Discussion of "FIVE FACTS ABOUT BELIEFS AND PORTFOLIOS"

by Stefano Giglio, Matteo Maggiori, Johannes Stroebel, and Stephen Utkus

Michaela Pagel - Columbia GSB, NBER, & CEPR

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 - Problem: survey expectations seem noisy, unrelated to reality, or very invariant
 - ► Can we still learn something from them? Presumably yes if they are correlated with actual behavior
 - ► How representative is the population? How high is that correlation? What is the regression's explanatory power?
 - ► How should we model expectations and beliefs to make them consistent with the empirical evidence?

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Reminds me of Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008)

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- ▶ Does it have to do with the Vanguard investment philosophy? People are in it for the long run
- Unlike in PSID or my own expectations stickiness, expectations are too volatile here (in the cross section)

► It seems that the change in expectations does not explain much in terms of actions


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- Can we do a kitchen-sink regression to see what does (of the observed variables)?
- ► Individual FEs explain 50% of the variation, even though, in the cross section, they are too volatile
- Expectations are probably very correlated with past market performance (Greenwood and Shleifer, 2014; Barberis, Greenwood, Jin, and Shleifer, Barberis et al.) as well as own performance (Karlsson et al., 2009; Olafsson and Pagel, 2018)

What about biases in belief/expectation formation?

► Karlsson et al. (2009); Olafsson and Pagel (2018): investors/individuals are selectively inattentive



Could that lead to misreporting and biases? I.e., I only want to think about (and respond to survey) after investments have been doing well/expectations were matched


What about Bonds?

- ► Investors appear to know about the yield curve and zero coupon bonds... which is impressive!
- ▶ But bond funds can be as volatile as stocks? How are they treated?
- ▶ Does the Covid decease in portfolio shares explained by return chasing of Treasury bond funds?




What about Bonds?

- ▶ We see a quite large decrease in the portfolio shares (net buys minus sells?) but not a full rebound
- ▶ But income should have not been affected, can we look at transfers into safe assets?



Nonprofit Fintech App Bank Account Data

➤ We see decreases in the amount and likelihood of payroll and other recurring income as well as increases in government income: pretty complete rebound



Spending and Saving During the Covid Pandemic

▶ All checking-account spending increased to stockpile needed home goods and also in anticipation of the inability to patronize retailers, then declined sharply, then increased for stimulus check recipients to pre-crisis levels but savings seems to increase too



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- * In terms of what is happening now: do we see transfers to save assets?
 - ▶ Is the stock market rebound reflected in trading?
 - ► Flight to safety?
- * What can we learn about expectations modeling in macro-finance models? From my research (I think) we can learn that people are selectively (not rationally) inattentive, what is the main takeaway here?

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