died at the age of 56.

Cato. — A word must be said finally about the great Cato, though he died B.C. 149, at the age of 85, when Scipio was only 36, and though he had quarrelled so desperately with the elder generation of Scipios, that he can hardly at any time have been much of a friend to the younger. He was in many ways a remarkable man, being all through his life a firm supporter of the *old* Roman republican ideal — a state of sturdy farmer citizens and soldiers, and senatorial government by the old families. However good this ideal may have been of old, it had clearly become untenable when Rome had entered on her career of conquest. Cato traced much of the evil tendencies of the day to Greek customs and influence of Greek literature and thought; and his attack on all luxury and "un-Roman manners" as he thought them began with the cultivated Scipios, and was continued with a narrow and unsparing persistency through his remarkable censorship.

In after years, it was the fashion to regard Cato as the typical virtuous Roman: a fashion for which there was doubtless some ground, but which was carried to extremes, from political motives, by the senatorial partisans and especially by Cicero. In his old age — his temperance and splendid constitution enabled him to live to 85 (see §5) — he became somewhat softened, and even was brought into a certain connexion with the Scipios by the marriage of his son with Aemilia, the sister of Africanus. So Cicero, in the dialogue *De Senectute*, chooses him as the type of noble old age, and makes the

conversation on that subject be carried on by Cato, Scipio, and Laelius. It is related that at last he modified his hatred of Greek literature, and confessed that Homer and Demosthenes were worth reading; though to the end he was a bitter opponent of Greek influence, of higher culture, and of luxury in all forms. Cato is referred to in *De Amicitia*, § 4, 5, 6, 9, 11, 21, 90, 101.

§ 5.—PEDIGREE OF THE SCIPIOS.



CONSPECTUS OF THE DIALOGUE

To assist the less advanced reader, I have thought it better to give both a *conspectus* and an *analysis* of the dialogue. The first gives a detailed sketch of the matter: and the latter puts the drift into a skeleton-form, in so far as it is possible with Cicero's somewhat loose structure. For the author wrote more for the general reader than the student or philosopher, and the treatment is rhetorical rather than logical; containing digressions, enlivened with anecdote and allusions; perhaps not very strict in arrangement, and even liable to repetition. But the general purpose and plan is fairly clear, and as such I have tried to present it.

- i. When young I used to visit Mucius Scaevola the Augur, who told many stories about his father-in-law Laelius (1). I remember a talk once about the quarrel between Sulpicius and Pompeius, who had been friends (2): and Scaevola related to us a discussion on friendship between Laelius, himself, and Fannius (3). You have often asked me to write on friendship: I have obeyed you, by writing down this dialogue, in a dramatic shape. Laelius is an appropriate eulogist of friendship, being himself a true friend; and with equal appropriateness I dedicate the dialogue to you (4-5).

The Dialogue.

- ii. **Fannius.** — They all regard you as the wisest of men, Laelius: wiser than Cato, or the Greeks, and wish to know how you bear the death of Africanus (6-8).

Scaevola. — I reply you feel it, but show self-control.

Laelius. — Thank you; but you underrate Cato: see

- iii. how he bore the loss of his son (9-10): as to Scipio, I feel his death; but am consoled by thinking that his life was happy (11) and his death rapid and opportune.
- iv. (12). The immortality of the soul I hold, with the best of the philosophers (13); and so did Scipio: whose soul is then more happy in his new life? (14) In any case it is a great consolation to think of our friendship (15)

Fa. and Scaev. — Please talk about friendship (16).

- v. **Lael.** — I would if I had the power: it is the most precious human treasure. Only good men can really have friendship; and by “good” I don’t mean the philosopher’s *ideal* good, which does not exist in real life, but men who show good qualities (18-19). Nature has implanted a certain sympathy, greater as the bond is closer; but friendship making its selection out of the whole world is much more powerful (20).
- vi. Friendship is the best gift of the gods, next to wisdom: if you count virtue the *summum bonum*, virtue is the base of friendship (21). Friendship covers the whole of life (22).
- vii. Friendship keeps up our hopes and energies, defies absence, poverty, even death. Goodwill is the bond of society (23); nay, Empedocles explained even the combinations of nature, by referring them to love! It appeals to every heart: witness the applause in the theatre at the devoted love of Pylades and Orestes! (24).

Fannius. — Please go on.

Scaevola. — You can plead the cause of friendship as well as you did that of justice (25).

- viii. **Laelius.** — What is the origin of friendship? Not interest, for the friendship that rests on that is often hollow, but nature; and it is seen in beasts as well as men (26-27). Virtue in another is *naturally* attractive
- ix. (28). To derive it from interest is to degrade it (29), and would make the most deficient men the best friends, which is absurd (30). Such a doctrine is worthy of the Epicureans, and fails to account for the permanency of friendship, which outlives mere interest (32). Do you agree?

F. and S. — Yes.

- x. Then hear Scipio’s views: He thought friendship liable to many dangers, divergence of interest and opinion (33), competition for marriage connexion or honours (34), or demand for some dishonourable service (35); e.g. traitors’ friends clearly ought to refuse aid (36). Blossius of Cumae was plainly wrong in saying he would have followed Gracchus in setting fire to Rome (37). The best men do not ask any disgraceful service; but you cannot lay down a rule than a man should follow his friend, human wisdom being imperfect (38-39).

- xi. Friends therefore must refuse shameful service; and the rule is all the more needful as the times are dangerous (40-41). Themistocles and Coriolanus found no supporters (42-43).
- xii. True friendship demands therefore a high code of duty (44). The idea of certain sophists, that it is safer to love but little, and so be free from care, is low (45); or that friendship is due to weakness, requiring aid (47). All virtue involves trouble: to be free from emotion is to be a stock and stone (47-48). Virtue is the cement of friendship (49). The good have a natural attraction for each other (50). The delight is the love itself, not the mere gain of aid — nay, friendship is evoked by rendering service, not receiving them (51). The wealthiest and most powerful tyrants have fewest friends; e.g. Tarquin (52-53). Prosperity is even a bar to friendship, as leading to arrogance (54). They desire luxury only, and end in being friendless and miserable (55).
- xiii. How far is love to go: Not (1) love your friend as yourself: many acts are done for friends which no one would do for himself (56-57). Nor (2) love as you are loved: such measurement of affection is foreign to the spirit of friendship (58). Nor (3) measure out your love according to your friend's estimate: often he is too diffident. Nor (4), as Bias said, "Love as though you would one day hate, i.e. with reserve (59); rather never begin a friendship which is likely to end (60). xvii. Let union with good friends therefore be complete, even stretching a point to please them, but avoiding grave wrong (61). Be careful in the selection — Scipio complains of the little care men give— and since you must be friends first before you can test a man (62), let friendship begin moderately; and try him in various ways. Money is a good test, ambition a severe one (63)
- xiv. Prosperity and adversity are both good tests (64). A friend should be *trusty*, and not *suspicious* (65).
- xv. Also gentle and kindly (66). *Old* friends are the best (67). Not that new ones should be abjured; but old associations are justly strong (68). Above all, a friend should be on footing of *equality* with his humbler friends (69): confer aid and honour on them (70).
- xvi. So the humbler should accept their inferiority: and avoid expostulating or claiming credit (71). And the great should help on the humbler (72), according to the capacity of each (73). *Childish* friendships constitute no obligation to remain

- friends, on the principle that friends must have like interests, though they should not be rudely dropped (74). A weak complaisance must be resisted (75).
- xvii. Friends must sometimes be dropped, gently, if possible (76). If changes make it necessary, it should be done, but gradually; and never turn to active hostility (77-78). Choose slowly, and choose worthily: a worthy friend is rare; but most men fail, from having only self-interest at heart (79). You should love your friend for his own sake (80): even beasts want comrades; and how much more men! (81).
- xviii. In addition to all the other rules, friends should *respect* each other (82), and so be helpers in virtue, not partners in vice (83): so we should attend to virtue (84), and not find out our mistake when too late (85).
- xix. Opinions differ about what is desirable: all agree that friendship is so (86). Even misanthropes require society: and all luxuries, with solitude, would be only misery (87). Even the beatific vision would be nothing if seen alone (88).
- xx. Offence should be avoided though it should be faced when needful to warn a friend (88). Truth may give offence; but it is his fault who takes offence (89); he is offended at the wrong thing, not his error, but his friend's remonstrance (90).
- xxi. *Flattery* is the worst bane of friendship (91); it saps the union and simplicity of the bond (92). What more fickle than a parasite? (93). Still worse is an influential man acting a parasite's part (94). A flatterer can be discerned however with care (95). Instances of even the mob detecting and repudiating their flatterers (96).
- xxii. How much greater must the power of truth be in friendship! (97). It is the vain and insincere who chiefly listen to flattery (98), though even others may be in danger from it (99).
- xxiii. Peroration. Virtue is the bond of friendship, once more, not interest (100). Instances of friendship between persons of equal and unequal age (101). The value and permanence of his friendship with Scipio (102-104).

ANALYSIS

1 - 16. Exordium.

The occasion of the dialogue, the death of Scipio: and the speakers.

17-25. General panegyric on friendship:

based on virtue, it brings all blessings and power and consolation.

26-32. The origin of friendship:

not interest, but natural kindliness and the attraction of goodness.

33-35. The dangers of friendship:

divergence, competition, demand for dishonourable service.

36-43. The latter point discussed:

such services ought to be refused.

44-55. False ideas of friendship.

- (1.) That it is less trouble to love little: or still more selfishly put,
- (2.) That the use of friendship is simply as an aid to our needs and weakness.

Answer, —

- (1.) All good things require trouble.
- (2.) Virtue is the real basis of friendship: the delight is the love of another's goodness — nay, the love itself. Again, the tyrant, the most powerful, has fewest friends.

56-61. Limits of friendship

The common rules are wrong, e.g., to love (1) as yourself, (2) as you are loved, (3) as your friend claims, (4) as if you would one day hate. The love should be *unlimited*, subject only to the condition of avoiding evil services.

62-66. Selection of friends —

care required: tests (62-64)

qualities required (65-66)

67-99. Practical hints on behaviour —

Old friends and new (67-68).

Equality and inequality (69-73)

Dropping friends sometimes needful (74-78) [Remarks, 79-81],

Mutual respect needful (82-85) [Remarks, 86-88].

Giving offence: must be risked sometimes (88-90).

Evils of insincerity and flattery (91-99).

100-104. Peroration

M. TULLII CICERONIS

LAELIUS DE AMICITIA

1.

I. Quintus Mucius augur multa narrare de C. Laelio socero suo memoriter et iucunde solebat, nec dubitare illum in omni sermone appellare sapientem. Ego autem a patre ita eram deductus ad Scaevolam sumpta virili toga, ut, quoad possem et liceret, a senis latere numquam discederem. Itaque multa ab eo prudenter disputata, multa etiam breviter et commode dicta memoriae mandabam, fierique studebam eius prudentia doctior. Quo mortuo me ad pontificem Scaevolam contuli, quem unum nostrae civitatis et ingenio et iustitia praestantissimum audeo dicere. Sed de hoc alias; nunc redeo ad augurem.

2.

Cum saepe multa, tum memini domi, in hemicyclio sedentem ut solebat, cum et ego essem una et pauci admodum familiares, in eum sermonem illum incidere, qui tum fere erat in ore. Meministi enim profecto, Attice, et eo magis quod. P.Sulpicio utebare multum, cum is tribunus plebis capitali odio a Q.Pompeio qui tum erat consul dissideret, quocum coniunctissime et amantissime vixerat, quanta esset hominum vel admiratio vel querela.

3.

Itaque tum Scaevola, cum in eam ipsam mentionem incidisset, exposuit nobis sermonem Laelii de amicitia, habitum ab illo secum et cum altero genere, C.Fannio Marci filio, paucis diebus post mortem

Africani. Eius disputationis sententias memoriae mandavi; quas hoc libro exposui arbitrato meo: quasi enim ipsos induxi loquentes, ne *inquam* et *inquit* saepius interponeretur, atque ut tamquam a praesentibus coram haberi sermo videretur.

4.

Cum enim saepe mecum ageres ut de amicitia scriberem aliquid, digna mihi res cum omnium cognitione tum nostra familiaritate visa est. Itaque feci non invitus ut prodessem multis rogatu tuo. Sed ut in Catone Maiore, qui est scriptus ad te de senectute, Catonem induxi senem disputantem, quia nulla videbatur aptior persona quae de illa aetate loqueretur, quam eius, qui et diutissime senex fuisset et in ipsa senectute praeter ceteros floruisset: sic, cum accepissemus a patribus maxime memorabilem C. Laelii et P. Scipionis familiaritatem fuisse, idonea mihi Laelii persona visa est quae de amicitia ea ipsa dissereret, quae disputata ab eo meminisset Scaevola. Genus autem hoc sermonum, positum in hominum veterum auctoritate et eorum illustrium, plus nescio quo pacto videtur habere gravitatis. Itaque ipse mea legens sic afficior interdum, ut Catonem, non me, loqui existimem.

5.

Sed ut tum ad senem senex de senectute, sic hoc libro ad amicum amicissimus scripsi de amicitia. Tum est Cato locutus, quo erat nemo fere senior temporibus illis, nemo prudentior: nunc Laelius, et sapiens (sic enim est habitus) et amicitiae gloria excellens, de amicitia loquetur. Tu velim a me animum parumper avertas, Laelium loqui ipsum putes.

C.Fannius et Q.Mucius ad socerum veniunt post mortem Africani: ab his sermo oritur; respondet Laelius: cuius tota disputatio est de amicitia, quam legens te ipse cognosces.

6.

II. Fannius. Sunt ista, Laeli; nec enim melior vir fuit Africano quisquam nec clarior. Sed existimare debes omnium oculos in te esse coniectos unum: te sapientem et appellant et existimant. Tribuebatur hoc modo M.Catoni; scimus L.Acilium apud patres nostros appellatum esse sapientem; sed uterque alio quodam modo: Acilius quia prudens esse in iure civili putabatur, Cato quia multarum rerum usum habebat. Multa eius et in senatu et in foro vel provisae prudenter vel actae constanter vel responsa acute ferebantur: propterea quasi cognomen iam habebat in senectute Sapientis. Te autem alio quodam modo, non solum natura et moribus, verum etiam studio et doctrina esse sapientem, nec sicut vulgus, sed ut eruditi solent appellare sapientem, qualem in reliqua Graecia neminem,

7.

(nam qui septem appellantur, eos qui ista subtilius quaerunt in numero sapientium non habent), Athenis unum accepimus, et eum quidem etiam Apollinis oraculo sapientissimum iudicatum: hanc esse in te sapientiam existimant, ut omnia tua in te posita esse ducas humanosque casus virtute inferiores putes. Itaque ex me quaerunt, credo ex hoc item Scaevola, quonam pacto mortem Africani feras: eoque magis quod proximis Nonis, cum in hortos D.Bruti auguris commentandi

causa, ut assolet, venissemus, tu non affuisti, qui diligenlissime semper illum diem et illud munus solitus esses obire.

8.

Scaevola. Quaerunt quidem, C.Laeli, multi, ut est a Fannio dictum.

Sed ego id respondeo quod animum adverti, te dolorem, quem adceperis cum summi viri turn amicissimi morte, ferre moderate: nec potuisse non commoveri, nec fuisse id humanitatis tuae. Quod autem Nonis in collegio nostro non affuisses; valetudinem respondeo causam, non maestitiam fuisse.

Laelius. Recte tu quidem, Scaevola, et vere. Nec enim ab isto officio, quod semper usurpavi cum valerem, abduci incommodo meo debui; nec ullo casu arbitror hoc constanti homini posse contingere, ut ulla intermissio fiat officii.

9.

Tu autem, Fanni, quod mihi tantum tribui dicis, quantum ego nec agnosco nec postulo, facis amice: sed ut mihi videris, non recte iudicas de Catone. Aut enim nemo, quod quidem magis credo, aut, si quisquam, ille sapiens fuit. Quo modo, ut alia omittam, mortem filii tulit! Memineram Paulum, videram Galum; sed hi in pueris, Cato in perfecto et spectato viro.

10.

Quam ob rem cave Catoni anteponas ne istum quidem ipsum, quem Apollo, ut ais, sapientissimum iudicavit: huius enim facta, illius dicta laudantur. De me autem, ut iam cum utroque loquar, sic habetote.

III. Ego si Scipionis desiderio me moveri negem, quam id recte faciam viderint sapientes: sed certe mentiar. Moveor enim tali amico orbatus, qualis ut arbitror nemo umquam erit, ut confirmare possum nemo certe fuit. Sed non egeo medicina: me ipse consolor, et maxime illo solacio, quod eo errore careo quo amicorum decessu plerique angustantur. Nihil mali accidisse Scipioni puto: mihi accidit, si quid accidit; suis autem incommodis graviter angustari non amicum sed se ipsum amantis est.

11.

Cum illo vero quis neget actum esse praeclare? Nisi enim, quod ille minime putabat, immortalitatem optare vellet: quid non adeptus est, quod homini fas esset optare? qui summam spem civium, quam de eo iam puero habuerant, continuo adulescens incredibili virtute superavit; qui consulatum petivit numquam, factus consul est bis, primum ante tempus, iterum sibi suo tempore, rei publicae paene sero; qui duabus urbibus eversis, inimicissimis huic imperio, non modo praesentia verum etiam futura bella delevit. Quid dicam de moribus facillimis, de pietate in matrem, liberalitate in sorores, bonitate in suos, iustitia in omnes? Nota sunt vobis. Quam autem civitati carus fuerit, maiore funus iudicatum est. Quid igitur hunc paucorum annorum accessio iuvare potuisset? Senectus enim quamvis non sit gravis, ut memini Catonem anno ante quam est mortuus mecum et cum Scipione disserere, tamen aufert eam viriditatem, in qua etiam nunc erat Scipio.

12.

Quam ob rem vita quidem talis fuit vel fortuna vel gloria, ut nihil posset accedere; moriundi autem sensum celeritas abstulit. Quo de genere mortis difficile dictu est; quid homines suspicentur, videtis. Hoc vere tamen licet dicere, P.Scipioni ex multis diebus, quos in vita celeberrimos laetissimosque viderit, illum diem clarissimum fuisse, cum senatu dimisso domum reductus ad vesperum est a patribus conscriptis, populo Romano, sociis et Latinis, pridie quam excessit e vita: ut ex tam alto dignitatis gradu ad superos videatur deos potius, quam ad inferos, pervenisse.

13.

IV. Neque enim assentior eis, qui haec nuper disserere coeperunt, cum corporibus simul animos interire, atque omnia morte deleri. Plus apud me antiquorum auctoritas valet: vel nostrorum maiorum qui mortuis tam religiosa iura tribuerunt, quod non fecissent profecto si nihil ad eos pertinere arbitrarentur; vel eorum qui in hac terra fuerunt, magnamque Graeciam, quae nunc quidem deleta est, tunc florebat, institutis et praeceptis suis erudierunt; vel eius qui Apollinis oraculo sapientissimus est iudicatus, qui non tum hoc tum illud, ut in plerisque, sed idem semper, animos hominum esse divinos, eisque cum ex corpore excessissent reditum in caelum patere, optimoque et iustissimo cuique expeditissimum.

14.

Quod idem Scipioni videbatur: qui quidem quasi praesagiret, perpaucis ante mortem diebus, cum et Philus et Manilius adessent et alii

plures, tuque etiam, Scaevola, mecum venisses, triduum disseruit de re publica; cuius disputationis fuit extremum fere de immortalitate animorum quae se in quiete per visum ex Africano audisse dicebat. Id si ita est, ut optimi cuiusque animus in morte facillime evolet tamquam e custodia vinculisque corporis: cui censemur cursum ad deos faciliorem fuisse quam Scipioni? Quocirca maerere hoc eius eventu vereor ne invidi magis quam amici sit. Sin autem illa veriora, ut idem interitus sit animorum et corporum nec ullus sensus maneat: ut nihil boni est in morte, sic certe nihil mali. Sensu enim amisso fit idem, quasi natus non esset omnino: quem tamen esse natum et nos gaudemus, et haec civitas dum erit laetabitur.

15.

Quam ob rem cum illo quidem, ut supra dixi, actum optime est: mecum incommodius, quem fuerat aequius, ut prius introieram, sic prius exire de vita. Sed tamen recordatione nostrae amicitiae sic fruor, ut beate vixisse videar quia cum Scipione vixerim: quocum mihi coniuncta cura de publica re et de privata fuit; quocum et domus fuit et militia communis, et id in quo est omnis vis amicitiae, voluntatum studiorum sententiarum summa consensio. Itaque non tam ista me sapientiae, quam modo Fannius commemoravit, fama delectat, falsa praesertim, quam quod amicitiae nostrae memoriam spero sempiternam fore: idque eo mihi magis est cordi, quod ex omnibus saeculis vix tria aut quattuor nominantur paria amicorum, quo in genere sperare videor Scipionis et Laelii amicitiam notam posteritati fore.

16.

Fannius. Istuc quidem, Laeli, ita necesse est. Sed quoniam amicitiae mentionem fecisti et sumus otiosi, pergratum mihi feceris — spero item Scaevolae — si quem ad modum soles de ceteris rebus cum ex te quaeritur, sic de amicitia disputaris, quid sentias, qualem existimes, quae praecepta des.

Scaevola. Mihi vero erit gratum: atque id ipsum cum tecum agere conarer, Fannius antevertit. Quam ob rem utrique nostrum gratum ad modum feceris.

17.

V. Laelius. Ego vero non gravarer, si mihi ipse confiderem; nam et praeclara res est, et sumus, ut dixit Fannius, otiosi. Sed quis ego sum, aut quae est in me facultas? Doctorum est ista consuetudo, eaque Graecorum, ut eis ponatur de quo disputent quamvis subito. Magnum opus est, egetque exercitatione non parva. Quam ob rem quae disputari de amicitia possunt, ab eis censeo petatis qui ista profitentur. Ego vos hortari tantum possum, ut amicitiam omnibus rebus humanis anteponatis; nihil est enim tam naturae aptum, tam conveniens ad res vel secundas vel adversas.

18.

Sed hoc primum sentio, nisi in bonis amicitiam esse non posse: neque id ad vivum reseco, ut illi qui haec subtilius disserunt, fortasse vere, sed ad communem utilitatem parum. Negant enim quemquam esse virum bonum nisi sapientem. Sit ita sane: sed eam sapientiam interpretantur, quam adhuc mortalis nemo est consecutus; nos autem ea quae sunt in

usu vitaeque communi, non ea quae finguntur aut optantur, spectare debemus. Numquam ego dicam C.Fabricium, M.Curium, Ti.Coruncanium, quos sapientes nostri maiores iudicabant, ad istorum normam fuisse sapientes. Quare sibi habeant sapientiae nomen, et invidiosum et obscurum: concedant ut hi viri boni fuerint. Ne id quidem facient: negabunt id nisi sapienti posse concedi.

19.

Agamus igitur pingui, ut aiunt, Minerva. Qui ita se gerunt ita vivunt, ut eorum probetur fides, integritas, aequalitas, liberalitas, nec sit in eis ulla cupiditas libido audacia, sintque magna constantia, ut ei fuerunt, modo quos nominavi: hos viros bonos, ut habiti sunt, sic etiam appellandos putemus, quia sequantur, quantum homines possunt, naturam, optimam bene vivendi ducem. Sic enim mihi perspicere videor, ita natos esse nos ut inter omnes esset societas quaedam, maior autem ut quisque proxime accederet. Itaque cives potiores quam peregrini, propinqui quam alieni; cum his enim amicitiam natura ipsa peperit; sed ea non satis habet firmitatis. Namque hoc praestat amicitia propinquitati, quod ex propinquitate benevolentia tolli potest, ex amicitia non potest; sublata enim benevolentia amicitiae nomen tollitur, propinquitatis manet.

20.

Quanta autem vis amicitiae sit ex hoc intellegi maxime potest, quod ex infinita societate generis humani, quam conciliavit ipsa natura, ita

contracta res est et adducta in angustum, ut omnis caritas aut inter duo aut inter paucos iungeretur.

VI. Est enim amicitia nihil aliud, nisi omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum cum benevolentia et caritate consensio; qua quidem haud scio an excepta sapientia nihil melius homini sit a dis immortalibus datum. Divitias alii praeponunt, bonam alii valetudinem, alii potentiam, alii honores, multi etiam voluptates. Beluarum hoc quidem extremum; illa autem superiora caduca et incerta, posita non tam in consiliis nostris quam in fortunae temeritate. Qui autem in virtute summum bonum ponunt, praeclare illi quidem: sed haec ipsa virtus amicitiam et gignit et continet, nec sine virtute amicitia esse ullo pacto potest.

21.

Iam virtutem ex consuetudine vitae sermoriisque nostri interpretemur, nec eam, ut quidam docti, verborum magnificentia metiamur; virosque bonos eos qui habentur numeremus, Paulos Catones Galos Scipiones Philos: his communis vita contenta est; eos autem omittamus qui omnino nusquam reperiuntur.

22.

Tales igitur inter viros amicitia tantas opportunitates habet, quantas vix queo dicere. Principio "qui potest esse vita vitalis", ut ait Ennius, quae non in amici mutua benevolentia conquiescit? Quid dulcius, quam habere quicum omnia audeas sic loqui ut tecum? Qui esset tantus fructus in prosperis rebus, nisi haberes qui illis aequae ac tu ipse gauderet?

Adversas vero ferre difficile esset sine eo, qui illas gravius etiam quam tu ferret. Denique ceterae res quae expetuntur opportunaesunt singulae rebus fere singulis: divitiae ut utare, opes ut colare, honores ut laudare, voluptates ut gaudeas, valetudo ut dolore careas et muneribus fungare corporis: amicitia res plurimas continet; quoquo te verteris praesto est, nullo loco excluditur, numquam intempestiva numquam molesta est. Itaque non aqua non igni, ut aiunt, locis pluribus utimur quam amicitia. Neque ego nunc de vulgari aut de mediocri, (quae tamen ipsa et delectat et prodest), sed de vera et perfecta loquor, qualis eorum qui pauci nominantur fuit. Nam et secundas res splendidiore facit amicitia, et adversas, partiens communicansque, leviores.

23.

VII. Cumque plurimas et maximas commoditates amicitia contineat, tum illa nimirum praestat omnibus, quod bonam spem praelucet in posterum, nec debilitari animos aut cadere patitur. Verum enim amicum qui intuetur, tamquam exemplar aliquod intuetur sui. Quocirca et absentes adsunt et egentes abundant et imbecilli valent et, quod difficilius dictu est, mortui vivunt: tantus eos honos, memoria, desiderium prosequitur amicorum; ex quo illorum beata mors videtur, horum vita laudabilis. Quod si exemeris ex rerum natura benevolentiae coniunctionem, nec domus ulla nec urbs stare poterit, ne agri quidem cultus permanebit. Id si minus intellegitur, quanta vis amicitiae concordiaeque sit ex dissensionibus atque discordiis perspicipotes. Quae enim domus tam stabilis, quae tam firma civitas est, quae non odiis

et discidiis fundirus possit everti? Ex quo quantum boni sit in amicitia iudicari potest.

24.

Agrigentinum quidem doctum quemdam virum carminibus Graecis vaticinatum ferunt, quae in rerum natura totoque mundo constarent quaeque moverentur, ea contrahere amicitiam, dissipare discordiam. Atque hoc quidem omnes mortales et intellegunt et re probant. Itaque si quando aliquod officium exstitit amici in periculis aut adeundis aut communicandis, quis est qui id non maximis efferat laudibus? Qui clamores tota cavea nuper in hospitis et amici mei M.Pacuvii nova fabula: cum ignorante rege uter Orestes esset, Pylades Orestem esse se diceret, ut pro illo necaretur, Orestes autem, ita ut erat, Orestem se esse perseveraret! Stantes plaudebant in re ficta: quid arbitramur in vera facturos fuisse? Facile indicabat ipsa natura vim suam, cum homines quod facere ipsi non possent, id recte fieri in altero iudicarent. Hactenus mihi videor de amicitia quid sentirem potuisse dicere. Si quae praeterea sunt, credo autem esse multa, ab eis, si videbitur, qui ista disputant quaeritote.

25.

Fannius. Nos vero a te potius; quamquam etiam ab istis saepe quaesivi, et audivi non invitus equidem; sed aliud quoddam filum orationis tuae.

Scaevola. Tum magis id diceres, Fanni, si nuper in hortis Scipionis cum est de re publica disputatum affuisses. Qualis tum patronus iustitiae fuit contra accuratam orationem Phili!

Fannius. Facile id quidem fuit, iustitiam iustissimo viro defendere.

Scaevola. Quid amicitiam nonne facile ei, qui ob eam summa fide constantia iustitiaque servatam maximam gloriam ceperit?

26.

VIII. Laelius. Vim hoc quidem est afferre: quid enim refert qua me ratione cogatis? Cogitis certe: studiis enim generorum, praesertim in re bona, cum difficile est tum ne aequum quidem obsistere. Saepissime igitur mihi de amicitia cogitanti maxime illud considerandum videri solet, utrum propter imbecillitatem atque inopiam desiderata sit amicitia, ut dandis recipiendisque meritis, quod quis minus per se ipse posset, id acciperet ab alio vicissimque redderet: an esset hoc quidem proprium amicitiae, sed antiquior et pulchrior et magis a natura ipsa profecta alia causa. Amor enim, ex quo amicitia nominata est, princeps est ad benevolentiam coniungendam. Nam utilitates quidem etiam ab iis percipiuntur saepe, qui simulatione amicitiae coluntur et observantur temporis causa; in amicitia autem nihil fictum est, nihil simulatum, et quidquid est, id est verum et voluntarium.

27.

Quapropter a natura mihi videtur potius quam ab indigentia orta amicitia, applicatione magis animi cum quodam sensu amandi, quam cogitatione quantum illa res utilitatis esset habitura. Quod quidem quale

sit, etiam in bestiis quibusdam animadverti potest: quae ex se natos ita amant ad quoddam tempus et ab eis ita amantur, ut facile earum sensus appareat. Quod in homine multo est evidentius: primum ex ea caritate quae est inter natos et parentes, quae dirimi nisi detestabili scelere non potest; deinde cum similis sensus exstitit amoris si aliquem nacti sumus cuius cum moribus et natura congruamus, quod in eo quasi lumen aliquod probitatis et virtutis perspicere videamur.

28.

Nihil est enim virtute amabilius, nihil quod magis alliciat ad diligendum: quippe cum propter virtutem et probitatem etiam eos, quos nunquam vidimus, quodam modo diligamus. Quis est qui C.Fabricii, M.Curii non cum caritate aliqua benevolentiae memoriam usurpet, quos nunquam viderit? Quis autem est qui Tarquinium Superbum, qui Sp.Cassium, Sp.Maelium non oderit? Cum duobus ducibus de imperio in Italia decertatum est, Pyrrho et Hannibale: ab altero propter probitatem eius non nimis alienos animos habemus, alterum propter crudelitatem semper haec civitas oderit.

29.

IX. Quod si tanta vis probitatis est, ut eam vel in eis quos nunquam vidimus, vel quod maius est, in hoste etiam diligamus: quid mirum est si animi hominum moveantur, cum eorum quibuscum usu coniuncti esse possunt virtutem et bonitatem perspicere videantur? Quamquam confirmatur amor et beneficio accepto et studio perspecto et consuetudine adiuncta: quibus rebus ad illum primum motum animi et

amoris adhibitis admirabilis quaedam exardescit benevolentiae magnitudo. Quam si qui putant ab imbecillitate proficisci, ut sit per quem assequatur quod quisque desideret; humilem sane relinquunt et minime generosum ut ita dicam ortum amicitiae, quam ex inopia atque indigentia natam volunt. Quod si ita esset, ut quisque minimum in se esse arbitraretur, ita ad amicitiam esset aptissimus: quod longe secus est.

30.

Ut enim quisque sibi plurimum confidit, et ut quisque maxime virtute et sapientia sic munitus est ut nullo egeat suaque omnia in se ipso posita iudicet; ita in amicitiiis expetendis colendisque maxime excellit. Quid enim? Africanus indigens mei? Minime hercule, ac ne ego quidem illius: sed ego admiratione quadam virtutis eius, ille vicissim opinione fortasse nonnulla quam de meis moribus habebat me dilexit. Auxit benevolentiam consuetudo; sed quamquam utilitates multae et magnae consecutae sunt, non sunt tamen ab earum spe causae diligendi profectae.

31.

Ut enim benefici liberalesque sumus non ut exigamus gratiam (neque enim beneficium feneramur), sed natura propensi ad liberalitatem sumus: sic amicitiam non spe mercedis adducti, sed quod omnis, eius fructus in ipso amore inest, expetendam putamus.

32.

Ab his qui pecudum ritu ad voluptatem omnia referunt longe dissentiunt, nec mirum. Nihil enim altum, nihil magnificum ac divinum suspicere possunt, qui suas omnes cogitationes abiecerunt in rem tam humilem tamque contemptam. Quam ob rem hos quidem ab hoc sermone removeamus; ipsi autem intelligamus natura gigni sensum diligendi et benevolentiae caritatem, facta significatione probitatis. Quam qui appetiverunt, applicant se et propius admovent, ut et usu eius quem diligere coeperunt fruantur et moribus: suntque pares in amore et aequales, propensioresque ad bene merendum quam ad repositum, atque haec inter eos est honesta certatio. Sic et utilitates ex amicitia maximae capientur, et erit eius ortus a natura quam ab imbecillitate gravior et verior. Nam si utilitas amicitias conglutinaret, eadem commutata dissolveret: sed quia natura mutari non potest, idcirco verae amicitiae sempiternae sunt. Ortum quidem amicitiae videtis, nisi quid ad haec forte vultis.

Fannius. fu vero perge, Laeli; pro hoc enim, qui minor est natu, meo iure respondeo.

Scaevola. Recte tu quidem. Quam ob rem audiamus.

33.

X. Laelius. Audite vero, optimi viri, ea quae saepissime inter me et Scipionem de amicitia disserebantur. Quamquam ille quidem nihil difficilius esse dicebat, quam amicitiam usque ad extremum vitae diem permanere: nam vel ut non idem expediret utrique incidere saepe, vel ut de re publica non idem sentiretur. Mutari etiam mores hominum saepe

dicebat, alias adversis rebus alias aetate ingravescente. Atque earum rerum exemplum ex similitudine capiebat ineuntis aetatis, quod summi puerorum amores saepe una cum praetexta toga ponerentur.

34.

Sin autem ad adulescentiam perduxissent; dirimi tamen interdum contentione vel uxoriae condicionis, vel commodi alicuius quod idem adipisci uterque non posset. Quod si qui longius in amicitia provecti essent, tamen saepe labefactari si in honoris contentionem incidissent; pestem enim nullam maiorem esse amicitiiis, quam in plerisque pecuniae cupiditatem, in optimis quibusque honoris certamen et gloriae, ex quo inimicitias maximas saepe inter amicissimos exstitisse.

35.

Magna etiam discidia et plerumque iusta nasci, cum aliquid ab amicis quod rectum non esset postularetur, ut aut libidinis ministri aut adiutores essent ad iniuriam; quod qui recusarent, quamvis honeste id facerent, ius tamen amicitiae deserere arguerentur ab eis quibus obsequi nollent; illos autem, qui quidvis ab amico auderent postulare, postulatione ipsa profiteri omnia se amici causa esse facturos. Eorum querela inveterata non modo familiaritates exstingui solere, sed odia etiam gigni sempiterna. Haec ita multa quasi fata impendere amicitiiis, ut omnia subterfugere non modo sapientiae, sed etiam felicitatis diceret sibi videri.

36.

XI Quam ob rem id primutn videamus, si placet, quatenus amor in amicitia progredi debeat. Numne, si Coriolanus habuit amicos, ferre contra patriam arma illi cum Coriolano debuerunt? Num Vecellinum amici regnum appetentem, num Maelium debuerunt iuvare?

37.

Ti. quidem Gracchum rem publicam vexantem a Q.Tuberone aequalibusque amicis derelictum videbamus. At C.Blossius Cumanus, hospes familiae vestrae, Scaevola, cum ad me, quod aderam Laenati et Rupilio consulibus in consilio, deprecatum venisset, hanc ut sibi ignoscerem causam afferebat, quod tanti Ti.Gracchum fecisset, ut quidquid ille vellet sibi faciendum putaret. Tum ego: "Etiamne si te in Capitolium faces ferre vellet"? "Numquam", inquit, "voluisset id quidem: sed si voluisset, paruissem". Videtis quam nefaria vox! Et hercule ita fecit, vel plus etiam quam dixit: non enim paruit ille Ti.Gracchi temeritati sed praefuit, nec se comitem illius furoris sed ducem praebuit. Itaque hac amentia quaestione nova perterritus in Asiam profugit: ad hostes se contulit, poenas rei publicae graves iustasque persolvit. Nulla est igitur excusatio peccati, si amici causa peccaveris; nam cum conciliatrix amicitiae virtutis opinio fuerit, difficile est amicitiam manere si a virtute defeceris.

38.

Quod si rectum statuerimus vel concedere amicis quidquid velint, vel impetrare ab eis quidquid velimus; perfecta quidem sapientia si simus, nihil habeat res vitii. Sed loquimur de eis amicis qui ante oculos sunt,

quos videmus aut de quibus memoriam accepimus, quos novit vita communis: ex hoc numero nobis exempla sumenda sunt, et eorum quidem maxime, qui ad sapientiam proxime accedunt.

39.

Videmus Papum Aemilium Luscino familiarem fuisse (sic a patribus accepimus), bis una consules, collegas in censura; tum et cum eis et inter se coniunctissimos fuisse M. Curium Ti. Coruncanium memoriae proditum est. Igitur ne suspicari quidem possumus quemquam horum ab amico quippiam contendisse, quod contra fidem contra iusiurandum contra rem publicam esset. Nam hoc quidem in talibus viris quid attinet dicere, si contendisset impetraturum non fuisse: cum illi sanctissimi viri fuerint, aequae autem nefas sit tale aliquid et facere rogatum et rogare. At vero Ti. Gracchum sequebantur C. Carbo C. Cato, et minime tunc quidem Caius frater, nunc idem acerrimus.

40.

XII. Haec igitur lex in amicitia sancitur, ut neque rogemus res turpes nec faciamus rogati: turpis enim excusatio est et minime accipienda cum in ceteris peccatis, tum si quis contra rem publicam se amici causa fecisse fateatur. Etenim eo loco, Fanni et Scaevola, locati sumus, ut nos longe prospicere oporteat futuros casus rei publicae. Deflexit iam aliquantulum de spatio curriculoque consuetudo maiorum.

41.

Ti. Gracchus regnum occupare conatus est, vel regnavit is quidem paucos menses. Num quid simile populus Romanus audierat aut viderat?

Hunc etiam post mortem secuti amici et propinqui quid in P.Scipione effecerin sine lacrimis non queo dicere. Nam Carbonem quocumque modo potuimus, propter recentem poenam Ti.Gracchi, sustinuimus: de Cai autem tribunatu quid exspectem, non libet augurari. Serpit deinde res: quae proclivis ad perniciem, cum semel coepit, labitur. Videtis in tabella iam ante quanta sit facta labes, primo Gabinia lege, biennio autem post Cassia. Videre iam videor populum a senatu disiunctum, multitudinis arbitrio res maximas agi. Plures enim discent quem ad, modum haec fiant, quam quem ad modum his resistatur.

42.

Quorsum haec? Quia sine sociis nemo quidquam tale conatur. Praecipendum est igitur bonis, ut si in eius modi amicitias ignari casu aliquo inciderint, ne existiment ita se alligatos, ut ab amicis in magna aliqua re peccantibus non discedant: improbis autem poena statuenda est, nec vero minor eis qui secuti erunt alterum, quam eis qui ipsi fuerint impietatis duces. Quis clarior in Graecia Themistocle, quis potentior? Qui cum imperator bello Persico servitute Graeciam liberavisset, propterque invidiam in exilium expulsus esset, ingratae patriae iniuriam non tulit, quam ferre debuit: fecit idem, quod XX annis ante apud nos fecerat Coriolanus. His adiutor contra patriam inventus est nemo; itaque sibi mortem uterque conscivit.

43.

Qua re talis improborum consensio non modo excusatione amicitiae tegenda non est, sed potius supplicio omni vindicanda est: ut ne quis

concessum putet amicum vel bellum patriae inferentem sequi. Quod quidem, ut res ire coepit, haud scio an aliquando futurum sit. Mihi autem non minori curae est qualis res publica post mortem meam futura, quam qualis hodie sit.

44.

XIII. Haec igitur prima lex amicitiae sanciat, ut ab amicis honesta petamus, amicorum causa honesta faciamus, ne exspectemus quidem dum rogemur. Studium semper adsit, cunctatio absit: consilium vero dare audeamus libere. Plurimum in amicitia amicorum bene suadentium valeat auctoritas, eaque et adhibeatur ad monendum non modo aperte, sed etiam acriter si res postulabit, et adhibitae pareatur.

45.

Nam quibusdam, quos audio sapientes habitos in Graecia, placuisse opinor mirabilia quaedam (sed nihil est quod illi non persequantur argutiis): partim fugiendas esse nimias amicitias, ne necesse sit unum sollicitum esse pro pluribus; satis superque esse sibi suarum cuique rerum, alienis nimis implicari molestum esse; commodissimum esse quam laxissimas habenas habere amicitiae, quas vel adducas cum velis vel remittas: caput enim esse ad beate vivendum securitatem, qua frui non possit animus si tamquam parturiat unus pro pluribus.

46.

Alios autem dicere aiunt multo etiam inhumanius — quem locum breviter perstrinxi paulo ante — praesidii adiumentique causa, non benevolentiae neque caritatis, amicitias esse expetendas, itaque ut

quisque minimum firmitatis haberet minimumque virium, ita amicitias appetere maxime: ex eo fieri ut mulierculae magis amicitiarum praesidia quaerant quam viri, et inopes quam opulenti, et calamitosi quam ei qui putentur beati.

47.

O praeclaram sapientiam! Solem enim e mundo tollere videntur, qui amicitiam e vita tollunt: qua nihil a dis immortalibus melius habemus, nihil iucundius. Quae est enim ista securitas? Specie quidem blanda, sed reapse multis locis repudianda. Neque enim est consentaneum ullam honestam rem actionemve ne sollicitus sis aut non suscipere, aut susceptam deponere. Quod si curam fugimus, virtus fugienda est, quae necesse est cum aliqua cura res sibi contrarias aspernetur atque oderit: ut bonitas malitiam, temperantia libidinem, ignaviam fortitudo. Itaque videas rebus iniustis iustos maxime dolere, imbellibus fortes, flagitiosis modestos. Ergo hoc proprium est animi bene constituti, et laetari bonis rebus et dolere contrariis.

48.

Quam ob rem si cadit in sapientem animi dolor, qui profecto cadit nisi ex eius animo extirpatam humanitatem arbitramur: quae causa est cur amicitiam funditus tollamus e vita, ne aliquas propter eam suscipiamus molestias? Quid enim interest, motu animi sublato, non dico inter pecudem et hominem, sed inter hominem et truncum aut saxum aut quidvis generis eiusdem? Neque enim sunt isti audiendi, qui virtutem duram et quasi ferream esse quandam volunt: quae quidem est cum

multis in rebus tum in amicitia tenera atque tractabilis, ut et bonis amici quasi diffundantur et incommodis contrahantur. Quam ob rem angor iste, qui pro amico saepe capiendus est, non tantum valet ut tollat e vita amicitiam: non plus quam ut virtutes, quia nonnullas curas et molestias afferunt, repudiantur.

XIV. Cum autem contrahat amicitiam, ut supra dixi, si qua significatio virtutis eluceat ad quam se similis animus applicet et adiungat; id cum contigit, amor exoriatur necesse est.

49.

Quid enim tam absurdum quam delectari multis inanibus rebus, ut honore, ut gloria, ut aedificio, ut vestitu cultuque corporis; animante virtute praedito, eo qui vel amare vel ut ita dicam redamare possit, non admodum delectari? Nihil est enim remuneratione benevolentiae, nihil vicissitudine studiorum officiorumque iucundius.

50.

Quid? si illud etiam addimus, quod recte addi potest, nihil esse quod ad se rem ullam tam illiciat et attrahat quam ad amicitiam similitudo: concedetur profecto verum esse ut bonos boni diligant, adsciscantque sibi quasi propinquitate coniunctos atque natura. Nihil est enim appetentius similium sui nec rapacius quam natura. Quam ob rem hoc quidem, Fanni et Scaevola, constet ut opinor, bonis inter bonos quas necessariam benevolentiam, qui est amicitiae fons a natura constitutus. Sed eadem bonitas etiam ad multitudinem pertinet. Non enim est inhumana virtus neque immunis neque superba, quae etiam populos

universos tueri eisque optime consulere soleat: quod non faceret profecto, si a caritate volgi abhorreret.

51.

Atque etiam mihi quidem videntur, qui utilitatis causa fingunt amicitias, amabilissimum nodum amicitiae tollere. Non enim tam utilitas parta per amicum quam amici amor ipse delectat, tumque illud fit quod ab amico est profectum iucundum si cum studio est profectum: tantumque abest ut amicitiae propter indigentiam colantur, ut ei qui opibus et copiis, maximeque virtute, in qua plurimum est praesidii, minime alterius indigeant, liberalissimi sint et beneficentissimi. Atque haud sciam an ne opus sit quidem nihil umquam omnino deesse amicis. Ubi enim studia nostra viguissent, si numquam consilio, numquam opera nostra nec domi nec militiae Scipio eguisset? Non igitur utilitatem amicitia, sed utilitas amicitiam secuta est.

52.

XV. Non ergo erunt homines deliciis diffuentes audiendi, si quando de amicitia, quam nec usu nec ratione habent cognitam, disputabunt. Nam quis est, pro deorum fidem atque hominum! qui velit, ut neque diligat quemquam nec ipse ab ullo diligatur, circumfluere omnibus copiis atque in omnium rerum abundantia vivere? Haec enim est tyrannorum vita nimirum, in qua nulla fides, nulla caritas, nulla stabilis benevolentiae potest esse fiducia: omnia semper suspecta atque sollicita, nullus locus amicitiae.

53.

Quis enim aut eum diligat quem metuat, aut eum a quo se metui putet? Coluntur tamen simulatione dumtaxat ad tempus. Quod si forte, ut fit plerumque, ceciderunt, tum intelligitur quam fuerint inopes amicorum: quod Tarquinius dixisse ferunt exsulantem, tum se intellexisse quos fidos amicos habuisset quos infidos, cum iam neutris gratiam referre posset.

54.

Quamquam miror, illa superbia et importunitate si quemquem amicum habere potuit. Atque ut huius, quem dixi, mores veros amicos parare non potuerunt; sic multorum opes praepotentium excludunt amicitias fideles. Non enim solum ipsa Fortuna caeca est, sed eos etiam plerumque efficit caecos quos complexa est. Itaque efferuntur fere fastidio et contumacia, nec quidquam insipiente fortunato intolerabilius fieri potest. Atque hoc quidem videre licet, eos, qui antea commodis fuerint moribus, imperio potestate prosperis rebus immutari [sperni ab iis veteres amicitias, indulgeri novis].

55.

Quid autem stultius, quam, cum plurimum copiis facultatibus opibus possint, cetera parare quae parantur pecunia, equos, famulos, vestem egregiam, vasa pretiosa; amicos non parare, optimam et pulcherrimam vitae ut ita dicam supellectilem? Etenim cetera cum parant, cui parent nesciunt nec cuius causa laborent; eius enim est istorum quidque, qui vicit viribus: amicitiarum sua cuique permanet stabilis et certa possessio.

Quod etiam si illa maneant quae sunt quasi dona Fortunae, tamen vita inculta et deserta ab amicis non possit esse iucunda. Sed haec hactenus.

56.

XVI. Constituendi autem sunt qui sint in amicitia fines et quasi termini diligendi. De quibus tres video sententias ferri, quarum nullam probo: unam ut eodem modo erga amicum affecti simus, quo erga nosmet ipsos; alterum ut nostra in amicos benevolentia illorum erga nos benevolentiae pariter aequaliterque respondeat; tertiam ut quanti quisque se ipse facit, tanti fiat ab amicis.

57.

Harum trium sententiarum nulli prorsus assentior. Nec enim illa prima vera est, ut quem ad modum in se quisque, sic in amicum sit animatus. Quam multa enim, quae nostra causa numquam faceremus, facimus causa amicorum! Precari ab indigno, supplicare; tum acerbius in aliquem invehi, insectarique vehementius: quae in nostris rebus non satis honeste, in amicorum fiunt honestissime. Multaeque res sunt in quibus de suis commodis viri boni multa detrahunt detrahique patiuntur, ut eis amici potius quam ipsi fruantur.

58.

Altera sententia est, quae definit amicitiam paribus officiis ac voluntatibus. Hoc quidem est nimis exigue et exiliter ad calculos vocare amicitiam, ut par sit ratio acceptorum et datorum. Divitior mihi et affluentior videtur esse vera amicitia, nec observare restricte ne plus reddat quam acceperit. Neque enim verendum est ne quid excidat, aut

ne quid in terram defluat, aut ne plus aequo quid in amicitiam congeratur.

59.

Tertius vero ille finis deterrimus, ut quanti quisque se ipse faciat, tanti fiat ab amicis. Saepe enim in quibusdam aut animus abiectior est, aut spes amplificandae fortunae fractior. Non est igitur amici talem esse in eum, qualis ille in se est; sed potius eniti et efficere, ut amici iacentem animum excitet, inducatque spem cogitationemque meliorem. Alius igitur finis verae amicitiae constituendus est, si prius quid maxime reprehendere Scipio solitus sit dixero. Negabat ullam vocem inimiciorem amicitiae potuisse reperiri quam eius, qui dixisset ita amare oportere ut si aliquando esset osurus: nec vero se adduci posse ut hoc — quem ad modum putaretur — a Biante dictum esse crederet, qui sapiens habitus esset unus e septem: impuri cuiusdam aut ambitiosi, aut omnia ad suam potentiam revocantis esse sententiam. Quonam enim modo quisquam amicus esse poterit ei, cui se putabit inimicum esse posse? Quin etiam necesse erit cupere et optare ut quam saepissime peccet amicus, quo plures det sibi tamquam ansas ad reprehendendum; rursum autem recte factis commodisque amicorum necesse erit angi dolere invidere.

60.

Quare hoc quidem praeceptum, cuiuscumque est, ad tollendam amicitiam valet. Illud potius praecipiendum fuit, ut eam diligentiam adhiberemus in amicitiiis comparandis, ut ne quando amare inciperemus eum quem aliquando odisse possemus. Quin etiam si minus felices in

deligendo fuissemus, ferendum id Scipio potius quam inimicitarum tempus cogitandum putabat.

61.

XVII. His igitur finibus utendum arbitror, ut cum emendati mores amicorum sint, tum sit inter eos omnium rerum consiliorum voluntatum sine ulla exceptione communitas: ut etiam si qua fortuna acciderit ut minus iustae amicorum voluntates adiuvandae sint, in quibus eorum aut caput agatur aut fama, declinandum de via sit, modo ne summa turpitudine sequatur; est enim quatenus amicitiae dari venia possit. Nec vero negligenda est fama, nec mediocre telum ad res gerendas existimare oportet benevolentiam civium: quam blanditiis et assentando colligere turpe est, virtus quam sequitur caritas minime repudianda est.

62.

Sed — saepe enim redeo ad Scipionem, cuius omnis sermo erat de amicitia — querebatur quod omnibus in rebus homines diligentiores essent: capras et oves quot quisque haberet dicere posse, amicos quot haberet non posse dicere; et in illis quidem parandis adhibere curam, in amicis eligendis negligentes esse, nec habere quasi signa quaedam et notas, quibus eos qui ad amicitias essent idonei iudicarent. Sunt igitur firmi et stabiles et constantes eligendi, cuius generis est magna penuria: et iudicare difficile est sane nisi expertum, experiendum autem est in ipsa amicitia; ita praecurrit amicitia iudicium, tollitque experiendi potestatem.

63.

Est igitur prudentis sustinere ut currum, sic impetum benevolentiae: quo utamur quasi equis tentatis sic amicitia, aliqua parte periclitatis moribus amicorum. Quidam saepe in parva pecunia perspiciuntur quam sint leves, quidam autem quos parva movere non potuit cognoscuntur in magna. Sin vero erunt aliqui reperti, qui pecuniam praeferre amicitiae sordidum existiment: ubi eos inveniemus, qui honores, magistratus, imperia, potestates, opes amicitiae non anteponant, ut cum ex altera parte proposita haec sint, ex altera ius amicitiae, non multo illa malint? Imbecilla enim est natura ad contemnendam potentiam: quam etiam si neglecta amicitia consecuti sint, obscuratum iri arbitrantur quia non sine magna causa sit neglecta amicitia. Itaque verae amicitiae difficillime reperiuntur in eis, qui in honoribus reque publica versantur.

64.

Ubi enim istum invenias, qui honorem amici anteponat suo? Quid? Haec ut omittam, quam graves quam difficiles plerisque videntur calamitatum societates! Ad quas non est facile inventu qui descendant. Quamquam Ennius recte,

Amicus certus in re incerta cernitur;

tamen haec duo levitatis et inconstantiae plerosque convincunt, aut si in bonis rebus contemnunt aut in malis deserunt. Qui igitur utraque in re gravem, constantem, stabilem se in amicitia praestiterit, hunc ex maxime raro genere hominum iudicare debemus et paene divino.

65.

XVIII. Firmamentum autem stabilitatis constantiaeque est eius, quam in amicitia quaerimus, fides; nihil est enim stabile, quod infidum est. Simplicem praeterea et communem et consentientem, id est, qui rebus eisdem moveatur, eligi par est: quae omnia pertinent ad fidelitatem. Neque enim fidum potest esse multiplex ingenium et tortuosum; neque vero qui non eisdem rebus movetur naturaque consentit, aut fidus aut stabilis potest esse. Addendum eodem est ut ne criminibus aut inferendis delectetur, aut credat oblatis: quae pertinent omnia ad eam, quam iamdudum tracto, constantiam. Ita fit verum illud quod initio dixi, amicitiam nisi inter bonos esse non posse. Est enim boni viri, quem eundem sapientem licet dicere, haec duo tenere in amicitia: primum ne quid fictum sit neve simulatum, aperte enim vel odisse magis ingenui est quam fronte occultare sententiam; deinde non solum ab aliquo allatas criminationes repellere, sed ne ipsum quidem esse suspiciosum, semper aliquid existimantem ab amico esse violatum.

66.

Accedat huc suavitas quaedam oportet sermonum atque morum, haudquaquam mediocre condimentum amicitiae. Tristitia autem et in omni re severitas habet illa quidem gravitatem sed amicitia remissior esse debet et liberior, et dulcior et ad omnem comitatem facilitatemque proclivior.

67.

XIX. Exsistit autem hoc loco quaedam quaestio subdifficilis: num quando amici novi, digni amicitia, veteribus sint anteponendi, ut equis

vetulis teneros anteponeere solemus. Indigna homine dubitatio. Non enim debent esse amicitiarum, sicut aliarum rerum, satietates: veterrima quaeque, ut ea vina quae vetustatem ferunt, esse debet suavissima, verumque illud est quod dicitur, “multos modios salis simul edendos esse ut amicitiae munus expletum sit”.

68.

Novitates autem si spem afferunt ut tamquam in herbis non fallacibus fructus appareat, non sunt illae quidem repudiandae; vetustas tamen suo loco conservanda, maxima est enim vis vetustatis et consuetudinis. Quin etiam in ipso equo, cuius modo feci mentionem, si nulla res impediat, nemo est quin eo quo consuevit libentius utatur, quam intractato et novo. Nec vero in hoc quod est animal, sed in iis etiam quae sunt inanima consuetudo valet: cum locis ipsis delectemur, montuosis etiam et silvestribus, in quibus diutius commorati sumus.

69.

Sed maximum est in amicitia parem esse inferiori. Saepe enim excellentiae quaedam sunt, qualis erat Scipionis in nostro ut ita dicam grege. Numquam se ille Philo, numquam Rupilio, numquam Mummio anteposuit, numquam inferioris ordinis amicis: Q. vero Maximum fratrem, egregium virum omnino, sibi nequaquam parem, quod is anteibat aetate, tamquam superiorem, colebat, suosque omnes per se esse ampliores volebat.

70.

Quod faciendum imitandumque est omnibus, ut si quam praestantiam virtutis, ingenii, fortunae consecuti sint, inpertiant ea suis communicentque cum proximis, ut si parentibus nati sint humilibus, si propinquos habeant imbecilliores vel animo vel fortuna, eorum augeant opes eisque honori sint et dignitati: ut in fabulis qui aliquamdiu propter ignorationem stirpis et generis in famulatu fuerunt, cum cogniti sunt et aut deorum aut regum filii inventi, retinent tamen caritatem in pastores quos patres multos annos esse duxerint Quod est multo profecto magis in veris patribus certisque faciendum. Fructus enim ingenii et virtutis omnisque praestantiae tum maximus capitur, cum in proximum quemque confertur.

71.

XX. Ut igitur ei, qui sunt in amicitiae coniunctionisque necessitudine superiores, exaequare se cum inferioribus debent: sic inferiores non dolere se a suis aut ingenio aut fortuna aut dignitate superari. Quorum plerique aut queruntur semper aliquid, aut etiam exprobrant: eoque magis, si habere se putant quod officiose et amice et cum labore aliquo suo factum queant dicere. Odiosum sane genus hominum, officia exprobrantium: quae meminisse debet is in quem collata sunt, non commemo rare qui contulit.

72.

Quam ob rem ut ei, qui superiores sunt, summittere se debent in amicitia: sic quodam modo inferiores extollere. Sunt enim quidam qui molestas amicitias faciunt, cum ipsi se contemni putant: quod non fere

contingit nisi eis qui etiam contemnendos se arbitrantur; qui hac opinione non modo verbis sed etiam opere levandi sunt.

73.

Tantum autem cuique tribuendum, primum quantum ipse efficere possis; deinde etiam quantum ille, quem diligas atque adiuves, sustinere. Non enim neque tu possis, quamvis licet excellas, omnes tuos ad honores amplissimos perducere: ut Scipio P. Rupilius potuit consulem efficere, fratrem eius Lucium non potuit. Quod si etiam possis quidvis deferre ad alterum, videndum est tamen quid ille possit sustinere.

74.

Omnino amicitiae corroboratis iam confirmatisque et ingeniis et aetatibus iudicandae sunt, nec si qui ineunte aetate venandi aut pilae studiosi fuerunt, eos habere necessarios, quos tum eodem studio praeditos dilexerunt. Isto enim modo nutrices et paedagogi iure; vetustatis plurimum benevolentiae postulabunt: qui neglegendi quidem non sunt, sed alio quodam modo. Aliter amicitiae stabiles permanere non possunt. Disparis enim mores disparia studia sequuntur, quorum dissimilitudo dissociat amicitias: nec ob aliam causam ullam boni improbis, improbi bonis amici esse non possunt, nisi quod tanta est inter eos, quanta maxima potest esse, morum studiorumque distantia.

75.

Recte etiam praecipi potest in amicitia, ne intemperata quaedam benevolentia, quod persaepe fit, impediat magnas utilitates amicorum. Nec enim, ut ad fabulas redeam, Troiam Neoptolemus capere potuisset,

si Lycomedem, apud quem erat educatus, multis cum lacrimis iter suum impedientem audire voluisset; et saepe incidunt magnae res ut discedendum sit ab amicis, quas qui impedire vult quod desiderium non facile ferat, is et infirmus est mollisque natura et ob eam ipsam causam in amicitia parum iustus.

76.

Atque in omni re considerandum est et quid postules ab amico, et quid patiari a te impetrari.

XXI. Est etiam quaedam calamitas in amicitiis dimittendis nonnumquam necessaria: iam enim a sapientium familiaritatibus ad vulgares amicitias oratio nostra delabitur. Erumpunt saepe vitia amicorum, tum in ipsos amicos, tum in alienos, quorum tamen ad amicos redundet infamia. Tales igitur amicitiae sunt remissione usus eluendae, et — ut Catonem dicere audiui — dissuendae magis quam discindendae: nisi quaedam admodum intolerabilis iniuria exarserit, ut neque rectum neque honestum sit nec fieri possit ut non statim alienatio disiunctioque facienda sit.

77.

Sin autem aut morum aut studiorum commutatio quaedam — ut fieri solet — facta erit, aut in rei publicae partibus dissensio intercesserit: loquor enim iam, ut paulo ante dixi, non de sapientium sed de communibus amicitiis: cavendum erit ne non solum amicitiae depositae, sed etiam inimicitiae susceptae videantur. Nihil enim turpius quam cum eo bellum gerere, quocum familiariter vixeris. Ab amicitia Q.Pompeii meo nomine se removerat, ut scitis, Scipio; propter dissensionem autem,

quae erat in re publica, alienatus est a collega nostro Metello: utrumque egit graviter, auctoritate et offensione animi non acerba.

78.

Quam ob rem primum danda opera est, ne qua amicorum discidia fiant; sin tale aliquid evenierit, ut extinctae potius amicitiae quam oppressae esse videantur. Cavendum vero ne etiam in graves inimicitias convertant se amicitiae: ex quibus iurgia, maledicta, contumeliae gignuntur. Quae tamen, si tolerabiles erunt, ferendae sunt, et hic honos veteri amicitiae tribuendus, ut is in culpa sit qui faciat, non is qui patiatur iniuriam.

79.

Omnino omnium horum vitiorum atque incommodorum una cautio est atque una provisio: ut ne nimis cito diligere incipiant, neve non dignos. Digni autem sunt amicitia, quibus in ipsis inest causa cur diligantur. Rarum genus! Et quidem omnia praeclara rara, nec quidquam difficilius quam reperire quod sit omni ex parte in suo genere perfectum. Sed plerique neque in rebus humanis quidquam bonum norunt, nisi quod fructuosum sit; et amicos, tamquam pecudes, eos potissimum diligunt, ex quibus sperant se maximum fructum esse capturos.

80.

Ita pulcherrima illa et maxime naturali carent amicitia per se et propter se expetita, nec ipsi sibi exemplo sunt haec vis amicitiae et qualis et quanta sit. Ipse enim se quisque diligit non ut aliquam a se ipse mercedem exigit caritatis suae, sed quod per se sibi quisque carus est.

Quod nisi idem in amicitiam transferetur, verus amicus nunquam reperietur; est enim is, qui est tamquam alter idem.

81.

Quod si hoc apparet in bestiis, volucribus nantibus agrestibus, cicuribus feris, primum ut se ipsae diligant (id enim pariter cum omni animante nascitur), deinde ut requirant atque appetant, ad quas se applicent, eiusdem generis animantes (idque faciunt cum desiderio et cum quadam similitudine amoris humani): quanto id magis in homine fit natura, qui et se ipse diligit, et alterum anquiri cuius animum ita cum suo misceat, ut efficiat paene unum ex duobus!

82.

XXII. Sed plerique perverse, ne dicam impudenter, habere talem amicum volunt, quales ipsi esse non possunt, quaeque ipsi non tribuunt amicis, haec ab eis desiderant. Par est autem primum ipsum esse virum bonum, tum alterum similem sui quaerere. In talibus ea, quam iamdudum tractamus, stabilitas amicitiae confirmari potest: cum homines benevolentia coniuncti primum cupiditatibus eis quibus ceteri serviunt imperabunt; deinde aequitate iustitiaque gaudebunt, omniaque alter pro altero suscipiet neque quidquam umquam nisi honestum et rectum alter ab altero postulabit; neque solum colent inter se ac diligunt, sed etiam verebuntur. Nam maximum ornamentum amicitiae tollit, qui ex ea tollit verecundiam.

83.

Itaque in eis perniciosus est error, qui existimant libidinum peccatorumque omnium patere in amicitia licentiam. Virtutum amicitia adiutrix a natura data est, non vitiorum comes, ut quoniam solitaria non posset virtus ad ea quae summa sunt pervenire, coniuncta et consociata cum altera perveniret: quae si quos inter societas aut est aut fuit aut futura est, eorum est habendus ad summum naturae bonum optimus beatissimusque comitatus.

84.

Haec est, inquam, societas in qua omnia insunt quae putant homines expetenda, honestas, gloria, tranquillitas animi atque iucunditas: ut et cum haec adsint beata vita sit, et sine his esse non possit. Quod cum optimum maximumque sit, si id volumus adipisci virtuti opera danda est, sine qua nec amicitiam neque ullam rem expetendam consequi possumus; ea vero neglecta qui se amicos habere arbitrantur, tum se denique errasse sentiunt, cum eos gravis aliquis casus experiri cogit.

85.

Quocirca — dicendum est enim saepius — cum iudicaris diligere oportet, non cum dilexeris iudicare. Sed cum multis in rebus negligentia plectimur, tum maxime in amicis et diligendis et colendis: praeposteris enim utimur consiliis et acta agimus, quod vetamur vetere proverbio. Nam implicati ultro et citro vel usu diuturno vel etiam officiis, repente in medio cursu amicitias exorta aliqua offensione dirumpimus.

86.

XXIII. Quo etiam magis vituperanda est rei maxime necessariae tanta incuria. Una est enim amicitia in rebus humanis, de cuius utilitate omnes uno ore consentiunt. A multis virtus ipsa contemnitur, et venditatio quaedam atque ostentatio esse dicitur: multi divitias despiciunt, quos parvo contentos tenuis victus cultusque delectat; honores vero, quorum cupiditate quidam infiammantur, quam multi ita contemnunt, ut nihil inanius nihil esse levius existiment! Itemque cetera quae quibusdam admirabilia videntur permulti sunt qui pro nihilo putent: de amicitia omnes ad unum idem sentiunt, et ei qui ad rem publicam se contulerunt, et ei qui rerum cognitione doctrinaque delectantur, et ei qui suum negotium gerunt otiosi, postremo ei qui se totos tradiderunt voluptatibus, sine amicitia vitam esse nullam, si modo velint aliqua ex parte liberaliter vivere.

87.

Serpit enim nescio quo modo per omnium vitas amicitia, nec ullam aetatis degendae rationem patitur esse expertem sui. Quin etiam si quis asperitate ea est et immanitate naturae, congressus ut hominum fugiat atque oderit, qualem fuisse Athenis Timonem nescio quem accepimus; tamen is pati non possit ut non anquirat aliquem, apud quem evomat virus acerbitalis suae. Atque hoc maxime iudicaretur si quid tale posset contingere, ut aliquis nos deus ex hac hominum frequentia tolleretur et in solitudine uspiam collocaret, atque ibi suppeditans omnium rerum quas natura desiderat abundantiam et copiam, hominis omnino adspiciendi

potestatem eriperet. Quis tam esset ferreus qui eam vitam ferre posset, cuique non auferret fructum voluptatum omnium solitudo?

88.

Verum ergo illud est, quod a Tarentino Archyta, ut opinor, dici solitum nostros senes commemorare audivi ab aliis senibus auditum: si quis in caelum ascendisset naturamque mundi et pulchritudinem siderum perspexisset, insuavem illam admirationem ei fore: quae iucundissima fuisset, si aliquem cui narraret habuisset. Sic natura solitarium nihil amat, semperque ad aliquod tanquam adminiculum adnititur: quod in amicissimo quoque dulcissimum est.

XXIV. Sed cum tot signis eadem natura declaret quid velit, anquirat, desideret; tamen obsurdescimus nescio quo modo, nec ea quae ab ea monemur audimus. Est enim varius et multiplex usus amicitiae, multaeque causae suspicionum offensionumque dantur: quas tum evitare tum elevare, tum ferre sapientis est. Una illa subeunda offensio est, ut et utilitas in amicitia et fides retineatur: nam et monendi amici saepe sunt et obiurgandi, et haec accipienda amice cum benevole fiunt.

89.

Sed nescio quo modo venim est quod in Andria familiaris meus dicit:

Obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit.

Molesta veritas, si quidem ex ea nascitur odium, quod est venenum amicitiae: sed obsequium multo molestius, quod peccatis indulgens praecipitem amicum ferri sinit. Maxima autem culpa in eo, qui et veritatem aspernatur et in fraudem obsequio impellitur. Omni igitur

hac in re habenda ratio et diligentia est primum ut monitio acerbitate, deinde ut obiurgatio contumelia careat. In obsequio autem (quoniam Terentiano verbo lubenter utimur) comitas adsit, assentatio vitiorum adiutrix procul amoveatur: quae non modo amico sed ne libero quidem digna est; aliter enim cum tyranno, aliter cum amico vivitur.

90.

Cuius autem aures clausae veritati sunt, ut ab amico verum audire nequeat: huius salus desperanda est. Scitum est enim illud Catonis, ut multa: melius de quibusdam acerbos inimicos mereri, quam eos amicos qui dulces videantur; illos verum saepe dicere, hos nunquam. Atque illud absurdum, quod ei qui monentur eam molestiam quam debent capere non capiunt, eam capiunt qua debent vacare. Peccasse enim se non anguntur, obiurgari moleste ferunt: quod contra oportebat, delicto dolere, correctione gaudere.

91.

XXV. Ut igitur et monere et moneri proprium est verae amicitiae, et alterum libere facere, non aspere, alterum patienter accipere, non repugnanter; sic habendum est, nullam in amicitiiis pestem esse maiorum, quam adulationem, blanditiam, assentationem: quamvis enim multis nominibus est hoc vitium notandum levium hominum atque fallacium, ad voluntatem loquentium omnia, nihil ad veritatem.

92.

Cum autem omnium rerum simulatio vitiosa est (tollit enim iudicium veri idque adulterat), tum amicitiae repugnat maxime: delet enim veritatem, sine qua nomen amicitiae valere non potest. Nam cum

amicitiae vis sit in eo, ut unus quasi animus fiat ex pluribus, qui id fieri poterit, si ne in uno quidem quoque unus animus erit idemque semper, sed varius commutabilis multiplex?

93.

Quid enim potest esse tam flexibile tam devium, quam animus eius qui ad alterius non modo sensum ac voluntatem, sed etiam vultum atque nutum convertitur?

Negat quis, nego; ait, aio: postremo imperavi egomet mihi

Omnia assentari,

ut ait idem Terentius: sed ille in Gnathonis persona, quod amici genus adhibere omnino levitatis est.

94.

Multi autem Gnathonum similes cum sint loco fortuna fama superiores, horum est assentatio molesta, cum ad vanitatem accessit auctoritas.

95.

Secerni autem blandus amicus a vero et internosci tam potest adhibita diligentia, quam omnia fucata et simulata a sinceris atque veris. Contio, quae ex imperitissimis constat, tamen iudicare solet quid intersit inter popularem, id est assentatorem et levem civem, et inter constantem, severum et gravem.

96.

Quibus blanditiis C. Papirius nuper influebat in aures contionis, cum ferret legem de tribunis plebis reficiendis! Dissuasimus nos, sed nihil de me: de Scipione dicam libentius. Quanta illi — di immortales! — fuit

gravitas, quanta in oratione maiestas: ut facile ducem populi Romani, non comitem diceret! Sed affuistis, et est in manibus oratio. Itaque lex popularis suffragiis populi repudiata est. Atque ut ad me redeam, meministis, Q.Maximo fratre Scipionis et L.Mancino consulibus, quam popularis lex de sacerdotiis C.Licinii Crassi videbatur! Cooptatio enim collegiorum ad populi beneficium transferebatur. Atque is primus instituit in forum versus agere cum populo. Tamen illius vendibilem orationem religio deorum immortalium, nobis defendentibus, facile vincebat. Atque id actum est praetore me, quinquennio ante quam consul sum factus. Ita re magis, quam summa auctoritate causa illa defensa est.

97.

XXVI. Quod si in scaena, id est in contione, in qua rebus fictis et adumbratis loci plurimum est, tamen verum valet, si modo id patefactum et illustratum est: quid in amicitia fieri oportet, quae tota veritate perpenditur? In qua nisi, ut dicitur, apertum pectus videas tuumque ostendas, nihil fidum, nihil exploratum habeas, ne amare quidem aut amari, cum id quam vere fiat ignores. Quamquam ista assentatio, quamvis perniciosa sit, nocere tamen nemini potest nisi ei, qui eam recipit atque ea delectatur. Ita fit ut is assentatoribus patefaciat aures suas maxime, qui ipse sibi assentetur et se maxime ipse delectet.

98.

Omnino est amans sui virtus; optime enim se ipsa novit, quamque amabilis sit intellegit: ego autem non de virtute nunc loquor, sed de

virtutis opinione. Virtute enim ipsa non tam multi praediti esse quam videri volunt. Hos delectat assentatio; his fictus ad ipsorum voluntatem sermo cum adhibetur, orationem illam vanam testimonium esse laudum suarum putant. Nulla est igitur haec amicitia, cum alter verum audire non vult, alter ad mentiendum paratus est. Nec parasitorum in comoediis assentatio faceta nobis videretur, nisi essent milites gloriosi.

Magnas vero agere gratias Thais mihi?

Satis erat respondere *Magnas: Ingentes* inquit. Semper auget assentator id, quod is cuius ad voluntatem dicitur vult esse magnum.

99.

Quam ob rem, quamquam blanda ista vanitas apud eos valet, qui ipsi illam allectant et invitant; tamen etiam graviores constantioresque admonendi sunt, ut animadvertant ne callida assentatione capiantur. Aperte enim adulantem nemo non videt, nisi qui admodum est excors: callidus ille et occultus ne se insinuet, studiose cavendum est. Nec enim facillime agnoscitur: quippe qui etiam advef sando saepe assentetur, et litigare se simulans blandiatur; atque ad extremum det manus vincique se patiatur, ut is qui illusus sit plus vidisse videatur. Quid autem turpius quam illudi? Quod ut ne accidat magis cavendum est, ut in Epiclero:

Ut me hodie ante omnes comicos stultos senes

Versaris atque emunxeris lautissime!

100.

Haec enim etiam in fabulis stultissima persona est, improvidorum et credulorum senum. Sed nescio quo pacto, ab amicitiiis perfectorum hominum, id est sapientium — de hac dico sapientia, quae videtur hominem cadere posse — ad leves amicitias defluxit oratio. Quam ob rem ad illa prima redeamus, eaque ipsa concludamus aliquando.

XXVII. Virtus, virtus, inquam, C.Fanni et tu Q.Muci, et conciliat amicitias et conservat: in ea est enim convenientia rerum, in ea stabilitas, in ea constantia. Quae cum se extulit et ostendit suum lumen, et idem adspexit agnovitque in alio, ad id se admovet vicissimque accipit illud quod in altero est, ex quo exardescit sive amor sive amicitia. Utrumque enim ductum est ab amando; amare autem nihil est aliud, nisi eum ipsum diligere quem ames, nulla indigentia, nulla utilitate quaesita: quae tamen ipsa efflorescit ex amicitia, etiam si tu eam minus secutus sis.

101.

Hac nos adulescentes benevolentia senes iilos L.Paulum M.Catonem C.Galum P.Nasicam Ti.Gracchum Scipionis nostri socerum dileximus; haec etiam magis elucet inter aequales, ut inter me et Scipionem, L.Furium, P.Rupilius, Sp.Mummium. Vicissim autem senes in adolescentium caritate acquiescimus, ut in vestra, ut in Q.Tuberonis; equidem etiam admodum, adolescentis P.Rutilii, A.Verginii familiaritate delector. Quoniamque ita ratio comparata est vitae naturaeque nostrae, ut alia aetas oriatur; maxime quidem optandum est ut cum aequalibus possis, quibuscum tanquam e carceribus emissus sis cum eisdem ad calcem ut dicitur pervenire.

102.

Sed quoniam res humanae fragiles caducaeque sunt, semper aliqui anquirendi sunt quos diligamus et a quibus diligamur: caritate enim benevolentiaque sublata omnis est e vita sublata iucunditas. Mihi quidem Scipio, quanquam est subito ereptus, vivit tamen semperque vivet: virtutem enim amavi illius viri, quae extincta non est. Nec mihi soli versatur ante oculos, qui illam semper in manibus habui; sed etiam posteris erit clara et insignis. Nemo umquam animo aut spe maiora suscipiet, qui sibi non illius memoriam atque imaginem proponendam putet.

103.

Equidem ex omnibus rebus, quas mihi aut fortuna aut natura tribuit, nihil habeo quod cum amicitia Scipionis possim comparare. In hac mihi de re publica consensus, in hac rerum privatarum consilium, in eadem requies plena oblectationis fuit. Numquam illum ne minima quidem re offendi, quod quidem senserim; nihil audiui ex eo ipse quod nollem: una domus erat, idem victus isque communis; neque solum militia, sed etiam peregrinationes rusticationesque communes.

104.

Nam quid ego de studiis dicam cognoscendi semper aliquid atque discendi, in quibus remoti ab oculis populi omne otiosum tempus contrivimus? Quarum rerum recordatio et memoria si una cum illo occidisset, desiderium coniunctissimi atque amantissimi viri ferre nullo modo possem. Sed nec illa extincta sunt, alunturque potius et augentur cogitatione et memoria mea; et si illis plane orbatus essem, magnum

tamen affert mihi aetas ipsa solatium. Diutius enim iam in hoc desiderio esse non possum; omnia autem brevia tolerabilia esse debent, etiam si magna sunt. Haec habui, de amicitia quae dicerem. Vos autem hortor ut ita virtutem locetis, sine qua amicitia esse non potest, ut ea excepta nihil amicitia praestabilius putetis.

NOTES

1.

For **Mucius** and **Laelius**, see Introduction, The Scipionic Circle.

memoriter, "with clear memory". That this is always the meaning of *memoriter* (and not simply "by heart" as opposed to *ex scripto* as dictionaries say) has been conclusively shown by Madvig, Fin. i. x. 34. Indeed, *memor* meaning "mindful", the adverb naturally has this sense.

ita eram deductus ut, [my father] "had made such a point of introducing me to": the word *deducere* means to "take to see", and here he means that he commended the young man to the old augur, acc. the Roman custom, that he might gain by his society.

Scaevolam, see Introduction.

sumpta virili toga, boys at Rome wore the white woollen toga with purple border (*praetexta*): after the age of about 16 (the time was not apparently fixed by law) they took the "*man's toga*", pure white, without border, and were considered grown up.

quoad possem, subjunctive, because dependent on the other consecutive subj. *discederem*, This subj. may always be used when the dependent clause is closely attached to the principal, as *part of the consequence*. See Scheme.

breviter et commode dicta, "terse and apt sayings".

pontificem Scaevolam, the younger Q. Mucius Scaevola, prob. son of the Augur's cousin. He was a man of great force and excellence of character, an illustrious orator and jurisconsult: "the founder", says Mommsen [Hist. Rome iii. 475], "of the systematic study of the law".

me contuli, "I attached myself to": being now a man, he chose his own society and uses a different word.

alias, ("I will speak) at another time": the verb being readily understood.

2.

cum saepe multa, tum memini: *cum* and *tum* often thus used without any reference to time, simply equivalent to "both... and", "not only... but also". "Among many other things, I remember".

hemicyclio, Greek word (*ἡμι*, half; *κύκλος*, circle) for a Greek invention "semicircular seat", "sofa".

sermo, "subject".

incidere; *memini* is properly used with pres. inf. of things of which the person was himself witness.

fere, "commonly, generally".

Attice, see Introduction.

P. Sulpicius Rufus, a noble by birth, the greatest orator of his day, who tried to reform the constitution by expelling insolvent senators, giving the franchise to freedmen, equalising the old burgesses and those newly admitted, and recalling exiles recently and unjustly

condemned. For this purpose he joined the democratic party, and became tribune 88 B.C. He was bitterly opposed by the senatorial party, with the consuls, Sulla and Q. Pompeius Rufus at their head: and after much disturbance and riot, Sulla occupied Rome with his army, and Sulpicius was seized at Laurentum and put to death.

utere multum, "were very intimate with". Sulpicius' brother had married a cousin of Atticus.

capitali odio dissideret, "had a deadly quarrel".

esset, subj. of oblique question: see Scheme.

querela, "distress" at the trouble which such a quarrel foreboded.

3.

cum in eam — incidisset, "happening to speak of that particular thing".

ea mentio — "mention of that": common idiom.

C. Fannio, see Introduction, Scipionic circle.

mortem Africani. Scipio Africanus the younger died 129 B.c. See Introduction, Scipionic circle.

arbitratu meo: lit. "at my own pleasure"; i.e. "I have given my own version"; he has recast it, with a certain freedom as to shape, preserving the substance. See, however, Introd. § 3.

quasi, adv. "as it were".

saepius, "so often". The comparative implies "more than is desirable".

4.

ageres, lit. "treated with me"; i.e. "urged me".

cum... tum, see 2.

digna res... est, i.e. I was bound by friendship to do what you asked, and also it was likely to be useful. The same idea is repeated in the next clause.

feci ut prodessem, "I have resolved to serve" (*feci* lit. "I have caused": common with the imperative *fac*).

Cato, see Introduction, Scipionic circle.

persona, "character": properly, "the players' mask" [*per-son* — "sound through"], and so used of *part* on the stage, 93. Hence the metaphor.

quae loqueretur, subjunctive (final) after *aptus, dignus, &c.*, with *qui*, "fitter to speak". See Scheme.

eius, sc. *persona*. We should say "he". So lower down *Laelii persona*,

qui... fuisset, subjunctive expressing the *cause*. See Scheme.

meminisset, because dependent on *dissereret*.

positum in auctoritate, "referred to the authority", "given on the authority".

plus goes with *gravitatis veterum*, not "old", but "men of past times": *et eorum* "and they too". See 17.

nescio quo pacto, adverbial, "somehow": he feels it to be unreasonable, but such is human nature.

ipse mea legens, a delicate touch of Cicero's vanity: "when I read my own dialogue, I am carried away — I quite forget myself, the author: it seems to be Cato himself speaking"!

5.

velim avertas, "please put me out of your thoughts". This is the brief form of the oblique petition, without *ut*, used commonly with *velim*, *malim*, *fac*, *licet*, and other words. See Scheme, where the origin is explained.

ab his... oritur, "the conversation begins with (lit. "from") them".

quam... cognosces, because he was so true a friend: a delicate compliment. For *te ipse*, compare *me ipse consolor*, 10, *mihi ipse confiderem*, 17.

6.

They have been speaking of the death of Scipio; Laelius has been deploring it: so we enter into the middle of the conversation dramatically with *sunt ista*, "quite true": (lit "what you say, is so". *Iste* is always used of the person addressed).

oculos in te coniectos, to see how a man so wise would behave in such a sorrow as his friend's death.

modo, "recently". Cato died in 149, Scipio in 129, B.c.: and this dialogue is supposed to take place just after Scipio's death.

L.Acilius, known only as an early jurist, who lived about the time of Cato maior.

usum, "experience". He was statesman, general, orator, farmer, jurist, &c.

multa eius: *eius* is possessive genitive after ***multa provis***a, &c. In English, recast: "Many stories were told of his wise foresight", &c.

cognomen sapientis, "the surname Wise": they called him M.Porcus Cato Sapiens.

te... esse sapientem, understand "people think": the verb is deferred till we reach *existimant*, 7.

qualem in Graecia neminem (i.e. *sapientem appellat*), "such as there are no instances of in the rest of Greece". He says *reliqua Graecia*, opposed to *Athenis unum*: there was one instance at Athens.

7.

qui septem appellantur, "the so-called seven sages". There were rather different lists of them, but perhaps the commonest was Bias, Chilo, Cleobulus, Pittacus, Periander, Solon, Thales.

qui ista subtilius quaerunt, "those who study such things more accurately", he says *ista*, as Laelius is, and he himself does not claim to be, a wise man.

unum accepimus, "we have been told of but one". Socrates, of course. The story is well known how Chaerephon, his friend, went boldly to Delphi, and asked whether any was wiser than Socrates, and the oracle answered "None".

et eum quidem, see 38.

hanc sapientiam... ut ducas. This use of the consecutive *ut*, after *is*, *illa*, *hic*, &c., is common, expressing a definition or expansion of the pronoun. "This wisdom, namely that you think"... See Scheme.

omnia tua in te posita. "All that is yours is within you", i.e. all your resources and qualities: for Laelius was a Stoic, and the Stoics taught the personal dignity of man, all external things, wealth, pleasure, pain, station, fortune, death itself, being quite secondary. For the phrase, see 30.

Nonis, the "Nones" were the 8th (the Romans, counting inclusively, said 9th) day before the Ides, and were, therefore, in most months on 5th, in March, July, October, May, the 7th.

D. Iunius Brutus, consul 138, B.C., chiefly famous for his victories in Spain, whence he obtained his surname, Callaecus. He was a cultivated man.

ut assolet, "as usual", *impers.*

qui... solitus esses, "though you had been accustomed", concessive use of the subjunctive with *qui*; see Scheme.

obeo, "to go over" lit.: here "to keep" both the day and the observance.

8.

animum adverti, prop. with *ad* or *dat.* Then it gets a secondary meaning "to notice", and simply takes a transitive accusative.

fuisse id humanitatis tuae, lit. "it did not belong to your kindness": i.e. "it was not possible for so kind-hearted a man" to be unmoved.

valetudinem, "your health": just as we say, meaning ill-health.

isto officio, "that duty *you speak of*".

incommodo meo, "by my own private grief".

constanti, "a man of principle".

9.

ut... fiat, after *hoc*, explaining it, see 7.

quod tribui dicis, "in saying that so much is ascribed to me"; *quod* is often used in Cic, to bring a fact or statement before the reader, and then express an opinion on it.

si quisquam, instead of the ordinary *si quis*, because he does not himself think there is any.

fili, Cato's elder son, also called M Porcius Cato, who died in 152 B.C., just before entering on his office as praetor.

Paulum, L.Aemilius Paulus, the conqueror of Macedonia (Macedonicus). He had four sons, the two elder of whom being adopted respectively by Q.Fabius and P.Cornelius Scipio, ceased to bear his name: the two younger, by a striking fatality, died within a week of each other, one before and the other just after his splendid triumph in 168, which commemorated the battle of Pydna. See Pedigree of Scipios.

G. Sulpicius Galus in the same year served as military tribune to Paulus. He was noted for his astronomic learning, and the night before the battle (June 21), an eclipse of the moon occurring, he explained the

matter to the soldiers, and allayed their fears. Of this loss of his son nothing more is known. [The best authorities (Baiter, Mommsen) approve the spelling, Galus].

hi in pueris, lit. "these in the case of boys" (see 24) (showed their fortitude): the verb is easily supplied. Construe: "but the sons they lost were children, while Cato, &c."

perfecto et spectato, "full grown and of tried worth".

10.

cave anteponas, "beware of preferring". The negative does not need inserting before the verb in this phrase, as *cave* suggests the avoidance.

istum, as before, see 8, "him you speak of", Socrates.

huius, Cato, being nearer in time, though mentioned first.

desiderio, "regret for".

si negrem, common form of the conditional, pure hypothesis: "if I were to deny".

viderint (jussive), "let them see to it", i.e. "I leave that question to them", implying that he does not agree with them.

sapientes, "philosophers": meaning the Stoics, who taught that grief, like all other human strong emotion, was to be suppressed.

errore; the "mistake" is to fancy death to be an evil, as he explains in the next sentence.

amicum, like *seipsum*, governed by *amantis*. "Is not love but selfishness".

11.

actum esse praeclare cum illo, "that it is well with him": an idiomatic phrase, with adverbs: cf. "*secum actum esse pessime*". Verr. 2, 3, 50.

putabat, i.e. that it was desirable to live forever.

vellet (as usual the imperfect expressing a condition excluded by the facts), "he had wished".

fas esset, consec. subj. "of the kind that".

ante tempus, the legal age (after 181) being 43, and Scipio's first consulship being 147 B.C., when he was only 38 (acc. others 35). The (third Punic) war was dragging on in Africa, and Scipio had shown great qualities in service there: he returned to Rome to sue for the aedileship, but was chosen consul by acclamation.

iterum, &c. The war in Spain was being conducted slowly and ill, and Numantia was holding out, when Scipio was again called to the consulship, in 134, "at the right time for him, almost too late for the State", says Cicero, pointedly.

urbibus, Carthage, 146, Numantia, 133 B.C.; both were destroyed, thus stopping not only those wars, but "all future ones", from those places.

pietate... liberalitate... bonitate. He is said to have supported his divorced mother, and been most generous in money matters towards his sisters, brother, and aunts.

ut memini disserere, for pres. inf. see 2. The conversation alluded to is the basis of Cicero's own *De Senectute*.

viriditatem "freshness": ("*cruda deo viridisque senectus*" of Charon, *Aen.* vi. 304).

12.

quo de genere mortis, "about the manner of his death". Cicero says distinctly (*Pro. Milone* vii. 16) that he was assassinated at night; and this seems to have been the general opinion. See Introduction. Laelius is speaking with the delicate reserve which characterizes him in the dialogue: though the accusation is more distinctly repeated below, 41.

celeberrimos. In Cic. this adjective always means "crowded", "accompanied by crowds". Translate: "out of the many days of public rejoicing, attended by immense gatherings, which he saw in the course of his life".

illum diem, see Introduction.

populo Romano, naturally they were his own friends, of the senatorial party: but Cicero in a partizan spirit calls them "*populo Romano*".

et Latinis, being the foremost among the *socii*: they had been frightened at the land assignments under Gracchus' law, and obtained the aid of Scipio to stop them.

deos is really in apposition to *superos*, "those below" being not gods but "shades" (*manes*). He represents him as being almost deified by his supreme position at the time of his death.

13.

eis, the Epicureans, who taught the mortality of the soul.

religiosa iura, "religious ordinances": he means the various observances of burial: the argument is that the institution of these observances implies the belief that the dead are affected (*pertinere ad eos*) by them, and so, that the soul did not perish at death.

Observe *fecissent*, "would have done", *act: arbitrantur* "had thought", *state*.

eorum, the Pythagoreans, who taught the transmigration of souls, viz., that the soul of man after death passed into another (human or animal) body, the good passing up through higher forms of existence, the bad down through the lower animals. The Pythagoreans were spread all over Magna Graecia as it was called, i.e. the Greek colonies on the south and west coasts of Italy, beginning from the 5th cent. B.C.

deleta, i.e. the old political status has disappeared; it was now all subject to Rome, of course.

tum hoc tum illud, ut in plerisque, sed idem semper, no verbs, which however are easily supplied. "Who did not think (about the Immortality question) first one thing and then another, as he did on most subjects, but always expressed the same view". Socrates' main doctrine as a philosopher was the untrustworthiness of most that was called knowledge; the need of attacking, examining, questioning

every thing; and so he founded the dialectic method, examination by question and answer, and so far from giving dogmatic teaching, he even, to get a thorough investigation, took different sides of the same question at different times.

optimo... cuique, idiomatic use of *quisque*, with superlatives "to all the best"...

14.

Philus, L. Furius Philus, consul 136 B.C., one of the incapable generals in the Numantine war: "inasmuch as he did nothing at all", says Mommsen (Hist. Rome iii. 6), "he came home without defeat". He was a friend of Scipio.

M. Manilius, consul 149 B.C., with Censorinus, in the third Punic war. They had to communicate to Carthage the cruel resolve of the Senate that the city should be destroyed: a message which roused the people to their last resistance. Manilius also seems to have been insignificant as a general. These two belonged to the Scipionic circle (see Introduction), and are both speakers in Cic.'s dialogue *De Re Publica*, which was the worked-up record of the conversation here spoken of. The sixth book contains the "Dream of Scipio," in which Africanus the Elder appears to him and reveals the Future Life.

id si ita est, ut (see 7, 9), "if the fact is so, that, &c.". So "*illa veriora, ut*"... below.

eventus, "end".

fit idem, "it comes to the same thing": *idem*, neuter.

quem tamen, &c. The argument in this section is: either after death he has consciousness (*sensus*) or not: if he has, he is gone to the blessed life, and is happy, and so death is a good: or he is annihilated, and death is not an evil. Still, even in this case it is a permanent joy to his fellow-country-men that he has lived.

15.

actum est, 11.

prius: Laelius was born prob. about 190, Scipio, 185 B.C.

vixerim, subjunctive, because virtually oblique: "I think my life happy because I have lived"... See Scheme.

studiorum, "interests".

cordi mihi est: "I have at heart, I like": *cordi* being probably a locative (old case signifying "at"), like *ruri*, *domi*, *humi*. [The other explanation, that *cordi* is predicative dative, like "*est mihi gaudio*", is very improbable, since *cor* is not an abstract word].

paria: "pairs": the adj. is used neut. as a substantive (cf. "*par nobile fratrum*", Hor. S. 2, 3, 243).

quo in genere, "in which class", "under which head".

16.

istuc ita neesse est, "that will certainly be so" (*necesse est ita sit*). *Istuc* is "your wish" about your friendship.

agere, see 4.

17.

non graverer, the imperfect conditional, as usual, implying that the *fact excludes* the supposition being realised: “If I had confidence (which I have not) in myself, I should not object.” See Index for other instances.

eaque Graecorum, “and that too of Greek philosophers”: *isque* or *et* is being only thus used, when a further point is given to make a description more precise. See 7, 38.

quamvis subito, lit. “however suddenly”, “or suddenly as you please”: “i.e. “on the spur of the moment”.

censeo petatis, “I advise you to apply”: for the constr. see 5, and Scheme.

18.

neque ad vivum reseco, “I don’t cut it down to the quick”: a vivid proverbial phrase for “I do not press that point too closely”, “I don’t speak with rigorous strictness”.

illi, the Stoics, who taught that the philosopher (*sapiens*) alone was good. Virtue was to live according to Reason, ignoring all passions and feelings: and this only the philosopher could do. Cicero here says that their standard of wisdom was an ideal and unattainable one.

sit ita sane, “granted, certainly”.

eam sapientiam interpretantur: *eam* is really used predicatively, though agreeing with *sapientiam*, according to the usual idiom. “They mean by wisdom, that which, &c.”

in usu vitaeque communi, “practical, in ordinary life”. So *figuntur... optantur* may be rendered “imaginary... ideal”.

C.Fabritius Luscinus, consul in the war with Pyrrhus (278), and a famous republican hero, of great simplicity and incorruptibility. The two most memorable tales about him are that he reraised the most splendid bribes from Pyrrhus, and that he sent back to Pyrrhus a traitor who had come to him, offering to poison his enemy.

M.Curius Dentatus, another hero of the same type. He fought against the Samnites (290) and Pyrrhus, and won immense booty, from which he derived no wealth himself. After his victories he retired to his Sabine farm; and the best story about him is that when the Samnites sent an embassy to him with costly presents, he refused them all, saying he would rather rule over those who had gold than have it himself.

Ti.Coruncanius, a third man of the same period, consul 280 B.C., successful in the field against Pyrrhus and the Etruscans. He was the first plebeian pontifex maximus, and remarkable for his law-learning. *invidiosum et obscurum*, “offensive and unintelligible” he calls it, because it was presumptuous to claim the name of Wise for their school; and yet being only an Ideal, which no man actually attained, the name seemed inappropriate.

concedant ut fuerint, *ut* defining a point, "let them admit that they were, &c," lit. "grant to have been". See 7, 9, 14, 50.

19.

pingui Minerva, a proverbial expression: Minerva being the

goddess of wisdom stands for the quality here; and *pinguis* is opposed to "subtle", "fine": so he means "with rude common sense", "with rough or homely mother wit".

liberalitas, "generosity" of temper.

audacia, "recklessness".

sint magna constantia, abl. of quality.

putemus, jussive, "let us think", "we must think:" *sequantur* is subj. as being dependent on the oblique *appellandos*.

societas quaedam, "fellowship", "a feeling of sympathy".

maior ut quisque proxime accederet, "stronger in proportion to the closeness of the connection". (This *ut* is simply "as", and the subj. is due to orat. obliq.)

ex propinquitate... potest, ex amicitia... non potest. The sharpest antitheses in Latin are given thus with no particle: see 66.

20.

quod ex infinita, &c., "that from the vast fellowship of all mankind, which nature herself has connected by a bond of sympathy, the circle has been so narrowed and contracted, that all ties of love are formed between two, or only a few persons".

(iungretur. imperf. y because the verb *contracta est* is past.)

haud scio an nihil, lit. "I don't know whether nothing has been given": and as *haud scio an* always expresses, in a modest way, the speaker's opinion, it means "*perhaps* nothing better has been given, &c.".

beluarum. hoc quidem extremum, "this last (pleasure) it belongs to beasts (to pursue)": the terse Latin being able to dispense with the verb. The reference is to the Epicureans, see 32.

posita in, "depending on": the regular idiomatic phrase.

temeritas, "caprice" [*temere* means "casually", used of things occurring without any assigned principle or cause: hence this meaning of *temeritas*].

21.

ex consuetudine vitae sermonisque, "by the ordinary standard of life, and the common use of language", i.e. virtue as the average man understands it, and not the ideal virtue of the philosopher, which no man attains. See 18.

Paulos, &c., for the names see above and Index. The plural is used idiomatically in speaking of the man as a *specimen* of a class: we say on the other hand, "a Cromwell", "a Milton".

his... contenta est: a touch of irony directed against the Stoics: "ordinary folk like us are satisfied with virtue as shown by Paulus,

Cato, &c., you philosophers require an ideal standard which — is never realized”.

22.

qui potest: *qui* is old abl. of *quis* or *qui* (cf. *quicum*), “how”.

Ennius, a Greek by birth, lived 239-169 B.C., and was the father of Latin poetry. His great work was *Annales*, an epic poem on the history of Rome in hexameters. Cic. often quotes him, and Virgil has adopted some of his expressions. He also wrote tragedies, see 64.

vita vitalis, “a life that is truly life”, “a living life”.

audeas (final, after *qui*). See Scheme.

opportuna... singulis, “are usually adapted each to only a single aim”.

aqua... igni, ut aiunt, “fire and water” being proverbially spoken of as the necessities of life: so the formula of banishment was “*aqua ei igni interdicere*”.

eorum qui pauci nominantur, “of those rare cases that are recorded”.

23.

illa sc. commoditas.

praelucet, rare transitive use “kindles the light of good hope for the future”.

quod difficilius dictu est, “and, though the expression may seem rather strong”. The comparative is often used in this sense (*Dictu*, called the supine, is really abl. of the verbal substantive; and *difficile dictu* is strictly “hard in the saying”).

benevolentiae coniunctionem, “the bond of good will”: the argument of the passage is: “the worth of friendship is infinite: friends defy absence, poverty, weakness, even death: nay, goodwill (the lower principle, *benevolentia*, which *amicitia* is the highest outcome), is the very foundation of all common life. If this is not clear, consider what happens when it is removed”.

quae non... possit, consec. subj. with *qui*, common especially in such interrog. sentences, “who is there so... that he cannot”... See 24, “*quis est qui non efferat*”? and Scheme.

24.

Agrigrentinum... virum. Empedocles of Agrigrentum in Sicily, an early Greek philosopher (flourished about 444 B.C.), taught that the universe was all composed of the four elements, Earth, Air, Fire, and Water: the various changes that go on in nature he explained as being the combining and parting of these elements, regulated by attraction and repulsion, or as he vividly called them, Love and Hate. He wrote in Hexameter verse.

hoc quidem, the power of Love or Friendship.

re probant, “establish by experience”.

exstitit, “has come to light”, “has been recorded”.

M.Pacuvii, Roman tragic poet (and painter), born about 220 B.C., and so some 30 years older than Laelius: he wrote many tragedies, mostly founded on Greek, which were great favourites with the Romans.

The scene alluded to here is from the *Iphigenia in Tauris*. Orestes and his friend Pylades have been caught, and Orestes is to be slain. Pylades, to save his friend, protests that he is Orestes, and a generous conflict ensues, each claiming to be the one to die.

Cicero refers again to the r passage, *De Fin.* v. 22, and quotes the words thus: —

Orestes. Ego sum Orestes.
Pylades. Immo enimvero ego sum inquam Orestes.
Thoas. Ambo ergo una necamini?
Both. Precamur.

Thoas is the King of Tauri, and he is asking which is Orestes.

stantes, the whole theatre rose in its enthusiasm.

in altero, “in the case of another,” a regular Latin use of *in*, 9. Cf *Aen.* ii. 390, “*dolus au virtus, quis in hoste requirat*”?

si quae, from *si quis*.

qui... disputant, i.e. the philosophers, see 17.

quaeritote, called *fut.imper.*, being regularly used with futures (as here *si videtur*).

25.

quamquam in its adverbial use as a corrective particle, “yet”. [This really comes quite simply from its conjunctive use, by brevity of style: and we do exactly the same with “though”. Thus: “As he asked me, I went and found him. *Though* I scarcely think he was glad to see me” i.e. (it was at his own request), *though*, &c.]

filum, “the texture”, “the quality”: not “the thread” in our sense, meaning “drift”. Thus Cic. says, *Argumentandi tenue filum*, *Orator* 36, 124: *uberiore filo*, *de Or.* 2, 22, 93: and *tenui deducta poemata filo*, *Hor. Ep.* 2, i. 225.

tum, used as a kind of antecedent to *si*: “in that case, if”, see 51.

in hortis, see 14.

patronus iustitiae. In the third book of Cicero’s *Republic*, Philus is induced to maintain, for the sake of the discussion, the thesis “that no state can be governed without injustice”. (*Cic. Rep.* iii. v. 8.)

[*qui... ceperit, consec.*]

26.

cum... tum, see 4.

quod quis, the enclitic *quis* “anyone”, for *aliquis*.

an esset hoc quidem... sed... alia causa. In English we should put the *quidem*-clause into the form of a subordinate sentence, thus: “or whether, while this was a property of friendship, the origin of it was different, and more ancient”, &c. Observe that the sequence here is incorrect, though most natural: *solet* leads to *desiderata sit* (perf.), as is right: the dependent clauses to that are historic, *posset*, *acciperet*, &c, as is right: but these insensibly lead him to put *esset* instead of *fuerit* when he comes to the second alternative.

princeps est ad, "is the main agent in".

nam utilitates quidem, &c. The argument is: It cannot be the desire of advantage which originated friendship: for advantage is received from those who are regarded with professed and not real friendship: but in friendship there cannot be anything forced or false. [*ab eis percipiuntur* be careful to construe "is received from those."]

27.

applicatio, "attachment".

ad quoddam tempus, i.e. till they are able to manage for themselves.

scelere, like the treason of the sons of Brutus, which made their father execute them: or the crime of Clytaemnestra, which made her son slay her.

exstitit, "has arisen".

si aliquem, "if we have found some one" [*si quem*, "if... anyone"].

congruamus, "we agree", or, as we should say more precisely, "ours agree", i.e. our character and disposition. The subj. is consec. *Videamur* is *virtual oblique*: "we love him... because we seem to see in him (as we think) a light", &c. It would have been sufficient, however, for this to have had either *perspiciamus* or *perspicere videmur*; but this irregularity is very natural, and occurs several times. Compare:

"compleverunt, quod se bellum gesturos dicerent". Caes. B.G. vii.

75.

"rediit, quod se oblitum nescio quid diceret". Cic. Off. i. 13.

"accusant, quod negent te respondere". Cic. Fam. vii. 6.

The verb of *saying* or *thinking* being subj. instead of the thing said. See Roby, Lat. Gram., § 1746.

28.

Fabricii, Curii, see 18.

usurpet, "cherish".

viderit, concessive subjunctive with *quos*. "Though he has never seen them". See 7, and Scheme.

Tarquinius, Lucius, the famous tyrant, who murdered his wife and his father, and was an accomplice in the murder of his brother.

Sp.Cassius, consul 486 B.C., and proposed an agrarian law, but when he resigned his office was condemned of aiming at sovereignty, and put to death (Liv. ii. 41).

Sp.Maelius, a wealthy plebeian, during a severe dearth (315 B.C.) sold corn cheap to the poor. This annoyed the authorities, who had to look after the corn-market, and they raised the cry again of "aspiring to sovereignty". A dictator was appointed, and his master of the horse, Ahala, slew Maelius with his own hand. Cicero speaks of him with horror, as a conspirator: but he was probably a benevolent patriot, the victim of aristocratic hatred.

non nimis alienos animos, "no very great aversion". The "virtue" he speaks of was Pyrrhus' general conciliatoriness, his kind treatment of

prisoners, and especially his restoration of captives without ransom, in return for Fabricius' honorable dealing, see 18.

crudelitatem, the Romans were always unjust towards Hannibal. Livy himself relates instances of Hannibal's gentle behaviour: e.g. when after Trasimene he let go all the Latin prisoners (xxii. 7), or when Gracchus' head was restored by him to the Romans in 212 (xxv. 17). Similarly they talked of his *perfidy*, though the only perfidy was on their side.

29.

cum videantur, subj. because dependent on and assimilated to *moveantur*. See Scheme and Index.

usu coniuncti, "associated in intimacy". *Utor* is often used of enjoying the society of a person.

quamquam, see 25.

studium is "kind feeling"; *consuetudo* "intercourse", *motus*, "impulse".

assequatur, final subj. after *qui desideret* dependent on it, the notion of purpose being continued on into the relative clause.

ut ita dicam is added because *generosum* is properly "high-born" and is used here not in its secondary sense of "morally noble", but with a distinct feeling of the *metaphor* and so requiring the apologetic "so to speak". The metaphor of the birth of friendship is kept up throughout the passage.

ut, "as", "in proportion as".

arbitraretur, subj. because it is part of the conditional sentence: see Scheme.

minimum in se esse, "that he is most deficient".

30.

suaque omnia, &c, see 7.

ne ego quidem, "no more am I", a regular use.

causae diligendi profectae, "the attachment originated".

31.

neque enim beneficium feneramus, "for we do not treat kindness as an investment", demanding a return with interest: the forcible metaphor is led up to by *exigamus*, "exact".

32.

ab his, "from this doctrine", neut.

qui pecudum ritu, &c. Another contemptuous reference to the Epicureans. Epicurus (342 — 272 B.C.), a Greek philosopher, taught for the last 35 years of his life in his famous garden at Athens. His doctrine was that the end of life is happiness, and this he identified with pleasure. He did not exclude the highest forms of pleasure, on

the contrary, he inculcated them, and especially both preached and practised temperance, with a view to true pleasure: but other schools, with a good deal of misrepresentation, denounced his doctrine as bestial. So Cic. says here *pecudum ritu*, and above (20) *beluarum hoc est*: and the garden was called "a sty": as Horace playfully says of himself (Ep. i. 4, 16), *Epicuri de grege porcum*.

susplicere, in its literal sense, "lookupto."

abiecerunt, "have degraded."

ad bene Merendum quam ad repositum, "to confer kindnesses rather than to demand return".

gravior, "deeper, more worthy".

nam si utilitas, &c. The argument is: True friendship, depending on nature which is constant, is constant too: if it depended on interest which is shifting, it would disappear with the change of interest.

ad haec vultis, i.e., "to reply": the verb readily supplied.

33.

quamquam, corrective as before, see 25: "yet." The sense is, "We talked over friendship: yet he thought rather differently from me".

ut non idem expediret... sentiretur, these *ut*-clauses depend on *incidere*: "it often occurred that either their interests clashed, or their opinions on public matters differed".

toga praetexta, the boy's toga: see 1.

34.

contentione, &c, "rivalry for". The phrase "*uxoria condicio*" shows that Cic. is thinking of the rivalry rather in the light of conflicting *ambition* than *love*: it is "an alliance", "a connexion". So *commodi* is "advantage".

quod idem, both neut.

labefactari, the subject of this, like *dirimi*, is *amicitiam* or *amores*. The construction would be a little awkward, if the sense was not so clear.

honoris, in the technical Latin sense of "public office".

optimis quibusque, see 13. The unusual plural is required here, for in each case there are two friends.

ex quo... exstitisse: this construction can only occur in the relative sentence, when the relative is a mere connexion = *et ex eo*, and the sentence can be therefore treated as a principal clause.

35.

plerumque iusta, "in most cases justified", manifestly on the part of the man who refuses to render the wrong service.

quidvis... postulare, notice the meaning of *quidvis* [esp. as compared with *aliquid* above]: "to make any demand": i.e. to stick at nothing.

Haec— videri. "These, he said, were the fatalities, so to speak [*quasi* apologizing for the metaphorical *fata*, see 29], which threatened

friendship, so numerous, that he said he thought it best to avoid them all, in the interest not merely of wisdom, but even of happiness". The *diceret videri* is a (natural but unnecessary) expansion of *videretur*, illustrating in a milder way the construction above, see 27.

36.

numne, rare (but good Latin), for *num*.

Coriolanus, the famous Cn. Marcius, surnamed Coriolanus from Corioli the Volscian town which he conquered: and who afterwards, indignant against his ungrateful country from which he had been expelled, led a Volscian army against it, and was only dissuaded from his purpose by his wife and mother. The story is well known to English readers from Shakespeare's *Coriolanus*.

Vecellinus, surname of Sp. Cassius, see 28.

Maelius, see 28.

37.

Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, tribune of the plebs, 133 B.C., feeling deeply the agrarian distress, owing to the growth of large estates and slave-culture, while the small farmerclass were dying out, proposed land-laws to remedy this; but was violently opposed by the aristocracy, and though his law was carried, a not was raised at the summer elections (133), and he was killed. Cicero, when he says *rem publicam vexantem*, is speaking as a member of the senatorial or aristocratic party, to whom the popular leaders were odious.

Q. Aelius Tubero, a Stoic and a man of talent, nephew of Africanus the younger, but a bitter opponent of Tiberius Gracchus, and ten years later (when he was praetor) also of his younger brother C. Gracchus. See Introd. Scipionic circle.

C. Blossius, of Cumae (in Campania), a philosopher, a friend of Ti. Gracchus, who after Gracchus' death (133 B.C.) was forced to flee, and took refuge with Aristonicus, king of Pergamus, in Asia; and ultimately committed suicide, when Aristonicus was conquered by the Romans.

P. Popilius Laenas, a stern and proud man, adherent of the aristocratical party, consul for 132 B.C., was president of a special commission for prosecuting the followers of Gracchus (Mommson, *Hist. Rome*, vol. iii. 95).

P. Rupilius Lupus, the other consul of the same year 132, also took a vehement part in the prosecution of the Gracchans. He was a friend of the younger Scipio: but in 123, in the tribunate of C. Gracchus, was condemned for his illegal and cruel acts nine years before.

aderam in consilio, "I was an adviser of": he was a member of the investigation committee; acting, of course, against the Gracchan party.

causam ut, because it is not a reason for a *fact (quod)*, but a ground for a *request*. Observe the antitheses *paruit... praefuit, ...comitem...*

ducem: "did not obey, but command, ...was not a follower, but a leader".

illius furoris, "his extravagances": *illius* depends on *furoris*.

nam cum, &c., "for since the friendship was cemented by the belief in your virtue, it is difficult for the friendship to subsist if you fall away from virtue".

38.

statuerimus, with *si*, see 16.

perfecta sapientia, abl. quality "if we were perfectly wise", i.e. if we had the ideal wisdom of which the Stoics talk, see above, 18; there is here the same antithesis between ideal wisdom, and that *practically attainable*.

hoc numero, "their number".

et eorum quidem, regular use of *et...* *quidem*, "and of those two especially", &c. See 7.

39.

M. Aemilius Papus is not known except from the magistrates' lists; he was consul with Fabricius, as C. here says, twice, in 282 and 278, and censor with him 275 B.C..

Luscinus: for C. Fabricius Luscinus, see 18; where also an account of *Curius* and *Coruncanus* is given.

contendisse, "solicit", "entreat": properly "to strain, strive".

in talibus viris, "in the case of", see 9.

impetraturum fuisse, is or. obliq. for *impetravisset*.

cum... *fuerint*, causal.

rogatum, masculine, agreeing with subject of *facere*: see *faciamus rogati* three lines further down.

C. Papirius Carbo, an energetic and able adherent of Ti. Gracchus, who, after his death, was one of the distributors of the lands under his agrarian law. He was tribune of the plebs in 131 B.C., but shortly after changed sides, and after energetically opposing C. Gracchus, was attacked by the democrats, and, being deserted by his new friends, committed suicide.

C. Cato, grandson of Cato the Censor (see Introd. Scipionic circle), consul 114 B.C.: little else is known of him.

minime tum quidem. C. Gracchus was doubtless a sympathiser all along in his brother's projects, but did not take a prominent part in politics till after his brother's death. He was, however, then appointed a member of the commission to carry out Tiberius' agrarian law, and so Laelius says, "nunc quidem acerrimus", speaking, it must be remembered, in 129. [It is not therefore necessary to suppose, with Madvig, that Cic. means *minime acer*, and not *minime sequebatur*: which would anyhow be a harsh construction.]

idem, idiomatic Latin use, when contrasting two points in the same person: we should say "now on the contrary".

40.

spatio curriculoque, “the course and track”, metaphor from racing.

41.

regnum occupare conatus, “tried to make himself king”, the regular aristocratic accusation against popular leaders. It was probably true, that any efficient reform could only be carried against the senate by one man making himself practically despot through the popular support: and Mommsen’s view is that Ti. Gracchus tried the reform without seeing where he was going, but that C. Gracchus did aim at such a practical despotism, taking the form of a permanent tribuneship through constant re-election by the people.

amici et propinqui, see 12. Here he distinctly charges the democrats with the assassination of Scipio. Others refer this to P. Scipio Nasica Serapio [see Pedigree of Scipios], consul 138, who, in 133 B.C., led the senate to the attack against Tiberius Gracchus (his cousin) and the mob; in which attack and the consequent confusion Tiberius was killed. Nasica became so odious for this that he was despatched to Asia, nominally on a mission, really to get him out of the way. But it is highly improbable that Laelius would refer to him without further distinction: and Laelius, as a moderate, would scarcely be so devoted to the violent Nasica; and in any case his fate was not such that “it would not be mentioned without tears”.

in Scipione, see 9.

*Carbonem... sustinui*mus. *We have endured,” i.e.

not actively resisted, but only stood firm under his attempts:

not wishing any more victims.

non libet, he says, out of delicacy: see 12.

serpit, “advances”.

res is a mild word for “the mischief”, i.e. the democratic movement, which of course seems to Laelius a “down-hill course” (*proclivis labitur*).

in tabella, “in the matter of the voting tablet”. The use of the tablet, or *ballot*, as we should say, had been recently adopted to secure secrecy, by the following laws: —

(1) *Gabinia*, 139 B.C., proposed by tribune Q. Gabinius, for elections of magistrates.

(2) *Cassia*, 137, by tribune L. Cassius Longinus, for the popular tribunals.

(?) *Papiria*, 131, by tribune C. Papirius Carbo (see 39), for voting on legislative proposals. This Laelius does not mention.

fiant... not “how... *are done*” (indirect question), but “how... *are to be done*” (indirect deliberative).

42.

quorsum haec, “what is the drift (*quorsum* = *quo-versum*) of all this”? He sees that political feeling has led him into a slight digression.

Observe the convenient *ut ne* for *ne*. Observe also that it is *ut ne* in the final clause (obliq. petit.); *ut non* in the consecutive clause.

Themistocles, the famous Athenian, commanded the Athenian fleet at Salamis, 480 B.C. (*imperator*): becoming vain, ostentatious, and corrupt after his victory, he was expelled by ostracism, 471. A few years after he fled (*fecit idem quod Coriolanus*) to Persia, and made friends with Artaxerxes the Great King.

xx annis. Coriolanus (see 36) fled to Volscians, 491 B.C.

uterque conscivit. Themistocles was rumoured to have poisoned himself, but Thuc. (i. 138) denies this, and says he died of disease. Coriolanus' death was also variously reported.

43.

haud scio an, see 20. "According to" the turn things are taking, perhaps it may some day come to pass. This prophecy Cicero puts into Laelius' mouth (although he says above, 41, "*non libet augurari*"), thinking of the years of civil wars which followed the Gracchi.

44.

non modo aperte sed etiam acriter, "not only plainly, but even sharply".

eaque et adhibeatur... et pareatur; the nom. is changed, since *pareatur* requires dat.: a slight but very natural irregularity.

45. DA COMPLETARE

nam quibusdam, &c. Cicero in this passage is partly, no doubt, attacking the Epicurean selfishness, which was carried into their notions of friendship, prompting them to avoid anything excessive or painful: but clearly he is thinking of a passage of Euripides, in the *Hippolytus*, 1. 253, where Phaedra's nurse says: —

Mortals should be moderate in friendship
Not love to the inmost soul:
The bonds of heart should be loosely tied
So that we can unloose and tighten.
That one soul should travail for two
Is grievous, as I suffer for her.
Therefore excess I esteem, less than moderation,
And all the wise will assent to me.

Χρῆν γὰρ μετρίας εἰς ἀλλήλους
Φιλίας θνητοὺς ἀνακίρνασθαι
Καὶ μὴ πρὸς ἄκρον μνηλὸν ψυχῆς.
Εὖλντα δ'εἶναι στέργηθρα φρενῶν
ἄπο τ' ὥσασθαι καὶ συντεῖναι.
Τὸ

nihil est quod illi non persequantur argutiis (subj. consec. after *qui*),
"There is nothing they do not split hairs about".
sibi cuique, idiomatic phrase, "to each for himself".
quas vel adducas, final subj., "that you may tighten them".
caput esse securitatem, "the chief thing is freedom from trouble".
tamquam, "so to speak", making more smooth the strong metaphor
in *parturiat*, which renders the Greek ὠδίνειν (in the passage above),
"to travail".

46.

alios, the Cyrenaics, called so from Aristippus of Cyrene. He taught
that the good was identical with pleasure, but that pleasure must be
moderately pursued in order to be enjoyed.
dicere multo inhumanius, "express a much more cynical view."
paulo ante, see 26-32; locum, as often "a point".
ut quisque... haberet. Observe here the mood and the tense. The
meaning is: "In proportion as each has least... so he is most anxious,
&c." The subj. therefore is due to orat. obliq., not to *ut*, which in the
sense of *as* takes indic. As to the tense, strictly after *aiunt* it should
have been primary, *habeat*; but as he is speaking of the doctrine of a
school (namely, the Cyrenaics), to which the past is as applicable as
the present, the irregularity is quite natural. Notice also that he
returns below (*quaerant... putentur*) to the strict sequence.
mulierculae, the diminutive gives a touch of pity or contempt to the
word; it suggests the helplessness of women.

47.

O praeclaram, ironical, of course, "a fine philosophy in truth!"
ista, as though he were addressing the Epicureans straight.
reapse, as though *re-eapse* (old declension of *ipse*), "in the thing
itself", "in reality".
locis, "points of view".
consentaneum, lit. "suitable, agreeable to", i.e. to reason: and so
"reasonable". Thus Cicero, de Off. i. 20, 68, "non est consentaneum,
qui metu non frangatur, eum frangi cupiditate".
quae necesse est, &c. The argument is: "You may aim at escaping
trouble, but virtue involves and entails some trouble; for example, the
indignation and hatred which virtue has for vice is incompatible with
perfect *securitas* or tranquillity".
aspernetur after *necesse est*, oblique petition, see Scheme.
flagitiosis modestos, "respectable people towards violent excesses".
proprium, as we say, "a property".

48.

qui profecto cadit, "which certainly does occur to him".
tollamus, dubitative or deliberative, "why we are to", see 41.

ne aliquas, a little more stress on the word than in the common *ne quas* "to escape *some* trouble", "some little trouble": cf. *si aliquem*, 27.

motu animi, "emotion".

isti, the Stoics, see 18.

quandam, like *quasi* qualifies the word *ferream*, "a kind of iron thing so to speak". *Duram* means "rigid".

Diffundatur, "expands": the nominative is *virtus*, but he is thinking here of the *heart*, not of the mere quality. The metaphor of the heart expanding and shrinking under joy and grief is quite intelligible.

quasi, see 35.

non plus quam ut, the meaning is plain: ... "any more than virtue is rejected because it involves trouble": but the construction is a little illogical, *ut... repudientur* being grammatically dependent on *tantum valet*. If he had put it strictly, it would have been, "non plus quam fit ut virtutes", &c.; or "non plus quam nonnullae curae, quas afferunt, valent ut virtutes repudientur". But C. is quite clear: the trouble in either case does not cause the good thing to be neglected.

contrahat... si, "it is a bond of friendship, if...", See 28, sqq.

49.

animante, "a living being",

ut ita dicam, apology for coining the word *redamare*.

vicisstudine studiorum, "interchange of attentions".

50.

nihil esse... similitudo. Again there is obviously a little looseness in the statement; though again the meaning is quite clear, "There is no attraction so strong as resemblance in friendship".

verum esse ut, usually after *verum est* the acc.inf. would be used; but the *ut* construction is used here (somewhat as it is in 7, 14, 18) as *defining a point*: "the truth of this point will be admitted, that", &c..

similium, gen. after *appetens*: for participles used as adjectives regularly take gen. (*servantissimus aequi*).

constet, jussive, "let it be established".

benevolentiam, qui est fons: relative attracted, as often, to predicate. *pertinet*, "extends".

inhumana, "narrow", "selfish": *immunis*, lit. "not taking its share in the common burdens", "contributing nothing"; a very expressive word, [Others read, with less authority, *immanis*, "cruel". Compare *communis*, 65, in opp. sense.]

quae... soleat, causal, see 4.

eis optime consulere, "heartily devoted to their welfare".

caritate volgi, "affection for people in general".

51.

fingunt amicitias, "imagine friendship (to be made)... "

tumque goes with *si*: "it is only in that case pleasant if..." see 25.
 tantum abest followed as usual by two *ut*-clauses: the first the *defining ut*, the second consecutive: so that the first clause is practically the subject to *abest*, lit. "*So far removed is the making of friendship on account of personal needs that, &c.*": i.e. "it is so far from being true that friends are cherished on account of personal needs, that", &c.

opibus et copiis, abl. of cause "from their wealth and resources".

quod ab amico est profectum, lit. "that which has come from a friend", i.e. "the advantage derived from a friend".

Atque haud sciam, &c., "and perhaps it is not even desirable that there should be nothing at all wanting to friends, i.e. perhaps it is even a good thing that there should be some deficiency, for then it brings out the devotion of friends. The Epicureans and Cyrenaics say, Friendship is based on *need*, a man cultivating you because you can be useful to him. No, says Cicero: the most devoted and beneficent friends are those who need you least. Nay, I will go further: it is good that a friend should need you, but good for you and not for him: it brings out your devotion.

domi... militiae, old *locatives*, a case which disappeared and only survives in a few words (*ruri, humi, cordi, &c.*) see 15.

52.

deliciis diffuentes, lit. "dissolving with delights", a very expressive phrase both from the metaphor and the sound: "in the lap of luxury".

ratio and usus correspond to our "theory" and "practice".

habent cognitam, a kind of elaborate perfect, describing not only the acquisition, but the possession, of the truth [So in Greek μαθὼν ἔχει: and compare English perfect].

proh deorum, &c, this solemn adjuration used (as we might use "in the name of gods and men") to indicate the strength of his feeling on the subject.

ut neque diligat, lit. "so that he should neither love", i.e. "on the condition of neither loving", &c. [a natural extension of the consecutive *ut*. Compare Greek ὥστε, and English use of so: "I care not, so he gets the prize".]

nimirum goes best with what precedes: "This is in good truth what the life of tyrants is", *nimirum* affirming what might be rather startling.

53.

quis diligat, "who would love", potential; *quem metuat* is dependent on it, part of the supposition, see *arbitraretur* 29.

dumtaxat, restrictive, "at any rate", qualifying "ad tempus".

quod... dixisse: *dixisse* has an acc.inf. sentence after it, Which is practically the expansion or explanation of this *quod*. In English it will be neater to say, "As they say T. said that he then discovered, &c".

[*Tarquinium*, the Proud Tarquin, whose cruelty and despotism caused the expulsion of the kings: a proverb of pride, see 28.]

54.

quamquam, adverbial, see 25.

illa superbia, "with that arrogance", as we say: the ablative of circumstances, which account for the wonder.

efferuntur, "are carried away".

[sperni... novis], not found in one MS., and perhaps not genuine: it reads rather as if inserted, without much regard to smoothness, to bring back Cicero to the point of friendship.

55.

parare... non parare, antithesis with no particle (we should say "*but*"): see 19.

istorum, i.e., "those I have mentioned to you", as frequently.

amicitiarum, with possessio.

quod etiamsi (like *quod si*) "but even if". The MSS. read "*ut etiam si*", which does not seem to make sense. Another conjecture, *quinetiam*, would also make sense, and maybe right.

56.

diligendi, gen.

ferri, "propounded".

unam, ut, &c. These being *rules*, the *ut*-clause is natural and necessary.

57.

non satis honeste, &c, "which it is not very respectable to do in our own affairs"; *satis* used to express the negative more mildly.

58.

definit paribus officiis, lit. "bounds friendship with", i.e. "restricts friendship to equality of attentions and good will".

exigue et exiliter, the alliteration helps the contemptuous effect: "in too narrow and niggardly a spirit".

ad calculos vocare, "to summon to a reckoning", "to take stock of": *calculus* being originally "a pebble", used for counting. The phrase is proverbial in character.

ratio, "account", keeps up the commercial metaphor.

excidat, "fall out", defluat, "bespilt"; congeratur, "heaped up"; "the metaphor is from *measures*, something sold by the quart: it is this retail-dealer spirit he is denouncing.

59.

finis, "limitation".

faciat, subj. dependent on *fiat*. How optional these *assimilated* subjunctives are, we have an instance here, comparing this with the corresponding clause in 56, which has *facit* for *faciat*. See Scheme.

iacentem animum, as we say, "low spirits".

quem ad modum putaretur, "as was supposed" (subj. because it is oblique): for it was variously reported. See *cuiuscumque*, 60. For *unus e septem*, see 7.

Quin etiam, &c. The argument is: if you love your friend with such caution and reserve, as would come from looking forward to a future quarrel, then you would be glad of his faults, and regret his good qualities and deeds: for you would be always thinking of what would be useful against him when the friendship is over.

60.

valet, "its influence is, "tends to".

possemus, subordinate and assimilated to *inciperemus*.

61.

cum emendati sint: *cum*, "when", does not take subj. in primary tenses: this subj. therefore is due to its being subordinate to *sit*.

62.

ut etiam, consec. "so that even".

si qua fortuna acciderit ut... sint, "if any chance occurs that... have to be supported"... The consec. sentence *ut... sint* develops and explains the chance, just as *accidit impers.* has an *ut*-clause after it.

in quibus agatur, dependent (and assimilated) subj. after *acciderit*: it is part of the supposition.

agatur caput, "their personal safety is at stake": *caput* either referring to the *life* (as in *capitis damnatus*) or to the *position, civil rights*, &c. (as in *capitis minor*). For *agatur* compare "tua res agitur", the common phrase.

modo ne, see Scheme.

est quatenus... possit, "can be to a certain extent", just as *est qui possit* means, "there is some one who can". The subj. is consec. The argument is: When the character of friends is good, then there should be complete companionship in act, thought, and will: extending even to *slight deviations* from right conduct, if it is not too far: since *some* concessions may be made to friendship.

virtus quam sequitur earitas, &c. The argument is: Popularity too should not be neglected: only it must not be sought by flattery and timeserving: if it follows on virtuous conduct it is legitimate.

We might perhaps have expected *caritas, quae sequitur virtutem*... But the fact is, he wishes to put it more pointedly: if you reject the popularity which is the legitimate fruit of virtue, it is practically repudiating the virtue.

62.

quod... essent, virtually oblique: the *substance of his complaint*.

63.

est igitur, &c., a sentence requiring a little care: "it is therefore prudent to keep a tight hand on the impetuous impulse of our affection, as on a team of horses, that we may test to some extent the character of our friends, and then enjoy the benefit of our friendship, as of horses that have been tried".

currum, for *cursum*, the old reading, is a great improvement.

quo = ut eo, "that so", final.

utamur, being the regular Latin word for "intercourse" with friends, make the phrase smoother in the Latin and more natural.

Notice the clearness and terseness of the Latin, from putting the *ut*-clause first, then the *sic*.

in parva pecunia; for *in*, see 9.

ut... cum... sint, ... malint, consecutive, with the dependent clause assimilated.

obscuratum iri, "it (the neglect of friendship for interest) will be put out of sight", and so forgiven or excused.

64.

ubi invenias, dubitative, "where are you to find", "where can you find"?

quid: often used in *transitions*, where we should say "further" or "again".

descendant [consec. subj. with qui], often used of *disagreeable* or *discreditable* things: "to submit to", "to face".

Ennius, see 22. Notice the (old-fashioned) alliteration in the line.

haec duo, "these two cases".

qui... praestiterit, fut. perf. just as it is frequently used with *si quis*, "anyone who shows...".

65.

communem et consentientem, "unselfish and sympathetic".

pertinent ad, "are connected with": *pertineo* used in a wide and vague sense.

multiplex et tortuosum, &c., "the subtle, scheming mind".

eodem, adv.

ut ne: he uses the *final* particles after *addendum est*, because it is a *rule or principle* he is laying down: "that he *must* not take detight".

iamdudum, with the present, according to the regular Latin usage; we should say, "I *have been* dealing with".

haec duo... ne quid... sit... non... repellere. Observe the two constructions both possible: these two principles... first, *that there should* be nothing [final, oblique petition after notion of a *rule*]...

secondly, *not only to repudiate* [put simply as a conception, “the not repudiating”, and so acc. with inf.]

fronte occultare sententiam, “to hide your feelings behind your face”, a very expressive phrase; perhaps we may render “to conceal your dislike with a mask of cordiality”.

ne... quidem, not here = “not even”, but “not... either”, the negative of “also”. “Not merely to repel charges, but not himself either to be suspicious”, “but also to reject suspicions himself”. Compare “*ne ego quidem*”, 80.

aliquid violatum, “some wrong has been done”.

66.

illa quidem, pronoun (grammatically superfluous) added to bear the *quidem*. “Sternness and strictness have, for their part, it is true, a certain impressiveness”.

67.

“*multos modios, &c.*”. a very good proverb, “you must eat many bushels of salt together [be intimate for a long time] that the function of friendship may be complete”.

68.

ut... fructus appareat, consec. “so that... fruit is forthcoming”.

illae quidem, exactly as above, see 66. Observe in this section the slightly strained meanings of the abstracts *novitates* (“new acquaintances”), *vetustas* (“old friendship”).

montuosis etiam et silvestribus: a striking example of the absence of the love of scenery, at least of the grander kind, which is so marked in the ancients.

69.

excellantiae, seems to mean “cases of individual superiority”, where a man is distinctly the king of his own circle.

Philo, see 14; *Rupilio*, see 37.

Sp. Mummius, one of the chief of the Scipionic circle, brother of L.Mummius, who conquered Greece 146 b.c, a Stoic, an orator, and a man of high character. He is one of the speakers in the dialogue *De Republica*, spoken of above. See Introduction, Scipionic circle.

Q. Maximum, Scipio’s elder brother, who had been adopted by Q.Fabius Maximus (and was now, therefore, called Q.Fabius Maximus Aemilianus), just as he had been by Scipio. He was consul 145 B.C., and carried on the war in Spain unsuccessfully against the patriot Viriathus. See Pedigree of the Scipios.

omnino, “most certainly”: introducing the antithesis *sibi nequaquam parem*.

esse ampliores, “to be more distinguished”, “to be raised”.

70.

ut... impertiant, explaining, expanding, the “quod”: “see 9. The second *ut*-clause, *ut... augeant*, is ordinary consecutive, “so that”.

stirpis et generis, “family and rank”.

quos duxerint, causal, “as they have considered them their fathers for many years”. Perhaps the correction *duxerunt* would be an improvement: but the subj. is quite good sense. He is “thinking of stories like those of Cyrus the elder, and Romulus and Remus, who were brought up by shepherds.”

71.

coniunctionis, “connexion” generally: though chiefly, no doubt, he is thinking of relationship.

si habere... dicere, “if they think they have some friendly service they can point to, rendered at the cost of some effort on their part”.

officia exprobrantium, “who claim credit for service”.

72.

sic quodam modo inferiores extollere, “so in a certain sense ought they (the superiors) to raise the inferior”. The order would be a little more accurate if *ut* came before *summittere*: but the sense is unmistakable.

opere, “actions”.

73.

possis, diligas, adiuves, really belong to the consec. class of subjunctives. They are *generic*. “Such a quantity as you can”. “The person you are fond of”. See Scheme.

neque tu possis. There is no second *nec* to answer to this. He was going to say, “Nor can your friend be equal to all honours”; but instead, he puts the same sense otherwise.

quamvis licet excellas, a fuller form of “*quamvis excellas*”: “both originally *jussives*: “Let you excel as much as you please”, and so coming to be equivalent to a *concessive* sentence: “though you excel ever so much”. Compare the use of *modo*, 61.

Rupilius, see 37. We see from this how great Scipio’s influence was: Cic. even speaks of his “obtaining the consulship” for Rupilius.

non potuit: Pliny tells us, that when his brother heard of this failure, he fell down dead.

74.

corroboratis iam confirmatisque, “when they have come to their full strength and maturity”: i.e. not till then.

isto, “that I have mentioned to you”: we should say here simply “this”.

paedagogi [Greek word, παιδ-αγωγοί, “boy-leaders”], trusty slaves, who looked after the boy on his way to and from school or the gymnasium.

vetustatis, see 68.

sed alio quodam modo, i.e. "non sunt neglegendi". "You must remember them", says Cicero, "but in a different way" from the friends of your own rank.

aliter, i.e. if you don't observe my caution about waiting till you are fully mature before settling finally who are to be your friends.

dispaes... sequuntur. It is probably best to take *mores* nom. "Dissimilar characters are attracted to dissimilar pursuits". The argument is: as you grow older, the characters diverge; this entails a divergence of interests, and so an end of friendship.

75.

Neoptolemus, son of Achilles and Deidamia, brought up at the court of his mother's father Lycomedes, king of Scyros: hence he was fetched by Ulysses to Troy, because it had been prophesied that Troy could not be taken without him. Lycomedes was reluctant to let him go.

impedientem, "trying to prevent".

ferat is virtually oblique, "because (as he says) he cannot", the reason as *felt* or *alleged*.

76.

est etiam — necessaria. "There is also one kind of misfortune, occasionally inevitable, consisting in breaking off a friendship".

quorum tamen redundet infamia, consec. "yet so that the disgrace of them reaches to their friends: "explaining *tum in alienos*, which otherwise might seem not to concern the friends of the offender.

eluendae, "dissolved", and *dissuendae* "unravelling", describe, by two different metaphors, the *gradual quiet* process which he recommends.

nec fieri possit, "possible".

77.

in rei publicae partibus, "on a political party-question".

vixeris, *generic*: "a man with whom".

Q. Pompeius Nepos, the first of the family who rose to high office, an incapable and unprincipled man, who having (when consul 141 B.C..) made peace with Numantines in Spain, disowned his promise (Mommsen, *Hist. Rome*, iii. 14). The story here alluded to was that he had promised to support Laelius in his candidature for 141, but when the time came, competed himself and was elected.

meo nomine, "on my account", a common idiom, possibly the same metaphor as the English: for nomen was the debtor's *name* in the creditor's book, and so came to be used for a person's *account*, or *debt*.

It may, however, be simply "in my name", alleging me as the ground.

Metello; Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus, who conducted successfully the last Macedonian war against the pretender Andriscus (148), and triumphed 146 B.C., was afterwards an augur, and colleague in that office with Laelius and Scipio.

graviter, auctoritate... acerba, "with dignity, without any offensive parade of his personal influence or displeasure". Rather a strange use of auctoritate, and the reading is not quite certain, but the sense is tolerably clear.

78.

extinctae... oppressae, "rather to have expired than been destroyed", a *natural* rather than *violent* death.

ut... in culpa sit, *ut*-clause defining *hic honos*, as so often: "that the blame be considered his who, &c".

omnino. "generally speaking".

una cautio, "one means of avoiding".

79.

cur diligantur, deliberative, "why they should be loved", i.e. ground for loving.

80.

per se et propter se, "by itself and for itself".

neo ipsi sibi exemplo sunt, i.e. "they do not learn from themselves (as they might — see next sentence) how precious and strong such a friendship is". A very strange notion: a man loves himself *disinterestedly*, because he expects no good from himself: such disinterestedness he ought to extend to his friends. A curious confusion of thought, which comes from arguing on the verbal distinction of *me* from *myself*. One would think it was playful, if it were not that Cic. is not given to such playfulness.

alter idem, "a second self".

81.

ad quas se applicent (final subj.), "to associate with".

quanto id, &c, "how much more is that naturally the case with man".

82.

par est, "it is fair", "reasonable": compare the use of *aequus* and *iniquus*.

colent inter se ac diligent: *inter se* is used after verbs for "each other", just like an accusative, or whatever case the verb requires; there being no Latin pronoun for "each other", corresponding to the Greek ἀλλήλους. Compare Cic. Cat. 3. 5, "furtim inter sese aspiciebant".

verebuntur... verecundiam, "respect".

83.

patere licentiam, "free licence is allowed".
virtutum adiutrix... vitiorum comes, are the predicates.
posset, subj. as subordinate and assimilated to final perveniret.
si quos inter, order changed to keep *si quos* together.
comitatus, "companionship".

84.

rem expetendam, "thing worth aiming at".
experiri, "put them (friends) to the test".

85.

plectimur, "we are punished" for our neglect [*neglegentia*, abl. of cause].
praeposteris... consiliis. praeposterus, "front-behind", i.e., "upside down", a very expressive word. Const. "we are beginning at the wrong end".
acta agere, proverbial, "to do what's done"; "i.e. "to try in vain when it's too late". So Cic. Att. ix. 5. "Sed acta ne agamus: reliqua paremus".
ultra et citra, "mutually", "reciprocally".
usu, "intercourse".

86.

quo etiam magis, "and therefore all the more", i.e. because carelessness leads to such embarrassments and troubles as he has just enumerated.
a multis: the MSS. read here *quamquam a multis*, which some of the comm. attempt elaborately to justify. Madvig, however, points out clearly that it spoils the sense; and I have followed him in omitting it. It is nonsense to say "Friendship is the only thing all admire, *though* some despise virtue".
venditatio, "display". It is an expressive word, describing the spirit of commercial "puffing".
cultus includes all comforts and luxuries. The whole phrase means just "plain living".
ad unum, "to a man".
se contulerunt, "have taken to".
suum negotium gerunt otiosi, one of those epigrammatic self-contradictions of phrase (like Sophocles' ὅσια πανουργήσασα or Tennyson's "faith unfaithful kept him falsely true"), called oxymoron, He means "live a life of leisure [from public interests], engrossed in their own affairs".
esse nullam, "is nothing".
si... relint: the subj. is due to the or. obliq.

87.

vitae: plural rare.

Timonem nescio quem, "like the Athenian Timon we have heard of, whoever he was", implying that nothing was known about him but the fact of his being a misanthrope. It is recorded that he lived in the end of the 4th century B.C., became a misanthrope from disappointments, and associated with Alcibiades chiefly, whose complete recklessness pleased him. He is of course well known to Englishmen from Shakespeare.

immanitas is used for anything *savage* or unnatural.

possit, "would not be able", though the first half of the sentence (protasis) was *si... est*: a slight irregularity, but quite natural.

apud quem, "into whose ear" (subj. final). Notice the strong metaphor.

atque hoc... iudicaretur, "and this would be most clearly seen if", &c. The subjunctives are all imperf. in this sentence, on the principle explained in 17.

ferreus, ferre, auferret, clearly an intentional jingle.

88.

Archytas, a Pythagorean philosopher of Tarentum, friend of Plato, flourished somewhere 400-370 B.C. He was drowned in the Adriatic: Hor. Od. i. 28. The phrase used here looks at first sight as if Cicero meant that Laelius had heard in his youth old men say they remembered other old men, who reported the saying of Archytas, *being contemporaries of his*; but as there must have been nearly two centuries between Archytas' time and Laelius' boyhood (375-175 about), this is hardly likely. The *alii senes* heard the saying *quoted*; and Cicero goes back so far, in order to strengthen the authority, not to complete the chain of tradition.

si quis ascendisset, i.e. "alone". The point is, that the splendour of the sight is not pleasurable (*insuavem*) unless there is some one to share the impression.

si aliquem, see 27.

adnititur ad, "leans towards".

quoque, with superl., see 13.

usus amicitiae, "intercourse".

tum... tum, "sometimes... sometimes".

una illa subeunda est offensio, "this one ground of offence must be encountered: "the *illa* is explained by the clause *nam — obiurgandi*.

I have adopted Madvig's reading *subeunda* for the ordinary *sublevanda* [which properly means *to alleviate*, i.e. the same as *elevare* above, to which it is manifestly opposed here]: if we adopt the latter we must construe it as meaning "endure", which is unlikely.

89.

familiaris meus, "my intimate friend", namely, *P. Terentius*; he was born at Carthage, 195 B.C., became the slave of a Roman senator,

Terentius, was set free, and became a popular comic poet. Six plays remain, the *Andria* among them. He was a friend of Laelius and Scipio, see Scipionic circle.

It is fair to say that the character in the play who utters this sentiment adds, "hoc tempore", and is really sneering at the degenerate times (*Andr.* i. 1, 41.).

Terence's comedies were mostly versions of the Greek Menander.

praecipitem ferri, "to pursue his downward way unchecked".

fraudem, "delusion", a common meaning: cf. *Cic. Pis.* i. 1, "hic in *fraudem* homines impulit: hic eos... decepit".

monitio, "warning", before: *objurgatio*, "reproof", after.

comitas, "friendliness", the good side *obsequium*: *assentatio*, "flattery", the bad.

adsit, jussive, "let it...".

non modo amico, according to the Latin usage, when the sentence is negative, the negative is reserved for the principal clause *ne-quidem*. "Not merely (is not worthy) of a friend, but not even", &c. Thus the ordinary statement "*non-modo* is used for *non modo non*", though practically true is badly expressed, obscuring the simple origin of the usage.

90.

Catonis, see Introduction.

quod contra oportebat, lit. "which ought to have been just the other way;" *quod*, acc. after *oportebat*, *esse* understood, and the other infinitives simply specifying the point.

91.

ad voluntatem loquentium, &c, * with a view to please, not to be true".

92.

adulterat, "pollutes", nearer to its original sense than our word adulterate.

qui id fleri, &c., "how?": it is an old abl. of *quis*, see 22.

93.

flexibile, "inconstant", *devium*, "irregular": both good metaphors in Latin, and expressive words.

negat quis, &c. This is from another extant play, the *Eunuchus* (2, ii. 21). It is the character Gnatho, the parasite, who is speaking.

persona, see 4.

adhibere omnino, "to admit at all "(to your acquaintance).

94.

Sense: "as there are many people like Gnatho (parasites) in

a higher position, their flattery is injurious, their compliments having more authority”.

95.

contio, “a crowd”, “a gathering” of people.

popularem, “a popular leader”. Here Cicero again shows his political leanings through the mouth of Laelius; the democrats, who were the opponents of the senatorial party which Cicero supported (and of which Laelius in his day was a moderate member), calling themselves *populares*, “supporters of the people”. He considers the *popularis* the natural antithesis to *constantem, severum, ac gravem civem*, the “man of character and strict principle”.

96.

quibus blanditiis influebat, “what smooth flattery he poured”.

Papirius Carbo (see 39) had proposed in his tribunate, B.C.131, that tribunes should be re-eligible at the end of their year of office. The object of this change was to secure the power and position of popular reformers (like *Tiberius Gracchus*, who had been driven to insist illegally on such re-election) against the *Optimates*. *Laelius* and *Scipio* spoke against it, and it was thrown out: but it was passed a few years later (*Mommsen’s Hist. Rome*, iii. 106).

ut facile... diceret, “so that you would naturally have said (lit. have been saying) he was, &c.” This seems to be one of those rare cases where the conditional subjunctive *diceret* is retained, though the *ut* requires a subj. on its own account.

Compare *Cic. Sest.* 62, “*quod si repudiasset, dubitatis quin ei vis esset adlata?*” and again, 83, “*non dubito quin si esset... senatus, statua ei statueretur*”.

comitem, i.e. “a private citizen”.

Q. Maximo, see 60.

Licinius Crassus, tribune 145 B.C., proposed to make the priestly colleges, which filled their own vacancies, surrender this right to the popular election. *Laelius* spoke against it, and it was rejected. The proper name of this election by the body itself was *co-optatio*, “a joint choosing”.

in forum versus agere cum populo, “to turn towards the forum and address the rabble”. The *rostra* or platform was between the *comitium* or sacred meeting-place (open to the sky, but marked off from the forum) and the open forum. In old days the speakers addressed the burgesses in the *comitium*: *Crassus* began the custom of turning his back on the *comitium* and addressing the mob in the forum. (*Burn, Rome and the Campagna*, p. 81.)

praetore me, see Introduction, *Scipionic circle*, *Laelius*.

vendibilis, prop. “saleable”, used to mean “agreeable, “popular”.

re magis, “more by the strength of the case”.

97.

in scaena: he calls the public assembly contemptuously "a stage".

loci plurimum, "most scope".

exploratum, in its common sense "certain".

qui ipse sibi assentetur, an expressive phrase, "who flatters himself".

The subj. probably consec, "the kind of man who".

98.

omnino, "most certainly", used like a stronger quidem, conceding but drawing a distinction in a later clause (*ego, autem*; &c.)

It is used just so above, see 69.

virtutis opinione, "supposed virtue".

nisi essent milites gloriosi, "unless there were (on the stage) swaggering soldiers", one of whom, "the soldier Thraso", in Terence Eunuchus 3, i. 1), he proceeds to quote. The words *milites gloriosi* are, however, doubtless suggested by the title of a play of Plautus, *Miles Gloriosus*.

Magnus vero, &c. The "swaggering soldier" asks his parasite Gnatho how Thais, his beloved, had taken a present he had sent. The verb understood is, "does she say".

ad voluntatem, see 91.

99.

excors, "silly. *Cor* was in Latin the seat of the *intelligence*, not affections (compare *Corculum*, 101).

det manus, "gives in: "the metaphor being from the attitude of clasping hands (as sign of surrender), for the conqueror to bind.

qui illusit sit, subj. subordinate (and assimilated) to the final *videatur*.

plus vidisse, "to have been clearer-sighted".

ut in Epiclero, "as in (the play of) Epiclerus, or the Heiress", ἐπίκληρος being the Greek for "heiress", and being the name of a play of the Greek poet Menander, which had been translated by Caecilius Statius, a poet who lived in the third century B.C. It is from Caecilius that Cicero here quotes.

The meaning of the extract is:

"How you will to-day have deluded and humbugged me
splendidly, beyond all the silly old men of comedy".

versaris and emunxeris are used in a slangy sense [The reading, however, is not certain; *emunxeris* being an emendation of Bentley's, which Madvig also adopts].

100.

de hac dico sapientia, i.e. as he insists in 18, and again in 38, he is speaking of ordinary wisdom such as can be realised, not the ideal and impossible wisdom of the Stoics.

aeque ipsa, "and even those". He naturally dwells more on the higher kinds of friendship; but he has nearly exhausted *even* that topic.

aliquando, "at length".

This last chapter contains the rhetorical peroration, in which he surna up.

convenientia, "harmony", "conformity".

eum ipsum diligere, *ipsum* is the emphatic word.

quaesita goes with *utilitate*: "not from any need, nor in the hope of any advantage, though that, &c.

minus, as constantly in Latin, is an elegant negative.

101.

These names have some of them been commented on: *Paulus* 9, *Cato* 4, *Galus* 9.

P.Nasica was the father of *Nasica Serapio* mentioned in 41 (see pedigree of the *Scipios*): he was consul 162 and 155 B.C., and *Pontifex Maximus* 150: he married *Cornelia* (daughter of *Africanus Maior*), his second cousin: and he had the surname *Corculum* for his wisdom, see 99.

Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus the elder, consul 177 and 163, father of the two famous tribunes *Tiberius* and *Caius*, and himself distinguished by his able, honest, and humane administration in Spain 181 — 179 B.C.. His daughter *Sempronia* married *Scipio Africanus minor*, and so he is called *Scipionis nostri socerum*. See Pedigree.

L.Furius Philus, see 14: *Rupilius Lupus*, see 37: and *Spurius Mummius*, have all been mentioned together as friends in 69.

Tuberonis, see 37, and Pedigree of the *Scipios*.

P. Rutilius (*Rufus*), an able and incorruptible man; served with honour under *Scipio* before *Numantia* (133 B.C.); was consul 105, and afterwards served as *legatus* in *Asia* under *Mucius Scaevola*, where he so resisted the extortion of the *publicani* as to incur the hostility of the *equites* at *Rome*, who audaciously condemned him to exile for extortion! (*Mommsen's Hist.Rome*, iii. 219.)

He is here "quite a youth" (129 B.C.).

Of *A.Verginius* nothing is known. He is supposed to have been a youthful student.

ratio comparata est, "system is so arranged".

ut alia aetas oriatur, rather obscure; and the reading has been doubted; but perhaps it merely means "that a different age arises after us" [*Madvig*, *Baiter*, and *Orelli*, read *alia ex alia*: which is a neat correction, if correction is required].

e carceribus... ad calcem, metaphors from the race, "from the starting-point... to the goal. *Carceres* were the vaults, closed by wooden gates, where the horses stood before the start: *calx* ("chalk") was the chalked rope which served as the line for the end of the race in the circus.

emissus sis, dependent on the oblique *possis*; it is part of the wish: see Scheme.

102.

in manibus, "in the closest connexion".

animo aut spe maiora suscipiet, "entertain great projects or hopes".

103.

quod quidem senserim, "so far, at least, as I was aware" the *restrictive* use of the consec. subj. with *qui* Literally — "at least such as I was aware of".

quod nollem, "that I did not like": the most delicate expression he could use for "nothing offensive".

104.

desiderium, "longing", "regret": as often, for something lost.

affrert. The natural sequence would give *affrret*, "would have brought me ": but the alteration, the break of construction, is effective: the memories are not lost; but he has the consolation all the same.

diutius, "much longer". Clearly Laelius himself did not long survive his friend.

ita locetis, "set virtue so high".

Every one will feel how skilfully this peroration is written, and what a charm it has from its melody, and pathos, and dignity.

THE SUBJUNCTIVE

To the student of Latin nothing is more important in the whole Syntax than to understand thoroughly the various uses of the Subjunctive. And there is no writer more instructive on this point than Cicero; inasmuch as, his style being at once delicate and precise, expressing a variety of fine shades of meaning, with a copious resource of form as well as vocabulary, his prose is a very storehouse of subjunctives.

It would be very little use to give a general theory of the subjunctive, presented in a definition consisting of abstract terms. To the beginner it would be meaningless; to the scholar probably superfluous. The first thing is carefully to classify the *uses*, until they become familiar, and the object of this scheme is to enable the learner to do so, with the subjunctives in this book, and so to learn to discriminate the uses generally. It would be quite possible to get a wide and accurate knowledge of this department of syntax from the De Amicitia only.

There will be doubtless many who read this edition to whom such classification is already familiar. These can easily omit this section. But considerable teaching experience leads me to think there will be more to whom it may be of use.

SCHEME OF THE SUBJUNCTIVE

Optative and Jussive

[a common use of the subj. as a principal verb is to express a *wish* or *command*: grammatically they are the same, though they differ in the feeling, and the difference is expressed in the tone].

a. direct.

Type: *faciat*! "may he do it" (*opt.*), or "let him do it" (*jussive*).

Examples: sit ita sane, lo.
agamus pingui Minerva, 10.
studium semper adsit, 44. So 50, 89. (so perfect).
viderint sapientes, 10.

b. indirect.

Type: *velim facias*, "I would wish you to do it".

Examples: velim animum averias, 5.
censeo petatis, 17.
necesse est asperneur, 47.
cave anteponas (where cave = negative, see notes)
10.

c. *interrogative*. Dubitative or Deliberative.

[The interrogative form of a jussive is that in which a man asks himself *what he must do*, *what he is to do*: and so is naturally used in the mental condition of doubt or deliberation, hence the name]

(1) *direct* dubitative.

Type: quid faciam? "What must I do"?
(No examples in this book.)

(2) *indirect*.

Type: doceo quid *faciat*, "I teach him what to do".
Examples: Plures discent quem ad modum haec *fiant*, 41.
causa est cur amicitiam *tollamus*, 48.
causa cur *diligantur* (are to be loved), 79.

Final

[the subjunctive also expresses, as in most languages, the end or purpose]

a. with *ut*, *ne*, and *ut ne*.

Types: Vigilo, *ut faciam*, "I watch, in order to do it".
orabam, *ut faceret*, "I prayed him to do it" (see oblique petition, below).

Examples: hortari possum *ut amicitiam anteponatis*, 17.
ageres *ut scriberem*, 4.
praecipendum *ut ne existiment*, 42; and 60, 65.
(even after *causa*) *causam afferebat ut ignoscerem*, 37.

others in 22, 59, 60: and often.

b. with *qui*.

[a neat use of the relative, making the structure more close and clear; very idiomatic and common in Latin.]

Type: mitto *qui faciat*, "I send a man to do it".

Examples: habere *quicum audeas loqui*, 22.

sit *per quem assequatur*, 29.

others in 45, 48, 59, 62, and 87.

: so *aptus qui faciat*, "fit to do".

apta quae loqueretur, 4: and *idonea quae dissereret*, ib.

c. with *dum*, *priusquam*, implying purpose:

[the conjunctions "until", "before that", especially with negatives, often express the purpose of the mind, and so take the subjunctive. This will be seen in a moment by comparing the two sentences, "the wind falls before the sun rises" (indic), and "I will not go away before the sun rises" (subj.)]

Types: *maneo dum faciat*, "I wait till he does it".

: *non abibo priusquam faciat*, "I will not go away before he does it".

Example: *ne exspectemus quidem dum rogemur*, 44,

Consecutive ("so that", expressing result).

Type: *talis sum ut faciam*, "I am such that I do it".

Examples: *tantum valet ut tollat amicitiam*, 48.

tantum abest... ut liberalissimi sint, 51.

ita alligatos, ut non discedant, 42.

[an extremely common use in Cic. is after pronouns like *hoc*, *illud*, &c, where the *ut*-clause does little more than expand the pronoun, defining the thing meant more precisely. Hence this use is sometimes called the Definitive or Explanatory use of *ut*: a few examples will make it plain]

Examples: *hanc amicitiam, ut omnia... postea ducas*, 7.

hoc contingere, ut ulla intermissio fiat, 9.

id si ita est, ut animus... evolet, 14.

and others, 50, 61, 70, 78, 92; so the first *ut*-clause with *tantum abest* is Definitive, 51.

This subj. is also used with many verbs, expressing the result.

Examples: *facere ut ...* 4.

incidere ut... 83.

fieri posse ut... 76.

pati ut, 87, &c.

[a special use of the consecutive is as a condition; like the English "I care not *so that* you come"]

Example: *quis est qui velit... vivere, ut neque diligat*, 52.

[for consecutive subj. with *qui* see below, 6.]

Causal ("since, whereas", &c)

a. *cum* [meaning "since", *always* with subj.]

Type: *cum faciat*, "since he does".

Examples: *cum illi sanctissimi fuerint*, 39.
cum contrabat amicitiam, 48.

So 68, 84, 92, 97: very common.

b. [but *cum* also takes subj. of *historic tenses* when it simply means "when": the fact being that in narrating a chain of events there was a feeling of one thing being the *occasion* of the other]

Examples: *cum ego essem una*, 2.
cum in eam mentionem incidisset, 3.
cum tecum agere conarer, 16.

and very common in all Latin.

[for causal subj. with *qui*, see below, 6.]

Concessive ("although")

Type: *quamvis faciat*, *abibo*, "though he does it, I shall go".

[The origin of this use is the jussive meaning, no doubt; and the above sentence meant literally "Let him do it as much as you please, I shall go": a vivid primitive way of saying *although*. The same origin is still clearer in *modo faciat*, "only let him do it", *licet faciat*, "let him do it"]

Examples: *quamvis non sit gravis*, 11.
quamvis honeste id facerent, 35.

("provided that") *modo ne summa turpitudine sequitur*, 61.

also with *quamvis licet*.

quamvis licet excellas 73.

[for concessive subj. with *qui*, see below, 6.]

Subjunctives with *qui*

The subjunctive is used with *qui* to indicate that the relative is used not in a definite and specific sense, as "*Hic est qui fecit*", "he is the man who did it"; but in a generic sense, as *sunt qui faciant* "there are people of the kind who do it": *non is sum qui faciam*, "I am not the kind of man to do it".

This use is very idiomatic and common and graduates into several different shades of meaning, usually classed under different heads, which we give below.

a. Generic or Consecutive

[The commonest is the use implying "any one who", "the kind of person who", "such a person who", generally called consecutive, though the term *generic* is often more applicable: the meanings being very near together, and easily sliding into each other]

Types: *quis est qui faciat*, "who is there who does?"

Examples: *quis est qui non efferat?* 24.

nemo quin *utatur*, 68 and 102.
so nihil quod, 28, 45, 103.

Type: is qui *faciat*, aliquis qui *faciat*, "one who does", "any one who does".

Examples: eum quem ames, 100.
ei qui *ceperit*, 25;
so *existiment*, 63; *queant*, 71; *diligas*, 73.
aliquis qui, 27, &c, see 76, 70, 97.
compare; cum *assint*, "any case when", 84.

: tam bonus qui *faciat*, "so good as to do" [consecutive proper].
tam firma quae non *possit* everti, 23.
tam ferreus qui ferre *possit*, 87.

b. Causal, "because"

[The subjunctive, fundamentally the same as (a), often expresses the reason]

Type: culpo te qui *facias* (lit. "I blame you, a man who does"), "I blame you for doing".

Examples: eius quis senex fuisset, 40.
so: quae soleat, 50.
quos duxerint, 70.

So with *quippe*: *agnoscitur*, *quippe* qui *assentetur*, 99: compare *quippe* cum, 28,

c. Concessive, "although"

[the same subjunctive expressing the thing or quality in spite of which the statement of the principal verb is made].

Type: nunc non facit, qui fere faciat [lit. "now he does not do it, a man who usually does it"], "he does not do it now, though he usually does it".

Examples: non affuisti, qui semper solitus *esses*, 7.
so: quos nunquam *viderit*, 28.

d. Restrictive

[the same subjunctive, often with *quidem* after *qui*, having the effect of a restriction or limit on the principal clause]

Type: nemo, quem *quidem* *noverim*, adest, "No one is here of the kind at least I know, whom at least I know".

Examples: numquam offendi, quod *quidem* *senserim*, 103.
i.e., "so far at least as I perceived".

Conditional

a. *Principal verb* (apodosis).

Types: *faciam, fecerim*, "I would do".

Examples: *certe mentiar*, 10.

Pergrauum feceris, 16.

Types: *facerem, fecissem*, "I should have been doing", "I should have done".

Examples: *Ego non gravarer*, 17.

Tum magis id diceret, 25.

so 29: *faceret*, 50.: *indicaretur*, 87.: *paruissem*, 37.

[all these instances have a condition attached in a clause beginning with "if", as is natural: sometimes the same subjunctive is found with the *if*-clause omitted, and then is called *Potential*]

Examples: *admodum gratum feceris*, 16.

quae nostra causa nunquam faceremus, 57.

quis diligat? 53.

b. *Dependent verb* (protasis).

[The tenses in ordinary sequence strictly corresponding to those in the Apodosis, i.e., primary tenses to primary, historic to historic]

Type: *sifaciam, sifecerim*, "if I should do".

Examples: *si me moveri negem*, 10.

si de amicitia disputaris, 16.

others: 38., 42., 48., 100.

Type: *si facerem, si fecissem*, "if I had been doing", or "had done".

Examples: *si mihi ipse confiderem*, 17.

so: *esset*, 29., *conglutinares*, 32., &c.

si voluisset, 37., *contendisset*, 39., &c.

Note. — A change is sometimes introduced, on purpose to express a change in the idea, so that the sequence is not kept.

Examples: *Si illis orbatus essem, magnum tamen affert solatium*, 104.

Oratio Obliqua.

a. *statement: only in dependent clauses.*

Type: *dixit se quod iussissem facere*, "he said he was doing that which I had ordered".

Examples: *te dolorem, quem acceperis, ferre*, 8.

quod facere non possent, id fieri, 24.

so *accederet*, 19.: see 35., 39., 45., 46., &c, very often.

So when the clause is *really* though not *in form* oblique, called *virtually oblique*.

Type: *irascor quod facias*, "I am angry on the ground that you do it, "because, as I allege, you do it".

Examples: quia *vixerim*, 15.
querebatur quod *essent*, 62.
impedire vult quod non facile *ferat*, 75.

[for incorrect virtual oblique with verbs of saying or thinking,
see 27., notes.]

b. oblique question

Type: nescio quid faciat, "I don't know what he does".

Examples: quam id recte faciam *viderint*, 10.
(disputaris) quid *sentias*, &c, 16.

so: 36, 48, 53, 97, &c, very common.

observe one instance with the sequence broken, owing to intervening
historic verbs:

meministi quanta *esset* admiratio, 2.
instead of *fuert*.

c. oblique petition

[under this convenient name have been united sentences of a
different *grammatical* character, but in *sense* closely allied.]

Types: velim *facias*; see 1, (b.)
oro ut *facias*; see 2, (a.)
pati ut *faciat*; see 3.

Principal-in-subjective

[It only remains to consider the cases where a subordinate clause
(usually with relative) is put into the subjunctive not to carry any new
sense, but simply because the principal clause is subjunctive. The
leading subjunctive is due to one or other of the reasons above
classified: and the dependent clause is *assimilated* to it]

Dependent and assimilated subjunctive.

Examples: (final) per quem assequatur quod *desideret*, 29.
ne plus reddat quam *acceperit*, 66.
ut ne inciperemus amare quem odisse *possemus*,
60.
so: quoniam non posset, 83.
(consec.) ita ut quoad *possem* numquam
discederem, 1.
ut is qui *illus* sit plus vidisse *videatur*, 99.
so: emendati sint t 61, sit, 83.
(conditional) ita esset aptissimus, ut *arbitraretur*,
20.
quis diligat quem *metuat*, 62.
so: *agatur*, 61.

It should be added that these cannot sometimes be distinguished from one or other of the subjunctives treated in 6. Often they may be referred to either.

NOTES ON THE READINGS

26. *quod quis mintts*: so P.: Madv., Baiter, and Halm read *quisque*. *quis* makes perfectly good sense.

32. *ab his*, Baiter with the MSS. Halm, Madv., read at *ii*.

46. *putentur*, P. Halm, Baiter, Madv., *putantur*.

49. *animante*, P. and Baiter. Halm and Madv. read *animo autem*, but the strange word *animante* is more liable to get altered: and *autem* is not so good in such an antithesis as there is no connexion.

53. *exsulantem*, *tum* is Madvig's neat correction for the clumsy *tum exsulantem*.

55. *quod etiam si* is Lahmeyer's correction for the MSS. *ut etiam si*, which does not make sense.

57. *causa amicorum* is the MSS. reading adopted by Halm: it is ugly certainly, but perhaps felt to be necessary by the writer after *nostra*, to which *amicorum* simply would not be a perfect antithesis.

70. *consecuti sint*, P. and Baiter: Halm and Madv. read *sunt*. The subj. is quite natural, and we had better follow the best MS.

duxerint, again P.: Madv., Halm, and Baiter read *duxerunt*. Again the subj. is quite right: see notes.

86. *a multis*. The MSS. insert before this *quamquam*, which is not sense, and so Madv. and Baiter omit it.

88. *subeunda*, Facciolati's correction adopted by Madv. for *sublevanda*; see notes.

99. *emunxeris*, Bentley's emendation adopted by Madv. The MSS. have *ut iusseris*; corrupt plainly.

100. *ductum*, P. Baiter. Madv. and Halm read *dictum*, which is perhaps commoner for "derived"; "but *ductum* will do.

104. *affert*. P. Madv., Baiter, and Halm read *afferret*, which is not necessary though natural: see notes.

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