# The Impact of Temporary Rental Subsidies on Homelessness: A Randomized Controlled Trial

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The long-run results are preliminary as they rely on a subsample.

#### Abstract

Unconditional, indefinite housing subsidies have been shown to reduce homelessness, but such programs are massively over-subscribed. Policymakers have expanded less expensive, time-limited Rapid Re-Housing (RRH) subsidies to serve more people, with little empirical backing. Time-limited rental subsidies are predicated on the idea that homelessness results from financial constraints that can be addressed with temporary assistance. We conduct a randomized controlled trial that provides temporary rental subsidies to single, homeless adults. During the 30 months after random assignment, the treatment group receives an unconditional average of about \$10,000 in financial assistance, even though only about half of those assigned to the treatment group successfully lease a unit with assistance. This assistance leads to a reduction in incidence of homelessness of one-third and a reduction in the number of shelter days by two-thirds while the subsidy is active. Preliminary sub-sample results indicate that most of these effects persist after the subsidy ends.

JEL Codes: R28, I38

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domized controlled trial

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### 1 Introduction

On a given night in 2024, more than seven hundred thousand people slept in emergency shelters, transitional housing, or unsheltered places like sidewalks, bus stops, or cars (De Sousa & Henry 2024). Being homeless has dramatic costs, both for people experiencing homelessness and for communities addressing the public costs of homelessness. Those experiencing homelessness have worse employment outcomes, more encounters with the criminal justice system, and worse health (Evans et al. 2021). Homelessness increases mortality risk, aging a person as much as 20 years (Meyer et al. 2023). The cost of all public services for someone experiencing homelessness, including welfare services and hospital and criminal justice costs, averages \$83,000 per person per year (Flaming et al. 2015). While national counts of homelessness declined from 2007 through 2016, they have increased 40 percent since then, with the years 2023 and 2024 setting consecutive records.

At the same time, unconditional rental subsidies for people experiencing homelessness have steadily increased. 'Housing First' models that prioritize immediate rental assistance have expanded and displaced transitional housing programs that condition housing assistance on receipt of mental health or substance use treatment (Evans et al. 2021). The primary option, permanent supportive housing, combines indefinite rental subsidies with voluntary treatment services for people who are chronically homeless. These long-term, unconditional subsidies have proven effective in reducing homelessness (Tsemberis & Eisenberg 2000, Rosenheck et al. 2003) but are expensive and massively oversubscribed. As a result, policymakers have rapidly expanded less expensive, time-limited rental subsidies that can serve more households with the same budget.<sup>1</sup> Rapid Re-Housing (RRH) programs provide rental housing vouchers to rent from a private landlord with a limited term of support, typically between 6 months and 2 years. Local and national RRH programs have added more than 100,000 beds since 2014, almost quadrupling the 37,000 beds allocated to such

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>See Evans et al. (2021) for a summary of long-term trends in the organization and content of homelessness services.

programs ten years ago (De Sousa & Henry 2024). Despite this sharp growth in the use of time-limited rental subsidies, very little rigorous evidence tests whether they are effective in addressing rising levels of homelessness.

In this paper, we implement a randomized controlled trial to determine whether time-limited rental subsidies improve housing stability for single, homeless adults. The study takes place in Santa Clara County, CA, a county that in 2022 had the 4th largest homeless population in the US. The subsidy program is operated by the County's Office of Supportive Housing (OSH) and a local non-profit service provider, HomeFirst. Between July 2018 and November 2023, we randomly offered about half of 733 eligible individuals a spot in the program, which includes rental assistance and case management. We examine outcomes during three distinct periods: 1) the enrollment period, or the initial 6 months after being offered assistance, when most participants are still finding housing to lease; 2) the subsidy period, or the window from 6 to 18 months after study enrollment, when the rental subsidy is typically active; and 3) the post-subsidy period, or the window from 18 to 30 months when subsidies from the program have ceased for most participants.

The randomized controlled trial (RCT) design results in a sharp difference in treatment intensity between the treatment and control groups. When offered temporary subsidies, the treatment group is 86 percentage points more likely to enroll in a housing subsidy program and 46 percentage points more likely to successfully pay for an apartment with rental assistance within six months. Within eighteen months of random assignment, the treatment group receives an (unconditional) mean of \$8,409 in assistance, or \$7,821 more than the control group. This gap narrows dramatically in months 18-30, when subsidies have largely ended and the treatment group adds only another \$1,249 beyond the control group.

Our estimated treatment effects show that temporary rental subsidies sharply reduce homelessness during the subsidy period. We quantify homelessness using Homelessness Management System (HMIS) data on enrollment in programs throughout the county that admit people who are already homeless. Those offered rental subsidies are 12 percentage points less likely to enter emergency shelter, permanent supportive housing, and street outreach programs, about a one-third decline from a 38% rate in the control group, and this difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Most of this decline results from a drop in emergency shelter use and street outreach contact. For example, 25% of the control group enters an emergency shelter between 6 and 18 months after study enrollment, compared to only 18% of the treatment group.

To understand the merits of a temporary subsidy program relative to alternative interventions that aim to reduce homelessness, it is important to determine whether the sharp reduction in homelessness that we find during the subsidy period persists after the subsidies stop. While we do not yet observe outcomes for the full sample for the post-subsidy period, a sub-sample of early enrollees provides a preliminary test of whether gains in housing stability persist.<sup>2</sup> For participants where we observe outcomes for at least 30 months after random assignment (71% of the full sample), we find that those offered temporary subsidies are nine percentage points less likely to be homeless in the post-subsidy period (statistically significant at the 5 percent level), an almost 30 percent decrease relative to the control group mean.

This paper provides some of the first experimental evidence on the effect of temporary housing subsidies for people already experiencing homelessness. Several experiments show that indefinite subsidies can reduce homelessness (Tsemberis & Eisenberg 2000, Rosenheck et al. 2003); see Evans et al. (2021) for a full review. A smaller but growing literature finds that temporary financial assistance for people who are not yet homeless can also reduce emergency shelter entry (Evans et al. 2016, Phillips & Sullivan 2025). But rigorous evidence testing whether temporary rental subsidies are sufficient to reverse the situations of people already experiencing homelessness is very limited. Most of the best available studies find positive effects but require assumptions that could be relaxed by a randomized trial, either selection-on-observables (Rodriguez & Eidelman 2017, Blackwell & Santillano 2023)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>As shown in A.2b in the appendix, we will have long-term outcomes for the full sample in May of 2026.

or the exclusion restriction in a random case worker assignment design (Cohen 2024). One exception is the 'Community-Based Rapid Re-housing' arm of the seminal Family Options Study (Gubits et al. 2018), which randomly assigned temporary subsidies versus usual care for families living in emergency shelter and found no lasting statistical differences in housing outcomes.<sup>3</sup> We find different results, but the intervention we examine differs from the one considered in Family Options in two important ways that could explain these different findings. First, we study people without children, rather than families. The average participant is a 48 year-old man with no children who has spent 75% of the past three years homeless; 47% have previously interacted with street outreach, and 78% have been to jail. The effectiveness of temporary subsidies may be different for this group and the families enrolled in Family Options. Second, our study and Family Options differ in the programming available to the control group. In the Family Options usual care group, about 22\% of participants received RRH assistance anyway. By contrast, single individuals in Santa Clara County during our study period had few available alternatives, making such crossover very rare. Despite similar sample sizes and because of differences in the available usual care, our study has greater statistical power to detect persistent effects of temporary subsidies.

Most broadly, our results shed light on a key contemporary question in public policy: why do people remain homeless? Both popular opinion and policymakers debate the extent to which homelessness is driven primarily by financial constraints or non-financial considerations, such as mental health issues and substance use. If homelessness results from permanent problems, either non-financial considerations or a persistent mismatch between income and the cost of living, then temporary assistance is not likely to have a sustained effect. That we find some evidence that temporary subsidies reduce homelessness even after subsidies end indicates that a significant fraction of homelessness results from financial constraints and particularly from temporary constraints that can be overcome with time-limited support.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Another example is Towe et al. (2019), which studies a RRH program for AIDS patients but in a much smaller sample.

## 2 Rapid Re-Housing in Santa Clara County, CA

### 2.1 Santa Clara County, CA

Santa Clara County is perhaps best known as the heart of Silicon Valley, home to numerous technology giants such as Google and Facebook. It is the most populous county in the San Francisco Bay area region and is one of the most affluent counties in the nation. But according to HUD's 2022 Point-in-Time counts, Santa Clara County has the 4th largest homeless population in the country and the highest percentage of unsheltered homeless persons among large cities (De Sousa et al. 2022). Housing market challenges appear alongside affluence. At the start of the study in July of 2018, Santa Clara County had the 5th highest median rent in the country and remained among the top five highest rental rates through 2023. Furthermore, Santa Clara's vacancy rates remain historically low, averaging only 5% over the past decade. Santa Clara County shares this combination of high homelessness rates, affluence, and high rents with the counties containing Los Angeles, New York City, Seattle, and Oakland, i.e. the other counties with homelessness counts among the five largest in the US.

## 2.2 The Rapid Re-Housing Intervention

While the structure of Rapid Re-Housing programs can differ across communities, the primary component of these programs is a temporary rent subsidy, typically lasting 12-18 months. They may provide some non-financial support as well, but unlike traditional 'Transitional Housing' programs, they focus primarily on rent payment and do not condition rent payment on compliance with receiving other services, like mental health or substance use treatment. Unlike longer-term programs, like housing vouchers or permanent supportive

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>HUD rent estimates at the 50th percentile for all Fair Market Rent areas can be found at https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/50per.html

 $<sup>^5</sup>$ Estimate from the Census' Housing Vacancies and Homeownership (CPS/HVS) at http://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/data/rates.html

housing, RRH programs limit the duration of subsidies. Given the less intensive financial support, RRH programs are often designed to serve clients with less chronic needs, but the scarcity of long-term subsidies often creates significant overlap between the set of clients served by RRH and more intensive programs.

Rapid Re-Housing has become an increasingly popular option among local governments, including in Santa Clara County. Figure 1 displays federal Housing Inventory Count data covering all homelessness response programs in the United States. RRH programs have increased dramatically from 37,000 beds to 145,000 beds over the past decade. This massive increase in temporary subsidies for market rentals has come alongside increases in long-term subsidies, like permanent supportive housing, and at the expense of traditional transitional housing programs.

The intervention we study is funded by local government and operated by a local non-profit organization. The Office of Supportive Housing in Santa Clara County funds the program via tax revenue. HomeFirst, a long-time provider of housing services in Santa Clara County, implements the Rapid Re-Housing services. The program serves people who are literally homeless by providing them with a temporary rental assistance subsidy that is meant to ease homeless persons' transition back into stable housing. In addition to the rental assistance, participants receive case management services that include assistance in finding a housing unit and can also include assistance generating additional income through employment and public benefit receipt. The program only serves households without children, which is a unique feature of the program. While the Office of Supportive Housing funded other Rapid Re-Housing programs during out study period, these other programs tend to prioritize other groups (families, veterans, etc.) who have little overlap with the study sample.

Upon enrolling in the program, staff help a client identify a housing unit with a landlord willing to receive the program subsidy. As shown in Appendix Table A.1, participants who find a unit do so in a median of 2.5 months from enrollment to move-in, but there is

considerable variation with a mean of 4 months and a standard deviation of 4 months. While searching, RRH participants are often placed in transitional or interim housing subsidized by the county and are guaranteed a bed in emergency shelters.<sup>6</sup> Finding a unit quickly depends on finding a willing landlord with a unit the tenant would like to rent. Prior research has shown that many landlords are hesitant to rent even to recipients of longer term subsidy programs that do not target those who are homeless (Phillips 2017, Cunningham et al. 2018, Faber & Mercier 2022, Aliprantis et al. 2022), and homeless individuals likely face even greater skepticism.

Because it can be difficult to find landlords who will accept RRH subsidies, the program assists participants with housing search. HomeFirst housing specialists actively identify receptive landlords and locate vacant units. The program provides some risk mitigation for landlords by paying up to two months of security deposit and covering up to one month's rent in property damages. Staff work with landlords to show clients up to three potential market rental units. If the client does not move forward with the third option, the case manager will schedule a meeting with the client to confirm their interest in the program and schedule one more viewing. If the client declines that last unit, it becomes the client's responsibility to find a unit. The client must have at least one interaction per week with their case manager to remain in the program; otherwise, the case manager will exit the client from RRH and, depending on the needs of the individual, refer the person to another program. If the landlord denies the client, that rejection does not count towards the threeunit limit described above. Upon finding a suitable unit with a willing landlord, HomeFirst staff facilitate the process of lease signing and move-in. For example, a housing specialist may sit with a client during a lease signing to explain the legal process and then after the signing connect them to a social service agency that delivers basic furniture.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>While earlier cohorts benefited from prioritization into emergency shelters upon enrollment in Rapid Re-Housing, later cohorts were only given priority for an emergency shelter bed if they were found living at an encampment. In that case, a stay at an emergency shelter would range from three days to a week. Aside from this restriction, during the study, participants did not face other shelter time restrictions as it may be common in other jurisdictions (e.g. a maximum of 60 days per calendar year).

After signing a lease, the program provides its core element: temporary rental subsidies. Rent payments are made directly to the tenant's landlord by either HomeFirst or a separate county vendor. The program uses a benchmark in which a client receives monthly rental subsidies for one year which begin at 100% of monthly rent and decline by 25% each quarter. However, the rent payments can be tailored to an individual. The program typically caps rent payments at 30% of income, which can slow this phase-out, and clients with no income typically contribute a nominal amount of \$20. While the typical duration is one year, length of subsidies can also vary. Appendix Table A.1 confirms that both the median and mean duration from move-in to program exit is 12 months, though the duration of assistance can in some cases last up to two years. If a client has not exited the program after one year, HomeFirst has a case conference to assess the situation and decide whether to extend services for a longer period. A key consideration is the client's level of program engagement and the potential to become stably housed. If this is unlikely, the client may be referred to a different program. Extensions were much more likely during the height of the COVID pandemic, when RRH services were extended to account for additional challenges in meeting with clients and prospective landlords.

Though the primary focus and expenses are rental subsidies, this program also provides some limited case management to participants. During the study period, HomeFirst employed one to four RRH case managers, each with a capacity to serve 20-25 clients at any given time. The program required participants to meet every three months with their case managers and an employment specialist. These meetings primarily focused on generating income, discussing employment opportunities and, when applicable, helping participants sign up for or renew public benefits (e.g. disability).

## 3 Empirical Strategy

#### 3.1 Study Enrollment and Random Assignment

As in most communities, Santa Clara County uses a coordinated entry system to match people experiencing homelessness to the community resources that could best fit their needs. Under this system, individuals experiencing homelessness seek services at various public and private agencies throughout the county. They first complete the standard assessment tool, Vulnerability Index – Service Prioritization Decision Assistance Tool (VI-SPDAT), which assigns each person a score and recommends services and housing options based on that score. The VI-SPDAT orders people within a waitlist of people eligible for Permanent Supportive Housing and Rapid Re-Housing in the County's Homeless Management Information System (HMIS).

Figure 2 outlines how the study enrollment process operated within the county's existing prioritization system. The study maintained the county's existing eligibility criteria for a RRH program serving single adults. First, the client must already be homeless, according to HUD category 1 or 4 definition of being homeless. Most participants were living in shelters or encampments at study enrollment. Second, the client must not have custodial rights for children (either currently living with them or not) at the time of enrollment. Households may include more than one adult. Third, participants must have a VI-SPDAT score between 4 and 7, the county's typical range for Rapid Re-Housing programs. The most vulnerable clients with scores above 7 are instead eligible for permanent subsidies.

Whenever HomeFirst has capacity to enroll new clients, Santa Clara County uses this waitlist to identify potentially eligible clients and refer groups of them to HomeFirst. Prior to the start of the study, the county prioritized individuals within the eligible range (4-7) by VI-SPDAT score, referring first those who scored a 7, then those who scored a 6, and so

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>HUD category 1 homelessness covers people who lack a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence, i.e. people who slept in places not mean for human habitation or emergency shelters (or institutions like jails or hospitals immediately after having been homeless). HUD category 4 homelessness covers people fleeing domestic violence who have neither another residence nor sufficient support to obtain other housing.

on. Furthermore, they prioritized within VI-SPDAT score according to the risk sub-score (one of four VI-SPDAT sub-scores). As a final tiebreaker, the County referred those with the most days homeless among clients with otherwise equal scores.

The evaluation changed how clients were chosen among this set of eligible people, intentionally recruiting the full range of eligible VI-SPDAT scores. When HomeFirst had capacity, the county would refer lists of eligible clients. Each list would have an equal number of clients who scored a 7, 6, 5, and 4 on the VI-SPDAT. Within a VI-SPDAT score, the lists created by the county continued to prioritize those with higher "risk sub-scores" and days homeless. When HomeFirst exhausted the list of potential participants, the county would share a new list.

Program staff contacted individuals referred by the county and enrolled them in the study. Case managers and outreach workers would make three attempts to connect with a potential client and remove them from the list if unsuccessful.<sup>8</sup> Upon locating individuals, they would determine interest in participating in the study. Among those interested, they would setup an in-person meeting<sup>9</sup> and complete an intake form on SurveyCTO, which caseworkers accessed through a mobile app on a computer tablet. The intake process confirmed program eligibility criteria, documented informed consent to research, and collected baseline information on the person's housing history and access to government assistance.

At the end of this intake process, study participants were immediately randomly assigned to the program or usual care. The tablet computer assigned clients randomly on the spot to either a treatment group offered housing subsidies or a control group referred to usual care. Stratification and the probability of treatment varied over time. Initially, we used independent draws with probability one-half. We quickly shifted to random as-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>A reasonable attempt usually means calling someone if they have a contact number or visiting the places frequented by a known client. Staff would also check HMIS records and contact homeless shelters or colleagues at other organizations to make contact with a potential client who had recently received services, as recorded in HMIS.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>For a few months during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, with the approval of both the SCC IRB and Notre Dame's IRB, case managers completed the intake form and informed consent process over the phone.

signment stratified by study entry time with alternating strata of six and four consecutive participants. Alternating strata sizes prevented long strings of assignments to one group but also made treatment assignment difficult to predict. As of March 26 2020, during the COVID-19 crisis, there was no longer excess demand for the RRH program, likely because of newly available housing supports made available during the emergency. As a result, we suspended the randomization process, and all eligible participants were assigned to receive RRH services. We do not include these participants in the analysis below. When random assignment resumed in August 31, 2020, we randomized within alternating strata of six and three consecutive participants, applying an altered ratio of two participants placed into the treatment group for each client placed in the control group. This ratio allowed us to align RRH enrollments with HomeFirst's capacity to take on new clients. We returned to a 1:1 randomization ratio on October 1, 2021. In summary, all people in our final study sample were randomly assigned, but stratification and the probability of treatment changed over time.

While the treatment group was immediately enrolled in the Rapid Re-Housing program described above, usual care options for control group participants were relatively limited. Individuals could only be enrolled in the study and randomized once; thus, existing control group participants were not eligible to be referred to this RRH program for a second time during the study period. At the close of the study, HomeFirst's RRH program for singles stopped enrolling new clients. Options with other programs were also rare. While several other county programs focus on families with children, no other Rapid Re-Housing programs dedicated to singles were available during the study period, though some narrower programs,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>During the first months of the study, caseworkers enrolling study participants encountered a string of control assignments. Even though treatment assignments were likely to balance in the future, this became a concern for the team of caseworkers tracking eligible clients. The change to randomize within strata ensured that study group assignments would balance out more quickly for each caseworker. This change did not alter the 50/50 chance of a study participant to get RRH services.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>While enrolled in Rapid Re-Housing, individuals were not eligible for a second VI-SPDAT assessment. However, if someone was reassessed upon entering an emergency shelter and was then deemed eligible for permanent supportive housing (PSH), they would exit Rapid Re-Housing and proceed to enroll in PSH. Otherwise, they would have to wait to exit RRH and live homeless for 12 months before being able to apply to PSH.

e.g. for veterans, that partially overlap with the study sample were available. This situation changed somewhat after the end of our study treatment but before the end of our long-run follow-up period, at which time local Rapid Re-Housing programs appeared that focused on enrolling people displaced after the removal of street encampments. These latter programs are relevant for our study population but, because they come after the end of treatment subsidies, are better categorized as long-run outcomes (indicating that the person was living in an encampment) than substitutable treatments.

#### 3.2 Data

Our primary data source is Santa Clara County's Homeless Management Information System (HMIS). HMIS provides baseline characteristics and program enrollment outcomes. In HMIS we can observe demographic characteristics, VI-SPDAT scores, shelter entry, and access to other temporary housing and homelessness prevention services. HMIS collects client-level data from all publicly contracted homeless service providers in Santa Clara County, allowing us to observe date-specific service records for both treatment and control group participants. We use these service records to measure homelessness, as indicated by using services for people who are literally homeless. In future work, we will also use HMIS as the primary database to merge with other County records.<sup>12</sup>

We measure our primary, pre-specified homelessness outcome using program enrollment from HMIS. HMIS tracks enrollment in a variety of programs, including some for people who are housed but at risk of homelessness and others for people who are already homeless. See Appendix Figure A.1 for a taxonomy of homelessness programs. Our outcome measures include only programs for people who are already homeless. In particular, we include enrollment in emergency shelter, street outreach, permanent supportive housing, transitional housing, and safe haven programs. We exclude programs that do not imply homelessness,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>The research team does not access PII directly. We keep track of enrollment and treatment status via the HMIS ID. OSH data specialists will use HMIS ID, name, SSN, date of birth, and other characteristics to link HMIS data with other County records.

such as prevention programs and non-housing services other than street outreach. To keep a distinction between the treatment and outcomes, we always exclude the study Rapid Re-Housing program at HomeFirst from the outcome measure. We sometimes include non-study Rapid Re-Housing programs, which for our sample largely appear during long-run follow-up when local programs appeared for people being displaced after street encampment removals. Because we did not anticipate the appearance of these programs in our pre-analysis plan, we show robustness of the results to including versus excluding non-study Rapid Re-Housing programs. For all types of homelessness programs, we use program enrollment dates to measure the fraction of people initiating any such services during a particular time period.

We add baseline survey data from study enrollment. Study participants go through an intake form with their caseworker immediately before randomization. The survey asks for demographic information, length of homelessness, income, and access to health insurance and public benefits. As an additional check, we compare HMIS outcomes at baseline with the self-reported information from the survey.

## 3.3 Regression Specification

Because we assign treatment randomly, we can compute treatment effects as simple intentto-treat comparisons of means. We also control for strata fixed effects to account for the experimental design and pre-specified control variables to potentially improve precision by removing residual variance. For our main specification, we estimate:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta T_i + \mathbf{X_i} \delta + \epsilon_i, \tag{1}$$

where  $Y_i$  is an outcome, such as an indicator for using homelessness programs within 1 year of random assignment;  $T_i$  is an intent-to-treat indicator of treatment group assignment (assigned to Rapid Re-Housing);  $X_i$  is a vector of controls; and  $\epsilon_i$  is a random error term. The vector of controls measured at baseline includes the outcome in the year prior to study enroll-

ment (if available), years since first becoming homeless (winsorized at the 95th percentile), total months homeless in the past three years, total earned income (winsorized at 95th percentile), total income (winsorized at 95th percentile), age, age squared, and indicators for VI-SPDAT scores, female, and month of study enrollment. These controls were pre-specified in our pre-analysis plan. We also include a set of indicators for strata of random assignment, which was omitted from our original pre-analysis plan but is necessary for proper inference. For our main results, we show in Appendix Table A.6 that accounting for stratification instead using randomization inference does not affect our results. We estimate our main specification by ordinary least squares and report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors with no clustering.

#### 3.4 Study Sample

We enrolled 733 participants in the study between July 2018 and November 2023. Of these, 373 were assigned to the treatment group receiving RRH services and 360 to the control group receiving usual care. The COVID-19 pandemic and other administrative issues led to no or very slow study enrollment during 2020 and the first half of 2021. See Appendix Figure A.2a for cumulative enrollment trends. Overall, we enrolled 290 study participants before the COVID shutdown, 71 from the time we resumed the lottery through the end of 2021, and 372 from 2022 onward. As noted above, everyone in this sample must be eligible for RRH, currently experiencing homelessness, not living with dependent children, and must consent to participate in the study.

In Table 1, we report the means for observable characteristics for both the treatment and control groups. In the third column, we report the difference in means across these groups. These differences are regression-adjusted differences to account for the randomization strata (but not other pre-specified controls), so they may not exactly match the raw difference between the first two columns. If random assignment was successful, we would expect to see

 $<sup>^{13}</sup>$ The most recent HMIS data extract was missing three clients (2 control and 1 treatment). Discrepancies in the balance table and the 6 to 18-month result tables are due to this incomplete file.

only small mean differences that are statistically indistinguishable from zero. Prior overall use of homelessness services, VI-SPDAT score, housing history, and most demographics are balanced. Only differences in one race/ethnicity indicator and ever enrolling in street outreach prior to random assignment are statistically indistinguishable from zero. These two observed imbalances are not a major source of concern. Given a large list of variables, it is not surprising to find at random at least one variable with a significant difference. Also, any differences in baseline characteristics do not point to likely differences in follow-up outcomes; the first row of Table 1 shows the rate of entry into homelessness services we would predict based on baseline characteristics, and it is similar across the two groups.<sup>14</sup>

Table 1 also shows that this program serves individuals with significant barriers to stable housing. By definition, everyone is experiencing homelessness at baseline and has a VI-SPDAT score in the RRH range of 4 to 7. This group is intended to be a middle range, while people scoring over 7 with greater barriers are directed to permanent subsidies. Still, two-thirds of study people assigned to control have previously resided in emergency shelter, and almost half have recorded contact with street outreach workers. On average, they have been homeless for most of the last three years, three-fourths have been in jail, more than ten percent suffer from mental health or cognitive issues, and about one-fifth say they have been removed from an apartment or program because of substance abuse. Other demographics are typical of single individuals who have experienced homelessness in Santa Clara County. The average age is almost 50 years old, and 70% are male. The group is racially diverse: 45% Hispanic, almost 20% non-Hispanic Black, and about 5% Asian. The study participants monthly income, which includes earned income as well as income from government benefits, is about \$750.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>To compute this value, we subset the sample to our control group and run a linear regression of our primary outcome of admission to homelessness services (within 6 to 18 months of random assignment), which includes admission to shelter, street outreach, permanent supportive housing, transitional housing, or safe haven, on income, VI-SPDAT scores at baseline, dummies for female, Hispanic, black, strata fixed effect and pre-randomization shelter admission, homelessness prevention, rapid rehousing, permanent supportive housing, services only, street outreach, and transitional housing. We use the coefficients from that regression to predict fitted values for the full sample.

### 4 Results

#### 4.1 Receipt of Rental Assistance

The fraction of those in the treatment group who receive rental subsidies rises in the six months after random assignment, as more participants find a unit to rent, but then falls in subsequent months as some exit the program. Figure 3a shows the cumulative share of participants who have ever received rental assistance from any program covered by HMIS, by treatment status and months since random assignment. In the first month, few rent payments have yet been made as households search for an appropriate housing unit and a landlord willing to accept payment from the program. By 6 months after random assignment, 86% of people assigned to treatment have administratively enrolled in Rapid Re-Housing and 48% have received some amount of rental assistance, compared to less than 5% of those assigned to the control group. The treatment share only increases marginally as we extend to 30 months after random assignment. Figure 3b shows the dynamics of rent payment as characterized by the unconditional mean of the flow of rental payments over time. Rental payments begin at low levels but rise sharply over the next six months as households begin leases. By a year and a half after random assignment, payments have fallen dramatically from their peak as households reach program time limits.

We use this information derived from the HMIS data on the typical timing of rental assistance to define study outcome periods. We split the main outcomes into three distinct periods: within six months of random assignment (short-run outcomes), from six to 18 months after random assignment (medium-run outcomes), and from 18 to 30 months after random assignment (long-run outcomes). The three distinct periods correspond to different stages of the process: short-run outcomes show the take-up of programs right after random assignment but before many in the treatment group have found a unit to rent with the subsidy; medium-run outcomes measure housing stability during the period when many in the treatment group are receiving Rapid Re-Housing payments, and long-run outcomes

measure housing stability after Rapid Re-Housing payments have largely ended. We choose these splits consistent with our pre-analysis plan based on the average six-month lag between random assignment and the first rent payment and the typical one-year time span between the first and the last rent payment among those who enroll in RRH (see Appendix Table A.2).

Table 2 quantifies the flow of rental assistance more precisely during these three periods. Within the first six months, 86% of the treatment group has enrolled in a RRH program, nearly always the study program, compared to only 8% of the control group, mostly due to other programs. 15 During this time, 48% of the treatment group has begun receiving financial assistance from Rapid Re-Housing. Incomplete take-up of assistance typically reflects inability to locate a housing unit and a willing landlord, though some participants also fail to follow through on their initial interest in the program. The inability to locate a suitable housing unit for the client may be driven by demand or supply factors. Based on conversations with program staff, even clients living on the street may reject a unit due to its location or quality. Clients may also decide against following through with the program once they become fully aware of the temporary nature of the subsidy and the steep decline in rental amounts. Anecdotally, individuals who are undocumented or have a physical disability often express concerns about their ability to increase their earnings within a year. Clients may also be rejected multiple times by different landlords due to their credit or criminal history. This landlord-tenant mismatch is exacerbated by the challenge of finding landlords willing to participate in the program.

The gap in assistance amounts widens in the medium run and, as expected, shrinks in the 18 to 30 months after random assignment, when RRH payments expire. Specifically, between 6 to 18 months after random assignment, people in the treatment group receive \$3,578 more in rental assistance and \$4,579 more in financial assistance overall. After 18 months, these differences shrink to \$899 and \$1,249, respectively. Similarly, the rate at which the treatment

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>See appendix A.5 for discussion of the few cases of control group enrollment in the study RRH program.

group receives any assistance at all is similar in the short (48%) and medium (50%) run, but much lower in the long run (18%). By about 18 months after random assignment, the temporary rental subsidies have largely run their course.

#### 4.2 Treatment Effects for Homelessness

We measure homelessness using enrollment records for housing services that are only available to people who are homeless. Our primary, pre-specified outcome includes enrollment in emergency shelters, permanent supportive housing, street outreach, and transitional housing. We also show a broader measure including enrollment in non-study RRH programs. As discussed above, non-study RRH programs are best thought of as substitutes for the study program in the short run but as an outcome in the long-run. Non-study RRH programs at long-run follow-up directly enroll participants from cleared street encampments, indicating homelessness at that time. For any given time frame, we measure indicators for whether a person began enrollment in the relevant set of programs during that time period. In these preliminary results, for each period, we restrict the sample to the individuals we can observe for at least that many months since random assignment.

Figures 4a and 4b preview the main result, showing that RRH reduces homelessness. They show the average number of new shelter enrollments, first cumulatively and then the flow, by months since random assignment. In the first month, people assigned to treatment briefly enter emergency shelter at higher rates, likely because in the early years of the study RRH participants had priority access to shelter during housing search. After this initial period, people assigned to treatment have lower rates of enrollment in other homelessness services. This gap persists over time, though attenuating slightly.

Table 3 shows short-run outcomes in the six months after randomization, when many treatment households are still leasing up. Even within the first 6 months, placement in RRH also has an effect on the use of some other services. The top row reports enrollment in program for people who are already homeless, other than the study RRH program. The

treatment group is 10 percentage points less likely to be homeless according to this measure. The second row shows our primary, pre-specified outcome which is identical except that it excludes all RRH programs. Under this measure, the treatment group is 7.6 percentage points less likely to be homeless. Most of this decrease results from less use of emergency shelters and street outreach. This decline in emergency services is partially offset as people assigned to RRH are more likely to receive transitional housing, consistent with the structure of the RRH program—people approved for RRH have priority access to some transitional services while looking for a landlord to accept their RRH subsidy.

Homelessness also declines when subsidies are available to the treatment group. Table 4 shows results for months 6 to 18. Those who are assigned to RRH have an 8 pp lower rate of entry into emergency shelter, a 3 pp lower rate of entry into permanent supportive housing, and about a 9 pp lower rate of contact with street outreach, but continue to have (statistically insignificant) greater entry into transitional housing programs. Our pre-specified overall outcome indicates that RRH leads to a 12 pp decrease in homelessness. Similarly, the broadest measure of homelessness a decline of 13 pp. These declines are statistically strong, rejecting zero effects at the 1% level. They are also practically large, particularly when considering that only half of the treatment group successfully accesses financial payments. For example, shelter entry declines from 25% in the control group to 18% in the treatment group.

Table 5 provides a preliminary test of whether gains in housing stability persist after housing subsidy payments end. Because we restrict the sample to people we can observe for at least 30 months since random assignment, the sample is smaller (71% of the full study sample), and statistical power is more constrained. However, even with this smaller sample, we find evidence of reductions in homelessness in the long run. Homelessness falls by either 13 or 9 pp, depending on whether we include non-study Rapid Re-Housing programs in our outcome measure. Depending on the measure, these results indicate that somewhere between three-quarters and all the observed reduction in homelessness persists after subsidies

are removed. However, this result uses data on only 71% of the study sample and should be interpreted with caution until full sample results are available.

This long-run success mostly reflects participants transitioning to unsubsidized market rentals. While we do not observe housing situations for the control group, Appendix Figure A.3 describes housing situations for the treatment group at exit from the program. Among treatment group participants who successfully lease within 6 months and have at least 30 months of follow-up data, almost half (48%) exit the program to a unit where they rent without a rental subsidy. As shown in table A.3, those who lease without a subsidy upon exit of RRH have a baseline predicted risk of homelessness similar to the rest of the treatment group. For example, 70% of them have ever been in shelter and 74% have ever been in jail. This RRH program appears to help a broad set of previously homeless people transition to renting on the private market.

### 4.3 Heterogeneous Effects

We also examine whether the treatment effects differ across various groups. Because many communities use a VI-SPDAT score to target access to RRH, we consider whether there are heterogeneous treatment effects across different scores. Figure 5a shows treatment effects on homelessness for people with different VI-SPDAT scores. Effects are somewhat greater for people with greater VI-SPDAT scores, though the effects do not vary monotonically with the VI-SPDAT score. This latter fact may be related to concerns that the VI-SPDAT has relatively low ability to predict future homelessness (Brown et al. 2018). A scoring system that instead predicts risk of homelessness based on many characteristics observed in HMIS data may do somewhat better at identifying people who are both at risk and have larger treatment effects. We define quartiles of a data-driven index of the risk of homelessness based on HMIS history. Figure 5b shows treatment effects for sub-groups defined by quartiles of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>We predict the outcome - use of non-homelessness prevention services - in the control group using a linear regression where the predictors are the baseline value of all primary outcomes, SPDAT score dummies, gender, race dummies, ethnicity dummies, month of interview dummies, and months between baseline and

that predicted risk. Treatment effects for the top quartile of risk are about twice as large as those for the bottom quartile, which are both smaller and statistically indistinguishable from zero. Treatment effects also increase monotonically with risk of homelessness. These results provide some suggestive evidence that there could be benefits from targeting the program to the higher risk groups, but we do not have sufficient precision to reject the hypothesis that the treatment effects are the same across these groups.

We also include preliminary results that examine variation in treatment effects for more detailed subgroups. Figure 6a suggests that there are no significant differences in the receipt of rental assistance by gender, race, age, behavioral problems, or contact with the criminal justice system. Despite well-understood barriers to housing by e.g. race and criminal history, these results suggest that the case management aspect of the program and/or the guaranteed rent from the County help a wide variety of RRH clients successfully lease a unit, offsetting these challenges. Similarly, in Figure 6b we do not observe noticeably different treatment effects across demographic subgroups for the use of homelessness services 6 to 18 months after random assignment, when many in the treatment group are still receiving rental subsidies.

## 5 Conclusion

This study examines the effect of temporary rental subsidies on homelessness. Over 2.5 years, people offered subsidies receive an average of \$9,070 more assistance than a comparable control group, with nearly all of these subsidies paid in the first 1.5 years. These subsidies flow to the half of the treatment group that successfully leases a unit that accepts program payments. Preliminary results indicate that these subsidies lead to large differences between the treatment and the control groups in homelessness in the short- and long-run. Treatment group participants were 12 percentage points less likely to be homeless between 6 and 18

follow-up dummies. We then estimate fitted values for all observations using observed characteristics and the coefficients from that regression. Following Abadie et al. (2018), we avoid endogenous stratification on an estimated index by using a repeated split sample procedure that, repeatedly, defines quartiles using one half of the control group and estimates treatment effects on the other half.

months after random assignment, a 32% decline. We do not yet have long-term follow-up for the full study sample, but in the sub-sample for which we observe outcomes after the subsidies expire, we still see that the program leads to a 28% decline in homelessness.

These results suggest that temporary subsidies can be a cost-effective response to homelessness. To consider cost-effectiveness, it is useful to compute the program cost of averting a day of homelessness. While this calculation ignores many potential costs and benefits, it provides one useful metric. Tables 3, 4, and 5 together imply that the treatment group experienced 43 fewer days in emergency shelters within 30 months of random assignment. Not all days homeless are spent in shelters; Table 4 implies that 62% of averted homeless spells are from shelters. So, we estimate that the treatment averts about 69 days of homelessness. Table 2 indicates that the treatment group receives \$9,070 of additional financial assistance over the course of the study. Direct financial assistance made up half of the total program budget, with staffing and overhead the other half. Thus, we estimate that during the 2.5 year study period, averting a day of homelessness cost about \$262. Because the cost of the temporary subsidy does not extend beyond the study follow-up period, the average cost of avoiding shelter days only falls if benefits extend to later years. For example, if we assume that the observed effects in months 18 to 30 extend through year 15 when the average sample member is age 65, the cost per homeless day averted falls to \$103.

The cost effectiveness of temporary subsidies compares well to the longer-term subsidies that are best supported by existing evidence. For example, a randomized trial (Rosenheck et al. 2003) implies that the prominent HUD-VASH permanent supportive housing program for veterans reduces homeless days by 90 during the 3-year study period at a program cost of \$12,390, or \$23,869 in 2022 dollars.<sup>17</sup> Those values yield a cost of \$265 per homeless day averted. Similar calculations for the large-scale At Home/Chez Soi permanent supportive housing trial (Goering et al. 2014) imply cost of \$344 per day.<sup>18</sup> Cost-effectiveness of per-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>The HUD-VASH study has more detailed cost data available. To be comparable to the present study, we focus on voucher and healthcare costs only, calculating program cost using the reported cost to the government, subtracting out shelter and incarceration costs.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>For At Home/Chez Soi, we use treatment effects on shelter use and street homelessness alongside stated

manent subsidies likely does not improve with a longer study window. Treatment effects of permanent subsidies decline over time (Goering et al. 2014), though cost declines proportionally if fading effects results from lower take-up. Overall, cost effectiveness of Rapid Re-Housing for single adults compares favorably to other programs even over moderate time horizons and likely to a greater extent over longer time horizons.

program costs.

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# Figures and Tables






Figure 1: Resources Devoted to Homelessness

Note: PSH, Emergency Shelter, Transitional Housing, and Rapid Re-Housing are taken from HUD's Housing Inventory Count. The number of HUD-VASH vouchers is found in https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/PIH/documents/HUD%20VASH%20Awards%202008-2023.pdf




#### (a) Before Randomization




(b) After Randomization

Figure 2: Study Enrollment Process

*Notes*: Enrollment and financial assistance outcomes are measured using dates and amounts for all Rapid Re-Housing programs in HMIS. These reflect enrollment and receipt rates within six months of random assignment.





- (a) Fraction Ever Received Rental Assistance
- (b) Unconditional Mean Monthly Rental Assistance

Figure 3: Rental Assistance Patterns

Note: data cover financial payments by all programs in Santa Clara County HMIs. Sample limited to participants at least 30 months of follow-up. Study participants with no payments are also included.




Figure 4: Entry into Emergency Shelter, by Treatment Assignment Note: Outcomes are measured using shelter entry dates for all emergency shelters in Santa Clara County HMIS. The sample is limited to participants with 30 months of follow-up in the data.






Figure 5: Treatment Effect on Use of Homelessness Services (6 to 18 months) by VI-SPDAT and Predicted Risk Group

Notes: Each plotted point shows the coefficient on a treatment assignment dummy in a regression of our primary outcome of admission to homelessness services, which includes admission to shelter, street outreach, permanent supportive housing, transitional housing, or safe haven, within 6 to 18 months of random assignment, subsetting the sample to the category listed on the y-axis. Figure 5a plots treatment effects for sub-samples of each VI-SPDAT score. Figure 5b plots the treatment effects for sub-samples defined by quartiles of a data-driven predicted risk of homelessness. The predicted values come from a linear regression estimated within the control group of our primary outcome of admission to homelessness services on income, VI-SPDAT scores at baseline, dummies for female, Hispanic, black, strata fixed effect and pre-randomization shelter admission, homelessness prevention, rapid rehousing, permanent supportive housing, services only, street outreach, and transitional housing. We use the coefficients from that regression to predict fitted values for the full sample. We follow Abadie et al. (2018) using a repeated split sample estimation procedure.



#### (a) Received Any Rental Assistance



(b) Homeless Services (6 to 18 Months)

Figure 6: Treatment Effects, by Sub-Group

Notes: The top row in each panel replicates the full sample result. Each subsequent row limits the sample to the category listed. Each plotted point shows the coefficient on a treatment assignment dummy in a regression of receipt of rental assistance on treatment assignment with bars showing confidence intervals. The top panel shows treatment effects on whether the participant received any financial assistance and the bottom panel for our primary measure of homelessness within 6-18 months.

Table 1: Baseline Characteristics

Predicted Risk of Homelessness	Treatment 0.37	Control 0.38	Adj. Diff -0.012 (0.012)
Homelessness Services			
Any Homeless Services	0.84	0.86	-0.020 (0.027)
Ever in Shelter	0.69	0.65	0.033 (0.036)
Ever in Street Outreach	0.39	0.47	-0.079** (0.038)
VI-SPDAT Score	5.71	5.79	-0.043 (0.13)
Years Since Housing Instability Began	7.56	7.34	0.44 $(0.57)$
Months Homeless in Last Three Years	27.1	27.0	0.30 (0.81)
Demographics			
Age	47.9	47.7	0.30 $(1.02)$
Monthly Income	757.7	746.7	-9.58 (95.5)
Female	0.27	0.30	-0.026 (0.034)
Hispanic	0.43	0.48	-0.044 (0.038)
Non-Hispanic White	0.30	0.30	0.016 $(0.036)$
Non-Hispanic Black	0.20	0.15	0.044 $(0.029)$
Asian or Asian American	0.049	0.047	$0.00065 \\ (0.016)$
Belongs to Native or Indigenous Group	0.094	0.18	-0.085*** (0.026)
Ever Been in Jail	0.78	0.79	-0.0045 $(0.032)$
Mental Health or Cognitive Issues Affect Access to Housing	0.13	0.12	$\stackrel{\circ}{0.0017}_{(0.025)}$
Drinking or Drug Use Caused Housing Instability	0.22	0.21	0.018 (0.032)
Joint test of balance (p-value) N	371	359	.097 730

Notes: Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels are denoted respectively by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*\*, respectively. Two clients assigned to the control group and one client assigned to the treatment group were missing from the most recent HMIS data extract. In the full study sample N=733 (360 in Control and 373 in Treatment). The regression-adjusted difference includes fixed effects for randomization strata. The VI-SPDAT reported on HMIS uses the score from the assessment closest to random assignment. If that assessment does not list a score, we use the next available score as long as the assessment is within two years of random assignment. This is based on the process OSH has specified for caseworkers. Homelessness Services is defined as admissions to shelter, street outreach, perm. supp housing, transitional housing, and safe haven. The predicted use of homelessness services comes from limiting the sample to control participants and regressing the use of homelessness services after random assignment on income and VI-SPDAT scores at baseline, dummies for female, Hispanic, black, and prerandomization shelter admission, homelessness prevention, rapid rehousing, permanent supportive housing, services only, street outreach, and transitional housing. The joint test of balance comes from a regression of treatment assignment on all listed baseline characteristics (except predicted risk) and strata fixed effects, the p-value corresponds to an F-test that all coefficients except the strata fixed effect are zero.

Table 2: Financial and Rental Assistance After Random Assignment

	Treatment	Control	Adj. Diff
6 months			<u>_</u>
Enrolled in Study RRH	0.85	0.011	0.86***
·			(0.020)
Enrolled in Any RRH	0.86	0.084	0.78***
Ever Received Financial Assistance from Any RRH	0.48	0.025	(0.025) $0.46***$
Ever received I maneral rississuance from riny reter	0.40	0.020	(0.030)
Any Type of Financial Assistance Amount from Any RRH	3409.4	166.8	3352.6***
			(289.0)
Rental Assistance Amount from Any RRH	3074.6	81.2	3161.0***
A.T.	971	250	(255.2)
N 6-18 months	371	359	730
0-10 monns			
Enrolled in Study RRH	0.038	0.0056	0.034***
v			(0.012)
Enrolled in Any RRH	0.059	0.042	0.019
			(0.018)
Ever Received Financial Assistance from Any RRH	0.50	0.053	0.47***
Any Type of Financial Assistance Amount from Any RRH	5000.1	421.5	(0.032) $4826.7***$
Any Type of Financial Assistance Amount from Any Kari	5000.1	421.0	(395.8)
Rental Assistance Amount from Any RRH	3878.7	300.4	3666.5***
1011001 110010001100 11110 0110 11011 11111 11111	30.0	300.1	(306.7)
N	371	359	730
18-30 months			
Enrolled in Study RRH	0.0038	0	3.9e-18***
	3.3333	, and the second	(1.1e-18)
Enrolled in Any RRH	0.019	0.058	-0.063***
			(0.020)
Ever Received Financial Assistance from Any RRH	0.18	0.039	0.14***
	1 490 0	100.0	(0.029)
Any Type of Financial Assistance Amount from Any RRH	1438.9	189.9	1326.8***
Rental Assistance Amount from Any RRH	1076.4	177.8	(252.3) $964.4***$
Tomai Tissisvance Timount Itolii Ally Itilii	1010.4	111.0	(202.3)
27	001	252	
N	261	258	519

Notes: Enrollment outcomes use program enrollment dates from HMIS. Rental and financial assistance outcomes are measured using payment dates and amounts for all Rapid Re-Housing programs in HMIS. Adjusted difference comes from a regression of the listed variable on a treatment indicator, strata fixed effects, and pre-specified controls (see text). Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels are denoted respectively by \*, \*\*\*, and \*\*\*\*, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 3: Use of Housing Services within 6 Months of Random Assignment

	Treatment	Control	Adj. Diff
Any Homeless Services	0.26	0.36	-0.10***
			(0.036)
Any Homeless Services (Not Incl. Other RRH)	0.26	0.31	-0.073**
			(0.036)
- Entered Shelter	0.21	0.23	-0.039
			(0.032)
- Entered Perm. Supp. Housing	0.0027	0.011	-0.0070
			(0.0068)
- Entered Street Outreach	0.038	0.095	-0.067***
			(0.020)
- Entered Transitional Housing	0.035	0.0084	0.029**
			(0.012)
- Entered Safe Haven	0.0027	0.0028	-0.00014
	0.0004	0.0=0	(0.0046)
Enrolled in Non-Study RRH	0.0081	0.072	-0.062***
	0.000=	0.001	(0.015)
Enrolled in Non-Study RRH Targeting Encampments	0.0027	0.031	-0.030***
	0.0001	0.017	(0.011)
Entered Homeless Prevention	0.0081	0.017	-0.0090
Entand Coming Only	0.25	0.01	(0.0088)
Entered Services Only	0.35	0.21	0.11***
Dave in Chalten	12.7	18.9	(0.037) -7.56**
Days in Shelter	12.1	16.9	
			(3.63)
N	371	359	730

Notes: Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels are denoted respectively by \*, \*\*\*, and \*\*\*\*, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. Adjusted difference comes from a regression of the listed variable on a treatment indicator, strata fixed effects, and pre-specified controls (see text). Outcomes are measured using enrollment dates from HMIS. In the top row, homelessness services include enrollments in shelter, street outreach, permanent supportive housing, transitional housing, and safe haven. The category "Services Only" covers a wide range of programs. These include transportation programs like UPLIFT, employment training, legal services, mobile showers, and case management without housing services. We restrict the sample to participants we can observe for at least 6 months after random assignment.

Table 4: Use of Housing Services 6 to 18 Months After Random Assignment

	Treatment	Control	Adj. Diff
Any Homeless Services	0.26	0.40	-0.13***
			(0.038)
Any Homeless Services (Not Incl. Other RRH)	0.25	0.38	-0.12***
			(0.037)
- Entered Shelter	0.18	0.25	-0.081***
			(0.031)
- Entered Perm. Supp. Housing	0.013	0.045	-0.029**
T 10			(0.014)
- Entered Street Outreach	0.094	0.17	-0.088***
D . 1 D 1 D	0.000	0.040	(0.028)
- Entered Transitional Housing	0.022	0.019	0.013
	0	0	(0.012)
- Entered Safe Haven	0	0	0
D. H. I. N. G. I. DDH	0.000	0.000	(.)
Enrolled in Non-Study RRH	0.022	0.036	-0.015
	0.011	0.015	(0.013)
Enrolled in Non-Study RRH Targeting Encampments	0.011	0.017	-0.0093
	0.019	0.010	(0.0091)
Entered Homeless Prevention	0.013	0.019	-0.0029
	0.07	0.07	(0.0096)
Enrolled in Services Only	0.37	0.27	0.11***
D : (1) 1/	10.7	44.0	(0.039)
Days in Shelter	19.7	44.0	-27.7***
			(7.06)
N	371	359	730

Notes: Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels are denoted respectively by \*, \*\*\*, and \*\*\*\*, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. Adjusted difference comes from a regression of the listed variable on a treatment indicator, strata fixed effects, and pre-specified controls (see text). Outcomes are measured using enrollment dates from HMIS. In the top row, homelessness services include enrollments in shelter, street outreach, permanent supportive housing, transitional housing, and safe haven. The category "Services Only" covers a wide range of programs. These include transportation programs like UPLIFT, employment training, legal services, mobile showers, and case management without housing services. We restrict the sample to participants we can observe for at least 18 months after random assignment.

Table 5: Use of Housing Services 18 to 30 Months After Random Assignment (Preliminary)

nt Control	
0.25	Adj. Diff
0.35	-0.13***
	(0.044)
0.33	-0.092**
	(0.043)
0.24	-0.066*
	(0.039)
0.012	-0.0050
	(0.0100)
0.13	-0.014
	(0.031)
0.0078	0.0031
	(0.0078)
0	0
	(.)
0.058	-0.063***
	(0.020)
0.012	-0.010
	(0.010)
0.016	0.017
0.020	(0.016)
0.28	-0.079*
0.20	(0.041)
40.3	-7.93
40.0	(9.51)
	(3.31)
258	519
	0.13 0.0078 0 0.058 0.012 0.016 0.28 40.3

Notes: Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels are denoted respectively by \*, \*\*\*, and \*\*\*\*, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. Adjusted difference comes from a regression of the listed variable on a treatment indicator, strata fixed effects, and pre-specified controls (see text). Outcomes are measured using enrollment dates from HMIS. In the top row, homelessness services include enrollments in shelter, street outreach, permanent supportive housing, transitional housing, and safe haven. The category "Services Only" covers a wide range of programs. These include transportation programs like UPLIFT, employment training, legal services, mobile showers, and case management without housing services. We restrict the sample to participants we can observe for at least 30 months after random assignment.

## A Appendix

### A.1 Homelessness Services Taxonomy





Figure A.1: Approaches to Reduce or Prevent Homelessness

### A.2 Enrollment and Outcomes Timeline



(c) Sample size included by Outcomes Lag

Figure A.2: Study Enrollment and Outcomes Timeline

# A.3 Rapid Re-Housing Summary Statistics (Conditional on Enrollment)

Table A.1: Length of Rapid Re-Housing Stages

	Mean	Median	SD	Min	Max
- Days from Enrollment to Move-In	126.0	69	136.2	0	770
- Days from Enrollment to Exit from RRH	385.8	379	253.9	7	1086
- Days from Move-In to Exit from RRH	355.6	365	218.7	0	829
- Days from Randomization to RRH Enrollment	173.0	6	378.5	0	2292
- Days from Randomization to Move-In	257.1	120.5	358.4	0	2309
- Days from Randomziation to Exit from RRH	516.5	470	383.0	7	2139
Observations	275				

Notes: We restrict the sample to participants we can observe for at least 30 months after random assignment and who enrolled in RRH

Table A.2: Payment Descriptives

	Mean	Median	SD	Min	Max
- Days from Random Assignment to First Rent Payment	173	84	263	13	1,948
- Days from Random Assignment to First Other Fin. Assist. Payment	183	74	278	2	1,948
- Days from First to Last Rent Payment	359	315	237	0	1,272
- Days from First to Last Other Fin. Assist. Payment	263	203	300	0	$2,\!255$
- Cumulative Rent Payments	14,813	12,968	8,768	0	42,029
- Cumulative Other Fin. Assist. Payments	4,610	1,610	$5,\!483$	15	$23,\!245$
- Average Monthly Rent Payment	1,626	1,443	850	308	4,742
- Average Monthly Other Fin. Assist. Payment	609	401	621	4	4,007
Observations	188				

Notes: We restrict the sample to participants we can observe for at least 30 months after random assignment and who received either rent payments or other financial assistance through rapid re-housing.

### A.4 Exit Destination (Conditional on Leasing)




Figure A.3: Exit Destination After Rapid Re-Housing

Note: Sample limited to participants in the treatment group who successfully lease within 6 months and who we can observe for at least 30 months after random assignment.

Table A.3: Exit Destination

	Rental w/o Subsidy	Other	Diff
Predicted Risk of Homelessness	0.36	0.38	-0.016 $(0.023)$
Homelessness Services			(0.023)
Any Homeless Services	0.80	0.85	-0.054
	a <b>-</b> a	0 = 0	(0.064)
Ever in Shelter	0.70	0.76	-0.061 $(0.075)$
Ever in Street Outreach	0.35	0.34	0.0100
			(0.080)
VI-SPDAT Score	5.68	5.71	-0.027
V C: IIi I I: D	e 15	<i>c</i> 71	(0.19)
Years Since Housing Instability Began	6.15	6.71	-0.56 (1.29)
Months Homeless in Last Three Years	25.0	26.2	-1.22
			(1.90)
Demographics			
Age	48.8	47.5	1.25
Marthly Ivan	010.1	F7F 6	(2.41)
Monthly Income	910.1	575.6	334.5* (174.7)
Female	0.33	0.27	0.063
			(0.077)
Hispanic	0.38	0.39	-0.015
			(0.082)
Non-Hispanic White	0.29	0.31	-0.021
Non-Hispanic Black	0.30	0.20	$(0.077) \\ 0.10$
1011-1115paine Diack	0.90	0.20	(0.073)
Asian or Asian American	0.058	0.095	-0.037
			(0.044)
Belongs to Native or Indigenous Group	0.10	0.068	0.034
Ever Been in Jail	0.74	0.78	(0.047) $-0.045$
Ever been in san	0.74	0.76	(0.072)
Mental Health or Cognitive Issues Affect Access to Housing	0.13	0.14	-0.0047
			(0.057)
Drinking or Drug Use Caused Housing Instability	0.17	0.20	-0.029
			(0.066)
Joint test of balance (p-value)			.692
N	69	74	143

Notes: Sample limited to participants in the treatment group who successfully lease within 6 months and who we can observe for at least 30 months after random assignment.

#### A.5 Review of Special Non-Compliance Cases and Team Response

For a very small number of study participants, the actual study group to which the individual was assigned, does not match the original group assigned to them. We recorded 9 cases of non-compliance due to human error and technical issues with the software used to enroll and randomize participants. These cases include incorrect assignments to both the treatment group and the control group. These cases of non-compliance were identified by comparing HomeFirst's study tracker to the randomization result documented on SurveyCTO's server (This is different from the noncompliance we can observe in the HMIS data).

After documenting these cases of non-compliance, we introduced additional checks and safeguards in the intake form software (SurveyCTO). Furthermore, to ensure a reliable internet connection for each of the tables used during study enrollment, HomeFirst had the tablets connected to a 3G service to improve the internet connection when the caseworkers meet with clients outside of the office. In response to these changes, such cases of non-compliance were rare. The number of cases of noncompliance is also quite small relative to the projected sample size of the study, so we expect their impact on the overall study to be negligible.

The Santa Clara County IRB and the University of Notre Dame IRB were notified of these events.

	A.6	Main	Tables	with	Rand	lomiza	tion	Inference
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Table A.4: Baseline Characteristics

				Adj. Diff	Adj. Diff	Adj. Diff
Homelessness Services	Treatment	Control	Adj.Diff	(reghdfe)	(areg)	(ritest)
	0.07	0.00	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010
Predicted Risk of Homelessness	0.37	0.38	-0.012 (0.012)	-0.012 (0.011)	-0.012 $(0.012)$	-0.012 (0.014)
			[0.30]	[0.29]	[0.30]	[0.014)
Any Homeless Services	0.84	0.86	-0.020	-0.020	-0.020	-0.020
·			(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.016)
			[0.47]	[0.47]	[0.47]	[0.45]
- Ever in Shelter	0.69	0.65	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.033
			(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.015)
	0.00	0.47	[0.35]	[0.34]	[0.35]	[0.34]
- Ever in Street Outreach	0.39	0.47	-0.079**	-0.079**	-0.079**	-0.079**
			(0.038) $[0.04]$	(0.037) $[0.03]$	(0.038) $[0.04]$	(0.0059) $[0.036]$
- Ever in Perm. Supp. Housing	0.030	0.025	0.0045	0.0045	0.0045	0.0045
- Ever in Ferm. Supp. Housing	0.000	0.020	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)
			[0.72]	[0.72]	[0.72]	[0.71]
- Ever in Transitonal Housing	0.13	0.16	-0.016	-0.016	-0.016	-0.016
_			(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.016)
			[0.54]	[0.53]	[0.54]	[0.54]
- Ever in Safe Haven	0.0054	0.0056	-0.00096	-0.00096	-0.00096	-0.00096
			(0.0060)	(0.0056)	(0.0060)	(0.011)
			[0.87]	[0.86]	[0.87]	[0.85]
Ever in RRH	0.10	0.086	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.024
			(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.014)
Ever in Homelessness Prevention	0.024	0.028	[0.27] -0.0062	[0.28] -0.0062	[0.27] $-0.0062$	[0.28] -0.0062
Ever in Homelessness Frevention	0.024	0.020	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.016)
			[0.62]	[0.61]	[0.62]	[0.58]
Ever in Services Only	0.74	0.73	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013
			(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.014)
			[0.69]	[0.68]	[0.69]	[0.74]
VI-SPDAT Score	5.56	5.60	-0.044	-0.044	-0.044	-0.044
			(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.016)
			[0.58]	[0.57]	[0.58]	[0.58]
Days Since Housing Instability Began	2572.9	2580.9	68.0	68.0	68.0	68.0
			(171.1) $[0.69]$	(171.3) $[0.69]$	(171.1) $[0.69]$	(0.014) $[0.71]$
Age	47.9	47.7	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30
			(1.02)	(1.00)	(1.02)	(0.013)
			[0.77]	[0.77]	[0.77]	[0.80]
Income	527.7	550.5	-23.0	-23.0	-23.0	-23.0
			(52.6)	(52.4)	(52.6)	(0.015)
F1-	0.07	0.20	[0.66]	[0.66]	[0.66]	[0.64]
Female	0.27	0.30	-0.026 (0.024)	-0.026 $(0.034)$	-0.026 (0.034)	-0.026
			(0.034) $[0.44]$	[0.44]	(0.034) $[0.44]$	(0.016) $[0.42]$
Hispanic	0.43	0.48	-0.044	-0.044	-0.044	-0.044
This partie	0.10	0.10	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.013)
			[0.25]	[0.24]	[0.25]	[0.23]
White	0.62	0.58	0.061	0.061*	0.061	0.061
			(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.0093)
			[0.10]	[0.10]	[0.10]	[0.095]
Black	0.22	0.16	0.047	0.047	0.047	0.047
			(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.0094)
A · A · A ·	0.040	0.047	[0.11]	[0.11]	[0.11]	[0.098]
Asian or Asian American	0.049	0.047	0.00065	0.00065	0.00065	0.00065
			(0.016)	(0.016) $[0.97]$	(0.016) [0.07]	(0.0073)
Belongs to Native or Indigenous Group	0.094	0.18	[0.97] -0.085***	[0.97] -0.085***	[0.97] -0.085***	[0.94] -0.085***
belongs to tradite of indigenous Group	0.034	0.10	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0)
			[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.020]	[0]
				[0:00]	[0.00]	ار∨ا
7			.097			
Joint test of balance (p-value) N	371	359	730			

Notes: Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels are denoted respectively by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively. Ritest does randomization inference within the randomization strata and is set to use 1000 replications or draws. The VI-SPDAT reported on HMIS uses the score from the assessment closest to random assignment. If that assessment does not list a score, we use the next available score as long as the assessment is within two years of random assignment. This is based on the process OSH has specified for caseworkers. The predicted shelter entity rate comes from limiting the sample to control participants and regressing shelter admissions after random assignment on income, VI-SPDAT scores at baseline, dummies for female, Hispanic, black, and pre-randomization shelter admission, homelessness prevention, rapid rehousing, permanent supportive housing, services only, street outreach, and transitional housing. Standard errors in parentheses and p-values in brackets.

Table A.5: Financial and Rental Assistance After Random Assignment

				Adj. Diff	Adj. Diff	Adj. Diff
	Treatment	Control	Adj. Diff	(reghdfe)	(areg)	(ritest)
6 months						
Enrolled in Study RRH	0.85	0.011	0.86***	0.86***	0.86***	0.86***
Emonoa in Stady 19191	0.00	0.011	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0)
			[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0]
Enrolled in Any RRH	0.86	0.084	0.78***	0.78***	0.78***	0.78***
			(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0)
			[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0]
Ever Received Financial Assistance from Any RRH	0.48	0.025	0.46***	0.46***	0.46***	0.46***
			(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0)
And Time of Financial Assistance Amount from And DDII	2400.4	166 0	[0.00]	[0.00] 3352.6***	[0.00] 3352.6***	[0]
Any Type of Financial Assistance Amount from Any RRH	3409.4	166.8	3352.6*** (289.0)	(275.2)	(289.0)	3352.6*** (0)
			[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0]
Rental Assistance Amount from Any RRH	3074.6	81.2	3161.0***	3161.0***	3161.0***	3161.0***
	001 -10		(255.2)	(244.0)	(255.2)	(0)
			[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0]
N	371	359	730	710	730	730
6-18 months						
					valuatedo	
Enrolled in Study RRH	0.038	0.0056	0.034***	0.034***	0.034***	0.034***
			(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.0014)
Enrolled in Any RRH	0.059	0.042	[0.00] $0.019$	$[0.00] \\ 0.019$	$[0.00] \\ 0.019$	[0.0020] 0.019
Enrolled in Any Rich	0.059	0.042	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.013)
			[0.28]	[0.27]	[0.28]	[0.28]
Ever Received Financial Assistance from Any RRH	0.50	0.053	0.47***	0.47***	0.47***	0.47***
,			(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0)
			[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0]
Any Type of Financial Assistance Amount from Any RRH	5000.1	421.5	4826.7***	4826.7***	4826.7***	4826.7***
			(395.8)	(386.8)	(395.8)	(0)
			[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0]
Rental Assistance Amount from Any RRH	3878.7	300.4	3666.5***	3666.5***	3666.5***	3666.5***
			(306.7)	(305.4)	(306.7)	(0)
A7	971	250	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0]
N 18-30 months	371	359	730	710	730	730
10-30 monuts						
Enrolled in Study RRH	0.0038	0	4.3e-18***	0	0	0
·			(1.4e-18)	(.)	(.)	(0)
			[0.00]	[.]	[.]	[1]
Enrolled in Any RRH	0.019	0.058	-0.063***	-0.063***	-0.063***	-0.063***
			(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.00100)
			[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.0010]
Ever Received Financial Assistance from Any RRH	0.18	0.039	0.14***	0.14***	0.14***	0.14***
			(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0)
Any Type of Financial Assistance Amount from Any RRH	1438.9	189.9	[0.00] 1326.8***	[0.00] 1326.8***	[0.00] 1326.8***	[0] 1326.8***
Any Type of Financial Assistance Amount from Any RRH	1490.9	109.9	(252.3)	(252.0)	(252.3)	(0)
			[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0]
Rental Assistance Amount from Any RRH	1076.4	177.8	964.4***	964.4***	964.4***	964.4***
	10.0.1	20	(202.3)	(199.6)	(202.3)	(0)
			[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0]
	2-:	25-			. ,	
N	261	258	519	505	519	519

Notes: Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels are denoted respectively by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively. Ritest does randomization inference within the randomization strata and is set to use 1000 replications or draws. Standard errors in parentheses and p-values in brackets.

Table A.6: Use of Housing Services within 6 Months of Random Assignment

				Adj. Diff	Adj. Diff	Adj. Diff
	Treatment	Control	Adj. Diff	(reghdfe)	(areg)	(ritest)
Any Homeless Services (Not Incl. Other RRH)	0.26	0.31	-0.073**	-0.073**	-0.073**	-0.073**
,			(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.0066)
			[0.04]	$[0.04]^{'}$	[0.04]	[0.046]
Any Homeless Services	0.26	0.36	-0.10***	-0.10***	-0.10***	-0.10***
			(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.00100)
			[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.0010]
- Entered Shelter	0.21	0.23	-0.039	-0.039	-0.039	-0.039
			(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.013)
			[0.23]	[0.22]	[0.23]	[0.23]
- Entered Street Outreach	0.038	0.095	-0.067***	-0.067***	-0.067***	-0.067***
			(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0)
			[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0]
- Entered Perm. Supp. Housing	0.0027	0.011	-0.0070	-0.0070	-0.0070	-0.0070
			(0.0068)	(0.0066)	(0.0068)	(0.014)
			[0.30]	[0.29]	[0.30]	[0.27]
- Entered Transitional Housing	0.035	0.0084	0.029**	0.029**	0.029**	0.029**
			(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.0026)
			[0.02]	[0.01]	[0.02]	[0.0070]
- Entered Safe Haven	0.0027	0.0028	-0.00014	-0.00014	-0.00014	-0.00014
			(0.0046)	(0.0044)	(0.0046)	(0.0092)
			[0.98]	[0.97]	[0.98]	[0.91]
Entered Homeless Prevention	0.0081	0.017	-0.0090	-0.0090	-0.0090	-0.0090
			(0.0088)	(0.0085)	(0.0088)	(0.015)
			[0.31]	[0.29]	[0.31]	[0.31]
Entered Services Only	0.35	0.21	0.11***	0.11***	0.11***	0.11***
			(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.00100)
			[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.0010]
Ever in RRH Targeted to Encampments	0.0027	0.014	-0.013**	-0.013**	-0.013**	-0.013**
			(0.0068)	(0.0065)	(0.0068)	(0.0063)
			[0.05]	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.041]
Days in Shelter	12.7	18.9	-7.56**	-7.56**	-7.56**	-7.56**
			(3.63)	(3.52)	(3.63)	(0.0048)
			[0.04]	[0.03]	[0.04]	[0.024]
N	371	359	730	710	730	730

Notes: Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels are denoted respectively by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively.

Standard errors in parentheses and p-values in brackets. Ritest does randomization inference within the randomization strata and is set to use 1000 replications or draws. The category "Services Only" covers a wide range of programs. These include transportation programs like UPLIFT, employment training, legal services, mobile showers, and case management without housing services.

Table A.7: Use of Housing Services 6 to 18 Months After Random Assignment

				Adj. Diff	Adj. Diff	Adj. Diff
	Treatment	Control	Adj. Diff	(reghdfe)	(areg)	(ritest)
Any Homeless Services (Not Incl. Other RRH)	0.25	0.38	-0.12***	-0.12***	-0.12***	-0.12***
,			(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.037)	
			[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.0010]
Any Homeless Services	0.26	0.40	-0.13***	-0.13***	-0.13***	-0.13***
			(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.038)	
			[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.0010]
- Entered Shelter	0.18	0.25	-0.081***	-0.081***	-0.081***	-0.081***
			(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.031)	
			[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.0040]
- Entered Street Outreach	0.094	0.17	-0.088***	-0.088***	-0.088***	-0.088***
			(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.028)	
			[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.0030]
- Entered Perm. Supp. Housing	0.013	0.045	-0.029**	-0.029**	-0.029**	-0.029**
			(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	
			[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.042]
- Entered Transitional Housing	0.022	0.019	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013
			(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	
			[0.28]	[0.25]	[0.28]	[0.25]
- Entered Safe Haven	0	0	0	0	0	0
			(.)	(.)	(.)	
			[.]	[.]	[.]	[1]
Entered Homeless Prevention	0.013	0.019	-0.0029	-0.0029	-0.0029	-0.0029
			(0.0096)	(0.010)	(0.0096)	
			[0.77]	[0.78]	[0.77]	[0.81]
Enrolled in Services Only	0.37	0.27	0.11***	0.11***	0.11***	0.11***
			(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.039)	
			[0.01]	[0.00]	[0.01]	[0.0050]
Ever in RRH Targeted to Encampments	0.0027	0.014	-0.010	-0.010	-0.010	-0.010
			(0.0070)	(0.0067)	(0.0070)	
			[0.15]	[0.13]	[0.15]	[0.14]
Days in Shelter	19.7	44.0	-27.7***	-27.7***	-27.7***	-27.7***
			(7.06)	(6.67)	(7.06)	
			[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.0010]
N	371	359	730	710	730	730
	~					

Notes: Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels are denoted respectively by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively.

Standard errors in parentheses and p-values in brackets. Ritest does randomization inference within the randomization strata and is set to use 1000 replications or draws. The category "Services Only" covers a wide range of programs. These include transportation programs like UPLIFT, employment training, legal services, mobile showers, and case management without housing services.

Table A.8: Use of Housing Services 18 to 30 Months After Random Assignment (Preliminary)

$ \begin{bmatrix} 0.69 \\ 0 \\ (.) \\ [.] \\ 0.017 \\ (0.016) \\ [0.29] \\ -0.079* \\ (0.041) \\ [0.05] \\ -0.017* \\ (0.0091) \\ [0.06] \\ -7.93 \\ (9.51) \\ [0.40] $	[0.68] 0 (.) [.] 0.017 (0.014) [0.24] -0.079** (0.039) [0.04] -0.017* (0.0089) [0.06] -7.93 (9.30) [0.39]	[0.69] 0 (.) [.] 0.017 (0.016) [0.29] -0.079* (0.041) [0.05] -0.017* (0.0091) [0.06] -7.93 (9.51) [0.40]	[0.70] 0 [1] 0.017 [0.22] -0.079* [0.038] -0.017* [0.077] -7.93 [0.37]
0 (.) [.] 0.017 (0.016) [0.29] -0.079* (0.041) [0.05] -0.017* (0.0091) [0.06] -7.93	[0.68] 0 (.) [.] 0.017 (0.014) [0.24] -0.079** (0.039) [0.04] -0.017* (0.0089) [0.06] -7.93	[0.69] 0 (.) [.] 0.017 (0.016) [0.29] -0.079* (0.041) [0.05] -0.017* (0.0091) [0.06] -7.93	[1] 0.017 [0.22] -0.079* [0.038] -0.017* [0.077]
0 (.) [.] 0.017 (0.016) [0.29] -0.079* (0.041) [0.05] -0.017* (0.0091)	[0.68] 0 (.) [.] 0.017 (0.014) [0.24] -0.079** (0.039) [0.04] -0.017* (0.0089)	[0.69] 0 (.) [.] 0.017 (0.016) [0.29] -0.079* (0.041) [0.05] -0.017* (0.0091)	0 [1] 0.017 [0.22] -0.079* [0.038] -0.017*
0 (.) [.] 0.017 (0.016) [0.29] -0.079* (0.041) [0.05] -0.017*	[0.68] 0 (.) [.] 0.017 (0.014) [0.24] -0.079** (0.039) [0.04] -0.017*	[0.69] 0 (.) [.] 0.017 (0.016) [0.29] -0.079* (0.041) [0.05] -0.017*	[1] 0.017 [0.22] -0.079* [0.038]
0 (.) [.] 0.017 (0.016) [0.29] -0.079* (0.041) [0.05]	[0.68] 0 (.) [.] 0.017 (0.014) [0.24] -0.079** (0.039) [0.04]	[0.69] 0 (.) [.] 0.017 (0.016) [0.29] -0.079* (0.041) [0.05]	[1] 0.017 [0.22] -0.079* [0.038]
0 (.) [.] 0.017 (0.016) [0.29] -0.079* (0.041)	[0.68] 0 (.) [.] 0.017 (0.014) [0.24] -0.079** (0.039)	[0.69] 0 (.) [.] 0.017 (0.016) [0.29] -0.079* (0.041)	0 [1] 0.017 [0.22] -0.079*
0 (.) [.] 0.017 (0.016) [0.29] -0.079*	[0.68] 0 (.) [.] 0.017 (0.014) [0.24] -0.079**	[0.69] 0 (.) [.] 0.017 (0.016) [0.29] -0.079*	0 [1] 0.017 [0.22]
0 (.) [.] 0.017 (0.016) [0.29]	[0.68] 0 (.) [.] 0.017 (0.014) [0.24]	[0.69] 0 (.) [.] 0.017 (0.016) [0.29]	0 [1] 0.017 [0.22]
0 (.) [.] 0.017 (0.016)	[0.68] 0 (.) [.] 0.017 (0.014)	[0.69] 0 (.) [.] 0.017 (0.016)	0 [1] 0.017
0 (.) [.] 0.017	[0.68] 0 (.) [.] 0.017	[0.69] 0 (.) [.] 0.017	0 [1]
0 (.) [.]	[0.68] 0 (.) [.]	[0.69] 0 (.) [.]	0 [1]
0 (.)	[0.68] 0 (.)	[0.69] 0 (.)	0
0	[0.68]	[0.69]	
	[0.68]	[0.69]	
	,	,	
(0.0078)	(0.0076)	(0.0078)	
0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031
[0.62]	[0.61]	[0.62]	[0.63]
(0.0100)	(0.0099)	(0.0100)	
-0.0050	-0.0050	-0.0050	-0.0050
[0.66]	[0.66]	[0.66]	[0.66]
(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	
-0.014	-0.014	-0.014	-0.014
[0.09]	[0.08]	[0.09]	[0.075]
(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.039)	
-0.066*	-0.066*	-0.066*	-0.066*
[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.0040]
(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.044)	
-0.13***	-0.13***	-0.13***	-0.13***
[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.031]
(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.043)	
-0.092**	-0.092**	-0.092**	-0.092**
Adi. Diff	•		Adj. Diff (ritest)
l	-0.092** (0.043)	-0.092** -0.092** (0.043) (0.042)	l Adj. Diff (reghdfe) (areg) -0.092** -0.092** -0.092** (0.043) (0.042) (0.043)

Notes: Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels are denoted respectively by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively.

Standard errors in parentheses and p-values in brackets. Ritest does randomization inference within the randomization strata and is set to use 1000 replications or draws. The category "Services Only" covers a wide range of programs. These include transportation programs like UPLIFT, employment training, legal services, mobile showers, and case management without housing services.