

Europeanization has by now become the most used and fashionable term found in social sciences. The application of the concept and the model(s) of Europeanization are thus no longer restricted only to domestic changes in EU member-state countries they are also used to study any of the domestic changes in the potential EU member-state countries because of the impact resulting from the Enlargement process. The literature on the potential EU member-state countries has been dealing almost exclusively with Europeanization of then-CEEC candidate countries and not with the new potential EU member-states from the Western Balkans. The book, therefore, study Europeanization of the Western Balkans, addressing same research questions but this time employing new cases and the most appropriate still less used method of fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), with a final aim of not only understanding the actual transformations that the region is going through as result of the enlargement process but also of contributing to a more general understanding of Europeanization in the potential EU member-state countries.

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*...to my Family*



## CONTENTS

|                            |  |
|----------------------------|--|
| Preface                    |  |
| List of abbreviations      |  |
| List of figures and tables |  |

### INTRODUCTION **9**

|   |    |
|---|----|
| EUROPEANIZATION LITERATURE AND ITS OPEN QUESTIONS | 11 |
| RELEVANCE AND AIM OF THE BOOK                     | 15 |
| RESEARCH QUESTION AND STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK       | 16 |

### CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF EUROPEANIZATION **21**

|  |    |
|--|----|
| WHAT EUROPEANIZATION REALLY IS AND WHAT ITS USEFULNESS MAY BE (SARTORI'S VS. GERRING'S GUIDELINES) | 22 |
| CONTIGUOUS, OVERARCHING AND SUB TERMINOLOGY  | 26 |
| THE CORE AND THE BROAD APPROACH OF EUROPEANIZATION   | 29 |
| EUROPEANIZATION IN THE MEMBER VERSUS POTENTIAL MEMBER STATES                                       | 31 |
| GETTING EUROPEANIZATION RIGHT IN THE POTENTIAL MEMBER STATES                                       | 34 |

### THE PROCESS OF EUROPEANIZATION IN THE WESTERN BALKANS **37**

|   |    |
|---|----|
| THE BACKGROUND OF THE EU APPROACH(ES) TOWARDS THE WBs | 37 |
| THE ENLARGEMENT APPROACH                              | 41 |
| EUROPEANIZATION IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SAP           | 44 |

### MODELING OF EUROPEANIZATION IN POTENTIAL MEMBER STATES: MECHANISM(S), EXPLANATORY CONDITIONS AND OUTCOME(S) **53**

|   |    |
|---|----|
| ON THE LOGICS AND MECHANISMS OF EUROPEANIZATION     | 53 |
| ON THE KEY EXPLANATORY VARIABLES OF EUROPEANIZATION | 59 |
| ON THE OUTCOME(S) OF EUROPEANIZATION                | 67 |
| ON THE MODEL(S) OF EUROPEANIZATION                  | 70 |

### THE GUIDING MAIN HYPOTHESIS OF EUROPEANIZATION **75**

|   |    |
|---|----|
| CHOOSING AMONG CONDITIONS: A DEDUCTIVE-INDUCTIVE APPROACH | 75 |
| HYPOTHESIS ON EUROPEANIZATION OF POTENTIAL MEMBER STATES  | 76 |
| SUMMARIZING AND MAPPING THE MAIN HYPOTHESIS               | 90 |



|   |            |
|---|------------|
| <b><u>METHODOLOGICAL CHOICE IN STUDYING EUROPEANIZATION</u></b>   | <b>95</b>  |
| WHY QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS FOR STUDYING EUROPEANIZATION                                       | 95         |
| QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND FUZZY SET THEORY   | 97         |
| QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS  | 98         |
| CALIBRATION OF FUZZY SETS FOR QCA   | 103        |
| QCA WEAKNESSES AND POSSIBLE WAYS TO HANDLE THEM   | 105        |
| <b><u>OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE OUTCOME(S) AND CONDITIONS, DATA GATHERING AND THEIR CALIBRATION</u></b> | <b>107</b> |
| DATA COLLECTION   | 107        |
| CASE AND ISSUE SELECTION  | 108        |
| EUROPEANIZATION OUTCOME (DEPENDENT VARIABLE)  | 112        |
| OPERATIONALIZING KEY CONDITIONS (INDEPENDENT AND INTERVENING VARIABLES)                                 | 117        |
| <b><u>CONFIGURATIONAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS USING FSQCA</u></b>  | <b>135</b> |
| SEARCHING FOR NECESSARY CONDITIONS  | 135        |
| ANALYSIS FOR SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS USING FUZZY TRUTH TABLE ALGORITHM (FSQCA)                            | 140        |
| DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION ON THE RESULTS  | 148        |
| EVALUATING THE STRENGTH OF RESULTS GAINED FROM FSQCA  | 151        |
| <b><u>COMPARING FSQCA RESULTS WITH DATA FROM EXPERTS SURVEY</u></b>                                     | <b>153</b> |
| METHODOLOGY OF THE SURVEY   | 154        |
| RESULTS AND COMPARISON WITH FSQCA ANALYSIS  | 157        |
| <b><u>CONCLUSIONS AND THE WAY AHEAD</u></b>   | <b>165</b> |
| SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS   | 165        |
| IDEAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  | 167        |
| References  |            |
| Appendix  |            |
| List of experts interview respondents   |            |

## PREFACE

The book began five years ago as part of my MA research and got finished only recently with my PhD final thesis. The research for this book has benefited not only from the academic environment of the universities I studied and visited but also from the experts I have met. In particular my professors Marco Giuliani, Claudious Wagemman and Stefano Bianchini have offered useful advice on parts of the manuscript, as did a number of my colleagues, conference participants and anonymous reviewers. Besides acknowledging the contributions of all, it goes without saying that the responsibility for all that follows is mine alone.

I had anticipated calling the book 'Europeanization', borrowed by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeir 2005 book, which not only captures the central idea of the manuscript but also the continuation of the politics of enlargement and its impact on the rest of the Central Eastern European countries, the Western Balkans. My contribution, I hope, will be an overview in which the quite distinctive dynamics of the Europeanization, I analyze in this book, can shed some light on the overall process and impact that EU enlargement has on the Western Balkans. Here, it is to be said that EU integration of the WB is still an ongoing process which will need further investigation and a number of books to be written on the EU role and its impact in the Western Balkan countries in the years to come.

Clarification: Any definition of the Balkans is problematic and questionable. Without entering in endless debates of *who is Western Balkans*, I suggest the use of the term contextually since for the purpose of this book the term above includes all countries that are undergoing the same process of EU integration although at different speed. *Western Balkans*, a 'Brussels construction' (Meurs, 2004: 3) term was officially introduced in 1998 by the Austrian Presidency of the EU once Bulgaria and Romania were allowed to open membership talks with EU. It refers to the countries of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia.

## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina

CARDS Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization

CoE Council of Europe

CEEC Central and Eastern European Country

COWEB Working Party on the Western Balkans Region

DG Directorate-General

ECJ European Court of Justice

EFTA European Free Trade Agreement

ENP European Neighborhood Policy

EP European Partnership

EU European Union

GDP Gross Domestic Product

ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

IMF International Monetary Fund

IPA Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

SAA Stabilization and Association Agreement

SAP Stabilization and Association process

SEE South East Europe

SEECP South East Europe Co-operation Process

SSCI Social Science Citation Index

STM Stabilization and Association process Tracking Mechanism (Kosovo)

TAIEX Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Office

UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

WB Western Balkan

WTO World Trade Organization

## LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| FIGURE 1: A SIMPLE MODEL OF EUROPEANIZATION IN THE POTENTIAL MEMBER STATES .....  | 18  |
| FIGURE 2: EUROPEANIZATION: BROAD, NARROW AND ITS CONTIGUOUS TERMS REPRESENTATION AS SUBSETS ....  | 31  |
| FIGURE 3: ADOPTION, IMPLEMENTATION AND EUROPEANIZATION IN ALBANIA.....  | 45  |
| FIGURE 4: ADOPTION, IMPLEMENTATION AND EUROPEANIZATION IN BIH.....  | 46  |
| FIGURE 5: ADOPTION, IMPLEMENTATION AND EUROPEANIZATION IN CROATIA.....  | 47  |
| FIGURE 6: ADOPTION, IMPLEMENTATION AND EUROPEANIZATION IN KOSOVO.....   | 48  |
| FIGURE 7: ADOPTION, IMPLEMENTATION AND EUROPEANIZATION IN MACEDONIA .....   | 49  |
| FIGURE 8: ADOPTION, IMPLEMENTATION AND EUROPEANIZATION IN MONTENEGRO.....   | 50  |
| FIGURE 9: ADOPTION, IMPLEMENTATION AND EUROPEANIZATION IN SERBIA.....   | 51  |
| FIGURE 10: EUROPEANIZATION OF WB (MODE SCORE).....  | 51  |
| FIGURE 11: EUROPEANIZATION OF THE WB (AVERAGE SCORE) .....  | 52  |
| FIGURE 12: A CONFIGURATIONAL MODEL OF EUROPEANIZATION.....  | 73  |
| FIGURE 13: X-Y PLOT SHOWING THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE 45 CASES ALONG THE NO POLITICAL CONSTRAIN<br>(CONDITION) AND THE EUROPEANIZATION (OUTCOME): NECESSITY .....     | 138 |
| FIGURE 14: X-Y PLOT SHOWING THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE 45 CASES ALONG THE BUREAUCRATIC EFFECTIVENESS<br>(CONDITION) AND THE EUROPEANIZATION (OUTCOME): NECESSITY ..... | 139 |
| FIGURE 15: X-Y PLOT SHOWING THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE 45 CASES ALONG THE EU FINANCIAL AID (CONDITION)<br>AND THE EUROPEANIZATION (OUTCOME): NECESSITY .....           | 139 |
| FIGURE 16: DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDERS: BY WB COUNTRY AND LEVEL .....  | 155 |
| FIGURE 17: DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDERS: BY INSTITUTIONS AND POSITIONS .....  | 156 |
| FIGURE 18: IMPORTANT CONDITION(S) FOR ADOPTION OF EU STANDARDS/ACQUIS COMMUNAUTAIRE .....   | 160 |
| FIGURE 19: IMPORTANT CONDITION(S) FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF EU STANDARDS/ACQUIS COMMUNAUTAIRE ..  | 160 |
| FIGURE 20: IMPORTANT CONDITION(S) FOR ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EU STANDARDS/ACQUIS<br>COMMUNAUTAIRE.....  | 161 |
| FIGURE 21: DO YOU THINK ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EU STANDARDS/ACQUIS COMMUNAUTAIRE..  | 163 |
|   |     |
| TABLE 1: IMPORTANT DATES IN THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS OF THE WB COUNTRIES .....   | 43  |
| TABLE 2: ALBANIA'S PERFORMANCE IN ADOPTION.....   | 44  |
| TABLE 3: BIH'S PERFORMANCE IN ADOPTION .....  | 45  |
| TABLE 4: CROATIA'S PERFORMANCE IN ADOPTION.....   | 46  |
| TABLE 5: KOSOVO'S PERFORMANCE IN ADOPTION.....  | 47  |
| TABLE 6: MACEDONIA'S PERFORMANCE IN ADOPTION.....   | 48  |
| TABLE 7: MONTENEGRO'S PERFORMANCE IN ADOPTION.....  | 49  |
| TABLE 8: SERBIA'S PERFORMANCE IN ADOPTION.....  | 50  |
| TABLE 9: MECHANISM OF EUROPEANIZATION IN POTENTIAL MEMBER STATES.....   | 58  |
| TABLE 10: KEY CONDITIONS FOR EUROPEANIZATION IN POTENTIAL MEMBER STATES.....  | 66  |
| TABLE 11: ON THE OUTCOMES OF EUROPEANIZATION.....   | 70  |
| TABLE 12: MODELING EUROPEANIZATION IN POTENTIAL MEMBER STATES: SUMMARY OF THE MECHANISMS,<br>KEY EXPLANATORY CONDITIONS AND OUTCOMES OF EUROPEANIZATION .....       | 71  |
| TABLE 13: STUDIES ON VETO PLAYER .....  | 78  |
| TABLE 14: STUDIES ON EU FINANCIAL AID .....   | 81  |
| TABLE 15: STUDIES ON EU DETERMINACY AND DENSITY.....  | 83  |
| TABLE 16: STUDIES ON EU PROGRAMMES.....   | 86  |
| TABLE 17: STUDIES ON BUREAUCRATIC EFFECTIVENESS.....  | 88  |
| TABLE 18: MAPPING HYPOTHESIS ON CONDITIONS FOR EUROPEANIZATION (ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION). 91  |     |
| TABLE 19: QUALITATIVE DATA EXTRACTED FROM COMMISSION PROGRESS REPORTS .....   | 116 |
| TABLE 20: 4 SCALE MEMBERSHIP .....  | 118 |
| TABLE 21: DATA AND CALIBRATION OF VETO PLAYERS (POLCON III).....  | 119 |

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| TABLE 22: DATA AND CALIBRATION OF FINANCIAL AID .....   | 121 |
| TABLE 23: DATA AND CALIBRATION OF DETERMINACY & DENSITY.....  | 125 |
| TABLE 24: DATA AND CALIBRATION OF THE NUMBER OF TWINNING PROJECTS AND PARTICIPANTS IN TAIEX<br>ACTIVITIES.....  | 128 |
| TABLE 25: DATA AND CALIBRATION OF BUREAUCRACY EFFECTIVENESS AND RULE OF LAW .....   | 131 |
| TABLE 26: OVERALL DATA CALIBRATION .....  | 134 |
| TABLE 27: DESCRIPTIVE OF FSQCA FOR NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR THE OUTCOME .....   | 136 |
| TABLE 28: DISTRIBUTION OF CASES ACROSS CAUSAL COMBINATIONS AND SET THEORETIC CONSISTENCY OF<br>CAUSAL COMBINATIONS AS SUBSET OF ADOPTION (ADOPT) .....  | 142 |
| TABLE 29: MODELS, CONSISTENCY AND COVERAGE SOLUTION FOR ADOPTION.....   | 143 |
| TABLE 30: DISTRIBUTION OF CASES ACROSS CAUSAL COMBINATIONS AND SET THEORETIC CONSISTENCY OF<br>CAUSAL COMBINATIONS AS SUBSET OF IMPLEMENTATION (IMPLEM).....  | 144 |
| TABLE 31: MODELS, CONSISTENCY AND COVERAGE SOLUTION FOR IMPLEM.....   | 144 |
| TABLE 32: DISTRIBUTION OF CASES ACROSS CAUSAL COMBINATIONS AND SET THEORETIC CONSISTENCY OF<br>CAUSAL COMBINATIONS AS SUBSET OF EUROPEANIZATION (ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION).....                                    | 145 |
| TABLE 33: MODELS, CONSISTENCY AND COVERAGE SOLUTION, AND BEST INSTANCES (CASES) FOR<br>EUROPEANIZATION .....  | 146 |
| TABLE 34: DISTRIBUTION OF CASES ACROSS CAUSAL COMBINATIONS AND SET THEORETIC CONSISTENCY OF<br>CAUSAL COMBINATIONS AS SUBSET OF NOT EUROPEANIZATION (NOT (ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION))<br>.....                      | 147 |
| TABLE 35: MODELS, CONSISTENCY AND COVERAGE SOLUTION FOR NOT EUROPEANIZATION .....   | 148 |
| TABLE 36: IMPORTANT CONDITION(S) FOR ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EU STANDARDS/ACQUIS<br>COMMUNAUTAIRE.....   | 159 |
| TABLE 37: GDP (GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, EUR MILLION) OF WBs .....  | 181 |
| TABLE 38: CARDS PROGRAMME ALLOCATION FOR 2002–2006 (EUR MN) IN EACH WB COUNTRY .....  | 181 |
| TABLE 39: MULTI-ANNUAL INDICATIVE FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK: BREAKDOWN OF THE INSTRUMENT FOR PRE-<br>ACCESSION ASSISTANCE ENVELOPE FOR 2008–2010 INTO ALLOCATIONS BY COUNTRY AND COMPONENT<br>(EUR MN, CURRENT PRICES)..... | 181 |
| TABLE 40: NUMBER OF TWINNING PROJECTS PER YEAR IN WESTERN BALKAN COUNTRIES .....  | 182 |
| TABLE 41: SUCCESS RATE OF TWINNING .....  | 183 |
| TABLE 42: POLCON VALUES.....  | 183 |
| TABLE 43: QUALITATIVE DATA EXTRACTED FROM THE COMMISSION REPORTS.....   | 184 |

## INTRODUCTION

‘The accession process profoundly transformed societies as diverse as the Polish and the Bulgarian, the Romanian and the Slovenian. There is now a widespread consensus that it can do the same for the Balkans.’ (International Commission on the Balkans, 2005: 28)

Since the fall of communism in the '90s, the Western Balkans have been undergoing fundamental and multiple transformations that are complex in their nature and uneasy to be explained by a single model. This is primarily, because many of the processes in the region have been running in parallel and with no clear-cut of when a process ends and when the other begins. This complex transformation, where democratization and transition have taken place in conjunction with nation- and state-building as well as European integration, usually comes at the expense of a truncated picture of the processes in the region. Most of the literature, studies the region very *selectively*, rather in terms of conflict, democratization or EU integration, focusing mainly on a specific process of the Western Balkans complex transformation. A search by keywords on 2008-07-15 of the Social Science Citation Index gave the following results. A total of 852 articles were found including in their title *Balkan\* or South\* East\* Europe\** (Timespan=1989-2008, Databases=SSCI), after a refined search by topic keyword the following results were shown: 1) topic *war* gave 139 articles 2) topic *transition or democrati\*ation* gave 35 articles and 3) topic *integration* gave only 19 articles. This simple data indicate that the today literature on the region, though uneven, is deeply engaged into the many transformations the region is going through. The major part of academic works has been mostly and primarily focused on nation- and state-building process. Transition research has also considered the region but lately, the focus has shifted towards the integration of the Western Balkans into the European Union (EU) employing so the enlargement literature. It was during the '90s where all the focus was centered round the nation- and state-building process. The region's main concern of that time was mainly related to 'state building'<sup>1</sup> in the literal sense of the word' (Krastev, 2003: 34) albeit with the distinct profiles of the individual cases, ranging from state weakness without unfinished state building in Albania to inconclusive state and nation building in ex-Yugoslavia (Meurs, 2004: 3). Parallel to these processes, all Western Balkan countries had to undergo major transformations as a result of their transition to a pluralist democracy and market economy. This kind of transformations required firstly the creation of new institutions that will set up and guarantee the proper functioning of their newborn democracy. From 2000 onwards the Western Balkan countries transformation had entered into a new stage since the prospect of EU membership has been extended to all Western Balkans countries. It was in 2000 where

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<sup>1</sup> 'State-building is principally about the creation and maintenance of the political unit, the state... In later stages of state-building, it mainly includes the creation of a positive identification with the state of the citizens' (Kopecký & Mudde, 2000: 529).

the Heads of EU States and Governments recognized the countries in the region as *potential candidates*<sup>2</sup> for EU membership with a long-term prospect of accession. Furthermore, the target towards membership status of the Western Balkans has gained more impetus, especially after the entry of all ten countries from Eastern Europe has been completed with the last accession of Bulgaria and Rumania completed on January 2007, where literally speaking the Western Balkan countries are the next waiting in the queue (including here also Turkey). In order to be admitted the aspiring potential candidate countries had to undergo certain transformations as a consequence of their final European aim.

This latest development, with the new process of EU integration the region has entered, asks for a shift in the research agenda of the Western Balkans. Two are the main stages of research regarding EU integration of the potential candidate countries. One regards the *politics of EU enlargement*<sup>3</sup> analyzing the process leading to accession, while a further aspect receiving more attention only recently regards the *impact of enlargement* analyzing the effects the process of enlargement brings about (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2002: 504-507; 2005c: 6-9). The first stage of research is an ontological one and regards the incentives of enlargement process, it answers the *why* question; while the second is a post-ontological stage of research and regards the effects of enlargement process, it answers the *how* question and *to what extent* and in *what ways* the EU enlargement has changed the potential candidate states.<sup>4</sup> This book will engage in the later, trying to analyze the impact and to set up a framework of how to study the overall impact the enlargement process has on the Western Balkans taken as a whole. In doing so, I propose to examine the latest transformations of the region resulting from the Enlargement perspective within the Europeanization context. The rationale for such a choice rests on the fact that the Balkanization and Transition literature although constituting on their own an important field of researching the WB they are still limited in terms of concepts and models offered to grasp the today reality of the region. The Balkanization, Democratization and Marketization literature are centrally concerned with nation- and/or state-building and the rise and consolidation of liberal democracy and market economy. They were most used to describe WB transformation processes right after the fall of communism as concepts directly linked to 'process of reorganizing the society within a national framework' (Agh, 1998: 216) while Europeanization research comes only after, with the enlargement perspectives of these countries into EU. Although some scholars have

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<sup>2</sup> The EU 'objective remains the fullest possible integration of the countries of the region into the political and economic mainstream of Europe .... All the [Western Balkan] countries concerned are potential candidates for EU membership' (Council of the European Union, 2000: § 67, parenthesis added).

<sup>3</sup> The *politics of EU enlargement* could be further distinguished into applicants, member state or EU (macro/polity and substantive/policy) enlargement politics. For more on the argument see Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2002; 2005c.

<sup>4</sup> For the argument on EU Enlargement theory as an ontological stage of research and Europeanization as its post-ontological stage on candidate countries see Grabbe (2003: 309-310; 2006: 47-49) who makes an analogy with the same argument Radaelli (2000) used for Europeanization in the member states as being post-ontological stage, different from the ontological stage of EU integration. The point here is that Europeanization would not exist without European integration or EU enlargement in the case of potential member states.

analyzed Europeanization (the impact of European integration on the domestic structures of nation-states) *within* the context of transition and democratization still they make it a distinct dimension of the transformations happening in CEECs where all democratization, marketization and nation-building (the ‘triple revolution’) should be fully carried out (a precondition) before the fourth process – Europeanization starts; in this sense, Europeanization is seen as a successfully completed process of transition or ‘the end of a transition process’ (Agh, 1998: 216). Furthermore, although processes may overlap partially in issues of democratic and economic conditionality, still Europeanization is a complementary perspective that is more narrowly focused in its empirical, conceptual and explanatory concerns (Goetz, 2001: 1037). The Europeanization approach offers a more focused conceptual and theoretical framework ‘because it is not simply about democratization and marketization in abstract terms, but about a particular type of political, economic and social systemic change which fits within the EU and meets the quite concrete EU requirements’ (Agh, 1998: 49).

Putting the debate on the Europeanization framework means that it should be kept in principle analytically separate from the other two researches since the context and the research questions are quite different. Studying Europeanization (the enlargement impact) on the Western Balkan countries means above all, shifting the focus of research from the nation and state building process (Balkanization research agenda) or the regime change (Transition and Democratization research agenda) towards EU member-state building. This overall process of member-state building, although in its genesis and with different pace in the region, asks for a more detailed investigation and a comparative study.

## **EUROPEANIZATION LITERATURE AND ITS OPEN QUESTIONS**

Europeanization research agenda, although new, has been enormously growing the scholarly attention. Given the great interest, an abundant literature has been produced in a very short period of time which often becomes impossible to be managed unless a clear research focus as well as a pre-systematization of it is undertaken in advance. If one has to present a general review of the literature on Europeanization (s)he can distinguish two main pillars. The first one regards the theoretical-approach on Europeanization, trying to build a more general understanding of the topic while the second one is an issue-related approach with the intention of detailing it to very specific topics. These two main pillars can be distinguished further more. The literature on Europeanization theoretical approach can be clustered first as literature round the concept of Europeanization which is primarily of an *explorative character* trying to better describe the process that the concept entails and secondly as literature which aims on the *explanatory character* trying to find the causality of the Europeanization process. Regarding the issue-related approach on Europeanization one can distinguish on the one hand a literature whose main focus is on very specific domains of political processes such may be policies, interest groups, political parties and on the other hand a literature whose main focus is country-specific. The latter, since it is directly and crucially important for this study, can be grouped further on the literature that deals



(exclusively) with EU member-states, with candidate states<sup>5</sup> or with non-candidate states but still on the EU proximity<sup>6</sup>. The study of the Europeanization of candidate countries, despite the many similar features sharing with Europeanization in member state, has distinctive characteristics which make it a *particular sub-field* of the broader Europeanization research agenda (Sedelmeier, 2006: 4-5). It is to be mentioned here that the literature on Europeanization with focus on the country-specific status, although it is not entirely a literature on member-states it is still the most dominant. After the growing literature of Europeanization examining the impact of European integration process on domestic developments of EU member states there was also a considerable literature dealing with the Europeanization process on the candidate states<sup>7</sup> and sometimes even on the non-member states<sup>8</sup>. The emerging literature which has been focused on candidate countries is rather recent and still comparatively small and what is more important, it has developed almost exclusively in the context of the EU's eastern enlargement (Sedelmeier, 2006) dealing with then-CEEC candidate countries and not with the newly (potential) candidate states from the Western Balkans. Beside such scarcity in the newly potential member states, it can be said that the Europeanization literature as a whole has laid the ground for studying Europeanization of the Western Balkans by offering conceptual and theoretical insights as well as specific analytical tools on how to investigate Europeanization in the new to-become-member countries. Regardless of the previous distinction of the literature for the purpose of a systemized very broad review, one has to recognize that they supplement and feed on each other, giving an insightful framework for understanding and studying Europeanization process.

The literature on the candidate countries is characterized by its attempts not only to research the impact of EU enlargement on different domestic issues but also to theorize this process. Indeed, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005a; 2007) have worked on building a more theoretical approach about Europeanization of the candidate countries. Other scholars have taken more an issue related approach by offering insights on specific countries and/or policy areas such as non-discrimination and minority protection (Schwellnus, 2005); civil service reform (Dimitrova, 2005); regional policy and health care (Jacoby, 2005); regulation on movement of persons (Grabbe, 2006); environmental policy (Andonova, 2005); social policy (Sissenich, 2005); reforming regional governance (O'Dwyer, 2006). Regarding the Western Balkans few literature exists on Europeanization issues of the region as a whole (Demetropoulou, 2002; Noutcheva, 2006) or it rather focus on specific countries (Elbasani, 2004) or even specific issues (the special issue of the Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 2008). That is why, 'the understanding of Europeanization in South East Europe is presently insufficient, especially when compared with that of the Western or Central

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<sup>5</sup> For then-CEEC candidate countries see for example the book length analysis in: Dimitrova, 2004; Grabbe, 2006; Hughes *et al.*, 2004a; Jacoby, 2004; Kelley, 2004; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005; Vachudova, 2005.

<sup>6</sup> Literature on Switzerland, Norway or even other countries of EU proximity under European Neighborhood Policy

<sup>7</sup> See Sedelmeier 2006, for a literature review on then CEEC candidate countries.

<sup>8</sup> See Schimmelfennig 2007, for a literature review on non-candidate countries.

European experiences' (Anastasakis, 2005: 80). Most of the literature studying the EU integration of the WBs focus on the EU conditionality and do not refer to the concept of Europeanization or more over do not approach it this way. Still beside the concepts and methods used they nevertheless constitute a very important part of the emerging Europeanization literature on the region as they reveal some proto evaluations on the impact of EU in these countries. That is why the aim of the present book will be to build upon this literature and make a step further by introducing and applying the already Europeanization literature on member-state and then-candidate state into the Western Balkans context since although Europeanization in member states and then –candidate states 'may be based on the same exogenous principles and the use of the same instruments it is still a distinctly national exercise of change and adaptability' (Anastasakis, 2005: 86).

As with all new research agendas, Europeanization research also carries a number of open questions which are basic concerns. Some of them related directly to the concept itself while others are of a more general character related to research design.

### **(Mis)Use of Europeanization**

The paradox with the literature on Europeanization of the candidate countries is the difficulty of where to draw the line. If some of the literature on the EU impact on Central and Eastern Europe after '90s do not speak explicitly of Europeanization as such, their research design still could perfectly fit into the Europeanization literature of candidate countries.<sup>9</sup> In the contrary, today you could easy read Europeanization term almost everywhere even though often it may not be rigorously used. In these cases Europeanization as a term is very loose and implies a number of different and very broad changes. In this paradox of the (mis)use of the Europeanization concept two extremes can be noticed. On the very broad understanding of the concept are the studies which 'would define all changes after '89 as Europeanization' (Dimitrova, 2005: 74-75). While on the other very minimalist side are the studies which will refer to Europeanization or at least operationalize it only to what may be called rather EUization<sup>10</sup>. So before dealing with any other issue an explicit statement of what does it means to undertake an Europeanization research in the context of the candidate countries is needed.

### **EU enlargement conditionality versus EU enlargement socialization**

The literature today on Europeanization is struggling on finding an all-inclusive model that can be academically widely accepted. To a certain degree this is logical not so much because of its newest character but more because 1) the Europeanization agenda is broad on scope including a variety of domains ranging from policy issues to politics and polity as well as a

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<sup>9</sup> An excellent example is Friis & Murphy 1999. The same problem has be noticed even in the literature on the EU studies were 'some of the writing has not explicitly used the terminology of Europeanization at all' and this makes part of what has been called the first phase of Europeanization studies. (Bulmer 2007: 48-49)

<sup>10</sup> Indeed, as Hellen Wallace has noted, the term 'EU-ization' would be more accurate to the impact of the EU.

number of actors such as EU institutions, or even more broad European institutions and 2) Europeanization explanatory models build heavily on the already divide of constructivist and rationalists. The same applies also for the Europeanization literature on the candidate countries.

*Alternative logic of explanations:* The logics that have been employed on explaining Europeanization derive from the new institutionalist perspective. Although the arguments presented so far build upon the three logics of new institutionalism, the rationalist arguments, the sociological (constructivist) arguments as well as the path-dependency arguments, the first has dominates the debate especially on the Europeanization literature of the candidate countries.

Secondly, the literature can be divided into two main groups regarding their approach towards Europeanization. The first group of scholars focuses on the top-down, vertical kind of Europeanization, explaining Europeanization primarily as an EU-driven process. From a methodological point of view this approach has EU requirements (conditionality) as the only independent variable. The second group focuses more on the candidate-driven factors where candidate countries are taken to be the independent variable (cross-loading horizontal type of Europeanization) or at a softer version they are at least mediating variables (bottom-up vertical Europeanization).

Based on these logics and on the methodological choice of choosing the direction of impact (what is the independent and what are the mediating variables) three main models have been put forwards albeit with different weight in the literature. The dominant trend in the literature stress the ‘external motivation model’, that is EU enlargement conditionality, as the only or the most important mechanism for transformations into the candidate countries (Elbasani, 2004; Schimmelfennig *et al.*, 2005; Vachudova, 2005). To put it their way, conditionality ‘is not just plain conditionality but ‘transformative’ conditionality. The state, the economy, and the society are transformed — in positive ways but also in negative ones — as a result of taking part in a process that lasts for many years’ (Vachudova, 2008: 30). On the other side, other scholars have emphasized the limit and the low explanation power of the conditionality model (Hughes *et al.*, 2004a; Jacoby, 2004; Kelley, 2004). Their emphasis is more on the domestic factors as the major factors of the transformations happening on then-candidate countries. Both these models have been widely studies although some prefers one over the other. The question rest on which model do we need to adopt and why? Is there any alternative of considering them all, if so which conditions will explain best Europeanization in the Western Balkans?

### **Methodology and Techniques**

As far as it regards the methodology, most of the studies on the candidate countries are case studies or at best focus on some countries and/or specific issues. The problem with these studies is that they limit the unit of analysis only to few issues which sometimes shows to be model-bias in the sense that given their selection of units of analysis it is quasi impossible to find supportive arguments for all the models, even in studies that try to test all models simultaneously. Schimmelfennig and his collaborators recognize that by selecting only on ‘problematic cases’ comes at a cost since they risk biasing the analysis against the model of

lesson drawing for example (2005: 34). Another problem is how to operationalize Europeanization since the results will heavily be dependent on not just how we conceptualize but finally also how we operationalize it. The way we operationalize Europeanization being it rather communicative adaptation, legal adaptation or behavioral adaptation may favor one explanation and hinder the influence of some other model or variable. Schimmelfennig *et al.* (2003) finds that resonance for example influences the discursive of candidate countries while it did not change their behavioral. The present limitations in the literature are acknowledged and they primarily derive from the complexity of the Europeanization process, that is why we need to be cautious with choosing the unit of analysis and the operationalization of the variable. What is most welcomed here, are methods and techniques that can handle simultaneously the complexity issue of the Europeanization process. The primacy here is to choose a method which will help us to move beyond simple case studies of only selected countries and issues and which can allow us to comprehensively consider the concept.

### **RELEVANCE AND AIM OF THE BOOK**

The relevance of studying Europeanization in the Western Balkans countries is two-fold. On the one hand it joins the debate of Europeanization in the previous (CEECs) candidate countries and on the other it engages on the actual transformations that the region is going through as result of the enlargement process. First of all, as in the case of the member-states countries where a growing number of both scholars and country experts acknowledged that ‘they can no longer study any European country without taking account of the EU’ (Schmidt, 2007: 2), the same is true also for the potential member states, albeit to the specificities of the enlargement process. The application of the concept and the model(s) of Europeanization are thus no longer restricted only to political changes in member-state countries they should also be used to study any of the domestic changes in potential member states because of the impact of their European integration orientation. In order to better understand the political transformation of the Western Balkan countries, one has to consider at least the EU great influence on the region as part of the enlargement process where all the Western Balkans are heavily engaged on. As such, ‘Europeanization – suitably adopted – could help research on how domestic transformations relate to new post-national forms of governance’ (Rosamond, 2006: 452). Secondly, as it have been suggested ‘we need to pay attention to the impacts of Europeanization on European countries that are not within the EU’ (Wallace, 2000a: 371) which could help understand better Europeanization. So, considering the Enlargement process and extending the scope of the Europeanization beyond existing member states can not only help us understand better the process of transformation in potential member states but can also contribute towards the refinement of Europeanization conceptual content (Papadimitriou & Phinnemore, 2003: 2-3).

The present book addresses the open questions in the Europeanization literature of the candidate countries applying the Europeanization framework and testing the already existing models of Europeanization in the new context of the Western Balkans with the final aim of contributing to a more general understanding of the Europeanization of the candidate

countries. For this reason the book will try to draw a comprehensive theoretical framework that is compatible with the Europeanization literature in the candidate countries as well as in the member state. All the major variables highlighted in Europeanization literature of then-CEE countries will be included for providing a comprehensive empirical test of how mechanisms of Europeanization process works into the potential member states of the Western Balkans.

In order to strengthen conclusions from the literature in then-CEE candidate countries, the future waves of enlargement may provide additional empirical evidence to test the impact of EU (Ekiert, 2008: 11), that is why this book will evaluate the already findings of the literature of then-candidate countries in almost same context of enlargement but this time with new cases as candidate countries. The research as designed, that is a comparative case study from the WB, will make the empirical picture of Europeanization of candidate countries more complete while it will highlight the transformation that the region as a whole is going through as result of their European aim. Different from many studies undertaken before which focus on rather selected cases or countries this book will consider all the (potential) candidate countries from the Western Balkans. Secondly, although some studies have empirically applied the already existing models (see Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeir, 2005) they have been selective on choosing one into expense of the other.

From the methodological point of view the book will check the already proposed variables in a comprehensive way by increasing at least variation in the existing studies. One of the weaknesses stresses on Europeanization literature is that it's short of covering various issues and various states across different periods of time. This book will cover all the issues resulting from the enlargement process grouped under the Copenhagen criteria (acquis conditions) in an aggregate level as well as all the WB countries taking into account different time periods in their road toward EU integration. Finally employing the fsQCA techniques will be an added-value not only to the already statistical analysis but also to previous comparative analysis.<sup>11</sup>

## RESEARCH QUESTION AND STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

The prime focus of the book is on how to study Europeanization in the Western Balkans potential member states. That is why I try to ask similar questions that are addressed into the Europeanization literature of the candidate countries but to a different context and with different cases under investigation. Studying Europeanization means first and foremost to see how Europe influences on domestic political developments, given the interest on the Western Balkans I will examine specifically the influence of European integration process on domestic developments of these new becoming-member states, that is studying the impact of EU enlargement process conceptually linked to Europeanization. I try to answer *if the EU enlargement process has an impact on the becoming-members states of the Western Balkans, and if so under what key conditions the EU enlargement has influenced domestic changes in the Western Balkans?* If the EU enlargement process did transform the CEECs as previous research has shown, does this apply also to the Western Balkan case; if yes, are the conditions

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<sup>11</sup> Acknowledge here that Schimmelfennig *et al.* (2006) applies the crisp/CQA method.

of transformation the same? In more specific terms I would like to consider what changes and to what degree as well as under what (combined) conditions have the EU enlargement process impacted on the domestic Western Balkan states. The main trend in the today literature is that there is a direct influence of EU enlargement process on the becoming-member states mainly through EU enlargement conditionality. Does this hold true also for the EU new potential member states? Can the EU conditionality be the only explanatory factors explaining the Western Balkans transformation or do other Enlargement instruments and the domestic country-specificity factors also play any role? What are the other conditions deriving from mechanism of horizontal Europeanization that we can detect beside the conditionality argument? If not, is it better to speak of a EUization of the region rather than Europeanization process?

In order to answer these questions in details I firstly discuss how I approach and structure the book.


The literature on Europeanization, regardless of the different research designs, shares some common characteristic. First of all, the literature refers to a *process* of domestic change and transformation, that is the dependent variable has been conceptualized as the impact of Europe on domestic change<sup>12</sup>. The disagreements mostly come when one has to define the independent variables and the direction of change. In most of the studies, European integration has been the independent variable on the member states and by analogy European Enlargement as the independent variable on the candidate countries. The EU enlargement instruments, conditionality and twinning/TAIEX programs, have been so far the independent (explanatory) variable in most of the literature but given that the process is not in isolation other possible intervening variables needs to be introduce as ‘it is debatable to what extent one can treat the EU as independent factor given that the precise role of external factors cannot be studied in isolation from home-grown phenomena’ (Elbasani, 2004: 25). Enlargement instruments are only one key variable that may or may not influence Western Balkans the other is the Western Balkan countries specificities. These other intervening/mediating domestic country-specificity variables may facilitate or hinder Europeanization. Consider both, EU enlargement instruments (conditionality and socialization) and domestic specificities, key variables is the best option to solve the rather questionable top-down or bottom-up approach existing in the Europeanization debate. The most appropriate technique of such design is the qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) which considers all explanatory variables as key conditions (variables) and there is no need for distinction on the independent/intermediate variable. What is important here is to define the conditions deriving from both the Enlargement instruments and the Western Balkans specificities under which EU enlargement process will have an impact on the political transformation of the Western Balkans, the new (potential) candidate countries. Such a design permits also identifying *if* and *how* different causal conditions may combine to produce the

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<sup>12</sup> It is important to be mention here that even the studies that have define Europeanization at the European level (e.g. Cowles *et al.*, 2001) consider the impact of European institutions on domestic institutions as their dependent variable. See Olsen, 2002: 929, footnote 7.

same Europeanization outcome. Figure 1 presents a simple model where causation here, is understood conjunctually in terms of combinations of conditions.

**Figure 1:** A simple model of Europeanization in the potential Member States



As presented in figure 1 the Europeanization (the impact of Europe) in WBs is modeled as a configuration of two main factors: the influence of various EU enlargement policy instruments being rather through conditionality or socialization and the domestic conditions of the WBs itself, being those political or administrative conditions.

The book consists of a three main parts. In the first part I focus on the theoretical framework, elaborating both the concept and the model(s) of the Europeanization process putting the emphasis on the candidate countries. Here, I discuss in details the process, the logics, the key explanatory conditions, the outcome(s) as well as the hypothesis to be tested. The second part includes the methodology, data collection as well as operationalization and calibration of the key conditions and the outcome(s). The qualitative comparative analysis will be the third part, where the main variables will be tested for necessity and sufficiency conditions and the results will be interpreted. Here the findings will be compared with information gathered from semi-structures questioners. As a last say, I will draw some conclusions and propose some ideas for further research.

**Part I**  
**EUROPEANIZATION CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL**  
**FRAMEWORK**



There are ample definitions and no single precise meaning of the concept of Europeanization. Furthermore, Europeanization is not approached as a new form of theorization as it cannot in and of itself provide explanations. As scholars of EU studies note in their contributions, Europeanization is not itself a theory but rather a phenomenon that needs to be explained (Bulmer, 2007: 47; Radaelli, 2004: 5; Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003: 333). Not only Europeanization is not a new theory but also a single grand theory of explaining the Europeanization phenomenon is missing (Olsen, 2002: 944). Thus, in order to describe and explain the Europeanization phenomenon a conceptual as well as theoretical framework of Europeanization thus comes in play and requires the explicit use of the concept and of explanations of causal inference. Even though a theory of Europeanization is missing we still have at our disposal some theoretical framework to build on, both for the concept employed and for the explanations of causal inference. We need these two theoretical tools in order to clarify what process(es) is (are) understood as Europeanization and what causal conditions may explain Europeanization. So a first step towards an empirical research needs above all to take proper account of its theoretical framework and explicitly show the detailed debate on the concept and its measurement as well as on the set of theoretical models and causal conditions to derive and control its main hypotheses.

The literature on Europeanization, being a new research agenda, is open on the debate of what priority we need to focus at. Is it the Europeanization concept we have firstly to clarify as Featherstone and Radaelli (2003) points or is the research challenge one of model building as Olsen (2002) suggests? The answer lays in-between, we do need concepts but 'in order to make progress, concepts need the flesh and bone of models and theories' (Radaelli & Pasquier, 2007: 42). 'Indeed, the two are related' (Caporaso, 2007: 24) and go hand-in-hand for giving a better understanding of the Europeanization process. Any research in Europeanization needs to pay equal attention at both, the concept employed and the explanatory models. That is why, two are the points to look at: first, what process(es) are understood as Europeanization; and second, what causal relationships theory should explain them (Bulmer, 2007: 47). This part will deal with conceptual issues, and mechanism of Europeanization with a focus on the potential member states.

## CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF EUROPEANIZATION

‘...language is the toolkit with which we conduct our work, as well as the substance *upon which* we work. Indeed, concept formation lies at the heart of all social science endeavor. It is impossible to conduct work without using concepts. It is impossible even to conceptualize a topic, as the term suggests, without putting a label on it.’ (Gerring, 1999: 359)

Europeanization has by now become the most used and fashionable term found in social science literature over crossing the borders of its disciplines. This new phenomenon observed after the ‘80s<sup>13</sup> by scholars of European Studies regarded the transformations and changes that the even deeper European integration was causing to its member states. Generally speaking, Europeanization as a concept employed in the EU literature is used to denote a variety of changes within and related to European politics and society. As a term its usage is widely spread to a huge range of issues broadly covered under politics, history, culture, society and economics. But then when it came to a rigorous definition of the term not all of the scholars agrees upon one definition.<sup>14</sup> This is very obvious since different researchers interested in different issues have to draw on different notions and adopt a different working definition. This, as Radaelli had argued, is an indicator of the vitality of the Europeanization debate (2000: 2).

A second issue related to the concept of Europeanization regards the use of the term not only to its member states but also beyond the EU borders. By now, ‘the scope of Europeanization is broad, stretching across existing member states and applicant states’ (Featherstone, 2003: 3-4). The extend of the concept outside member state countries has raised the key question of EU scholars of where precisely to pin down the territory covered by the concept. Radaelli and Pasquier discussing the key problems of Europeanization concept identify as a first problem the unclearness of the territory covered by the Europeanization concept, and raise also the issue of if Europeanization concept can be stretch as far as enlargement and candidate countries, or even countries that cannot possibly be interested in EU membership (2007: 39). On the contrary, many scholars occupying with Eastern Europe had refer to the same process but term it otherwise. Some scholars have

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<sup>13</sup> Featherstone in his survey of some 116 academic journal articles as listed in the ‘Social Sciences Citation Index’ observed only five articles (4 per cent) referring to ‘Europeanization’ were published in the 1980s (2003: 4). Olsen suggests the same: ‘Search in various databases revealed few occurrences of the term prior to the 1980s’ (Olsen, 2002: 922, footnote 1). Sedelmeier (2006) do the same keyword search in the Social Science Citation Index for the applicant states and new members and finds the same pattern where only 6 articles refer to Europeanization before 2000 and 30 in the period 2003-2005.

<sup>14</sup> For example Europeanization has been defined in a number of ways by different scholars such as Ladrech (1994: 17), Börzel (1999: 574), Risse, Cowles & Caporaso (2001: 3), Radaelli (2000: 2-3), Wallace (2000a: 370).

referred to the process of transformations and changes that enlargement was causing to CEEC countries but they have called this process differently. For example in their edited book (Linden, 2002) the authors refer and conceptualize the process of EU impact (and more broadly others international organizations) as '*international socialization*'. In the same line, Schimmelfennig *et al.* (2006) refer to 'international socialization' while analyzing the process in which CEEC states are induced to adopt the constitutive rules of international community in light of the European experience. Other scholars speak of '*domestication*' of 'Europe' to uncover the impact of the EU in the domestic political transformations of CEEC (e.g. Elbasani, 2004). '*External governance*' has been another term used to study the transformative power of EU external policies in Eastern Europe or even the impact of EU to CEECs more particularly in relation to implementing the *acquis* (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004). Although scholars use different terms they all evaluate the same process, that of impact in domestic CEEC states in the light of European experience.<sup>15</sup> So the legitimate question is why not calling this process Europeanization? Indeed, today Europeanization is taking ground also on Eastern European studies as the processes of transformation in those countries are more and more explicitly related to European integration and because Europeanization have been developed further.

This chapter will lay out the general debate on the concept of Europeanization discussing what Europeanization is and what its usefulness may be. The concept of Europeanization will be confronted with other contiguous (overarching and sub) terminologies as well as making clear the core and the broad approaches of the concept aiming to 'logically' map the concept. The similarities as well as the differences of the concept in the member states case and in the potential member states will be pointed out. In the overall discussion of this chapter emphasis will be on trying to get the concept right in relation to the potential member states.

#### **WHAT EUROPEANIZATION REALLY IS AND WHAT ITS USEFULNESS MAY BE (SARTORI'S VS. GERRING'S GUIDELINES)**

A long and divided debate has been carried out on the concept of Europeanization itself. The till now scholarly attempts to conceptualize Europeanization take two major directions. On the one track some scholars have been trying to answers 'what Europeanization really is' (see for example Radaelli, 2000; Maniokas, 2002) while for some others the focus have been more to identify 'what Europeanization usefulness may be' (see for example Olsen, 2002; Buller & Gamble, 2002). In analyzing and evaluating the Europeanization concept two major works that deal with concepts in political sciences have been primarily consulted. The first refers to Sartori's (1970) works on concept formation and the second one on Gerring's (1999) suggestions about the utility a concept should have. Scholars of Europeanization had employed either of the approaches, although they sometimes explicitly have preferred one over the other. For example Radaelli (2000) uses Sartori's works to 'unpack' the concept of Europeanization while Buller and Gamble (2002) prefer Gerring's criteria for evaluating the

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<sup>15</sup> Today the attention, even from scholars previously not referring to Europeanization, has been directed to describe the process or at least link it to Europeanization (for example see the issue 11(4) of the Journal of European Public Policy linking 'external governance' to Europeanization).

usefulness the Europeanization concept may have. This choice is more a scholarly decision depending on one's own focus and aim. That is to say, if the researcher goal is the very ontology of the object under investigation then he is aiming at clarifying what exactly the concept is (e.g. Radaelli, 2000) or if the researcher goal is the operationalization of the object under investigation then he is aiming at demonstrating if the concept is useful enough (e.g. Buller & Gamble, 2002). Both of them are crucial and of importance since they give indications and implications on how, a researcher dealing with Europeanization issues, needs to design its research. The two approaches rather than contradictory are more complementary to each other and have to do with the 'generality-specificity' notion of the concept of Europeanization. The first group of researches is concern with definition of Europeanization on more general theoretical terms while the latter tries to set a more specific operational definition that can be translated into measurable terms. If the first approach tries to define Europeanization as an explanatory preposition on its own the latter try to see it as an organizing concept, a starting point from where further meanings can derive out of it (such as impact, transformation, compliance, adoption and implementation). Considering both of the guidelines on the Europeanization concept is helpful since it can be used as a stepping down from a more general theoretical concept to a more specific operational (research organizing) concept<sup>16</sup>. It is important to consider both elements since any preposition trying to theoretically conceptualize Europeanization needs to consider also that the concept should be useful enough to derive any suitable operational definition (indicators) that will allow us for empirical (qualitative or quantitative) control of it.

### **What Europeanization is?**

Concepts themselves provide a foundation for inquiry by specifying the variables and general relationships among them. A concept identifies not only the set of variables (object) but also the relationships among them (subject) that account for the phenomena under inquiry.

To start with, the question of what is Europeanization needs to be addressed. The literature on this point is diverse. There is not a single definition of Europeanization that could be encountered in the overall Europeanization literature. But beside the varieties of formulating what can be defined as Europeanization some common characteristics are shared by all. First of all, when speaking of Europeanization scholars refer to a process, this because the label itself suggests it's a process since any term in social sciences ending in '-ization' denote the process described by the initial word it accompanied. Secondly, all definitions, rather explicitly or implicitly, refer to the result of such process and their possible generalizations. As such, in very broad terms Europeanization is a process of transformation and change caused by Europe. In order to get, what Europeanization really is we need to look at both the process and the result.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> For more on the argumentation about the passage from more general concepts to more specific ones see Corbetta, 2003: 75

<sup>17</sup> Maniokas (2001) makes this relative grouping of all definitions of Europeanization into two groups: 1) definitions emphasizing *Europeanization as the process* with certain distinct logic (process-oriented); 2) definitions focusing on the *results of Europeanization* (result-oriented).

### ***The end-result of Europeanization (result-oriented definitions) ...from the (ontological) object to the dependent variable***

The first thing on undertaking a research is to exactly know the object of your investigation, being that at the ontological level (related to the question of what is) or rather at the operational level (related to the question of what the variables are). If Europeanization is a process of transformation than what is the (ontological) object of such process because only admitting that Europeanization is a process of change and transformation it is not the whole story. Doubts have been raised on whether Europeanization exists at all or whether Europeanization can be classified as an objective entity to be considered for an aseptic definition (Radaelli & Pasquier, 2007: 35). But speaking of Europeanization either as an object *per se* or as a narrative or discourse, one thing they agree upon is that the end-point of Europeanization is ‘the domestic political (and social) processes’. A point seems important to be mention here that even the studies that have define Europeanization at the European level (e.g. Cowles *et al.*, 2001), yet the dependent variable in their study has been the impact of European institutions on domestic institutions.<sup>18</sup> So in very general term Europeanization is ‘the impact of European integration [a process of transformation] on domestic political and social processes [the ontological object]’ (Börzel & Risse, 2003: 57, parenthesis added). The next question should be what is being changed; to put it into Radaelli’s words what is being Europeanized? That is to say, how can we operationalize Europeanization, where we have to look for these domestic changes? What are the domains of Europeanization? In the literature the most common attention has been on the (Europeanization of) public policy but studies on (Europeanization of) institutions and structures do not rest behind and have gained momentum lately. In such a context even the scholars that have been dealing with conceptualizing Europeanization agree that the object of Europeanization are political structures/institution and public policies (Radaelli, 2000: 15; Maniokas, 2002: 162). Even though in most of the definitions the object of Europeanization has been limited only to politics and policy there are still spaces that ‘perhaps one could add identities and the cognitive component of politics’ (Radaelli, 2000: 3) since insightful works have been carried out on this dimension of Europeanization. Such definitions have more a theoretical base character and they try to answer the question of *what* is being Europeanized. Their merit is on setting what the object of Europeanization should be, by attributing so the concept to particular object and not letting it open to ‘anything that goes’. If something is not explicitly said (in a definition) than everything can be related to Europeanization and everything can be Europeanized to a certain degree.

### ***The subject of Europeanization (process-related definitions)***

If the object of Europeanization in ‘theoretical terms’ is ‘the impact of European integration on domestic political processes’ and to a certain extend seem to be accepted by the scholars, the subject (that is, its relationship with other objects and processes) of Europeanization

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<sup>18</sup> James Caporaso has reminded me that Europeanization was defined as institution-building at the European level, yet the dependent variable in their study was the impact of European institutions on domestic institutions’ (Olsen, 2002: 929, footnote 7).

seems more problematic. Buller and Gamble raise this issue by arguing that a definition which emphasizes Europeanization only as a process of change can neglect the subject of what Europeanization actually is (2002: 21). From a methodological point of view this has raised the issue of identifying what are (in positivist terms) the dependent and the independent variable in Europeanization studies. 'We know (or we think we know) that Europeanization is influential as a force for change (independent variable), but at times we find it difficult to conclude with any certainty that Europeanization actually exists (dependent variable)' (Buller & Gamble, 2002: 21). The most common conceptualization of the Europeanization is that of downloading or top-down process. This kind of conceptualizations has well-defined (relationships) directions and clarity in terms of explanatory power and causality. Here, 'European-level development is treated as the explanatory factor and changes in the domestic systems of governance as the dependent variable' (Olsen, 2002: 932). Although, fewer contradictions seem to have been raised about the dependent variable, the problem rests on identifying the independent variable and much more on the causality relationship. As Radaelli noted 'the general impression is that there are doubts as to whether the EU is a major independent variable changing administrations across Europe' (2000: 9). It is Bulmer and Burch who argue that European integration is not just out there as some kind of independent variable; it is itself to a significant degree the product of member governments' wishes (2000: 9). For the candidate countries, Goetz is also critical if European integration can be considered as an explanatory variable for changes in political systems of CEE; he would rather argue that European integration may be a trigger for, or intervening variable in domestic institutional development (2001: 1040-1041). European integration or enlargement explains little on its own. Such studies conceptualize Europeanization as uploading or bottom-up process. A third way is in the coming which adds to the already complex conceptualization of Europeanization, the notion of cross-loading<sup>19</sup> (more developed in policy studies). Speaking of a cross-loading process implies a horizontal Europeanization where domestic transfer and incorporates learning from 1) other member state without the necessary direct European institutions involvement or 2) EU models since 'EU can have an influence without actually having political powers by just providing a pool of ideas national actors can turn to' (Radaelli, 2004: 4). In the case of the potential member states it means that the coercive pressure in the form of EU requirements are missing and the potential member states can import freely and selectively (See Jacoby for an example in CEEs countries). 'Under these circumstances, the notion of 'impact' does not denote adaptation to vertical pressures, but more subtle impacts of socialization processes, ideational convergence, learning, and interpretations of policy paradigms and ideas' (Radaelli & Pasquier, 2007: 38).

### **What Europeanization is useful for?**

Defining Europeanization is a difficult task but showing its main object and the different ways it relates to other processes helps us get the concept of Europeanization right. While there are ample definitions of Europeanization they point to a common analytical framework of tracing the changes coming from Europe. Although there is not a rigorously specified

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<sup>19</sup> For the notion of cross-loading in Europeanization see Howell, 2004.

analytical concept the utility of the term Europeanization lies in its ability to provide a focal point for analyzing the multidimensional processes of change occurring in today Europe. The theme of Europeanization opens ample ways for researching contemporary developments in Europe and in its potential member states. As such, we need to conceptualize Europeanization not as the explanation for change (as explanans) but as the variable that needs to be explained (explanandum) (Radaelli, 2004: 2). Europeanization explains little on its own that is why it may 'turn out to be less useful as an explanatory concept than as an attention-directing device and a starting point for further exploration' (Olsen, 2002: 943) on the domestic politics of member as well as to-become-member countries. In this aspect 'Europeanization research can provides a 'European' route to the study of national politics' (Vink & Graziano, 2007: 3). By studying Europeanization we 'assess the European sources of domestic politics' (Vink, 2002: 2). For the candidate country, the importance, rest in understanding the trajectories of their domestic politics and policies in the light of their accession towards EU. At this point the importance of Europeanization as a concept is not much its definition but its usefulness to direct a research. That is, Europeanization is more a framework rather than a theory. 'The challenge is to model the dynamics of change in ways that make the simplifying assumptions behind various definitions accessible to empirical tests' (Olsen, 2002: 944). That is why Europeanization is not so much a theory as a distinct set of processes in need of explanation (Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003: 333). Although Europeanization as a concept is constantly evolving and still remain open on the explanatory terms, its usefulness still is unquestionable. Its eclecticism stems from not being a single theory, but rather a distinct set of research foci (Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003: 333). Beside the plurality in terms of definitions and models of explanations, the use of the Europeanization framework as the theoretical point of departure remains important in issues of studying any European county. Europeanization importance rests instead in being more useful as a framework to organize inquiry and a way of orchestrating existing concepts and theories (Radaelli, 2004). Its merits rest on enriching the study of European integration by pointing out some previously under-researched questions particularly related to the effects the process of EU political integration brings about at the domestic level (Vink, 2002).

To conclude, it is clear that the concept of Europeanization is nothing completely new and can be linked both to known concepts and known means of examination (Sittermann, 2006: 8). The recent development have link the concept of Europeanization with other known concepts of political science such as compliance, implementation. Furthermore, the recent more theory-oriented literature has drawn heavily on new institutionalist theory providing a variety of theoretical suggestions, models, mechanisms, and explicit explanations of when and how Europe 'makes a difference' in domestic politics.

#### **CONTIGUOUS, OVERARCHING AND SUB TERMINOLOGY**

In addressing the major questions related to conceptual clarifications, scholars invites us above all to distinguish and clarify the difference between Europeanization and other contiguous term (Radaelli, 2000: 5; Vink, 2002: 17). Apart from many attempts to clarify directly Europeanization through providing definitions (what Europeanization *is*) other best

options, more indirectly, have suggested indirect clarity to the issue by saying what and how Europeanization differs from other terms. In order to gain more clarity on the concept ‘we need to specify not only what Europeanization is, but also what it is *not*’ (Vink & Graziano, 2007: 10). Keeping in mind the logic of the process as well as the logic of the results of Europeanization certain knowledge could be gain in differentiating the concept of Europeanization from other contiguous, overarching and sub terminology.

### **Distinction with regard to end-result**

With regard to the end-result of Europeanization we need to differentiate Europeanization from other contiguous concepts. As Radaelli points out the end-result of Europeanization is not to be confused with *convergence* and/or *harmonization* as they are but just only one possible consequence since empirical research have shown Europeanization can produce also divergence or end up in regulatory competition or distortions of competition (2000: 5-6). This is because of different national reactions the process may lead to variation results across countries and issues. Other terminology, most used in legal studies, is approximation or harmonization<sup>20</sup> referring to the process of adopting the legal system of Member and potential Member States to the *acquis communautaire*. Both reflect similar terminology that is relevant to the description of only the impact of *acquis communautaire* on the legal systems of Member and potential Member States but not the process and mechanisms to achieve to it. Identifying Europeanization as convergence or more generally as approximation, homogenization or standardization shadow the process and its mechanisms as well as mislead us towards the end-result since the process often ends up differently than convergence.

The transposition or the implementation of EU legislation usually entails certain policy or institutional changes at the domestic level. In this sense, both transposition and implementation are one important outcome of Europeanization. Even though they have similar end-result the notion of transposition, compliance and implementation are more narrow concepts than Europeanization, with reference to the process. They (compliance and implementation) both are limited in their focus on the process, limited to only certain parts of Europeanization. Europeanization, differently from compliance and implementation, may have many other, direct or indirect, intended or unintended, effects at the domestic level, in this sense, Europeanization encompasses, but is broader than, EU implementation or compliance (Treib, 2008: 4). One example may be the idea put forward by Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002) stressing that Europeanization could proceed equally well through ‘framing’ of domestic beliefs and expectations and not be restricted to only complying with EU regulations or transposing and implementing EU directives. *Domestication* has been another term used in the Europeanization literature but it regards only the end-result of differentiated response (of domestic factors) to the impact of European integration. As

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<sup>20</sup> Harmonization and approximation are related legal concepts which have a specific meaning in the context of EU law. Harmonization and approximation means to bring divergent national laws more in line with each other, compatible with EU law.



Wallace puts it domestication refers to 'the ways in which domestic factors frame and influence the incoming impacts of Europeanization' (2000a: 369-370).

### **Distinction with regard to the process**

With regard to the process of Europeanization parallels have been drawn between Europeanization and Globalization, Internationalization, Westernization or even Modernization. Wallace (2000a) by referring only to the process (the ways in which the process of Europeanization works out) sees the intersection of the two, Europeanization and Globalization, being the phenomenon of removing international boundaries. Beside such intersection, they are not one thing. Although Europeanization may be one type (regional variety) of globalization it still is a (regional) subset with distinctive characteristics. Europeanization is primarily differentiated from internationalization and globalization with its distinct geographical boundaries and existing characteristics of national organizations (Ladrech, 2001). Furthermore, Europeanization is, in effect, not only a local variant of globalization but also a 'filter' (Wallace, 2000a: 381) or an 'antidote' for globalization (Graziano, 2003). Europeanization itself might be a specific respond to, or a filter for globalization (Wallace, 2000a: 381) by reinforcing their trends or by shielding EU member states against their undesired effects (Risse *et al.*, 2001: 4) or Europeanization might act as an 'antidote' to globalization through promoting different policy and institutional effects that globalization is not able to determine in the EU member states (Graziano, 2003: 174).

Another important distinction regards the many transformation process that the Central Eastern European countries undergo after '90s. While, Democratization, Marketization, Westernization and Modernization are terms most used to describe their transformation processes right after the fall of communism and are centrally concerned with the rise and consolidation of liberal democracy, the Europeanization concept comes only after with the enlargement perspectives of this countries into EU and differently from the previous 'can be considered as the end of a transition process' (Sittermann, 2006: 4). Democratization, marketization and nation-building (the 'triple revolution') should be fully carried out (a precondition) before the fourth process – Europeanization (Agh, 1998: 216). In this sense, Europeanization is seen as a successfully completed process of transition in which all of the candidate countries become fully integrated into the entire range of political, economic, and security structures of West European integration and Trans-Atlantic co-operation (Agh, 1998: 42-45). As such, Europeanization of CEEC countries analysis 'the impact of European integration on the domestic structures of nation-states *within* the context of transformation and democratization' (Lippert *et al.*, 2001: 982, italics added) so Europeanization is a distinct dimension of the transformations happening in CEECs although it may overlap partially in issues of democratic and economic conditionality. Furthermore, although Europeanization and Westernization may be overlapping processes the two are different as some norms and rallies on either side of the Atlantic are growing apart (Flockhart, 2008: 6). The notion of Europeanization, especially in the case of the more geographically peripheral and less economically developed member or potential member states of the EU, is understood sometimes as modernization process, a series of structural transformations aiming to bring these countries back into the European mainstream (Harmsen & Wilson, 2000:16). In South-

European countries and the new member countries discourses on Europeanization has become equivalent to modernization and normalization in the sense of making these countries more similar to other EU partners (for discussion in CEEC see Goetz, 2001). Here, Europeanization is not a rival approach to modernization, with which it shares many basic assumptions, rather, it is a complementary perspective that is more narrowly focused in its empirical, conceptual and explanatory concerns (Goetz, 2001: 1037).

Europeanization as a concept is used also to understand the emergence of new forms of European governance. Scholars have referred to the process as 'EU-Europeanization' 'Unionization' and 'Communitization'. Such concepts denote the shift of attention of all national institutions and their increasing participation in EU decision-making. Although focused in European Union, Europeanization is not simply a synonym for European integration, rather the emphasis is placed on the ways in which European integration has led to redefinitions of the conceptions, relations and structures of power at both the national and the supranational levels (Harmsen & Wilson, 2000:14). Europeanization is not political integration as Europeanization is post-ontological and should not exist without European integration (Radaelli, 2000: 6). Even though few research use European integration and Europeanization interchangeably (in particular see Risse *et al.*, 2001) they still are interested in the domestic effects of the European integration process.

Europeanization as such, is also different from 'Europeification' (the *de facto* sharing of power between national governments and the EU) as Europeanization is the *de jure* transfer of sovereignty to the EU level and as a term refers to what happens once power has been transferred to Brussels (the *de jure*) (Lawton, 1999; Radaelli, 2000: 2). Moreover, 'Europeification' refers only to the division of power between national domestic and EU it does not connote the *processes* and mechanisms by which European institution-building may cause change at the domestic level. Thus 'Unionization', 'Communitization' and 'Europeification' refers only to the emergence of EU competencies and the pooling of power at EU level, differently from Europeanization which put attention to what happens once power has been transferred to Brussels.

#### **THE CORE AND THE BROAD APPROACH OF EUROPEANIZATION**

So, as argued above the Europeanization process is quite complex and cannot be reduced to just a simple rather Top-down, Bottom-up or Horizontal process with a certain type of result. That is why applying a min-max approach to the concept of Europeanization is the best choice. On the more explicit form (minimal) Europeanization is conceptualized as the process of downloading EU directives regulations and institutional structures (in the case of the candidate countries, the Copenhagen criteria) to the domestic level. 'Minimally, 'Europeanization' involves a response to the policies of the European Union (EU)' (Featherstone, 2003: 3) since the notion of Europe often has been EU-centric. This minimal conceptualization of Europeanization could be bettered term 'EU-ization' (Radaelli, 2003: 27; Wallace, 2000a). In fact, scholars favor this narrow usage of the term, where Europeanization as domestic impact of EU has become the dominant application of most empirical studies on Europeanization since it is a pragmatic definition for analytical research purposes. Most of the empirical studies focus on the process and the extent to which

perspective and members states adopt and implement EU rules. On an extended form (maximalist sense) Europeanization is ‘a phenomenon exhibiting similar attributes to those that predominate in, or are closely identified with, ‘Europe’’ (Featherstone, 2003: 3). In this sense one can ‘speak of Europeanization when something in the domestic political system is affected by something European’ (Vink, 2002: 1). For the candidate countries this means that the impact is not coming only as a response to EU pre-accession conditionality, but also rather as a voluntary choice of some best models Europe can offer. For example Europeanization in CEEC has involved many other processes, such as policy transfer, regime transfer and institutional isomorphism or mimicry (Grabbe, 2005: 204). A number of literatures have been concentrating on the processes of social learning, adaptation and lesson-drawing as mechanisms involved in the process of Europeanization.

The need of such mini-max approach derives from the difficulty that arises when one comes to know which Europe we are talking about? Is it the *political Europe* or the *cultural Europe* that we are referring to? Europeanization includes both and regards everything that is ‘European’ (Flockhart, 2008; Sittermann, 2006: 4). Within most of the literature, Europeanization deals primarily with the effects of the EU institution and its policies on its member states, ‘while in the potential member states the focus is on the specific adaptive requirements associated with EU membership negotiations and eventual EU accession’ (Goetz, 2001: 1037). Europeanization is seen as exclusive to the European Union although political Europe does consist of other institutions than EU such as OSCE, EFTA or the Council of Europe (Vink, 2003: 65). EU is perhaps the most important institution but not the only one, since other organizations and frameworks (formal and informal) also play a part. The involvement and interaction of European states and societies with other regional organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the Council of Europe, adds a further dimension to Europeanization.<sup>21</sup> The broad conception sees EU membership (negotiations and accession) and their consequential systemic domestic change as a *special* part of a broader process of ‘return to Europe’ (Lippert *et al.*, 2001). On the other hand, the narrow approach has been criticized by some as being overly restrictive. It has, therefore, been proposed to distinguish between Europeanization broad approach and other limited understanding of integration effects. In terms of explaining changes brought about by the EU, ‘EU-ization’ term has been proposed (see Wallace, 2000c; Radaelli, 2003: 27) introducing a distinction between the broad approach of ‘Europeanization’ and ‘EU-ization’ as changes driven by the demands of EU membership. The two are intricately connected as it is inconceivable to imagine EU-ization without prior processes of Europeanization or Europeanization without some degree of EU-ization, yet the empirical focus of EU-ization is clearly more limited than the empirical focus of Europeanization (Flockhart, 2008: 7). EU-ization is much more limited process of specific policy transfer (*acquis*) and does not imply Europeanized simply because they adopt certain policies.


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<sup>21</sup> Croft *et al.* 1999 cited in Lippert, 2001: 983.

So taking a mini-max approach we can conceptualize Europeanization as a member–state building process where both the EU requirements and European models have an impact on domestic (polity, politics and policy) potential member states. In this notion Europeanization is not only ‘EU-ization’ (taking the requirements from EU) but it is also becoming more European like. Conceptualizing Europeanization this way includes both the vertical uploading or down-loading concepts as well as the horizontal Europeanization of cross-loading. Considering Europeanization on its extended form offer us a better and full understanding but at the same time warns us on some methodologically issues when conducting empirical research. Firstly, we are not anymore dealing with uni-direction and static causal relation but rather with complex and multi-pathways. Secondly rather than using the tools and language of positivist (statistical methods and independent/dependent variable) we need to use other methods that can deal with the complexity of the issue (Olsen, 2002: 942).

These two paragraphs focused on comparing Europeanization concept to other contiguous terms as well as giving its broad and narrow meaning aiming to better shed light in the Europeanization concept. While many of the concepts have a considerable degree of overlap it is important to keep in mind that there are also important analytical differences as demonstrated above. Regarding the end-result contiguous concepts, they can be at best part of the Europeanization outcome, while the process-related contiguous concepts are either overarching or underarching Europeanization. In sum, Europeanization encompasses, but is broader than, EU-ization, ‘EU-Europeanization’, ‘Unionization’ and ‘Communitization’, and it is being encompassed by Globalization, Westernization, Modernization, Internationalization. Europeanization may be only a subset variety with very distinctive characteristics of the most comprehensive Globalization approach but Europeanization empirical domain still extends itself beyond the stricter definition of EUization. In other words, the analytical space for EUization is a portion of Europeanization studies and Europeanization itself a portion of Globalization studies.

**Figure 2:** Europeanization: broad, narrow and its contiguous terms representation as subsets



### EUROPEANIZATION IN THE MEMBER VERSUS POTENTIAL MEMBER STATES

The literature on the candidate countries have been heavily engaged in the Europeanization issues of then-CEEC countries. The question is if the concept of Europeanization fit well into

the potential member states. Given the still unsettled definition of Europeanization; the issue is not much a problem of conceptual stretching rather than a problem of circularity, that is do we start with definition or with cases<sup>22</sup>. Both, the extension (*cases* where the concept applies) of Europeanization is the same for member and potential member states (that is domestic polity, politics, policy) and the intention (*features*, the concept have) of Europeanization is still the same (impact of Europe). Both, member-state and potential member-states, are categories which although not exactly the same they share some features in common; they are directly influenced by EU and Europe. So, the question may be related to the problem of circularity, that is if there is a significant mismatch between the definition of Europeanization and cases with different degree of integration we are applying to. Considering the potential member states as ‘family resemblance’<sup>23</sup> we have a perfect match with the Europeanization definition(s), conceptualizing it for both as the impact of EU integration. Here, none of the groups is exactly the same, but potential member states have some features in common with the other group of member states regarding Europeanization process. Making analytical choice in ways that allows research to proceed on the basis of resemblance cases is a way to escape circularity problem. The issue becomes a matter of rethinking only particular elements of the potential candidate countries experience as instances of Europeanization phenomena studied elsewhere in member-state countries. There are two key characteristics of the impact of EU on member states that are comparable to those of candidate countries: first the significant extent to which EU actors and institutions direct and enforce the adjustment process (even if instruments differ) and the comprehensive nature of adjustment to cover the entirety of the *acquis* (Sedelmeir, 2006: 4). Candidate countries are subject to same process of adoption and implementation of EU policies (*acquis communautaire*) as current member states are. As Papadimitriou & Phinnemore argues in their article ‘a conception of Europeanization as a process confined exclusively to the existing EU Member States is misleading’ (2004: 635). Thus Europeanization is not a process confined to those countries that are members of the European Union (Wallace, 2000a: 370) as there is undoubtedly Europeanization of policy in countries applying for EU membership (Radaelli, 2000: 4). Furthermore, scholars have argued that the essence of Europeanization is best understood outside the EU (Maniokas, 2001: 167) as the process is one way, no uploading. As a final point, we should mention that the distinct Eastern pattern of Europeanization is, in principle, a transitional phenomenon; Enlargement will remain an external force as long as the candidate countries are not yet full EU members but once they acquire the full rights of membership, Europeanization mechanisms and substance can be expected to progressively approximate those in the member states (Goetz, 2002).

Although the process and dynamics of Europeanization process in candidate countries are essentially similar to those in member-states, the circumstances are different (Bulmer, 2007: 54). Given their candidate status the EU’s influence on applicants has the added dimensions of conditionality and of the accession negotiations (Grabbe, 2001: 1014; Heritier, 2005).

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<sup>22</sup> The Problem of Circularity (Do you start with a definition or with a case?) regards the significant mismatches that exist between definitions and cases (Mudde, 2007).

<sup>23</sup> The ‘family resemblance’ concept where none of the parties is exactly the same, but each family member will have some features in common with all other members (see Collier & Mahon, 1993).

Such circumstances have distinctive characteristics regarding first, the instruments used by EU institutions to influence and to monitor the adjustment process and secondly the asymmetrical relation process (Sedelmeir, 2006: 5). In order to induce adjustment EU institutions cannot rely on the treaty-based sanctions or through financial penalties imposed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), but rather on other instruments such as conditional incentives (withholding membership and financial aid), normative pressure, persuasion and framing, further more European Commission, different from the infringement procedures used in member state, publish Regular Reports as a way to monitor the process of compliance with EU conditions in candidate countries. Furthermore, as Grabbe (2003) has convincingly argued the effects of Europeanization in the candidate countries although similar in nature with those in the member states, they are much broader and deeper in scope. The EU agenda for institutional and policy change in candidate countries is extensive as the candidate states must not only adopt '*acquis communautaire*' but also have a stable democratic institutions and form competitive market economies, respect human and ethnic rights as set out in the Copenhagen European Council meeting (1993). Furthermore, as Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier argued Europeanization in CEE not only proceeded at a much quicker pace because of time pressures of accession, but also produced more homogenous and convergent outcomes than in the member states (2005b: 225; 2007: 98). The speed of adjustment to EU institutions and policies is much faster and more thoroughly than in current members because there is with very limited scope for negotiating transitional periods (Grabbe, 2003: 306; Grabbe, 2001: 1014).

With regard to candidate countries, there has been also different rationalities of why adopt to EU institutions and policies. The post-communist transformations had made CEE and WB more receptive to external and specifically to EU institutional paradigms and as a consequence show less institutional resistance than then candidates from EFTA states and existing member states, because WB are in search of institutional models to replace or to create new structures (Grabbe, 2003: 307; Grabbe, 2001: 1014, emphasis added). On the other side, given the very broad and sometimes double standards needed to be adopted as well as the high adjustment costs created, it is argued that 'the main rationale for adopting the *acquis* was the benefits of full EU membership rather than the intrinsic benefits of EU models in the various policy areas' (Sedelmeier, 2006).

So, the more rigorous usage of the term should be used closely linked to the Europeanization literature of the member states where Europeanization of the potential member states is understood as the impact of EU enlargement process.<sup>24</sup> Being linked to the enlargement process as well as of their status (candidate) and the asymmetrical relation of the process, it has been only one-way process. If Europeanization in the member-state is a two-way street where member-states have sought to influence or even propose policy measure they are subsequently expected to comply with, quite the opposite seems to be the case in Europeanization of the candidate countries since the candidates had no voice in the making of

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<sup>24</sup> On a discussion of the more broad use of Europeanization defined as changes after 1989 in the CEECs see Dimitrova, 2005: 74-75.

the rules that they have to adopt so there have been few (if none) policy initiatives on the part of accession states to actively shape the individual EU policies that then have to be adopted (Sedelmeir, 2006: 5; Heritier, 2005: 208, parenthesis added).

Candidate countries, because of their pre-accession status, 'are not yet *acting within* the EU policy cycle, unlike the member state administrations. Rather, they *interact with* the EU system at different levels and with different degrees of intensity. Within the pre-accession strategy, the candidates are principally concerned with the implementation and control of EU decisions at a national level, but they are not yet part of the comitology of the Commission. Nor are they, as yet, involved in the preparatory, decision-making and controlling stages. They still experience parts of the EU system as 'outsiders' and decision-'takers' rather than decision-makers' (Lippert *et al.*, 2001: 984).

That is why, accession states undergo only downloading or top-down Europeanization and cross-loading or horizontal Europeanization prior to EU membership, without participation in up-loading/bottom-up Europeanization or European integration (Howell, 2004: 5, footnote 2). This overall process, where European integration has an impact on the to-become member countries has been referred to as 'Eastern style' Europeanization meaning that for the candidate countries we can speak of a pre-Europeanization process because of their preparation for accession. All the adjustments and transformations are not only 'anticipatory effects' (preparing for accession) but also 'anticipated effects' (the likely long-term implications of eventual EU membership) (Goetz, 2007: 75; 2001: 1036). Europeanization in this context is nothing but a member-state building where candidate countries (Western Balkans states) had to become Europe-like (maximal Europeanization), or in more detailed terms the candidate countries had to adopt much of their legislation and existing institutions or build new ones conforming EU's legislation, policies, and standards (minimal Europeanization) prior to accession.<sup>25</sup>

#### GETTING EUROPEANIZATION RIGHT IN THE POTENTIAL MEMBER STATES

The dominant literature has employed only a minimal concept of Europeanization, although some of them recognize its only one side 'EU-ization' dimension of Europeanization. The process of Europeanization seems to be shadowed by the accession negotiations process and the conditionality issue (Heritier, 2005). The studies on Europeanization of the candidate countries tend to focus strictly on the impact of *conditionality* rather than on a more general impact of Europe (say it framing). This because, of firstly, the assumptions are based on a status quo and secondly the research focus on the positive/visible results (what model brings Europeanization) but not on the way processes function. Say it in other words; Europeanization has been the tool to argue for the ends not the means.

Europeanization of the potential member states serves a dual function. First as a concept, Europeanization of the potential member states highlights the role of European institutions as a key variable in domestic politics. Secondly as an explanatory model, Europeanization of the

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<sup>25</sup> The stabilization and association process had put forward not only political and economical criteria of general character to be fulfilled but also specific requirements on approximation of domestic legislation and policies with those of the *acquis*.

potential member states highlights the mechanism (the ways) through which domestic (policy, polity, politics) change and adapt to European requirements and models as a result of their Enlargement process. Europeanization as in the member states is both an area of inquiry as much as a concept that is why we need to use concepts, ideas and methods from Europeanization literature (Grabbe, 2005: 4) and their similar causal mechanisms to explaining adjustment or non-adjustment in the potential member states (Heritier, 2005). In a more broader perspective 'the relevance of Europeanization as a framework of understanding domestic change stretches beyond the geographical borders of the EU, providing us with a valuable resource in understanding the complex and unpredictable process of post-communist transition in central and eastern Europe' (Papadimitriou & Phinnemore, 2004: 635).

While not wishing to add more un-necessity to the many Europeanization definitions that already exist, still a way of conceptualizing Europeanization in the potential member states is needed first of all to distinguish it from other processes that may be similar, like Modernization, Globalization and Internationalization. Europeanization approach differs from Modernization or Globalization approach in the strict sense that it 'is more narrowly focused in its empirical, conceptual and explanatory concerns' (Goetz, 2001: 1037). The specificity of Europeanization approach for the potential member states rests in the fact that the impact of it involves the (direct or indirect) influence of European enlargement process.

The changes in the national political systems are attributed to European integration process in the case of member-state countries and by analogy, to the enlargement process in the case of potential member states. For this reason, the Europeanization of the potential member states is simply conceptualized here, analogous to the conceptualization in the member-states, as domestic impact (transformation) resulting from the EU enlargement process. As such, Europeanization in the potential member states is first and foremost a member-state building process since enlargement process influence in restructuring domestic institutions and public policies in the to-become member states conform European (broad sense) or EU (strict sense) models. And secondly Europeanization of the potential candidate countries is anticipation (pre-Europeanization), it links impact 'to anticipated EU membership' (Lippert *et al.*, 2001). Europeanization of potential member states comes as a result of the overall adaptation pressure that the EU causes on the to-become-member state as part of membership conditionality before they could join EU. Conceptualizing Europeanization in the potential member states this way, is firstly in line with the Europeanization concept in the member states and secondly distinguishes it from other broader processes of Modernization or Globalization.

As the EU's weight across the continent grows, through enlargement instruments the transformation role of EU does not effects only member states but also their potential candidate countries, as there is undoubtedly Europeanization of countries applying for EU membership.





## THE PROCESS OF EUROPEANIZATION IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

The countries of the region have come a long way in the stabilisation process... Now, you need to complete the stabilisation process, cement progress made to date, and move on. As you get closer to EU membership, the nature of your work will gradually change. The current focus on achieving minimum standards will no longer be enough; the rationale will become one of preparing you to be able to function successfully as future Member States of the EU. In the coming years, we must be able to move more and more from stabilisation towards association. (Olli Rehn, former European Commissioner for Enlargement, 2004)

In order to describe Europeanization of Western Balkans, that is the process of transformation and change caused by Europe, we need firstly to state when Europe becomes involved in the WB and secondly what dynamics of this involvement can be directly and exclusively related to Europeanization. In the member-state case scholars had made clear that in order to describe Europeanization 'a closer look is required at the dynamics of the European integration process' (Vink, 2002: 7-8). For the candidate countries, Europeanization has been explicitly link to the impact of Enlargement. In the case of CEEC, the relations with EU have been one of Enlargement approach since the beginning. That is not the case with WB since EU approach has been many in the region. The previous EU approach towards WB has been far from integration, with no enlargement perspective. It was only in 2000 where EU saw WB as potential candidate countries and launched an enlargement policy for those countries. So, speaking of Europeanization process, one has to focus on enlargement from 2000 onwards.

### **THE BACKGROUND OF THE EU APPROACH(ES) TOWARDS THE WBS<sup>26</sup>**

Having a look at the EU – Western Balkans relation one can notice not only the many EU approaches and policies but also the WBs' progress of moving towards enlargement.

### **The Terra Incognita<sup>27</sup> Approach (1990-1995)**

The EU (then EC) committed itself to enlarge eastward only after the communism fall in all Eastern Europe. Besides EU commitment, the approach towards Eastern European countries was different. In the first half of the '90s the relations of EU with the Western Balkans countries were minimal and very different from those with the CEEs<sup>28</sup>. From the very beginning of the dissolution of Yugoslav Federation till the acute phase of the Bosnian crisis

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<sup>26</sup> For more on the argument see Jano (2008).

<sup>27</sup> '*Terra Incognita*' is a term used by Smith (2000) to describe the EU approach to the WBs in the '90s.

<sup>28</sup> The reason for such a differentiation on the EU approach is related mainly to the different transitions experienced by CEE and WB.

(1995), the EU precise desire was to keep problems at distance. The EU deployed the strategy of keeping the 'infection' at arm's length meaning that EU was willing to enter into post-crisis reconstruction but not to engage in the acute phase of crisis management (Smith, 2000: 817-818). For the large part of the 90's there was a lack of EU's political strategy towards the region. It was only after the cessation of the military conflict that the EU took measures. Even then, the EU acted only in the fields of crisis management by handling of the early stages of the ex-Yugoslav crisis and of humanitarian aid by helping Albania to overcome its extreme poverty. The forward-thinking strategy toward the Eastern Europe was to give incentive to the countries that already had or were considered to have progressed sufficiently down the path of political and economic reforms by eventually allowed to negotiate European Agreements with the EU. In this respect the Western Balkans countries fall behind since they were facing other problems related to ethnic conflicts and poverty issues. Still, even in the WB case, EU still try to keep a rewarding politics for the countries not involved into the ethnic conflicts. EU relations with the WB countries were based on a series of bilateral agreements the deep of which was determined by the domestic regimes' degree of compliance with the conditionality principle (Papadimitriou, 2002: 187). For Albania and later for Macedonia although the speed of reform was slower, EU provided assistance through Phare programme and trade concessions in the form of trade and Cooperation agreements. That was the reward for those countries which did not directly involve in the wars. Whereas for the countries directly involved in the Bosnian conflict the EU did not establish bilateral relations, they rather benefit from the EU's humanitarian operations (Papadimitriou, 2002: 187).

Most of the assistance came through programmes such as PHARE and OBNOVA, and not all the countries were included from the very first beginning, Croatia for example was excluded from the whole range of PHARE assistance until November 1999. Still, although the PHARE program was introduced even in the Central Eastern European countries it held a different aim with respect to that it had in the Western Balkans. The PHARE program in the CEEs countries 'co-finance institution building together with associated investment in the infrastructure for the implementation of the *acquis*' while the PHARE assistance for the Western Balkans 'was more limited and primarily targeted at conflict management and humanitarian relief' (Dimitrova, 2003: 9-12). The largest financial aid and resources of EU went to humanitarian aid helping Western Balkans countries merely to survive not to build institutions and prepare for EU as happened in the CEEs.

In sum it can be said that the 1990-1995 EU-Balkan relations were concentrated more on post-conflict stabilization of the region being very far from integration strategies and perspectives of enlargement.

### **The Regional Approach (1995-1999)**

After the end of the Bosnian war in 1995, EU policies even though still concerned with the stabilization of the region marked a turning point on the way EU was approaching Western Balkans. EU started to see the WBs more as part of Europe rather than a region far from its doors. The idea that 'this is Europe embodied the European Union's moral imperative' (International Commission on the Balkans, 2005: 6) when dealing with WBs. At that phase,

the EU immediate task and new challenge was focused more on how to ‘help transform the proverbially chaotic, bloody and unpredictable Balkans of the past into a stable, peaceful and dependable Southeastern Europe of the future’ (International Commission on the Balkans, 2005: 3). As a consequence of regional political developments, EU was urged to adapt the so-called *Regional Approach* aiming at political and economic cooperation among all the Balkan countries, Bulgaria and Rumania included. This type of policy seek to promote stability; establish good-neighborhoodness relations regarding the free movement of goods, services and people; as well as economic recovery and the development of projects of common interest for the region were the respect of minority rights and the improvement of bilateral relations were given importance.<sup>29</sup> The initiatives inspired and launched by the EU at that time were all aiming at a regional dimension. A clear example is the Royaumont Process<sup>30</sup> for Stability and Good Governance initiated at a conference on 13 December 1995 organized by the European Union aiming at promoting civil society development and multilateral dialogue between journalists, academics, trade unionists, NGOs and parliamentarians. Other initiatives with a regional character were launched. In 1996, the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI)<sup>31</sup> was another regional initiative established being inspired by US as a supportive mechanism for the Dayton Peace Agreement. Initiated by the Bulgarian Government, being the only regional initiative generated from within the region, the Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEEC) was established aiming at regional cooperation respecting territorial integrity of the states covering a range of issues including security, economic cooperation, humanitarian, social and cultural cooperation and cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs.

Despite the step forward in EU – WBs relations, the Regional Approach in its first phase (1995-1999) bears a number of shortcomings: firstly, regardless of its name (*regional approach*), the approach was more at the *bilateral* level; secondly the EU strategies were to be more a continuation of the ‘*Terra Incognita*’ approach; thirdly, all regional initiatives in the region appeared rather late being more post-conflict reactions rather than preventive ones; fourthly, their success was fatally undermined by the lack of sufficient financial resources; and fifthly, most of the initiatives were not comprehensive enough, being limited to one or a few areas. Furthermore, the *regional approach* was judged ‘out of context’ considering that the interested countries had ‘different degrees of integration with the EU’ (Anastasakis & Bojicic-Dzelilovic, 2002: 26)<sup>32</sup>. The ‘unifying tendencies’ of the regional approach arouses fears among the more advanced South-Eastern European countries since they perceived their participation in regional cooperation initiatives as a delay in their EU integration process

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<sup>29</sup> The EU adopted the Regional Approach to the countries of South-Eastern Europe on 26 February 1996. For more see the Conclusions of the General Affairs Council of 26 February 1996.

<sup>30</sup> The Royaumont process was initiated at a conference on 13 December 1995, organized by the European Union, with a declaration of 27 countries to promote stability and good neighbourhood in South Eastern Europe. See Royaumont Process at: <<http://www.royaumont.lrf.gr>>.

<sup>31</sup> Official web site of SECI Center <<http://www.secicenter.org>>

<sup>32</sup> Bulgaria and Romania were part of the EU’s enlargement process; Albania and Macedonia had trade and co-operation agreements; whereas relations with then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were frozen as it did not meet the relevant criteria (Friis & Murphy, 2000: 770).

(Dimitrova, 2003: 5&44). The European Commission itself would acknowledge that the WB countries did not react positively to the incentives provided by the EU Regional Approach (COM, 1999: 3). This was mainly because the EU Regional Approach of 1995-1999 lacked a long-term strategy and a perspective of membership for the WBs countries, at a time when most of them prioritized integration into the EU.

### **The Comprehensive Approach (1999 onwards)**

The already existing EU policies in the Western Balkans region were 'mostly perceived as ill-conceived and insufficient' (Biermann, 1999: 9). Thus EU could not rest only on the *regional approach* since promoting only regional co-operation and economic reconstruction proved to be not enough. Facing such a reality would lead EU to search for other alternatives so to have a broader and more integrated approach. It was during the Vienna European Council (December 1998) that the EU decided to prepare a 'common strategy' for the Western Balkans. The Kosovo crises and the NATO intervention in 1999 were another warning, urging the EU to pay more attention and possibly to introduce a more *comprehensive approach* into the entire region including the question of its enlargement into EU. As a response to these needs the EU foreign ministers met in a special meeting in Cologne in June 1999 and launched the 'Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe'<sup>33</sup>. This initiative was the first serious commitment and 'the first example of the EU's changing strategy, bringing together a very large number of countries and organizations' (Papadimitriou, 2002: 188). The new and most important element that the Stability Pact contained, beside the aim to promote and coordinate the joint efforts of all its members in conflict prevention and peace building, was the perspective of membership in Euro-Atlantic structures for the countries of the region. The prospect of membership into EU and NATO was seen as the most effective way to stabilize the region in the long term; if membership perspective was believed to be effective in fastening democracy and market reforms in Central and Eastern Europe it was possible to repeat the exercise for South-East Europe (Friis & Murphy, 2000: 769). At the core of this strategy there was the project of *Europeanization* of the region which would anchor the countries of the Western Balkans firmly in the values and institutional structures of the Euro-Atlantic Community.

Other very important steps toward deepening the EU-WB relations were to follow. On June 2000, in the Feira European Council, the EU member countries confirmed that the prospect of the Balkan countries to be potential candidates for EU membership would be the main motivator for reform. The EU main 'objective remains the fullest possible integration of the countries of the region into the political and economic mainstream of Europe through the Stabilization and Association process, political dialogue, liberalization of trade and cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs. All the countries concerned are potential candidates for EU membership' (Council of the European Union, 2000: § 67). Another important development was the Zagreb Summit of November 2000, the first summit of Balkan states and European Union, which launch the SAP. EU and Western Balkans countries agreed to proceed with the 'Stabilization and Association Process' (SAP) as a mean to prepare the

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<sup>33</sup> See Stability Pact at <http://www.Stabilitypact.org>.

region for sustainable reform and possible candidate status. The prospect of potential candidacy was offered in return of the commitment by the Western Balkans countries to undertake a set of reforms<sup>34</sup>. The European Union General Affairs Council argued that, for the WB states, the process of formulating the SAP ‘approach has proved an effective means of focusing authorities’ minds on essential reforms and of engaging with them in a sustained way to secure implementation’ (Council of the European Union, 2001). The importance of the Zagreb Summit rest on the fact that for the very first time the EU came up with a fairly clear idea of its vision for the states of the WBs (being potential candidate) and even more important was the mechanism of how this could be realized (through the Stabilization and Association Process). EU’s commitment to assist the Southeast European states in their preparation for membership was reaffirmed at the Thessalonica European Council held in June 2003, under the Greek presidency. The new agenda enriched the SAP by introducing the European Partnerships (EPs) which would build upon previously negotiated Stabilization and Accession Agreements (SAA) and translate their general priorities into specific policy measures as well as target assistance towards each country’s specific needs.

The enriched SAP remained at the perspective of membership with some several elements of the enlargement process such as the eligible for technical assistance for harmonizing national legislation with the *acquis communautaire* and the opening of the twinning exchange programs helping WB countries to adapt to EU by learning from member state experiences through framing the legislation and building the organizational capacity necessary to implement the *acquis*. Still, the missed opportunity to transfer SAP to DG Enlargement and the push for intra-regional co-operation rather than functional co-operation within a broader European framework were some of the shortcomings of the Thessaloniki Agenda (Meurs, 2003: 16).

### THE ENLARGEMENT APPROACH

The EU enlargement can be defined ‘as a process of gradual and formal horizontal institutionalization of organizational rules and norms’ Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2002: 503; 2005c) where *Institutionalization*, as the first step, can be broadly understood as ‘the establishment of special institutional relations between the organization and an outsider state’ (Schimmelfennig, 2002b: 601). Achieving any substantial formal institutional arrangements is an important first-step toward the enlargement process.

### The Stabilization and Association Agreements for WB

In the EU enlargement context with the Western Balkan states, this first step is the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAAs) which are legally binding international agreements. Today all Western Balkan countries, except Kosovo, have signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement with EU. The SAAs borrowed heavily from the European

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<sup>34</sup> Western Balkans countries committed to establish new relations between their countries, promoting regional co-operation, sustained structural reforms and respect for democratic standards and international obligations, while EU promised to offer all the countries of the region the European perspective of being potential candidates for membership through the Stabilization and Association process (SAP). For more see: Zagreb Summit Final Declaration, 2000.

Agreements signed with the CEEs. They are an up-dated version resembling in term of structure and content with the Europe Agreements signed in '90s between the EU and then-candidate countries of Central East Europe. The EU devised such Agreements 'as a mean of regulating economic and political relations' with those countries as well as being 'a tool for reducing uncertainty and enhancing the predictability' of the Western Balkans (Papadimitriou, 2002: 17). The SAA creates a framework for co-operation between EU and Balkans with the final goal to help the latter to enter in the European family. The attraction and the element added by this new approach is the explicit prospect for future membership into the EU since it introduces the status of a potential candidate for EU membership to the Western Balkans countries with a long-term prospect of accession. The SAAs guide each country toward meeting EU membership requirements by offering the necessary financial and political assistance to each of the respective WB countries so to speed up political, economic and administrative reforms. The SAAs implies that the Western Balkans should focus more on adapting the core elements of the EU conditions, known as the Copenhagen Criteria, requiring the candidate country to achieved 'stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to adopt the common rules, standards and policies of the Union'<sup>35</sup>. While for the EU, the SAA implies 'firstly, the promise of aid as a return to the EU's regulatory control over the reform process; and secondly, the promise of EU membership at some point in the future' (Chandler, 2003: 7).

### **The state of affairs in EU – WB enlargement-relation**

**Macedonia** was the first to sign a Stabilization and Association Agreement on March 2001, during the armed conflict in the country. The signing of the SAA with Macedonia was more an offered by the EU to stop fighting rather than a reward in recognition of the success of structural reforms made by Macedonia in the process of preparation for the EU membership. Macedonia applied for EU membership on March 2004, even before the SAA entered into force on 1 April 2004. The European Council decided on December 2005 to grant candidate status to Macedonia. **Croatia** was the second country to sign a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU on 29 October 2001. This agreement entered into force on 1 February 2005 but Croatia as Macedonia had already applies for EU membership, on February 2003. On June 2004 the European Council confirms Croatia as candidate country. European Council sets 17 March 2005 as start date for negotiations but they were postpone as there it was evaluated that Croatia had failed full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). It was only on 3 October 2005, after the ICTY's Chief Prosecutor assesses Croatia to have fully cooperated with ICTY, where the Council launce accession negotiations. After delays due to political instability and difficulties in implementing reforms, the SAA with **Albania** were officially launched only in 31 January 2003 by the Commission President Romano Prodi. Negotiations between Albania and the European Union for a Stabilization and Association Agreement were concluded with signing

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<sup>35</sup> See: The Copenhagen Criteria, DG Enlargement – Available at [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement\\_process/accesion\\_process/criteria/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accesion_process/criteria/index_en.htm)

of the SAA only in 12 June 2006 at the General Affairs and External Relations Council in Luxembourg, being so the third Western Balkan state to sign a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU. The SAA entered into force only on 1 April 2009. On 28 April 2009 Albania submits its application for EU membership. Albanian request for membership was accepted and now Albania received and in due time answered to the questioner from the commission. It is now waiting to receive the candidate status. On 2003 the Commission produces a feasibility study assessing **Bosnia and Herzegovina's** capacity to implement a Stabilization and Association Agreement. But it was only in October 2005 were the EU Commission recommends to the Council to open talks on a SAA with Bosnia and Herzegovina and in January 2006 the SAA talks were formally opened. On 16 June 2008 the EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina signed the SAA which will enter into force once its ratification process has been completed. Council conclusions open up the process for the Stabilization and Association Agreement with **the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro** in October 2004 and the negotiations for a SAA were launch in October 2005. Negotiations took place on the basis of the twin-track approach. On 3 May 2006, they were temporally called off due to lack of progress on Serbia's co-operation with the ICTY. The Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) between Serbia and the EU was signed in Luxembourg in 29 April 2008. After the **Montenegrin** Parliament declares independence on June 2006, the EU Council declared the will to develop further the relations with Montenegro, now an independent state, in bilateral relations. On 26 September 2006 the SAA negotiations with Montenegro are launched. On 15 October 2007 the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) is signed in Luxembourg and in January 2008 it enter into force. Montenegro submits its application for EU membership on December 2008. In the case of **Kosovo**, the Commission established in November 2002 what it called the Sap Tracking Mechanism (STM). This is because Kosovo was a sui generis case. Being under the UN administration it could not in any case be covered by any SAA negotiated by the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro and in the same time it cannot enter independently into international contractual relations. Through the Stabilization and Association process Tracking Mechanism, Kosovo benefits from all elements of the Sap without having the opportunity to establish contractual relations with the EU and hence to reach a SAA. Still, the Sap Tracking Mechanism will lead Kosovo to reforms compatible with EU standards and it will provide policy advice and measuring progress.

**Table 1:** Important dates in the Enlargement process of the WB countries

|            | SAA negotiations start | SAA signature | SAA entry into force | Membership application submitted | Candidate status received | Membership negotiations start |
|------------|------------------------|---------------|----------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Croatia    | 2000                   | Oct. 2001     | Feb.2005             | Feb.2003                         | June 2004                 | Oct. 2005                     |
| Macedonia  | 2000                   | Apr.2001      | Apr. 2004            | Mar. 2004                        | Dec. 2005                 | --                            |
| Albania    | Jan. 2003              | Jun. 2006     | Apr. 2009            | Apr. 2009                        | --                        | --                            |
| BiH        | Jan. 2006              | Jun. 2008     | --                   | --                               | --                        | --                            |
| Serbia     | Oct. 2005              | Apr. 2008     | --                   | --                               | --                        | --                            |
| Montenegro | Sep. 2006              | Oct. 2007     | Jan 2008             | Dec. 2008                        | --                        | --                            |
| Kosovo     | Nov. 2002              | --            | --                   | --                               | --                        | --                            |



## EUROPEANIZATION IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SAP

With the Stabilization and Association process, from 2000 onwards a far-reaching process of Europeanization is currently under way in WB. As in the CEEC cases, similar policies of alignment, assistance, and conditionality are part of the EU's relations with the Western Balkans (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005a: 2). EU is structuring domestic institutions and the entire range of public policies in WB through its conditionality and technical assistance and models. Before 2000 the impact of EU was of a different nature than enlargement impact, as a result not directly linked to Europeanization, after that date an important note of conditionality and assistance enter the calculus. 'The accession conditions apply to all the candidates, regardless of how far they are from membership. Both front-runners and those further from accession need to show that they are making progress.' (Grabbe, 2001: 1016). The perspective of becoming member-states shifted the EU approach toward enlargement perspective which will impact on a high degree of performance by WB states. The requirements from EU lead and will lead WBs to the adoption of EU laws and establishment of institutions on state level.

The questions is if and to what extent EU have impact on WB states policies and institutions. Putting it differently, to what extent the WB countries were able to bring their policies and institutions – in both formal and practical terms – in line with the EU requirements. A way to comprehensively evaluate such Europeanization performance is to look at the European Commission progress reports published every autumn on each country.

### Europeanization as adopting and implementing EU standards or Acquis

In order to describe the varying degree of WB state and region Europeanization within the Stabilization and Association process I focus on qualitative data extracted from the European Commission progress reports. The European Commission (Enlargement DG) is in charge of monitoring the WB countries performance with EU standards or Acquis (and with EU requirements in general). This qualitative data are comprehensive and unique, in the sense that they evaluate the progress of each potential and candidate country with regard to not only the formal transposition of EU laws and policies (adoption/alignment) but also the aspect of their practical application (implementation).

### *The Performance of the WB Countries:*

**Table 2:** Albania's performance in adoption and implementation of Acquis


|         | Years | Adoption            | Implementation   |
|---------|-------|---------------------|------------------|
| Albania | 2002  | (relative) Progress | Limited progress |
|         | 2003  | Limited Progress    | Limited progress |
|         | 2004  | Limited Progress    | Limited progress |
|         | 2005  | Some progress       | Some progress    |
|         | 2006  | Some progress       | Some progress    |
|         | 2007  | Progress            | Progress         |
|         | 2008  | Progress            | Little progress  |

there was a 'considerable lack of implementing capacity' in 'almost every area where Albania would take on obligations under a future SAA' (COM, 2002: 15). During 2003,

**Albania's** starting point was extremely low and its reforms were 'seriously adrift from the level of development in Western Europe' but since 1998 achievements have been done and the country's performance on 2002 was evaluate as having only *relative progress* but sufficient enough to bring Albania to the threshold of negotiating a SAA with the EU (COM, 2002: 15). Despite *relative progress*,

‘[l]imited progress has been made by Albania’ since recommendations included in the 2002 SAP report have been only partially addressed (COM, 2003: 26). Moreover, Albania still lack ability to implement the provisions of the future Agreement where ‘at the current speed of reform implementation, negotiations risk being long and drawn out’ (COM, 2003: 26). Progress in reforms has been still *limited* in 2004, only in some specific areas and many of the recommendations included in the previous SAP report have *not been properly implemented* (COM, 2004: 34). During 2005 and 2006, the country made *some progress* towards meeting European standards, both in adoption of new legislation and the establishment of new institutions (MEMO, 2005: 2; MEMO, 2006: 2). Albania during 2007 and 2008 made ‘progress in aligning its legislation, policies and capacity with European standards’ (MEMO, 2007: 1; MEMO, 2008: 1). But the score in implementation was positive only for 2007 while for 2008 the report warned Albania for the need ‘to enhance its efforts in the implementation’ of the laws and policies adopted (MEMO, 2008: 1).

**Figure 3:** Adoption, Implementation and Europeanization in Albania



In Albania, only little progress can be detected regarding the adoption of EU standards and laws, and only in the last years could the country achieve progress. While in the implementation records Albanian shows to have only

some progress. If both these dimensions, adoption and implementation, are to be considered simultaneously in order to construct an Europeanization measure where both adoption and implementation need to be considered then we can use the logical AND (that is, taking the minimum value of both). Following this logic, Europeanization in the country has only some progress with the best result only in 2008 achieving progress.


**BiH** faced numerous problems primarily because of its internal complex order making it loose time in European target aim, falling behind all its neighbors. Although BiH made progress since 1995, this progress was not enough to reach its European integration goal within the SAP as, in 2002, BiH delayed in Road Map completion. In 2003, progress within the SAP has been noted and the ‘Road Map was ‘substantially completed’’ but still little was done to put into effect because ‘its full

**Table 3:** BiH's performance in adoption and implementation of Acquis

| BiH | Years | Adoption         | Implementation   |
|-----|-------|------------------|------------------|
|     | 2002  | No progress      | No progress      |
|     | 2003  | Progress         | Little progress  |
|     | 2004  | Little Progress  | Limited progress |
|     | 2005  | Progress         | Some Progress    |
|     | 2006  | Progress         | Little progress  |
|     | 2007  | Limited Progress | Limited progress |
|     | 2008  | Some Progress    | Good Progress    |

implementation require[d] continued attention.’ (COM, 2003: 28, 29). The progress of meeting the technical SAP requirements in 2004 was mix as in some crucial areas reform was not completed or did not even begun (COM, 2004: 35). Progress in 2005 towards meeting European standards was both through adoption of new legislation and the establishment of new institutions although efforts needed to be seriously enhanced particularly in areas central for the implementation of a future SAA (MEMO, 2005: 5). In 2006, BiH made further steps towards meeting European standards but it needed to intensify its efforts in implementation since the ‘[o]verall administrative capacity need[ed] further strengthening’ (MEMO, 2006: 3). BiH made limited progress in 2007, in aligning its legislation and policies with European standards furthermore; achievement of public administration reform was one of the four main conditions in order for the conclusion of the SAA (MEMO, 2007: 2). Good progress followed in the four priorities of implementation, as of such progress SAA was sign in June 2008 but reforms were mix, with progress in some fields and in some others more efforts were needed (MEMO, 2008: 4).

**Figure 4:** Adoption, Implementation and Europeanization in BiH



In BiH many oscillations can be detected in EU law adoption between some progress to progress. While the implementation reached lately good progress starting from no progress in the beginning, still most of the time it


remained to critical values of some progress. Almost the same trend of implementation, starting from no progress to achieving only some progress, can be said for Europeanization.

**Croatia:** The signature of the SAA ‘had an immediate and concrete impact on the domestic reform programme’ of the country with the new government showing determination and serious efforts to establish the necessary EU legislative framework, though ‘the implementation of adopted legislation remains a major challenge’ as the administration lacks the capacity to implement the reforms (COM, 2002: 19). Croatian, in 2003, continued to progress in ‘align[ing] its legislation with the acquis and address[ing] most of the priorities identified in the 2002 SAP Report’, still the problem of

necessary administrative capacity in order to ensure proper enforcement of new legislation

remained (COM, 2003: 30). On the opinion on Croatia's Application for EU Membership, the commission evaluate that the country ‘has made progress in applying the Interim Agreement’ and ‘has also taken important steps towards complying with future obligations of the SAA’ (COM, 2004: 120). The challenge ahead remained the ‘strengthening administrative and judicial structures that are necessary for the effective implementation and enforcement of the *acquis*’ (*ibid.*). The same pattern was notice also in 2005, where progress has been made in legislative alignment but less progress in effective enforcement of EU laws and standards (MEMO, 2005: 2). While in 2006, a reverse trend was notice with the implementing capacity to had been improved while in terms of legislative alignment in most areas only some progress had been achieved (MEMO, 2006: 2). Croatia improved its ability in 2007 to take on the obligations of EU membership, progress has been both in terms of legislative alignment and also implementation, the challenge remained reaching full alignment and implementation of EU laws and standards (MEMO, 2007: 2). In 2008, Croatia continued progress in improving its ability to take on the obligations of membership and meeting EU requirements at a steady pace (MEMO, 2008: 2).

**Figure 5:** Adoption, Implementation and Europeanization in Croatia



Croatia had a very good start, with significant progress in adoption EU law but that come later to be only a persistence progress. The implementation also has reached to progress having started from some progress. The

Europeanization of Croatia has been smooth, moving from some progress to progress in the last years.


**Kosovo:** Some real progress and commitment to reforms have been evidenced in then-Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) including Kosovo although more efforts should have been done in ‘deepening structural reforms throughout the FRY - moving from the adoption to the implementation stage of reforms (COM, 2002: 20). In 2003, many of the issues regarding Kosovo were evaluated to be the same as other parts of then-FRY were some progress was notice in EU-compatible reforms but greater responsibility for their implementation was needed (COM, 2003: 34). During 2004

**Table 5:** Kosovo's performance in adoption and implementation of Acquis

|        | Years | Adoption           | Implementation   |
|--------|-------|--------------------|------------------|
| Kosovo | 2002  | Some progress      | No progress      |
|        | 2003  | Some progress      | Little progress  |
|        | 2004  | Progress           | Progress         |
|        | 2005  | Some Progress      | Progress         |
|        | 2006  | Some progress      | Limited progress |
|        | 2007  | (Further) progress | Little progress  |
|        | 2008  | Some progress      | Little progress  |

‘progress has taken place in setting Kosovo’s European perspective through the implementation of the Stabilization and Association process Tracking Mechanism (STM)’ and work has been done, through commission support, on reforms compatible with EU standards (COM, 2004: 38).

**Figure 6:** Adoption, Implementation and Europeanization in Kosovo



Progress continued in 2005 in implementing European standards while further efforts were needed to many other reforms (MEMO, 2005: 3). Kosovo made only ‘some progress towards approximate its legislation and policies with European

standards’ during 2006 and ‘limited progress... in the effective implementation and enforcement of legislation passed’ (MEMO, 2006: 6). In 2007, Kosovo made ‘further progress in approximating its legislation and policies with European standards’ however still implementation and enforcement of legislation remained poor (MEMO, 2007: 6). Only ‘some progress in approximating its legislation and policies with European standards’ had been made during 2008 and with still persistent little progress on the effective implementation and enforcement of legislation (MEMO, 2008: 6). In Kosovo the progress of adopting EU laws have oscillated between some progress to progress, while implementation noticed a gradual progress (from no progress to progress) in the beginning and in the following years remained to only some progress. This trend can be said also for Europeanization.

Although **Macedonia** sign a SAA with EU in April 2001 still ‘the political crisis slowed down the process of institutional and legislative change’ but what remained more problematic for the country in 2002 was the implementation of obligations deriving from SAA (COM, 2002: 22). The reforms needed to be accelerated in 2003 in order to ‘ensure that all obligations arising out of the Interim Agreement [were] fully complied with and that the preparatory works needed for the implementation of the full SAA [were]


**Table 6:** Macedonia's performance in adoption and implementation of Acquis

|           | Years | Adoption             | Implementation  |
|-----------|-------|----------------------|-----------------|
| Macedonia | 2002  | Little progress      | Little progress |
|           | 2003  | Little progress      | Little progress |
|           | 2004  | Little Progress      | Little progress |
|           | 2005  | Significant Progress | Little progress |
|           | 2006  | Some progress        | Little progress |
|           | 2007  | Progress             | Little progress |
|           | 2008  | Good progress        | Little progress |

completed’ (COM, 2003: 31-32). Beside the recommendations, even in 2004, the reform process in many areas was in its infancy and further efforts were needed to sustain reforms and convert them into concrete changes and expected outcomes (COM, 2004: 36). In 2005, Macedonia ‘made significant efforts to align its legislation with the *acquis*’ however major challenges in implementing and effectively enforcing the legislation still remained (COM,

2005: 5). During 2006 only some progress was done on new legislation and the establishment of new institutions while the country still faced major challenges in implementation issues (MEMO, 2006: 3). Macedonia ‘made further efforts to improve its ability to assume the obligations of membership’ in 2007 while ‘still face[d] major shortcomings in implementing and effectively enforcing legislation’ (MEMO, 2007: 3). A step forward was done on 2008 both in making a ‘good progress in legislative alignment with the EU’s legal order in a significant number of areas’ and in improving implementation although still having shortcoming (MEMO, 2008: 4).

**Figure 7:** Adoption, Implementation and Europeanization in Macedonia



Macedonia, from the beginning had some progress in adopting EU laws, but after its performance was mix, achieving significant performance then back to some progress and progress to achieve at the end significant progress in

adopting EU laws. Although the evaluation of the year (2005) may be biased, as the (good) evaluation of that year could have influence the candidacy of Macedonia, it can be seen from the following years that Macedonia’s progress was progressively better. The same thing cannot be said for Macedonia’s implementation records which seem problematic and remain constantly low throughout all the period with only some progress. The Europeanization trend resembles that of implementation.


In **Montenegro**, as part of then-Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), strong commitment to reform and some real progress was noticed but what remains as a challenge was the moving from the adoption to the implementation stage of reforms (COM, 2002: 20). For the year 2003, 2004 the commission address the report as State Union without making any distinction, only in 2005 the report addresses to both the State Union and its constituent Republics, although the evaluation is the same. In 2006, after Montenegrin independence, Commission evaluated the countries’ performance separately where ‘some progress in approximating legislation and policies with European standards’ and further advancement in strengthening its administrative capacity particularly related to EU integration matters were noticed (MEMO, 2006: 4), while in 2007 the country ‘made some progress in alignment with European standards and in strengthening its administrative capacity, leading to the signature

**Table 7:** Montenegro’s performance in adoption and implementation of Acquis

|            | Years                                    | Adoption         | Implementation |
|------------|--|------------------|----------------|
|            | 2002 – 2005<br>See Serbia and Montenegro |                  |                |
| Montenegro | 2006                                     | Some progress    | Progress       |
|            | 2007                                     | Some progress    | Some progress  |
|            | 2008                                     | Further progress | Some progress  |

of the SAA with the EU' (MEMO, 2007: 3). Montenegro in 2008 'made further progress in alignment with European standards' and the Interim Agreement was smoothly implemented (MEMO, 2008: 2).

**Figure 8:** Adoption, Implementation and Europeanization in Montenegro



Montenegro had some progress in EU law adopting with few cases of progress while implementation being only to some progress, reaching progress only in 2006. Europeanization had a tendency towards keeping constantly at

only some improvements.

**Serbia**, as part of then-Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), was evaluated to have made


**Table 8:** Serbia's performance in adoption and implementation of Acquis

| Years | Adoption      | Implementation  |
|-------|---------------|-----------------|
| 2002  | Some progress | Little progress |
| 2003  | Some progress | Some progress   |
| 2004  | Some progress | Little progress |
| 2005  | Progress      | Little progress |
| 2006  | Good progress | Progress        |
| 2007  | Progress      | Good progress   |
| 2008  | Some progress | Good progress   |

some real progress in reforms but poorly performing on the implementation stage of reforms (COM, 2002: 20). Some progress has been made but 'the state must accelerate the pace of reform and improve the implementation of legislation if it is to fulfill its potential' (COM, 2003: 33). Some progress continued on the European reform agenda in 2004 but the Feasibility Report was postponed as issue of an Action Plan how to implement (and other key issues) remained unsolved (COM, 2004: 37). There was progress in reforms in 2005 but not enough efforts to improve legislative and administrative capacities with a view to fulfill their future SAA obligations (MEMO, 2005: 4). In 2006, 'Serbia made good progress in approximating its legislation and policies in most areas... [and] has further strengthened its administrative capacity to be able to implement the SAA properly' (MEMO, 2006: 5). Progress in reforms continued in 2007 and what was more important was the good administrative capacity Serbia achieved, competent to implement any obligation from a future SAA (MEMO, 2007: 5). In many areas there had been only little progress in legislative output on European standards while implementation capacity remained still its strongest point (MEMO, 2008: 5).

Serbia has started with some progress in law adaptation, achieving its pick gradually to significant progress in 2006 and then coming back again gradually to only some progress. While implementation has a gradual but significant improvement starting from some progress during 2002-2005, then progress and lately achieving significant progress.

Figure 9: Adoption, Implementation and Europeanization in Serbia




Europeanization, in fact achieved some progress in 2006-2007, after the constant low values of only some progress to come back again to these values.

*The performance of the region as a whole*

If we refer to the qualitative data above, some important conclusions can be drawn regarding the region taken as a whole. The adoption mode in the region has some progress in the first years and then after 2004, the year of completion of the enlargement of the CEEC countries, gets a better value towards achieving progress. This trend cannot be noticed in implementation, which throughout the years remains in only some progress values. If taken the average values, adoption fares better than implementation only till 2004, after this year the region seems to receive same values for achievements in adoption and implementation.

Figure 10: Europeanization of WB (Mode score)



Note: Europeanization (min) mode is calculated through taking the modes of Europeanization (the minimum value of adoption and implementation) of each country in a specific year; while *Adopt and Impl* mode is calculated as the mode of all adoption and implementation values (separately) of all countries in a specific year.

Taking the ‘mode’ (the most frequent value in the data) value of both the adoption and implementation separately and together as Europeanization measure we can notice that the most frequent pattern of achievement in Europeanization in a yearly base is only some progress, a pattern shown throughout the years. Only the year 2007 could be considered as a




year were the region as a whole made better progress in adoption and implementation (taken together) of EU acquis. This trend can be noticed even if we take the average where the values stay near by the some progress evaluation. Another conclusion by taking the average is that Europeanization is very slow but still tending to be very slowly improving.

The qualitative data of the Commission confirms two important conclusions:

- 1) Firstly, if we refer to the performance of WB countries in adopting and implementation of the EU standards or acquis there has been some Europeanization in the region with the tendency of slowly improving further. The data confirm that the entire process of Europeanization (adoption and implementation) is very slow and with only some progress. But beside the slow speed of adopting and implementing at which the process of Europeanization in WB proceeds, some progress can be clearly noticed given that each year some progress is achieved. The Europeanization of the region has only some progress, a persistence trend which if taken in average is very slow but still with a tendency of improvement.
- 2) And secondly, there is significant variance in the level of performance among the potential member states. The trend of adoption and implementation records is quite different from country to country and has its ups and downs through the years. Given that the results are quit diverse among the WB countries the next question will be to see what factors, both at the EU and domestic level, influence adoption and implementation.

**Figure 11:** Europeanization of the WB (average score)



Note: Europeanization (min) average is calculated through taking the average of Europeanization (the minimum value of adoption and implementation) of each country in a specific year. While *Adopt and Impl* average is calculated as the average of all adoption and implementation values of all countries in a specific year.

Given that Europeanization, as adoption and implementation, can be notice in the region and that significance variance regarding Europeanization exists despite that those countries are under the same process it is important to see what conditions at both external and domestic level may have influence Europeanization in the potential member states or what combinations of factors bring about progress in adopting and implementing the acquis.

# MODELING OF EUROPEANIZATION IN POTENTIAL MEMBER STATES

## MECHANISM(S), EXPLANATORY CONDITIONS AND OUTCOME(S)

Having the conceptual clarifications in mind and describing the process of Europeanization the next step is to see what causal explanations of the Europeanization phenomena are available. Europeanization being not a theory but a process implies above all that we need to search for mechanism(s) since ‘processes are frequently occurring combinations or sequences of mechanisms’ (Tilly & Goodin, 2006: 15). The mechanism-based explanations are better compared to other type of explanations because causal mechanisms provide more detailed and in a sense more fundamental explanations than general laws do (George & Bennett, 2005: 141). And since no theory of Europeanization exist, what we are left here are at best some models that help us capture the full picture of Europeanization dynamics. Employing a mechanism-based strategy we can make use of a maximalist Europeanization approach identifying the plurality of mechanisms at work. Another point to be stressed here is that a mechanism-based approach towards Europeanization put the emphasis on the ‘how’ question by focusing on causes of Europeanization, that is we are looking at *causal mechanisms* not at *causal effects* of Europeanization. Speaking for the mechanisms at work we acknowledge the interactive link between the ‘domestic’ and the ‘European’ level. So there is no need for independent variable, we can consider the causal factors as key variables. Focusing on the causal chains or mechanisms of Europeanization offers several other advantages: firstly, a more differentiated analytical focus on distinctive causes or channels of Europeanization would help to reduce the high degree of ambiguity with regard to specification and operationalization of dependent and independent variables; Secondly, we are more precise and focused on explanations that account for specific and not for every kind of Europeanization processes; Thirdly the mechanism approach makes possible identifying the scope of particular mechanisms and the specific characteristics of the process and the context that are likely to make particular mechanisms relevant; Fourthly, it link Europeanization studies to the broader scientific debate and general theories. (Knill, 2008)

Thus in this chapter I explore the logic of action, causal mechanisms and conditions as well as the expected outcomes of Europeanization

## ON THE LOGICS AND MECHANISMS OF EUROPEANIZATION

### Logics of Europeanization

How Europeanization scholars have theorize the domestic changes (adoption and implementation) to European integration (European enlargement in the case of potential member states)? To answer this fundamental question there is not a simplifying assumption that one can do and at the same time pretend to have captured the all complexity of how

Europeanization brings about change, for this reasons 'Europeanization scholars have reverted almost without exception to the broad spectrum of theories that fall under the umbrella of the so-called 'new institutionalism' (Vink & Graziano, 2007: 12-13). In fact, three main logics of change are usually distinguished when applying new institutionalist approach into Europeanization research. Most of the Europeanization research follows March and Olsen's (1989) two institutional logics, those of consequentiality and of appropriateness (e.g. Börzel & Risse, 2003, and Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). Others may also distinguish a third historical strand of new institutionalism that points more directly at the temporal dynamics of change (Hall & Taylor, 1996; see also Bulmer, 2007). Each of the three logics of new institutionalism has different epistemological and ontological views and in addition they interpret the role of institutions in Europeanization differently. Yet, although the three logics have been the main classification of how 'Europe' could matter in domestic transformation they still do not have the same weight. The first and the most influential of all the variants have been *the logic of consequentialism* drawing from the rational choice institutionalism focusing on those aspects that are instrumental and based on strategic calculation. As of the logic of consequentiality 'Europe' affects the opportunities and constraints of actors through redistribution of resources within institutions bringing so the differential empowerment of domestic actors (Börzel & Risse, 2003). The effect of such a logic, being rather change or not, will depend on the anticipated consequences and prior preferences. In the candidate countries, the rationalist logic has clearly attracted the most scholarly attention focusing on the use of conditionality. The second logic derives from a sociological/constructivist institutionalism, and has been referred to as *the logic of appropriateness*. As of such logic 'Europe', through socialization and learning, affects ideas and norms by getting them internalized in domestic politics. The consequence of such logic, still bringing change or not, will depend on the norm entrepreneurs and the nature of political culture (Börzel & Risse, 2003). Both of the logics are based on the presupposition that institutions matter what they differ is *how* do institutions matter. This is related to their understanding of institutions where in the logic of appropriateness we have a 'thick' understanding of institutions (change of preferences) while in the logic of consequentialism we have a 'thin' understanding of institutions (strategically realizing their preferences) (Vink, 2002: 11). The core difference between these logics is their exclusive focus on either interest or ideas. The third variant draws from Historical institutionalism and follows the *logic of path dependency* meaning that the current institutions depend not only on present conditions but also on the historical path of institutional development. The logic of path dependence implies the existence of certain specific institutional development path which has been shaped by historical events and experiences, that is legacies of the past. Its main argument claims inertia where the existing institutional paths are resistant to change. As of such logic 'Europe' and its consequences, change or not, will greatly depend on how consolidated the domestic situation is. The logic of path dependency focuses on the effects of previous 'institutions' (legacies) over time. The role of time and its different facets (time, timing and tempo) are important as they give Europeanization research the temporal dimension of domestic adjustment processes to the EU (Bulmer, 2007: 50). A historical institutionalist argument in Europeanization literature of the member-state has been the goodness-of-fit hypothesis. Many of the scholars

see logic of consequentialism and the logic of appropriateness not as contradictory logics but rather as complementary to each other (e.g. March & Olsen, 1989; Börzel & Risse, 2001). Furthermore, *the logic of path dependency* does not seem to be different or contradict with the previous two logics, it only takes time seriously.<sup>36</sup> These logics need not be mutually exclusive but may be seen as part of a *synthetic* theoretical framework for Europeanization research. Scholars have already modeled these logics rather as occurring simultaneously (Börzel & Risse, 2001) or as specific phase (alternative explanations of the second phase of the Europeanization process) (Caporaso, 2007) or even as alternative models (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). So the way ahead lies in integrating these logics on the model rather than choosing among them. Europeanization being a complex process needs a synthetic investigation of conditions deriving from the three logics of new institutionalism to see which of them or which of the combinations matters in a significant way.

### **On the mechanisms of Europeanization**

The literature on the mechanisms of Europeanization is not vacant. A number of scholars have tried to put emphases on what mechanisms could work on Europeanization. On the member states, Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999; 2002) have presented three mechanisms which vary with policy issues (based on the EU regulatory policies of compliance, competition and communication) and type of integration they represent (positive, negative and framing integration). Beside mechanisms at member states, other scholars have recently presented also mechanisms working in the Europeanization process of candidate countries. Bauer *et al.* (2007) based on Knill and Lehmkuhl policy-analytical model and distinguishing between the three EU governance modes (compliance, competition, and communication) analyzes domestic change in candidate countries. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005a) distinguish mechanisms of Europeanization according to different logics of actions (logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness) and the actors driving the process (EU-driven or Candidate countries- driven). Grabbe (2001, 2003, 2006) identifies five types of Europeanization mechanisms: gate-keeping (the access to negotiations and further stages in the accession process); benchmarking and monitoring; provision of legislative and institutional templates (models); transfer of aid and technical assistance (Money); advice and twinning.

There are some common elements to differentiate among these mechanisms. The first way to distinguish these mechanisms is through analyzing along two dimensions if they are agency-centered concentrated on institutional elements or if they are actor-centered and concentrate on their preferences or beliefs. In the institution-based dimension the institutions (commonly viewed as the ‘rules of the game’ that structure decision-making processes) determine outcome(s) of Europeanization process while in the preference-based dimension, it is predominately the actors preferences or belief that shape the outcome. In the candidate countries institutional adaptation, however, has been only a part of the EU’s impact as

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<sup>36</sup> According to Hall and Taylor (1996: 939), ‘historical institutionalisms tend [...] to conceptualize relations between institutions and individual behavior in relatively large terms’ and differ from rational or constructivist institutionalism only in its diachronic optic not in its presuppositions.

cognitive shifts could also be seen at work across the CEE region (Papadimitriou & Phinnemore, 2003: 622). All mechanisms of domestic impact can also be differentiated according to the dominant logic of action they follow where the consequentiality logic is divided into mechanisms of material and political influence while the appropriateness logic into cognitive and normative dimensions (Schimmelfennig, 2002a: 11). These mechanisms range from soft (assistance provision) to hard (gate-keeping) measure and involve different pressures for reform. The harder measure relate to Europeanization as a process of conditionality and pressure while in the contrary the softer measure relate to Europeanization as a process of framing and socialization . They can be further classified as direct or indirect mechanism of Europeanization, in particular on changing opportunity structures and the framing of discourse. The ‘Enlargement Governance’ can affect the target government either directly through intergovernmental bargaining or indirectly through the differential empowerment of domestic actors and framing of beliefs.

Based on the above distinctions I re-arranged the mechanisms discussed by scholars into two main broad mechanisms through which Europe can influence potential member states. In simple term, I consider the mechanisms in those cases in which domestic states would not have changed if it had not been for a particular action of EU, rather direct, less direct or indirect.<sup>37</sup> In this perspective, two main different mechanisms can be identified. From a rationalist perspective, change is driven through hard mechanisms of well prescribe institutional model and by rational actors calculating the costs and benefits of rule adaption in the light of external incentives as provided by conditionality. On the other hand, from a constructivists/sociological perspective change is driven through soft mechanisms of normative persuasion changing actors’ preferences or cognitive logic of changing domestic actors beliefs. As such, I distinguish between *Europeanization through conditionality* and *Europeanization through socialization* as the main mechanism of Europeanization in the potential member states countries. Distinguishing between this two main mechanism is also closer to the Europeanization literature in the member state since ‘conditionality and normative pressure are thus similar to enforcement and managerial explanations of compliance’ (Kelley, 2004: 9). As such, both ‘pressure’ and ‘usage’<sup>38</sup> (Radaelli, 2004: 11) can be the mechanisms at work in the Europeanization of potential member states. The domestic change of potential member state countries is possible because EU exerts not only *leverage* (conditionality) but it also promotes *linkage* (intense socialization of political and administrative elites) through enlargement instruments.

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<sup>37</sup> If change has not been for a particular action of EU then we need to include also the persistence mechanism focusing on historical and cultural explanations of a path-dependence logic. Although it is not a distinct Europeanization mechanism, since it does relate to any EU action but rather domestic countries, its conditions will be considered in domestic level.

<sup>38</sup> *Pressure* has been related to rationalist argumentations while *usage* is a sociological argumentation, see Jacquot & Woll, 2003.

### ***Europeanization through conditionality***

The first and most important mechanism of the EU's influence has been *Europeanization through conditionality*<sup>39</sup>. The use of conditionality has been a prominent strategy of the EU to influence potential member states. EU set the adaption of its rules as conditions that potential member states have to fulfill in order to receive membership status. The domestic actors evaluate the material threats and promises of EU and respond mainly with institutional adaptation. Ambition to achieve full membership is the rationality underlying candidates' reactions to EU compliance since EU will grant the reward (full membership) only if the applicant fully complies with its rules. The EU used conditionality as a means of 'reinforcement by reward', i.e. the EU withheld the reward if the accession country failed to comply with its conditions, but did not intervene either coercively or supportively to change the cost-benefit assessment of the target government by inflicting extra costs ('reinforcement by punishment') or offering unconditional assistance ('reinforcement by support') (Börzel *et al.*, 2005:10; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005a: 11).

Such mechanisms of Europeanization may trigger domestic change through concrete prescribed institutional requirements with which potential member states must comply, in this way (potential) member states have only limited institutional discretion when deciding on the concrete arrangements in order to comply with European requirements (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 1999: 1; 2002: 257-258, parenthesis added). Compliance-based policies have an obligatory nature but still EU must be able to enforce its rules and have tools at its disposal. Monitoring and sanctions are two central instruments of reinforcement (Tallberg, 2002: 617) and potential member states must comply in order to avoid sanctions of not getting financial aid and of not getting membership status. EU through the intergovernmental channel directly influences governments and policy-makers in candidate countries.

### ***Europeanization through socialization***

An alternative mechanism to affect domestic change has been *Europeanization through socialization*. Differently from Europeanization through conditionality, the EU's domestic impact results from a process of socialization in which domestic actors internalize EU norms that they regard as legitimate. Through socialization process, candidate countries come to consider the rules of EU through a logic of appropriateness (either normative or cognitive mode) as having an intrinsic value, regardless of the instrumentally rational action of material incentives for adopting them. EU does not link any concrete incentive (as in the case of Europeanization through conditionality) but rely solely on the use of norms to persuade and frame actors in order to make them change their policies. Europeanization through socialization comes through societal and transnational channels. The influence of EU is indirect through changes of either preferences or beliefs of domestic actors.

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<sup>39</sup> It is important to clearly distinguish between 'conditionality' as a strategy used by the EU, and 'conditionality' as an explanatory model or ideal-typical mechanism of EU influence. The latter refers to 'rationalist institutionalist' approach or the 'external incentives' model with clearly defined conditions... (Sedelmeier, 2006: 19).

Firstly, EU can affect the target government not directly but through the differential empowerment of domestic actors, changing the domestic opportunity structure (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004: 664; 2005a: 11). *Europeanization through socialization by changing domestic opportunity structures* is somewhat more implicitly, since European legislation affect domestic arrangements indirectly by altering the domestic rules of the game and hence the distribution of power and resources between domestic actors in an absence of a European model (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 1999: 1; 2002: 258). Domestic structures of candidate countries may be changed through market-related conditionality and (at least partly) involvement in the EU common market, thus the impact of the EU is less direct and works through market pressures rather than institutional sanctions (Bauer *et al.*, 2007: 413). Secondly, the other indirect mechanism is the *Europeanization through socialization by framing domestic beliefs and expectations* and refers to the cognitive impact of European integration. In its weakest form European policy neither prescribes concrete institutional requirements nor modifies the institutional context for strategic interaction, but by changing domestic beliefs may, in turn, affect strategies and preferences of domestic actors and potentially leading to corresponding institutional adaptations (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 1999: 2; 2002: 258). EU aims to promote mutual learning and voluntary information exchange in EU-sponsored networks (such as numerous associations, partnership agreements and other platforms) by applying a communicative governance approach; Candidate countries are embedded tightly in the European network, through accession negotiations, where an illustrative example of the impact of communication-based measures on candidate countries is the twinning project launched by the EU (Bauer *et al.*, 2007: 416). Twinning is aimed at helping candidate countries to adapt their administrative and democratic institutions in complying with membership requirements by learning from member state experiences of framing the legislation and building the organizational capacity necessary to implement the *acquis* (Grabbe, 2001: 1024). Rather than the direct sanctions of the EU or the indirect sanctions of the market, it is the legitimacy of policy models that drives Europeanization.

**Table 9:** Mechanism of Europeanization in Potential Member States

|                 | <i>Europeanization through conditionality</i> | <i>Europeanization through socialization</i>    |  |
|-----------------|---|---|--|
|                 | Rationalist                                   | Constructivist/Sociological                     |  |
| Logic of action | Bargaining mode                               | Normative mode                                  | Cognitive mode                                   |
|                 | Incentives                                    | Normative power                                 | Cognitive power                                  |
| Processes       | Enforcement                                   | Empowerment                                     | Framing  |
| Channels        | Direct  | Less direct                                     | Indirect   |
|                 | Intergovernmental                             | Social and transnational                        |  |
| Focus           | Institutional-based                           | Actor-based                                     |  |
|                 |   | Preferences                                     | Beliefs  |
| EU modes        | <i>Compliance (positive integration)</i>      | <i>Competition-based (negative integration)</i> | <i>Communication-based (framing integration)</i> |
|                 | Institutional model                           | No model  | Model  |

## ON THE KEY EXPLANATORY VARIABLES OF EUROPEANIZATION

One of the central themes of the Europeanization literature is how we can explain the effects of European integration being them rather on the member or potential member states. Most of the literature sustain that in order to understand the impact from European integration, it is important that conditions at both the European-level and the domestic-level are consider important in explaining Europeanization process. Europeanization is a two-way process where although the European dimension is important, there are also factors of domestic dimension where country-driven characteristics remain important in explaining what happens (Wallace, 2000b: 157).

### Is ‘misfit’ a necessary explanatory precondition for change?

The ‘misfit’ as a variable of explaining Europeanization is linked to the ‘goodness of fit’ hypothesis first introduced into the Risse *et al.* (2001) simple chain model and latter on the more elaborated model by Börzel & Risse (2003). Speaking of misfit means that there is ‘incompatibility of EU-level and domestic-level processes, policies, institutions’ (Börzel & Risse, 2003). The misfit is nothing but the degree of compatibility between domestic and European institutions and/or policies (Radaelli, 2000), in more plain English, the mismatch between European and the domestic situation. Considering the ‘goodness of fit’ scholars have argued that the easy of adaptation to EU requirements will depend on the degree to which these requirements fit existing domestic policies and institutions. The adaptation to EU requirements will be greater in cases where the domestic policies and institutions fit with EU requirements and poorer in cases where the domestic policies and institutions (greatly) misfit with EU requirements since in the second case they require major shifts. The question rests on how we can explain adaptation in cases where there is a great degree of misfit. Börzel & Risse argue that the lower the compatibility between European and domestic processes, policies, and institutions, the higher the adaptational pressure (2003: 61). The argument here is that if a degree of misfit (incompatibility) between the European and domestic level exist then this on its own will create adaptation pressures where the greater the misfit, the greater the adaptational pressure will be. In the Börzel and Risse model the misfit is considered to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for domestic change to take place (2003: 58).

The problem with the ‘misfit’ as an explanatory variable rests on a number of issues which have been discussed heavily in the Europeanization literature. First of all, the ‘goodness of fit’ lacks conceptual strength as it is an essentially apolitical concept (Mastenbroek & Kaeding, 2006: 337). Secondly, various empirical studies considering the goodness of fit hypothesis have turned out to be rather disappointing, demonstrating that the ‘misfit’ as an explanatory variable is rarely detected in empirical findings.<sup>40</sup> Having said this, Mastenbroek & Kaeding have argued that ‘the hypothesis is logically flawed, in that the alleged relationship between fit and the ease of adaptation is spurious’ (2006: 332). For a cause to be

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<sup>40</sup> For a synthesis of some studies that showed that a good fit is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for smooth compliance see Mastenbroek, 2005: 1109-1110 and for a criticism of misfit see Mastenbroek & Kaeding, 2006.



a necessary condition (and not sufficient condition) we have to see if all the instances where the outcome is present have also the cause (Ragin, 1989). In the case of the goodness of fit hypothesis, it implies that if an outcome (change) is present but the cause, here misfit, is absent (that is there is a fit instead of a misfit) then the hypothesis of the necessity misfit does not hold. Mastenbroek and Kaeding argue that the studies reporting good results of misfit as a necessary condition for domestic change comes from selection bias as they only study cases of misfit making logically impossible the rejection of the goodness of fit as a necessary condition (2006: 339).<sup>41</sup> Thirdly, the problem with the misfit hypothesis rests also on the problem of operationalization and measuring the misfit. Beside some tries<sup>42</sup> Radaelli (2004: 7) will argue against the degree of fit as to him it is discursively and socially constructed and cannot be measurable with objective standards. Fourthly, 'the goodness of fit' hypothesis does not hold especially in the potential member state of the Western Balkans countries for two major reasons. First of all, the goodness of fit hypothesis is rather statistic in nature and too deterministic since it assumes that domestic actors want to maintain the status quo (Mastenbroek, 2005: 1110, Mastenbroek & Kaeding, 2006: 332). Maintaining the 'status quo' was an unrealistic assumption in the case of the potential member state countries, Western Balkans countries especially, for the simple fact that these countries are undergoing processes of transformations and are more open to changes than perhaps the member-states may be. Secondly, it seems not plausible to assume that the pressure for adaption on non-member countries is determined by the degree of 'misfit' since the lower the 'goodness of fit', between EU and the domestic policies and institutions, the fewer the institutional ties and as a consequence the lower the adaptation pressure.<sup>43</sup>

All in all, the misfit hypothesis lacks empirical and conceptual strength. These shortcomings make it more reasonable to drop the misfit variable altogether and directly focus on the domestic actors regarding a particular EU requirement (Mastenbroek & Kaeding, 2006: 339). As such the easy of domestic change will depend firstly on the content of EU requirements and the institutional ties between EU and potential member states which may put adaptational

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<sup>41</sup> To some extent, the good explanatory value stems from selection bias. If a misfit is indeed a necessary condition for domestic change, one would expect not to find well-fitting pieces of EU law that are followed by domestic change. However, the studies that report good results only study on cases of misfit, on this basis, it is logically impossible to reject the goodness of fit as a necessary condition (Mastenbroek & Kaeding, 2006: 339).

<sup>42</sup> E.g. Risse *et al.* (2001: 7) and Börzel & Risse (2003: 60-63) misfit can be identified rather as *policy misfit* (of rules and regulations between EU and domestic policies) and as *institutional misfit* (challenging domestic rules and procedures and the collective understanding attached to them). Falkner tries to establish an aggregation of different sub-categories of the degree of policy and politics/polity misfit i.e. the economic consequences, as opposed to e.g., the citizenship dimension, of a required reform for the addressees on all levels' (Falkner, 2003:4).

<sup>43</sup> The argument is brought up by Schimmelfennig 'It is plausible to assume that the pressure for adoption on nonmember countries is not only determined by the degree of 'misfit' between international and domestic norms and institutions but also by the density of their institutional ties with the international organization (that is stage of integration with EU). It even seems that the lower the 'goodness of fit' the fewer the institutional ties and the lower the adaptation pressure (e.g. Belarus)' (2002: 5).

pressure, and secondly on the reactions of the domestic actors. Seen this way, we do not underestimate the core assumption of the misfit hypothesis deriving from historical institutionalism underlining the rigidity of institutional arrangements. As such the goodness of fit can be more useful if presented as a path dependency argument which highlights the possible resistance to domestic change as result of past legacies.

On the bases of the argumentations above, considering that the goodness of fit is neither necessary nor sufficient condition for domestic change, it is proposed that we better look at the nature of European policies combined with the variance in domestic constellations in order to account for the differential impact of Europeanization (Mastenbroek, 2005: 1111).

### **Exogenous, European-level conditions**

Europeanization as a domestic impact is being explained by European integration (integration-related) variables. The domestic impact of European-level institutions is the most common and widely spread use of Europeanization in research purposes and it explains how domestic institutions respond and deal with pressures stemming from the European level (Olsen, 2002: 932). In the potential member states, EU already exerts a considerable adaptation pressure during the association and accession negotiations. The adaptation pressure to candidate countries coming from EU is in form of membership conditionality. The more credible membership incentives is given to a country the more likely it is that it align to EU requirements. Thus, exogenous conditions in the case of the candidate countries are mostly related to EU requirements (Copenhagen criteria and EU *acquis communautaire*) and to certain extend to other European policy paradigms and ideas (forms of socialization processes). The EU requirements prescribe concrete and direct institutional requirements with which potential member states must comply (vertical Europeanization). But other more voluntary models may be at the disposal of the candidate countries rather from EU itself or member states (horizontal Europeanization). For example Vachudova (2005) makes a distinction of active (EU requirements deliberate through pre-accession process) and passive (attractive/contagion models) EU leverage. When studying Europeanization it is important to consider both aspects (the vertical and horizontal) since ‘Europeanization is more than just EU-ization (requirements coming from Brussels)’ (Vink, 2002: 6).

At the European-level, the most important EU instrument for inducing reforms in the aspiring candidate countries has been conditionality. In the European Union, conditionality developed from a minor policy tool used in a limited way in agreements with third countries and development assistance, to become the main pillar of EU enlargement governance and a successful tool of EU foreign policy (Smith, 2003). The EU enlargement conditionality is an exchange between the EU and a candidate country in which the EU offers the candidate a realistic prospect of EU membership, if the candidate implements a wide range of EU driven domestic reforms (Steunenberg & Dimitrova, 2005: 3). The political, economical and the *acquis* requirements once included in the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ have been aiming at far-reaching reforms in the potential member state.

Many of the studies on the previous candidate countries speak of such a ‘transformative power’ that EU exerted through conditionality on the CEEs countries to bring them to EU

standards. Hence, conditionality has been found to be both necessary and sufficient to induce policy change in applicant countries in most of the policies areas cases (see e.g. Grabbe 2001, Dimitrova 2002, Kelley 2004a, 2004b; Schimmelfennig *et al.*, 2003, 2006).

***Key conditions deriving from the rationalist perspective (Europeanization through conditionality)***

Key conditions at the European level deriving from the rationalist perspective (Europeanization through conditionality) have been summarized by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier as the determinacy of conditions, the size and speed of rewards, the credibility of threats and promises, and the size of adaption costs (2005a: 10-17). The size and speed of rewards regards the full membership in EU while credibility regards the realistic chance of gaining the EU membership. Both these conditions in the potential member states can be assumed to be constant during the pre-accession stage and not vary. For all potential member states the *maximum reward* of prospective membership is gained and its *credibility is high*. So determinacy of condition and the size of adaptation cost remain the key conditions at European level.<sup>44</sup>

Determinacy means that the candidates need to know what exactly they need to do, it refers both to the clarity and the formality of rule (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005a: 12; 2004: 664). Beside the clarity and the formality of rules, the density of the conditions matters. Determinacy and density help the target governments to know exactly what they have to do. If EU requirements are formal, clear and dense then the potential member states cannot misinterpret or avoid compliance. A number of studies have considered the determinacy of EU conditionality as an important factor influencing Europeanization. Hughes *et al.* argues that it is

‘important to recognize that the pattern of detail [clarity of the *acquis*] is not uniform but is, in fact, highly uneven both across and within policy areas’ and as a result ‘where the detail in the *acquis* is ‘thick’ on a particular policy issue, we can reasonably expect it to provide strong leverage for the Commission to achieve particular outcomes in its interactions with the CEECs, but where the *acquis* is ‘thin’ we should expect the explicit leverage, and thus the formal conditionality and compliance, to be weak’ (2004: 526, 2004: 26).

Jacoby argue that in fields where the EU *acquis* density was low it provide more scope for choosing or ignoring prevailing models (2004: 16). So the prediction is that only when the *acquis* is determinate (clear and formal) and dense (‘thick’) we can expect it to provide a strong leverage for compliance.

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<sup>44</sup> These arguments are also considered by Schwellnus *et al.* who argue that: ‘*External incentives*: Before accession, the EU gives candidate states positive incentives for compliance with conditionality in the form of a membership perspective. According to the external incentives model, rule adoption depends on the following external conditions: the size of the reward, the credibility of delivering or withholding the reward, the strength of conditionality, and the determinacy of conditions. For the countries and the pre-accession time-period covered in this analysis we assume that both the credibility of EU conditionality and the size of the most important reward – EU membership – were always high. This leaves the strength of conditionality and the determinacy of conditions as the central external factors to determine the likelihood of rule adoption.’ (2009: 7).

Alignment with the *acquis* generally creates high financial and administrative costs for the CEECs (Sedelmeier, 2008: 808). In order to overcome such domestic cost sufficient financial or personnel resources are crucial for efficient implementation' (Falkner *et al.*, 2004: 461). The more financial resources are allocated by EU in domestic countries the better it will be to overcome possible domestic costs of aligning with EU policies.

### ***Key conditions deriving from the constructivist perspective (Europeanization through Socialization)***

The most important factor for rule adaptation from the constructivist/sociological perspective at European level regarding EU conditions is the legitimacy these rules have, making so domestic actors comply. The EU itself is seen as legitimate to candidate countries but still the accession process could create a problem of legitimacy to specific issues since candidate countries have to accept the entire of the *acquis* and sometimes even more condition, having more burden than the member states do. Jacoby distinguish between high and low 'density of rule' as an important factor shaping EU impact in CEEC countries arguing that low density of EU demand increases legitimacy and allows domestic actors 'to engage in relatively unpressured learning (2004: 10). If the policy area is one in which the EU has a relatively small body of legislation then the job of taking on these fairly modest *acquis* is easy. Legitimacy in the WB is high. Recent research has shown that 'ultimately, it is Europe's norms and values which stands as the common denominator around which a new collective identity of the Western Balkans has begun to crystallize (Bechev, 2006: 22).

Although there is a widespread agreement in the Europeanization literature of the candidate countries that a credible conditional EU membership perspective is indeed a necessary condition for the EU to bring about substantial domestic change it still need to be pointed that the credible accession conditionality, however, is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition of EU success, that is why it has to be accompanied by favorable domestic conditions (Schimmelfennig, 2008: 919-920). Considering simply the European integration-related conditions as the only explanatory variable for changes in the potential member states will be a truncated picture. As the literature on member states has demonstrated 'the European integration may be a trigger for, or intervening variable in domestic institutional development but it explains little on its own (Goetz, 2001: 1040-1041). That is why we need to include endogenous condition at domestic level.

### **Endogenous, Domestic-level conditions**

For the candidate countries although much has been explained through the pressure that EU has put on the applicant countries in light of accession there are cases of relatively 'soft' EU conditionalities where the EU has fallen well short of prescribing specific benchmarks for reform. In this case, the significance of domestic factors mediating the Europeanization of the accession applicants should be reinforced.

Acknowledging the Western Balkans dynamics and their transformation, it is important to ask if their specific feature of the domestic conditions have an influence on the Europeanization process at all. The variation in domestic adaptation change may be more

because of the domestic specific conditions rather than because of the EU requirements. The example of the CEES has shown that ‘political dynamics of transition affected how these countries reacted to EU influence’ (Grabbe, 2005: 98). Noutcheva in her comparative analysis of four Balkan countries also suggests that domestic politics although alone not sufficient, holds the key in providing an answer to the question of compliance (2006: 8). The endogenous domestic structures and actors are likely to have an important mediating effect on exogenous pressure. For example variations in outcomes of impact are due to mediating domestic factors (Caporaso, 2007: 29). For the CEEC countries, Papadimitriou & Phinnemore also argue that ‘failure to account for the wealth of contextual factors underpinning the process of Europeanization at the domestic level would greatly undermine our understanding of the distinctive patterns and outcomes of reforms across different policy sectors and accession applicants’ (2004: 636).

Even though ‘nearly every domestic structural condition that affects the impact of European integration could be conceptualized as a mediating factor’ (Caporaso, 2007: 30) we still need to group them and related to the context of the analysis. The domestic conditions may be related to country-specific political, institutional and polity factors looked up at two levels; the macro-analysis related to simple/compound polity and the fine-grained analysis related to case specific institutional, actor and policy constellation (Goetz, 2007: 80). On the first, polity dimension, factors such as the presence of a liberal democratic state may be a factor (Vachudova, 2005) while on a more fine-grained analysis the administrative effectiveness of the liberal democratic state may be a factor.

### ***Key conditions deriving from the rationalist perspective (Europeanization through conditionality)***

In the policy dimension, both on the member as well as potential member states, the veto players is seen as an important factor of Europeanization. As defined by Tsebelis, ‘a veto player is an individual or collective actor whose agreement (by majority rule for collective actors) is required for a change in policy’ (1995: 301). Inspired by Tsebelis’ veto player theory, scholars of Europeanization have argued that a large number of veto players impinges on the capacity of domestic actors to achieve policy change and limits their empowerment (Börzel & Risse, 2003: 64). Thus a large number of veto players are likely to inhibit or at least to considerably slow down adaptation to Europeanization pressure (Cowles *et al.*, 2001: 9). In the candidate countries the number of veto player have influence only the timing, variation in the time of rule adaptation, but did not lead to systematic variation in the success of EU rule transfer (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005a: 17).

Added to the number of veto players, the net adaptation costs of EU requirements needs to be considered since even in cases where there may be a lower number of veto player still they may consider the EU requirements against their interest and very costly. The adaptation of an EU requirement may be costly even for a single government.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier reformulates the veto player hypothesis as ‘the number of veto players with significant net costs of rule adaptation’ (2005a: 16, 2004: 675).

### ***Key conditions deriving from the constructivist perspective (Europeanization through Socialization)***

The low number of veto players, or as Jacoby calls the low ‘actor density’, in policy areas is also a key facilitating factor even in emulation, a process following a logic of appropriateness (Jacoby, 2002; 2004). Other factors regard the role of the transnational epistemic communities that exercise pressure and persuade governments on the legitimacy of rules and thus induce change (Börzel & Risse, 2003: 67; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005a: 23). The EU twinning programmes are an example of transnational epistemic communities that facilitate Europeanization in potential member states since bureaucrats from the member states assist their counterparts in the candidate countries with adopting EU legislation.

### ***Key conditions deriving from the historical perspective (persistence instead of Europeanization)***

One further explanation, at the domestic level, is connected with the notion of ‘path dependency’ advanced by scholars (e.g. Pierson, 2000) from the new institutionalist camp. In the historical institutionalist sense, influence of domestic legacies past may acts as an intermediate variable to obstruct institutional and policy change.

There are many good theoretical reasons to expect that Europeanization of potential member states will be slow, shallow and unsustainable because of legacies of the past. Countries such as Bulgaria and Rumania, the one facing strong legacies of the past, were the slowest to respond to compliance with EU conditionality as reported in EU progress reports and if we refer to the fact that they become member state in 2007 (laggards) beside starting simultaneously the accession process with other CEE countries. The depth of Europeanization may be *shallow* since change may happen in paper (formal transposition) but not real effects (application and enforcement) in the sense of taking on the behavioral logic of EU (Grabbe, 2006: 105-106). Furthermore, such problems of ‘partial’ Europeanization may raise the question of sustainable compliance especially after accession. As such in order to fully understand Europeanization we need to take into careful consideration also conditions resulting from historical legacies, as it may well be those initial conditions responsible for a large part of the outcome demonstrated.

In the member states scholars have demonstrated variation across areas and member states in the light of past domestic policy legacies. In the candidate countries Hughes *et al.* argue with reference to regional policies that their ‘evidence suggests that domestic political considerations, informed but not determined by historical experiences and legacies, played a more salient role in this policy area than a causative effect of EU conditionality’ (2004a: 170; 2004a: 543). In the CEE countries, scholars have argued that national institutional legacies vary widely from sectors with very rich policy traditions (e.g. agriculture) to sectors with almost entirely novel in CEE (e.g. regional policy) (Jacoby, 2006: 650). Given this variation, in turn a condition of Europeanization may be the absent of institutional and policy legacies.

In the Europeanization literature two key factors are important for explaining Europeanization when considering legacies of the past: the prevailing legal culture (rule of law) and administrative system (domestic management capacity). Sverdrup (2002: 26) found that with CEEC enlargement the average score on ‘government effectiveness’ and ‘rule of

law’ in the EU has dropped significantly, this is because the administrative quality of the ten new member states is far lower than the average level of the EU 15. As such he expect that the number of infringement proceedings will increase as the scores of the government effectiveness and rule of law indicators are correlated with the number of infringement cases (Sverdrup, 2002: 26).

The domestic management approach to compliance focuses on sources of involuntary non-compliance, especially on administrative capacity limitations as a consequence of legacies of communism’ (Sedelmeier, 2008: 809). The argument behind is that although there may be the (political) ‘will’ to comply with EU conditions the candidate countries may lack the ‘skills’ to do so (at least in the implementation phase). Although states have an intention to comply, they often lack the ability or capability (Sverdrup, 2005: 15). In the CEEC case it has been argued that although creating an efficient national administration system designed to ensure smooth transposition and implementation of European laws was necessary it was lacking during the accession period (Zielonka, 2001: 513). The lack of a proper administrative and structure sufficient to implement and enforce EU rules led the EU to include as part of the accession conditionality also the creation of administrative capacities (see e.g. Dimitrova, 2002). Falkner *et al.* (2007) recognized that the decisive factor (in the world of transposition neglect) is administrative inertia caused by bureaucratic ineffectiveness. But even if the necessary administrative infrastructure is in place and laws are formally adopted their implementation and functioning will depend on the domestic legal culture (Zielonka, 2001: 513).

‘Given the communist legacies of the candidate countries from CEE doubts exist about the ability of states and society to build political systems based exclusively on the rule of law. One of the pathologies of totalitarian regimes has been to keep on paying lip service to laws and resolutions while the de facto administration and power was performed through unwritten rules and institutions. Compliance with the official formalized rules as a behavioral reflex could have been eroded during the communist rule, many thought. It remains to a large extent an open question whether the former communist countries can integrate in a political and administrative system that relies exclusively on formalized rules in the form of written laws and directives for its regulation (and whether all countries from the group can integrate equally well). (Toshkov, 2005: 11)

Falkner *et al.* (2005, 2007) hypothesize that the effect of domestic opposition on the easy of compliance is mediated by a member state’s culture of implementation. Arguments have been raised about the Nordic countries belong to a special world, the world of law observance where respecting the rule of law is of particular importance.

**Table 10:** Key conditions for Europeanization in potential member states

| Logic of action   | Rationalist  | Constructivist                            | Path dependency  |
|-------------------|--|---|--|
| At European level | i) Determinacy& density (clarity & formality)<br>ii) Financial resources | Legitimacy                                | ---  |
| At domestic level | Political & Material cost (Veto Players & Low Cost)                      | EU Epistemic Community (twinning & TAIEX) | No strong institutional legacies (administrative capacity) |

## ON THE OUTCOME(S) OF EUROPEANIZATION

Another important set of Europeanization research question relates to the outcome(s) of the Europeanization process. As scholars had noticed, 'we have less systematic knowledge of the actual outcomes of European integration' (Sverdrup, 2005: 23; 2007: 209). This, primarily had been because European integration has effected many of the domestic political spheres thus 'the impact of the European integration becomes so multiple and complex that is difficult to distinguish its main trends and forms' (Maniokas, 2001: 161). The research agenda of Europeanization today focuses on many aspects of domestic political change being them rather the institutional structure, policymaking processes or representative politics. A great number of issues have been studied under the rigor framework of Europeanization. Even in the candidate countries a number of issues have been under investigation. Just to mention a few; *Political Parties and Party Systems* in Western Balkans (special issue of the 'Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans' 2008, 10:2); *CEE Executive* (Lippert *et al.*, 2001) and *Administrative* (Goetz, 2001) *Structures; Policy-making and Institutional System* in Hungary (Agh, 1999); *Public Administration* in CEE (Dimitrova, 2002); *Regionalization* (Glenn, 2004; Hughes *et al.*, 2004a); *Democratization and Human Rights* (Schimmelfennig *et al.*, 2003; Schimmelfennig *et al.*, 2005); across policy area: *Health Policy* (Jacoby, 2005), *Regional Policy* (Glenn, 2004; Hughes *et al.*, 2004b; Jacoby, 2004; 2005); *Social Policy* (Sissenich, 2005), *Environmental Policy* (Andonova, 2005), and *Justice and Home Affairs* (Grabbe, 2000; 2005; Trauner, 2009a).

### The broad outcome(s) of Europeanization

Speaking on the outcome of Europeanization two main questions should guide us, firstly, *Europeanization of what* (domains) and *how much* (degree).

#### *The Europeanization of What...*

The outcome of Europeanization, for Hix and Goetz, is the change in national institutional and policy practices that can be attributed to European integration (2000: 27). A much broader sphere of European influence could be found in Radaelli's definition who speaking for the outcome in terms of 'domestic discourses, identities, political structures and public policies' (2000: 4). This broad conceptualization on the outcome emphasizes a very important aspect of Europeanization where changes are to be expected not only in public policies but also in the structures and identities of domestic political systems. Polity, politics and policies, as Börzel & Risse (2003: 60) points out and has been employed in the literature, are the three main domains one has to look for domestic impact of Europeanization. In a more dynamic analysis, Radaelli argues that '[i]nstead of separating the domains of policy, politics, and polity (as Börzel & Risse, 2003 do) one can investigate the dynamic relations between policy change and macro-institutional structures' (2004: 7). Arguing in favor or against any Europeanization effect by taking into consideration only one of them may be misleading, unless it is explicitly said what is the specific domain we are looking for an Europeanization effect? Speaking of Europeanization effect in the broader sense and measuring it, for example as a legal or policy outcome, may undermine any possible effect which may have been in the form of discourse or structural change. As Radaelli & Pasquier rightly notice



EU policies processes may lead to policies and legislation, but in some circumstances they may be highly conflictual and may not end with the adoption of any EU policy. However, they can still produce effects on member states' politics (2007: 37).

In dealing with Europeanization one has to consider a specific issue within one of the three components of the possible change in the domestic political space (polity, politics, and policies) or it may take a more dynamic analysis where policy changes is accompanied by institutional changes as well. An example of the latter may be if we focus on the *institutionalization* of EU *acquis communautaire* at the domestic level of the potential member states. By analyzing *institutionalization* of EU *acquis communautaire* at the domestic level we include not only the Europeanization of policy domain as transposition of EU laws into national law but also the restructuring of domestic institutions and the change of domestic political practices according to EU requirements and standards.

### **...and how much**

But how can we be sure that there is Europeanization of the domestic polity, politics, and policies or Europeanization of policy and institutions? Knowing only *what* (the Europeanization domains are), is not the whole story. We have to ask also to what degree the outcome has been Europeanized. The first issue where the literature seems to have brought forward is that convergent as an indication of Europeanization outcome is neither expected nor looked for, so we need to identify the different possible outcomes that could be attributed to Europeanization and the way to measure them. So this leaves us looking for 'degrees and kinds of outcome' rather than a simple 'yes' or 'no' answer. Scholars have employed different measures to qualify the change. Radaelli (2000, 2003) considers two issues that he names *direction*, that is, if the change is positive or negative (becoming more or less 'European' than before) and *extension*, the magnitude of change (how much change). Based on this, he then distinguishes four possible outcomes (inertia, absorption, transformation, retrenchment) (Radaelli, 2000:15-16; 2003: 37). A slightly different classification of the outcome is employed by Börzel and Risse using only absorption, accommodation, transformation as outcomes of Europeanization (2003: 69-73). While these classifications of the outcome make sense for the member state, in the potential member states given the need and speed with which they have to comply for becoming member states, retrenchment seems not a plausible outcome. A different classification is employed by Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier (2005a: 7-8) consider two other issues, the *likelihood* (degree of change) and the *forms* of change (formal, behavioral and communicative or discursive change).

### **Two Aspects of Europeanization outcome: Adoption and Implementation**

Aspects of Europeanization are not of one type, but three main issues seem important and can capture the debate here, the *likelihood* (degree of change measured as partial or full, low or high), the *direction* (measured as positive or negative) and the *form of change* (being rather as communicative/discursive, formal and/or behavior). Adaptation<sup>46</sup> to Europe (in the broad

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<sup>46</sup> Note that adaptation and adoption need to be distinguished, 'the *adoption* of the *acquis*, a largely formal process of legislative engineering- and the *adaptation* to the *acquis*, a largely informal process by which legal and institutional norms and practices are adjusted to the new ecology of enlargement' (Hughes *et al.*, 2004b: 526).

sense) and to EU (in the narrow sense) has two main aspects, the formal rule adaptation and the behavioral rule adaptation. One way that can capture a wide range of these issues and of the circumstances in the potential member states is to consider both, adoption and implementation of the *acquis communautaire* and also the degree of their change being rather fully, partially or not at all change. Scholars have applied a number of terms interchangeably when speaking about the outcome of Europeanization. Terms like compliance, implementation, transposition, adoption, approximation, adaptation, sometimes have been used interchangeably however a clear distinction should be made between formal change (the legal transposition of rules) and behavioral change (implementation, application and enforcement). These distinction needs to be made firstly to have a clearer and at the same time a comprehensive understanding of the outcome. Looking for example only at the legal impact (transposition, alignment, adoption of EU *acquis communautaire* we may lose sight of the practical impact EU may have at domestic level (implementation, enforcement of EU *acquis communautaire*). Secondly, the legal impact either as a legislation passed or a policy program is clearly situated on the political level while the practical impact as implementation and application of the laws and policies adopted is a much more complex matter involving a wider range of actors on the political, administrative and societal level (Falkner *et al.*, 2005: 6). Thirdly, specific logic of action may end up only in certain aspect of Europeanization outcomes. Studies on CEEs have shown that Europeanization through conditionality (or more precisely the external incentives model) envisages more a formal rule adaptation (adoption) while Europeanization through socialization predicts a much higher likelihood of behavior rule adaptation (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005b: 217).

That is why, we should not rest only on the legal aspect of Europeanization outcome but in the contrary consider also the practical aspect of Europeanization outcome.

**Formal adaptation (adoption):** A number of terms such as transposition, alignment, adoption have been used with reference to the formal impact. I prefer to use here adoption. Formal rule ‘adoption consists in the transposition of EU rules into national law or the establishment of formal institutions and procedures in line with EU rules’ (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005a: 8). The effects of Europeanization measures are not generally of a legal nature but instead consist in policy programs also (mostly in *acquis conditionality*, issue areas). Formal rule adoption is a decision taken at the political level and most often consists in the passing of legislation as well as policy paradigm.

**Behavioral adaptation (Implementation):** Implementation also is another key aspect when studying Europeanization. It refers to the behavior impact as it refers to the enforcement and application of the adopted legislation and policies. ‘The term implementation means to give practical effect to, and to ensure of actual fulfillment by concrete measures (Sverdrup, 2005: 1; 2007: 197). Thus implementation refers to what happens after a bill becomes a law and is translating policy into action.

As such, the outcome of Europeanization will be both adoption and implementation since causal conditions involved in the process of adoption and implementation may influence them separately and simultaneously. Dealing either with legal adoption or practical implementation would probably reveal different picture since implementation is generally

harder than merely adoption of written rules (Toshkov, 2007: 347, footnote 1) as implementation requires new structures, bureaucratic expertise and financial capacity. Considering them separately will evident these difference while considering them both (as logical and) will give the broad general outcome of Europeanization.

**Table 11:** On the Outcomes of Europeanization

|                                  |  |
|----------------------------------|--|
| Where?<br>Domains                | Policy, Polity, Politics<br>-----or-----<br>Policies & Institutions  |
| What Forms?                      | Discursive/Communicative, Formal, Behavioral                         |
| How much (degree)?<br>Likelihood | Partial/full<br>-----or-----<br>Low/high                             |
| Which way?<br>Direction          | Positive/negative  |
| Aspects                          | Adoption (Formal adaptation)<br>Implementation (Behavior adaptation) |

#### ON THE MODEL(S) OF EUROPEANIZATION

Based on the above discussed topics this paragraph will try to put all the things together and help construct a model of configurationally conditions of Europeanization on the potential member states.

##### Vertical and Horizontal type of Europeanization

First of all, it needs to be point out that most of the literature, including here the literature on the CEECs, has made a clear distinction formulating three main advanced models<sup>47</sup>, while there are only few exceptions that provided a more parsimonious model including all in one model (Börzel & Risse, 2003; Risse *et al.*, 2001). All of these models are based and distinguish according to the direction the Europeanization process occurs. In terms of directions we can speak of a Horizontal type of Europeanization and a Vertical type of Europeanization. Horizontal Europeanization or 'Horizontal effects may be understood as the result of both increased competition and cooperation between countries and also of increased exchange of information and mutual learning simply by being part of an integrated Europe' (Vink & Graziano, 2007: 10). It is a cross-loading approach and usually no pressure of adaptation. It has indirect and unintentionally effects. Vertical Europeanization exerts adaptational pressure and it can be either coercive or persuasive. In this term Vertical Europeanization can be a top-down (coercive) and/or a bottom-up (persuasive) process of rule adaptation of rule.<sup>48</sup> There are also horizontal processes based on cooperation among the potential member and member states in context of twinning for example.

<sup>47</sup> E.g. Radaelli (2000) for member states and Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier (2005a) for the candidate states.

<sup>48</sup> Note here that in the vertical Europeanization in the potential member states only a process of downloading or top-down Europeanization is undergoing, without participation in up-loading/bottom-up Europeanization.

Europeanization thus can be both ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’. It is rather EU pressure that can induce the process of Europeanization or domestic actors themselves can use Europe rather by drawing of Europe as resource without specific pressure from Brussels.

**Table 12:** Modeling Europeanization in Potential Member States: Summary of the Mechanisms, Key Explanatory Conditions and Outcomes of Europeanization

|                      |                            |   |   |                                       |  |
|----------------------|----------------------------|---|---|---------------------------------------|--|
| Europeanization type | Direction                  | Vertical Europeanization  |   | Horizontal Europeanization            | ---  |
|                      | Actors leading the process | EU-driven domestic impact   |   | WB-driven domestic impact             |  |
|                      | Adaptational pressure      | Yes   |   | No                                    |  |
|                      | Ways of rule adaptation    | Coercive  | Persuasive  | Voluntary                             |  |
|                      |                            | Top-down  | Bottom-up   | Cross-loading                         | ---  |
| Mechanism            | When (scope conditions)    | Clear   | Unclear   |                                       | ---  |
|                      |                            | <i>Europeanization through conditionality</i>                       | <i>Europeanization through Socialization</i>                |                                       | ---  |
|                      | Logic of action            | Rationalist   | Constructivist/Sociological                                 |                                       | Path dependency  |
|                      |                            | bargaining mode   | normative mode  | cognitive mode                        |  |
|                      |                            | Incentives  | Normative power   | Cognitive power                       |  |
|                      | Processes                  | Enforcement   | Empowerment   | Framing                               | Persistence  |
|                      | Channels                   | Direct  | Less direct   | Indirect                              | ---  |
|                      |                            | Intergovernmental   | Social and transnational                                    |                                       |  |
|                      | Focus                      | Institutional-based   | Actor-based   |                                       |  |
| Key conditions       | At European-level          | 1. determinacy & density of conditionality<br>2. financial resource | Legitimacy  |                                       | ---  |
|                      | At domestic level          | 1. low VP<br>2. low cost  | EU-centered epistemic community (twinning & TAIEX projects) |                                       | No strong institutional legacies (administrative capacity) |
|                      | Aspects                    | More formal impact (adoption)                                       | More behavior impact (implementation)                       | More behavior impact (implementation) | Less formal and behavior impact                            |

### **A configurational model of Europeanization**

So far the three alternative models proposed by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005a) have been more advance and elaborated compare to the very general nature of the Börzel and Risse (2003) model. Anyway both of them have their advantages and weaknesses. If the models presented by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) are detailed in the sense of mechanisms and preciseness of the conditions employed they are difficult to be tested in their whole, firstly because each model stand alone, at least as alternatives, and not incorporated in a single model. On the other side the Börzel and Risse (2003) model incorporated all in one but gives less detail on the variables and explanatory mechanism.

Rather than making a choice among them, the best strategy rest on 1) firstly, trying to point their common elements and 2) secondly identifying the scope conditions of where a model works better than the other. This approach will be useful for redrawn a common framework. As suggested by Featherstone and Radaelli ‘synthesis is necessary for completeness’ (2003: 335). The attempt here will be to put the entire elements together, trying to create a model that is all inclusive to the most possible parsimony. Drawing into the Goertz and Mahoney (2005) argument<sup>49</sup> I will conceptualize causal variables at two levels of analysis that are systematically related to one another. They distinguish the variables into two – levels (the core/basic level variables) and secondary-level variables. The second level focuses on causal variables at a less central level of aggregation, often at a lower level. Even the variables at this ‘secondary level’ are also causes of the main outcome under investigation, but their effects cannot be understood independently of their relationship with the causal factors at the basic level. They examine three possible theoretical relationships, what they call causal, ontological, and substitutable, on how variables at a secondary level relate to the causal variables of the basic level. With a causal relationship, the variables at the secondary level are treated as the causes of the causal variables at the basic level modeling the relationship as ‘causes of causes’. With an ontological relationship, the variables at the secondary level represent features that define or constitute causal variables at the basic level. These secondary-level variables are *not* indicators of the basic-level variables, but rather are the elements that literally constitute basic-level phenomena. Finally, with a substitutable relationship, the variables at the secondary level are different ways by which it is possible to arrive at basic-level state. Here secondary-level variables often refer to alternative means of achieving ends represented by variables at the basic level.

Considering both models presented by Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier (2005a) and Börzel & Risse (2003) it can be said that they both share the same variables at the ‘basic level’, from one side there are the conditions at the European level (EU requirements and models) and on the other side there are the domestic conditions. This basic level of analyses considers the interactions between the primary EU level conditions AND domestic

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
<sup>49</sup> Two-level theories explain outcomes with causal variables at two levels of analysis that are systematically related to one another. The overall structure of two-level theories requires both specifying the particular type of relationship (i.e., causal, ontological, or substitutable) that exists between and within levels of analysis and specifying the logical linkages between levels in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. They argue that for the purposes of testing these theories fuzzy-set analysis provides a powerful set of tools (Goertz & Mahoney, 2005: 497).

conditions. Moreover, the pathways and mechanisms identified are by no means mutually exclusive. Although the three approaches emphasize analytically distinct mechanisms, these are at least partly complementary, and not necessarily mutually exclusive. Analytically distinguished logics of action often occurs simultaneously or characterize different phases of the process of adaptational change depending on 1) actors certainty; If the actors are uncertain about their preferences and strategy option a process of socialization is more likely to be followed while in the contrary if actors are certain about their preferences and strategy options a process of Europeanization through conditionality may occur, 2) context; if for example,

Norm entrepreneurs might be empowered by supportive institutions, but then start a socialization process of persuasion in order to overcome multiple veto points in the domestic system. In contrast, if domestic change in response to Europeanization involves high redistributive costs, a socialization process might be necessary to overcome stalemate and to develop new rules of fairness on the basis of which actors can the bargain over the distribution of costs. (Börzel & Risse, 2003: 75)

That is why a model at the basic level gives the general picture of the process, while the interaction of the other key variables will depend on the other scope conditions. So we consider only key factor at different level to model Europeanization in the potential member state countries.

**Figure 12:** A configurational Model of Europeanization



**Conventional Legend:** == ontological; → causal; - - > substitutability; →← conjunction of necessary conditions; logical OR; logical AND

**Source:** The model considers only the primary variables at the ‘basic level’ share by both Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005 and Börzel & Risse (2003) and uses the methodological approach proposed by Goertz & Mahoney (2005).



## THE GUIDING MAIN HYPOTHESIS OF EUROPEANIZATION

### CHOOSING AMONG CONDITIONS: A DEDUCTIVE-INDUCTIVE APPROACH

Over the years various research have been set out to empirically test Europeanization (adoption and implementation), listing numerous variables at the level of both the EU and the member states.<sup>50</sup> Given that the variables explaining Europeanization have been many and sometimes treated as competing explanations; one strategy to deal with the choice of conditions in an initial complexity of possible factors influencing the outcome can be the use of a multi-methodological procedure so to be able to reduce the number of conditions. Choosing among the conditions will be not only thorough application of theoretical knowledge (deductive reasoning) but also through application of empirical knowledge (inductive reasoning). In accordance with this strategy, 'it important to underline that neither a purely deductive nor a purely inductive approach represents a perfect solution to any research problem in the social sciences. Instead, a combination of both ways of thinking — even in the same study — promises to be more fruitful for drawing causal inference' (Schneider & Wagemann, 2003: 10). This kind of combined deductive-inductive reasoning throughout the whole analysis is favored also by Ragin who suggests going back and forth between ideas (theories) and evidence (empirical findings) with the aim of improving the specification of the model, or what he calls the property space (Ragin, 1994: 57).

Given that many empirical analyses have been already undertaken in the Europeanization literature, I do not perform but I rather employ the already pre-tested conditions through statistical techniques and other empirically case studies in order to discriminate among worthy and unworthy conditions. Through extended case studies a lot of contextual information is brought in order to assess the conditions that explain the outcome of adoption and implementation. Moreover, the empirical inductive knowledge can be build and go beyond insights from case-studies through quantitative studies. That is why, here I take account of only conditions (variables) already empirically verified and that have shown some statistical significance.<sup>51</sup> Based on the basic model proposed in the literature and the core variables having greatest explanatory power as shown by previous empirical research, I will consider them for argumentation on if they are also necessary and/or sufficient conditions for Europeanization in the Western Balkans countries. Although some conditions have already been demonstrated to have a 'net effect' on the outcome it is still important to assess, through other techniques such as QCA, how these causal conditions combine to produce the outcome

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<sup>50</sup> For an excellent map of the empirical research carried out in 1986-2005 and their main explanatory factors being put forward and tested see Mastenbroek, 2005: 1105-1107.

<sup>51</sup> Among the six approaches to selection of conditions in QCA analysis is also 'the significance approach, where the conditions are selected on the basis of statistical significance criteria' (Yamasaki & Rihoux, 2009: 125).



on our context-specific cases, the potential member states. The already quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis can be complemented using the configurational analysis (QCA) that explicitly considers combinations and configurations of case aspects. Only conditions displaying some strong relationships were retained across all categories and tested again, showing also some specific combinations of factors. For each conditions showing empirical relevance I formulate a clear hypothesis regarding its outcome (adoption and/or implementation) in the form of statement about necessity and/or sufficiency.

The deductive-inductive approach is used to enforce the argument where *relevant conditions* are drawn not only from theory but also from empirical analysis. Furthermore, the fewer the number of 'causes' we need to explain a phenomenon of interest (Europeanization in terms of adaptation and/or implementation) the closer we come to the 'core elements of causal mechanisms (Berg-Schlosser & Meur, 2009: 25-32, parenthesis added). This multi-methodological procedure of conditions' selection seems to be the ideal choice where the 'core' theories are retain and at the same time the number of 'causes' is kept to its necessary limits. The selection of empirically tested conditions do not simply shows variation in the explanatory factors but also include the broad range of logics of actions. Also the set of factors identified for Europeanization (adoption and implementation) considers both, management as well as political factors. Moreover, conditions are divided according to the expected outcomes since not all conditions account equally for all the aspects of the outcome. Which condition count exclusively for adoption and which for implementation? Do they make a difference on any of the expected outcome? As Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier argue, external incentives model would primarily result in formal rule adaptation while social learning model predict a much higher likelihood of behavior adaptation (2005b: 217-220). Rational logic conditions are expected to result in the form of legal acts while socialization conditions are expected to result in the form of implementation.

#### **HYPOTHESIS ON EUROPEANIZATION OF POTENTIAL MEMBER STATES**

Guided by the key theoretical conditions presented in the previous section and drawn from the empirical literature showing rather quantitatively or qualitatively importance I draw the main hypothesis. While the literature often treats the rationalist and sociologist approach separately, there are good reasons, both theoretical and empirical, to combine them. For each of the Europeanization mechanisms at work a great number of hypotheses can be drawn from the literature but I constrain myself only on conditions that have either shown significantly important in quantitative analysis and case studies. I acknowledge that the set of hypotheses considered here is not exhaustive and does not represent the full range of hypothesis in the literature neither a fully integrated theory of Europeanization. Rather, it adapts propositions introduced in the theoretical literature and that have shown significant empirical evidences on Europeanization of the potential member states with the final aim of combining them to take account simultaneously.

### **Following the logic of consequentiality: *Domestic level conditions***

#### *Political Constrains / Veto players*

Political constrains on the decision-making process, generally linked to the number of veto players, are considered a facilitating condition for Europeanization both in the literature on the member states as well as candidate countries. In the member state, scholars have argued theoretically that the number of institutional or factual veto players is a condition for achieving domestic change (Risse *et al.*, 2001: 9-10; Börzel & Risse, 2003: 64-65). A low number of veto players is theoretically a condition for successful Europeanization. In the CEECs and specifically in the Western Balkan countries the number of veto players is considered to be low for three main reasons: firstly, because of their unconsolidated democracies the share of power between legislative, executive and judicial is unequal; secondly the Western Balkans societies have been characterized as weak where there is a huge gap between state and societal actors (NGO, trade unions etc.); And thirdly, because of their legacies of the past 'quasi-authoritarian' behavior can be observed since in post-communist countries consensus is easily achieved around the leadership. Although, the number of veto players in the region in general is considered to be small it still may vary in causally relevant ways across issue-areas (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005a: 17). Noutcheva sustains that when the EU conditionality concentrates on governance norms a consensual domestic political space does appear, in the contrary when EU conditionality interfere in statehood matters the domestic political space tends to be divided and political contestation arises (Noutcheva, 2006: 26). As such, the domestic *veto players* do not play the same role throughout EU conditionality. In the case of the *acquis* conditionality they show to be weak and not play as decisive role as in the case of democratic conditionality but still even in the *acquis* conditions there may be areas and sectors where many political constrains may arise. Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier in their conclusion to the EU impact on the CEEC accession countries conclude that 'in the context of *acquis* conditionality... adaptation costs and veto player structure only explain variation in the timing of rule adaptation' (2005b: 211). If in the cases analyzed by Sissenich (2005) and Grabbe (2005) high adaptation costs and domestic veto players did not have a negative effect on rule adaptation but Jacoby (2005) and Andonova (2005) suggests that veto players if not accounted for systemic variation in the likelihood of rule adaptation they account for variation in the speed of rule adaptation.

*Empirical findings:* It has not only theoretically been argued that the number of veto players is a condition for achieving Europeanization but in some studies it has also been empirically confirmed. The low number of veto players has been shown statistically important by a number of authors. In the member states, Giuliani (2003) finds the correlation between the number of veto players (operationalized as the parties in the government coalition plus the influential president or second chamber) and the degree of national adaptation (standardized index based on the rate of prompt transposition, national quota of letters of formal notice, reason opinions and references to European Court of Justice) to be as expected, negative and statistically highly significant. Perkins and Neumayer (2007) in their quantitative analysis using regression techniques find that their control (dummy) variable of political constrain (operationalize as POLCON in Heinz's index of political constraints) have

some positive effects on the dependent variable of referrals to the European Court of Justice<sup>52</sup>. Börzel *et al.* 2007 with the same operationalization of veto players (POLCON) finds no effect while Börzel *et al.* 2004 used the index of Beck *et al.* 2001 as veto player and found a negative sign but not significant. Kaeding (2006) found that ‘a unit increase in the Schmidt’s veto player index raises the probability of a delayed transposition process by 8 per cent’ (2006: 244) while using Huber’s 1993 index of constitutional structures no strong effect is found. In the candidate countries, the political veto players were shown to be of very limited significance in the pre-accession period. Hille and Knill (2006) not only found no support for the veto-player hypothesis (operationalize as POLCON) but in the contrary they estimated that a higher number of veto players is associated with relatively good alignment performance. They argue that this may be because studies finding support on veto player hypothesis focus just on formal adoption, while their focus is on practical implementation where veto players are of less importance (2006: 548). Toshkov who deals mainly with legal transposition also warns that the hypothesis on the veto player deserves further attention and more careful reflection on its possible link with implementation outcomes since as he admits some of the single-party governments have been minority governments, while some of the coalitions in the sample were oversized collations (2007: 346). In another study Toshkov found some support that the number of parties in government returns a strong negative and statistically significant relationship between the number of parties in government and the probability that EU legislation will be transposed on time (2008: 393). The empirical results on veto player are inconclusive with less evidence been traced, still a comparison and final evaluation of these empirical results is difficult due to numerous operationalizations employed both for the dependent and the independent variable.

**Table 13:** Studies on Veto Player

|              | Study                     | Operationalized  | Result   | Dependent Variable |
|--------------|---------------------------|--|--|--------------------|
| Member-state | Börzel <i>et al.</i> 2007 | Nr. Veto Players / POLCON  | Not significant, in some model changed also sign     | Legal Infringement |
|              | Perkins & Neumayer 2007   | Political Constrain /POLCON  | <b>Significant, positive</b>                         | Legal infringement |
|              | Kaeding 2006              | Schmidt’s data on veto points  | <b>Negative, significant effects</b>                 | Legal              |
|              |                           | Huber <i>et al.</i> index of constitutional structures                               | Negative but not significant                         |                    |
|              | Börzel <i>et al.</i> 2004 | Index of Beck et al.   | expected positive but gave negative, not significant | Legal              |
|              | Giuliani 2003             | parties in the government coalition plus the influential president or second chamber | <b>Significant &amp; negative</b>                    | Legal              |

<sup>52</sup> Note: Their dependent variable has been not only the referrals to the European Court of Justice but also as reasoned opinions.

|                     |                    |  |  |                     |
|---------------------|--------------------|--|--|---------------------|
| Candidate countries | Toshkov 2008       | government capacity as nr of parties in government | <b>Expected and estimated negative &amp; significant</b> | Legal Transposition |
|                     | Toshkov 2007       | number of parties in a government                  | Not in the expected direction, and not consistent        | Legal Transposition |
|                     | Hille & Knill 2006 | Political Constrains / POLCON                      | Positive, significant & robust                           | Practical           |

In sum, despite the theoretical and intuitive plausibility of the Veto Player condition there are also some empirical evidence for a negative relation between the number of veto player and, at least, the formal adoption. For this reasons the veto player hypothesis still needs to be considered in any analysis.

Hypothesis 1: The **low number of veto players** is a condition for Europeanization (adoption and implementation).

### **Following the logic of consequentiality: EU level conditions**

#### *Material Cost and Financial Aid*

Besides the political constrains there are also material constrains to be considered because adopting and implementing EU acquis is costly. Alignment with the acquis generally creates high financial costs for the candidate countries (Sedelmeier, 2008: 808). In order to overcome such material costs EU aid is needed since 'EU aid – both current receipts and the prospect of future transfers – has a direct impact in creating new governance structures' (Grabbe, 2001: 1023). The relatively high or low budget allocated to each country and each specific sector of the acquis conditionality can be used as an indicator for measuring the cost of a reform. If the amount of money allocated in a sector is high this indicates that the cost of reform is low for the government. Therefore, on the basis of financial aid given to the countries on specific sectors, one can draw if the reform in the sector in each country is costly or not. Many analysts of the region have continuously raised critics concerning the financial insufficiencies provided by EU to support the adoption and implementation of the EU conditions by the Western Balkan countries. If the political will and commitment to adopt and implement the acquis may not encounter political constrain it may be still a problem of involuntary non-adoption or non-implementation as the resources may be missing on the WB potential member states. Therefore, measures to overcome material cost of adoption and implementation in countries with only few resources should come from European financial aid. If the previous EU aid policy on the WB has been mainly in form of humanitarian aid, the later through Phare, CARDS and now IPA<sup>53</sup> programs were/are oriented towards a broad range of goals connected with transition towards pluralist democracy and market economics and cross border cooperation as well as for adoption and implementation of the acquis. Cards

<sup>53</sup> The new regulation creates a single framework and a unified instrument for pre-accession assistance. The previous pre-accession instruments - the Phare, Ispa, Sapard, Cards along with 'structural funds' and 'rural development funds' - are replaced in the period 2007-2013 by the so-called Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). Under this regulation the aid would be divided depending on the country status (Council Regulation 1085/2006: 82)

and IPA have been the mechanisms of transferring money to support candidate countries. The additional EU financial assistance increases the incentive for the adoption and implementation of the EU *acquis* (reinforcement by support). The amounts transferred to WB although are relatively small in comparison with CEEC and the fiscal transfers to the existing member-states under the structural and cohesion funds<sup>54</sup> still 'they have an important role in reinforcing the transfer of EU models, because the aid helped to pay for implementation and the technical assistance built institutional capacity to take on EU practices' (Grabbe, 2006: 80).

*Empirical findings:* Many of the case studies have stressed the importance of financial aid as a condition for Europeanization. Falkner *et al.* studying the implementation of six directives in 15 member states reveals that besides others administrative shortcomings the insufficient financial aid was the prime source of transposition failure in 7 infringement cases out of 29 (2004: 466). And they put it clearly that 'sufficient financial or personnel resources are crucial for efficient implementation' (Falkner *et al.*, 2004: 461). In the case of candidate countries, governments continued implementation in the area of Schengen policies partly because of material incentives (Grabbe, 2005: 133). As far as it regards quantitative studies, they have shown little evidence. Börzel *et al.* (2004) found a positive (although they expected a negative correlation) significant and robust correlation between EU subsidiaries and infringements, thus as of their statistical results countries which receive comparatively high levels of funding violate EU law more frequently. However, they question if the direction of cause and effect could be considered since they argue that the funds are allocated to those countries that miss administrative capacities and it's the low administrative capacity responsible for the frequent violations of European law and not the funds from Brussels (spurious relation) (Börzel *et al.*, 2004: 23-24). Perkins and Neumayer (2007) also found the same trend, enforcing Börzel *et al.* (2004) findings, by controlling also for other variables in a multivariate regression. Contrary to their prior expectations (that net recipients of EU resources will have a better record of implementing EU law) they found a positive statistically significant and robust<sup>55</sup> relationship between the net fiscal transfers per capita and legal infringements (2007: 197). In accordance with Perkins and Neumayer (2007) findings, König and Luetgert (2008) hypothesized that increasing net funding may encourage the transposition delay of EU directives but they found modest evidence as 'the expected gains... remain significant, but the sign of the small coefficient on net EU funding does not support the anticipated effect' (2008: 191). In the candidate countries, Hille and Knill (2006: 539) hypothesized that '[t]he more financial resources are available to a candidate country's government, the better it will be able to align its policies towards EU policies'. They

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<sup>54</sup> The initial Commission budget proposal for the pre-accession assistance (IPA) was originally €14.1 billion but it was reduced finally to some €11 billion (Council Regulation 1085/2006: 91). This amounts to 13 Euros annually if divided by years and per capita; that is twice less if compared to the per capita annual amount that the countries of CEEs received. Nikolovski Z. (2006) 'EU to grant assistance to SEE Countries under new instrument', *Southeast European Times* 27/03/06.

<sup>55</sup> 'This result is very robust to permutations in the possible ways of measuring fiscal benefits. For example, replacing the preferred measure with net transfers relative to GDP, with a transfer to payments ratio or with gross transfers rather than net transfers leads to the same surprising result' (Perkins & Neumayer, 2007: 197).

operationalize the governments' financial capabilities with a very direct measurement of government spending per capita and do not find any statistical significant correlation with the CEEC county performance in aligning towards EU policies.

**Table 14:** Studies on EU Financial Aid

|                     | Study                   | Operationalized   | Result  | Dependent Variable  |
|---------------------|-------------------------|---|---|---------------------|
| Member-state        | Perkins & Neumayer 2007 | Real net transfers from the EU per capita (data from Rodden 2002)     | Expected negative but estimate a positive and statistically significant             | Legal infringements |
|                     | Börzel et al. 2004      | EU subsidies (Commission data on annual allocation of European funds) | Expected negative but found positive. <b>(spurious correlation)</b>                 | Legal               |
|                     | König & Luetgert 2008   | Net EU funding data provided by Eurostat 2004                         | significant but not expected sign (hypothesize positive, found negative small sign) | Legal               |
| Candidate countries | Hille & Knill 2006      | financial capabilities (yearly government expenditures per capita)    | not statistically significant   | Practical           |

Although the EU funding hypothesis could not find support as a condition in itself still it needs to be consider as a facilitating condition since 'EU funding enabling domestic actors to gain support for pursuing change' (Bulmer, 2007: 51).

Hypothesis 2: The **EU financial aid** is a condition for Europeanization (adoption and implementation).

#### *The determinacy and density of EU conditionality*

According to 'the external incentives model' presented by (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004, 2005a), rule adaption as a result of EU conditionality depends on a number of main external conditions such as: the *size* of the reward, the *credibility* of delivering or withholding the reward, the *strength* of conditionality, and the *determinacy* of conditions (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004; 2005a). In the pre-accession stage the Western Balkans is, the *membership credibility* and the *size of the reward* can be assumed to be constant and high. All the Western Balkans states from 2000 onwards have a realistic chance of EU membership and the size of the most important reward is constant over-time and across all WB countries (that is EU membership). This leaves the *strength* of conditionality and the *determinacy* of conditionality as the central external factors to determine the likelihood of rule adaption. The conditions which are repeatedly and prominently stated can serve as an indicator for assessing the strength of membership conditionality (strong conditionality) since they clearly signal to the candidate countries which conditions to concentrate on and where EU puts a strong emphasis on compliance with these conditions. The determinacy of the conditions refers both to the clarity and the formality of a rule. 'The clearer the behavioral

implications of a rule and the more legalized and binding its status, the higher its determinacy' (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005: 12). An EU condition will be determinate, if it is formulated in an unambiguous and binding way making the potential member states know exactly what they must do in order to fulfill the condition and which behavior may contradict the condition. It follows that explicit and concrete demands such as European Partnerships are more likely to be followed than general principles and vaguely formulated occasional critiques. The effectiveness of EU conditionality rests on how much the EU highlights certain conditions and insists on their fulfillment. The pressure EU puts through its conditionality will depend on 'the coherence in explaining the demands and the firmness in insisting on particular results' (Noutcheva, 2006: 19) and on 'the density of norms' to be adopted and implemented.

*Empirical findings:* The hypotheses on EU directives for the member states and conditionality for the potential member states have been many and inconclusive. In the member state countries Kaeding hypothesizes that the level of detail of EU directives (measured by the number of recitals<sup>56</sup>, the considerations at the beginning of the text of a directive) have a negative effect in speeding up transposition, the more detail an EU directive is the more likely its transposition process is to be delayed (2006: 236). He found that, the level of detail of EU directives measured as the number of recitals is highly significant and a strong determinant of transposition delay (2006: 244). In another study, Steunenberg & Kaeding (2009) look for the effects of the degree of EU directives '*specialization*' (how technical the content of the directive is) and expect that a more specialized directive to be more easily transposed (positive effect) but which turned out to be insignificant. Toshkov using logistic regression to track the effects that drives at the transposition performance of the eight CEEC countries from the late 90s until 2005. At the EU-level factors he considers also the number of recitals (to measure the political complexity of EU legislation on CEEC countries) and found it to be not significant although it shows a negative sign the coefficient is not significant (2008: 393). But still if combined with other factors, using a complex causal structure, they may become significant. For example, Toshkov finds that a regular directive with an average number of recitals during a two-party government and having mean scores on the EU and left/right dimension has a probability of 86% to be transposed on time if it is related to trade, or a probability of 68% if the directive is part of the environment field and 79% for the rest of directives (2008: 395). Other operationalization for EU/conditionality pressure as the backlog of directives yet to be transposed in a particular country at a particular point of time did not show any effect on the transposition (Toshkov, 2007).

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<sup>56</sup> 'Recitals are so specific they have become almost a 'third kind of law-making' ... They are meant to state the purpose of the directive and to describe each of the main provisions of the directive.' (Kaeding, 2006: 236). He notes that the number of articles for each directive (ARTINUMB) and the number of pages of each directive (PAGNUMB) which he counted in a preliminary analysis, next to the numbers of recitals, he found them not to show any significance in the model. (Kaeding, 2006: 250, footnote 6).

**Table 15:** Studies on EU Determinacy and Density

|                     | Study                        | Operationalized  | Result   | Dependent Variable  |
|---------------------|------------------------------|--|--|---------------------|
| Member State        | Steunenberg & Kaeding (2009) | <i>Specialization</i><br>(how technical the content of directive is)   | expected a positive effect, turns out to be insignificant. Not an effect | Legal               |
|                     | Kaeding 2006                 | the number of recitals (level of details of directives)  | <b>is highly significant and a strong determinant</b>                    | Legal               |
| Candidate Countries | Toshkov 2008                 | number of recitals (political complexity)  | slight negative effect but the coefficient is not significant.           | Legal               |
|                     | Toshkov 2007                 | EU/conditionality pressure – backlog of legislation to adapt (the amount of directives yet to be transposed divided by the time periods until the end of the deadline) | Not significant  | Legal Transposition |

Qualitative research in the CEECs Enlargement has shown that countries cannot be expected to adopt the *acquis communautaire* unless the EU provides strong and clear requirements. Jacoby discriminates between high and low ‘density of norms’ as an important factor shaping the impact of the EU in the CEECs (2002: 320). He conclude that the external incentives model (which he operationalizes through the determinacy of conditions)<sup>57</sup> explains rule adoption best after the EU explicitly formulated its conditionality and particularly in those policy areas in which EU applied significant pressure on CEECs (e.g. regional policy). For him determinacy points toward rule adaptation while the veto players does not (Jacoby, 2005: 101). Dimitrova (2002) and Grabbe (2001: 1025) see the lack of rule clarity as one main inhibiting factor in the enlargement governance (Europeanization). Grabbe (2005, 2006) shows that evolving nature of Schengen *acquis* influence adaptation. Uncertainty disappears once rules become part of accession requirements through formal and script documents. The overall strength of the EU's conditionality overcame the disincentives to comply with particular policy area (free movement of workers) (Grabbe, 2005: 133). Schwellnus comparing the implementation of non-discrimination and minority rights legislation in Romania, Hungary, and Poland found that ‘whenever explicit and determinate conditionality was applied (minority rights in Romania, nondiscrimination in Romania and Hungary), it led to rule adaptation of some sort in the end, although not necessarily quickly and not entirely in line with EU demands’ (2005: 69). Andonova (2005) conducting a longitudinal analysis of Europeanization in the area of environmental policy argues that one of the factors that facilitate the influence of external incentives to become dominant in the accession preparation is the fact that conditions became more specific. In the same line, Hughes *et al.* argues that the key factor to explain the outcome is the detailness in the *acquis*; ‘where the detail in *acquis* is ‘thick’ on a particular policy issue, we can reasonably expect it to provide strong

<sup>57</sup> For the external incentives model, this is operationalized through the determinacy of conditions; where determinacy is high, states have clear cues about which rules to adopt (Jacoby, 2005: 91).



leverage for the Commission to achieve particular outcomes but where the *acquis* is ‘thin’ we should expect the explicit leverage, and thus the formal conditionality and compliance, to be weak’ (2004: 525). In their conclusion Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier observe that ‘once a given issue area become subject of the EU’s conditionality, rule adaptation increased drastically and became a consistent feature across countries and issue areas’ (2005: 215), moreover ‘variation in timing of rule adaptation can be explained primarily with... the salience of an issue area for accession’ (2005: 217). The key factor that renders EU’s conditionality credible and hence leads to an increase in rule adaptation is the salience (determinacy and strength) the EU attaches to a particular area.

In sum, if the EU requirements are weak and not stressed enough in terms of their clarity and formality and if the EU requirements are many then the chances of inducing adaptation changes in domestic politics of the potential member states is low. As such, the hypothesis on the conditionality argument question whether a more precise, clearer and dense EU requirements, say in one word, the determinacy and the density of EU requirements influence the adaptation of EU rules.

Hypothesis 3: The **determinacy and low density** of EU enlargement requirements is a condition for Europeanization (adoption and implementation).

### **Following the logic of appropriateness**

#### *Twinning and TAIEX programm (‘EU-centered community’)*

The external model implies that there is a (strong) tendency to keep the status quo otherwise the changes would not need EU requirements, in the contrary the potential member states would voluntarily change their policies and structures. Given that the Western Balkan countries are in transition and the likelihood of keeping the status quo may be low for certain issues it is reasonable to include also a variable following the logic of appropriateness.<sup>58</sup> In issues where the EU requirements may be weak or missing we may still witness rule adaptation through EU or member-state model transfer since a general influence of EU models as being ‘good practice’ and ‘ready-made’ may dominate the domestic arena.

In the Europeanization literature of both the candidate countries and the member state it is hypothesized that the likelihood of rule adaptation will depend on if there are ‘epistemic communities’ and ‘norm entrepreneur’ (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005: 19-20; Börzel & Risse, 2003).

As such hypothesis rule adaptation will be easier if policy experts have contact with domestic expert communities, that is, if there is an engagement of an epistemic community of policy professionals in proposing changes. Even though the domestic experts usually there may be small in the Western Balkans or even if there may be a lack of policy-makers to turn

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<sup>58</sup> In the literature of the candidate countries the two models social learning model and lesson drawing stands apart. Furthermore lesson drawing is further distinguished as ‘simple learning’ (following a logic of consequentiality) and ‘complex learning’ (following a logic of appropriateness). See Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005: 20-21 with further references. While Börzel and Risse 2003 in their model for the member state countries presents them together. For the purpose of the book I make a synthesis of the variable as one condition including its main factors of socialization that may lead to a condition for adaptation following the logic of appropriateness.

to their domestic experts (e.g. usually the Western Balkans experts are not called or participate in significant reforms) still the policy-makers may turn to European model and have contact with European-level experts. Furthermore, EU programs of twinning and TAIEX are well established instruments in accession stage and have a socialization effect on their participants (bureaucrats and politicians) from candidate countries. As such contacts, member-states experts not only help in providing merely technical assistance but they transfer also practices and 'ways of doing things'.

*Empirical findings:* Most contribution in Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) emphasize the presence or absence of epistemic communities promoting EU rules, as a key factor. The presence of EU-centered networks of experts and officials was an important condition for the transfer of EU rules. Jacoby (2005) found that the lesson drawing model (for the lesson drawing model alternatives come through EU-centered epistemic communities p.91) explains rule adoption best in the time period in which EU conditionality was less determinate prior to the publication of the commission's white paper on alignment with internal market rules) and in policy areas in which the low density of EU rules resulted in a rather light application of conditionality (such as health policy). Andonova (2005) finds that air pollution reforms in the Czech Republic largely completed in the early 1990s were strongly influenced through the 'Environment for Europe' process, which provided a forum of policy learning and leveraging of financial assistance. The EU assistance in the form of capacity building and expertise-sharing continued throughout the accession period. She also argues that 'in settings where ideation and constitutive influence prevails, we should see greater density of mechanisms such as network-building, capacity-building, framework agreements, and support for transnational expert groups' (2005: 139). Sissenich (2005) concludes that two domestic factors, weak state capacity and civil society, need to be considered in understanding cross-national rule spread. While Jacoby (2000) argues that implementation is lagging behind partially because of the absence of social stakeholders whose active involvement would help 'pull in' the new rules. Epstein (2005) argues that dense interactions between CEECs officials and experts with their EU counterparts also facilitate social learning as in the case of polish central banking. Grabbe (2005) found that CEEC officials from interior ministries have internalized at large the Schengen idea.

Beside the qualitative studies, a recent quantitative research by Knill and Tosun (2009) explore the adoption of three European environmental policy measures by 33 European states (candidate countries included) during 1980-2006. They hypothesize that the more a country exchanges information with EU, the more likely it will adopt European environmental policies. The results of the statistical analysis gave only some positive support to the relevance of 'EU information exchange' hypothesis (positive effects but not robust). Still, they do not discard the potential long-term effect given that they consider only the period till 2006 while most of the countries adopt EU environmental legislation after that year.<sup>59</sup> Other quantitative studies also have found that learning and experience, usually measured as the

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<sup>59</sup> 'Yet, taking into consideration that our research design may suffer from right-censoring (i.e. a country adopts EU environmental legislation after 2006), we should not discard the potential long-term effect of network governance. A more satisfactory evaluation of hypothesis 3 may thus need to look well beyond 2006, which we cannot accomplish in this study' (Knill & Tosun, 2009: 889).

time of membership, are (negatively) related to transposition performance. For example, Perkins and Neumayer (2007) and Giuliani (2003) found that membership length decreases compliance levels, that is different from expected, a lower number of infringement procedures was found in recent member countries.

**Table 16:** Studies on EU programmes

|                                      | Study              | Operationalized                                    | Result                                   | Dependent Variable |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------|--|--|--------------------|
| Member-state and Candidate countries | Knill & Tosun 2009 | ‘EU information exchange’,<br>(network governance) | Some support, positive though not robust | Legal              |

Hypothesis 4: The **twinning and TAIEX** programs (‘EU-centered communities’) are a condition for Europeanization (adoption and implementation).

**Following the logic of path dependency**

*Administrative capacity: bureaucratic efficiency and rule of law*

Another condition of government constrain (‘capacity’ constrain not ‘will’ constrain) has been the administrative capacity or administrative effectiveness and rule of law to comply with the EU acquis. The logic behind is that an ineffective bureaucracy and lack of rule of law will slow down and delay the process of Europeanization even if there may be the ‘political will’ of the potential member states not to oppose the adoption and implementation of EU acquis. Scholars have identified national administrations as crucial actors determining the efficiency of the adoption and implementation process not only in the member states but also on the previous candidate countries. Regarding theoretical accounts Tallberg (2002) has argue that non-compliance may be also due to government capacity limitations. Besides theoretical considerations a number of empirical studies, both qualitatively and quantitatively, has shown governance effectiveness to be an important condition to explain Europeanization in member states as well as in candidate countries. Case studies from CEECs have shown that bureaucratic effectiveness is important. For example on candidate countries, Sissenich (2005) stress that the weak state capacity of CEEC countries as one of the domestic factors that needs to be considered in understanding cross-national rule spread in previous (CEEC) candidate countries. Quantitative empirical studies also have supported the hypothesis that the administrative capacity is an important condition both in member state and candidate countries.

Empirical findings: Two factors of administrative capacity can be identified in the literature, government effectiveness and rule of law, which usually have been argued separately or sometimes operationalized just as one variable. Government effectiveness has emerges as a key factor determining why domestic governments are able to incorporate EU acquis into domestic law and implement them. For the member state countries, among others, Perkins and Neumayer find bureaucratic quality (measured through the score provided by the International Country Risk Guide) to be statistically significant with the anticipated coefficient signs for both the reasoned opinions and ECJ referrals (as the dependent variable)

arguing that countries with higher bureaucratic quality have fewer infringements (2007: 189). Börzel *et al.* also in their empirical analysis showed also that bureaucratic efficiency (operationalized as an index of performance related pay for civil servants, lack of permanent tenure, and public advertising of open positions) has a strong negative effect on the number of infringements of European law (larger bureaucratic efficiency brings about fewer violations of European law (2007: 19).

Following a path-dependency approach implementation may be difficult in counties where acceptance of rule of law is low. Regarding the CEEs experience, scholars suggest that ‘difficulties in legal implementation are related to the lack of a sound legal culture of these societies in transformation, a lack of real understanding of the principles of the Rule of law and advantages they can bring as cultural good in societies in transition’ (Bempt & Theelen 1996, with further reference)... ‘From this point of view, the degree of compliance can be attributed to the extent to which addressees of a rule accept the principle of the rule of law. The acceptance of a rule and the subsequent inclination to comply with it result from the diffuse support for law-making as a means of ensuring political order in a community.’ (Börzel *et al.*, 2004)

Falkner *et al.* in one of their ‘worlds of compliance’ consider that implementation may result according to a culture of respect for the rule of law, that is they hypothesis that ‘if a country belongs to the world of law observance, transposition typically proceed in a dutiful manner, both administrators and politicians acting according to a culture of respect for the rule of law.’ (2007: 410). As of such argumentation compliance with EU is unproblematic in countries, in which the principle of the rule of law is strong. But beside these theoretical argumentations, Börzel *et al.* (2007) in their statistical analysis find only in one model support for the rule of law hypothesis while for the other models they finds hardly any significant correlation between the support for the rule of law and the frequency of violations of European law. Anyway, they call for cautions since firstly ‘the rule of law hypothesis... could probably be confirmed with better data’ and their findings would be better if evaluated in the light of other conditions (Börzel *et al.*, 2007: 20), meaning that rule of law is not sufficient as a condition in its own. In the contrary, Perkins and Neumayer (2007) found that member states with a law tradition other than countries with a Scandinavian legal system, all have a higher number of infringements.

Other studies, especially in candidate countries has include the bureaucratic effectiveness and rule of law under one hypothesis and usually operationalize it with the World Bank ‘Governance Matters’ indicators. Evidence in favor of the positive effect of Governance indicators in performance of candidate countries is brought by the studies of Hille & Knill 2006 and Toshkov 2007, 2008. Hille and Knill (2006) conducted a quantitative study of the performance of CEECs in a period of time between 1999 and 2003 and using the World Bank’s index of Governance Indicators they find a positive correlation between the quality of the bureaucracy and the alignment performance of the CEEC candidate countries (statistically significant at least at the 99% level), so CEEC countries with independently and effectively operating bureaucracies have fewer problems in aligning to EU policies. Toshkov’s results of the quantitative empirical analysis shows also that administrative effectiveness (operationalized also through World Bank index) has positive and substantial effects on the

number of directives transposed in a given period of time. The analysis gave highly significant coefficients and in the expected direction where the size and significance is retain in all his four models (2007: 346). In line with previous research (Hille & Knill, 2006; Toshkov, 2007), Toshkov (2008) argues that ‘regulatory quality’/ ‘administrative effectiveness’ (highly correlated) has had a positive effect on the speed (performance) of transposition although the magnitude of the effect is not great.

**Table 17:** Studies on Bureaucratic Effectiveness

|                     | Study                     | Operationalized   | Result   | Dependent Variable  |
|---------------------|---------------------------|---|--|---------------------|
| Member-state        | Börzel <i>et al.</i> 2007 | index of performance related pay for civil servants, lack of permanent tenure, and public advertising of open positions (Auer <i>et al.</i> ) | <b>negative and significantly different from zero</b>  | Legal Infringements |
|                     |                           | Gibson and Caldeira’s opinion poll survey (rule of law)   | hardly any significant correlation, only for one model.  |                     |
|                     | Perkins & Neumayer 2007   | Bureaucratic quality (score by the International Country Risk Guide)  | <b>statistically significant</b> with the anticipated coefficient signs  | Legal Infringements |
|                     |                           | culture of law compliance (Scandinavian legal system as baseline)   | <b>Confirmed</b>   |                     |
|                     | Börzel <i>et al.</i> 2004 | index of performance related pay for civil servants, lack of permanent tenure, and public advertising of open positions                       | variable with the greatest explanatory power. <b>(negative, significant)</b>   | Legal               |
|                     |                           | Gibson and Caldeira’s opinion poll survey (rule of law)   | <b>negative and significant</b> , correlation between rule of law and infringement                                     |                     |
| Candidate countries | Toshkov 2008              | administrative effectiveness/Regulatory quality’ (World bank Governance Indicators)   | <b>positive and significant</b> , administrative effectiveness and regulatory quality highly correlated                | Legal               |
|                     | Toshkov 2007              | Government Effectiveness (World bank Governance Indicators)   | <b>Confirmed</b> . Highly significant and in the expected direction. Retain their size & significance in all 4 models. | Legal Transposition |
|                     | Hille & Knill 2006        | Government Effectiveness (World bank Governance Indicators)   | <b>positive correlation</b> between quality of bureaucracy and alignment performance, significant                      | Practical           |

In sum, not only theoretically but also empirically the positive effect of administrative capacity (measured in different ways) is very well established in the literature of both member and candidate states. Evidence in its favor is brought by most studies. Given such strong theoretical discussions and most empirical findings we can hypothesis that:

Hypothesis 5: **The bureaucratic effectiveness and the rule of law** are both a condition for Europeanization (adoption and implementation)

**Contextual hypothesis: *Potential vs. candidate countries***

The Western Balkans countries, unlike the CEEC countries, vary on the degree and type of contractual relation with EU. First of all, the Western Balkans countries are being considered to start the Stabilization and Association Agreement or the Accession Negotiations on individual level, differently from the CEECs who start Association Agreements as one block and the Accession Negotiations as two blocks<sup>60</sup>. This makes them differ much on the stages of accession they actually are. Even though all WB countries are considered potential candidates, not all of them have yet received the candidate status. Furthermore even within a modality, - being candidate (Accession Negotiation) or potential candidate (Stabilization and Association Agreement) country, - they still present differences in the speed of enlargement process. With such diversity in the stages of accession 'one has to consider that within the phase of candidacy the responses of states to compliance measures may vary due to the status of their application' (Bauer *et al.*, 2007: 410). As Schimmelfennig notice it is plausible to assume that the pressure for adoption on non-member countries is determined also by the density of their institutional ties with the international organization (that is stage of integration with EU) since the fewer the institutional ties and the lower the adaptation pressure (2002a: 5). A study evaluating the pressure of negotiation accession in the CEEC countries on one of the *acquis communautaire* chapters (regional policy) stresses the point that the process of negotiation creates at least pressure for adaptation although not a uniform impact (Glenn, 2004: p.18). If entering the process of accession negotiations (only candidate countries can start and enter accession negotiations) creates pressure, how much this pressure differs and reflects on the variation outcome between potential candidate and candidate countries. That is, is the impact of EU greater on the candidate countries? Does being closer to accession plays a greater role in adopting and implementing EU requirements or is it the contrary?

If we refer to the literature on the CEECs, the results are inconclusive and sometimes even contradictory. Speaking in general terms, many scholars seem skeptic and not to relate the outcome of Europeanization to the stages of accession. Grabbe for example in trying 'to test whether the closeness to accession was a key determinant of Europeanization effects' (2005: 114) argues that 'the outcome of negotiations might have had some effect where policies were very controversial or expensive to implement, but on the whole Europeanization continued regardless of the negotiations... Europeanization becomes embedded in domestic policies and institutions long before accession' (2005: 203). Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier will also agree that 'the stage of accession process does not seem to have a systematic impact on compliance' (2005: 216). Beside such generalization

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<sup>60</sup> The first CEECs countries (Cyprus also started in the same year) that start accession negotiations in 1998 where Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. The rest of the countries (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia – Malta was also included) started accession negotiations in 2000.

there are good reasons to think that firstly before the application for candidate countries the potential candidate countries makes an effort to comply with EU requirement as prove of their commitment to the very restricted measures that will follow. Secondly, at a later stage of accession when the fear of exclusion may diminish, it is reasonable to think that candidate countries may demonstrate difficulties or even resistant in implementing EU requirements. Such tendencies of negative impact on rule adaptation were observed even with the so called CEEC front-runners in the late stage of accession because of non fearing exclusion (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2007: 93; 2005: 216-217). The experience of Bulgaria and Rumania may be the best illustrative case of that where shortly before their scheduled accession for January 2007, a monitoring report by the European Commission published in early 2006 revealed that efforts in both countries to enforce law reforms and to combat corruption were insufficient and did not meet European standards (Bauer *et al.*, 2007: 410 with further reference) leading so to the postponement of their accession for 2008. Steunenberg and Dimitrova argue that 'EU conditionality is not equally effective throughout the period of preparation of a candidate for accession' (2007, 2005) and they have shown even formally that the conditionality becomes ineffective the moment a decision on the accession date is made. Countries tend to do less in their adoption and implementation efforts when they are close to accession because they are certain of getting membership. For example, Czech Republic made little effort to comply with EU's condition on introducing civil service legislation, since it was considered as forerunner and it was highly unlikely that the Union would leave this country out of the process at a later stage (Dimitrova, 2005: 87).

As such we will control if the stage of accession gives different patterns of conditions counting for Europeanization.

Control Hypothesis 6: The conditions on Europeanization (adoption and implementation) are the same regardless of the stage of accession.

## SUMMARIZING AND MAPPING THE MAIN HYPOTHESIS

To map the hypothesis in a synthetic way, I distinguish first on the type of outcomes (adoption and implementation) **since different conditions are responsible for different type of outcome**. Secondly, conditions themselves can be distinguished according to their logic of action: if they follow from the conditionality or socialization mechanism of Europeanization, since the previous research on CEEC has shown that the logic is specific to the type of stage of EU adaptation we analyze. Parallel to these two main logics, conditionality and normative pressure used in the candidate countries, we have similarly for the member states the enforcement and managerial conditions of explanations.<sup>61</sup> **Furthermore, conditions can be distinguished if they are exogenous, at the European level or if they are endogenous, at the domestic level**. The latter division can be group further into two ways, if they are of a 'political' character or if they are more of an 'administrative' character. The domestic political actors matters more for adoption while the domestic administrative actors matter more for implementation aspect of Europeanization. Scholars have argued that 'legislators do

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<sup>61</sup> 'Conditionality and normative pressure are thus similar to enforcement and managerial explanations of compliance' (Kelley, 2004: 9).

not necessarily matter for processes of EU implementation, as these are often carried out by administrative actors’ (Mastenbroek & Kaeding, 2007: 343). On the same track for the candidate countries, Hille and Knill argue that practical implementation is basically a matter of bureaucracy rather than the realm of politics (2006: 548). Non-adoption of EU *acquis* may be an intentional result of political conditions (variables), for example high number of veto players while non-implementation may be rarely a result of intention defection but more of an administrative condition (organizational, legal, technical and financial causes).

**Table 18:** Mapping Hypothesis on conditions for Europeanization (adoption and implementation)

| Map of Hypothesis |   | ...by the outcomes  |  |
|-------------------|---|---|--|
| ...by the logics  |   | <i>Adoption</i>   | <i>Implementation</i>                  |
|                   | <i>Logic of consequentialism (conditionality)</i> | <i>Determinacy and low density of EU requirements</i><br>(Kaeding 2006)<br><i>Veto players</i><br>(Giuliani 2003; Kaeding 2005; Perkins & Neumayer 2007; Toshkov 2008)                  | <i>EU funds</i><br>(spurious relation) |
|                   | <i>Logic of appropriateness (socialization)</i>   | <i>Twining and TAIEX programs</i><br>(Knill & Tosun 2009)   |  |
|                   | <i>Logic of path-dependency (persistence)</i>     | <i>Administrative capacity / bureaucratic effectiveness and rule of law</i><br>(Börzel <i>et al.</i> , 2004, 2007; Perkins & Neumayer, 2007<br>Knill & Hills, 2006; Toshkov 2007, 2008) |  |

The determinacy of EU laws is significantly important in Kaeding (2006) while Toshkov (2008) found negative sign but not significant, still I consider the determinacy of EU conditions as it may not be a sufficient condition but INUS<sup>62</sup> combined with other conditions. The low number of veto players has been shown statistically important by a number of authors in the member states, Giuliani (2003), Kaeding (2005), Perkins and Neumayer (2007), while in the candidate countries the political veto players were shown to be of very limited significance in the pre-accession period (Hille & Knill, 2006; Toshkov, 2007). Hille and Knill (2006) and Toshkov (2007) have shown that administrative capacity (the bureaucratic effectiveness and the rule of law) are significantly important. And Knill and Tosun (2009) find some support for the epistemic community hypothesis.

<sup>62</sup> An INUS condition is Insufficient but Necessary part of a condition which is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient for the result.





## **Part II**

### **METHODOLOGY, OPERATIONALIZATION, DATA COLLECTION AND CALIBRATION**

As Ragin rightly has notice ‘methodology does not concern mere technique’ (1987: 165) in fact it covers a number of issues. Given that the issues of conceptual and theoretical matters are discussed in detail in the previous part, this part will engage in deep discussion of methodological choices, operationalization of the conditions and outcomes hypothesized (variables), data gathering and **case selection**. Europeanization literature has primarily dealt with concept and theoretical issues (the nature, mechanisms and outcomes) of Europeanization but very rarely they do address issues of research design and methodological concerns (with the exception of Haverland, 2005, 2007) (Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2009: 508).

In this part I will expose the qualitative comparative analysis and its justification in Europeanization studies and specifically as the best choice to address the research question and research design settle in this book since ‘[a] method’s comparative strength is most obvious only when confronted with a specific research question’ more than by their strengths *per se* (Henriksson, 2009: 7). Furthermore, as Haverland warns us, the general methodological question on Europeanization studies to be tackled and put emphasis rests on ‘how should we design our research and shape our strategies of data collection and analysis in order to achieve a maximum of reliability and validity given a specific research question and theoretical framework?’ (2007: 59). **Moreover, in comparative research design case and variable (conditions and outcome) selection are two operations that are particularly crucial and they should both be guided by explicit theoretical concerns** (Berg-Schlosser & Meur, 2009: 19-32).

The initial steps of QCA analysis regards the technique, case selection, collection of data and their calibration, all of these steps, will be exposed in detail.

# METHODOLOGICAL CHOICE IN STUDYING EUROPEANIZATION

## WHY QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS FOR STUDYING EUROPEANIZATION

The till now methodological choice in Europeanization research in the candidate countries has been focused mostly on case studies (Andonova, Dimitrova, Grabbe, Jacoby, Schimmelfennig *et al.*, Sissenich, Schwellnus in Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005; Hughes *et al.*, 2004) and only few quantitative analysis (Hille & Knill, 2006; Toshkov, 2007). Analyses of the causes or the mechanisms deriving into adaptation with EU law have been methodologically handled either through qualitative or quantitative research design whereas the dominant strategy has been the case study (Haverland, 2007: 64). The qualitative-quantitative debate is relevant also in Europeanization studies in member states. The question rests on what will be the best choice (knowing that both approaches have their strengths and weaknesses) for designing our research. A method that bridges the qualitative-quantitative divide is the qualitative comparative analysis (known as QCA) proposed by Ragin (1987; 2000). The strength of the QCA is that it tries to identify possible lawful relationships between variables (as in quantitative research) taking into consideration the specificity of each of the cases (as in qualitative research).

This method is best appropriate in studies where the causal heterogeneity – that is, the existence of multiple causations for the same outcome, - is expected. This has been the case in Europeanization where a number of variables have shown to be empirically significant. For example even an empirical study by Börzel *et al.* shows the limits of mono-causal explanations in Europeanization concluding that ‘monocausal explanations... are unlikely to account for the observed variations in non-compliance’ (2004: 41). As such Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is the best option taking into account the advises of scholars who see causes of Europeanization not as monocausal and/or competing explanations since the QCA method is not interested in the general significance and explanatory power of individual variables but in their embeddedness in causal fields as either individually or jointly necessary and/or sufficient conditions (Ragin, 1987: 15-16). QCA should be preferred here more over conventional techniques as it is much more compatible with the analysis of causal complexity. Rather than excluding or making a choice among alternative conditions (variables) on Europeanization (adopting and implementing), the use of QCA makes capable the examination of complex patterns of interactions between all the hypothesized conditions (variables).

But besides its particular appropriateness for situations with causal heterogeneity where neither case studies nor conventional statistical can address, the QCA method is lacking in Europeanization research<sup>63</sup> (Haverland, 2007: 69). Its application and strengths has yet to be

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<sup>63</sup> Kaeding also points to the non-existent of QCA analysis (fuzzy set methodology) in EU studies (2008: 277, footnote 1).

appreciated as the QCA method is often lacking Europeanization studies where few late studies, Raunio 2005, Kaeding 2008 and Dimitrova & Toshkov 2009, are the exception. And in the CEEC countries the only study using QCA is that of Schimmelfennig *et al.* (2006) who although do not refer to Europeanization nevertheless their research design could fit well the Europeanization literature.

Thirdly, the issue of interest in this book is not only on generalization but also on studying the Western Balkans countries. But the problem with case studies, although they are potentially strong in deep and thick description of complex causal processes, they are generally difficult to draw broader inferences from their results. A proper method that do not lose track of the cases being interested (Western Balkans) and at the same time still produce generalized results (depend on the data set and context analysis, the potential candidate countries in this book) is the QCA. Since 'QCA is a method that allows the researcher to be sensitive to complex causality in terms of conjunctural causation and equifinality without, however, giving up the aim of generating generalizable and therefore theoretically fruitful findings' (Schneider & Wagemann, 2003: 7-8). As such, QCA strength rests on being a mid-path way between qualitative and quantitative research that build general knowledge from understanding of specific cases in specific contexts (Ragin, 2008: 5).

### Qualitative Comparative Analysis versus Quantitative Analysis<sup>64</sup>

First of all, Qualitative Comparative Analysis is much more compatible with the analysis of causal complexity than conventional techniques. If regression analysis confines us to isolating a single path of causality (Clark *et al.*, 2006) the QCA makes multiple paths causality, an advantage since 'causes rarely operate in a simple additive fashion; rather, they usually combine and intersect to produce change' (Ragin, 1993: 306). The Qualitative Comparative analysis works also particularly well in studies that have a moderate (neither small nor large) *n* without getting into trouble as the number of units of analysis is too many for in-depth (qualitative) case-oriented analysis or too few for variable-oriented (statistical) analysis. Differently from the regression analysis where multicollinearity (correlation of independent variables) poses major problems for causal inference, in QCA analysis the correlation coefficient is almost completely irrelevant (Ragin, 2008: 6). In fuzzy-set analysis (QCA) causal connections can be strong despite relatively weak correlations (Ragin, 2008: 41) or what's more, correlations among independent variables does not obstruct the reliability of results, it simply increase the likelihood that one will reach similar conclusions about the causal relevance of the correlated independent variable (Katz *et al.*, 2005: 568).

QCA, different from quantitative analysis which calculate the net-effects of different variables across samples drawn from entire populations, is based on structured focused comparison using specific kinds and categories of cases. QCA runs counter to the central logic of the most popular quantitative techniques which are geared toward assessing the net, independent effect of causal variables, not their multiple combined effects (Ragin, 2008:

<sup>64</sup> A more general structure discussion comparing QCA and logistic regression, their degree of convergence, complementarities or divergence see Grendstad (2007), Katz *et al.* (2005) and Seawright (2004).

172), as such QCA assess not the ‘net effect’ of conditions (independent variables) but their multiple combined effects. QCA is context-specific assessment (examining cases as configurations) with a strong focus on categories and kinds of cases (as are here the potential member states) not on variables and their net effects across heterogeneous populations. Furthermore, QCA, unlike conventional statistical analysis, encourages the investigator to consider the context in which specific causal relationships will hold (Ragin, 2000; Schneider & Wagemann, 2003). The study of diversity is the main strength of the QCA methodological strategy. The qualitative comparative analysis is based on logical method (present and absent of conditions and outcomes) not on statistical methods (correlation). As we study cases, set relation are important since a case cannot have membership in a variable but instead a case can have membership in a set (Ragin, 2008: 195). ‘[Q]uantitative correlational analysis commonly indicates the association of two variables, but not their set-theoretic relationship (i.e. one being the subset of another)’ (Pennings, 2003: 562).

Qualitative Comparative Analysis is more appropriate in research whose concern is related with the ‘causes of an effect’ while regression are more useful if one’s concern is more with the ‘effects of a cause’ (Katz *et al.*, 2005: 569). QCA in this case fits better as the research question is to explain how different Europeanization conditions result in adopting and implementing EU requirements in the potential member states. Such a research is focused on the outcome (dependent variable), i.e. explaining certain outcome (Europeanization as adoption and implementation) (Ragin, 2000: 39-40). The focus here is the process, how different conditions bring the outcome, not what outcome does a specific condition brings.

## QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND FUZZY SET THEORY

The method chosen to study Europeanization in the WBs in this book is the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) as developed by Charles Ragin (1987; 2000). The method focuses on the configuration of conditions that are necessary and/or sufficient to bring about a specific outcome. It is grounded in set theory and set theoretic relations (Ragin, 2008: 23) to give necessary and sufficient conditions. The subset principle represents an essential part of social science theory, indeed Ragin (2000, 2008) argue that theoretical discourse is set-theoretic by nature<sup>65</sup>. The theoretical discourse can be easily translated into formal language of set-theoretic relation and Boolean algebra. ‘Almost all social science theory is verbal and, as such, if formulated in terms of sets and set relations’ (Ragin, 2008: 13). The set relationship, as demonstrated by Ragin (2008), is central to the analysis of complexity, where the subset relation is used to assess causal sufficiency (Conditions  $\leq$  Outcome) while superset relation is used to assess causal necessity (Conditions  $\geq$  Outcome).

The most basic understanding of sets is that of being a list of objects under a same characteristic attributes. QCA studies cases holistically<sup>66</sup>, -it look and compare cases as wholes, - (Ragin, 1987: 3) as specific configurations of attributes, in this way each case is

<sup>65</sup> ‘...almost all social science theory is verbal and, as such, is formulated in terms of sets and set relations’ (Ragin, 2008: 13).

<sup>66</sup> ‘... each individual case is considered as a complex combination of properties, a specific ‘whole’ that should not be lost or obscured in the course of the analysis- this is a holistic perspective’ (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009: 6).

understood as a **combination of causal conditions linked to a particular outcome** (Ragin, 1994: 119). There is a well-developed mathematical system for addressing logical operations with sets. In set-theoretic relations, the logical notion OR, sign with (+), refers to the union of the sets together in the inclusion sense (the maximum value of the two sets) while the logical notion AND, sign with (\*), refers to the intersection of sets, that is their overlap (the minimum value of the two sets) (Ragin, 2008: 36). Logical NOT, sign with (~), refers to the complement of the set and in algebraic term, the difference from the whole (1) of the given set. Concerning Boolean operators and representation, the upper-case letters indicate the presence of an outcome or of a condition while the lower-case letters indicate their absence.

### Set-theoretic consistency and coverage

Two measures to evaluate the set-theoretic relations are the consistency and the coverage. Both are measure of reliability of our results or to put it differently, of fit of the model we find. They are important in the QCA analysis in the same way that *significance* and *strength* are important in correlation analysis (Ragin, 2008: 45).

The set-theoretic **consistency** is a measure of the degree to which the cases sharing a given combination of conditions agree in displaying the outcome in question (Ragin, 2006: 297, Ragin, 2008: 45-46). The measure for consistency is the proportion of cases in which the relation holds relative to the number of cases in which we observe the condition, that is what proportion of observed cases are consistent with the pattern we found. Consistency responds to *how often* the solution terms and the solution as a whole are subsets of the outcome. Consistency and complexity of a solution are directly related to one another **since the less complex a solution is the more likely it is that it is also less consistent** (Schneider & Wagemann, 2003: 770).

The set-theoretic **coverage** gauges empirical relevance or importance and the way the solution coverage is calculated exhibits some conceptual similarities to the meaning of the level of explained variance (the coefficient of codetermination  $R^2$ ) in regression analysis (Ragin, 2006: 301, Ragin, 2008: 44-45). Coverage gives the relative importance of different paths to an outcome, through the proportion of total membership in outcome was explained by the causal condition. **Coverage for the solution found responds to how much of the outcome is explained by each solution term and the solution as a whole.**

‘Consistency and coverage sometimes work against each other... complex set-theoretic relation involving the intersection of many sets can achieve remarkable consistency but low coverage’ (Ragin, 2008: 55). **Although often a trade-off between consistency and coverage should be done still it is reasonable to calculate and establish first that a set relation is consistent and then calculate its coverage; this is because coverage gauges only empirical importance while consistency gauges theoretical importance, so a relation may be empirically ‘rare’ (low coverage) but still centrally relevant to theory (consistency high) (Ragin, 2008: 55).**

### QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Qualitative Comparative Analysis using Boolean algebra, improve traditional qualitative analysis since it can handle a larger number of cases than typically analyzed in qualitative

research without need in the large  $N$  of statistical analyses (Ragin, 2000). Furthermore, QCA brings methodological discipline and the rigor of quantitative analysis to qualitative analysis and offers a more systematic replicable approach to data analysis. QCA analysis may be exploited in a number of ways, such as summarize data, check for their coherence and more importantly QCA enables to corroborate or falsify hypothesis or existing theories (Berg-Schlosser *et al.*, 2009: 16).

QCA is designed to handle complex solutions and it contains procedures to minimize these complex patterns in order to achieve a desirable parsimony (Ragin, 1987: 121-123). The key analytical tool for analyzing complex causal patterns is the 'truth table' where for every case represented as one row there is the corresponding combination of values of the key causal variables (conditional configuration) together with the associated value of the outcome (dependent variable). The truth table is then analyzed and reduced with procedures of combinatorial logic to arrive at three min solutions.

### Fuzzy-set versus crisp-set analysis

The QCA, or named differently with its new covering heading as Configurational Comparative Methods (CCM)<sup>67</sup> encompasses three core specific techniques, the crisp-set (Boolean) QCA (csQCA), the fuzzy-set (fsQCA) and the multi-value (mvQCA)<sup>68</sup> qualitative comparative analysis.

With crisp-set we need to dichotomize the variables as being rather present or absent. But the dichotomization has the disadvantage of a large information loss since phenomena are rarely either completely present or completely absent (Pennings, 2003: 545). As such, dichotomizing imply a loss of information however this weakness can be overcome when we introduce the fuzzy-set notion into the logic of QCA since the fuzzy-set concept, unlikely from the crisp set (0 and 1), allows values in-between 0 and 1. Fuzzy-set or fsQCA (Ragin, 2000) allows the assignment of continuous 'membership scores' between '0' and '1' to be used in the coding and thus allows for a more fine-grained and information-rich analysis. If in crisp-sets a condition either exists or it does not, without any other option of partiality, in fuzzy-sets we have the possibility of addressing a condition that might exist partially to some degree. Fuzzy-set, differently from crisp-set, allow for *partial membership* making them more precise and better suited to represent variables that are not easily dichotomized. Furthermore, fuzzy-set are a well-developed mathematical system for addressing partial membership (Ragin, 2009: 89). In addition to the maximum and minimum values of 1 and 0, the fuzzy set also distinguishes between objects that are 'more in' versus 'more out' by using the 'crossover' point of 0.5. Fuzzy set for example is important especially in cases where the nature of data is continuous and would be problematic to simply rely on the conventional indication of either present or absent condition. A point to be reminded here is that the fuzzy membership values indicate *the strength* of membership (truth value) in a set not its probability (likelihood). Fuzzy set logic allows for gradations (degrees) and they do not

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<sup>67</sup> The more generic term for QCA, Configurational Comparative Methods (CCM), has been proposed latterly (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009) so not to confuse QCA as the overall method with crisp-set QCA specific technique.

<sup>68</sup> mvQCA is used with analysis of categorical data.



assign the likelihood of being true (the probability), that is a fuzzy-value of 0.7 indicates seven-tenths membership of a property (or more in than out) not the likelihood of occurring.

‘One of the greatest strength of fuzzy sets is that they make set theoretic analysis possible while retaining fine-gained empirical gradation’ (Ragin, 2008: 38). Fuzzy sets have many of the virtues of conventional interval-scale variables, but at the same time they permit set theoretic operations, operations that are outside the scope of conventional variable-oriented analysis (Ragin, 2008). Fuzzy sets are simultaneously qualitative and quantitative (fuzzy sets have the virtue of conventional variables and permit also for qualitative evaluation) since they combine qualitative and quantitative assessment in a single instrument (Ragin, 2000: 8; 2008: 30). With fuzzy sets it is possible to have the best of both worlds, namely, the precision that is prized by quantitative researchers and the use of substantive knowledge to calibrate measures that is central to qualitative research (Ragin, 2008: 82). All fuzzy sets consist of two qualitative states, full membership and full non-membership, and all the quantitative variation (the degree in-between) that exists between these two qualitative states.

Fuzzy-sets are better compared to crisp-sets not only because it goes beyond the presence/absence (the problem of simply dichotomizing) but furthermore as it is argued by Pennings the necessary conditions that may be missed, if used a crisp set, are revealed through fuzzy-set (2003: 562).<sup>69</sup> Although, the use of fuzzy-sets increases the complexity of a research study still it leads to higher content validity and results that are closer to reality. Fuzzy-sets are better preferred in dealing also with ‘problematic’ concepts and their measurement, since fuzzy-sets have the capability to capture and represent the inherent vagueness of the concepts. ‘Fuzzy sets are designed to handle a particular kind of uncertainty - namely degree-vagueness- which results when we have a property that can be possessed by objects to varying degrees’ (Smithson & Verkuilen, 2006: 6). For this book, the advantage of fuzzy set is that it gives precision not only of quantitative (continuous or discrete) variables but also of qualitative linguistic indicators and qualifiers typically included in European progress reports. Linguistic qualifiers, such as little, some, quite, many, much, give more precision and indicate a different fuzzy set membership of the variable rather than the simple present – absent dichotomization.

Moreover, fuzzy set 1) is more precise and demanding in assessment of consistency because a case although with both condition and outcome greater than the threshold (present) may be still substantially inconsistent when considered from the view point of fuzzy set; 2) is more encompassing since the assessment of conditions is based on patterns observed across all cases not on a small subset; 3) does not exacerbate the problem of limited diversity (a problem with mvQCA) (Ragin, 2009: 119).

### **Necessary and/or Sufficient conditions**

Causation in QCA is expressed in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. The analytical strategy of QCA is that of identifying causal conditions shared by cases with the same

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<sup>69</sup> ‘Basically, in crisp set analysis, the more limited the data in their diversity, the greater the role of simplifying assumptions. The greater this role is, the more likely it is that necessary conditions will be missed. This means that the main point of contrast between the two results is the necessary condition revealed in the fuzzy-set analysis’ Pennings (2003: 562).

outcome (necessary conditions) and examining if cases with the same causal (combinations of) conditions display the same outcome (sufficient conditions). The analysis of necessary conditions focuses and looks on positive cases-instances of outcomes (Ragin, 2000: 271) that is we look at all outcomes that are positive (cases displaying the outcome) and if all these positive outcomes share a common cause (a common condition is present). A necessary condition means that all instances of outcome exhibit the cause. Necessary are those causal conditions which 'must be present for the outcome in question to occur', in other words, whenever we have an outcome the cause should be also present. According to this understanding, a necessary condition exerts its effect independent of all other factors as it is present in all instances of the outcome. A condition is necessary meaning that it is a supporting condition and its effects are shown only in the context of (together with) other conditions, that is, a necessary condition appears in all the solutions combined with other conditions. The analysis of sufficient condition focuses on a condition (or combination of conditions) and check if they always are linked to the (positive) outcome (cases displaying the outcome). A condition is sufficient whenever the cause is present it should be followed by an outcome. A sufficient condition produce by itself the outcome, the occurrence of this condition alone will produce the outcome in question (Ragin, 2000: 92). Although sufficient causal conditions always produce by itself the outcome in question, this does not impede the existence of other conditions (sets of conditions) to be (altogether) sufficient also and produce the outcome. If the same condition (set of conditions) does not produce the outcome then the test of the sufficiency of the causal combination fails.

Both crisp set and fuzzy set are used to identify necessary and/or sufficient conditions. In crisp sets both conditions and outcomes (dependent and independent/intervening variables) get a 1 where the conditions/outcomes (variable) are present and a 0 in cases it is absent. As such a cause is necessary if in all cases where outcome is present the condition is also present (we check the cases where the outcome is present to find if a condition is also present in all these positive outcome) while a cause may be sufficient if a condition brings always the outcome (we check a specific condition if it brings always the outcome). In case of fuzzy sets a cause is necessary when its score is consistently higher than the score of the outcome while a cause is sufficient when its score is consistently lower than the score of the outcome. The 'subset principle' can be of great use to express them also in arithmetical terms. A cause is necessary if the score of cases in the outcome are less than or equal to the score on their respective cause (score of outcome  $\leq$  score of cause, that is, outcome are a subset of the cause). In the case of a sufficient cause it is the other way around. That is, a cause is sufficient if its score is consistently less than or equal to the score on their respective outcome (score of cause  $\leq$  score of outcome, that is the cause is now a subset of the outcome).

### **Deterministic, Probabilistic or Possibilistic results**

Although theoretically possible in empirical cases we hardly find any condition that is strictly necessary or strictly sufficient for all of the cases analyzed, they are the exception rather than the rule. So, finding the necessary and/or sufficient causes can and should be done either in deterministic when possible or probabilistic terms otherwise. Rather than making a strict interpretation of the data we can make inference using probabilistic methods in the evaluation

of the data. A veristic evaluation means that there is not even one case that fails the test, no exception is allowed. With a veristic (deterministic) approach, the researcher explores a hypothesis in which a single inconsistent data point is enough to rule out a conclusion of necessary or sufficient causation. This strategy is mostly used when the number of cases is small. While especially when the number of cases is greater a probabilistic or possibilistic approach using benchmarks or qualifiers is more adequate.

Ragin (2000) introduce a probabilistic test for allowing discomfoting cases; the first is the small-N version (30 or fewer cases) based on the binomial probability test and the second is used in large-N version (greater than 30 cases) based on the  $z$  test for the significance of the positive difference between a sample proportion and a benchmark proportion (Ragin, 2000: 116). The incorporation of probabilistic criteria sketch by Ragin and in more general applying formal statistical tests is supported also by some other authors as a way to correct possible problems. The main supportive argument here is that the probabilistic approach may open up the possibility to take ‘troubling aspects of social data – error, chance, randomness, and other factors – into account’ (Ragin, 2000: 109).

The debate seems to remain unsettle on whether we can use probabilistic test on QCA. Some authors argue against the use of statistical tests. For example Lieberman focus is mainly on the *deterministic* (that is no use of probability tests in QCA) aspect of QCA because he believes that ‘You cannot be probabilistic and at the same time employ the central concepts of QCA’ (2004: 25). Gerring, commenting on the issue states that ‘as the  $N$  increases, probabilistic techniques become possible; but QCA then loses its distinctiveness as a method and Boolean logic breaks down.’ (2001: 209, Footnote 15). Other scholars are more in favor of using probabilistic techniques. For example Mahoney, considers the idea that ‘necessary and sufficient causes are deterministic and inherently inconsistent with probabilistic analysis’ as one of the erroneous intuition (belief) that do not reflect a sophisticated understanding of QCA (2004: 18). Seawright also argues that by ‘rejecting the ideas and research tools developed in probability theory and statistics, QCA takes a major step backwards’ (2004: 27).

Beside those divided divergences on the issue of determinism-probability for QCA, it should be stressed that although there may be reasons and space on using statistical test in QCA still even those that acknowledged the use of probability (statistical) test do not implemented it anymore<sup>70</sup> and the software program do not incorporate the statistical tests analysis.

Still, given the argumentations above and the divide in the arguments, a middle-way will be to accept quasi-sufficient/necessary conditions in the proper sense of qualitative expressions not in statistical test since QCA is a qualitative method above all. In a ‘qualitative’ possibilistic approach, the data may not be fully consistent with necessary or sufficient causation, but the researcher may nevertheless infer that they are consistent with quasi-necessary and/or quasi-sufficient causation (using qualitative expressions such as *usually*, *often*). The ‘quasiness’ of necessity and sufficiency can be simply expressed qualitatively without further statistical tests of the proportion of cases that are consistent with the argument being tested. It is possible to assess the quasi-necessity or quasi-sufficiency of

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<sup>70</sup> I would like to thank Claudion Wageman for pointing to me this issue.

causal combinations using only linguistic qualifiers such as ‘more often than not’ for at least 0.50 (50% of cases), ‘usually’ for at least 0.65 (65% of cases) and ‘almost always’ for at least 0.80 (80% of cases) without having to link them with probabilistic criteria. As such the results are better interpreted as possible rather than certain.

### **CALIBRATION OF FUZZY SETS FOR QCA**

The most important and discussed issue of fuzzy QCA is the translation of the empirical evidence and data into fuzzy membership scores in the sets representing both the outcome and the conditions. The translation of data into fuzzy membership scores leaves open the possibility that the results of this process may be influenced by ‘measurement imprecision’ (Ragin, 2000). Such doubts of imprecision come primarily because of a ‘lack of a theory of measurement’ (see Clark *et al.*, 2006: 4 with further references). As such the calibration (that is, the translation of data and evidence into meaningful sets through the degree of membership) of data and evidences into degree of membership in a fuzzy set rests entirely on the researcher’s substantive and theoretical knowledge and as such there are no universal agreed upon standards that can be used for calibrating measures. Moreover, we risk of not achieving reliable conclusions since they become then consequences of how the data are measured. This makes the careful calibration of the data the most important and delicate step in the QCA analysis (Ragin, 2009). For calibration of continuous or ordinal indexes or scales to be translated into fuzzy sets we need first of all to define theoretical meaningful qualitative thresholds of what counts as full membership value (1) and full non-membership value (0) as well as a cut-off point (‘breakpoint’) value that is neither in nor out of the set. As such the most important task in the translation of data into set-membership values is to specify these three important qualitative thresholds and to offer an explicit rationale for each breakpoint, that is, the point of reaching full membership, of full non-membership, and the point of maximum ambiguity (Ragin, 2000: 158–161).

Beside the discussion and problematic on the calibration of data, there are techniques that can be used in order to identifying the thresholds or benchmarks of what constitute a full membership, a full nonmembership or the point of ambivalence of being rather in than out. Ragin (2008: 85-105) identifies two techniques for calibrating conventional interval and ratio-scale variables, the direct method and the indirect method. These two major ways of assigning membership score can be distinguished according to the way the anchors are decided. The membership criteria for fuzzy set may be 1) externally determined qualitative anchors (direct method) or 2) inductively derived qualitative grouping (indirect method). In order to use the direct method of calibration substantive knowledge should be available in order to provides the external criteria and make it possible to calibrate variables, if such knowledge is absent the indirect method is to be used. The first, based calibration on substantive knowledge while the second on mathematical/statistical models. Although it needs to be acknowledged that the three benchmarks points do not necessarily correspond to the lowest, highest, and mean value of a continuous dataset still ‘statistical procedures are useful to construct membership functions and to construct analyses based on fuzzy sets (Verkuilen, 2005: 468) especially when substantive knowledge is missing. Although these criteria may be not acceptable by all and they are open to criticism and improvement that is

why they are stated explicitly and applied systematically and transparently. Both methods yield precise calibrations of set membership scores based on translations using either qualitative anchors (direct methods) or qualitative groupings (indirect method). The first method relay in deductive knowledge from theory to set the qualitative anchors while the second, indirect method, relay more on inductive knowledge from empirical data to set the qualitative grouping.

### **The direct method**

The direct method is more knowledge centered and base calibration on external standards (the external standard used is a qualitative assessment of the degree to which cases with given scores on a conventional interval-scale measure are members of a target set). It uses three qualitative anchors (the point at which full membership is reached, the point at which full non-membership is reached, and the point of maximum ambiguity whether it is more in or more out). The qualitative anchors make it possible to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant variation (Ragin, 2008: 33). The direct method is a technique for calibrating conventional interval and ratio-scale variables base calibration on external, dependably known standards (Ragin, 2008). These external dependably known standards provide a context for the interpretation of scores. In order to calibrate the data it is necessary to invoke external standards (qualitative anchors) to assess what it is for a value to be considered in a specific set. In many circumstances the likely error in subjective assessments is less than those found in seemingly objective indicators, which may have substantial bias but still although the direct method and a subjective scale might well be a better reflection of what is actually going on, still some main problems remain with direct assignment, such as interpretation the meaning of numbers when they are not related to more easily interpreted, reliably particularly for very abstract concepts, subjectivity, neglect estimation of uncertainty, differences in meaning across subjects (Verkuilen, 2005: 470-474). In order to create fuzzy sets using the 'direct' method of calibration the membership scores are calculated using the formula proposed by Ragin (2008):  $\text{Degree of Membership} = \exp(\log \text{ odds}) / (1 + \exp(\log \text{ odds}))$ , where variables scores are translated into the metric of log odds. This method of calibration is now automated in the latest version of the fs/QCA software package.

The most usefulness of 'direct' method is when the researcher has substantial knowledge at hand. Unfortunately, substantial knowledge may be missing, and not providing enough evidence to guide calibration. In such cases knowledge may be gain inductively, through statistical and mathematical information of the data.

### **The indirect method**

When deciding thresholds if it is not possible to justify the threshold on substantive and/or theoretical grounds then a mechanical cutoff point based on technical criteria (mean and median) can be used (e.g., considering the distribution of cases along a continuum) (Rihoux & Meur, 2009: 42). This indirect method is more variable centered approach and base calibration on internal standards such as the mean and standard deviation. The challenge with the direct method is that the membership criteria (qualitative grouping) must reflect agreed-upon standards otherwise; the constitution of a category or set will be contested. The indirect

method offers a crude form of calibration as it relays on (deductive standards) mean and standard deviation which vary from sample to sample (Ragin, 2008: 77). Where qualitative anchors are missing, the calibration will relay on the use of statistical methods to assist the determination of membership. To qualitatively group the data, I will use measures of variation, specifically the standard deviation and z-scores to place each case in the total distribution and differentiate between degrees of inclusion and exclusion. Given that I will use a 4-scale grouping, I used (quartile values) in order to group the cases into their specific set. Once the z-scores for each case relative to the mean of the distributions is determine then the following grouping will proceed.

|   |                                |     |                          |
|---|--------------------------------|-----|--------------------------|
| Fuzzy score of 1.00: fully in           | $z\text{-score} \geq 0.6745$   | 25% | 4 <sup>th</sup> quartile |
| Fuzzy score of 0.67: more or less in    | $0.6745 > z\text{-score} > 0$  | 25% | 3 <sup>rd</sup> quartile |
| Fuzzy score of 0.50: neither in nor out | $z\text{-score} = 0$           |     |                          |
| Fuzzy score of 0.33: more or less out   | $0 > z\text{-score} > -0.6745$ | 25% | 2 <sup>nd</sup> quartile |
| Fuzzy score of 0.00: fully out          | $z\text{-score} \leq -0.6745$  | 25% | 1 <sup>st</sup> quartile |

Note: In the normal distribution the mean is zero and the standard deviation is one and virtually all scores lie between  $-2.5$  and  $2.5$ . The quartile values leaves 25% between 0 and  $0.6745\sigma$  and also 25% between 0 and  $-0.6745\sigma$ , and in the other two tails (value smaller than  $-0.6745\sigma$  and bigger than  $0.6745\sigma$ ) 25% each.

### QCA WEAKNESSES AND POSSIBLE WAYS TO HANDLE THEM

Apart from the validity of operationalization (that is, if the variable measures what it is supposed to measure) and the discussion on possible limitations of the measurement calibration (that is putting the qualitative anchors) there are several potential pitfalls that one should keep in mind and need to handle in order not to bias the results obtained through the application of the QCA method. The most significant of them, beside the precise calibration of the conditions and outcome (variables) discussed above, are the selection of the independent variables and of the cases (that will be discussed in detail in the next chapter) and the **limited diversity**.

Although QCA studies diversity, in the empirical analysis diversity may be limited. Diversity is limited when logically possible configurations of relevant conditions do not appear empirically. The danger of limited diversity is that the necessary conditions may be overlooked (Ragin, 2000: 115). The first way to handle this limitation is to keep conditions (independent variables) in a reasonable amount excluding less relevant explanatory factors or group them under one condition if supported by theoretical knowledge (the example in this book may be the bureaucratic effectiveness and rule of law, which may be grouped under the administrative capacity condition). **The general rule is that the number of possible combinations of causal conditions, calculated as  $2^k$  where k is the number of causal conditions (independent variables), should at least not exceed the total number of cases under investigation.** For example, in this book the total number of cases will be equal to 45 (7years x 6countries and 1country x 3years= 42+3= 45case) while the possible combinations of 5 causal conditions is 32 ( $2^5$ ), compared to total number of cases investigated is less. Still, this is not a golden rule, as the empirical evidence will most likely show limited diversity (many cases may have same configuration) and not cover all logically possible combinations. Given that limited diversity is the rule rather than the exception and in order to deal with it the QCA

analysis has techniques which treat logically possible but empirically not observed configurations as 'logical remainders' (Ragin, 2000: 107, 198). There are explicit procedures to handle logical remainders (the limited diversity) in a QCA analysis. Firstly, logical remainders are ignored by the analysis, thus producing the most complex solution (no logical remainders used). Secondly, logical remainders are included as simplifying assumptions producing the most parsimonious solution (logical remainders used without evaluating their plausibility). There is also a third way to even select on, based on the substantive knowledge, which logical remainders are plausible to include arriving at an intermediate solution (logical remainders restricted to those that are most plausible). Each of these solution specify a complex, parsimonious, intermediate solution of combination of necessary and sufficient causes for the presence or the absence of the outcome to be explained and makes the analysis explicit and the interpretation of the results reach. One of the great strength of QCA is that all counterfactuals, both easy and difficult, are made explicit (Ragin, 2008: 167) (rather avoiding or including them or even selecting on which to include) making this process transparent and open to re-evaluations.

Furthermore, Ragin himself warns us that QCA is not a panacea and it does not substitute for insight or for in-depth knowledge of the research topic (2000: 87). Moreover, he and other prominent scholars on QCA suggest using other approaches if possible. In the light of this warning and not to over-rely on QCA alone I will further substantiate the QCA results by a qualitative survey of bureaucrats and politicians dealing with the European integration of the Western Balkans, seeing how much the findings from QCA corroborate with the response of the experts.

## **OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE OUTCOME(S) AND CONDITIONS, DATA GATHERING AND THEIR CALIBRATION**

‘All social science concepts are vague, in the sense that it is frequently very difficult to assign objects to exactly defined categories.’ (Verkuilen, 2005: 462).

A way to handle such vagueness of the concept is the application of fuzzy sets as ‘they can be used to help make analyses, perhaps ironically, less fuzzy because vagueness is managed formally’ (Verkuilen, 2005: 464). The crucial stage in the fuzzy-set analysis is the assigning of the fuzzy membership scores. Although it is the researcher’s duty on assigning fuzzy membership score to each variable (conditions and outcome) and this assignment is conventional based on qualitative evaluations, it is important that all the necessary steps and procedures on how one arrives on such decisions should be open and explicit as to give other scholars the possibility of their evaluation (Ragin, 2000: 6). The assigning of fuzzy membership depends greatly on the nature of the data available. The more straightforward the data are the better and more transparent the evaluation may be. But given that there may be a scarcity of available data for certain variables it is the difficult and demanding task of the researcher to find other ways of proceeding and indicators of qualitatively assigning the score. Such choices can be certainly challenged and re-evaluated by future researches.

For this research a four-value scheme (0, fully out; 0.33, more out than in; 0.67, more in than out; 1, fully in) seems more appropriate to be used. As Ragin argues ‘the four-value scheme is especially useful in situations where researchers have substantial amount of information about cases, but the evidence is not systematic or strictly comparable from case to case’ (2008: 31, 2009: 90). Also other schemes with more or less differentiation can be used but the middle solution between the crisp set and a fine great scale of fuzz set is preferred here because the information for some variables are not so discrete for a fine-grain qualitative distinction (such as the determinacy and density condition, the socialization condition of twinning and TAIEX programs) and other variables (bureaucratic efficiency and rule of law) that have more exact data information. If in a dichotomous crisp set we gain simplicity, in a greater value scheme fuzzy set we gain fine-grained information.

The aim here is to find the best solution which simplifies the data at the minimum cost of losing some fine-grained information.

### **DATA COLLECTION**

Given that ‘the degree of maturity and robustness of a generalization will strongly depend on the quality of the empirical data set constructed by the researcher’ (Berg-Schlusser *et al.*,



2009: 12), it is important that data collection be explicitly argued and the step arriving at those be fully exposed.

In trying to finding the multi-causality of change as result of Europeanization, this book will employ an empirical study. The data will draw both from quantitative as well as qualitative evidences available. For example the data on the outcome (the dependent variable) will be qualitatively drawn from the official documents on Association and Stabilization process of the EU with the potential member states. To do so, I will (qualitatively) collect data from the European Commission reports on the rule adoption and implementation of the EU standards/acquis as part of SAA for all the Western Balkan countries (potential member states) over a period of at least six years (from the first report 2002-2008). The data (expressed in qualitative form, of progress) will be drawn through 'reading between the lines' of the summaries of the Commission reports.

While time and countries are taken into account systematically, that is not the case with policies as the data will give an aggregate value/evaluation of the SAA's EU standards/acquis policies in general (a country may fair well in a specific policy but not well in another, here what it counts is the total not some policy in particular). This qualitative database will then be coded into fuzzy values and form the outcome (dependent variable) basis for conducting a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA).

In order to establish the conditions of rule adoption and implementation (independent variables) I will rely primarily on already existing political quantitative databases (such as World Governance Index, POLCON). The advantage with these data rests not only in ensuring maximum consistency across countries and over time but also on the easiness to transform into qualitative data as they are accompanied by descriptive characteristics and categories (e.g. Good Governance index beside the numerical points has grouped the score into categories) making fsQCA coding transparent, clear and more reliable. When such already existing data sources are missing literature will be used in order to generate new data and calibrate them. It needs to be stressed that being a new research agenda, the discussion on the quality of data used in Europeanization are usually problematic and in absent of other choices they may show limitations,<sup>71</sup> for this reasons a more comprehensive discussion on each of the data used will follow in other sections of this chapter.

The database in itself will provide systematic quantitative and qualitative data covering a large period of time and countries from the Western Balkans which may prove valuable for other researchers investigating the adoption and implementation of SAA rules in the Western Balkans candidate countries as the process seems to take long.

## CASE AND ISSUE SELECTION

Studies on Europeanization have demonstrated that countries, time as well as policy matters. For example, Börzel *et al.* (2004) found that there is significant variation across member

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<sup>71</sup> Sverdrup argues that 'So far, we have often relied upon data generated by European institutions. These data are not collected and presented primarily for the purpose and criteria of relevance for researchers, and they have some important limitations.' (2005: 21; 2007: 209). For a detailed discussion on the quality of data used in Europeanization literature see: Börzel, 2001; Hartlapp & Falkner, 2009.

states and policy sectors.<sup>72</sup> Heinze *et al.* also found in their study that ‘results differ across policy fields’ (2008: 3) and the explanatory power of some variables may be more pronounced in some policies rather than in other.<sup>73</sup> Moreover, we have data not on absolute level of Europeanization but rather on the progress made by each country on a yearly base. As such we can analyze relative Europeanization that is with reference to rather variation across time periods, potential member states and/or policy sectors.

## Countries

We selected all WB cases not simply in order to ensure variation in the outcome but also to present a fully cross comparative study of Europeanization process in the potential member states which have received little attention after the CEECs become member state in 2004. The countries selected for this analysis are all the potential candidate and candidate countries from the Western Balkan region; Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia since they are all (potential) candidate countries. In the analysis of potential member states I have excluded Turkey, - which is also a candidate country - , not only because of the vastly different political, social, and economic situation this country have but also because Turkey had the perspective and started its integration process even before the CEE countries did. This makes Turkey a special case in this same wave of integration of Western Balkans. To keep cases comparable, I focus only on the potential candidate and candidate countries from the Western Balkans since they share similar domestic administrative, political and economical background and same integration perspective. Although in QCA approach the cases (population) may be heterogeneous and no need for homogeneous cases as in the quantitative approach, still instead of analyzing cases as absolute unique I prefer to focus on cases which fit into certain types or kinds (as the group of WB countries are).

## Polic(ies)

The major tool of EU has been the (SAp) the Accession process through conditionality on many political, economical and policies issues. As such the EU membership criteria seem to constitute a general background on which the EU influence (Europeanization process) takes place. Here it is important to call the attention on the importance of selection on this general background. Selecting to analyze the adoption and implementation of only *acquis communautaire* is both theoretical and practical. On a theoretical base Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005b, 2007) distinguish between two main context of Europeanization in CEE, *democratic* and *acquis* EU conditionality,<sup>74</sup> based on the rationale that in each of them

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<sup>72</sup> Controlling for time trends they found that the level of non-compliance in the European Union has not increased over time within member states while there are some exceptions within policy sectors in which non-compliance also varies significantly across time.

<sup>73</sup> ‘Whereas the explanatory power of the so-called goodness of fit is quite pronounced in environmental policy, rule-specific explanations like the degree of open legal terms in EU directives fit better for social policy’ (Heinze *et al.*, 2008: 3).

<sup>74</sup> Democratic conditionality concerns the general EU rules of liberal democracy while *acquis* conditionality concerns the specific rules of EU’s *acquis communautaire*.

different processes and factors of Europeanization are operative; If the external incentives model can largely account for the impact of EU in candidate countries in both democratic and *acquis* conditionality, the social learning and lesson-drawing are primarily relevant only in the context of *acquis* conditionality (2005: 210-212). Furthermore, EU democratic conditionality starts with the beginning of post-communist transition in Eastern European countries the *acquis* conditionality comes at a later stage only once the potential member states start to prepare for membership (democratic conditionality needs to be fulfilled prior before *acquis* conditionality).<sup>75</sup>

On a practical base having a wide range of issues under influence, the doubt arise on if the changes are a result of only EU pressure? As many scholars have noticed it is often difficult to isolate the ‘net effect’ of Europe and to disentangle it from other international sources. ‘The context of transformation makes it difficult, however, to distinguish unambiguously between those processes that are caused by, and connected to, EU integration and those associated with democratization and marketization’ (Lippert *et al.*, 2001: 985). The democratic conditionality is linked to fundamental political principles of liberal democracy and the institutions of market economy. Such democratic requirements are not only required by EU, rather a number of other international organizations such as NATO, OSCE and Council of Europe have required the fulfillment of such democratic conditions in order for the eastern European countries to become member of them. These democratic conditions better fit into democratization literature, as efforts of international organization to help transform post-communists countries from communist regimes to consolidated democracies and from state centralized economies to free market economy. Western Balkans countries have been aspiring to join these institutions and as a result they have been under influence of many of these International Organizations in many political issues (OSCE, NATO) or economical issues (World Bank). So how can we be sure that changes observed at the national level are originated by EU (or member states) pressure and models, and not by other equally important external forces? Is there any issue/area where the external influence can be exclusively attributed to EU? If ‘democratic’ conditionality and ‘economic’ conditionality have been subject to many other external actors concerns, the ‘*acquis*’ conditionality have been an exclusive concern of EU since it deals with the EU policies and rules. Furthermore *acquis* ‘are not additional requirements to political and economic reform. Rather, they identify the most urgent priorities and give orientation and direction by putting reform and the goal of sustainability in the context of integration into EU structures’ (COM, 2002: 17).

This justifies the choice of studying only ‘*acquis* conditionality’ of SAP as policies ‘exclusively’ under EU. The other issue regards which policies and which of their aspects should be considered. In this book I will consider, both the legislative and policy changes and

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<sup>75</sup> Note here that ‘the temporal distinction between the two contexts is not always perfectly clear-cut. In many cases, *acquis communautaire* already began to apply before all the problems of democratic conditionality had been sorted out. In eastern enlargement, regulatory alignment (such as the process triggered by the 1995 White Paper on the adoption of internal market rules) had started for the associated countries, although the EU still criticized the authoritarian politics of the Slovak government and the lack of respect for minority rights in the Baltic countries’ (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005b: 212).

their practical application in the field of EU standards/acquis communautaire. The main indicative element of the Europeanization process as adaptation is the Western Balkans performance on adopting and implementing the acquis and it can be proxy by an aggregate index measuring the general annual progress made by the WBs. Several reasons justify this choice. First of all, not all of the acquis policy are relevant for every country at every year since, different from the CEECs, the Western Balkans have a different pace in accession process (on a specific year the EU conditionality is non-uniform and specific to countries stage of accession). And secondly, choosing over the policies to be considered has a degree of bias since policies matter and are endogenous to the process. An aggregate of the overall acquis communautaire solves 'the problem of intentional selection of cases' (Haverland, 2005). Although performance on aligning and implementing the acquis could have been possible to a measure at the level of each policy directive, for example through special program of word counting (see Hille & Knill, 2006). Here, it is preferred that the analysis to be at the aggregate level where information to be gathered is more direct and possible to be handled also through reading between reports lines. Gaining in the quality of data collected, it is recognized that aggregation comes at a cost, as it skip any opportunity for testing policy-dependent conditions which may be a suggestion for further research.

## Time

Although theoretically, we could study Europeanization process in the WB countries from 2000 onwards when the Sap was launched and the WB gained the perspective of joining EU (for more refer to chapter 3). For practical reasons the time-period covered by the analysis will be the Stabilization and Association process starting from 2002 time when the European Commission publish its first SAA report on the Western Balkan countries and ending as recently as data were available (2008) so at least a five-year period is covered.

Following the logic of QCA analysis any combination which can vary across countries and over time is a unit for our analysis. Every time the value of a variable for a country in a given year changes this is a new combination and constitutes a new unit (observation) for our analysis. It is important to remind here that 'units' do not always equate with 'cases'. For instance, a case (*unit of analysis*) could be a country, whereas a unit of observation within that case could be... that country at a given point in time' (Berg-Schlosser & Meur, 2009: 32, footnote 1). So the cases (countries) being considered with their characteristics (conditions) and each of these cases is being observed in a number of times (yearly base from 2002-2008).

In sum, I analyze seven countries, six of them from 2002-2008 (seven years) and one more country (Montenegro) from 2006-2008 (three years) (since Serbia and Montenegro where one country and the data for Montenegro are available from 2006 onwards once Montenegro and Serbia becomes two separate countries). So the total number of cases will be equal to 45 (7years x 6countries and 1country x 3years= 42+3= 45case) that is greater compared with the possible combinations of causal conditions ( $2^k$  where k is the number of conditions, independent variables), that is  $2^5 = 32$ . Although I follow the suggestions by Berg-Schlosser and Meur who suggest that while there is no ideal balance between the number of cases and the number of conditions 'a common practice, in an intermediate-N analysis (say, 10 to 40

cases) would be to select from 4 to 6-7 conditions' (2009: 28), still this is not a guarantee, as the empirical evidence will most likely show limited diversity and not cover all logically possible combinations. As Ragin argues 'having a larger number of cases is no guarantee, however, that remainders can be avoided. Again, limited diversity (i.e., an abundance of remainder rows) is the rule, not the exception, in the study of naturally occurring social phenomena' (2008: 158). If this will be the case and empirical data show limited diversity, it will be transparently treated in the way suggested by Ragin and discussed in previous chapter.

## EUROPEANIZATION OUTCOME (DEPENDENT VARIABLE)<sup>76</sup>

### Operationalizing Europeanization as Adoption and Implementation

The first issue in Europeanization research is if the concept can be measured at all and how. The reviewed literature gives a variety of possibilities of how to conceptualize and operationalize Europeanization. Scholars have used different other concepts to refer to Europeanization. In both the member states countries and candidate countries Europeanization is perceived as compliance, transposition, implementation, adoption or alignment. Moreover, even those concepts have been measured in a wide range of possibilities through the reference of transposition time (rates of prompt transposition, delay in transposition) or the occurrence of infringement procedures (notifications, reason opinions, referrals and judgments by the European Court of Justice). Europeanization as a complex concept at best can be used to summarize the union among different observable components and as such it is very difficult to pin it down to only one concrete indicator.

Noticing the vastness of operationalization and the complexity the outcome (dependent variable) of Europeanization has, one has to make choices and narrow the scope of investigation by analyzing only certain aspects of it. For making a balance trade-off between keeping the full representation of the concept and at the same time have clear and concrete indicators, it is usually preferable and a good strategy to break the concepts down into components, subjectively assign membership for the components—preferably according to explicit rules—and then reconnect the components according to a model; fuzzy set theory provides a great number of aggregators that accommodate disjunctive ('or,' which represents a situation of redundancy among components), compensatory ('average,' which represents trade-offs among components), and conjunctive ('and,' which represents a lack of substitution among components) models naturally (Verkuilen, 2005: 471 with further references). That is why in this book in order to completely and comprehensively argue for an Europeanization effect that might take place not only on the level of revoking legislation but instead also on the level of implementation I code *adoption* of formal rule separately from the *implementation* and *Europeanization* as logical conjunctive of the previous two, that is both

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<sup>76</sup> 'In correlational studies researchers usually identify a 'dependent variable'- an outcome that varies across cases... The important consideration, in this procedure, is that the outcome must vary across relevant 'observations'... In a comparative case study of commonalities, by contrast, the outcome is often something that does not vary substantially across cases (Ragin, 2000: 32). So I prefer to use 'outcome' being coherent with the method used.

components (adoption and implementation) should be present, none of them does substitute the other.

Given that the Europeanization in the potential member states is a process and that the misfit with European norms and rules has been deep the impact needs time to arrive at it. The key aspect of the outcome (dependent variable) here is (positive) legislative (in formal rule adoption) and policy (practical implementation) change compare to previous status quo on a yearly base. (Positive) change in both formal rule adoption and implementation compare to the previous status quo at a given point in time will be the two indicators for measuring Europeanization in the potential member states. As such the dependent variable (outcome) will be operationalized as performance of the potential member states in both adopting and implementing their laws and policies towards EU *acquis* conditionality. Operationalizing Europeanization as performance of both adopting and implementing, I intend not to assess the actual degree of convergence achieved by WB countries but rather their performance in aligning and implementing EU conditionality aiming to deduce the factors that might determine such performance. Furthermore Europeanization performance here includes not only formal aspects (adoption laws) but also the aspect of practical application (implementation) of the EU requirements.

### **Data and the calibration of the Outcome**

In the member state countries the date for the dependent variable usually are based exclusively on official data from EU databases (*Celex* and *Eurlex*) only in few exceptions they are complemented with national legislative sources.<sup>77</sup> On the candidate countries the official EU data are taken rather by the Internal Market Scoreboards (only for internal market directives and only for candidate countries) compiled by DG Internal Market of the European Commission (see e.g. Dimitrova & Toshkov, 2009) or the general European Commission progress report monitoring the accession process (see e.g. Hille & Knill, 2006).

In this book, to provide a measure for the performance of the potential member states towards the adoption and implementation of the EU *acquis* conditionality the EU Commission progress reports will be used. These reports were introduced to strictly monitor the performance of the potential member states on a yearly base. There are several sound reasons that justify such a choice. The assessment of the process as recorded in the EU annual progress reports offers a very useful source of systematic and aggregate information on the performance of the potential member states in aligning their policies towards EU requirements. The European Commission's regular reports are the key documents in the EU's membership conditionality policy. Not only have these reports made clear in what areas countries were expected to introduce further reforms, they have also evaluated the progress made by candidate countries on a yearly basis. Furthermore, these reports speak of the progress of potential member states with regard to not only the formal transposition of EU

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<sup>77</sup> These official data although extensively used in empirical analysis have been criticized of being potentially biased. For a latter, extensive argumentation on the limitations of EU official data see: Hartlapp & Falkner, 2009.

policies but also the aspect of practical application (Hille & Knill, 2006: 541). Beside the advantages the data may have potential limitations. As Hille & Knill also acknowledge these data would not be a valid measurement of Europeanization 'if the European Commission were biased – by political or other reasons – towards under- or overestimating the performance of certain of the candidate countries' (2006: 541). Another potential shortcoming may be the possibility of endogeneity problem of the dependent variable with for example World Bank governance indicators as 'the analysts' assessments are likely to stem at least to some degree from the criticisms or approvals contained in the Commission reports' (Toshkov, 2008: 382) or the reverse, that is the European Commission may draw heavily from the World Bank Governance reports to evaluate WB progress. Dimitrova for example caution us that World Bank Governance index may partly coincide with the European Commission's regular assessments for implementation (2007: 9, footnote 13). Another argumentation may be the subjectivity on EU reports since there are no specific measurable standards of evaluating progress. But as Grabbe argues, although EU did not had clear benchmarks to show progress it was working towards producing them in some areas (2001: 1024). Now, in the case of WB, given also the experience with CEEC, as it was confirmed also by an expert interview, EU has precise benchmarks (Diplomat of Candidate Country Mission to EU).

The basic source for coding adaptation will be the DG progress reports on the Western Balkans countries. Since March 2002, the Commission has reported regularly to the Council and Parliament on progress made by the countries of the Western Balkans region. These progress reports are on a yearly base and largely follow the same structure as in the previous years. Progress is measured on the basis of decisions taken, legislation adopted and measures implemented. As a rule, legislation or measures which are under preparation or await Parliamentary approval have not been taken into account. This approach ensures equal treatment across all reports and permits an objective assessment. The reports are compiled by the Commission based on information gathered from many sources. These sources include information and contributions from the Commission delegations in each capital, the national governments of potential member states and the Member States, European Parliament reports and assessments made by various international organization (in particular Council of Europe, OSCE, International Financial institutions) and non-governmental organizations.<sup>78</sup>

With respect to the process of monitoring, as was the case with the CEECs, SAP's key mechanism is the Commission's annual progress reports which were instituted in 2001 with the aim of assessing the compliance of the countries of the Western Balkans with the 1997 Council criteria as well as measuring progress towards achieving the objectives set up in the SAP. As Grabbe has notice this is the new mechanism that EU is using to monitor the progress or not of the political reforms and adaptation to EU requirements. It is to be mention that the reports do give a qualitative evaluation of if progress is achieved, or partially achieved or if it is not achieve at all, sometimes they follow with more details that will also be considered especially if some explicit statement is missing.

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<sup>78</sup> This is found in all the progress reports (introduction, preface).

An examples extracted from the reports (emphasis with bold is added)

Albania has made **progress in aligning** its legislation, policies and capacity with European standards. It now **needs to enhance its efforts in the implementation** of these laws and policies... Montenegro has made **further progress in alignment** with European standards... Serbia is **well placed to implement** the SAA and the Interim Agreement, thanks to its good administrative capacity. There has been **progress** in the field of free movement of goods and continued improvements in customs and taxation administrations. However, there was **little legislative output** on European standards and weak enforcement capacity in competition... Kosovo has made **some progress in approximating** its legislation and policies with European standards notably in areas such as customs, agriculture and free movement of goods. However, **little progress** has been made **on the effective implementation and enforcement** of legislation... (Memo, 2008). Croatia has **improved its ability to take on the obligations of membership**. Preparations for meeting EU requirements are moving forward at a steady pace. **Significant progress** has been made in economic and monetary policy and information society and media. **Good progress** has been made in many chapters, such as public procurement, intellectual property law, customs union, food safety and financial services. However, **significant efforts** lie ahead, in particular in areas such as judiciary and fundamental rights, environment, competition policy and agriculture and rural development... The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has made **good progress in legislative alignment** with the EU's legal order in a significant number of areas such as public procurement, competition, transport, enterprise and industrial policy, information society and media... However the country still **faces shortcomings in implementing and effectively enforcing legislation**... (Memo, 2008).

For the years 2002, 2003, 2004 the first, second and third Annual reports of the European commission on The Stabilization and Association process for South East Europe will be used. Each of the reports include in it annexes a summary of individual country reports. From 2005 onwards the Memo documents on the key findings of the progress reports on both the potential and candidate countries will be used.<sup>79</sup> In the cases where the countries are missed in the general reports it is because they have applied for membership, in such cases the commission opinion on the specific applicant country will be consulted. This reports also have a same format and indicate the progress or not of the applicants countries. There are two such commission opinion reports, one on 2004 for Croatia and one on 2005 for Macedonia.

The scale to calibrate the qualitative assessment of the relative adoption and implementation (in this case the relative means the progress compared to the previous year) is a four-value scale. The grouping is done according to the particular qualitative expressions found in the reports. The European Commission used distinct qualitative phrases (see the extract above) to describe progress with regard to meeting the EU requirements. The word progress is the key word and a *relative progress* is sufficient enough to bring the countries

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<sup>79</sup> Note: From 2005 the memo documents about the key findings of the progress reports do not include all WB in one. One memo regards the potential candidate countries Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro and Kosovo and the other one the candidate countries of Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey as well.



into the threshold of adopting and implementing EU standards and acquis.<sup>80</sup> That is why the word *relative progress* will be the value for the cross-over point (0.5) to discriminate between progress or non-progress. The no progress will be used for full non-membership (0) while the superlative words significant, good or full will be for full membership (1). All the other in-between words will be grouped depending on their additional meaning. I code as not fully non-membership (0.33) if they have pejorative meaning, some, little, limited and I code as not fully membership (0.67) if they have word progress.

The outcome corresponding to adoption and implementation (further in the analysis denoted as adopt, implem) in each of the European reports takes assessment of no progress (0 fuzzy membership); little, few, limited or some progress (0.33 fuzzy membership); progress (0.67 fuzzy membership); good, significant or full progress (1 fuzzy membership)

|  |                       |
|--|-----------------------|
| No progress                            | 0 fuzzy membership    |
| Little, few, limited, or some progress | 0.33 fuzzy membership |
| Progress                               | 0.67 fuzzy membership |
| Good, Significant or Full progress     | 1 fuzzy membership    |

**Table 19:** Qualitative data extracted from Commission progress reports

| Countries | Years | Adoption<br>(EU Standards/<br>Acquis) | Adopt<br>(Fuzzy<br>Value) | Implementation<br>(EU Standards/<br>Acquis) | Implem<br>(Fuzzy<br>Value) |
|-----------|-------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------|---|----------------------------|
| Albania   | 2002  | (relative) Progress                   | 0.33                      | Limited Progress                            | 0.33                       |
|           | 2003  | Limited Progress                      | 0.33                      | Limited Progress                            | 0.33                       |
|           | 2004  | Limited Progress                      | 0.33                      | Limited Progress                            | 0.33                       |
|           | 2005  | Some progress                         | 0.33                      | Some Progress                               | 0.33                       |
|           | 2006  | Some progress                         | 0.33                      | Some Progress                               | 0.33                       |
|           | 2007  | Progress                              | 0.67                      | Progress                                    | 0.67                       |
|           | 2008  | Progress                              | 0.67                      | Little Progress                             | 0.33                       |
| BiH       | 2002  | No Progress                           | 0                         | No Progress                                 | 0                          |
|           | 2003  | Progress                              | 0.67                      | Little Progress                             | 0.33                       |
|           | 2004  | Little Progress                       | 0.33                      | Limited Progress                            | 0.33                       |
|           | 2005  | Progress                              | 0.67                      | Some Progress                               | 0.33                       |
|           | 2006  | Progress                              | 0.67                      | Little Progress                             | 0.33                       |
|           | 2007  | Limited Progress                      | 0.33                      | Limited Progress                            | 0.33                       |
|           | 2008  | Some Progress                         | 0.33                      | Good Progress                               | 1                          |
| Croatia   | 2002  | Good Progress                         | 1                         | Little Progress                             | 0.33                       |
|           | 2003  | Progress                              | 0.67                      | Some Progress                               | 0.33                       |
|           | 2004  | Progress                              | 0.67                      | Little Progress                             | 0.33                       |
|           | 2005  | Progress                              | 0.67                      | Little Progress                             | 0.33                       |
|           | 2006  | Some Progress                         | 0.33                      | Progress                                    | 0.67                       |
|           | 2007  | Progress                              | 0.67                      | Progress                                    | 0.67                       |
|           | 2008  | Progress                              | 0.67                      | Progress                                    | 0.67                       |
| Kosovo    | 2002  | Some Progress                         | 0.33                      | No Progress                                 | 0                          |
|           | 2003  | Some Progress                         | 0.33                      | Little progress                             | 0.33                       |
|           | 2004  | Progress                              | 0.67                      | Progress                                    | 0.67                       |
|           | 2005  | Some Progress                         | 0.33                      | Progress                                    | 0.67                       |
|           | 2006  | Some Progress                         | 0.33                      | Limited Progress                            | 0.33                       |
|           | 2007  | Further Progress                      | 0.67                      | Little Progress                             | 0.33                       |
|           | 2008  | Some Progress                         | 0.33                      | Little Progress                             | 0.33                       |

<sup>80</sup> The report on Albania, in 2002, notice that ‘All this relative progress has brought Albania to the threshold of negotiating a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU’ (COM 2002). As such the relative progress can be considered the threshold to discriminate between progress or non-progress.

|            |      |                      |      |                 |      |
|------------|------|----------------------|------|-----------------|------|
| Macedonia  | 2002 | Little Progress      | 0.33 | Little progress | 0.33 |
|            | 2003 | Little Progress      | 0.33 | Little progress | 0.33 |
|            | 2004 | Little Progress      | 0.33 | Little progress | 0.33 |
|            | 2005 | Significant Progress | 1    | Little progress | 0.33 |
|            | 2006 | Some Progress        | 0.33 | Little Progress | 0.33 |
|            | 2007 | Progress             | 0.67 | Little Progress | 0.33 |
|            | 2008 | Good Progress        | 1    | Little Progress | 0.33 |
| Montenegro | 2006 | Some Progress        | 0.33 | Progress        | 0.67 |
|            | 2007 | Some Progress        | 0.33 | Some Progress   | 0.33 |
|            | 2008 | Further progress     | 0.67 | Some Progress   | 0.33 |
| S&M        | 2002 | Some Progress        | 0.33 | Little Progress | 0.33 |
|            | 2003 | Some Progress        | 0.33 | Some Progress   | 0.33 |
|            | 2004 | Some Progress        | 0.33 | Little Progress | 0.33 |
|            | 2005 | Progress             | 0.67 | Little Progress | 0.33 |
| Serbia     | 2006 | Good Progress        | 1    | Progress        | 0.67 |
|            | 2007 | Progress             | 0.67 | Good Progress   | 1    |
|            | 2008 | Some Progress        | 0.33 | Good Progress   | 1    |

Source: My own calculations of qualitative data extracted from COM (2002) 163 final, COM (2003) 139 final, COM (2004) 202 final, COM (2005) 562, MEMO/05/410 2005, MEMO/05/411 2005, MEMO/06/411 2006, MEMO/06/412 2006, MEMO/07/446 2007, MEMO/07/447, MEMO/08/672 2008, MEMO/08/675 2008. For the detailed references on the words taken from the report see table 43 in appendix (data commission report).

## OPERATIONALIZING KEY CONDITIONS (INDEPENDENT AND INTERVENING VARIABLES)

### Operationalization of Veto Players - Political constrains

Once the EU conditionality is set-up for the potential member states, political opposition by actors within the government (or the broader political system, president, parliament, constitutional courts) may arise and delay adoption and implementation. In Europeanization literature the number of veto players (points) is strongly considered and has shown some empirical evidence. Veto players, - as defined by Tsebelis, - are those ‘actors whose agreement is necessary for a change in the status quo’ (2002: 19). In the literature two dataset can be used for measuring Veto Players, the POLCON index by Henisz and the CHECKS by Becks *et al.* Checks is a variable that records the number of veto players in the executive branch of government, adjusted for the alignment of government parties with the opposition while POLCON (Political constraints) capture the difficulty of effecting change in policies. The political constraints (POLCON) index from Henisz measures ‘the feasibility of policy change, [i.e.] the extent to which a change in the preferences of any actor may lead to a change in government policy’ (2002: 363).

### Data and Calibration of Veto Players (POLCON III)

Regarding the data on the number of veto players I rely on the POLCON III index. Henisz’s Polcon III index is a measure that estimates the feasibility of policy change in a country in a given year, i.e. the extent to which a change in the preferences of any one political actor may lead to a change in government policy. The POLCON III index count the executive and the presence of an effective lower and upper house in the legislature while POCON IV differently from POLCON III takes into account also independent judiciary power and the presence of sub-federal branches of government. Henisz’s Polcon III index measures how the number of formal checks affects the policy process (veto players) by taking into account the decreasing marginal impact of added veto players and the policy preferences of each veto

player. As such POLCON index is a reliable and valid measure to be used for operationalization of the formal political constraints variable. Henisz when constructing the POLCON variable focus on ‘the number of independent veto points over policy outcomes and the distribution of preferences of the actors that inhabit them’ (2002: 380, appendix 1) as such the POLCON is constructed according to Tsebelis’ concept of veto players and the ‘results echo those produced in similar works by Tsebelis’ (Henisz, 2002: 363).

### ***Direct method of calibration***

In POLCON III, values range from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating more political constraint and thus less feasibility of policy change. Where values closer to zero means few actors and the executive have greater discretion for policy change while values closer to one represent more constraints. The POLCON III may reach a maximum value of 2/3 (0.67) with a single legislative chamber and the legislative branch is in hands of the opposition while with two chambers and when neither of them is aligned with the executive a maximum value of 4/5 (0.8) could be reached. So the constraint measure equal 0 (no veto point or perfect alignment) and 2/3 if it was completely independent (one veto point and perfect opposition) (Henisz, 2002: 385). A value of 2/3 (0.66) or more corresponds to one or more veto points, and can be taken as the cross over point, while the full non membership is the value 0 and the 4/5 (0.8) is the value for a full membership.

I perform the calibration process in QCA program using the three qualitative anchors, 0 the value for nonmembership (no political constrain), 0.66 the break point and 0.80 the maximum for full membership (political constrain).

Command

Variables

Compute...

Calibrate (polcon, 0.80, 0.66, 0) gave the following results presented in the table 21.

Then the data gained are translated into 4 scale membership according to the following table

**Table 20:** 4 scale membership

| <i>Verbal label</i>             | <i>Degree of membership</i> | <i>4 scale membership</i> |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|
| Full membership                 | 0.993                       | 1                         |
| Threshold of full membership    | 0.953                       |                           |
| Mostly in                       | 0.881                       | 0.67                      |
| More in than out                | 0.622                       |                           |
| Cross-over point                | 0.500                       | 0.500                     |
| More out than in                | 0.378                       |                           |
| Mostly out                      | 0.119                       | 0.33                      |
| Threshold of full nonmembership | 0.047                       |                           |
| Full nonmembership              | 0.007                       | 0                         |

**Table 21:** Data and Calibration of Veto Players (POLCON III)

| Countries  | Years | POLCON III<br>(data 2010) | Direct method of calibration<br>Qualitative break point (0.80,0.66,0) | POLCON<br>4scale Fuzzy-score |
|------------|-------|---------------------------|---|------------------------------|
| Albania    | 2002  | 0.41                      | 0.24  | 0.33                         |
|            | 2003  | 0.41                      | 0.24  | 0.33                         |
|            | 2004  | 0.41                      | 0.24  | 0.33                         |
|            | 2005  | 0.41                      | 0.24  | 0.33                         |
|            | 2006  | 0.50                      | 0.33  | 0.33                         |
|            | 2007  | 0.50                      | 0.33  | 0.33                         |
|            | 2008  |                           |   |                              |
| BiH        | 2002  | 0                         | 0.05  | 0                            |
|            | 2003  | 0                         | 0.05  | 0                            |
|            | 2004  | 0                         | 0.05  | 0                            |
|            | 2005  | 0                         | 0.05  | 0                            |
|            | 2006  | 0                         | 0.05  | 0                            |
|            | 2007  | 0                         | 0.05  | 0                            |
|            | 2008  |                           |   |                              |
| Croatia    | 2002  | 0.13                      | 0.08  | 0                            |
|            | 2003  | 0.13                      | 0.08  | 0                            |
|            | 2004  | 0.50                      | 0.33  | 0.33                         |
|            | 2005  | 0.50                      | 0.33  | 0.33                         |
|            | 2006  | 0.50                      | 0.33  | 0.33                         |
|            | 2007  | 0.50                      | 0.33  | 0.33                         |
|            | 2008  |                           |   |                              |
| Macedonia  | 2002  | 0.50                      | 0.33  | 0.33                         |
|            | 2003  | 0.43                      | 0.26  | 0.33                         |
|            | 2004  | 0.43                      | 0.26  | 0.33                         |
|            | 2005  | 0.43                      | 0.26  | 0.33                         |
|            | 2006  | 0.43                      | 0.26  | 0.33                         |
|            | 2007  | 0.51                      | 0.34  | 0.33                         |
|            | 2008  |                           |   |                              |
| Montenegro | 2006  | 0.46                      | 0.29  | 0.33                         |
|            | 2007  | 0.46                      | 0.29  | 0.33                         |
|            | 2008  |                           |   |                              |
| S&M        | 2002  | 0.21                      | 0.11  | 0.33                         |
|            | 2003  | 0.21                      | 0.11  | 0.33                         |
|            | 2004  | 0.53                      | 0.36  | 0.33                         |
|            | 2005  | 0.53                      | 0.36  | 0.33                         |
| Serbia     | 2006  | 0.53                      | 0.36  | 0.33                         |
|            | 2007  | 0.53                      | 0.36  | 0.33                         |
|            | 2008  |                           |   |                              |

Source: Henisz POLCON 2010 dataset. Calibration is done through QCA software, using qualitative break points (0.80, 0.66, 0). When data are missing (data on Kosovo are missing) it is left blank.

### Operationalization of EU Financial aid

An indicator to measure if the adaptation is costly or not is to see if the budget allocated to each country *per* each sector (political, economical & acquis) is relatively high or low. If the amount of money allocated to the reforms in a sector is high this indicates that the cost of

reform is low for the government. Therefore, on the basis of financial aid given to the countries on specific sectors, one can draw if the reform in the sector in each country is costly or not. For the period 2000–2006, the main instrument of EU financial support as part of the Stabilization and Association Process was CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization). From 2007, a new instrument, IPA (Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance) has replaced all previously existing pre-accession instruments, including CARDS. IPA provides a single framework and a unified instrument for pre-accession financial assistance. The IPA aid is divided depending on the country status where the potential candidate countries will be eligible only for the first two IPA components (Transition Assistance and Institution Building) but not for the other three components (Regional Development; Human Resource Development; Rural Development) (for more see Council Regulation, 2006: 82–93).

To extract such indicators the EU financial assistance programs, CARDS program 2002–2006 and IPA 2007–2008, will be consulted. The variable of material cost will be operationalize as the annual CARDS or IPA transfer for each country each year, expressed as a % of GDP. The same variable is operationalized by Cernat (2006: 118) in the same way, that is the annual EU contribution as percentage of GDP. This choice of measurement is justified by argumentations and empirical findings. It is plausible to think that even though an office may receive a higher amount of money with respect to another office, in relation to the country’s GDP that amount might be insufficient (Fingleton *et al.*, 1996: 90). Furthermore, a study on EU allocation in CEE countries found that a determining factor of EU funds allocation is the country’s GDP arguing that ‘the majority of the CEE countries receive very similar volume of EU funds with respect to their GDP... though the final budget is always influenced by the final of bilateral negotiations with the EU Commission’ (KPMG, 2008: 14).

The table presents the data on EU financial aid and GDP of each WB and then the ratio aid/GDP x 100 is calculated. Mean, standard deviation of these ratios is estimated and the z-value of each is calculated and calibration is done. The data are reported below:

| Ratio aid /GDP x100: Descriptive Statistics |                       |            |           |         |    |
|---|-----------------------|------------|-----------|---------|----|
| Variable                                    | Mean                  | Std. Dev.  | Minimum   | Maximum | N  |
| Ratio aid/GDP                               | 1.2272                | 1.38204937 | 0.2364986 | 8.927   | 45 |
| Cases Missing                               |                       |            |           |         |    |
| 0   |                       |            |           |         |    |
| No financial aid                            | z-score ≤ -0. 6745    |            |           |         |    |
| Fuzzy score of 0: fully out                 | (X ≤ 25%)             |            |           |         |    |
| Some financial aid                          | 0 > z-score > -0.6745 |            |           |         |    |
| Fuzzy score of 0.33: more or less out       | (25%< X <50%)         |            |           |         |    |
| Fuzzy score of 0.50: neither in nor out     | z-score = 0 (X= 50%)  |            |           |         |    |
| Enough financial aid                        | 0.6745> z-score > 0   |            |           |         |    |
| Fuzzy score of 0.67: more or less in        | (50%< X ≤75%)         |            |           |         |    |
| Full financial aid                          | z-score ≥ 0.6745      |            |           |         |    |
| Fuzzy score of 1: fully in                  | (75%< X ≤100%)        |            |           |         |    |

**Table 22:** Data and Calibration of Financial aid

| Countries  | Years | EU Financial aid | GDP       | EU Financial aid as % of GDP, Ratio=aid/GDPx100 | Normal distribution of the ratio | Fuzzy Membership Ratio |
|------------|-------|------------------|-----------|---|----------------------------------|------------------------|
| Albania    | 2002  | 44.9             | 4704.7    | 0.954   | -0.197506776                     | 0.33                   |
|            | 2003  | 46.5             | 5047.6    | 0.921   | -0.221481963                     | 0.33                   |
|            | 2004  | 63.5             | 5882.5    | 1.079   | -0.106983071                     | 0.33                   |
|            | 2005  | 44.2             | 6581.6    | 0.672   | -0.402127223                     | 0.33                   |
|            | 2006  | 45.5             | 7197.137  | 0.632   | -0.43061636                      | 0.33                   |
|            | 2007  | 61.0             | 7907.9704 | 0.771   | -0.329912417                     | 0.33                   |
|            | 2008  | 70.7             | 8659.1872 | 0.816   | -0.297279567                     | 0.33                   |
| BiH        | 2002  | 71.9             | 6559.36   | 1.096   | -0.094920902                     | 0.33                   |
|            | 2003  | 63.0             | 7416.4    | 0.849   | -0.273405684                     | 0.33                   |
|            | 2004  | 72.0             | 8071.38   | 0.892   | -0.242602138                     | 0.33                   |
|            | 2005  | 49.4             | 8654.77   | 0.571   | -0.475052052                     | 0.33                   |
|            | 2006  | 51.0             | 9776.56   | 0.522   | -0.510598995                     | 0.33                   |
|            | 2007  | 62.1             | 11065.04  | 0.561   | -0.481966738                     | 0.33                   |
|            | 2008  | 74.8             | 11248.6   | 0.665   | -0.406900991                     | 0.33                   |
| Croatia    | 2002  | 59.0             | 24447.7   | 0.241   | -0.71343139                      | 0                      |
|            | 2003  | 62.0             | 26215.8   | 0.236   | -0.716928295                     | 0                      |
|            | 2004  | 81.0             | 28677     | 0.282   | -0.68367498                      | 0                      |
|            | 2005  | 105.0            | 31263.35  | 0.336   | -0.645036564                     | 0.33                   |
|            | 2006  | 140.0            | 34220.57  | 0.409   | -0.592032569                     | 0.33                   |
|            | 2007  | 138.5            | 37497.02  | 0.369   | -0.620792739                     | 0.33                   |
|            | 2008  | 146.0            | 41246.722 | 0.354   | -0.631932111                     | 0.33                   |
| Kosovo     | 2002  | 154.9            | 1735      | 8.927   | 5.571888502                      | 1                      |
|            | 2003  | 76.28            | 1797      | 4.245   | 2.183368915                      | 1                      |
|            | 2004  | 75.4             | 3006.5    | 2.508   | 0.926573739                      | 1                      |
|            | 2005  | 54               | 3068.4    | 1.760   | 0.38533063                       | 0.67                   |
|            | 2006  | 89.5             | 3191.7    | 2.804   | 1.140928389                      | 1                      |
|            | 2007  | 63.3             | 3343      | 1.894   | 0.482023248                      | 0.67                   |
|            | 2008  | 64.7             | 3739      | 1.730   | 0.364010369                      | 0.67                   |
| Macedonia  | 2002  | 41.5             | 3892.8    | 1.066   | -0.116680495                     | 0.33                   |
|            | 2003  | 43.5             | 3838.9    | 1.133   | -0.068153717                     | 0.33                   |
|            | 2004  | 59.0             | 4000.9    | 1.475   | 0.178965604                      | 0.67                   |
|            | 2005  | 45.0             | 4105      | 1.096   | -0.094862589                     | 0.33                   |
|            | 2006  | 40.0             | 4324.5    | 0.925   | -0.21878124                      | 0.33                   |
|            | 2007  | 58.5             | 4676      | 1.251   | 0.017177672                      | 0.67                   |
|            | 2008  | 70.2             | 4963.287  | 1.414   | 0.135347094                      | 0.67                   |
| Montenegro | 2006  | 24.5             | 2148.9    | 1.140   | -0.063102448                     | 0.33                   |
|            | 2007  | 31.4             | 2540      | 1.236   | 0.006433615                      | 0.67                   |
|            | 2008  | 32.6             | 2900      | 1.124   | -0.074665182                     | 0.33                   |
| S&M        | 2002  | 189.7            | 16811.8   | 1.128   | -0.071600033                     | 0.33                   |
|            | 2003  | 240              | 18008.7   | 1.333   | 0.076234832                      | 0.67                   |
|            | 2004  | 218              | 19723.5   | 1.105   | -0.088309722                     | 0.33                   |
| Serbia     | 2005  | 154.5            | 21077.2   | 0.733   | -0.357664019                     | 0.33                   |
|            | 2006  | 179              | 24254.8   | 0.738   | -0.354061626                     | 0.33                   |
|            | 2007  | 186.7            | 28423.96  | 0.657   | -0.412784591                     | 0.33                   |
|            | 2008  | 190.9            | 33234.53  | 0.574   | -0.472433421                     | 0.33                   |

Sources: EU Financial aid data are taken from official site and reports of European Commission, see Appendix Tables 38&39; GDP data are taken from EUROSTAT (eurostat code 1402) when missing from EBRD and from IMF, see Appendix Table 37.

### **Operationalization of determinacy and density of EU conditionality**

Two main issues regard the operationalization of the determinacy and density issue. The first one regards the context it is used and the second one what indicators to use. How can we operationalize determinacy of EU conditions once the EU perspective is given? Is this determinacy the same or does EU makes some conditions linked to certain specific issues at specific time for specific countries more determinate than others?

Although the membership credibility of all WB is given, the determinacy of EU conditionality is differently spread in different time span and for different issues of different countries. Some candidates have been pressed more than others and on a different range of issues. Steunenberg and Dimitrova (2007, 2005) in their study argue that the intensity (number of conditions on the European Commission's Regular Reports) of conditionality varies from country to country. This means that the determinacy of EU conditions is not a constant one,<sup>81</sup> it changes throughout time regarding the specific issue and country and such determinacy of EU condition is needed even though the EU perspective is given to keep the momentum of reforms the specific countries need. Although the enlargement perspective is irreversible the postponement and delaying of accession is still an option (Turkey may be the best case to illustrate this argument). The variation in the determinacy of EU conditions could be seen if one takes into account the very different signals the Western Balkans have received throughout enlargement process, e.g. the EU requirement on minority rights put more weight (pressure) say in Macedonia than in Albania, or lately EU has put more pressure and clear benchmarks on the issues of security, illegal migration, public order and security, and external relations and fundamental rights, as policies of visa facilitation than other policies.

The characteristics of the conditions the EU sets, the reform demands, the degree of intensity and salience of conditions vary from year to year and from country to country. (Steunenberg & Dimitrova, 2007: 12). EU enlargement conditionality although based on Copenhagen criteria (and Madrid administrative capacity criterion) in fact consists of multiple sub-conditionalities. These sub-conditionalities do not matter equally at all the stages and for all the applicant countries. They are classified in short-term and long term conditions, thus showing a hierarchy of salience of conditions. In fact, the European Commission (DG enlargement dealing with enlargement negotiations) in their biannually Partnership reports point out only a part of reform conditions which are of the greatest significance for a country's progress in the specific period (short term conditionality that need to be fulfilled within a period of 2 years).

The characteristics of evaluating EU conditionality are many and as such it is very difficult and will be incomplete if operationalized only to one concrete indicator. For this reason, two indicators will be considered of great importance: first of all determinacy issue, for a condition to be determinate enough its required that time of adaptation has to be as short

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<sup>81</sup> Furthermore, though in much previous writing on this topic it has been assumed that pressure from the EU is a constant across candidates (e.g. Dimitrova, 2002), this is not really the case.

as possible and it needs to have detailed guidelines on which and how changes have to be carried out (short term conditions in European Partnership reports); secondly, their intensity/density, that is the number of conditions.

In order to gather such data the European Partnership reports for potential member states will be used since they indicate the main priority areas by distinguishing between short-term priorities, which are expected to be accomplished within one to two years, and medium-term priorities, which are expected to be accomplished within three to four years. In the European Partnerships we read that:

The priorities listed in this European Partnership have been selected on the basis that it is realistic to expect that they can be completed or taken substantially forward over the next few years. A distinction is made between short-term priorities, which are expected to be accomplished within one to two years, and medium-term priorities, which are expected to be accomplished within three to four years. The priorities concern both legislation and its implementation... Among the short-term priorities, the key ones have been identified and grouped together at the beginning of the lists. The order of these key priorities does not imply a ranking in their importance. (European Partnerships<sup>82</sup>)

This distinction between long-term and short-term priorities will be one of the indicators for the determinacy of EU conditionality since the shorter the time set for adaptation the greater the determinacy this condition has. The other indicator drawn by the Partnership Reports will be to see the relative number of short term priorities since the amount of these priorities will influence the time of adoption or implementation. The European partnerships with the Western Balkan countries are an indication to measure the EU determinacy and density since these reports are the only formal documents where EU set priorities and timetables of reforms' adoption and implementation by each WB country.

### ***Data and calibration of determinacy and density of EU conditionality (short term and their density)***

Conditions, which are stated as *short term* serve as indicators for assessing the determinacy of the EU conditions, short term conditionality is a clearly signal to the candidate countries that the EU puts a strong emphasis on compliance with these conditions. This gives the target governments an incentive to concentrate on these conditions. Not only determinacy (short term) but also the density/intensity of conditions matters (nr of conditions).

A qualitative evaluation of the determinacy and density of EU conditions on a time scale can be drawn considering the short term EU acquis conditionalities. While a quantitative evaluation of the density of EU acquis conditions on a yearly base can be drawn by the ratio of the short terms conditions on the European standards/acquis and the overall short terms conditions as stated on the European Partnerships (political, economical and European standards/acquis). The following table gives the number of short term conditions on European standards/acquis, the overall short term conditions (political, economical, and European standards/acquis) and their ratio. This ratio is then divided by two given that the short term conditions are expected to be fulfilled within a two year period. The measurement

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<sup>82</sup> See part 3 Priorities of the European Partnership reports.



of the European standards/acquis conditionality pressure is based on this ratio [(short term European standards condition/overall short term conditions)/2].

#### *Using direct method of calibration*

In their study Steunenberg & Dimitrova (2005, 2007) calculated the proportion of conditions highlighted for a given candidate (CEECs countries) in a given year compared to the overall conditions used by the Commission and found that ‘on average and for each year an applicant needed to satisfy about 24% of the conditions set out during the accession process’ (2005: 26; 2007: 12). This will be used as a cross-over point to measure the pressure of EU conditionality. If in a yearly base the proportion of short-term acquis conditionality over the total nr of short term conditions is smaller than 0.24 then the EU conditionality determinacy and density is low, if the proportion of short-term acquis conditionality over the total nr of short term conditions in a yearly base is greater than 0.24 then the EU conditionality determinacy and density is high.

The total of short term conditions make 100% while if the acquis conditionality (in % as the ratio between the acquis conditionality and the overall short term conditions) is greater than 24% then the determinacy and strength of EU conditions is higher.

Calibration through QCA program, with cross-over point of 0.24 and full-membership value of 0.95 ratio (determinacy and density) and full non-membership 0.05 ratio (no determinacy and density)

Command

Variables

Compute...

Calibrate (dens, 0.95,0.24,0.05) gave the following results presented in table 23.

Then the data gained are translated into 4 scale membership according to the Table 20.

#### *Using indirect method of calibration*

I evaluate the statistical mean and standard deviation of the determinacy and density ratio (the number of short term conditions on EU standard/acquis over the overall number of EU condition divided by 2) then I calculated the z-value and calibrate according to their percentiles (explain above)

Determinacy and density ratio: Descriptive Statistics

| Variable | Mean      | Std. Dev. | Minimum | Maximum | N  | Cases Missing |
|----------|-----------|-----------|---------|---------|----|---------------|
| Dens     | 0.2128222 | 0.1339934 | 0       | 0.35    | 45 | 0             |

Both calibrations are reported. The values do not change much; only in some cases the shift by one fuzzy point is observed. The two versions have been tested and they do not the same paths in Europeanization outcome, the direct calibrated data add just one more path reducing consistency and but adding solution coverage (indirect calibration test results will be reported).

**Table 23:** Data and Calibration of Determinacy & Density

| Countries  | Years              | Determinacy & Density (intensity)        |   |                               |                            | Calibration Ratio <b>sh-AC/sh-all</b> |                     |  |             |
|------------|--------------------|--|---|-------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------|--|-------------|
|            |                    | Nr of short-term acquis ( <b>sh-AC</b> ) | Nr of all short-term conditions ( <b>sh-all</b> ) | Ratio ( <b>sh-AC/sh-all</b> ) | On a yearly base= Ratio /2 | Direct method                         |                     | Indirect method  |             |
|            |                    |  |   |                               |                            | Fuzzy score                           | 4 scale Fuzzy score | Ratio Standardized into z-scores (Mean=0.2128222; St.dev.=0.1339934) | Fuzzy score |
| Albania    | 2002               |  |   | 0                             | 0                          | 0.02                                  | 0                   | -1,57059222  | 0           |
|            | 2003               |  |   | 0                             | 0                          | 0.02                                  | 0                   | -1,57059222  | 0           |
|            | 2004               | 18                                       | 34  | 0.529                         | 0,264705882                | 0.53                                  | 0.67                | 0,387210731  | 0.67        |
|            | 2005               |  |   | 0.529                         | 0,264705882                | 0.53                                  | 0.67                | 0,387210731  | 0.67        |
|            | 2006               | 97                                       | 141   | 0.688                         | 0,343971631                | 0.61                                  | 0.67                | 0,978775307  | 1           |
|            | 2007               |  |   | 0.688                         | 0,343971631                | 0.61                                  | 0.67                | 0,978775307  | 1           |
|            | 2008               | 92                                       | 133   | 0.692                         | 0,345864662                | 0.61                                  | 0.67                | 0,992903096  | 1           |
|            | 2002               |  |   | 0                             | 0                          | 0.02                                  | 0                   | -1,588303603   | 0           |
| BiH        | 2003               |  |   | 0                             | 0                          | 0.02                                  | 0                   | -1,588303603   | 0           |
|            | 2004               | 11                                       | 23  | 0.478                         | 0,239130435                | 0.5                                   | 0.67                | 0,196339781  | 0.67        |
|            | 2005               |  |   | 0.478                         | 0,239130435                | 0.5                                   | 0.67                | 0,196339781  | 0.67        |
|            | 2006               | 53                                       | 91  | 0.582                         | 0,291208791                | 0.55                                  | 0.67                | 0,585003375  | 0.67        |
|            | 2007               |  |   | 0.582                         |                            | 0.55                                  | 0.67                | 0,585003375  | 0.67        |
|            | 2008               | 80                                       | 115   | 0.696                         | 0,347826087                | 0.61                                  | 0.67                | 1,007541319  | 1           |
|            | 2002               |  |   | 0                             |                            | 0.02                                  | 0                   | -1,588303603   | 0           |
|            | 2003               |  |   | 0                             |                            | 0.02                                  | 0                   | -1,588303603   | 0           |
| Croatia    | 2004               | 18                                       | 34  | 0.529                         | 0,264705882                | 0.53                                  | 0.67                | 0,387210731  | 0.67        |
|            | 2005               |  |   | 0.529                         |                            | 0.53                                  | 0.67                | 0,387210731  | 0.67        |
|            | 2006               | 67                                       | 96  | 0.698                         | 0,348958333                | 0.61                                  | 0.67                | 1,015991335  | 1           |
|            | 2007               |  |   | 0.698                         |                            | 0.61                                  | 0.67                | 1,015991335  | 1           |
|            | 2008               | 54                                       | 98  | 0.551                         | 0,275510204                | 0.54                                  | 0.67                | 0,467843969  | 0.67        |
|            | 2002               |  |   | 0                             |                            | 0.02                                  | 0                   | -1,588303603   | 0           |
|            | 2003               |  |   | 0                             |                            | 0.02                                  | 0                   | -1,588303603   | 0           |
|            | 2004               | 7  | 17  | 0.412                         | 0,205882353                | 0.37                                  | 0.33                | -0,051792454   | 0.33        |
| Kosovo     | 2005               |  |   | 0.412                         |                            | 0.37                                  | 0.33                | -0,051792454   | 0.33        |
|            | 2006               | 34                                       | 73  | 0.466                         | 0,232876712                | 0.47                                  | 0.33                | 0,149667911  | 0.67        |
|            | 2007               |  |   | 0.466                         |                            | 0.47                                  | 0.33                | 0,149667911  | 0.67        |
|            | 2008               | 54                                       | 98  | 0.551                         | 0,275510204                | 0.54                                  | 0.67                | 0,467843969  | 0.67        |
|            | 2002               |  |   | 0                             |                            | 0.02                                  | 0                   | -1,588303603   | 0           |
|            | 2003               |  |   | 0                             |                            | 0.02                                  | 0                   | -1,588303603   | 0           |
|            | 2004               | 36                                       | 53  | 0.679                         | 0,339622642                | 0.6                                   | 0.67                | 0,946318561  | 1           |
|            | 2005               |  |   | 0.679                         |                            | 0.6                                   | 0.67                | 0,946318561  | 1           |
| Macedonia  | 2006               | 76                                       | 119   | 0.639                         | 0,319327731                | 0.58                                  | 0.67                | 0,794856546  | 1           |
|            | 2007               |  |   | 0.639                         |                            | 0.58                                  | 0.67                | 0,794856546  | 1           |
|            | 2008               | 84                                       | 120   | 0.700                         | 0,35                       | 0.61                                  | 0.67                | 1,02376535   | 1           |
| Montenegro | 2006 <sup>83</sup> | 34                                       | 60  | 0.566                         | 0,283333333                | 0.55                                  | 0.67                | 0,526228406  | 0.67        |

<sup>83</sup> Only on January 2007 EU 'adopt an updated European Partnership only for Montenegro', so for the year 2006 the common European Partnership for Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo will be used. When Commission put a separate condition for Serbia I will not count.

|        |                    |    |     |       |             |      |      |                  |
|--------|--------------------|----|-----|-------|-------------|------|------|------------------|
| S&M    | 2007               | 66 | 99  | 0.667 | 0,333333333 | 0.6  | 0.67 | 0,899381114 1    |
|        | 2008               |    |     | 0.667 |             | 0.6  | 0.67 | 0,899381114 1    |
|        | 2002               |    |     | 0     |             | 0.02 | 0    | -1,588303603 0   |
|        | 2003               |    |     | 0     |             | 0.02 | 0    | -1,588303603 0   |
|        | 2004 <sup>84</sup> | 25 | 51  | 0.490 | 0,245098039 | 0.51 | 0.67 | 0,240876336 0.67 |
| Serbia | 2005               |    |     | 0.490 |             | 0.51 | 0.67 | 0,240876336 0.67 |
|        | 2006 <sup>85</sup> | 35 | 64  | 0.547 | 0,2734375   | 0.53 | 0.67 | 0,452375266 0.67 |
|        | 2007               |    |     | 0.547 |             | 0.53 | 0.67 | 0,452375266 0.67 |
|        | 2008               | 66 | 113 | 0.584 | 0,292035398 | 0.55 | 0.67 | 0,591172388 0.67 |

Note: The European Partnerships are issued from 2004 every 2 years. For the year 2002-2003 there are no European Partnership so a 0 value is given since no clear and official conditionality is put in the potential member states. For Montenegro after its independence the Commission issued the EP in 2007 updating the 2006 EP with Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo included here).

### Operationalization of EU-centered communities (Twinning and TAIEX)

To code the EU-centered epistemic communities variable one has to consider the density of domestic experts and professionals as wells as EU expert in the specific issue and their role on bringing the change. The greater the support for EU groups of experts the most likely it will be that they have an impact on the change.

Two important instruments for advice and socialization of the associate and candidate countries are available in the WB case (as in the CEE case); the Twinning projects and the Commission's TAIEX (Technical Assistance Information Exchange Office). 'TAIEX and Twinning, were designed to facilitate the transfer of knowledge from member states to accession countries and to assist the candidates to build up the institutional capacities for implementing the *acquis*.' (Börzel & Risse, 2004: 10; Börzel *et al.*, 2005: 12). Twinning projects are based on the secondment of civil servants from EU Member States to work for at least one-year as advisers to beneficiary institutions from the acceding, candidate and potential candidate countries on specific issues of *acquis*. Under the CARDS and now IPA programme, twinning not only provides technical and administrative assistance, but also helps the Sap countries in long-term establishment of a modern efficient administration and institutions that will be capable to implement the *acquis* to the same standards as in the current Member States.<sup>86</sup> TAIEX (Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Programme) provide short-term technical assistance and advice in the transposition and implementation of all areas of EU legislation through organized numerous training events, study visits, seminars, and workshops for members of the parliament, civil servants, judiciary authorities, professionals and representatives of social partners, associations and trade unions, interpreters and translators of legislative texts.<sup>87</sup>

<sup>84</sup> When Commission put a separate condition for Serbia and Montenegro they are counted as 1 since here the country is taken as a whole. If all the conditions are counted the result is not so different 32 *acquis* condition over all 63 (21+10+32) conditions gives a rate of 0.51 and this does not change the calibrated value.

<sup>85</sup> When Commission put a separate condition for Montenegro I will not count.

<sup>86</sup> For more detail see the Twinning official web site [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/how-does-it-work/technical-assistance/twinning\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/how-does-it-work/technical-assistance/twinning_en.htm).

<sup>87</sup> For more detail see the TAIEX official web site <http://taieux.ec.europa.eu/>

These programmes help beneficiary countries build relationships with existing Member States bringing them into a wider contact with the various different practices and models inside the EU. They are good instruments to help countries, especially through institution-building (twinning) and technical assistance (TAIEX) programmes, deal with adoption and implementation of EU standards/acquis. If the twinning programme, aim on the longer-term secondment of EU member state experts, the TAIEX programme provides mainly short-term expertise through training.

A fuzzy set membership of EU-centered epistemic communities will be constructed using the success of both the Twinning and the TAIEX programs. The twinning projects especially for the first period were generally considered not very successful. A success rate of about 1 in 4 projects has been widely considered in experts evaluations. 'Informal attempts to quantify success rates are ultimately not very accurate, helpful or consistent, but stakeholders commonly refer to projects achieving around a 25% success rate in reaching guaranteed results (Cooper & Johansen, 2003: 11). Grabbe also admits this trend in her interviews with twinning agents where as she puts 'anecdotal evidence from the member-states which sent their own civil servants suggests a success rate of about one in four projects' (Grabbe, 2006: 86). On an informal evaluation by the commission only 22% of the projects were graded as very successful.<sup>88</sup> In a latest presentation from DG enlargement, twinning team presented the twinning success rate (as Lead Partner) of both 'Old' and 'New' EU Member States since 1998 in the Enlargement context, taking the average value of those we get a 22% (see table 41 in appendix). Although these evaluations are subjective they still pose an indicative value.

Based on the approximate success rate  $\frac{1}{4} = 0.25$  I distinguish between countries as having at least one twinning successful project and countries that do not have any successful twinning project. For the TAIEX programme I discriminate between good cases where the number of participants from beneficiary countries is above the average number of participants per country and less good cases where the number of participants from beneficiary countries is below the average number of participants per country. The average number of participants (only the Western Balkan countries are considered) per country per year is 417.<sup>89</sup>

Then, for the fuzzy membership of EU-centered community I do a cross section of these two to make the four scale fuzzy membership. The presence of both, that is at least one successful twinning program (success rate 1 in 4) and number of participants greater than the average will be coded as 1, while the absence of both, that is no successful twinning programme and the number of participants less than the average will be coded as 0. Given that

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<sup>88</sup> 'Individual projects launched in 1998 have been informally evaluated by the Commission. In most cases the 104 projects were graded either 'satisfactory' (35 per cent), 'successful' (31 per cent) or 'very successful' (22 per cent) with only seven being deemed to be 'unsatisfactory' or 'unsuccessful' (7 per cent)' (Papadimitriou & Phinnemore, 2003: 12-13).

<sup>89</sup> For potential candidate countries (2006-2008) all the number of participants is 10818 total / 5 countries x 3 years = 721.2. For candidate countries (2004-2008, turkey excluded) number of participants is 16461 total / 2 countries x 5years = 164.61; So, the average of number of participants from Western Balkan countries =  $(668.86 + 164.61) / 2 = 416.735$  participants per country per year. Data are taken from TAIEX 2008 activity report.

the twinning projects have a direct impact<sup>90</sup> while the TAIEX has an indirect impact<sup>91</sup> I code as 0.67 if the present of at least one successful twinning program (success rate 1 in 4) and the number of participants less than the average; while I code as 0.33 if there are no successful twinning program (success rate 1 in 4) and the number of participants is greater than the average.

|   | Not enough TAIEXES<br>Nr of participants < average 417 | TAIEXES<br>Nr of participants ≥ average 417 |
|---|--|---|
| No successful twinning<br>Nr twinning < 4           | 0  | 0.33  |
| At least one successful twinning<br>Nr twinning ≥ 4 | 0.67   | 1   |

An argument of twinning and TAIEX as a socialization argument can be that any project could have an effect all the way through even though it runs in a certain year but the short-term effects of these socializing projects have been recognized by the scholarly work. The sustainability of the Twinning is questionable because of the politicization of the public administration (especially central government) of the beneficiary country and the huge turnover of staff in civil service in these countries (see Papadimitriou & Phinnemore, 2004: 634, with further references on the argument). TAIEX also was thought as a short-term technical assistance so each of the program will be considered for the year and not having an added value.

**Table 24:** Data and Calibration of the number of Twinning Projects and Participants in TAIEX activities

| Countries | Years | Nr of twinning | Nr of participants in TAIEX | Successful twinning (success rate= %) | TAIEX success ≥ average 417 | Fuzzy Membership |
|-----------|-------|----------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------|
| Albania   | 2002  | 1              | 0                           | No                                    | No                          | 0                |
|           | 2003  | 1              | 0                           | No                                    | No                          | 0                |
|           | 2004  | 5              | 0                           | Yes                                   | No                          | 0.67             |
|           | 2005  | 2              | 0                           | No                                    | No                          | 0                |
|           | 2006  | 0              | 376                         | No                                    | No                          | 0                |
|           | 2007  | 1              | 634                         | No                                    | Yes                         | 0.33             |
|           | 2008  | 0              | 1413                        | No                                    | Yes                         | 0.33             |
|           | 2002  | 2              | 0                           | No                                    | No                          | 0                |
| BiH       | 2003  | 1              | 0                           | No                                    | No                          | 0                |
|           | 2004  | 2              | 0                           | No                                    | No                          | 0                |
|           | 2005  | 3              | 0                           | No                                    | No                          | 0                |
|           | 2006  | 2              | 461                         | No                                    | Yes                         | 0.33             |
|           | 2007  | 5              | 480                         | Yes                                   | Yes                         | 1                |
|           | 2008  | 0              | 679                         | No                                    | Yes                         | 0.33             |

<sup>90</sup> ‘Twinning provided the EU with a direct line into policy-making structures in CEE because EU civil servants worked alongside CEE counterparts. It could thus provide a route for cognitive convergence, as EU officials taught their CEE colleagues how to ‘do things the EU way’ (Grabbe, 2006: 84-86). ‘The most direct form of assistance is the ‘twinning program’ (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005: 2)

<sup>91</sup> The report on evaluating the TAEIX states that ‘As TAIEX does not have a specific mandate to strengthen institutional structures, it is complemented by, and complements, several other institution building instruments’ (MWH Consortium, 2007: 1).

|            |      |    |      |     |     |      |
|------------|------|----|------|-----|-----|------|
| Croatia    | 2002 | 13 | 0    | Yes | No  | 0.67 |
|            | 2003 | 10 | 0    | Yes | No  | 0.67 |
|            | 2004 | 12 | 386  | Yes | No  | 0.67 |
|            | 2005 | 12 | 1613 | Yes | Yes | 1    |
|            | 2006 | 7  | 2427 | Yes | Yes | 1    |
|            | 2007 | 8  | 4784 | Yes | Yes | 1    |
|            | 2008 | 0  | 3778 | No  | Yes | 0.33 |
| Kosovo     | 2002 | 0  | 0    | No  | No  | 0    |
|            | 2003 | 0  | 0    | No  | No  | 0    |
|            | 2004 | 0  | 0    | No  | No  | 0    |
|            | 2005 | 0  | 0    | No  | No  | 0    |
|            | 2006 | 0  | 408  | No  | No  | 0    |
|            | 2007 | 2  | 414  | No  | No  | 0    |
|            | 2008 | 8  | 367  | Yes | No  | 0.67 |
| Macedonia  | 2002 | 0  | 0    | No  | No  | 0    |
|            | 2003 | 1  | 0    | No  | No  | 0    |
|            | 2004 | 4  | 213  | Yes | No  | 0.67 |
|            | 2005 | 4  | 897  | Yes | Yes | 1    |
|            | 2006 | 2  | 475  | No  | Yes | 0.33 |
|            | 2007 | 1  | 693  | No  | Yes | 0.33 |
|            | 2008 | 0  | 1197 | No  | Yes | 0.33 |
| Montenegro | 2006 | 0  | 319  | No  | No  | 0    |
|            | 2007 | 3  | 535  | No  | Yes | 0.33 |
|            | 2008 | 4  | 579  | Yes | Yes | 1    |
|            | 2002 | 0  | 0    | No  | No  | 0    |
|            | 2003 | 0  | 0    | No  | No  | 0    |
|            | 2004 | 5  | 0    | Yes | No  | 0.67 |
|            | 2005 | 10 | 0    | Yes | No  | 0.67 |
| S&M        | 2006 | 4  | 553  | Yes | Yes | 1    |
|            | 2007 | 3  | 901  | No  | Yes | 0.33 |
|            | 2008 | 0  | 1914 | No  | Yes | 0.33 |

Note: TAIEX data are taken from the official web site of the Commission on the TAIEX program, see: TAIEX Activity Report 2008: 30. 'In December 2003, services provided by TAIEX have been extended to all Western Balkans' *Evaluation of the assistance to Balkan countries...*, 2004: 17.

### **Operationalization of administrative capacity: *bureaucratic effectiveness and rule of law***

The importance of the legacies of past regarding the administrative capacity, will be operationalize as an indicator comprised of government effectiveness and rule of law. The data will be based on the World Banks Governance indicators (Governance Matters VIII: Governance Indicators for 1996-2008). This data are based on multiple data sources produced by different organizations worldwide and measure governance and institutional change on a yearly base and they can be accessed online on the World Bank website.<sup>92</sup> This index is mostly used to measure governance and it includes 6 variables 'Voice and Accountability', 'Political Stability', 'Government Effectiveness', 'Regulatory Quality', 'Rule of Law' and 'Control of Corruption'. For the purpose of our book I will rely only on two variables,

<sup>92</sup> The governance indicators are provided based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from separate data sources constructed by different organizations. They give the point estimates of the dimensions of governance, the margins of error, the countries' percentile ranks as well as the number of sources for each country in a yearly based.

namely ‘Government Effectiveness’ and ‘Rule of Law’ which directly are related to the hypothesis set, and a logical AND of them will be the variable to measure administrative capacity. Although such data contain a ‘subjective’ view since it is based on perceptions, still they have been a good way to operationalize concepts of government efficiency and rule of law as well as the most used data even in the analysis of Europeanization.

The government effectiveness and rule of law estimates are standardized values follow a normally distribution (a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one) for each year of measurement so all scores lie between  $-2.5$  and  $2.5$ , with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes. I use the standardized score estimation rather than looking at the countries’ percentile ranks. This makes the qualitative grouping easy and follows the same logic as for other conditions (independent variables) used in the book. Authors suggested the ranking may be more suitable for over-time comparisons<sup>93</sup> so I report the two values and note the differences may arise in calibration.

**Bureaucracy effectiveness:** For operationalizing bureaucracy effectiveness I will use the ‘*Government Effectiveness*’ indicators which refers to the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies. ‘The main focus of this index is on ‘inputs’ required for the government to be able to produce and implement good policies and deliver public goods’ (Teorell *et al.*, 2008: 188).

**Rule of law:** The operationalization of the legal culture hypothesis is also relatively unproblematic, as the extent of the support for the rule of law can be still qualified on the basis of the World Banks Governance indicators. Here I will use the *Rule of Law* indicator which measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and respect the rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts (law enforcement). Even here, instead of looking at the countries scores I will use the countries’ percentile ranks for the same arguments as on Governance effectiveness data (that is, for over-time comparisons index is suitable particularly when converted to country rank-orders and to make the qualitative evaluation automatic). These are good data for a more reliable statement about the influence of legal culture on Europeanization (used also by Börzel *et al.*, 2004).

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<sup>93</sup> ‘Finally, for some purposes it is useful to look just at countries’ percentile ranks rather than their scores on our governance indicators. Without similar adjustments these percentile ranks too would not be fully comparable over time as they too would be influenced by new entrants. Thus, we also perform such adjustment to the percentile ranks, and when we report countries’ scores in the form of percentile ranks on our website, we compute the percentile ranks based on a sample consisting of the actual data we have for that indicator and year, combined with imputed data from the nearest year as described above.’ (Kaufmann *et al.*, 2008: 102).

**Table 25:** Data and Calibration of Bureaucracy Effectiveness and Rule of Law

| Countries  | Years | <i>Government Effectiveness</i> |                    |                     | <i>Rule of Law</i>      |                    |                     |
|------------|-------|---------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
|            |       | score<br>(-2.5 to +2.5)         | Percentile<br>Rank | Fuzzy<br>Membership | Score<br>(-2.5 to +2.5) | Percentile<br>Rank | Fuzzy<br>Membership |
| Albania    | 2002  | -0.59                           | 32.2               | 0.33                | -0.94                   | 19.5               | 0                   |
|            | 2003  | -0.56                           | 32.7               | 0.33                | -1.02                   | 15.7               | 0                   |
|            | 2004  | -0.38                           | 41.7               | 0.33                | -0.88                   | 20.0               | 0                   |
|            | 2005  | -0.62                           | 31.3               | 0.33                | -0.80                   | 24.3               | 0                   |
|            | 2006  | -0.50                           | 35.5               | 0.33                | -0.80                   | 26.7               | 0                   |
|            | 2007  | -0.36                           | 43.1               | 0.33                | -0.69                   | 28.1               | 0                   |
|            | 2008  | -0.34                           | 44.5               | 0.33                | -0.60                   | 32.5               | 0.33                |
| B&H        | 2002  | -0.97                           | 12.8               | 0                   | -0.74                   | 29.0               | 0                   |
|            | 2003  | -0.80                           | 20.9               | 0                   | -0.86                   | 23.3               | 0                   |
|            | 2004  | -0.61                           | 31.3               | 0.33                | -0.64                   | 33.3               | 0.33                |
|            | 2005  | -0.63                           | 30.3               | 0.33                | -0.62                   | 33.3               | 0.33                |
|            | 2006  | -0.53                           | 34.1               | 0.33                | -0.53                   | 40.5               | 0.33                |
|            | 2007  | -0.79                           | 21.3               | 0                   | -0.52                   | 40.5               | 0.33                |
|            | 2008  | -0.55                           | 35.1               | 0.33                | -0.35                   | 43.5               | 0.33                |
| Croatia    | 2002  | +0.34                           | 66.8               | 0.67                | +0.02                   | 54.8               | 0.67                |
|            | 2003  | +0.33                           | 65.9               | 0.67                | +0.06                   | 54.3               | 0.67                |
|            | 2004  | +0.45                           | 71.1               | 0.67                | +0.10                   | 57.1               | 0.67                |
|            | 2005  | +0.47                           | 69.7               | 0.67                | +0.06                   | 54.8               | 0.67                |
|            | 2006  | +0.50                           | 70.1               | 0.67                | -0.05                   | 52.9               | 0.33                |
|            | 2007  | +0.41                           | 68.7               | 0.67                | +0.03                   | 55.2               | 0.67                |
|            | 2008  | +0.52                           | 69.7               | 0.67                | +0.08                   | 55.0               | 0.67                |
| Kosovo     | 2002  |                                 |                    |                     | N/A                     | N/A                |                     |
|            | 2003  |                                 |                    |                     | -1.13                   | 13.3               | 0                   |
|            | 2004  |                                 |                    |                     | -0.98                   | 17.1               | 0                   |
|            | 2005  |                                 |                    |                     | -0.96                   | 16.7               | 0                   |
|            | 2006  | -0.36                           | 43.6               | 0.33                | -0.90                   | 19.0               | 0                   |
|            | 2007  | -0.35                           | 44.1               | 0.33                | -0.81                   | 23.8               | 0                   |
|            | 2008  | -0.81                           | 18.5               | 0                   | -0.63                   | 30.1               | 0.33                |
| Macedonia  | 2002  | -0.46                           | 37.0               | 0.33                | -0.58                   | 33.3               | 0.33                |
|            | 2003  | -0.25                           | 48.3               | 0.33                | -0.58                   | 34.8               | 0.33                |
|            | 2004  | -0.08                           | 54.5               | 0.33                | -0.24                   | 47.6               | 0.33                |
|            | 2005  | -0.31                           | 45.5               | 0.33                | -0.35                   | 44.8               | 0.33                |
|            | 2006  | -0.14                           | 52.1               | 0.33                | -0.49                   | 42.9               | 0.33                |
|            | 2007  | -0.28                           | 46.4               | 0.33                | -0.43                   | 43.8               | 0.33                |
|            | 2008  | -0.14                           | 50.7               | 0.33                | -0.32                   | 45.5               | 0.33                |
| Montenegro | 2006  | -0.29                           | 46.0               | 0.33                | -0.55                   | 38.1               | 0.33                |
|            | 2007  | -0.19                           | 48.3               | 0.33                | -0.31                   | 48.1               | 0.33                |
|            | 2008  | +0.01                           | 56.9               | 0.67                | -0.09                   | 53.1               | 0.33                |
| S&M        | 2002  | -0.61                           | 31.3               | 0.33                | -0.92                   | 20.5               | 0                   |
|            | 2003  | -0.54                           | 35.1               | 0.33                | -0.98                   | 18.6               | 0                   |
|            | 2004  | -0.21                           | 49.8               | 0.33                | -0.71                   | 29.0               | 0                   |
|            | 2005  | -0.34                           | 45.0               | 0.33                | -0.84                   | 22.9               | 0                   |
| Serbia     | 2006  | -0.21                           | 49.3               | 0.33                | -0.58                   | 35.2               | 0.33                |
|            | 2007  | -0.33                           | 45.5               | 0.33                | -0.53                   | 39.5               | 0.33                |
|            | 2008  | -0.28                           | 47.9               | 0.33                | -0.46                   | 41.1               | 0.33                |

Note: In the normal distribution (the quartile values) this leaves 25% between 0 and  $0.6745\sigma$  and also 25% between 0 and  $-0.6745\sigma$ , and in the other two tails 25% each. If used the country ranking percentage (0 for  $X \leq 25\%$ , 0.33 for  $25\% < X \leq 50\%$ , 0.67 for  $50\% < X \leq 75\%$  and 1 for  $75\% < X \leq 100\%$ ) we get the same results. For bureaucratic effectiveness only Macedonia 2004, 2006, 2008 shows problem if used their ranking percentage, while for rule of law only Albania 2006, 2007, BiH 2002, Croatia 2006, Montenegro 2008 and SM 2004 shows inconsistency if used their percentile rank.



### **Contextual: Candidate versus Potential Candidate Countries**

The Western Balkans countries, unlike the CEEC countries, vary much on the degree and type of contractual relation with EU, even though all WB countries are considered potential candidates, not all of them have yet received the candidate status. Furthermore even when a country has gained candidacy status the Accession Negotiation may have not yet started or potential candidate have not all signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement.

Consequently, present research takes into account the official position of the Western Balkans states with regard to their stage of enlargement. Particularly whether a country has been recognized for accession and started the accession negotiations (the date of accession) will be grouped in one while if the accession negotiations have not been started yet are grouped in another group. These two groups, potential vs. candidate countries, with their respective cases will be considered in the results obtained from fsQCA analyzed and checks if different patterns or if a pattern is stress more in any situation than other. Considering the contextual stage of accession will be a good strategy in order to identify scope conditions, if any, or to check for the robustness of the results achieved.

**On the stage of accession**, the candidates will be grouped according to their contractual relations achieved at the specific time of measurement. The two major distinction to be considered are if the country has the status of candidate country or not, still other further distinction may be considered in between such as if the country has signed a Stabilization Association or not, or if it has started accession negotiations or not<sup>94</sup>. A potential candidate country may have not yet signed the SAA (only Kosovo) or it has started the Stabilization and Association Agreement; while a candidate country may have not yet started accession negotiation.

### **OVERALL DATA**

The overall data and their calibration as discussed above is presented in the table

1. For the polcon the year 2008 is missing and the values on Kosovo. On the years missing I give the values on the last year available for the years missing (that is for 2008 I give the values of 2007) while for Kosovo I give a 0 value given that Bosnia gets a 0 value (and this is because Bosnia is still under the EU representative veto power), the same argument goes for Kosovo (or even more stronger) since Kosovo was under UN from 2000 and only in 2008 it got independence.
2. For the determinacy and density of EU conditions the direct method of calibration is reported here. Given that European Partnership started from 2004 I give a 0 value for dates 2002-2003. Furthermore European partnership are issued once every 2 years and the short-term conditionality include a time of 12-24 months (1 to two years), that's why I give the same value for the two years

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<sup>94</sup> Schimmelfennig suggest that the main political enlargement decisions are the decision to open association negotiations (Europe Agreements for CEEC and Stabilization and Association Agreements for WB) and the decision to open accession negotiations (2008: 922).

3. For administrative capacity variables, all the WB countries are covered for the period of 2002-2008. Data are missing only for Kosovo 2002-2005 on bureaucratic effectiveness and Kosovo 2002 for rule of law. Given that before 2002 scholars have ‘The values are assumed to reflect effectiveness for the year the assessment is made, and the previous year’ (Toshkov, 2007: 339). So when data are missing the previous year data will be considered.
4. Europeanization (noted as *adimp*) is calculated as logical AND of adoption and implementation; that is, take the minimum of both.
5. Not Europeanization (*noadimp*) is calculated as logical NOT of Europeanization (logical AND of adoption and implementation), that is take the value (rest) from subtraction of Europeanization values from 1 (Not Europeanization = 1 – Europeanization)

**Table 26:** Overall data calibration

| Case Nr | Countries | Years | Political<br>constraints | Aid/GDP | Density | Twinning &<br>TAIEX | Rule of Law | Bureaucracy<br>strength | Adoption | Implementation | Europeanization | Not<br>Europeanization |
|---------|-----------|-------|--------------------------|---------|---------|---------------------|-------------|-------------------------|----------|----------------|-----------------|------------------------|
|         |           |       | polcon                   | aid     | dens    | twinta              | rul         | bur                     | adopt    | implem         | adimp           | noadimp                |
| 1       | Albania   | 2002  | 0.33                     | 0.33    | 0       | 0                   | 0           | 0.33                    | 0.33     | 0.33           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 2       |           | 2003  | 0.33                     | 0.33    | 0       | 0                   | 0           | 0.33                    | 0.33     | 0.33           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 3       |           | 2004  | 0.33                     | 0.33    | 0.67    | 0.67                | 0           | 0.33                    | 0.33     | 0.33           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 4       |           | 2005  | 0.33                     | 0.33    | 0.67    | 0                   | 0           | 0.33                    | 0.33     | 0.33           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 5       |           | 2006  | 0.33                     | 0.33    | 0.67    | 0                   | 0           | 0.33                    | 0.33     | 0.33           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 6       |           | 2007  | 0.33                     | 0.33    | 0.67    | 0.33                | 0           | 0.33                    | 0.67     | 0.67           | 0.67            | 0.33                   |
| 7       |           | 2008  | 0.33                     | 0.33    | 0.67    | 0.33                | 0.33        | 0.33                    | 0.67     | 0.33           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 8       | B & H     | 2002  | 0                        | 0.33    | 0       | 0                   | 0           | 0                       | 0        | 0              | 0               | 1                      |
| 9       |           | 2003  | 0                        | 0.33    | 0       | 0                   | 0           | 0                       | 0.67     | 0.33           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 10      |           | 2004  | 0                        | 0.33    | 0.67    | 0                   | 0.33        | 0.33                    | 0.33     | 0.33           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 11      |           | 2005  | 0                        | 0.33    | 0.67    | 0                   | 0.33        | 0.33                    | 0.67     | 0.33           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 12      |           | 2006  | 0                        | 0.33    | 0.67    | 0.33                | 0.33        | 0.33                    | 0.67     | 0.33           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 13      |           | 2007  | 0                        | 0.33    | 0.67    | 1                   | 0.33        | 0                       | 0.33     | 0.33           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 14      |           | 2008  | 0.33                     | 0.33    | 0.67    | 0.33                | 0.33        | 0.33                    | 0.33     | 1              | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 15      | Croatia   | 2002  | 0                        | 0       | 0       | 0.67                | 0.67        | 0.67                    | 1        | 0.33           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 16      |           | 2003  | 0                        | 0       | 0       | 0.67                | 0.67        | 0.67                    | 0.67     | 0.33           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 17      |           | 2004  | 0.33                     | 0       | 0.67    | 0.67                | 0.67        | 0.67                    | 0.67     | 0.33           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 18      |           | 2005  | 0.33                     | 0.33    | 0.67    | 1                   | 0.67        | 0.67                    | 0.67     | 0.33           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 19      |           | 2006  | 0.33                     | 0.33    | 0.67    | 1                   | 0.33        | 0.67                    | 0.33     | 0.67           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 20      |           | 2007  | 0.33                     | 0.33    | 0.67    | 1                   | 0.67        | 0.67                    | 0.67     | 0.67           | 0.67            | 0.33                   |
| 21      |           | 2008  | 0.33                     | 0.33    | 0.67    | 0.33                | 0.67        | 0.67                    | 0.67     | 0.67           | 0.67            | 0.33                   |
| 22      | Kosovo    | 2002  | 1                        | 0       | 0       |                     |             |                         | 0.33     | 0              | 0               | 1                      |
| 23      |           | 2003  | 1                        | 0       | 0       | 0                   |             |                         | 0.33     | 0.33           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 24      |           | 2004  | 1                        | 0.33    | 0       | 0                   |             |                         | 0.67     | 0.67           | 0.67            | 0.33                   |
| 25      |           | 2005  | 0.67                     | 0.33    | 0       | 0                   |             |                         | 0.33     | 0.67           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 26      |           | 2006  | 1                        | 0.33    | 0       | 0                   | 0.33        |                         | 0.33     | 0.33           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 27      |           | 2007  | 0.67                     | 0.33    | 0       | 0                   | 0.33        |                         | 0.67     | 0.33           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 28      |           | 2008  | 0.67                     | 0.67    | 0.67    | 0.33                | 0           |                         | 0.33     | 0.33           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 29      | Macedonia | 2002  | 0.33                     | 0.33    | 0       | 0                   | 0.33        | 0.33                    | 0.33     | 0.33           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 30      |           | 2003  | 0.33                     | 0.33    | 0       | 0                   | 0.33        | 0.33                    | 0.33     | 0.33           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 31      |           | 2004  | 0.33                     | 0.67    | 0.67    | 0.67                | 0.33        | 0.33                    | 0.33     | 0.33           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 32      |           | 2005  | 0.33                     | 0.33    | 0.67    | 1                   | 0.33        | 0.33                    | 1        | 0.33           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 33      |           | 2006  | 0.33                     | 0.33    | 0.67    | 0.33                | 0.33        | 0.33                    | 0.33     | 0.33           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 34      |           | 2007  | 0.33                     | 0.67    | 0.67    | 0.33                | 0.33        | 0.33                    | 0.67     | 0.33           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 35      |           | 2008  | 0.67                     | 0.67    | 0.33    | 0.33                | 0.33        |                         | 1        | 0.33           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 36      | Mont.     | 2006  | 0.33                     | 0.33    | 0.67    | 0                   | 0.33        | 0.33                    | 0.33     | 0.67           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 37      |           | 2007  | 0.33                     | 0.67    | 0.67    | 0.33                | 0.33        | 0.33                    | 0.33     | 0.33           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 38      |           | 2008  | 0.33                     | 0.67    | 1       | 0.33                | 0.67        |                         | 0.67     | 0.33           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 39      | S & M     | 2002  | 0.33                     | 0.33    | 0       | 0                   | 0           | 0.33                    | 0.33     | 0.33           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 40      |           | 2003  | 0.33                     | 0.67    | 0       | 0                   | 0           | 0.33                    | 0.33     | 0.33           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 41      |           | 2004  | 0.33                     | 0.33    | 0.67    | 0.67                | 0           | 0.33                    | 0.33     | 0.33           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 42      | Serbia    | 2005  | 0.33                     | 0.33    | 0.67    | 0.67                | 0           | 0.33                    | 0.67     | 0.33           | 0.33            | 0.67                   |
| 43      |           | 2006  | 0.33                     | 0.33    | 0.67    | 1                   | 0.33        | 0.33                    | 1        | 0.67           | 0.67            | 0.33                   |
| 44      |           | 2007  | 0.33                     | 0.33    | 0.67    | 0.33                | 0.33        | 0.33                    | 0.67     | 1              | 0.67            | 0.33                   |
| 45      |           | 2008  | 0.33                     | 0.67    | 0.33    | 0.33                | 0.33        |                         | 0.33     | 1              | 0.33            | 0.67                   |

## CONFIGURATIONAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS USING fsQCA

Taking into account the complexity of the procedures because of the number of cases (45) and the number of conditions (5) I will utilize the software package, fsQCA 2.0<sup>95</sup> (version date January 2009) as a data processing tool for fuzzy set QCA analysis.

As suggested, necessary and sufficient conditions would be analyzed in separate analytical steps (Wagemann & Schneider, 2007: 24), starting with the analysis of necessary conditions first. Although theoretically possible, in empirical cases ‘very often, we do not find any conditions which are sufficient or necessary for all cases under examination’ (Wagemann & Schneider, 2007: 4). Given that strictly necessary and sufficient conditions will be exceptional in this analysis I will mostly rely on the ‘quasi-necessity’ and ‘quasi-sufficiency’ analysis. As Ragin argues it is possible to assess the ‘*quasiness*’ of causal relationship using linguistic qualifiers such as ‘more often than not’ (0.5), ‘usually’ (0.65), and ‘almost always’ (0.8). (Ragin, 2000: 109) Such qualitative statements of ‘quasi-sufficient’ or ‘quasi-necessary’ conditions give a more possibilistic rather than deterministic criteria. This is the case where certain causal conditions might be necessary/sufficient in many cases but not in all of them, say for example in 80% of the cases. The ‘quasiness’ of necessity and sufficiency is provided by the use of benchmark proportions. The benchmark allowed refers to the proportion of cases that are consistent with the argument being tested. This means that testing for a benchmark of 0.8 a causal combination is claimed to be ‘almost always’ necessary/sufficient in 80 per cent of the cases where the causal combination applies.

In general, values of consistency and coverage considered as ‘good’ or ‘acceptable’ across all QCA applications on a medium-sized N (30-60) are consistency value of 0.7 and higher for sufficient conditions while higher should be set the consistency for necessary conditions. (Wagemann & Schneider, 2007: 29). A value of consistency below 0.75 is considered substantially inconsistent (Ragin, 2000).

### SEARCHING FOR NECESSARY CONDITIONS

Often the analysis of necessary conditions in QCA applications had been considered of secondary importance and at best they are (wrongly) derived from the solution of sufficiency analysis by factoring out the condition in common of all the paths (Wagemann & Schneider, 2007: 14). This has been criticized since a necessary condition if included in a (fuzzy) truth table procedure (which, after all, is essentially an analysis of sufficiency), often may be eliminated from solutions that include logical remainders (i.e., necessary conditions are often eliminated from parsimonious solutions) (Ragin, 2009: 110). In such a case it is important to test first for necessary conditions before examining sufficiency, especially when there is ‘limited diversity’ (logically possible combinations of causal conditions lacking empirical

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<sup>95</sup> Available at <<http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml>>.

instances) (Ragin, 2000: 131) so if there are any necessary condition it will be keep in sufficiency test through the intermediate solution.

The necessary test looks for all causal conditions with membership scores that are consistently greater than or equal to outcome membership scores. If a causal condition appears in all of the cases then this condition passes a test of necessity; in set theoretical language the necessary condition is a super-set of the outcome. Since in our case we have a medium number of cases (N=45) it makes sense to accept also a smaller consistency value rather than the full-consistency 100% and speak of quasi-necessary conditions than necessary conditions. For example testing for ‘almost always necessary’ (quasi-necessary) conditions we are based on a proportion of positive cases exceeding 80%, a consistency 0.8. That is the benchmark proportions of consistency related to a particular condition should be greater than 0.8, that is the number of cases fulfilling the subset principle should be greater than 80%.

**Table 27:** Descriptive of fsQCA for Necessary Conditions for the outcome

|                   |             | Data in table 26 |                 | Data in table 26 and supposed |          |
|-------------------|-------------|------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------|----------|
|                   |             | Consistency      | Coverage        | Consistency                   | Coverage |
| Condition tested: | polcon      | 0.495620         | 1.000000        |                               |          |
|                   | ~polcon     | <b>0.958698</b>  | 0.636213        | 0.956272                      | 0.611064 |
|                   | aid         | 0.599499         | 0.876487        | 0.657686                      | 0.773105 |
|                   | ~aid        | 0.937422         | 0.710963        |                               |          |
|                   | dens        | 0.688360         | 0.746269        | 0.706272                      | 0.770602 |
|                   | ~dens       | 0.724656         | 0.670915        |                               |          |
|                   | twinta      | 0.603880         | 0.761642        | 0.543286                      | 0.769231 |
|                   | ~twinta     | 0.643930         | 0.532333        |                               |          |
|                   | rul         | 0.519399         | 1.000000        | 0.483657                      | 1.000000 |
|                   | ~rul        | 0.831665         | 0.560760        |                               |          |
|                   | bur         | 0.705257         | 0.970715        | 0.702739                      | 0.979077 |
|                   | ~bur        | 0.831665         | 0.651790        |                               |          |
|                   |             |                  |                 |                               |          |
|                   | rul+bur     | 0.725907         | 0.971524        |                               |          |
|                   | ~polcon+aid | <b>0.958698</b>  | 0.636213        |                               |          |
| Condition tested: | polcon      | 0.628572         | 1.000000        |                               |          |
|                   | ~polcon     | <b>0.973810</b>  | 0.509552        | 0.965116                      | 0.515382 |
|                   | aid         | 0.733333         | 0.845380        | 0.733615                      | 0.720665 |
|                   | ~aid        | 0.973810         | 0.582345        |                               |          |
|                   | dens        | 0.738095         | 0.630936        | 0.737315                      | 0.672289 |
|                   | ~dens       | 0.811905         | 0.592700        |                               |          |
|                   | twinta      | 0.578572         | 0.575375        | 0.507400                      | 0.600375 |
|                   | ~twinta     | 0.735714         | 0.479565        |                               |          |
|                   | rul         | 0.550794         | 0.836145        | 0.506871                      | 0.875799 |
|                   | ~rul        | 0.946826         | 0.503376        |                               |          |
|                   | bur         | <b>0.813492</b>  | <b>0.882860</b> | 0.751586                      | 0.875077 |
|                   | ~bur        | 0.919841         | 0.568416        |                               |          |
|                   |             |                  |                 |                               |          |
|                   | rul+bur     | <b>0.839683</b>  | <b>0.886097</b> |                               |          |
|                   | ~polcon+aid | <b>0.973810</b>  | 0.509552        |                               |          |

|  |             |                 |                 |          |          |
|--|-------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------|----------|
| Conditions tested:   | polcon      | 0.683348        | 1.000000        |          |          |
| Necessary Conditions for the<br><b>Europeanization</b> outcome<br>(adoption AND implementation)            | ~polcon     | <b>1.000000</b> | 0.481312        | 1.000000 | 0.458086 |
|  | aid         | <b>0.797239</b> | <b>0.845380</b> | 0.834258 | 0.703011 |
|  | ~aid        | 1.000000        | 0.550071        |          |          |
|  | dens        | 0.743745        | 0.584803        | 0.775724 | 0.606747 |
|  | ~dens       | 0.882658        | 0.592700        |          |          |
|  | twinta      | 0.599655        | 0.548540        | 0.570548 | 0.579112 |
|  | ~twinta     | 0.770492        | 0.461976        |          |          |
|  | rul         | 0.598792        | 0.836145        | 0.590881 | 0.875799 |
|  | ~rul        | 0.970665        | 0.474684        |          |          |
|  | bur         | <b>0.855048</b> | <b>0.853575</b> | 0.855207 | 0.854154 |
|  | ~bur        | 0.970665        | 0.551741        |          |          |
|  |             |                 |                 |          |          |
|  | rul+bur     | <b>0.883520</b> | <b>0.857621</b> |          |          |
|  | ~polcon+aid | <b>1.000000</b> | 0.481312        |          |          |
| Conditions tested:   | polcon      | 0.388045        | 1.000000        | 0.332638 | 1.000000 |
| Necessary Conditions for <b>NOT</b><br><b>Europeanization</b> outcome (NOT<br>adoption AND implementation) | ~polcon     | 1.000000        | 0.847591        |          |          |
|  | aid         | 0.535522        | 1.000000        |          |          |
|  | ~aid        | <b>0.917197</b> | <b>0.888467</b> | 0.801182 | 0.895493 |
|  | dens        | 0.655561        | 0.907734        |          |          |
|  | ~dens       | 0.700147        | 0.827926        | 0.716371 | 0.849897 |
|  | twinta      | 0.490446        | 0.790055        |          |          |
|  | ~twinta     | 0.719745        | 0.759959        | 0.766076 | 0.759738 |
|  | rul         | 0.390005        | 0.959036        |          |          |
|  | ~rul        | <b>0.933366</b> | <b>0.803797</b> | 0.952728 | 0.804993 |
|  | bur         | 0.552180        | 0.970715        |          |          |
|  | ~bur        | <b>0.916707</b> | <b>0.917607</b> | 0.917622 | 0.918261 |
|  |             |                 |                 |          |          |
|  | ~rul+~bur   | <b>0.933366</b> | <b>0.792759</b> |          |          |
|  | polcon+~aid | <b>0.917197</b> | <b>0.888467</b> |          |          |


Note: All these results are obtained by the data in table 26, without the data missing, leaving blank in the analysis. If the supposed data are added (reported in two last columns of this table) the results almost are the same, they different very slightly in their consistency and coverage values that do not change substantially the interpretation below.

When testing for Necessary Conditions only the no political constrain condition (~polcon) shows a great consistency (96% of the cases) with the outcome of adoption but a lower coverage of only 63%. For the outcome implementation, still the no political constrain condition (~polcon) shows to be necessary the same as in adoption outcome (consistent in 97% of the cases and covering 51%). In addition to the no political constrain condition, the bureaucratic effectiveness (bur) show a good consistency of 0.82 and good coverage of 0.88. The rest of the conditions shows substantial inconsistency values (below 0.75) and are not considered to pass the necessary test. When **Europeanization outcome**, as adaptation and implementation, is considered we see that the no political constrain (~polcon) shows a full consistency of 1(100%, that is the fuzzy set value of condition is greater or equal to the outcome). Although the consistency value is high, its coverage is low covering empirically only 48% of the outcome. The bureaucratic effectiveness (bur) is a quasi-necessary condition consistent in 86% of the case empirically covering a proportion of 0.85 of instances of the

outcome. Another quasi-necessary condition, with a consistency value of 0.8 is the EU financial aid condition (aid) which has a good coverage of 0.85. The rest of conditions have some consistency but these values are below or in the limits of substantial consistency (0.75) indicating substantial inconsistency and are not considered as necessary conditions. As accompanying picture of Europeanization I run an analysis also for **Not Europeanization**. Acknowledge here that different from statistical method QCA analysis is asymmetrical, that is the reverse argumentation does not have to be true (for more on the argument see Ragin, 2008: 15-17). That is here, the analysis will be not to undermine the results gained for Europeanization but to add support on conditions (their reverse, present or absent) that may be necessary also for non Europeanization. As presented in the table, from already necessary conditions shown for Europeanization, the absent of bureaucratic effectiveness ( $\sim$ bur), the absent of EU financial aid condition ( $\sim$ aid) are quasi-necessary condition 0.92 consistent each and covering a proportion of 0.92 and 0.89 respectively, of instances of the outcome. Differently from the analysis of Europeanization in analysis of not Europeanization, the political constrain (polcon) is not a necessary condition for non Europeanization while the absent of rule of law ( $\sim$ rul) shows a quasi-necessary condition consistent 0.93 and covering 0.8 of instances of the outcome.

In order to see which cases escape the solution I present in an x-y plots the condition showing necessity (the distribution of the 45 cases along the output and the condition showing necessity). On the y-axis I display the fuzzy membership values of the cases in the outcome while on the x-axis I display the fuzzy membership score of the cases in the condition showing necessity. The main diagonal cuts the square into two triangles of similar size so if all (or most) cases fall below the main diagonal ( $x_i \geq y_i$ ) the condition is said to (quasi-)necessary. If some cases escape the necessity argument they show to be above the diagonal and so we can detect which cases escape the necessity condition.


**Figure 13:** x-y plot showing the distribution of the 45 cases along the No Political Constrain (condition) and the Europeanization (outcome): Necessity



Note: The number in the upper y-axis shows the coverage while the number in the right x-axis shows the consistency.


None of the case escapes the necessity condition ( $x_i \geq y_i$ )

**Figure 14:** x-y plot showing the distribution of the 45 cases along the Bureaucratic Effectiveness (condition) and the Europeanization (outcome): Necessity



Points A and B are cases that escape the necessity test. Analytically, cases in A ( $x=0$ ,  $t=0.33$ ) are bh03, bh07 and kos08 and Cases in B ( $x=0.33$ ,  $y=0.67$ ) are alb07, ser06, ser07. To put into the contextual analysis of the stage of accession, all this cases escaping necessity are potential candidate countries; none of the case is in candidacy status.

**Figure 15:** x-y plot showing the distribution of the 45 cases along the EU financial aid (condition) and the Europeanization (outcome): Necessity



Points A and B are cases that escape the necessity test. Analytically, cases in A ( $x=0$ ,  $t=0.33$ ) are cro02,03,04; Cases in B ( $x=0.33$ ,  $y=0.67$ ) are alb07, cro07,08, ser06,07. No contextual evidence regarding the stage of accession can be traced from these pattern, since the cases escaping the necessity consistency are potential and candidate cases.



From the evidence in the necessity analysis and presented graphically in the figures above, it is reasonable to conclude that membership in ‘no political constrain’ is *fully* necessary for membership in ‘Europeanization’ outcome since all cases fall under the main diagonal in an x-y plot. So the condition ‘no political constrain’ (x) is a perfect superset of outcome ‘Europeanization’ (y), i.e. the statement that ‘no political constrain’ is fully necessary for ‘Europeanization’ as the consistency coefficient takes on the value of 1 (full consistency). Regarding ‘bureaucratic effectiveness’ and ‘EU financial aid’ the analysis shows that in *most* of the membership scores for ‘Bureaucratic Effectiveness’ and ‘EU financial aid’ are consistently higher than the degree of membership in outcome ‘Europeanization’ with only six and seven cases respectively escaping necessary and lying above the diagonal. As such they can be considered as *almost always* necessary conditions for Europeanization outcome. The no political constrain (~polcon) although have a perfect consistency (1), that is the argument is theoretically consistent, it shows the lowest coverage, that is little empirical evidence, while bureaucratic effectiveness (bur) and the EU financial aid (aid) although does not have a full consistency it had good value explaining a great proportion of the outcome.

A last thing, although they are considered as (quasi-) necessary conditions none of them could be identified also as sufficient condition on its own.<sup>96</sup> These conditions identified as (quasi-)necessary needs to be considered for the analysis of sufficiency conditions (include them in the intermediate solution).

#### **ANALYSIS FOR SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS USING FUZZY TRUTH TABLE ALGORITHM (fsQCA)**

There are two way to conduct fuzzy-set analysis, the first one using truth table algorithm and the second one using inclusion algorithm. Here the use of fuzzy-set truth table approach is preferred for two main reasons. First of all, as Ragin suggests the fuzzy-set truth table analysis is an analytic strategy that is superior in several respects to the one sketched in Fuzzy-set Social Science (Ragin, 2000) (the analysis of truth table synthesizes the results of multiple fuzzy-set analyses) and furthermore it is more transparent and the researcher has more control over the analysis (assess both, the distribution of cases across different logical possible combinations of causal condition as well as the consistency of the evidence for each causal combination with the argument that it is a subset of the outcome) (2009: 89; 2008: 128). Secondly, for practical reasons given that the truth table algorithm has proven to be more robust (QCA Manual) that is why the truth table algorithm is prefer over the inclusion algorithm. By using the truth table algorithm instead of the inclusion algorithm, the analysis is virtually identical to the crisp-set procedure. Still instead of dichotomizing data to create crisps set for conventional crisp-set analysis is not preferred but rather using truth table analysis with fuzzy-set data is recommended. Ragin suggests that if a researcher can present their causal conditions and outcomes as fuzzy-sets, they should do so and not use crisp sets because even though simplicity may be obtained by using crisp-set data they may involve some costs; such as the appearance of contradictions (identical cases with contradictory outcomes), the more complex and more inclusive solution due to lower consistency standards (see Ragin, 2008: 138-141). Using truth table are very useful for investigating ‘limited

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<sup>96</sup> For necessary conditions to be also sufficient all cases should fall on the main diagonal.

diversity' and the consequences of different 'simplifying assumptions' that follow from using different subsets of 'logical remainders' to reduce complexity (Ragin, 2009: 88).

The researcher has to decide on two important issues (the distribution of cases across causal combinations and assess the consistency of fuzzy subset relations).

1) Firstly, it is important to decide which observations are empirically relevant and which are empirically irrelevant (irrelevant cases are treated as remainders, a logically possible combination of conditions lacking empirical instances).<sup>97</sup> This task is accomplished by selecting the frequency threshold based on the number of cases in each of the configurations which at least should be 1 case with greater than 0.5 membership in a combination (that is, we have at least one empirical observation). Ragin (2000) suggest that when the number of cases is relatively small, the frequency threshold should be 1 or 2 while when the total N is large, a more substantial threshold should be used (the number of cases observed for a specific combination of cases is shown in the column labeled *number*).

2) Secondly, distinguish configurations that are subsets of the outcome from those that are not by using a cutoff value to determine which causal combinations pass the fuzzy-set theoretic consistency and which do not. The perfect set-theoretic consistency will be the cutoff value of 1 while values below 0.5 indicate inconsistency and negative values indicate strong inconsistency. As Ragin suggests 'in most analysis the consistency cutoff value will be less than 1.0, for perfect set-theoretic consistency is not common with fuzzy-set data' (2008: 135). In general, a cutoff value of 0.85 is recommended although other scores can also be used but it should not be less than 0.75 as values below 0.75 indicates substantial inconsistency (Ragin, 2008: 136). (The measure of fuzzy-set theoretic consistency is shown in the *consist* column). 'This measure of consistency (as described by Ragin Formula) prescribes substantial penalties for large inconsistencies but small penalties for near misses (e.g., a Xi score of 0.85 and a Yi score of 0.80) (Ragin, 2009: 108).

The standard analysis is preferred over the specific analysis as it gives all the three solutions; the most complex solution (Positive cases are set as True and all the others to False), the most parsimonious solution (Positive cases are set as True, Negative Cases and Remainders as Don't Care cases, while Contradictions are set to False) as well as the intermediate result

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<sup>97</sup> 'It is important to assess the distribution of cases' membership scores across causal combinations in fuzzy-set analyses because some causal combinations may be empirically trivial. In other words if most cases have very low or zero membership in a combination then it is pointless to assess that combination's link to the outcome' (Ragin, 2008: 130). Treating this rows as irrelevant or 'remainders is justified on the grounds that the empirical evidence relevant to these combinations is not substantial enough to permit an evaluation of set-theoretic consistency' (Ragin, 2008: 125, footnote 4). 'If all cases have very low membership in a combination, then it is pointless to conduct a fuzzy-set assessment of that combination's link to outcome' (Ragin, 2009: 106)... 'if the membership scores in causal combination are very low, then it is very easy for that combination to satisfy the subset relation signaling sufficiency (where scores in the casual combination must be less than or equal to scores in the outcome). However, the consistency with the subset relation in such instances is meaningless, for the researcher lacks good instances of the combination (i.e. cases with greater than 0.5 membership in the casual combination)' (Ragin, 2009: 119, footnote 3).

which uses theoretical knowledge to set if a condition according to expectations should be present, absent or either of both.

It is very important to examine the distribution of cases across conditions (QCA Manual). First we have to assess the distribution of cases across the combinations. The value of at least 1 case was selected because the N is medium and it captures 100% of cases assigned to combinations. The other rows not meeting the frequency threshold (showing at least, one evidence) are considered as ‘remainder’ combinations in the analysis.

For the three outcome, adoption, implementation and Europeanization (as intersection of adoption AND implementation) I use a

- i. relevant vs. irrelevant cases: I apply a frequency threshold of 1 to the data, eliminating all other configurations that do not show any observation (100% of the cases are captured)
- ii. consistent subset of outcome: I choose the consistency threshold of (approximately)<sup>98</sup> 0.85, following Ragin’s suggestion that consistency should preferably exceeds 0.85.

### Outcome Adoption (adopt)

With 6 causal conditions, there are 64 (2<sup>6</sup>) corners to the vector space formed by the fuzzy set causal conditions corresponding to 64 logically possible arguments (causal combinations), graphically 64 rows. While the data gives only 9 cases with 55 combinations do not showing empirical evidence (very limited diversity). The remaining 55 logical remainders are thus available as potential counterfactual cases for further logical simplification. The 45 empirical cases are unevenly distributed within the 6-dimentional vector space of only 9 combinations out of 55 (the table below reports the results).

**Table 28:** Distribution of cases Across Causal Combinations and set theoretic consistency of causal Combinations as Subset of Adoption (adopt)

| Cases                 | polcon | aid | dens | twinta | rul | bur | Number<br>(Nr of cases with > 0.5 membership) | Consist<br>(consistency as a subset of adoption) |
|-----------------------|--------|-----|------|--------|-----|-----|---|--|
|                       | 0      | 0   | 1    | 0      | 0   | 0   | 9 (28%)                                       | 0.796163   |
|                       | 0      | 0   | 0    | 0      | 0   | 0   | 7 (50%)                                       | 0.783759   |
|                       | 0      | 0   | 1    | 1      | 0   | 0   | 6 (68%)                                       | 0.866667   |
|                       | 0      | 0   | 1    | 1      | 1   | 1   | 3 (78%)                                       | 1.000000   |
|                       | 0      | 0   | 0    | 1      | 1   | 1   | 2 (84%)                                       | 1.000000   |
|                       | 0      | 1   | 1    | 0      | 0   | 0   | 2 (90%)                                       | 0.939609   |
|                       | 0      | 0   | 1    | 1      | 0   | 1   | 1 (93%)                                       | 0.939502   |
|                       | 0      | 1   | 0    | 0      | 0   | 0   | 1 (96%)                                       | 0.915511   |
|                       | 0      | 1   | 1    | 1      | 0   | 0   | 1 (100%)                                      | 0.939502   |
|                       | 0      | 0   | 0    | 0      | 0   | 1   | 0 (100%)                                      | 1.000000   |
| No empirical evidence | ...    | ... | ...  | ...    | ... | ... | ...   | ...  |

Using a frequency threshold of 1 AND a consistency threshold of 0.85 we get the following results reported in table 29.

<sup>98</sup> In the program although a value of say 0.8 is put as the consistency cutoff, in the results the lowest actual value above this cut-off is shown, this is reported in the table.

**Table 29:** Models, Consistency and Coverage Solution for Adoption

|   | Model: adopt = f(polcon, aid, dens, twinta, rul, bur)<br>Rows: 9<br>frequency cutoff: 1.000000<br>consistency cutoff: 0.866667                                     | Raw coverage | Unique coverage | Consistency |
|---|--|--------------|-----------------|-------------|
| Complex solution without simplifying assumptions (no counterfactuals allowed)                   | ~polcon*aid*~twinta*~rul*~bur +  | 0.475594     | 0.269086        | 0.882694    |
|   | ~polcon*dens*twinta*~rul*~bur +  | 0.414894     | 0.000000        | 0.829787    |
|   | ~polcon*~aid*dens*twinta*~rul +  | 0.414894     | 0.000000        | 0.829787    |
|   | ~polcon*~aid*twinta*rul*bur  | 0.395494     | 0.147685        | 1.000000    |
|   | Solution coverage: 0.831665<br>Solution consistency: 0.830625  |              |                 |             |
| Parsimonious solution with simplifying assumptions (easy and difficult counterfactuals allowed) | aid +  | 0.599499     | 0.269086        | 0.876487    |
|   | twinta +   | 0.603880     | 0.273467        | 0.761642    |
|   | Solution coverage: 0.872966<br>Solution consistency: 0.775862  |              |                 |             |
|   | Model: adopt = f(bur, rul, twinta, dens, aid, polcon)<br>Rows: 8<br>frequency cutoff: 1.000000<br>consistency cutoff: 0.866667<br>Assumptions:<br>~polcon (absent) | Raw coverage | Unique coverage | Consistency |
| Intermediate solution with simplifying assumptions (most plausible counterfactuals allowed)     | ~bur*~rul*~twinta*aid*~polcon +  | 0.475594     | 0.269086        | 0.882694    |
|   | ~rul*twinta*dens*~aid*~polcon +  | 0.414894     | 0.000000        | 0.829787    |
|   | ~bur*~rul*twinta*dens*~polcon +  | 0.414894     | 0.000000        | 0.829787    |
|   | bur*rul*twinta*~aid*~polcon  | 0.395494     | 0.147685        | 1.000000    |
|   | Solution coverage: 0.831665<br>Solution consistency: 0.830625  |              |                 |             |

Intermediate solution gave the same results as complex solution.

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~bur\*~rul\*~twinta\*aid\*~polcon: kos04 (0.67,0.67), kos06 (0.67,0.33), kos08 (0.67,0.33)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~rul\*twinta\*dens\*~aid\*~polcon: alb04 (0.67,0.33), bh06 (0.67,0.33), cro04 (0.67,0.33), kos02 (0.67,1), mac02 (0.67,0.33), mac03 (0.67,0.67), mac04 (0.67,1)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~bur\*~rul\*twinta\*dens\*~polcon: alb04 (0.67,0.33), bh06 (0.67,0.33), cro08 (0.67,0.33), kos02 (0.67,1), mac02 (0.67,0.33), mac03 (0.67,0.67), mac04 (0.67,1)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term bur\*rul\*twinta\*~aid\*~polcon: bh07 (0.67,1), bh08 (0.67,0.67), cro02 (0.67,0.67), cro03 (0.67,0.67), cro05 (0.67,0.67)

### Outcome Implementation (implem)

Even in implementation, from the 64 (2<sup>6</sup>) logically possible causal combinations the data gives only 9 cases missing 55 combinations not showing empirical evidence. The table below reports the results:

**Table 30:** Distribution of cases Across Causal Combinations and set theoretic consistency of causal Combinations as Subset of Implementation (implem)

| Cases                 | polcon | aid | dens | twinta | rul | bur | Number<br>Nr of cases with > 0.5<br>membership | Consist<br>Consistency as a subset of<br>Implementation |
|-----------------------|--------|-----|------|--------|-----|-----|--|---|
|                       | 0      | 0   | 1    | 0      | 0   | 0   | 9 (28%)  | 0.755396  |
|                       | 0      | 0   | 0    | 0      | 0   | 0   | 7 (50%)  | 0.752737  |
|                       | 0      | 0   | 1    | 1      | 0   | 0   | 6 (68%)  | 0.777778  |
|                       | 0      | 0   | 1    | 1      | 1   | 1   | 3 (78%)  | 0.863454  |
|                       | 0      | 0   | 0    | 1      | 1   | 1   | 2 (84%)  | 0.871698  |
|                       | 0      | 1   | 1    | 0      | 0   | 0   | 2 (90%)  | 0.879219  |
|                       | 0      | 0   | 1    | 1      | 0   | 1   | 1 (93%)  | 1.000000  |
|                       | 0      | 1   | 0    | 0      | 0   | 0   | 1 (96%)  | 0.915511  |
|                       | 0      | 1   | 1    | 1      | 0   | 0   | 1 (100%)                                       | 0.939502  |
|                       | 0      | 0   | 0    | 0      | 0   | 1   | 0 (100%)                                       | 1.000000  |
| No empirical evidence | ...    | ... | ...  | ...    | ... | ... | ...  | ...   |

Using a frequency threshold of 1 AND a consistency threshold of 0.85 we get the following results reported in table 31.

**Table 31:** Models, Consistency and Coverage Solution for Implem

|   | Model: implem = f(polcon, aid, dens, twinta, rul, bur)<br>Rows: 9<br>frequency cutoff: 1.000000<br>consistency cutoff: 0.863454 | Raw coverage | Unique coverage | Consistency |
|---|---|--------------|-----------------|-------------|
| Complex solution without simplifying assumptions (no counterfactuals allowed)                 | ~polcon*aid*~twinta*~rul*~bur +   | 0.576190     | 0.183333        | 0.843206    |
|   | ~polcon*aid*dens*~rul*~bur +  | 0.550000     | 0.026190        | 0.871698    |
|   | ~polcon*~aid*dens*twinta*bur +  | 0.473016     | 0.026984        | 0.897590    |
|   | ~polcon*~aid*twinta*rul*bur   | 0.393651     | 0.052381        | 0.784810    |
|   | Solution coverage: 0.865873<br>Solution consistency: 0.781519   |              |                 |             |
| Parsimonious solution with simplifying assumptions (easy & difficult counterfactuals allowed) | aid +   | 0.733333     | 0.052381        | 0.845380    |
|   | bur   | 0.813492     | 0.132540        | 0.882860    |
|   | Solution coverage: 0.865873<br>Solution consistency: 0.781519   |              |                 |             |

*Complex solutions:*

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~polcon\*aid\*~twinta\*~rul\*~bur: kos04 (0.67,0.33), kos06 (0.67,0.33), kos08 (0.67,0.33)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~polcon\*aid\*dens\*~rul\*~bur: cro08 (0.67,0.33), kos04 (0.67,0.33), kos06 (0.67,0.33)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~polcon\*~aid\*dens\*twinta\*bur: cro02 (0.67,0.33), cro03 (0.67,0.33), cro04 (0.67,0.67), cro05 (0.67,0.67)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~polcon\*~aid\*twinta\*rul\*bur: bh07 (0.67,0.33), bh08 (0.67,0.33), cro02 (0.67,0.33), cro03 (0.67,0.33), cro05 (0.67,0.67)

*Parsimonious solution:*

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term aid: cro08 (0.67,0.33), kos04 (0.67,0.33), kos06 (0.67,0.33), kos08 (0.67,0.33)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term bur: bh07 (0.67,0.33), bh08 (0.67,0.33), cro02 (0.67,0.33), cro03 (0.67,0.33), cro04 (0.67,0.67), cro05 (0.67,0.67).

|   |   |              |                 |             |
|---|---|--------------|-----------------|-------------|
|   | Model: implem = f(bur, rul, twinta, dens, aid, polcon)<br>Rows: 12<br>frequency cutoff: 1.000000<br>consistency cutoff: 0.863454<br>Assumptions:<br>bur (present)<br>~polcon (absent) | Raw coverage | Unique coverage | Consistency |
| Intermediate solution with simplifying assumptions (most plausible counterfactuals allowed) | ~rul*~twinta*aid*~polcon +  | 0.576190     | 0.183333        | 0.843206    |
|   | ~rul*dens*aid*~polcon +   | 0.550000     | 0.026190        | 0.871698    |
|   | bur*rul*twinta*~aid*~polcon +   | 0.393651     | 0.052381        | 0.784810    |
|   | bur*twinta*dens*~aid*~polcon +  | 0.473016     | 0.000000        | 0.897590    |
|   | bur*~rul*twinta*dens*~polcon  | 0.446032     | 0.000000        | 1.000000    |
|   | Solution coverage: 0.865873<br>Solution consistency: 0.781519   |              |                 |             |

Intermediate solution gave the same results as complex solution.

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~rul\*~twinta\*aid\*~polcon: kos04 (0.67,0.33), kos06 (0.67,0.33), kos08 (0.67,0.33)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~rul\*dens\*aid\*~polcon: cro08 (0.67,0.33), kos04 (0.67,0.33), kos06 (0.67,0.33)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term bur\*rul\*twinta\*~aid\*~polcon: bh07 (0.67,0.33), bh08 (0.67,0.33), cro02 (0.67,0.33), cro03 (0.67,0.33), cro05 (0.67,0.67)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term bur\*twinta\*dens\*~aid\*~polcon: cro02 (0.67,0.33), cro03 (0.67,0.33), cro04 (0.67,0.67), cro05 (0.67,0.67)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term bur\*~rul\*twinta\*dens\*~polcon: cro04 (0.67,0.67)

### Analysis with Europeanization (=Adaptation AND Implementation) as Outcome

Even in Europeanization from the 64 (2<sup>6</sup>) logically possible causal combinations the empirical data gives only 9 cases missing 55 combinations not showing empirical evidence. The table below reports the results:

**Table 32:** Distribution of cases Across Causal Combinations and set theoretic consistency of causal Combinations as Subset of Europeanization (adoption AND implementation)

| Best Instances        | polcon | aid | dens | twinta | rul | bur | Number<br>Nr of cases with > 0.5<br>membership | Consist<br>Consistency as a subset of<br>Europeanization |
|-----------------------|--------|-----|------|--------|-----|-----|--|--|
|                       | 0      | 0   | 1    | 0      | 0   | 0   | 9 (28%)  | 0.714628   |
|                       | 0      | 0   | 0    | 0      | 0   | 0   | 7 (50%)  | 0.752737   |
|                       | 0      | 0   | 1    | 1      | 0   | 0   | 6 (68%)  | 0.777778   |
|                       | 0      | 0   | 1    | 1      | 1   | 1   | 3 (78%)  | 0.863454   |
|                       | 0      | 0   | 0    | 1      | 1   | 1   | 2 (84%)  | 0.871698   |
|                       | 0      | 1   | 1    | 0      | 0   | 0   | 2 (90%)  | 0.879219   |
|                       | 0      | 0   | 1    | 1      | 0   | 1   | 1 (93%)  | 0.939502   |
|                       | 0      | 1   | 0    | 0      | 0   | 0   | 1 (96%)  | 0.915511   |
|                       | 0      | 1   | 1    | 1      | 0   | 0   | 1 (100%)                                       | 0.939502   |
|                       | 0      | 0   | 0    | 0      | 0   | 1   | 0 (100%)                                       | 1.000000   |
| No empirical evidence | ...    | ... | ...  | ...    | ... | ... | ...  | ...  |

Using a frequency threshold of 1 AND a consistency threshold of 0.85 we get the following results reported in table 33.

**Table 33:** Models, Consistency and Coverage Solution, and Best Instances (cases) for Europeanization

|  | Model: $\text{adimp} = f(\text{polcon}, \text{aid}, \text{dens}, \text{twinta}, \text{rul}, \text{bur})$<br>Rows: 9<br>frequency cutoff: 1.000000<br>consistency cutoff: 0.863454  | Raw coverage | Unique coverage | Consistency | Best instances <sup>99</sup>  |
|--|--|--------------|-----------------|-------------|---|
| Complex solution without simplifying assumptions             | $\sim\text{polcon}*\text{aid}*\sim\text{twinta}*\sim\text{rul}*\sim\text{bur} +$<br>$\sim\text{polcon}*\text{aid}*\text{dens}*\sim\text{rul}*\sim\text{bur} +$<br>$\sim\text{polcon}*\sim\text{aid}*\text{dens}*\text{twinta}*\text{bur} +$<br>$\sim\text{polcon}*\sim\text{aid}*\text{twinta}*\text{rul}*\text{bur}$<br>Solution coverage: 0.911993<br>Solution consistency: 0.757163 | 0.626402     | 0.199310        | 0.843206    | kos04, kos06, kos08.<br>cro08, kos04, kos06.<br>cro02, cro03, cro04, cro05.<br>bh07, bh08, cro02, cro03, cro05. |
| Parsimonious solution with simplifying assumptions           | aid +<br>bur<br>Solution coverage: 0.911993<br>Solution consistency: 0.757163  | 0.797239     | 0.056946        | 0.845380    | cro08, kos04, kos06, kos08.<br>bh07, bh08, cro02, cro03, cro04, cro05.  |
|  | Model: $\text{adimp} = f(\text{bur}, \text{rul}, \text{twinta}, \text{dens}, \text{aid}, \text{polcon})$<br>Rows: 16<br>frequency cutoff: 1.000000<br>consistency cutoff: 0.863454<br>Assumptions:<br>bur (present)<br>aid (present)<br>$\sim\text{polcon}$ (absent)   |              |                 |             |   |
| Intermediate solution most plausible counterfactuals allowed | $\sim\text{rul}*\sim\text{twinta}*\text{aid}*\sim\text{polcon} +$<br>$\sim\text{rul}*\text{dens}*\text{aid}*\sim\text{polcon} +$<br>$\text{bur}*\text{rul}*\text{twinta}*\sim\text{polcon} +$<br>$\text{bur}*\text{twinta}*\text{dens}*\sim\text{polcon}$<br>Solution coverage: 0.911993<br>Solution consistency: 0.757163   | 0.626402     | 0.199310        | 0.843206    | kos04, kos06, kos08.<br>cro08, kos04, kos06.<br>bh07, bh08, cro02, cro03, cro05.<br>cro02, cro03, cro04, cro05. |

**Formula 1:**  $\sim\text{rul}*\sim\text{twinta}*\text{aid}*\sim\text{polcon} \rightarrow \text{europeanization}$  Kosovo (kos04,06,08)

**Formula 2:**  $\sim\text{rul}*\text{dens}*\text{aid}*\sim\text{polcon} \rightarrow \text{europeanization}$  Croatia and Kosovo (cro08, kos04,06)

**Formula 3:**  $\text{bur}*\text{rul}*\text{twinta}*\sim\text{polcon} \rightarrow \text{europeanization}$  BiH and Croatia (bh07,08, cro02,03,05)

**Formula 4:**  $\text{bur}*\text{twinta}*\text{dens}*\sim\text{polcon} \rightarrow \text{europeanization}$  Croatia (cro02, cro03, cro04, cro05)

The value of the solution consistency is good, at least above the recommended 0.75 consistency while the solution coverage value is even better; this perhaps even because there is much complexity of conditions in displaying the outcome. The overall solution term  $\sim\text{rul}*\sim\text{twinta}*\text{aid}*\sim\text{polcon} + \sim\text{rul}*\text{dens}*\text{aid}*\sim\text{polcon} + \text{bur}*\text{rul}*\text{twinta}*\sim\text{polcon} + \text{bur}*\text{twinta}*\text{dens}*\sim\text{polcon}$  is 75% consistent and it covers about 91% of the fuzzy scores in

<sup>99</sup> In fuzzy set analysis is possible to report which row has strong instances but not assign cases strictly to rows as in crisp-set analysis, since all cases being fuzzy value have some degree of membership in each row (Ragin, 2009: 112). That is why here I report cases with greater than 0.5 membership in respective term, obtain from the analysis.

the outcome Europeanization. The solution has a considerable consistency and also covers or account for a large proportion of the instances of an outcome (0.91) and as such it is also empirically important. The good values of coverage indicate there may not be many other conditions or combinations of conditions for the outcome.

‘One possibility to argue that one path is more important than another is the empirical measure of (unique and/or raw) coverage’ (Wagemann & Schneider, 2007: 27). The raw coverage of 4 paths alone is about 40% to 60% but their unique coverage range from 20% to 3%, 6% and 0% (it is rather low). The raw coverage indicate which share of the outcome is explained by a certain alternative path and in our case with raw coverage from 40%-60%, the all 4 paths explains almost equally the overall solution outcome. While considering unique coverage, a measure that indicate which share of the outcome is *exclusively* explained by a certain alternative path, we see that the first path ( $\sim\text{rul}*\sim\text{twinta}*\text{aid}*\sim\text{polcon}$ ) exclusively best explains our outcome. Having low coverage scores means that the paths solution (conjunctions) strongly overlaps with each other.

### Outcome Not Europeanization = NOT (Adaptation AND Implementation)

To give a full picture we analyze also the conditions for Not Europeanization outcome as (NOT (adoption AND implementation)). As stated for the necessary analysis, the analysis here does not contradict those gained for Europeanization outcome as QCA logic is not symmetrical. We simply want to check what opposite explanation exist for Not Europeanization and if other paths exists for non Europeanization.

**Table 34:** Distribution of cases Across Causal Combinations and set theoretic consistency of causal Combinations as Subset of Not Europeanization (NOT (adoption AND implementation))

| Best Instances           | polcon | aid | dens | twinta | rul | bur | Number<br>Nr of cases<br>with > 0.5<br>membership | Consist<br>Consistency as<br>a subset of Not<br>Europeanization |
|--------------------------|--------|-----|------|--------|-----|-----|---|---|
|                          | 0      | 0   | 1    | 0      | 0   | 0   | 9 (28%)   | 0.918465  |
|                          | 0      | 0   | 0    | 0      | 0   | 0   | 7 (50%)   | 1.000000  |
|                          | 0      | 0   | 1    | 1      | 0   | 0   | 6 (68%)   | 0.955556  |
|                          | 0      | 0   | 1    | 1      | 1   | 1   | 3 (78%)   | 0.931727  |
|                          | 0      | 0   | 0    | 1      | 1   | 1   | 2 (84%)   | 1.000000  |
|                          | 0      | 1   | 1    | 0      | 0   | 0   | 2 (90%)   | 1.000000  |
|                          | 0      | 0   | 1    | 1      | 0   | 1   | 1 (93%)   | 1.000000  |
|                          | 0      | 1   | 0    | 0      | 0   | 0   | 1 (96%)   | 1.000000  |
|                          | 0      | 1   | 1    | 1      | 0   | 0   | 1 (100%)  | 1.000000  |
|                          | 0      | 0   | 0    | 0      | 0   | 1   | 0 (100%)  | 1.000000  |
| No empirical<br>evidence | ...    | ... | ...  | ...    | ... | ... | ...   | ...   |

Using a frequency threshold of 1 AND a consistency threshold of 0.85 we get the following results reported in table 35.



**Table 35:** Models, Consistency and Coverage Solution for NOT Europeanization

|   | Model: noadimp = f(polcon, aid, dens, twinta, rul, bur)<br>Rows: 9<br>frequency cutoff: 1.000000<br>consistency cutoff: 0.955556   | Raw coverage | Unique coverage | Consistency |
|---|--|--------------|-----------------|-------------|
| Complex solution without simplifying assumptions (no counterfactuals allowed)                 | ~polcon*~dens*~twinta*~rul*~bur +  | 0.569819     | 0.278785        | 0.972408    |
|   | ~polcon*aid*dens*~rul*~bur +   | 0.389515     | 0.049976        | 1.000000    |
|   | ~polcon*~aid*dens* twinta*~rul +   | 0.374816     | 0.099951        | 0.957447    |
|   | ~polcon*~aid*~dens*twinta*rul*bur  | 0.259677     | 0.033317        | 1.000000    |
|   | Solution coverage: 0.850074<br>Solution consistency: 0.962819  |              |                 |             |
| Parsimonious solution with simplifying assumptions (easy & difficult counterfactuals allowed) | ~dens +  | 0.700147     | 0.166095        | 0.827926    |
|   | aid +  | 0.535522     | 0.033317        | 1.000000    |
|   | twinta*~rul  | 0.423812     | 0.099951        | 0.962180    |
|   | Solution coverage: 0.850074<br>Solution consistency: 0.839787  |              |                 |             |
| Intermediate solution with simplifying assumptions (most plausible counterfactuals allowed)   | Model: noadimp = f(bur, rul, twinta, dens, aid, polcon)<br>Rows: 10<br>frequency cutoff: 1.000000<br>consistency cutoff: 0.955556<br>Assumptions:<br>~bur (absent)<br>~rul (absent)<br>~aid (absent) |              |                 |             |
|   | twinta*~ dens*~aid*~polcon +   | 0.340519     | 0.033317        | 1.000000    |
|   | ~rul* twinta*~aid*~polcon +  | 0.407153     | 0.099951        | 0.960694    |
|   | ~bur*~rul*~twinta*~dens*~polcon+   | 0.569819     | 0.278785        | 0.972408    |
|   | ~bur*~rul*dens*aid*~polcon   | 0.389515     | 0.049976        | 1.000000    |
|   | Solution coverage: 0.850074<br>Solution consistency: 0.962819  |              |                 |             |

## DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION ON THE RESULTS

Ragin suggests that:

‘in general, intermediate solutions are preferred because they are often the most interpretable. When limited diversity is substantial, complex solutions can be exceedingly intricate because little or no simplification occurs. Likewise, under these same conditions, parsimonious solutions can be unrealistically simple, due to the incorporation of many (easy and difficult) counterfactual combinations. Intermediate solutions strike a balance between parsimony and complexity, based on the substantial and theoretical knowledge of the investigator’ (2008: 175).

An important benefit of intermediate solutions is that they will not allow removal of necessary conditions – any condition that is superset of the outcome and that makes sense as a necessary condition (Ragin, 2009: 111). Using fsQCA program it is possible to derive three solutions: one maximizing parsimony, the other maximizing complexity and one (in between) intermediate solution deriving from the most complex solution using only ‘easy’ counterfactuals (intermediate solution is a subset of the most parsimonious solution and superset of the most complex solution). The most parsimonious solution permits the

incorporation of any counterfactual combination that contributes to derivation of a logically simplifier solution.

‘The terms included in the parsimonious solution must be included in any representation of the results, for these are the decisive causal ingredients that distinguish combinations of conditions that are consistent subsets of the outcome from those that are not (that is, among the combinations that pass the frequency threshold). Thus, these ingredients should be considered the ‘core’ causal conditions. The ingredients that are added in the intermediate solution are those that are present in the cases that consistently display the outcome but require difficult counterfactuals to be removed. Thus, these conditions are ‘complementary’ or ‘contributing’ conditions in the sense that they make sense as important contributing factors and can be removed from the solution only if the researcher is willing to make assumptions that are at odds with existing substantive and theoretical knowledge’ (Ragin, 2008: 204).

Before interpreting the results of the fsQCA analysis, it is important to point out several important observations.

1) Given that the values are not perfect consistent (theoretical) and coverage (empirically) this may be even because the values of each variable and their calibration may contain any measurement errors.

2) Operationalizations and calibrations (translating data into verbal qualifiers) can be criticized given that this is a very sensitive and much argued point of fuzzy set.

3) We have better values of consistency and coverage for non Europeanization outcome than for Europeanization outcome but the solution does not add much to our understanding as in most paths the absent of the conditions show to arrive to non Europeanization (expected). But what it is important in that analysis is that: 1) the present of veto player is neither necessary nor INUS condition for non Europeanization. 2) the forth path solution ( $\sim\text{bur}^*\sim\text{rul}^*\text{dens}^*\text{aid}^*\sim\text{polcon}$ ) shows that the absent of administrative capacity ( $\sim\text{bur}^*\sim\text{rul}$ ) lead to non Europeanization although the EU determinacy and density of conditionality and financial aid may be present.

First of all, the results of the empirical fuzzy set analysis of Europeanization identifies the absent of political constrain, EU financial aid and bureaucratic effectiveness as necessary conditions, meaning that they are present whenever Europeanization, as adoption and implementation, outcomes appear. Only veto players (Polcon) shows to be a necessary condition for Europeanization with a perfect consistency of 1 (its consistency is also high for adoption and implementation). This is theoretically correct but however cautionary remarks are in place here since the calibration of veto players applied here can certainly be challenged, as we used a demanding cross over-point (2/3). This cross-over point leave all the WB countries in values between 0 - 0.33 without any case showing to have at least one or more veto player (perfect political constrain). Anyway this empirical observation, of no veto player in the WB, is consistence with scholar’s argumentations that veto players are low in the WB and Eastern Europe more general (for an extensive argumentation see paragraph). Polcon shows a perfect consistency (1) so having theoretical importance but low coverage that means few empirical importance. Here it may be argued that political veto players

(POLCON) is a trivial necessary condition because it is a condition constant (low) for all values of the outcome, that is it happens often (see Goertz, 2006). A simple measure for the importance or relevance of a necessary condition is also the coverage; very low coverage corresponds to an empirically irrelevant meaningless necessary condition (Ragin, 2008: 61). Polcon is a necessary condition and centrally relevant to theorizing Europeanization but 'rare' from empirical point of view in the WBs (exhibit low coverage, explains less). In the contrary, EU financial aid and bureaucratic effectiveness as necessary conditions have not a full consistency but they cover a greater range of empirical evidence in WB. When considering non Europeanization outcome, the presence of the veto player does not show to be a necessary condition for non Europeanization. In the contrary, the lack of EU financial aid and the lack of bureaucratic effectiveness are quasi-necessary conditions for non Europeanization. In addition to these conditions, the absent of the rule of law shows to be a quasi-necessary condition for non Europeanization.

Furthermore, the results of the empirical fsQCA analysis besides the necessary conditions gave also a quasi-sufficient solution that combined the conditions into 4 paths (models):

1)  $\sim \text{rul} * \sim \text{twinta} * \text{aid} * \sim \text{polcon}$

The number of Veto Players with (financial) adaptation costs. These findings are in line with both the hypothesis of Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005

2)  $\sim \text{rul} * \text{dens} * \text{aid} * \sim \text{polcon}$

The number of Veto Players with (financial) adaptation costs and the determinacy & density of EU.

The first two paths at arriving to Europeanization are both of the enforcement approach. Here, not only the EU but also the domestic needs to be considered.

3)  $\text{bur} * \text{rul} * \text{twinta} * \sim \text{polcon}$

The bureaucratic effectiveness and rule of law as well as twinning and TAIEX are important in achieving Europeanization. This path takes a management approach, were twinning and taix, socializing effects help administrative capacity to achieve Europeanization.

4)  $\text{bur} * \text{twinta} * \text{dens} * \sim \text{polcon}$

This path considers conditions from different logics, that is in the absent of veto players, bureaucratic effectiveness and twinning and TAIEX as well as the determinacy and density of EU conditions we have Europeanization. This solution is logical possible but do not show specific contribution to our solution empirical coverage.

When conditions of management approach are missing (like in formula 1, no rul of law and no epistemic communities; and formula 2, no rule of law) then conditions of enforcement approach are needed (in formula 1 aid and absent of political constrain; and formula 2 density, aid and absent of political constrain). In the contrary, when conditions of management approach are present still enforcement factors are present. In this sense, the rational logic seems to be sufficient by itself even when appropriateness or path-dependency conditions are missing as we have in formula 1 and 2. While the present conditions from appropriateness and path-dependence logic when present they still need conditions of rationality so to sufficiently derive into an outcome of Europeanization. This interpretation

give credits and corroborate with the previous findings of the CEEC countries in pre-accession, findings of most scholars Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, Grabbe 20006 when consequentialist logic is necessary for Europeanization.

The success on Europeanization needs both actors, conditions from both actors while in the contrary the failure on Europeanization comes especially with the failure of domestic conditions even when EU level conditions are present. And more specifically these domestic conditions important for non Europeanization are the administrative capacity and not the veto players.

### **EVALUATING THE STRENGTH OF RESULTS GAINED FROM FSQCA**

The most common criticism of QCA is that results gained are very sensitive to researcher's discriminatory power, although proponents of QCA reject this criticism by referring to the prerequisite of extensive theoretical and substantial knowledge which minimizes the problem. The example in this book may be the confirmation of the same results obtain even when the analysis is done with the data missing (leaving blank in the analysis) and with the supposed data added according to available information. The difference is very slightly in their consistency and coverage values that do not change substantially the solution.

Still an important point, not just from critics but also from proponents of QCA remains how to make the results of QCA analysis more robust. Beside the measures of consistency and coverage for assessing the strength of empirical results (as proposed by Ragin) there are other strategies to assess the robustness, - that is the degree to which solutions are sensitive to small changes in the discriminatory choices made by researchers in various stages of the processes of systematic complexity reduction, - of the results gained by QCA analysis. Skaaning lists a number of ways to assess robustness in QCA such as 1) methodologically triangulation (multi-methods test); 2) change case selection, model specification, and or operationalization 3) different use of logical cases, theoretically guided inclusion (use of easy contrafactual) and the inclusion of all (relevant) logical cases – associated more with parsimony and inference rather than robustness (2008: 4-5). Following his suggestion I will try to address these points and assess the QCA results gained. In this paragraph I deal with changing calibration and case selection, since the different use of logical cases (the three solutions) I have already tackled and the methodological triangulation (experts survey) will be the next chapter exposed in more detail.

*How **robust** is the relationship between conditions measurement and outcome (adoption and/or implementation)? Are the solutions revealed in fsQCA results **sensitive to changes** in the calibration method used and/or case selection made?*

### **Changing calibration: determinacy and density of EU conditionality direct and indirect calibration**

The data for determinacy and density of EU conditions are calibrated through two different procedures (indirect and direct method) yielding different fuzzy-scores for the dens condition. In the test for necessary conditions the results gained for EU determinacy and density conditionality (dens condition) we get the almost the same value of consistency and coverage for all the three outcomes (0.7, 0.68 & 0.63, 0.74 for outcome; 0.73, 0.73 & 0.52, 0.63 for

implementation; 0.74, 0.74 & 0.48, 0.58 for Europeanization) and even when they slightly change they do not influence the (interpretation) results. In the sufficiency analysis the solution for the adoption outcome is exactly the same even when used the data of dens indirect calibration, while for implementation outcome the results with data of dens direct calibration two more paths  $bur^*rul^*twinta^*aid^*polcon$  and  $bur^*rul^*twinta^*dens^*polcon$  are added making the consistency of the overall solution also falls a bit while the value of coverage increases compare to results with data of dens indirect calibration.

For Europeanization outcome again the results are almost the same except that here we have one more paths ( $bur^*rul^*twinta^*polcon$ ) different that is not shown in the results if considering data of dens indirect calibration and again the consistency also falls a bit (being in the dens indirect calibration 0.785261) while the value of coverage increases (being in the dens indirect calibration 0.855047). This is not surprise since another path is added.

So although reasonable changes into fuzzy set values of dens condition are made they do not influence the solution to a significant degree. Moreover, even when a different result is achieved it is either or very like the principal solution presented.

### **Case selection: potential versus candidate countries**

The case escaping the necessity test for Europeanization outcome were bh03, bh07 and kos08 ( $x=0$ ,  $t=0.33$ ) and alb07, ser06, ser07 ( $x=0.33$ ,  $y=0.67$ ) (see x-y plot). To put into the contextual analysis of the stage of accession, all this cases escaping necessity are potential candidate countries; none of the case is in candidacy status. As such, if considering only cases where countries have already gained candidacy status bureaucratic efficiency would have been a necessary condition (not a quasi-) 100% consistent. As a scope condition, in the stage of candidate status (accession negotiation) bureaucratic effectiveness is a necessary condition for Europeanization. This trend is not traced for other conditions (polcon and aid).

The solution for quasi-sufficient condition and the 4 different paths do not show any contextual trend of potential vs. candidate country case selection. The first path is more of a special case (such as Kosovo) where in the absent of other conditions, the low veto player with no adaption cost can sufficiently lead to Europeanization.

## COMPARING fsQCA RESULTS WITH DATA FROM EXPERTS SURVEY

‘... expert interviews are, of course, not only a popular way of gathering information, they are also a totally legitimate method for some forms of research.’ (Bogner *et al.*, 2009: 5)

Many scholars have argued that one of the weaknesses of the QCA is the robustness of the results (Skaaning, 2008). It has been argued that we ‘risk arriving at conclusions that are little more than consequences of how the data are measured’ (Clark *et al.*, 2006). Even prominent scholars on QCA suggest that ‘*QCA should not be applied as the only data analysis technique in a research project...* Indeed, the different methods should be used in a complementary way in order to achieve triangulation’ (Wagemann & Schneider, 2007: 17).

Consequently, the final step in this study will be an additional qualitative analysis of data gained from experts through questioner surveys and interviews in order to compare it with fsQCA findings. Given that we decide to conduct interviews and questioners to get some cross-check of the results we get from the fsQCA analysis. Departing from the fsQCA results I prepare a questionnaire to be sent to experts, bureaucrats and politicians, dealing with WB enlargement. Firstly I decide to e-mail out a set of questionnaires with all hypotheses conditions to experts working on the European integration departments of the potential candidate countries as well as on the DG enlargement department in order to verify some information and validate the model provided by the data gathered and fsQCA analysis. The results produced by fsQCA provide detailed information about which (combinations of) factors were sufficient for the outcome adoption and implementation.

The questionnaire included both multiple choice and open questions and we encouraged the respondents to add any information or comments they felt were necessary. In interviews, additional questions were also asked to get more specific answers or make deeper explorations.

Relying on experts’ knowledge seems particularly important here because 1) it help gain an alternative way to obtain specific information (unofficial) since experts have ‘privileged access of information’ (Meuser & Nagel, 1991: 443; 2009) and posses technical (very specific, detailed), process (directly involved) and explanatory (subjective interpretations of relevance) knowledge in his area of expertise thus having only systematized and reflexively accessible expertise knowledge but it also has the character of practical knowledge (Bogner & Menz, 2009). 2) results established from the fsQCA could be corroborated potential causes of Europeanization derived in the first step and underlying causal path understood more clearly.

## **METHODOLOGY OF THE SURVEY**

To cross-check for the results taken from the QCA analysis straight-forward questions were designed. The conditions hypothesized were given as a multiple choice (multiple choices were allowed) and the experts were asked to choose among them what they considered as important necessary and sufficient conditions for adoption and for implementation of EU standards/Acquis in separate questions. They were free to add other conditions they considered relevant to the questions. A preliminary questioner, very specialized and directly related to QCA analysis were sent where the context of the questioners had as key words necessary and sufficient conditions for adoption, implementation. Analyzing the first group of responses we get in these preliminary set of questions, we notice that the logic of necessary and sufficiency as was employed in this book was not understood the same way as applied in the book. For example, in the first question where it was asked for choosing which of the condition they find important necessary one of the responders identified three necessary conditions for the adoption of EU acquis which them do not appeared in the sufficient combination of conditions he identified in the second question. This make us rethink the questioner and instead of a questioner directly linked to sufficient and necessary logic we construct a more general questioner identifying only important conditions without specifically mentioning sufficiency or necessity. That is why it was decided to make it more simple and asked only for choosing the important conditions. Then by comparing the answers (number) from these data we implicate the possible sufficient ways (conditions or combination of conditions with a greater percentage) and see if there is any conditions that shows in the majority of their answer so to imply the necessity of this condition.

For the research, semi-structured questioners seem more appropriate as to get not only direct answers to the questioners but also more information regarding the process. So we left also open answers to responders as we thought that a set of judgment criteria and evaluation indicators given by the experts could be useful qualitative data for interpretation latter. An introductory question of what Europeanization is for the potential member states (more specifically related to the countries of the Western Balkans) aimed at getting some more information regarding the process as well as cross-check if experts' understanding of Europeanization fit to the usage in the questionnaire. Then, experts were ask to provide their knowledge on very specific questions related to hypothesis of the book as well as detailed questions regarding adoption and implementation of EU standards/acquis (such as if they are country-specificity and/or policy-specificity, if they depend on country's status or if they are just a matter of time and if they differ from political and economic conditionality). To deepen the gained knowledge form the experts beside the questioner, some in-depth telephone interviews were conducted among some of the responders, both domestic and EU officials, with the aim to get an comprehensive knowledge of the issues raised on the questioner.

The research was conducted between October 2009 and January 2010. The experts were identified firstly mainly through official websites information, e-mails and telephones were used as sources and ways of sending out questioners and conducting interviews. In order to secure the highest possible return rate the questionnaire was put on the website, both the link and the attached word document was send by e-mail.

**Target group and reporting**

The main users of the questioner are experts, both politicians and bureaucrats, from the WB countries and EU. The experts interviewed were selected according to their knowledge on the WB enlargement process. Generally, they were active participants of the negotiation, monitoring and transposition process so they had first-hand knowledge of the adoption and implementation.


In addition, to the political (second generations) data used for the fsQCA analysis, the questioners and interviews with key officials are considered another alternative sources of primary information, ‘behind the scenes’, about the adoption and implementation processes.

At the domestic WB level, experts dealing with the adoption and implementation of EU conditionality were contacted. Bureaucrats from European integration ministries and other ministries department dealing with EU acquis, members of the negotiation teams, members and experts of the European Integration Committee of the WB parliaments, European Integration political advisor form the offices of the president, EU Directorate at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and ambassadors and diplomats of WB countries Mission to the EU.

At the EU level, experts and politicians dealing with WB enlargements were also asked to participate as they give an opinion from the European level which may be different from that of the potential candidate countries. Experts responding the survey were members of different units at the DG Enlargement responsible for WB countries, experts working at the delegation of the European Union to the WB (potential) candidate countries, political advisor at European Parties groups dealing with issues of enlargement and assistant of MEPs being members or chair of the EP delegations for relations with the countries of WB, also experts from the Permanent Representation of the member state to the EU dealing with WB.


A total of 63 questionnaires have been sent back from all the representative actors mentioned above.

**Figure 16:** Distribution of responders: by WB country and level





**Figure 17:** Distribution of responders: by Institutions and Positions



For the purpose of this book, the questioner was organized around two themes: 1) direct questions on the conditions gained by fsQCA 2) other related issues of gaining more understanding on what factors may influence the results achieved.

### Difficulties faced and what can be gained

Given that the responders where high officials it was sometimes impossible to get responses back. The success or not of the survey depended on the accessibility and (un)responsiveness of the experts. Secondly, the answers were very delicate for the process of WB integration. Expressing an opinion on the conditions influencing adoption/implementation may get interpretation, for example a bureaucrat say that administrative capacity is not important, or from EU if the twinning is not important? Another problem of getting few responses is the difficulty and complexity of the process, where the issues raised needed expertise. This was confirmed also by some responses 'I regret that I am not in a position to respond individually to the detailed questions in your research paper. The issues you raise are complex and need to be addressed taking into account a wide range of aspects.' (RELEX-PODGORICA, personal communication, November 19, 2009) 'You will understand that as civil servants we cannot answer you in our personal capacity, but only for the tasks we are given' (RELEX-ZAGREB, personal communication, January 25, 2010). But more than the great scope of the questionnaire it was the delicateness of the issue... and to put into the words of a bureaucrat who said that 'although each of us certainly has his/her own view - we cannot disclose them publicly and you should better refer to DG Enlargement as a whole.' (RELEX-ZAGREB, personal communication, January 25, 2010). Some of the experts did not answer to the survey because 1) they considered the process very delicate. In the case of Montenegro for example, (were the responders' rate is low) the time of the survey the country had to submit 'EU questionnaire' to the Commission so they considered giving opinions delicate issue. As of my communication with some expert they confirm these, and to quote 'The answers to the Questionnaire are classified information (confidential) for now. We hope that we will send you the Questionnaire as soon as we deliver our answers to the European Commission. Unfortunately we couldn't send it before...' (MFA-Montenegro, personal communication, November 30, 2009). The same could be said also from the EU side, were some officials did

not give their opinion but just redirecting me to the ‘official documents’. Quote: ‘I am not in a position to provide a separate detailed analysis for your research, but would encourage you to make use of the analysis in the documents to which I directed you’ (RELEX-PODGORICA, personal communication, November 19, 2009). Many of the responders in my communication didn’t want to be quoted and they emphasized that the answers to the questionnaire were ‘strictly unofficial, reflecting only personal views’. For these reason the data will be given, keeping the personal anonymity.

## **RESULTS AND COMPARISON WITH FSQCA ANALYSIS**

First and the more important issue when dealing with experts survey is how to be sure that experts answer questions in the way the questionnaire is intended meaning that the experts understand and provide evaluations of the same phenomenon that were questions. That is why, we firstly asked experts to give a definition or their understanding of what Europeanization for the candidate countries is:

*Question: Given your experience and expertise A) Please give your understanding or a definition of what Europeanization for the candidate countries (in the Western Balkan countries) is...*

The responders at large put their definition into the enlargement context seeing Europeanization as a process and a necessary outcome to arrive at accession. The majority of responders gave a narrow definition of Europeanization to only EU requirements. Meeting with standards required by EU, thus adopting and implementing EU standards for EU membership criteria, has been a general understanding of Europeanization of almost all experts interviewed. ‘Meeting the Copenhagen Criteria’ in general and other more specific and detailed criteria ‘set out in the Stabilization and Association Agreement, European Partnership, and the other documents that represent the basis for the process of acquiring the status of full member’ (N.K.) is the common perception among experts. While some, besides the core arguments, included all areas and spheres of influence arguing that ‘the Europeanization shouldn’t be understood only as a process of meeting all the technical criteria’ (N.J.). ‘Adopting and implementing EU acquis is just an instrument in the process, but the most important outcome of ‘Europeanization’ is establishing sustainable democracies and rule of law in the WB countries’ (S.K.), Or in more details ‘fight against organized crime and corruption, improvement of civil society, generation of employment, education, research act’ (N.K.), ‘respect of rule of law, creating a society with equal opportunities... access to health, education, job market and well-fare’ (D.S.). ‘Education, respecting human rights, economic recovery and above all political development of each WB country, growth of GDP per capita, developed infrastructure (roads, highways, railways, telecom etc...)’ (S.M.), ‘Human rights and the freedom of speech, Free movement (Visa-free regime), Good neighborly relations between the countries, Way of thinking and understanding, Europe without borders (Balkan without borders)’ (N.J.), ‘better life’ (D.P.), ‘completing the evolutionary path of development of the state and finally entering into the stage of modernization’ (N.S.), ‘providing strong and undoubted proves of regional cooperation’

(D.T.), ‘a complete transition not only in the area of economy but also on a cultural level’ (N.J.), ‘The pull of the EU might help these countries to transform them into modern and well-functioning democracies (L.B.)’, transition to functional market economy and liberalization (internal and external) of economy and stabilization of political scene, leading to the reduction of extreme (left/right) political parties (V.M.), ‘Europeanization means being closer to the EU Member States standards and conditions of living’ (S.M.). ‘Additionally, this means rising of the citizens’ awareness and their stronger political and social participation’ (V.S.).

In this broad context ‘Europeanization’ refers to a wide range of long-term and complex social, cultural, political, economic and other transformations that make a society more ‘Euro-friendly’ in terms of values, its public policy environment more receptive to European political and policy-making style and its public administration sufficiently and appropriately capable of implementing the ‘Brussels’ conditionality (during the accession) and commonly-agreed rules (after the accession)’ (A.Ç.).

**Process:** ‘Europeanization comprises the whole European Integration process aimed at the EU Membership as the final step in this process’ (M. B.). *Generally speaking* ‘Europeanization is the process of reforming of WB countries through the Copenhagen Criteria, in order to be ready for accession in the EU (E.G.). So Europeanization ‘is a phenomenon that calls for restructuring of all levels of government, but also economic and social structures of a single nation, so that the EU requirements (or entrance prerequisites are met) (M.S.). Those criteria regards ‘have in place stable and democratic institutions’ (I.A.) that is ‘putting sustainably into practice the principal ideas and institutions of liberal democracy’ (J.T.), ‘reforms leading to the competitive open market economy’ (D.S.) and ‘strengthening of national institutions in a way to be able to implement Stabilization and Association Agreement and to manage pre-accession assistance allocated to candidate countries from EU’ (N.K.). ‘It is a process of substantial changes and reforms of the national legal and administrative systems’ (D.D.). But also ‘fundamental or paradigmatic change of the mentality of the people in the region... Thus, more grass-roots activities and citizens involvement based on the EU values are indispensable toolkit in providing the fundamental change of the societies and bigger convergence to the EU standards, especially in the fields of judiciary, political and administrative system’ which (V.S.). ‘It requires changes in the institutional and legal framework, and a proper implementation of the changes (i.e. not only pro forma). But it also represent a necessary change in the mindset of the political elites in the country, and indeed its population, by expanding their focus beyond their short-term national interests only’ (L.J.). As such Europeanization does not only regards ‘improvement of political, social and economic system of these countries [but also] recovering common European values and ideas’ (K.R.).

**Outcome:** ‘Speaking in the EU enlargement context, it is a process of gradual adoption of the EU standards to national legal and political framework’ (L.J.).

*In more specific* term ‘Europeanization means adoption and implementation of EU standards, norms and values’. Or other terms, rather than adoption and implementation, are

used reflecting the lively debate on terminology scholarly, such as seeing Europeanization as a process ‘of approximation to European values’ (B.P.), ‘approximation of the EU legislation’ (S.M.), ‘harmonization of the legislation’ (A.V.), ‘absorption of *acquis communautaire* and EU standards’ (M.G.), ‘process of aligning of national governments and its institutions with those present in the EU’ (M.S.), ‘Comply with directives and regulations of EU’ (N.H.), ‘The adoption of a set of EU rules and legislation (the *acquis*), their implementation and enforcement’ (G.P.), ‘internalization of European values and standards in all spheres of social life’ (S.K.), ‘Process of diffusion and acceptance of common European norms’ (M.R.).

***In sum:*** ‘In terms of Europeanization I was thinking about all the process that is relevant for the candidate countries or potential candidate countries to get close to the EU in every... in a broad general terms of course the process in technical level will be adoption and implementation of EU legislation in a broad sense is every step of who WB get closer to EU is part of the broader approach’ (P.I.). ‘A process of impact of EU policies on domestic politics and the response (adaptation/changes) of domestic institutions to such policies’ (S.M.).

### Answers from the questionnaire

Considering their expertise, the experts were asked to state separately the important condition(s) for adoption and implementation. Multiple choices were allowed and also an open option to add explanations and/or other condition not mention and that they consider important. The aggregate results are presented below

**Table 36:** Important condition(s) for adoption and implementation of EU standards/*Acquis communautaire*

|                             | Priorities in European Partnership <sup>100</sup> | Low Political constrains <sup>101</sup> | Number of Twinning & TAIEX <sup>102</sup> | Financial aid <sup>103</sup> | Administrative capacity <sup>104</sup> | Other <sup>105</sup> |
|-----------------------------|---|---|---|------------------------------|--|----------------------|
| Adoption                    | 37  | 21                                      | 15  | 19                           | 43                                     | 13                   |
| Implementation              | 19  | 18                                      | 16  | 36                           | 51                                     | 11                   |
| Adoption AND Implementation | 17  | 11                                      | 8   | 17                           | 37                                     |                      |

Note: adoption and implementation, is calculated as ‘a conditions’ when the expert identified this condition for both the adoption and implementation and not only just for one.

<sup>100</sup> ‘Priorities set in the European Partnership reports (the great number of short terms)’

<sup>101</sup> ‘Low Political constrains (low number of political actors with different preferences)’


<sup>102</sup> ‘Number of Twinning programs AND participants in TAIEX’

<sup>103</sup> ‘Financial aid from EU (amounts from CARDS AND IPA)’

<sup>104</sup> ‘Administrative capacity (bureaucracy effectiveness AND Rule of Law)’


<sup>105</sup> ‘Other (please specify)’

**Figure 18:** Important condition(s) for adoption of EU standards/Acquis communautaire



More than half of the responders identified *the administrative capacity (the bureaucracy effectiveness AND the Rule of Law)* (43 responders, about 68%) and *Priorities set in the European Partnership reports (the great number of short terms)* (37 responders, about 59%) as important condition for adoption. 13 Responders (about) identify among the given also other conditions as important for adoption.


**Figure 19:** Important condition(s) for implementation of EU standards/Acquis communautaire



Regarding Implementation, the most important condition identified by the experts is still, *the administrative capacity (the bureaucracy effectiveness AND the Rule of Law)* (51 responders, about 81%) and *the financial aid from EU (amounts from CARDS AND IPA)* (36 responders, about 57%). These results corroborate with those gained by the fsQCA for implementation.

Considering ‘a conditions’ important (for Europeanization as was operationalized in this book adoption AND implementation) when the expert identified it on both adoption and implementation we have the following results.

**Figure 20:** Important condition(s) for adoption and implementation of EU standards/Acquis communautaire



This finding corroborate with the fsQCA analysis showing the administrative (37 responders, 59%) and aid (17 responders, 27%) as important necessary condition for Europeanization. Here also priorities set in the European Partnership reports (the greater number of short terms) is considered by (17 responders, 27%), a condition that was not necessary in fsQCA. Low political constrains also gets low score (11 responders, 17%).

13 responders (20%) mentions other conditions than those proposed in the questionnaire. Most of them confirm some of the conditions mentioned in the questionnaire by reinforcing and giving more details of the already conditions presented. For example experts mention again ‘economic benefits’, ‘administrative capacity’, ‘sets of priority’, another reinforced that ‘sustainable model of financing of acquired policies for example in the field of environment and climate change’ are important or ‘specific country circumstances - culture, tradition’ which can be include in the rule of law. Others mention some more general and most obvious conditions such as the general Copenhagen Criteria, recommendations from EU progress report and other working groups and subcommittees. But as an expert mentioned, more important than the priorities of the commission reports now are the specific negotiating chapters opening and closing benchmarks. Furthermore, an expert sees priorities set in the European Partnership reports (‘benchmarks’) as (independent) condition while EU programs and funds (TaieX, Twinning, IPA) as intermediate conditions (‘assistance’) which improves

administrative capacity of potential member states. Other additional important conditions that responders identify are the 'political commitment and will'. For adoption the 'strong determination of the incumbent government' is an important condition. The 'existence of political focus and national consensus' eases the implementation. Europeanization 'can be influenced by the existing political will and support to the EU integration agenda'. In this context not only government may seem important but also the broad public opinion and its support. Another important condition identified by some responders, is the 'public awareness and strong public support'. The public awareness of the significance of complying with EU standards seems an important condition on the progress of adoption and implementation. The public awareness will depend mostly on the European knowledge in general. 'Understanding and acceptance of EU standards' seems prerequisite condition for progress. The level of 'social dialogue' also seems to be important since public participation, through democratic processes, help determine political priorities'. But '*public awareness and support*' may indirectly influence adoption and implementation, as they facilitate political decisions and settling priorities. As one expert writes the important condition is the 'political will on the side of Government' while the 'capacity of the civil society to act as a watchdog'. We believe that the political will and support at all levels is of a great importance for the process of transposition and implementation of the EU legislation, because it can substantially influence the speed and the effectiveness of this exercise.


The importance of all the conditions mentioned in the questionnaire, (except 'Low Political Constraints' which should be the same (low) for all) may 'vary depending on the specific area' and policy sector. For example as one expert explains 'the environmental sector is financially demanding and therefore strong financial and political support is necessary including all levels in the country (national, regional and local) and also EU support' (Expert in the Ministry of Environmental Protection Physical Planning and Construction, personal communication, November 25, 2009).

***Depends on Country-specificity:*** the adoption and implementation progress will be effected depending on country-specificities (34+5 responders, 62%, confirm these statements) for the number of conditions identified in these books (political constraints, administrative capacity). According to the majority of the responders it is the 'country's specific organizational and institutional set up that can affect the process of adoption and/or implementation of the *acquis*'. In more general terms, the situation and the current development of the potential member states seems by the majority of responders to influence the adoption and/or implementation of *acquis*.

***Depends on Policy/sector-specificity:*** Adoption and implementation of *acquis* depends also on policy/ specificity according to 67% of the responders. We could argue that the policy sector or area is a condition on its own influencing the progress on adoption and implementation. This is because there are policy areas which are very 'sensitive' and well established which could face strong political constraint, resistance (ex. Minority area) or there may be 'new and underdeveloped' policy sectors/areas where beside the political will their

progress on adoption and mostly implementation may be impossible because of the lack of experience and countries availabilities. The adoption and especially implementation of the *acquis* can depend on the policy/sector specificities, because the *acquis* requirements in certain sectors can be substantially ‘easier’ and in other sector it may be much more costly thus the process of adoption as well as its practical implementation and enforcement in these sectors can be much more difficult (Expert in Ministry of Labor & Social Policy, personal communication, December 15, 2009). As such ‘adoption and implementation is conditioned by the readiness of the sector i.e. its status of development’.

**Figure 21:** Do you think Adoption and Implementation of EU standards/*Acquis communautaire*



***Depends on the country's Status (candidate vs. potential candidate countries):*** Arguing on this issue seems a bit awkward situation. From one side adopting and implementation of the *acquis* depends on the candidate's status (potential vs. candidate) in the sense that only after receiving the candidate country status the focus is put on the *acquis*, before that the adoption and implementation of political conditionality matters mostly. Another important conclusion from the responders is that the (progress of) 'adoption of *acquis* will depend on the advancement on political criteria'. Given the sequence of the process of enlargement, the fulfillment of political condition is a prerequisite for bringing the process further (gaining candidate status) as such complying with *acquis* will become important only after the



political conditions are fulfilled. The priorities of integration are different at different stage of integration.

On the other hand taken the process as a whole, 'regardless of the current status of the country, the process of harmonization with the EU rules and standards as such, is the same, the requirements are the same and the work that needs to be done is rather the same. Once a country is clear about its EU agenda and intends to become an EU member, it has to achieve the same standards, which implies hard work from all stakeholders involved in the process of approximation with EU legislation' (Expert in Ministry of Labor & Social Policy, personal communication, December 15, 2009). Furthermore, as one expert argues, 'reforms should ideally take place early in the process, before formal status of a candidate is even awarded or before the negotiations start' (Enlargement Diplomat in the permanent representation of member state in EU, personal communication, January 8, 2010).

Rather than the status 'timing' seems more important here. 'By experience the timing for membership is very different and cannot be easily predicted, so every country aspiring for membership should be committed' (Expert in Ministry of European Integration, personal communication, November 16, 2009) and progress fast. As such it can be argued that 'the speed of the entire process of EU accession' determines the level of compliance, the faster a country is going the more *acquis* law need to be adopted; The faster degree of integration may 'raise positive expectations' at both sides, EU asking more progress and at the same time potential member states trying to do more. (Expert in Government office for European Integration, personal communication, December 10, 2009)

***Is a matter of Time:*** Other than timing, adaptation and implementation may be consider as 'a matter of time' once the country's objection is settle and this is because 'sometimes some procedures of adoption and implementation stage can take certain amount of time to be finalized and become effective' (Expert in Ministry of Labor & Social Policy, personal communication, December 15, 2009).

***Differs from adoption and implementation of political and economic conditionality:*** In general terms adoption and implementation of *acquis* do not differ from adoption and implementation of political and economic conditionality, in fact 'they are strongly related'. 'We believe that there is no big difference and clear distinction between the acceptance of the Community *acquis* and the other two Copenhagen accession criteria, i.e. the political and economic criteria. In many instances these three closely correlate and complement each other' (Expert in Ministry of Labor & Social Policy, personal communication, December 15, 2009). What may be seen as a difference, and is important for this book, are the conditions influencing them. As one expert writes 'In case of political and economic conditionality political constraints are always possible threat' while for *acquis* conditionality 'political constrains are less important but implementation heavily depends on administrative capacities' (Advisor in Council of Ministers directorate of European Integration, personal communication, December 2, 2009).

## CONCLUSIONS AND THE WAY AHEAD

### SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Europeanization research is recent but still embraces a vast number of writing. Coming across Europeanization literature the researcher first of all needs to rightly conceptualize the object of research as well as choose the relevant conditions influencing it. This book conceptualize Europeanization as adoption and implementation, because we need to see if potential member states not only transpose EU standards/acquis into national legislation but also apply and enforce EU rules in their domestic administrative practice. The book displays the relevant conditions (conditions deriving from the already models and that have shown some empirical, both qualitative and quantitative, evidence) for adoption and implementation of EU standards/acquis in CEE then-candidate countries. In order to investigate these conditions and to answer the central question of the current research the relevance of six different condition, - in three sets of theoretical argumentation, - influencing Europeanization (aspects of adoption and implementation) are operationalized, calibrated and tested for necessary and sufficiency. It then undertakes an fsQCA analysis in order to build a new, mixed model of Europeanization in potential member states.

Empirical studies of the then CEEC candidate countries' adoption and implementation record offer an ambivalent picture (Schimmelfennig & Trauner, 2009).

The literature on pre-accession Europeanization attributes the candidate countries' adoption of EU rules predominantly to credible EU accession conditionality (Grabbe, 2006; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004; 2005) and administrative capacity (Hille & Knill, 2006). These assumptions provide a basis for the development of three sets of theoretically derived hypotheses. The literature on CEE then-candidate countries explains pre-accession compliance by a rationalist logic, considering actors to act rationally calculating the material as well as political costs and benefits of adopting and implementing EU standards/acquis. More precisely, EU external incentives are necessary in order to overcome opposition to EU rules by national governments or other domestic veto-players incurring costs from rule adoption.

In this view the findings from the fsQCA analysis confirm this hypothesis since the low number of veto player and EU financial aid are a necessary condition for adoption and implementation of EU standards/acquis.

An alternative other model criticizing the external incentive one and emphasizes domestic politics and its legacies. Hughes *et al.* (2004) argue 'that domestic political considerations, informed by historical experiences and legacies, seem to have played a more important role than the influence of EU conditionality.' This argumentation is supported by Hille & Knill (2006) findings that administrative capacity is a condition for effective implementation.

The administrative capacity gains some support in this book also, where the bureaucratic effectiveness is a quasi-necessary condition for adoption and implementation. This hypothesis not only is consistent with the theoretical argumentation but get a good empirical evidence in the WB case. This results may not corroborate with Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier's findings that the domestic factors play minor role in the Europeanization process of the CEECs may be even because they consider only adoption of the EU rules when define Europeanization, which is a very narrow notion and leaves the implementation of the rules and policies out of the analysis, a factor which have produced biased results (Henriksson, 2009) against administrative capacity, while as studies have shown administrative capacity is important for implementation.

Key preconditions for the successful Europeanization in the potential member states have been the application of conditionality were clearly defined policies and demands on part of the EU and the clear willingness and capacity to adopt and implement the EU requirements (standards and *acquis*) on part of the candidate countries, which was mostly driven by the conditionality mechanisms (incentive of EU membership) and socialization mechanism. The conditionality and the prospect of membership seem to be a strong factor for Europeanization but since all WB are potential and candidate countries this condition is the same for all countries.

Concerning the new potential member states from the WBs, this book found that, the crucial role of external incentives, strongly emphasized in the CEE countries is confirmed as a necessary condition. In addition, to this the findings add new insights on the important role, of the administrative capacity as quasi-necessary condition for adoption and implementation, and an alternative to the external model. This goes against most literature in CEE then candidate countries, that the domestic factors play minor role in the Europeanization process of the CEECs. The importance of administrative capacity is confirmed also by the questionnaire survey taken with bureaucrats and politicians of the WB and EU institutions. As other scholars have argued 'Socialization is neither sufficient, nor necessary condition for Europeanization (Radaelli, 2004: 11). In our analysis, Twinning and TAIEX program, conditions of socialization mechanisms, are not a necessary and/or sufficient condition but they indicate a potential learning effect facilitating administrative capacity and together are a sufficient condition for adoption and implementation. Thus, twinning and TAIEX can be seen as one of many instruments used in building effective administrative capacity to handle EU standards and *acquis*.

So Europeanization, adoption and implementation, is not a one side exercise. In fact external and domestic factors need to cooperate, low domestic constrain needs EU financial aid, and bureaucratic effectiveness need twinning and TAIEX programs to be sufficiently translated into adoption and implementation of EU standards/*acquis*. We should distinguish between the CONDITIONS for the accession (such as benchmarks set during the negotiations on chapters) and ASSISTANCE, which is often vital for the country to be able to improve its administrative capacity (Taix, Twinning, IPA etc.) (Officer in DG enlargement, personal communication, December 18, 2009)

Theoretically, the minimal necessary condition is the low number of veto players with adoption cost, empirically; Europeanization is a demand on candidate countries and not much in the political actors but must be based on organizational (bureaucratic efficiency).

#### **IDEAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH**

Europeanization of the WB is still an ongoing process which will need further investigation because 1) the process is taking longer and different directions if compared to Europeanization on CEE. The most obvious is the not membership conditionality at once but separate ‘conditionality’ as with the policy of free visa regime. 2) the research on WB Europeanization is few, still insufficient and only in its genesis.

Moreover, patterns and results in the pre-accession stage are an important background that will help understand adoption and implementation latter on, once they become member states. They can also be considered conditions for further stages when WB will become member states. And as an expert said ‘we could argue that the proper implementation of the new set of standards is actually [a] condition in itself’ (Officer in DG enlargement, personal communication, December 18, 2009). And they should be seen in post-accession stages.

Further research needs to be carried out regarding the sustainability and the effectiveness of conditionality-induced rule adaptation/implementation once these countries will be member state and conditionality will be over.

Although it needs to be emphasized that some sort of rule adaptation in form of voluntary reference to European models have been observed even before the EU conditionality was introduced (as research on CEEC countries have shown) but it was patchy and selective while once a given issue become subject to EU conditionality the rule adaptation increased and become a consistent features of across countries and issues (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2007: 92).

Policy matter and considering different policies not the aggregate may yield different results. ‘[C]ompliance are relatively low (involving little new legislation or institutional adjustment), whereas for others the demands are quite high (involving new legislative arenas and institutions). Similarly, for some chapters, the policy legacies prior to reform in applicant countries are relatively weak, whereas in others, prior laws and institutions must be significantly changed’ (Glenn, 2004: 18).



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MEMO/06/412 “Key findings of the progress reports on Kosovo1 and the potential candidate countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia” Brussels, 8 November 2006

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MEMO/07/447 “Key findings of the progress reports on the candidate countries: Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey”, Brussels, 6 November 2007

MEMO/08/672 “Key findings of the progress reports on Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Kosovo” Brussels, 5 November 2008

MEMO/08/675 “Key findings of the progress reports on the candidate countries: Croatia, Turkey and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Brussels, 5 November 2008

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## APPENDIX:

**Table 37:** GDP (Gross domestic product, EUR million) of WBs

| Country | Croatia    | Macedonia | Albania    | Bosnia and Herzegovina | Montenegro | Serbia    | Kosovo   |
|---------|------------|-----------|------------|------------------------|------------|-----------|----------|
| Year    |            |           |            |                        |            |           |          |
| 2002    | 24447.7    | 4000.9    | 4704.7     | 6559.36                | 1360.1     | 16811.8   | 1735 p   |
| 2003    | 26215.8    | 4105      | 5047.6     | 7416.4                 | 1510.1     | 18008.7   | 1797 p   |
| 2004    | 28677      | 4324.5    | 5882.5     | 8071.38                | 1669.8     | 19723.5   | 3006.5 p |
| 2005    | 31263.35   | 4676      | 6581.6     | 8654.77                | 1814.9     | 21077.2   | 3068.4 p |
| 2006    | 34220.57   | 5081      | 7197.137*  | 9776.56                | 2148.9 p   | 24254.8 p | 3191.7 p |
| 2007    | 37497.02   | 4676      | 7907.9704* | 11065.04 p             | 2540*      | 28423.96* | 3343**   |
| 2008    | 41246.722* | 4963.287* | 8659.1872* | 11248.6*               | 2900*      | 33234.53* | 3739**   |

**Note:** The data are taken from the official website of the European Commission, The EUROSTAT webpage coded as indic\_co 1402 Gross domestic product (EUR million). P stands for Provisional Value.

**Source:** European Commission > Eurostat home page > Data navigation tree > Non EU countries (noneu) > Economy and finance (cpc\_ec) > Candidate and potential candidate countries: GDP and main aggregates (cpc\_ecnagdp) <<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/>>

When Data are missing they are calculated (noted by \*) based on EBRD data. To convert from dollar currency to Euro currency, the currency rate of Euro/country currency is calculated from data of both on the same year. For Kosovo 2007 (Est.), 2008 (Proj.) (noted by \*\*) the IMF staff estimates are taken. See IMF, Aide-Mémoire, April 2008, Table 1. Kosovo: Main Indicators, 2005-12, p.6

<[http://www.unmikonline.org/docs/2008/reports/IMF-Aide\\_Memoire\\_Final-April-2008.pdf](http://www.unmikonline.org/docs/2008/reports/IMF-Aide_Memoire_Final-April-2008.pdf)>

**Table 38:** CARDS Programme allocation for 2002–2006 (EUR mn) in each WB Country

|                    | 2002  | 2003  | 2004 | 2005  | 2006  |
|--------------------|-------|-------|------|-------|-------|
| Albania            | 44.9  | 46.5  | 63.5 | 44.2  | 45.5  |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina | 71.9  | 63.0  | 72.0 | 49.4  | 51.0  |
| Croatia            | 59.0  | 62.0  | 81.0 | 105.0 | 140.0 |
| Macedonia          | 41.5  | 43.5  | 59.0 | 45.0  | 40.0  |
| Serbia             | 189.7 | 240   | 218  | 154.5 | 179   |
| Montenegro         | 15    | 15    | 19   | 22    | 24.5  |
| Kosovo             | 154.9 | 76.28 | 75.4 | 54    | 89.5  |

**Note:** Croatia from 2005 transfer to pre-accession financial aid. Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo have for 2005-2006 (€333.5 million, €46.6 million and €143.5 million respectively. For 2005 Serbia gets €154.5 million, Montenegro €22 and Kosovo €54.<sup>106</sup> So we can get the amount allocated for 2006 (€179, €24.5 and €89.5).

**Source:** Official site of the Commission, Enlargement Directorate. Financial statistics per country 2000-2006 ([http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/how-does-it-work/financial-assistance/cards/statistics2000-2006\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/how-does-it-work/financial-assistance/cards/statistics2000-2006_en.htm)) and ([http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/cards/financial\\_en.htm](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/cards/financial_en.htm)).

**Table 39:** Multi-Annual Indicative Financial Framework: Breakdown of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance Envelope for 2008–2010 into allocations by country and component (EUR mn, current prices)

| Country | Component                                      | 2007         | 2008         | 2009         | 2010         |
|---------|--|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| CROATIA | Transition Assistance and Institution Building | 47.6         | 45.4         | 45.6         | 39.5         |
|         | Cross-border Cooperation                       | 9.7          | 14.7         | 15.9         | 16.2         |
|         | Regional Development                           | 44.6         | 47.6         | 49.7         | 56.8         |
|         | Human Resources Development                    | 11.1         | 12.7         | 14.2         | 15.7         |
|         | Rural Development                              | 25.5         | 25.6         | 25.8         | 26.0         |
|         | <b>TOTAL</b>                                   | <b>138.5</b> | <b>146.0</b> | <b>151.2</b> | <b>154.2</b> |

<sup>106</sup> Delegation of European Commission

<http://www.delmkd.ec.europa.eu/en/whatsnew/2005/11%20CARDS%202005%20SCG.htm>

|                                    |  |               |               |               |               |
|------------------------------------|--|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| FYROM                              | Transition Assistance and Institution Building | 41.6          | 39.9          | 38.1          | 36.3          |
|                                    | Cross-border Cooperation                       | 4.2           | 5.3           | 5.6           | 5.7           |
|                                    | Regional Development                           | 7.4           | 12.3          | 20.8          | 29.4          |
|                                    | Human Resources Development                    | 3.2           | 6.0           | 7.1           | 8.4           |
|                                    | Rural Development                              | 2.1           | 6.7           | 10.2          | 12.5          |
|                                    | <b>TOTAL</b>                                   | <b>58.5</b>   | <b>70.2</b>   | <b>81.8</b>   | <b>92.3</b>   |
| SERBIA                             | Transition Assistance and Institution Building | 178.5         | 179.4         | 182.6         | 186.2         |
|                                    | Cross-border Cooperation                       | 8.2           | 11.5          | 12.2          | 12.5          |
|                                    | <b>TOTAL</b>                                   | <b>186.7</b>  | <b>190.9</b>  | <b>194.8</b>  | <b>198.7</b>  |
| MONTENEGRO                         | Transition Assistance and Institution Building | 27.5          | 28.1          | 28.6          | 29.2          |
|                                    | Cross-border Cooperation                       | 3.9           | 4.5           | 4.7           | 4.8           |
|                                    | <b>TOTAL</b>                                   | <b>31.4</b>   | <b>32.6</b>   | <b>33.3</b>   | <b>34.0</b>   |
| KOSOVO                             | Transition Assistance and Institution Building | 60.7          | 62.0          | 63.3          | 64.5          |
|                                    | Cross-border Cooperation                       | 2.6           | 2.7           | 2.8           | 2.8           |
|                                    | <b>TOTAL</b>                                   | <b>63.3</b>   | <b>64.7</b>   | <b>66.1</b>   | <b>67.3</b>   |
| BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA               | Transition Assistance and Institution Building | 58.1          | 69.9          | 83.9          | 100.7         |
|                                    | Cross-border Cooperation                       | 4.0           | 4.9           | 5.2           | 5.3           |
|                                    | <b>TOTAL</b>                                   | <b>62.1</b>   | <b>74.0</b>   | <b>89.1</b>   | <b>106.0</b>  |
| ALBANIA                            | Transition Assistance and Institution Building | 54.3          | 61.1          | 70.9          | 82.7          |
|                                    | Cross-Border Cooperation                       | 6.7           | 9.6           | 10.3          | 10.5          |
|                                    | <b>TOTAL</b>                                   | <b>61.0</b>   | <b>70.7</b>   | <b>81.2</b>   | <b>93.2</b>   |
| Total Country Programmes           |  | 1098.7        | 1188.6        | 1263.9        | 1399.4        |
| Regional and Horizontal Programmes |  | 100.7         | 140.7         | 160.0         | 157.7         |
| ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS               |  | 55.8          | 54.0          | 56.5          | 64.6          |
| <b>GRAND TOTAL</b>                 |  | <b>1255.2</b> | <b>1383.3</b> | <b>1430.4</b> | <b>1621.7</b> |

**Source:** European Commission, 2006: 'Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) Multiannual Indicative Financial Framework for 2008–2010', p.5-6.

**Table 40:** Number of Twinning Projects per year in Western Balkan Countries

| <i>Country Year</i> | Albania | Bosnia & Herzegovina | Croatia | Kosovo | Macedonia | Montenegro | Serbia |
|---------------------|---------|----------------------|---------|--------|-----------|------------|--------|
| 2002                | 1       | 2                    | 13      | 0      | 0         | Na         | 0      |
| 2003                | 1       | 1                    | 10      | 0      | 1         | Na         | 0      |
| 2004                | 5       | 2                    | 12      | 0      | 4         | Na         | 5      |
| 2005                | 2       | 3                    | 12      | 0      | 4         | Na         | 10     |
| 2006                | 0       | 2                    | 7       | 0      | 2         | 0          | 4      |
| 2007                | 1       | 5                    | 8       | 2      | 1         | 3          | 3      |
| 2008                |         |                      |         | 8      |           | 4          |        |

**Source:** The spread of each twinning program for each country in a yearly base comes from my own communication with Ivo SCHUTTE 03-2009, and as he mentioned some 2007 and virtually all 2008 projects still have to be launched and they are not in the table as yet.

**Table 41:** Success rate of twinning

| Success rate (as Lead Partner) 'Old' EU Member States since 1998 in the Enlargement context | Success rate |     | Success rate (as Lead Partner) 'New' EU Member States in the Enlargement context | Success rate |     |
|---|--------------|-----|--|--------------|-----|
|   | Austria      | 36% |  | Slovenia     | 16% |
|   | Belgium      | 11% |  | Slovakia     | 23% |
|   | Denmark      | 31% |  | Poland       | 9%  |
|   | Finland      | 42% |  | Malta        | 0%  |
|   | France       | 40% |  | Lithuania    | 7%  |
|   | Germany      | 53% |  | Latvia       | 10% |
|   | Greece       | 9%  |  | Hungary      | 15% |
|   | Ireland      | 23% |  | Estonia      | 0%  |
|   | Italy        | 29% |  | Czech        | 8%  |
|   | Netherlands  | 32% |  | Bulgaria     | 40% |
|   | Portugal     | 0%  |  |              |     |
|   | Spain        | 32% |  |              |     |
|   | Sweden       | 26% |  |              |     |
|   | U.K          | 45% |  |              |     |

Source: Jung-Olsen *et al.* (2009).

Note: Success rate of twinning projects, Average value 22% own calculation

**Table 42:** POLCON Values

| ICRG country         | Year | POLCONIII | ICRG country        | Year | POLCONIII |
|----------------------|------|-----------|---------------------|------|-----------|
| Albania              | 2000 | 0,36      | Macedonia           | 2000 | 0,50      |
| Albania              | 2001 | 0,36      | Macedonia           | 2001 | 0,50      |
| Albania              | 2002 | 0,41      | Macedonia           | 2002 | 0,50      |
| Albania              | 2003 | 0,41      | Macedonia           | 2003 | 0,43      |
| Albania              | 2004 | 0,41      | Macedonia           | 2004 | 0,43      |
| Albania              | 2005 | 0,41      | Macedonia           | 2005 | 0,43      |
| Albania              | 2006 | 0,50      | Macedonia           | 2006 | 0,43      |
| Albania              | 2007 | 0,50      | Macedonia           | 2007 | 0,51      |
| Bosnia & Herzegovina | 2000 | 0,00      | Montenegro          | 2006 | 0,46      |
| Bosnia & Herzegovina | 2001 | 0,00      | Montenegro          | 2007 | 0,46      |
| Bosnia & Herzegovina | 2002 | 0,00      | Serbia & Montenegro | 2000 | 0,48      |
| Bosnia & Herzegovina | 2003 | 0,00      | Serbia & Montenegro | 2001 | 0,25      |
| Bosnia & Herzegovina | 2004 | 0,00      | Serbia & Montenegro | 2002 | 0,21      |
| Bosnia & Herzegovina | 2005 | 0,00      | Serbia & Montenegro | 2003 | 0,21      |
| Bosnia & Herzegovina | 2006 | 0,00      | Serbia & Montenegro | 2004 | 0,53      |
| Bosnia & Herzegovina | 2007 | 0,00      | Serbia & Montenegro | 2005 | 0,53      |
| Croatia              | 2000 | 0,42      | Serbia              | 2006 | 0,53      |
| Croatia              | 2001 | 0,13      | Serbia              | 2007 | 0,53      |
| Croatia              | 2002 | 0,13      |                     |      |           |
| Croatia              | 2003 | 0,13      |                     |      |           |
| Croatia              | 2004 | 0,50      |                     |      |           |
| Croatia              | 2005 | 0,50      |                     |      |           |
| Croatia              | 2006 | 0,50      |                     |      |           |
| Croatia              | 2007 | 0,50      |                     |      |           |

Source: POLCON III data are taken from 2010 POLCON dataset release with temporal coverage up to the year 2007, <http://www-management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/POLCON/ContactInfo.html>

**Table 43:** Qualitative data extracted from the Commission Reports

| Countries             | Years        | Adoption<br>(Acquis conditionality) | Implementation<br>(Acquis conditionality) |
|-----------------------|--------------|-------------------------------------|---|
| Albania               | 2002         | (relative) Progress i               | Limited progress ii                       |
|                       | 2003         | Limited Progress iii                | Limited progress iv                       |
|                       | 2004         | Limited Progress v                  | Limited progress vi                       |
|                       | 2005 vii     | Some progress                       | Some progress                             |
|                       | 2006 viii    | Some progress                       | Some progress                             |
|                       | 2007 ix      | Progress                            | Progress                                  |
|                       | 2008         | Progress x                          | Little progress xi                        |
| Bosnia & Herzegovina  | 2002 xii     | No progress                         | No progress                               |
|                       | 2003         | Progress xiii                       | Little progress xiv                       |
|                       | 2004         | Little Progress xv                  | Limited progress xvi                      |
|                       | 2005 xvii    | Progress                            | Some Progress                             |
|                       | 2006         | Progress xviii                      | Little progress xix                       |
|                       | 2007         | Limited Progress xx                 | Limited progress xxi                      |
|                       | 2008         | Some Progress xxii                  | Good Progress xxiii                       |
| Croatia               | 2002         | Good Progress xxiv                  | Little progress xxv                       |
|                       | 2003         | Progress xxvi                       | Some Progress xxvii                       |
|                       | 2004         | Progress xxviii                     | Little progress xxix                      |
|                       | 2005         | Progress xxx                        | Little progress xxxi                      |
|                       | 2006 xxxii   | Some progress                       | Progress                                  |
|                       | 2007 xxxiii  | Progress                            | Progress                                  |
|                       | 2008 xxxiv   | Progress                            | Progress                                  |
| Kosovo                | 2002 xxxv    | Some progress                       | No progress                               |
|                       | 2003 xxxvi   | Some progress                       | Little progress                           |
|                       | 2004 xxxvii  | Progress                            | Progress                                  |
|                       | 2005 xxxviii | Some Progress                       | Progress                                  |
|                       | 2006         | Some progress xxxix                 | Limited progress xl                       |
|                       | 2007         | (Further) progress xli              | Little progress xlii                      |
|                       | 2008         | Some progress xliii                 | Little progress xliv                      |
| Macedonia             | 2002         | Little progress xlv                 | Little progress xlvi                      |
|                       | 2003 xlvii   | Little progress                     | Little progress                           |
|                       | 2004 xlviii  | Little Progress                     | Little progress                           |
|                       | 2005xlix     | Significant Progress                | Little progress                           |
|                       | 2006         | Some progressl                      | Little progressli                         |
|                       | 2007         | Progress lii                        | Little progress liii                      |
|                       | 2008         | Good progress liv                   | Little progress lv                        |
| Montenegro            | 2006         | Some progress lvi                   | Progress lvii                             |
|                       | 2007 lviii   | Some progress                       | Some progress                             |
|                       | 2008         | Further progress lix                | Some Progress lx                          |
| Serbia and Montenegro | 2002         | Some progress lxi                   | Little progress lxii                      |
|                       | 2003lxiii    | Some progress                       | Some progress                             |
|                       | 2004         | Some progress lxiv                  | Little progress lxv                       |
|                       | 2005 lxvi    | Progress                            | Little progress                           |
| Serbia                | 2006         | Good progresslxvii                  | Progress lxviii                           |
|                       | 2007         | Progress lxix                       | Good progress lxx                         |
|                       | 2008         | Some progress lxxi                  | Good progress lxxii                       |

**Source:** My own calculations of qualitative data extracted from COM(2002) 163 final, COM (2003) 139 final, COM(2004) 202 final, COM (2005) 562, MEMO/05/410 2005, MEMO/05/411 2005, MEMO/06/411 2006, MEMO/06/412 2006, MEMO/07/446 2007, MEMO/07/447, MEMO/08/672 2008, MEMO/08/675 2008

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### **Albania**

1. Gledis GJIPALI, former expert at the Approximation of Legislation Directorate and the Directorate of Justice and Home Affairs, Ministry of European Integration, Albanian.
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3. Florian LAMA, Expert at Competition, State Aid, Public Procurement and Intellectual Property Unit, Directory of Internal Market, Ministry of European Integration, Albania.
4. Ledina GJIKNURI, (LUZI), Head of Instruments of Pre-Accession Unit, Ministry of European Integration, Albania.
5. Eglaj GOLLAJ, Expert on Economic and Financial Issues, Ministry of European Integration, Albania.
6. Hilda MEZINI, Chief of Sector for Competition and State Aid, Ministry of European Integration, Albania.
7. Lisander HOXHA, Specialist, Ministry of European Integration, Albania.
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9. Patris KRAJA, Director, Department of Institutional Support of the Integration Process, Ministry of European Integration, Albania.

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12. Amra HODŽIĆ, Adviser, Department for Coordination of the Stabilisation and Association Process, Division for Strategy and Integration Policies, Directorate for European Integration, Council of Ministers, BiH.
13. Anda ČOSIĆ, Adviser, Research and Analysis Department, Division for Strategy and Integration Policies, Directorate for European Integration, Council of Ministers, BiH.
14. Nenad PANDUREVIĆ, Office of the Committee on Foreign and Trade Policy, Customs, Transportation and Communications, Parliamentary Assembly of BiH. Former Assistant Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations (MoFTER).
15. Vlatka DANGUBIC, Secretary of Joint Committee on European Integration, Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUD BiH).

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16. Marija Pejčinović BURIĆ, MPs Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), Members of the European Integration Committee of the Croatian Parliament.
17. Visnja SAMARDŽIJA, Head of the Department for European Integration, Institute for International Relations. Former member of the Negotiation Team on SAA and of the Working Group on adjustment to the EU standards. Also, former assistant minister in the Ministry for European Integration of the Republic of Croatia.
18. Biserka PUC, Head of department for European Integration, Directorate for the European Union, Ministry of Environmental Protection Physical Planning and Construction, Croatia.
19. Marko BABIĆ, Directorate for Support to Croatia's EU Accession Process, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, Croatia.
20. Tomislav JELIĆ, Head of European Integration Department at the Cabinet of the Minister of Culture of the Republic of Croatia.

### **Kosovo**

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22. Lulzim BEQIRI, Head of European Integration Office, Ministry of Justice, Government of Kosovo.

23. Artan ÇOLLAKU, Senior European Affairs Officer, Governance Department, Agency for Coordination of Development and European Integration, Office of the Prime Minister, Government of the Republic of Kosovo.

24. Burim BLAKAJ, Senior Officer for Coordination of Development and European Affairs, Department for Strategy and Coordination, Agency for Coordination of Development and European Integration, Kosovo.

25. Arta SADIKU, Senior Officer for European Legislation, Directorate for Legislation, Agency for Coordination of Development and European Integration.

26. Rajmonda KUKALAJ, Acting Director of Economy and Market, Directorate for Economy and Market, Agency for Coordination of Development and European Integration.

27. Shqipe MJEKIQI, European Integration Advisor, Office of the President, Kosovo.

### **Macedonia**

28. Boris MIRCEVSKI, Directorate on EU at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Macedonia. Also former Secretariat for European Affairs of the Government of Macedonia

29. Natalija SPASOVSKA, former intern (March 2005) at the General Secretariat of the Government of Macedonia.

30. Malinka Ristevska JORDANOVA, State Counsellor at Secretariat for European Affairs, Government of the Republic of Macedonia. Former Chief of Cabinet of Deputy Prime Minister at Secretariat for European Affairs and Former Senior Counsellor at Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia. Also Former Secretary General of the European Movement in Macedonia.

31. Darko DOCINSKI, Head of Unit for EU Integration and Accession Negotiations, Department for European Integration, Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, Republic of Macedonia.

32. Nijazi JAHJA, Head of Unit for monitoring of the EU integrations, Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia.

### **Montenegro**

33. Svetlana KATNIĆ, 2<sup>nd</sup> Secretary Direction for EU, Department for EU and NATO, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro.

34. Danica PONOMAREV, Department for EU Integration, Department for Coordination of the process of joining, Ministry for European Integration, Montenegro.

35. Nataša KOVAČEVIĆ, Sector for Finance and Contracting of the EU Assistance Funds (CFCU), Ministry of Finance, Montenegro.

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36. Zoran SRETIĆ, Head of Group for Environment, Agriculture and Rural Development, Serbian European Integration Office, Serbian Government.

37. Ivan ANTONIJEVIĆ, Assistant Director, Serbian European Integration Office, Government of the Republic of Serbia.

38. Vladimir MEĐAK, Head of section for internal market, European Integration Office, Government of the Republic of Serbia.

39. Dordana KURIR, Head of the European Integration Unit, National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia.

40. Marija GAGIC, European Integration Unit, National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia.

41. Katarina RISTIĆ, Advisor, European Integration Unit, National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia.

### **Mission to EU**

42. Blerim REKA, Ambassador, Head of Mission of the Republic of Macedonia to the EU (correspondence with Beti JACEVA).

43. Osman TOPČAGIĆ, Ambassador, Head of the Mission of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the EU. Former Director of the Directorate for European Integration for BiH.

44. Vladimir VUČINIĆ, Third Secretary, Mission of Montenegro to the EU.

#### **European Commission - DG Enlargement**

45. Jan TRUSZCZYNSKI, Deputy Director General, European Commission, DG Enlargement.

46. Desk Officer in the Unit on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, responsible for several chapters regarding the enlargement process, DG Enlargement, European Commission. (correspondence with Catherine Tireau-Paquet, Secretariat of the Unit).

47. Louis HERSOM, Sectoral Desk in the Unit on Serbia (Unit C2), responsible for many sector policies (agriculture, food safety, health and consumer affairs, research and development, social policies, education, culture, civil society), DG Enlargement, European Commission.

48. Paolo GOZZI, Team Leader TWINNING and SIGMA, Institution Building ,TAIEX, TWINNING (Unit D4), DG Enlargement, European Commission.

49. Leoš JAVŮREK, International Relations Officer, Unit B2 - FYR of Macedonia, DG Enlargement, European Commission.

50. Pietro IENNA, Information and Communication Officer, Institution Building, TAIEX and TWINNING (Unit D4), DG Enlargement, European Commission (telephone interview 11 December 2009).

#### **Delegation of the European Union to...**

51. Dimitrije TMUSIC, Programme and Coordination Manager, Operations Section, Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Serbia (RELEX-BELGRADE).

52. Luca MANUNTA, attaché to the European Commission Delegation to the Republic of Serbia, Cross Border Cooperation, Sector for Programming and Management of EU funds and Development Assistance (RELEX-BELGRADE).

53. Nicola BERTOLINI, Head of Operations, EC Delegation to Montenegro (RELEX-PODGORICA).

54. Normela HODZIC-ZIJADIC, Delegation of European Commission to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

55. Damijan SEDAR, Political Adviser, Office of the European Union Special Representative, Delegation of the European Union in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (RELEX-SKOPJE-EXT), Former official in charge of the Balkans (COWEB Adviser), Slovenian Permanent Representation to the EU.

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57. Theodoros GEORGITSOPOULOS, political advisor, International Relations - Interparliamentary Delegations Unit, South-East Europe.

58. Anita TUSAR, political advisor at PES Group, Unit Foreign Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs.

59. Aleksander MARLECI, Assistant to MEP Doris Pack (EPP member, Germany) Member of the Delegation for relations with Albania, BiH, Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo and Substitute Delegation to the EU-Croatia Joint Parliamentary Committee also former Chairwoman of the Delegation for Relations with the countries of SEE, European Parliament.

60. Asta VENCKUTĖ, Policy Adviser to MEP Vilijus Blinkievičiūtis (S&D member, Lithuania), European Parliament.

#### **EU Council (The Permanent Representation of the member state to the EU)**

61. Bogdan BATIČ, Enlargement, The Permanent Representation of the Republic of Slovenia to the EU.

62. Adam PETHEO, COWEB Diplomat, The Permanent Representation of Hungary to the EU.



63. Maurizio GREGANTI, Western Balkans, The Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU.

#### LIST OF INTERVIEWERS

1. Victor BOJKOV, Political Desk officer, Unit C3 - Kosovo Issues, DG Enlargement, European Commission. 24 November 2009.
2. Elisa SCELISA, Economic Desk, Economic issues and European integration, Unit C4 - Albania / Montenegro, DG Enlargement, European Commission.
3. Leoš JAVŮREK, International Relations Officer, Unit B2 - FYR of Macedonia, DG Enlargement, European Commission. 18 December 2009.
4. Pietro IENNA, Information and Communication Officer, Institution Building, TAIEX and TWINNING (Unit D4), DG Enlargement, European Commission. 11 December 2009.
5. Maja BAKRAN MARCICH, First Secretary, Head of Sectoral Department, SAA implementation, Accession negotiations, Mission of the Republic of Croatia to the European Communities.

#### QUESTIONNAIRE SAMPLE

##### Questionnaire:

##### *Conditions for Adoption and Implementation of EU standards/acquis communautaire*

- Please answer the questions in this survey by ticking the response that you think best responds to the question (MULTIPLE choices are allowed) or add your comments.
- The data gathered by these questionnaires will be used only for academic purposes.
- After you have filled out the questionnaire, please e-mail it to [dorian.jano@unimi.it](mailto:dorian.jano@unimi.it) PhD Candidate at the University of Milan, Italy.

The process of preparation for EU membership requires that the potential member states adopt and implement EU Copenhagen Criteria. These questions are related **only to EU standards/acquis communautaire** requirements (not on EU political or Economic requirements) of the Stabilization and Association process and they regards pre-accession period starting from 2000 on.

Note:

**Adoption /Alignment** here means, transposition of EU standards/acquis communautaire into national legislation or policy programs

**Implementation /Enforcement** = putting legislation/policy into practice

|   |   |
|---|---|
| Given your experience and expertise   |   |
| A)  | Please give your understanding or a definition of what Europeanization for the candidate countries (in the Western Balkan countries) is |
| B) What do you consider to be:  |   |
| 1) Important condition(s) for ADOPTION of EU standards/Acquis communautaire       |   |
| <input type="checkbox"/>  | Priorities set in the European Partnership reports (the <b>great number of short terms</b> )  |
| <input type="checkbox"/>  | <b>Low Political constraints</b> (low number of political actors with different preferences)  |
| <input type="checkbox"/>  | The number of <b>Twinning</b> programs <b>AND</b> participants in <b>TAIEX</b>  |
| <input type="checkbox"/>  | The <b>financial aid</b> from EU (amounts from <b>CARDS AND IPA</b> )   |
| <input type="checkbox"/>  | The administrative capacity (the <b>bureaucracy effectiveness AND the Rule of Law</b> )   |
| <input type="checkbox"/>  | <b>Other</b> (please specify)   |
| 2) Important condition(s) for IMPLEMENTATION of EU standards/Acquis communautaire |   |
| <input type="checkbox"/>  | Priorities set in the European Partnership reports (the <b>great number of short terms</b> )  |
| <input type="checkbox"/>  | <b>Low Political constraints</b> (low number of political actors with different preferences)  |
| <input type="checkbox"/>  | The number of <b>Twinning</b> programs <b>AND</b> participants in <b>TAIEX</b>  |
| <input type="checkbox"/>  | The <b>financial aid</b> from EU (amounts from <b>CARDS AND IPA</b> )   |
| <input type="checkbox"/>  | The administrative capacity (the <b>bureaucracy effectiveness AND the Rule of Law</b> )   |
| <input type="checkbox"/>  | <b>Other</b> (please specify)   |

|  |                  |            |
|--|------------------|------------|
| 3) Do you think Adoption and Implementation of EU standards/Acquis communautaire:  |                  |            |
| Depends on <b>Country-specificity</b>  | It is irrelevant | because... |
| Depends on <b>Policy/sector-specificity</b>  | It is irrelevant | because... |
| Depends on the country's <b>Status (candidate vs. potential candidate countries)</b>   | It is irrelevant | because... |
| Is a matter of <b>Time</b>   | It is irrelevant | because... |
| <b>Differs</b> from adoption and implementation of <b>political and economic conditionality</b>  | It is irrelevant | because... |
| <b>Other</b>   |                  | because... |
| <p>Comments / Notes:</p> <p>Is there anything else you would like to add regarding the adoption and implementation of EU standards/Acquis communautaire:</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>We thank you very much for taking the time to share your knowledge with us.</b></p> <p>E-mail the filled out questionnaire to <a href="mailto:dorjan.jano@unimi.it">dorjan.jano@unimi.it</a> PhD Candidate at the University of Milan, Italy.</p> |                  |            |

Endnotes table 43:

<sup>i</sup> "All this relative progress has brought Albania to the threshold of negotiating a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU." COM(2002) 163 final, p.15

<sup>ii</sup> "In almost every area where Albania would take on obligations under a future SAA, there is a considerable lack of implementing capacity." COM(2002) 163 final, p.15

<sup>iii</sup> "Limited progress has been made by Albania in addressing the many challenges it has to face. Recommendations included in the 2002 Stabilisation and Association process (SAP) report have been only partially addressed... Some improvements have been noticed in controlling illegal migration towards the EU, but trafficking in human beings, drugs and other forms of organised crime, as well as corruption in key areas such as the judicial system, customs and police, remain matters of deep concern. Improvements in the judiciary have been limited and the prosecution of crimes poor, despite an increased number of detentions." COM (2003) 139 final, p. 26-27

<sup>iv</sup> "... at the current pace of reform implementation, negotiations risk being long and drawn out. Before negotiations can be concluded, Albania will need to demonstrate its ability to implement the provisions of the future Agreement, and to address the priority issues identified by the European Union through its various reports and monitoring instruments." COM (2003) 139 final, p. 26

<sup>v</sup> "Reform in Albania over the past twelve months has been limited." COM(2004) 202 final, p.34

<sup>vi</sup> "Despite some progress in specific areas, many of the recommendations included in the 2003 Stabilisation and Association process (SAP) report have not been properly implemented... Despite progress made during SAA negotiations in discussing the text of the future agreement, many of the reforms necessary to guarantee its proper implementation have not been carried out." COM(2004) 202 final, p.34

<sup>vii</sup> "Albania has made some progress towards meeting European standards. Progress has been made in adoption of new legislation and the establishment of new institutions." MEMO/05/410 2005, p.2

<sup>viii</sup> "Albania has made some progress on putting in place the structures and laws needed to meet European standards." MEMO/06/412 2006, p.2

<sup>ix</sup> "Albania has made progress in aligning its legislation, policies and capacity with European standards and is implementing its Interim Agreement trade commitments." MEMO/07/446 2007, p.1

<sup>x</sup> "Albania has made progress in aligning its legislation, policies and capacity with European standards." MEMO/08/672 2008, p.1

<sup>xi</sup> "It now needs to enhance its efforts in the implementation of these laws and policies." MEMO/08/672 2008, p.1

<sup>xii</sup> "Finally, if it is to reach its declared goal of integration into European structures BiH must progress decisively within the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) over the next twelve months. Delays in Road Map completion reflect the complexities of BiH's internal order, but, unfortunately possibly, also a willingness by

some to hide behind those complexities. Regrettably, this has meant lost time and BiH falling behind its neighbours. The Road Map must be completed quickly in 2002.” COM(2002) 163 final, p.17

<sup>xiii</sup> “Progress within the Stabilisation and Association process (SAP) has been noted. The Road Map was ‘substantially completed’ by September 2002.” COM (2003) 139 final, p. 28

<sup>xiv</sup> “Regrettably, its substantial completion took too long and its full implementation requires continued attention.” COM (2003) 139 final, p. 29

<sup>xv</sup> “In terms of meeting the technical SAP requirements, the judgement of the Feasibility Study remains valid: “... a pattern of intermittent progress, interspersed with areas where crucial reform has not been completed, or in some cases even begun”. COM(2004) 202 final, p.35

<sup>xvi</sup> “Moreover, it remains a concern that in too many areas where progress has been achieved, that progress has come only thanks to international pressure.” COM(2004) 202 final, p.35

<sup>xvii</sup> “Progress has been made towards meeting European standards, notably through adoption of new legislation and the establishment of new institutions... However, efforts need to be seriously enhanced. Institutions have to be properly equipped and legislation implemented. Continued progress needs to be made in all areas, particularly in those which are central for the implementation of a future Stabilisation and Association Agreement.” MEMO/05/410 2005, p.5

<sup>xviii</sup> “Bosnia and Herzegovina has made further steps towards meeting European standards. Progress has been made in the fields of taxation, anti-trust policy, transport, energy and some of the justice and home affairs-related areas.” MEMO/06/412 2006, p.3

<sup>xix</sup> “Overall administrative capacity needs further strengthening.” MEMO/06/412 2006, p.3

<sup>xx</sup> “Bosnia and Herzegovina has made limited progress in aligning its legislation and policies with European standards.” MEMO/07/446 2007, p.2

<sup>xxi</sup> “The conclusion of the SAA, however, depends on Bosnia and Herzegovina meeting four conditions: achievement of police reform in accordance with the EU’s three principles, full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), public broadcasting reform, and public administration reform. MEMO/07/446 2007, p.2

<sup>xxii</sup> “As far as European standards are concerned, progress has been made in the fields of customs, taxation, agriculture, transport, visa administration, border management, asylum and migration. However, the country needs to intensify its efforts in many areas, as free movement of goods, persons and services, employment and social policies, state aids, energy, environment and statistics. Improved results as regards the fight against organised crime, drug trafficking and money laundering are also necessary.” MEMO/08/672 2008, p.4

<sup>xxiii</sup> “Following progress in four key areas set out by the EU in 2005, the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) was signed in June 2008.”... the four key areas were: “1) Implementation of police reform in compliance with the October 2005 agreement on police restructuring; 2) full co-operation with the ICTY; 3) adoption and implementation of all necessary public broadcasting legislation; and 4) development of the legislative framework and administrative capacity to allow for proper implementation of the SAA.” MEMO/08/672 2008, p.4; p.3

<sup>xxiv</sup> “The Agreement has had an immediate and concrete impact on the domestic reform programme. For instance, the Government is making serious efforts to establish the necessary legislative framework.” COM(2002) 163 final, p.19

<sup>xxv</sup> “However, the implementation of adopted legislation remains a major challenge and the administration needs to look at its own capacity to implement the reforms and address the deficits it finds.” COM(2002) 163 final, p.19

<sup>xxvi</sup> “Croatia has started to work intensively in order to align its legislation with the *acquis* and to address most of the priorities identified in the 2002 SAP Report. Important new legislative texts in areas such as competition and state aid, intellectual property and consumer protection have been prepared over the last 12 months and must be adopted as a matter of priority.” COM (2003) 139 final, p. 30

<sup>xxvii</sup> “In parallel, the necessary administrative capacity must be created, including the establishment of an independent State Aid Authority, in order to ensure proper enforcement of new legislation. Also, the enforcement of existing legislation often remains a challenge, due either to delays in the adoption of the necessary implementing regulations or to weak administrative capacity. More generally, Croatia needs to pay special attention to strengthening its public administration with a view to ensure that the relevant ministries and other public authorities are in a position to properly implement the numerous legislative reforms to which Croatia has committed itself.” COM (2003) 139 final, p. 30

<sup>xxviii</sup> “The ratification process of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Croatia has not been completed. Croatia has made progress in applying the Interim Agreement although due attention needs to be paid to the respect of the deadlines set out therein. Croatia has also taken important steps towards complying with future obligations of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA).” COM (2004) 257 final, p.120

xxix “Administrative capacity is uneven and enforcement of legislation needs to be improved. Croatia needs to continue legislative alignment while at the same time strengthening administrative and judicial structures that are necessary for the effective implementation and enforcement of the *acquis*.” COM (2004) 257 final, p.120

xxx “Croatia has made progress, particularly in areas such as the free movement of goods, public procurement, information society, education and culture and in foreign, security and defence policy. Croatia needs to continue legislative alignment across the board.” MEMO/05/411 2005, p.2

xxxi “At the same time the strengthening of administrative and judicial structures is necessary for the effective enforcement of EU laws and standards.” MEMO/05/411 2005, p.2

xxxii “Croatia has improved its ability to take on the obligations of membership. In most areas there has been some progress, mainly in terms of legislative alignment. Implementing capacity has also been improved. However, in many cases enforcement is weak and administrative capacity remains uneven. Progress has varied considerably between different policy areas. As regards the overall level of alignment and administrative capacity, much remains to be done.” MEMO/06/411 2006, p.2

xxxiii “Croatia has improved its ability to take on the obligations of EU membership. Preparations for meeting EU requirements are moving forward at a steady pace and alignment with EU rules is high in some sectors. However, significant efforts lie ahead in order to reach full alignment. In most areas there has been some progress, principally in terms of legislative alignment but also as regards administrative capacity building. In some chapters such as transport and environment, good progress made in previous years has been sustained. In other chapters such as public procurement and taxation, progress has remained limited. As regards the overall level of alignment and administrative capacity, much remains to be done.”

MEMO/07/447 “Key findings of the progress reports on the candidate countries: Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey”, Brussels, 6 November 2007, p.2

xxxiv “Croatia has improved its ability to take on the obligations of membership. Preparations for meeting EU requirements are moving forward at a steady pace. Significant progress has been made in economic and monetary policy and information society and media. Good progress has been made in many chapters, such as public procurement, intellectual property law, customs union, food safety and financial services. However, significant efforts lie ahead, in particular in areas such as judiciary and fundamental rights, environment, competition policy and agriculture and rural development;” MEMO/08/675 2008, p.2

xxxv See Serbia 2002

xxxvi “The situation in Kosovo has its own characteristics, due to the presence of an international civil and military administration, yet many of the issues are the same. Work continues on building democracy and rule of law, as well as other EU-compatible reforms including in the economic sphere. The future challenge is for the provisional institutions to take greater responsibility for reforms and their implementation – working within the powers which have been transferred – and to devote less time and fewer resources to challenging UNMiK and seeking a premature debate on status issues.” COM (2003) 139 final, p. 34

xxxvii “Over the reporting period, progress has taken place in setting Kosovo’s European perspective through the implementation of the Stabilisation and Association process Tracking Mechanism (STM). The Commission has provided to the Kosovo authorities policy advice on a number of sectors with a view to supporting EU compatible reforms. At the same time, the STM process reinforces and strengthens the work being done on the Standards for Kosovo.” COM(2004) 202 final, p.38

xxxviii “Kosovo has made progress in implementing European standards, notably in the areas of consumer protection, customs and taxation. Some progress has been made on the environment, energy and media. However, electricity provision remains precarious and more decisive efforts are needed substantially to increase revenue collection and improve governance structures of this public utility. Further efforts are needed to improve the tax administration, the statistical system and to strengthen Kosovo’s law enforcement agencies.” MEMO/05/410 2005, p.3

xxxix “Kosovo has made some progress towards approximate its legislation and policies with European standards. MEMO/06/412 2006, p.6

xl “However, limited progress has been made in the effective implementation and enforcement of legislation passed. More efforts are needed to create an administrative environment that will ensure further approximation to European standards.” MEMO/06/412 2006, p.6

xli “Kosovo has made further progress in approximating its legislation and policies with European standards. In some areas, such as customs and free movement of goods, progress made in previous years has been sustained.” MEMO/07/446 2007, p.6

xlii “However, little progress has been made on the effective implementation and enforcement of legislation. More efforts are needed to create the administrative capacity that will ensure further approximation and implementation of European standards, in particular in fighting organised crime, protecting the external borders and boundary, taxation and energy.” MEMO/07/446 2007, p.6

<sup>xliii</sup> “Kosovo has made some progress in approximating its legislation and policies with European standards notably in areas such as customs, agriculture and free movement of goods.” MEMO/08/672 2008, p.6

<sup>xliiv</sup> “However, little progress has been made on the effective implementation and enforcement of legislation.” MEMO/08/672 2008, p.6

<sup>xliiv</sup> “However, the political crisis has slowed down the process of institutional and legislative change which is necessary if the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is to come close to European structures. COM(2002) 163 final, p. 22

<sup>xliiv</sup> “But careful, thorough implementation of these obligations will be the only real indicator of progress... It is important that every effort is made in 2002 to refocus attention on the implementation of the Interim Agreement.” COM(2002) 163 final, p. 22

<sup>xliiv</sup> “Rapid implementation of the Framework Agreement will also enhance progress in the Stabilisation and Association process, including the ongoing ratification process of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA). In the meantime, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia should ensure that all obligations arising out of the Interim Agreement are fully complied with and that the preparatory works needed for the implementation of the full SAA are completed so that work can start as soon as it enters into force.” COM (2003) 139 final, p. 31-32

<sup>xliiv</sup> “In many areas, the reform process is still in its infancy and will need further efforts to be converted into concrete changes and bring the expected benefits... The Stabilisation and Association process has benefited from the support of all political parties and efforts have been made to make it the framework for Government actions. A National Action Plan to follow up the recommendations set in last year’s report has confirmed the will to go ahead. Further efforts and resources are needed to sustain reform.” COM(2004) 202 final, p.36

<sup>xlix</sup> “The country has made significant efforts to align its legislation with the *acquis*, particularly in areas related to the Internal Market and trade. These efforts need to be continued. However, the country faces major challenges in implementing and, especially, effectively enforcing the legislation. Administrative and judicial capacity remains weak in many areas and will need to be significantly strengthened for the *acquis* to be properly applied.” COM (2005) 562, p.5

<sup>l</sup> “The country has made some progress. New legislation and the establishment of new institutions constitute progress. Progress has been made, notably on some areas concerning the internal market.”

MEMO/06/411 2006, p.3

<sup>li</sup> “However, the country still faces major challenges in implementing and effectively enforcing the legislation.” MEMO/06/411 2006, p.3

<sup>lii</sup> “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has made further efforts to improve its ability to assume the obligations of membership. There was some progress in the fulfilment of the short term priorities of the European partnership.” MEMO/07/447 2007, p.3

<sup>liii</sup> “However, the country still faces major shortcomings in implementing and effectively enforcing legislation. Adequate human and financial resources to fully implement the Stabilisation and Association Agreement are lacking. Large scale replacement of qualified staff following political changes hampered efforts to improve administrative capacity.” MEMO/07/447 2007, p.3

<sup>liv</sup> “The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has made good progress in legislative alignment with the EU’s legal order in a significant number of areas such as public procurement, competition, transport, enterprise and industrial policy, information society and media. There has been good progress in the introduction of biometric passports.”

MEMO/08/675 2008, p.4

<sup>lv</sup> “However the country still faces shortcomings in implementing and effectively enforcing legislation, mainly in areas as free movement of goods, taxation, food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy.” MEMO/08/675 2008, p.4

<sup>lvi</sup> “Montenegro made some progress in approximating legislation and policies with European standards.” MEMO/06/412 2006, p.4

<sup>lvii</sup> “It further advanced in strengthening its administrative capacity in particular in coordination of European integration matters, including on the negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement. However, it is still at an early stage of preparations and considerable resources need to be allocated to deal with the challenges of introduction and full implementation of legislation. MEMO/06/412 2006, p.4

<sup>lviii</sup> “The country has made some progress in alignment with European standards and in strengthening its administrative capacity, leading to the signature of the SAA with the EU... Montenegro needs to continue to improve its legal, political and administrative capacity to ensure a successful implementation of the SAA. MEMO/07/446 2007, p.3

<sup>lix</sup> “Montenegro has made further progress in alignment with European standards. Good progress was achieved in the areas of free movement of services, customs and taxation and agriculture. Some progress can also be

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reported in the areas of free movement of goods, competition, public procurement, intellectual property rights, industry and SMEs, food safety, as well as justice, freedom and security. However, progress in transport, energy, environment, and information society remained uneven. Progress was not satisfactory with regard to statistical system development.

MEMO/08/672 2008, p.2

<sup>lx</sup> “The Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-related matters, which entered into force on 1 January 2008, is being smoothly implemented, while SAA ratification is ongoing.”

MEMO/08/672 2008, p.2

<sup>lxi</sup> “During 2001, a full-fledged strong commitment to reform, and some real progress, has been evident in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Republic of Serbia, Kosovo and the Republic of Montenegro). COM(2002) 163 final, p. 20

<sup>lxii</sup> “As the pace of transition picks up in 2002, there should be deepening structural reforms throughout the FRY - moving from the adoption to the implementation stage of reforms. COM(2002) 163 final, p. 20

<sup>lxiii</sup> “Some progress has been made, with much still to be done, and not yet the qualitative leap forward required if the state of Serbia and Montenegro is to reap the full benefits of Stabilisation and Association... The European agenda and the Stabilisation and Association process remain catalysts for reform. But much time has been lost in 2002, and the state must accelerate the pace of reform and improve the implementation of legislation if it is to fulfil its potential.” COM (2003) 139 final, p. 33

<sup>lxiv</sup> “There was some progress on the European reform agenda in the framework of the Stabilisation and Association process (SAP).” COM(2004) 202 final, p.37

<sup>lxv</sup> “The Feasibility Report was postponed in order to give the authorities more time to address the remaining key issues, including in particular political conditionality, constitutional issues and the Action Plan... The Feasibility Report looks into the possibility to open negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement on the basis of a number of criteria: the degree of compliance with SAP political and economic conditions, the overall functioning of the State Union, the existence of a single trade policy and a single market, progress on sectoral reforms and on those institutions at the state level necessary to implement an SAA.” COM(2004) 202 final, p.37

<sup>lxvi</sup> “Both republics have made some good progress in the area of the internal market, notably on customs, competition and trade. They must now continue to make sustained efforts to improve legislative and administrative capacities with a view to fulfilling their future SAA obligations. They must also avoid creating new barriers between the republics. There has been some progress on sectoral policies, but it is uneven. As regards justice, freedom and security, no visible progress has taken place in areas such as visa, border control, asylum and migration, where the competences are shared between the State Union and the Republics. In some areas falling within the exclusive remit of the republics, they have made progress, but further resolute efforts are needed.” MEMO/05/410 2005, p.4

<sup>lxvii</sup> “Serbia made good progress in approximating its legislation and policies in most areas, including the fight against money-laundering and trafficking in human beings, as well as standardisation, accreditation, movement of services, certain areas concerning the internal market, customs, education, employment and social policy, SME policy, agriculture and transport. MEMO/06/412 2006, p.5

<sup>lxviii</sup> “Overall, Serbia has further strengthened its administrative capacity to be able to implement the SAA properly.” MEMO/06/412 2006, p.5

<sup>lxix</sup> “Good progress was achieved in areas such as free movement of goods, customs and taxation, Industry and SME, agriculture and visa facilitation. However progress has been limited in areas like information society and media, financial control and money laundering.” MEMO/07/446 2007, p.5

<sup>lxx</sup> “The SAA negotiations have shown that Serbia has the administrative capacity to progress towards the EU. Serbia is well placed to implement a future SAA.” MEMO/07/446 2007, p.5

<sup>lxxi</sup> “There has been progress in the field of free movement of goods and continued improvements in customs and taxation administrations. However, there was little legislative output on European standards and weak enforcement capacity in competition. Little progress has been made in the area of information society and media. A comprehensive and effective system of public internal financial control is still not in place. Money laundering and organised crime continue to be a serious problem in Serbia.” MEMO/08/672 2008, p.5

<sup>lxxii</sup> “Serbia is well placed to implement the SAA and the Interim Agreement, thanks to its good administrative capacity.” MEMO/08/672 2008, p.5





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