Hazard Analysis CVT Simulator

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Table 1: Revision History

Date	Developer(s)	Change
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1 Introduction

A hazard refers to any circumstance or occurrence that has the potential to endanger, damage or cause a system to fail. Hazards may arise from errors in design, implementation or operation and may affect both the system and the user.

In this document, we will examine the possible risks related to the creation and application of a software system intended to replicate the functionality of a Continuous Variable Transmission (CVT) for the car of the McMaster Baja Racing team. By systematically examining the components and assumptions of the software, this hazard analysis attempts to make sure that the finished solution satisfies performance objectives and is robust enough to manage the intricacies inherent in CVT modeling.

2 Scope and Purpose of Hazard Analysis

The purpose of conducting a hazard analysis when designing software that aims to improve the McMaster Baja team's Continuous Variable Transmission(CVT), is to identify and become aware of potential risks that could negatively affect the project. A hazard such as producing flawed simulations could delay the tuning process and create unreliable and incorrect outputs thus negatively impacting the vehicle performance and efficiency. These performance flaws could then lead to losses during Baja competitions. Through exploring the possible hazards involved, the project's code quality can be enhanced, potential risks can be mitigated and it ensures that the system will function as intended.

This document assumes that the user has access to a hard drive with sufficient storage space to download the software, an appropriate computer that meets the system requirements and a stable internet connection when downloading the software. [You should say what **loss** could be incurred because of the hazards. —SS]

3 System Boundaries and Components

This system is divided into three main components:

User Interface Component

This component is responsible for taking user input, providing the output to the user, and displaying the simulation of the 3D models.

Backend (Math) Component

This component handles the mathematical calculations required for the program. The calculations will be done using Python and specifically the libraries NumPy and SciPy.

Simulation Component

This component displays various models that are part of the CVT system, moving in accordance with the simulation.

[Dividing the system into components will help you brainstorm the hazards. You shouldn't do a full design of the components, just get a feel for the major ones. For projects that involve hardware, the components will typically include each individual piece of hardware. If your software will have a database, or an important library, these are also potential components. —SS

4 Critical Assumptions

[These assumptions that are made about the software or system. You should minimize the number of assumptions that remove potential hazards. For instance, you could assume a part will never fail, but it is generally better to include this potential failure mode. —SS]

- A1: Users will not intentionally misuse the software or purposefully try to find unsafe settings.
- A2: The system that the software is running on will be not compromised and will function in a standard manner.
- A3: Third party software and libraries used are trusted to be safe and free of vulnerabilities.
- A4: Users will not leak information received from the application to other teams or organizations.
- A5: The software will not be connecting to the internet or any other network.
- A6: The application wil not be collecting any user data or personal information.

5 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis

[Include your FMEA table here. This is the most important part of this document. —SS] [The safety requirements in the table do not have to have the prefix SR. The most important thing is to show traceability to your SRS. You might trace to requirements you have already written, or you might need to add new requirements. —SS] [If no safety requirement can be devised, other mitigation strategies can be entered in the table, including strategies involving providing additional documentation, and/or test cases. —SS]

- Improper load balancing
- Power transfer between pulleys (belt stuff)
- Inaccurate ODE solving (check the library / precision)
- Engine speed and torque calculations
- Realistic torque / force ratings of components
- Insufficient frictional forces

Design Func- tion	Failure Modes	Effects of Failure	Causes of Failure	Detection	Recommended Action	SR	Ref
Simulates the CVT system	Improper Load Balancing	 Increased wear over time leading to premature failure. Suboptimal power transfer between the engine and the wheels. 	 Incorrect distribution of forces across the pulleys due to inaccurate mass or load models. Errors in simulating the torque requirements based on the load. Inaccurate assumptions about load transfer between the pulleys. 	in acceleration of the vehicle.	model to more accurately represent the vehicle.	1	R18
	Inaccurate power transfer between pulleys (belt dynamics)	 Increased wear over time leading to premature failure. Suboptimal power transfer between the engine and the wheels. 	 Inaccurate modelling of belt tension and friction. Incorrect pulley geometry, taking advantage of belt assumptions to lead to impossible configurations. 	 Sudden drops in power transfer, or incredibly high torque differences. Unreasonably high belt tension or slack. 	• Dynamically check if belt tension is within reasonable limits.	2	R19
	Poor numerical precision	 Inaccurate simulation results, leading to incorrect design decisions Inconsistent behaviour of the system, leading to confusion and potential damage. 	 Insufficient precision in the ODE solver. Inappropriate time-step size. 	 Erratic in times of high acceleration or deceleration. Results that are inconsistent with the expected behaviour of the system. 	 Manually verify precision is sufficient by a factor of safety. Validate the ODE library's precision and accuracy. 		
	Insufficient frictional forces	 Excessive belt slippage or tension, leading to wear and poor efficiency. Simulations provide overly generous results. 	 Incorrect assumptions about the frictional forces between the belt and the pulleys. Incorrect friction models for the pulleys due to false geometry or temperature assumptions. 	 Consistently high forces that would be reduced by friction. Slip conditions met excessively while not being accounted for. Compare to belt slip and RPM data. 	 Investigate friction assumptions and models. Validate simulation in simple cases to ensure friction is accounted for. 	3	R20
	Software Crash	 Loss of data and work. High frustration and loss of trust in the software. 	 Memory leaks or poor memory management. Incorrect handling of edge cases, such as a division by 0. Poor error handling, leading to system crashes rather than graceful failures. 	 Application crashes during normal use. Program does not output data. Unusually high memory or CPU usage. Logs showing unhandled exceptions or errors. 	 Implement robust error handling. Conduct memory profiling and avoid loading large or unnecessary data. Test the software in edge cases to ensure it fails gracefully. 	4	R21

Table 2: Failure Modes, Effects, and Recommended Actions for Insulin Delivery

6 Safety and Security Requirements

- **SR 1** The simulation will dynamically check load balancing and adjust the computations accordingly.
- SR 2 The simulation will dynamically check that the belt tension is within reasonable limits.
- **SR 3** Ensure that the precision exceeds the standard 32-bit level by using 64-bit to ensure greater accuracy.
- **SR 4** The software shall implement robust error handling mechanisms that detect and handle at least 95% of all expected and unexpected errors, ensuring that no more than 5% of critical system failures result in unhandled exceptions or system crashes.

[Newly discovered requirements. These should also be added to the SRS. (A rationale design process how and why to fake it.) —SS]

7 Roadmap

[Which safety requirements will be implemented as part of the capstone timeline? Which requirements will be implemented in the future? —SS]

Appendix — Reflection

[Not required for CAS 741—SS]

The purpose of reflection questions is to give you a chance to assess your own learning and that of your group as a whole, and to find ways to improve in the future. Reflection is an important part of the learning process. Reflection is also an essential component of a successful software development process.

Reflections are most interesting and useful when they're honest, even if the stories they tell are imperfect. You will be marked based on your depth of thought and analysis, and not based on the content of the reflections themselves. Thus, for full marks we encourage you to answer openly and honestly and to avoid simply writing "what you think the evaluator wants to hear."

Please answer the following questions. Some questions can be answered on the team level, but where appropriate, each team member should write their own response:

- 1. What went well while writing this deliverable?
- 2. What pain points did you experience during this deliverable, and how did you resolve them?
- 3. Which of your listed risks had your team thought of before this deliverable, and which did you think of while doing this deliverable? For the latter ones (ones you thought of while doing the Hazard Analysis), how did they come about?
- 4. Other than the risk of physical harm (some projects may not have any appreciable risks of this form), list at least 2 other types of risk in software products. Why are they important to consider?