LIST OF TABLES

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

PREFACE

The study of Nationalism has burgeoned in the last twenty-five years during which theorizng has improved not least because of increasing awareness and debate about the phenomenon and its recurrences, but also because this dynamic has challenged scholars to revisit their perspectives. The variety of uncertainties in this process include to what extent the theories are applicable outside of the time and place which have most influenced the theorizing - 18th century Europe; and also what the nationalism should be long after national self determination has been achieved, particularly in multinational states where a heterogeneity of national groups share similar citizenship. Subsequently, how to capitalize on trigger points for reconstructing the nation or rebranding one's image has been left to blaze its own trail. Existing theoretical formulations have achieved a measure of success in categorizing the macro expressions of Nationalism, but are insufficient to tease out its microbehaviours, such as the voting habits of the sophisticated urbanized and globalized individual living within the melting pot of social and political integration, yet with an ingrained identity. Hence, in addition to contributing to and shaping the theoretical overview, this book introduces what can be understood as a microstudy of Nationalism.

This research intended simply to apply the innovative use of SPSS software to investigate how Ghanaian citizens might wish to vote in the 2000 presidential election. It turned out that voting in multinational states is a form of Nationalism; that the collectivity of micronationalisms influenced the macronationalism and vice versa; and furthermore, that the existing theoretical formulations are insufficient to deal with the peculiar nature of the balance between nationalism and patriotism as we know it; or which of the two forms of behaviour we would expect an integrated and globalized urbanite to demonstrate.

1

INTRODUCTION

A lot of detail exists about imagining the nation[1], and inventing the traditions[2] that form it. Little however has been theorized on what happens after nationhood or national identity has assumed, however so formed or conceived, if at all; or how it is that beleaguered nationhood can be restored, revived, or reconstructed. This book offers the view that, in some cases, after nationhood has assumed around an event or major occurrence, the national feeling anti-climaxes, which could effectively be that the soul or spirit of the nation has waned, even if the national self-determination survives. In other words, there are many a nation existing but without a soul, the revival or resurrection of which could occur through reifying an ascription with sufficient unifying power to capture the psychology of citizens towards the demonstration of belongingness and national consciousness, this idea of a nation based on the Seton-Watson definition[3]. To achieve this ascription, leadership ought to acknowledge it and trumpet its significance so as to obtain broader citizenship response to it, and hence avoid the syndrome of citizenship disengagement to the nationalist cause.

   The idea that a nation's soul might require revival lies simply in the fact that: after national self-determination, reputation, confidence and status can deteriorate; or the nationalist movement can cease to exist after achievement of purpose, and the vision vacuum that follows demotivates, deflates or dissipates the national passion. There can be many scenarios that depict this syndrome, as for example: where the nationalist movement expires; where the polity fails to compete effectively among international peers; or where subsequent leadership does not embody or epitomise the original vision or some other attractive vision beyond the original. In some postcolonial states, the anticolonial nationalism that birthed nationhood simply dissipated after independence had been achieved, or that subsequent economic decline frustrating the nation's image

and ego could dampen the nation's spirit. Even where nations - whether colonised or never - are buzzing, a nation's personality does suffer when for example leadership seems cut adrift from citizenship and the two sides are disagreeing whether because the former is not meeting expectations or that the latter has lost confidence in the former.   Either way, the effect dissipates the robustness of the national passion (feeling).

A nation's personality evolves through a variety of stages, and a revival of the national feeling can be triggered not just by the positives from leadership but also the opposite, as for example when American or British passions unite against the respective President and Prime Minister for going to war against Iraq on a false premise, as demonstrated through the subsequent poor electoral performances of George Bush Jnr and Tony Blair in comparison with the preceding election for each. Sporting events do occasionally arouse national sentiments but do not have enough political capital to command a nationalist movement. As argued therefore, there is a valid case for reconstructing the nation - albeit on a reified objective with sufficient psychological capital towards which citizenship can ascribe a national passion. Once this is established, a nationalist movement is born (or reborn), and stays alive until the ascription is achieved or dissipates. The Ghanaian national construct which dominated the psychology of citizens and led towards the independence of the Gold Coast in 1957, can therefore be reconstructed.

The task of reconstructing the nation becomes necessary because once the anticolonial nationalism had expired at independence, and the first post-independence president had carried the torch of the nationalist movement up to a point, the ascription seems missed that there is something else pursuing beyond these events. Anti-colonial nationalism was a legitimate and inarguable reason for bonding up the national feeling among those inhabiting a geographical demarcation who felt that they belonged at least for the purposes of breaking off the colonial yoke. After Kwame Nkrumah's political demise, what must hold the nation together seems to have fizzled out, and the ensuing politics has contributed to dissipating the national construct; in not exercising the sensitivity to egalitarianise opportunity and resource; and thereby creating, fuelling and refuelling antagonisms among a people who felt that they belonged and should be made to both feel and experience that the national

cake belongs to the belonged. After Nkrumah, what is the nationalism really, and what does the nation ascribe towards? Is there: (a) a challenge to develop the polity to a degree of sufficiency and stature among international peers; (b) a political and cultural organism with a life of its own and a sense of mission to grow and burgeon into a perceived identity or ascription; (c) or just another state which simply exists among a plethora of global boundaries? The first two are questionable, since the national feeling, or raison d'etre which motivates, seems missing. It would appear that leadership post Nkrumah has not yet embodied or captured a convincing purpose for which to unite the country, and politics-of-the-belly has contributed its part to dissipating the national construct. The post-Nkrumah leadership has not quite connected with the psychology of citizens on what it is to be achieved, and citizens are having difficulty perceiving leadership as credible icons to which they could selflessly offer co-operation towards furthering the cause of the national construct or endearing the spirit of the nation for that purpose. Subsequent leadership are not required to reincarnate the personality of Nkrumah, but rather that the national construct should not be neglected unless it was merely to achieve independence. This book at the very least provides a fact that can be reified - the full ethnographic jigsaw of modern Ghana; a raison d'etre; or at least a psychological point of ascription to rekindle the spirit of the nation, to bring back lost national feeling, and to provide a passion for completing the national construct. And what is that psychological ammunition? It is that modern Ghana consists of people groups with distant but similar ethnogeographic origins; people groups of common past glory; the ammunition for the post independence bonding of these groups; one for the reconstruction of belongingness; a national identity worth living for; one nation, people and destiny.

This book conducts a survey on theorizing on the subject of nationalism and navigates the path which mainstream thinking has charted towards the criteria for nationhood; it also examines to what extent existing theories are applicable globally. There can be the antiquity about some nations, and indeed some modernity about others, but a strict antiquity or modernity of nations obscures the debate. Nationhood has unfolded and convened before and after the so-called modernist threshold, and as to when was the first nation is

certainly prior to modernity. Evidence shows that nations and nationalisms existed in parts of the world other than Europe before the 18th century threshold. This book also demonstrates the point that substantial attention has been devoted to how nationalism demonstrates at the macro level to the neglect of the microbehaviours that form it.

In the process of applicability, evidence amounts to the juicy view that naming Modern Ghana after Ancient Ghana is not political fantasy, but that there is substantial anthropological reality to it. Hence the monograph discusses the origination of the Ghana hypothesis which laid the foundation for renaming the former Gold Coast after Ancient Ghana. It also deals with the Guan controversy which has contributed to some of the confusion, not just about the traditions of origin of ethnonational identity groups in Modern Ghana, but also the anthropological nuances entrapped within the issue of who in the country are entitled to refer to themselves as Guan. It builds on the evidence that the majority of Modern Ghana has migrated from the area occupied by the Old Ghana Empire which in the height of its glory spanned the broad geographical area of the Western Sudan, a section of the Sahara, and the Djenne and Timbuktu regions. A few groups south-east of the country, including the Central Togo Minorities (CTMs) and Ewe-speaking peoples[4] are not of Guan ancestry and do not share the same traditions of origin; of course this does not disqualify them as citizens and nationals of modern Ghana, nor constitute a cause for withholding patriotism.

The thrust of this book is not on highlighting any political sensitivities between the ethnonational groups within the current multinational Ghanaian state. Rather it presents the argument that naming the former Gold Coast as Ghana has more to do with historical and anthropological reality than political fantasy on the part of J. B. Danquah who lobbied the idea at the time of independence, and Kwame Nkrumah, the first president who took Danquah's suggestions on board[5]. This monograph therefore has a mission to complete the unfinished business of Kwegyir Aggrey[6], Nkrumah and Danquah, and has the historical and anthropological evidence to substantiate the traditions of origin. The colonial Gold Coast was named Ghana at independence on the basis of a discussion and decision reached between Nkrumah and the

Opposition Leader at the time (Danquah), both of whom had conducted extensive research on the issue as part of their academic pursuits. Following the incomplete research of the two pioneers, many have tried unsuccessfully to piece the jigsaw together, but the full evidence to seal the holes in the debate has been outstanding. This book successfully traces the ethno-geographic origins of all nationalities in modern Ghana, fills the gaps, completes the jigsaw and explains the evolution of the phenomena.

On the identity project of modern Ghana, this book theorizes that the tension between ethnonationalism and patriotism[7] (and between any ethnonational groups for that matter) helps us to understand, that the attempt by the colonial legacy to bunch separate ethnonational identities within a single state which should serve as the incubator for the gestation of new nationhood[8], is a difficult chore. Yet this nation-state project or the national construct is achievable in the sense that, with time, ethnonational heterogeneity evolves into national homogeneity (and vice versa) if the conditions are right, and that heterogeneity is not an absolute obstacle to the attainment of a single national identity for the multinational postcolonial state. In other words, heterogeneity does not always prevent homogeneity. Hence modern Ghana is a nation and all citizens within the Ghanaian state share similar nationality irrespective of ethnonational heterogeneity[9].

Ethnonationalism is the patriotism in a nation-state. But in multinational states, where more than one ethnonational identity group co-exist under a single state jurisdiction, the ethnonationalisms compete and conflict with patriotism or solidarity towards the state institution; this conflict is mutual, one at the other's expense. Contrary to the mainstream theorizing however, in multinational Ghana, ethnonationalism and patriotism synchronize because ethnonationalism has become the civic nationalism within the realities of the local political rationality[10]. As is usual with theorizing - and the academy would not be exciting without this - posterity seems to have proved that the mutual conflict theoretically posited between ethnonationalism and civic nationalism is demonstrable only to a limited extent. It would seem that within the rationality of some African political contexts, for example that of Ghana, the two nationalistic attitudes have synchronized, thanks to figuration, also known as politics-of-the belly, which can be defined

as: a status quo of unequal distribution and accumulation of public opportunity and wealth, in which a system of social inequality operates through the political interdependence of allies (or opponents) within the political arena, along tribal or clientelistic contours, and supervised by the State[11]. Basically, the political choices of voters would be skewed towards the interests of their ethnonational identity group or a preferred other closely related, for any reason, in what can be described as the rationalization of ethnonationalism (ROE). Figuration works for those who gain from the mutual beneficence of the patron-client relationship existing among the plethora of multiple ethnonational and political groupings operating within the state[12]. Hence ethnonationalists tend to vote for whichever candidate best represents the interests of their ethnosect, and civic nationalists tend to vote for the best suitable candidate for the state. The icing on the figuration cake is that the two forms of nationalism are usually expressed through calculative voting habits; hence election period is the season for patrons to reap their harvest, and for voters to pay back for patronage or the lack of it as they deem fit.

The notion also exists that the urban opportunities of modernization, education, industrialization and employment tended to enhance inter-group integration within the urban melting pot thereby shifting the primary allegiance of urbanites away from the ethnosect and towards institutions of the state[13] and promoting patriotism. Urbanites are therefore notioned as detribalized or having neutral ethnosectarian interests as a result of physical and geographical alienation from their ethnonational autochthons. But research[14] reveals that urbanites, although geographically detribalized, are not so attitudinally, and for most, association with their ethnonational roots grew stronger with length of urban experience even if there is no proof of a direct relationship between the two, or between association with roots and ethnonationalism. It should be said that even before theorizing would introduce and highlight ROE to the academy, the practice has been in vogue for the majority[15] of Ghanaian urbanites. Non-urbanites are largely ethnonationalists nonetheless, so it was the investigation of urbanites that mattered for reasons briefly outlined above and fully expanded in Chapter Seven.

It should also be known that identity perceptions among Ghanaians vis-à-vis fellow multinational citizens are influenced by

both the immediate political history and the distant myths of origin, and that an accentuation of recent enmities between various ethnonational groups enhances the invocation of the myths of origin to explain the present. To what extent this influences figuration or vice versa is yet to be fully ascertained by thorough research into the wire mesh of figuration and the principles behind the networks. At the very least, readers can be equipped here with the myths of origin.

This monograph has ten chapters. This 'Introduction' which is the first chapter has set the scene and explained its purpose. The second chapter – 'The invention of a doctrine' - is about theorizing on the subject of Nationalism and charts the path on which the theorizing has assumed, explaining the underpinning scenarios and placing the whole process into the relevant context. The chapter effectively lays the theoretical foundation for this publication by providing a thorough overview on the theories; a one-stop shop on mainstream theorizing on the subject. It is a lively discussion and includes how the theorizing has been shaping; how the thinking behind the doctrines has assumed; and how the theories currently play out in the real world. As against primordialists, modernist theorists of nationalism have generally iconised France and England as nobiliar nations whose nationalist development set the criteria for assessing all other such and related developments of nationalism. The discussion includes to what extent the theories are applicable to non-European socio-political scenarios, and would prove that even by the criteria set for the nobiliar nations, there existed such nations in the Gold Coast as the Fanti and Ashanti prior to 1789 France, late 18th century England, and 1957 Modern Ghana.

Chapter Three which is about the traditions of origin is what dissects the "Ghana hypothesis" – in simple terms – why modern Ghana is named so, and completes the jigsaw. The chapter puts together the traditions of origin and attempts the colossal task of tracing each ethnonational identity group in modern multinational Ghana from their ancient origins to their current ethnogeographic environs, and establishes the anthropo-historical connection. Hence it includes the rare and filling account of the genesis of the "Ghana hypothesis" and an explanation of the "Guan controversy" based on this doctoral work. The chapter would also enlighten readers on the current state of nationalism for the various ethnonational groups in modern multinational Ghana. The fourth chapter underpins the third, and offers a comprehensive critique on all the contributing

evidence about the Old Ghana origins of Modern Ghana. It covers the broad authorship which has contributed to the scholarship on the traditions of origin, and includes wide ranging discussions on the works of Eva Meyerowitz, Jan Vansina, Maxwell Owusu, Nehemiah Levtzion, Ivor Wilks, Madeleine Manoukian, Michael D Warren, K. Y. Daaku, Louis Wilson, Jack R Goody, Father J J Williams, David Kimble, Melville Herskovits, A B Ellis, J D Fage, Reverend J B Anaman, Paul Nugent, Michael Kwamena-Poh, Michelle Gilbert and Anthony Ephirim-Donkor. The chapter which follows then discusses the Ghanaian nation-state project which began from Independence Day 6 March 1957, and includes other significant contributions to current theorizing on the subject of nationalism, for example, that heterogeneity has potential to assume homogeneity. Hence as already mentioned, the national construct set before the body politic after independence is difficult yet achievable. Within the context of the nation-state project, this chapter assesses the criteria of modern nationhood against other ethnonational groups whose current territoriality spills over modern Ghana's borders and where this includes countries without border relations with Ghana; hence Ewe nationalism is discussed and the analyses presented on its stages in the recent political history of modern Ghana, together with what implications this has for politics within the West African sub-region.

Chapter Six is what fully fleshes out one of my personal contributions to theorizing on the subject of Nationalism – the rationalization of ethnonationalism (ROE). Chapter Seven details the fieldwork survey undertaken to explore the ROE concept and includes the theoretical and conceptual formulation, research design and methodology. The eighth chapter discusses the evidence from the survey and summarises the findings and conclusions. Following the survey, the ninth chapter consolidates the theorizing on Ghanaian electoral behaviour by providing analyses on the real presidential elections of 2000 and 2004. The concluding chapter is more or less a short summary thought.

One should point out here that figuration is not restricted to Africa, and does exist in other forms around the world, for example in modern Britain. British academics reveal that the characteristic modern problems of political accountability are 'bound up with entitlements as well as provisions with the redistribution of the wealth and power of the nation through the political process'[16].

2

THE INVENTION OF A DOCTRINE

This chapter provides a thorough overview on the theories of nationalism. It does not pretend to be definitive or exhaustive of the unending debate on the subject, but discuses enough to help the reader navigate their thinking mainstream. It outlines the criteria for ascertaining a tribe, ethnic group and nation, accompanied by associated demonstrations of, or attempts at self-determination. It is a lively discussion which encompasses how the theorizing has taken shape, or how the thinking behind the doctrines has assumed, and features such usual suspects among the cast list as Hugh Seton-Watson, Hans Kohn, Elie Kedourie, Anthony Smith, Walker Connor, Ernest Gellner and J V Stalin.

As against primordialists, modernist theorists of nationalism have generally iconised France and England as noble nations whose development into nationhood set criteria for assessing the other political entities. The eurocentricity of the theorizing emerges when the discussion involves to what extent the mainstream theories can be applicable to non-European political scenarios, and at this stage the discussion proves that - even by the criteria set for the nations of nobiliar status - there existed nations in the Gold Coast (namely the Fanti and Ashanti) prior to 1789 France, 18th century England, and of course prior to modern Ghana's independence in 1957.

The chapter makes it easy for the reader to appreciate the simple point that the main difference between a tribe and a nation is one of a boy and a mature man with a few more perks, however of the same sex. It also sets the distinguishing factor between a tribe and an ethnic group as the former being genetically defined and the other socially defined; and that a tribe can be an ethnic group but not always vice versa. Hence, the English are a tribe and a nation at the same time, but not an ethnic group.

Tribe and Nation: the checklist

Tribe and ethnic group
Several definitions, descriptions and explanations have been given
for the term tribe. Piddington defines it as:

> A group of people speaking a common dialect, inhabiting a
> common territory and displaying a certain homogeneity in
> their culture. The tribe is never exogamous; in fact, its
> members marry fellow-members more often than they marry
> outsiders. The tribe is not primarily or usually a kinship group,
> but in certain cases all members of a tribe claim descent from
> a common ancestor. The tribe is frequently a political unit for
> purposes of the internal administration of justice and external
> relations, such as the prosecution of war[1].

An analysis of the demonstrations and characterizations of the term
as portrayed by both the phenomenon itself and the varying
authorships on the subject, produces the following fundamental
features or attributes for both tribe and ethnicity:

- a collective proper name (or ethnonym);

- a myth of common ancestry or origin;

- shared historical memories;

- one or more differentiating elements of common (or shared)
  culture;

- an association with a specific 'homeland' (territorial belonging
  or territoriality);

- a sense of solidarity (or identity) for significant sectors of the
  population[2].

As a checklist, each tribe or *ethnic* unit would exhibit some or all
of these attributes at any time. The above six criteria for a *tribe* are
not too different from what constitutes an *ethnie,* defined by
Anthony Smith 'as a named human population with myths of
common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more
elements of shared culture, a link with a homeland, and a measure
of solidarity, at least among the elites'[3].

At this point, it is also worth alerting readers that the synonymous usage of the terms *tribe* and "ethnic group" in the literature has contributed to some of the confusion that occurs when an attempt is being made to explain tribal or national phenomena on one hand, and ethnicity on the other. From time to time, experts intervene to clarify the essential distinction, and it is to this end that Walker Connor gracefully sets the theorizing straight when he states that the word *ethnic* roots from *ethnos* (the ancient Greek for *nation* in the pristine sense of common descent), and that any prefix *ethno* would mean national. Hence, introducing the term *ethnonationalism* is a response to the general misapplication of the word "nationalism" to convey loyalty to the state (patriotism) rather than to the *ethno* or national group[4]. I should comment that one trigger point for the trajectory of distinctions between Smithian and Connorist theorizing on the subject of nationalism is that Smith's understanding of the original usage(s) of the word *ethnos* is cultural[5] and that of Connor is kin related or biological[6].

   The identification of *tribe* is first to be located in the aspects of birth, blood relations, endogamy and kinship as the items of most significance, with any allusions to culture being peripheral[7]. Although through endogamy common blood results, kinship is not always derived from common blood, but also by law, as for example a spouse being the "next of kin". Lucy Mair states that, 'it is not the biological calculation of the proportion of "common blood" – actually genes – that measures nearness of kin; it is the law of any given society'[8]. On the other hand, the phrase "ethnic group" (or ethnicity for that matter) is defined in terms of social behaviour. One reason therefore, for the confusion in the synonymity, is that people can be 'socially defined as belonging together by virtue of common descent'[9]. Therefore, ethnic groupness (or ethnicity) can suffice in certain respects for *tribe* but not vice versa, and we must note that the word "ethnicity" is a more or less recent acquisition in modern English. Its usage is more quasi and social as opposed to anything strictly ethnonational. E. K. Francis has defined an ethnic group as 'any major collectivity that is socially defined in terms of common descent'[10]. Obviously, the somewhat grey area of synonymity has contributed to the loose mis/application of the terms *tribe* and ethnic group. Common descent (or ancestry) is not only of blood, but merely of any forms

of orientation or traceability, for example, religion, occupation or peer group. Francis rightfully claims that, 'ethnicity may be said to be dominant if it is salient in the orientation of social action, especially in determining the personnel of a social unit as well as the rights and obligations of the people involved'[11]. Thus, whereas *tribe* or *ethnos* may be more or less genetically defined, ethnicity is more inclusive and socially defined. The latter covers aspects of "common descent" which may not necessarily constitute traceability in blood or kinship relations, as for example the development or forging of a common culture where or when peoples of different kinship, blood backgrounds or common ancestry reside together on the same geographic territory. In this case, Smith's phrase 'a community of native birth and culture'[12] can suffice for the *ethnos*, as can also be said for emigrants from a particular country, say "Italians in Australia"[13]. Connor sets the difference between *tribe/ethno* and ethnicity as one of gemeinschaft and gessellchaft: one resting on a sense of kinship and sentiment, resulting in such formations as family, band, tribe, nation; the other based on some form of social contract, that personal self-interest can best be promoted through membership of a group[14]. Gessellschaft social formations are what Francis tried to explain as "secondary ethnic units". According to Francis:

> Our discussion will furthermore reveal that societal units that are ethnically quite heterogeneous and actually based on territorial, economic, or political principles of social organisation may be reinterpreted and socially defined as if they were based on shared ethnicity. We shall call such units *secondary ethnic units*[15].

Hence, through other competing loyalties in society, whether class, political party, neighbourhood and peer groups, professional and business groups, or even trade unions and religion, an "ethnic group" (or ethnicity) could crystallise over and above tribal or national identity[16]. However the ethnic phenomena may be characterised, Pierre Van Den Berghe states that 'nevertheless, in their ideal-typical form, each kind of group has a clearly distinct basis of solidarity: kinship and interest respectively'[17].

Nation

Just like *tribe*, the term *nation* has been defined severally. According to Seton-Watson:

> A nation is a community of people, whose members are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture, a national consciousness . . . no "scientific definition" of the nation can be devised: yet the phenomenon has existed and exists . . . a nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one. It is not necessary that the whole population should feel, or so behave, and it is not possible to lay down dogmatically a minimum percentage of a population which must be so affected. When a significant group holds this belief, it possesses "national consciousness" . . . [18].

According to Elie Kedourie, '. . . nations by definition, are composed of citizens who are at one with each other, among whom there is neither conqueror nor conquered, neither ruler nor subject, but are all animated by one general will, willing the good of the nation, which is also that of the individual'[19]. Also, according to Walker Connor, a '. . . nation connotes a group of people who believe they are ancestrally related'[20]. The above are reinforced by Naomi Chazan's view which presents the nation as relating to '. . . the psychocultural phenomenon of a group of people possessing a common symbolic referent and joint aspirations and who desire to give political expression to these identities'[21]. J. V. Stalin, in dealing with the national question, states that 'a nation is a historically evolved, stable community of people which arose on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture'[22]. According to Smith 'the nation is a large, vertically integrated and territorially mobile group featuring common citizenship rights and collective sentiment together with one (or more) common characteristic(s) which differentiate its members from those of similar groups with whom they stand in relations of alliance or conflict'[23]. By 2000, Smith's understanding of a nation had revised from territorial mobility to 'a named human population occupying a historic territory or

homeland and sharing common myths and memories; a mass public culture; a single economy; and common rights and duties for all members'[24]. Hans Kohn, in dealing with the fundamental conditions for the growth of modern nationhood also lists the following: national homogeneity as a result of the breakdown of class and gender barriers; internal and external peace and security; growth in economic and political life resulting in the erasure (eradication) of feudal power; the emergence of the middle class – shift in social prestige[25]; literary activity and research into the national past; a doctrinal or standard text, for example the Bible, poems, etc; the emergence of a recognised national language; citizenship rights and liberty[26].

A discussion of nationhood cannot be done without a discussion on the state. The most notable definition of the state is given by Weber as 'a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory'[27]. Naomi Chazan affirms the above by defining the state as 'a legal-territorial concept . . . that set of structures and institutions that seek to maintain effective control over a given population within a specifically defined geographical area'[28]. Smith also affirms both definitions and makes a further distinction when he claims that, the state refers 'exclusively to public institutions, differentiated from, and autonomous of, other social institutions and exercising a monopoly of coercion and extraction within a given territory'[29]. It becomes clear that, as has been the obfuscation by common usage, of the distinction between the terms *tribe/ethnos* and "ethnic group" (or ethnicity), so have the distinct relationships between "nation" and "state" been confused[30]. Seton-Watson makes the distinction clearer:

> States can exist without a nation, or with several nations, among their subjects; and a nation can be co-terminus with the population of one state, or be included together with other nations within one state, or be divided between several states. There were states long before there were nations, and there are some nations that are much older than most states which exist today. The belief that every state is a nation, or that all sovereign states are national states has done much to obfuscate human understanding of political realities. A state is

a legal and political organisation, with the power to require obedience and loyalty from its citizens[31].

It seems that some of the attributes of a modern nation overlap with those of *tribe/ethnos*. However, as a result of many developments over the centuries, coupled with the simultaneous development of an international community, several other in-organic characteristics have assumed. An analysis of definitions, characterizations and descriptions of a nation – whether by an evolution of the entity itself or that of scholarship - outlines the following attributes:

- a large centralised government (or state);
- a common territory;
- a collective proper name;
- common myths of ancestry or origin or shared historical myths;
- a common language;
- a common economic life and policy;
- common rights and duties for all citizens, plus a common mental make-up (that all citizens belong to the same nation/state);
- evidence of some sort of ideology or doctrine serving as guidance to leaders of the nationalist movement and which contributed to the emergence of the nation;
- evidence of cohesion between the masses - the common people - and the aristocracy, that is, no class barriers in politics;
- a common public culture or education system.[32]

As like *tribe/ethnos*, any modern nation would demonstrate any combination of the above attributes. Whether the *enos* or *ethnos* of any identity entity[33] and the multiplicity or otherwise within any given example, we can judge from the checklists already discussed, that the essential distinction between *tribe/ethnos* and nationhood in modernity is that between a boy and a man. Although of the same sex (in that both are nations), the latter has evolved to become mature, and more responsibly equipped politically, and has shaped up to compete within the global evolution of political units which are now essentially more gessellschaft than gemeinschaft.

At this stage, it is essential to discuss the theorizing by Smith that modern nations have gemeinschaft roots. The concept of the 'ethnic origins of nations', is based on a position that modern nations have ethnic foundations or roots, usually a combination of predominant, pre-existing, core *ethnie* and other minor ethnic groups[34]. Smith's characterization of the *ethnie* is exactly similar to that of *tribe/ethnos* listed above: a collective proper name (or ethnonym); a myth of common descent or origin; shared historical memories; one or more differentiating elements of common (or shared) culture; an association with a specific 'homeland' (territorial belonging or territoriality); a sense of solidarity (or identity) for significant sectors of the population[35]. The essential critique that has assumed on this theory is that, useful though it might be, modern nations did/do not have to be *ethnies* in order to be nations. The counter arguments revolving around the criteria have listed themselves as follows:

- on ethnonyms, there can be other non-*ethnie*-based characterizations such as "American" or "Muslim". Pakistanis are not Indians simply because they are Muslims. Pakistan is a modern construct which did not assume until hostilities with the latter. From the Smithian perspective it can be argued that Pakistanis are an Indian *ethnie* that has assumed a new identity, but Pakistanis might not share this view;

- with regard to myths of common descent, different interpretations can negate what should be alluded, (and perhaps Smith might prefer the phrase "common myths of descent");

- although shared memories are intrinsic, they do not have to be of a distant era;

- shared cultural distinctiveness is not sufficient for modern nationhood to assume, even under the gestation of a superimposed state mechanism which has jurisdiction over multiple national identities. In postcolonial Africa, this could be the very reason for severe tensions at the state level which trigger hostile events below or vice versa, depending on the socio-political context. Many nation-state projects are under heavy strain as a result of similar scenarios.

- rapid developments within the evolving global village such as transnational business, electronic commerce or even migrational transformations in the expanded European Community of states, can reduce the essence of territoriality;

- solidarity does not have to be cultural.

The above summary critique against the Smithian attributes for *ethnies* is sourced mainly to Thomas Hylland Eriksen, who argues that, the constituting elements of an *ethnie* (or the ethnic roots of modern nation-formation for that matter) can be both useful and inapplicable at the same time. This in one sense reflects a typical posture of Smith who tends to be both primordialist and modernist across the board. Eriksen argues that: the list of factors 'need not produce *ethnies* but can also produce other kinds of collectivities based on ascription'[36]; the constituting elements are too dependent on a distant era and long periods of process formation to achieve; modern communities need not 'have an ethnic foundation in order to function as nations . . . that there are several ways in which the requirements of nationhood can be met'[37]. Eriksen further argues that the Smithian criteria cannot accommodate the full possible range of communities that imagine themselves in the evolving world.

An Invented Doctrine

Just as there are several authors on the subject, so are there several explanations of nationalism, some essentially doctrinal and others definitional, some tirelessly attempting to explain a phenomenon that seems in their opinion natural to humanity, even if in different forms and demonstrations over different epochs, and others trying to explain an unnatural doctrine imposed on humanity. In all of this, others also try to expose what the agenda of the doctrine is. In this last respect and perhaps in the others as well, Elie Kedourie seems to have hit the mark in his description of the whole scenario:

> Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It pretends to supply a criterion for the determination of the unit of population proper to enjoy a government exclusively its own, for the legitimate exercise of power in the state, and for the right organisation of a society

of states. Briefly, the doctrine holds that humanity is divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics, which can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government. Not the least triumph of this doctrine is that such propositions have been accepted and are thought to be self-evident, that the very word nation has been endowed by nationalism with a meaning and a resonance which until the end of the eighteenth century it was far from having. These ideas have become firmly naturalised in the political rhetoric of the West, which has been taken over for the use of the whole world[38].

The problem about: (a) the invention of the Eurocentric doctrine or ideology of nationalism, and: (b) the fixation of the advent of nationalism around the 18th century - with the French Revolution as a key exemplary event[39] revolves around the formation of three European nations, specifically, England, France and Spain as noble examples or models of the processes of nation-formation. Hence the doctrine has derived its ethos from the patterns associated with the political processes by which these nobiliar nations have so emerged. The emergence of England as a nation coincided with the emergence of the modern state both of which took place in the period from the 16th to the 18th century[40]. This event, coupled with the experience of France, have each been classified as the nearest examples of what has been described as a nation being 'co-terminus with the population of one state'[41].

With regard to the threshold for the advent of nationalism, the list of dates usually singled out to signal or typify the 18th century includes: 1789 and 1792 - first and second phases of the French Revolution; 1775 - First Partition of Poland; 1776 - American Declaration of Independence and; 1807 - Fichte's address to the German Nation[42]. The period spanning the 18th to 20th centuries has been noted generally as one of formation of nations in Western Europe, with their populations not necessarily being co-terminus with their governing states, since in a few multi-national situations, more than one nation have emerged under one state, and in some cases what used to be one nation has eventually emerged under different states, for example the former Yugoslavia. Within this time span, scholars of modernism – one stream of theorizing on

Nationalism - would dare to propose that all "less fortunate" and aspiring nations were imitating the "success pattern" of the successful "models" who had already "arrived" as nations by the 18th century as a result of a "more fortunate" history of military power and prowess which burgeoned during the 16th and 17th centuries[43]. This bloc of a time-span was not uneventful. The role of the state in creating nationhood was phenomenal. Through its managerial role, geographical and jurisdictive powers, the supervision of such activities as taxation, conscription and employment, tended to require and develop a sense of bonding and loyalty from subjects or citizens. Additionally, the emergence of infrastructure that aided the co-ordination and communication between classes and geographical areas, thus facilitating the extension of citizenship rights, tended to remove any geographical barriers within a territory. Therefore, the view that the processes of nation-formation were baked by the state acting as the engineer, political incubator and supervisor, has credibility since it created 'the necessary condition and matrix for the gestation of the national loyalties so evident today'[44]. In the case of England, the state was the rulership of the Tudor Monarchs from the 16th century[45].

However, Smith argues that the mobilising and penetrative powers of the state could not take the full responsibility for nation-creation and the bonding of citizens, in that, the state was largely a bourgeois organization, and that 'the lower classes were not politically incorporated until the end of the 19th century in France and England, and women not until the 1920s'[46]. Milton and Cromwell (both statesmen and intelligentsia at the same time) spearheaded the Puritan Revolution which rebelled against the Tudor Monarchy and sought the citizenship rights of civil liberty from "Custom and Authority" (church and state-monarchy) within the matrix of a Christian doctrine or ideology[47]. In addition, the two colonising countries (England and France) had a much wider global influence, that is, an empire resulting from the incorporation of other peoples. This constitutes some evidence that the state had the ability to allow a fuller local integration of all classes if it so politically willed. Smith therefore argues that, the responsibility for nation-formation is a combination of state design and also two simultaneous evolving processes, which are: first, the capitalist revolution and the subsequent move towards a market economy;

and second, a cultural or educational revolution. With the former, trade networks were established between the nobiliar nations and their colonies, yielding mercantile wealth to their bourgeoisie, rich benefits to the state, and enabling it to raise larger and better-equipped armies and expert civil service staff. With the latter, the Reformation and its resultant upsurge of Protestant Churches led to the development of secular studies in both the humanities and natural science, alongside with the development of an intelligentsia who despite their important roles in the universities, were still subordinate to the state. Hence, the administrative, economic and cultural revolutions resulting in a political socialization through a public mass education and communication system within the period, also contributed their quota in the nation-building or nation-creation processes of the nobiliar nations. As an ethnicist, Smith furthermore argues that all this developed around a central core of aristocratic ethnie, from which the dissemination and transmutation of 'myths, memories and symbols embodied in customs, traditions, codes and styles' were effected[48].

The Debate on Nationalism

The debate on the doctrine or ideology of nationalism ensues as the question looms: were there no nations and nationalism before the French Revolution in the late 18th century? It is essential to spell out that the term "nationalism" stands for two things at once: one as 'a doctrine about the character, interests, rights and duties of nations'[49], and the other as; 'an organised political movement, designed to further the alleged aims and interests of nations'[50] with the purpose of independence and/or national unity. The doctrine or ideology and its practical outworkings (nationalist movements) have been programmed to go together, such that, without the ideology there are no nationalist movements and vice versa. This presupposes the idea that; it was after the 18th century threshold (when the doctrine of nationalism was in place) that events towards nation-creation or nation-building became known as moves towards nationalism, or nationalist movements. Hence, there were no nationalist movements before the 18th century threshold, and furthermore, any attempts by any polity towards nation-building before this threshold should not to be considered as constituting nationalism. According to Seton-Watson, 'once the doctrine had

been formulated, it was used as a justification for creating nationalist movements, and then sovereign states to encompass the lands in which it was claimed that nations lived'[51]. Smith argues against this invention of a doctrine by debunking the mutual presupposition hanging between the doctrine and practice of nationalism. He claims that 'for just as there are many nations without nationalisms, so there are as many nationalisms without nations. The terms "nation" and "nationalism" are analytically and empirically distinct. And where nationalism arises without a pre-existent nation, the "nation" for which it strives is only an embryo, a project, a "nation of intent"'[52], at best a potential nation[53]. The perennialists (like Seton-Watson) and the primordialists also agree that nations and therefore nationalism have ever been from time immemorial albeit in different forms and variations of self-awareness and activism. They claim that the roots of nations:

> stretch back into the medieval era, or even antiquity. There never was an age without its nations and nationalisms, even if the doctrine of self-determination was born in the modern epoch. Every human being feels in 'his or her bones' the enduring power of their nations, the almost timeless quality of the national character. Nations can be found from earliest antiquity, from the beginnings of records in ancient Sumer and Egypt, and they have dominated political life in every era since that time[54].

The perennialist argument is further supported by Seton-Watson who makes the definitive contribution that:

> no "scientific definition" of the nation can be devised: yet the phenomenon has existed and exists . . . a nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one. It is not necessary that the whole population should feel, or so behave, and it is not possible to lay down dogmatically a minimum percentage of a population, which must be so affected. When a significant group holds this belief, it possesses "national consciousness" . . .[55].

Following Seton-Watson's view above, the following questions loom: what exactly is a nation, whether real or of intent? Is it only when both the cultural and political units or boundaries are congruent[56]? What term is given to situations where anti-colonial nationalisms lead to clearly-defined state boundaries? Would national consciousness derived from a united anti-colonial nationalism make a newly-carved, multi-national state, a nation-state? Following from the ethnicist definition of a nation[57] and as reflected in the definitions already outlined by Chazan, Stalin, Kedourie and Seton-Watson, it becomes clear, that perhaps most (if not all) African countries which gained independence from the Partition would not qualify to be called nation-states, as this could only be possible when one adopts the statist definition of a nation - when nationalism results into a territorial-political unit, rather than a psycho-cultural and unified unit based on alleged descent and common culture[58]. It becomes easy to make the distinction that, where the anti-colonial nationalism was pursued by a people of alleged common descent and culture - in which case the nationalist movement was a cultural movement[59], and at the same time the territory of independence from colonialism is inhabited strictly and solely by the said people, the country is a nation-state from the time it gained independence. With the fast-racing globalising trends of economics, government and multi-cultural melting pots, plus the growing prominence of the term "globalisation" in academic literature - especially in the 1990s[60], another question looms: 'is the nation-state becoming a fiction . . . and government obsolete?'[61].

Proponents of the dramatic effects of globalisation on the nation-state like Anthony Giddens, argue that globalisation deducts from some of the nation-states' powers, particularly those which underlie Keynesian economic management, and also enhances the potential for regenerating local identities[62]. Opponents of this view also argue that despite the over-arching supra-nationalist potential of globalisation, the nation-state identity would remain and become even more sharpened within the matrix of the increasing competition through inter-nation-alism.

Modernism
Contrary to the perennialist view is that of the modernists - a 'modern generation of scholars'[63], who claim that the occurrence of

nationalism begins from the 18th century, and is contingent on the evidence of the nation-formation processes similar to those of France, England, Spain, etc, and which line up with the elements of a definition of nationalism, which is, '. . . an ideological movement, for the attainment and maintenance of self-government and independence on behalf of a group, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential "nation" like others'[64]. Although modernists disagree on the timing of this threshold [some preferring the 18th century, and others preferring a 19th & earlier 20th century periods, with adherents to the latter periodisation basing their argument on the fact that this period witnessed both the nationalisation of the masses or their inclusion into the running of the state machinery, and the enfranchising of women[65]], their argument dwells within the contingency that 'the conditions that brought the nation into being were absent in antiquity and the middle ages, and the differences between pre-modern and modern collective cultural identities are too great to be subsumed under a single concept of the nation'. As described by Smith, 'mass "citizen-nations" can only emerge in the era of industrialism and democracy'[66], that is, 'nations and nationalism are treated as products of the specifically modern conditions of capitalism, industrialism, bureaucracy, mass communications and secularism'[67].

A couple of questions then arise from the modernist concept of a nation: was there no democracy during the pre-18th century period, and is there democracy after it? It is more or less, as quite rightly described by Smith, an imposition of a 'Western concept of a nation onto quite different areas and periods'[68]. The import of these questions does matter for the post 18th century era, especially if the route to the presidency of the most powerful liberal democracy is perceived to entail rigged elections in Florida State, or that government decisions to commit troops to major wars are in direct contravention of the will of the people. It is perhaps a safeguard that democracy is not on the checklist for nationhood; even within the best liberal democracies, the will of the people can be trampled upon by leadership via constitutional powers. Democracy has proved to mean different things to different individuals within the same society let alone among the different and complex societies across the globe; the outworkings of even

the most agreeable principles can be fraught with frustrations by both local and international politics.

Smith further adds that even a multi-dimensional concept of a nation would still not suffice for the wide cultural differences between areas and historical epochs, although it becomes evident that as an ethnicist, a bias cannot be hidden, in that, he terms a strong example such as that of Ancient Egypt as a mere ethnic state and not a nation. He claims inter-alia: that Egypt had a national identity (and consequently national consciousness) yet Egyptians did not feel that they were citizens of Egypt; neither was there anything that constituted nationalism simply because there were class divisions in all sectors of society (politics, religion, economy, education, legal rights, etc.), and that a public culture of equal opportunities was not inculcated into the middle and lower classes[69]. This argument can be criticised in two ways: doctrinally and historically. First, according to Seton-Watson:

> the formation of national consciousness does not necessarily lead to nationalism. A nation which has become conscious of itself, whose members are united within the same country, independent of foreign rule, does not need to be nationalist, to formulate nationalist doctrines or create nationalist movements. The English and the Spaniards are cases in point. But although you can have a nation without nationalism, you cannot have nationalism without national consciousness[70].

What remains to be tackled is the historical point, that is, the fact that the gap between the aristocracy and the masses, whether it is social or political, may not have been bridged yet. Most probably, that gap is not bridgeable. It all depends on whether the social boundaries constituted political boundaries. Smith has been domiciled in Britain for at least the last three decades and has never theorized that there is no British nationalism, so let us discuss what is closest to his criticism of Ancient Egypt. Using modern Britain as an example, we can see that despite a mass public culture and modern technological trends in mass communication and co-ordination both media-wise and geographically, which link up the polity as it were, there are still class differences and a wide gap between the aristocracy and the people. There is the royal family,

which owns royal property privately, with the Queen as President of the polity (to whom Prime Ministers must submit manifesto), and with several other royal sub-titles and offices for example princes and princesses, dukes and duchesses, barons and baronesses, and earls amongst them, spread over the country. Prospective heirs of the realm must not break their marriage vows or else cease to be head of the Church of England. Public recognitions such as Member or Order of the British Empire (MBE/OBE), Queen's Counsel (QC) and knghthood are awarded only by the Queen. Attitudes of British citizenry to the royalty are periodically unstable. The royalty is absolutely devolved from both the lower and middle classes. Would this scenario of class divisions not constitute a lack of nationalism as attributed to Egypt? Furthermore, Scottish and Welsh citizens have opted for devolution from the British Parliament. There is no such absolute thing as tribal or national homogeneity in Britain. It could be argued that Britain is heterogeneous, comprising of mainly English, Scots, Welsh and Irish. Yet isolating any from the British equation does not erase the class divisions within each of the identity groups.

In terms of education, children of the nobility and upper class attend special schools like Eton. Also, there is no longer free university education in England, thus making upward mobility and integration more difficult for the lower classes in their existing predicament of diminishing returns in socio-economic status. Furthermore, big business and the highest paid jobs are also run by the nobility and established families. In the "public" civil service, the highest jobs are reserved for the highly educated, with the ruling political party and its Ministers setting the political agenda. The state machinery has neither been "nationalised" to the level of the masses, nor to the universal and proportional inclusion of women, who are still occupationally dis-enfranchised in English society. The lower classes are not easily integrating. There are still affluent sections of society by geographical demarcations - some geographical areas are visibly rich, and others poor. State religion (the Church of England) is highly organised with the Head of the Royal Family as the head (unless disqualified by marrying a non-royal or divorcing through infidelity). The legal system does not speak equal opportunity since legal aid is restrictive to some cases, and not others. Therefore, one cannot say that a universal set of

equal rights and opportunities exists for all citizens in England or Britain. This is a similar transposition of Ancient Egypt, despite differences in culture and epochs. Essentially, the very criteria which has been used in disqualifying Ancient Egypt from being a nation – that is - the failure of the state breaking 'free from its aristocratic and priestly bases unlike the French and British states'[71], ought to be the plumb line in current analysis. Going by the contingencies and criteria of the modernist scholars, the scenario of modern Britain (or even England) is still lacking, and therefore, neither polity should constitute a nation, two centuries after the French Revolution "threshold". It is evident that 'the chief actors (are) king [or queen], ministers and bureaucrats, with the middle classes appearing later, and the aristocrats and clergy often ambivalent'[72]. The aristocrats and clergy have not been marginalized, their heritage and culture have, even in principle, not become everyone's, in the post-modern England or Britain they have not been by-passed, to counter Smith[73]. Quite clearly, Smith's criticism that Ancient Egypt was not a nation is not fair.

The antithesis of modernists

It would appear that the modernist position is only a fashionable viewpoint around which modernist intellectuals romanticise, as the literature would reveal that some of the modernists do not actually believe what they say, for example, Anthony Giddiness. A close examination of his writings betrays this antithesis. As a modernist, Giddens states that 'nationalism, like the nation-state, is a phenomenon generated originally from within Europe, and I think it is right to stress that it would not have emerged without the bourgeois idea of popular sovereignty that ushered in the modern phase of European liberalism'[74]. Somewhere else, Giddens posits an antithetical view which strongly lends support to primordialism and perennialism (the opposite of modernism). Giddens states that '. . . nationalist sentiments relate to a myth of origins supplying a psychological focus for the unity of the political community; but any interpretation of origins that has concrete reference to the past is likely to stimulate as much tension as harmony, because of the diversity of cultural differences characteristically involved'[75]. So therefore Giddens appreciates myths of origin and is starkly aware of the problems accompanying them. Myths of origin, as a

psychological element for uniting any people, constitute one of the major cornerstones of the argument against the modernist position. Giddens' acceptance of the validity and potential of myths of origin as a driving force of nationalism, defeats his position as a modernist, in that, myths of origin are a phenomenon which relates to antiquity.

Primordialism and perennialism

Smith elaborates on the view that primordialism seems to be a more plausible explanation of nationalism. Primordialism in its extreme form holds that tribal identities exist just as speech, sight and smell, and that humanity, by nature, belongs to fixed tribal communities just as families. This organic version further connotes the view that nations have "natural frontiers", 'a specific origin and place in nature . . . a peculiar character, mission and destiny'[76]. This view, which equates nations and *ethnies* as being synonymous and part of the natural order of the processes of nationalism, is reminiscent of 'a naturalistic attribute of humanity'[77], and synonymous with Gellner's theory of the co-terminus existence of nation and state boundaries, an ideal which any attempt towards its attainment constitutes an expression of nationalism[78]. The nation-state is also referred to as an ethnocracy in the literature[79]. Inherent in primordialism, of course, is the concept of 'ethnic origins of nations', which is based on the position that modern nations have ethnic foundations or roots, usually a combination of predominant, pre-existing, core *ethnie* and other minor ethnic groups within the territoriality[80]. Another view of primordialism – the historical evolution of tribal communities - despite its depiction of the geographical and political displacement of some of these communities, at least also supports their organicity. The socio-biologist version of primordialism as postulated by Christopher Badcock[81] additionally portrays ethnicity as being enhanced by genetic evolution, nepotism, kin-grouping, etc. However, this view seems to be mechanistic, in that it fails to explain broader, non-biological manifestations of cultural similarity and assimilation, and even biological assimilation.

It is important to highlight the difference between primordialism and perennialism. The former (in all of its forms), although lays emphasis on the avoidance of time specificity on any

demonstrations of nationalism, has its emphasis embedded in nature, that is to say, that forms of primordialism constitute the "'givens" of human existence'[82]. Hence "organic" ethnicity[83] has a strong place in primordialism. Perennialism on the other hand, also avoids any time specifity in categorising nationalisms and agrees to the inception of nationalism from antiquity, but does not emphasise the organicity or naturalisation of events. This connotes the view that there can be some instrumentalism in perennialism, and implies that not all forms of pre-"modern" nationalisms were organically or ethnonationalistically-inspired, that is, organised by an organic tribal or national identity group. The French Revolution was basically economically-inspired although it was staged by a largely homogeneous national group. Situational ethnicities therefore have a place in perennialism since they cannot be consigned only to the period after the modernist threshold.

Instrumentalism

Definitely, the most potent argument against primordialism is instrumentalism (and especially the manifestations of "situational ethnicity"). The instrumentalist approach:

> is one that regards human beings as having always lived and worked in a wide range of groups. As a result, people have a variety of collective identities, from the family and gender to class, religious and ethnic affiliations. Human beings are continually moving in and out of these collective identities. They choose, and construct, their identities according to the situations in which they find themselves. Hence, for instrumentalists, identity tends to be "situational" rather than pervasive, and must be analysed as a property of individuals rather than of collectivities[84].

The instrumentalist argument therefore holds the view that, ethnic identities are not static or fixed, and that owing to several factors, which could be socio-marital, political, economic, religious, and supported by contexts such as trade, urbanization and employment or even conquest, human beings tend to assume a variety of collective identities which are "situational" rather than pervasive. Simply put, we are all opportunists. [Note that this is not the same

as the historical evolution of core or organic tribes]. As already discussed, such collective, non-tribal identities are sometimes termed "secondary ethnicities" due to their "non-primary" as well as inorganic nature. They seem to assume and occur over and above the primary organic identity of people, that is, the tribal identity. As echoed by Morrison, 'dynamics and ecology operate such that ethnicity is always changing albeit around a base'[85] and that 'ethnicity is the result of the complex series of changes in contemporary life which affect individuals on a daily basis. Several identities or a mix of identities can be seen among members of an assumed homogenous group'[86]. Hence secondary identities or some ethnicities are demonstrated when tribal identity is influenced by several factors such as urbanization, education, socio-economic status, ideology or religion. As already demonstrated, the phrase "secondary ethnicity" or the term "secondary" has not been devised by mere inference. E. K. Francis, one of the sources of its academic usage, claims that 'primary ethnic groups were transformed into secondary ethnic groups because of endogenous changes, such as modernisation, shifts in the balance of political power, transculturation, or loss of leadership'[87]. He further concludes that 'economic factors are of paramount importance in secondary ethnic-group formation, whilst in primary ethnic group formation political factors take precedence'.[88]

However, these pseudo, quasi and ephemeral identities, and their supporting instrumentalist theories seem to overlook the feelings and sentiments that are associated with tribal roots, and the organicity of naturalistic groupings. They fail to explain an aspect of situational ethnicity - itself based on the organic sentiments of primary tribal groups - which could be of irrational and explosive potential even in a modernizing and increasingly interdependent world where people sacrifice their lives for their tribal or national fatherland or motherland[89], in civil or military wars, or even in suicide bombings. This explosive and sensitive aspect of situational ethnicity can also be found in 'the variety of ways in which ethnic members respond in a larger community to policies or actions, which have a bearing on the ethnic members'[90]. For example, the foundation of the Ashanti-based National Liberation Movement (NLM), which emerged from the Ashanti Region of Ghana, results from the fact that the colonial government of the Gold Coast had

refused to respond positively to demands for an increase in the producer price of cocoa beans. Since most of the cash crop was being produced from the Ashanti Region, and the proceeds contributed largely towards the national exchequer, Ashantis saw themselves as financing the rest of the country on their cheap labour and toil. A simple economic demand for more money had been tribalistically-inspired, and had actually led to the formation of what is currently the strongest political party in Ghana - the New Patriotic Party (NPP) – which is more or less Ashanti dominated[91]. As duly summarised by Morrison, 'whenever a group perceives discrimination, whether or not based on ethnic phenomena, the group will reassert its ethnic base and thwart national integration'[92]. Hence it is clear that an aspect of instrumentalism - "situational" ethnicity - is not always inorganic. This supports Smith's view that the instrumentalist approach (or instrumentalism) 'fails to explain why people should choose ethnicity or nationalism as their vehicle of advancement rather than class or religion'[93].

Instrumentalism seems to concentrate on the dynamics of the elite or the intelligentsia's manipulation of the masses instead of the very dynamics of mass mobilizations. It seems to be more of a tree-top method of analysis as against grass-root[94]. It also seems to take attention away from the popular power of nationalism – (the tribal base) - in order to ascribe it to superficial and super-imposing influences. Essentially, it is the people that make a nation; leadership and any extraneous conditions of context only shape the politics. Therefore Smith refers to the modernist doctrine of nationalism, and also instrumentalism, as the 'myth of the modern nation'[95]. Hence it would seem that despite the role of elite leadership in nationalist movements, their instrumentalist intentions or agenda may not have a widely acceptable base, form a nation or even lead towards the emergence of a state; and also that their motives may not always be doctrinally pure. Smith highlights this in an explanation of the doctrine that:

> nationalism holds that power emanates from only a "people" who form a seamless whole, an indivisible brotherhood which abolishes all existing ties, whether of family, neighbourhood or occupation. The only genuine identity is a national one, and every man, be peasant or worker, merchant or intellectual, can

only rediscover self and freedom through that new collective identity. By sloughing off lethargy, passivity, ignorance, routine, tradition, and the burdens of rural backwardness, and by joining the nationalist movement, subjects become free citizens, and social divisions will be swept away through the unity created by a common struggle and purpose[96].

Elie Kedourie also reiterates the seemingly usurping role of elites and intelligentsia. He states that:

> . . . nations by definition, are composed of citizens who are at one with each other, among whom there is neither conqueror nor conquered, neither ruler nor subject, but are all animated by one general will, willing the good of the nation, which is also that of the individual. Historic boundaries present yet other difficulties, for they may not have been the same at different periods in history . . . . [97]

These last two statements by Kedourie and Smith above corroborates one of the main items on the checklist for nationhood, that is, that there must be some cohesion between the masses and the aristocracy, and that the state needs to break free from its aristocratic and priestly bases just as happened with the French Revolution[98].

More pre-threshold flaws of the modernist argument

The modernist argument is still flawed, in that, as echoed by Seton-Watson[99] there were several nations in existence before the modernist threshold, for example, the Fanti and Ashanti of Ghana[100]. Therefore another main issue that needs to be dealt with is the argument of lack of evidence - (where evidence means processes of nation-formation similar to the English and French examples) - within other polities in the world. This evidence is further explained by Smith when he states that 'ideas and doctrines such as the cultural determination of politics, auto-emancipation, the primacy of the nation and popular sovereignty, had to wait until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries for more than fleeting expression as did their translation into nationalist activities and movements'[101]. Smith further states that in most colonies 'both

cultural and political identities were lacking. Any identity or solidarity that a colonial population possessed was initially the product of the incorporation and changes brought by the colonial power'[102]. But it is important to note that nation-building and nationalism around the world goes much further beyond the modernist threshold and European examples. The Ashanti in Ghana were known to have been in existence as a powerful nation-state long before 1699 when trouble began to brew between them and the Dutch over the procurement of slaves[103], obviously over a century before the 18th century threshold. In some societies the public education system was embedded in their daily social systems, hence knowledge and culture were passed on through tradition. In others, this was standardised or bureaucratically organised. With regard to a mass public culture or education system, we can surely give the thumbs-up for the Timbuktu example. A city of the Old Ghana, it is on record to have been one of the world's first academic centres of higher learning and was at its peak in commercial and intellectual development, certainly a pioneer in university education.

It is also interesting to note that Smith's definition of a nation is devoid of one of the crucial determining factors of nationhood, that is, language[104]. Other definitions, (for example, Stalin's, when he dealt with the National Question in his document at the end of 1949), do highlight that 'a nation must have four characteristics: a common language, a common territory, a common economic life and a common-mental make-up. No group which did not possess all four was entitled to be considered a nation'[105]. In the case of England, language played a major role in the formation of national consciousness and nation-creation over the centuries. In 1362, the English Parliament replaced the French language with English on the basis that the former was partially incomprehensible to the people of the land[106]. The English language had itself only emerged in the 14th century as a fusion of Saxon and French[107]. Therefore, it would appear that Smith's definition is inadequate.

Evidence of ideology of leadership
Smith also concedes for the perennialist argument by saying that 'it is true that nationalism, the ideology and the movement, is a fairly recent phenomenon, dating from the late eighteenth century, but it

is also possible to trace the growth of national sentiments which transcend ethnic ties back to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, if not earlier, in several states of Western Europe'[108]. Having jumped another major hurdle, it is clear that, national sentiments are perennial (at least if not always primordial), but the ideology is what some scholars postulate as modern. Another question therefore looms: was there no doctrine or ideology of nationalism before the 16th/18th century threshold? The following statement from Smith necessitates the question:

> modern nations are legitimated through a universally applicable ideology, nationalism. As an ideology, nationalism holds that the world is divided into nations, each of which has its own character and destiny; that an individual's first loyalty is to his or her nation; that the nation is the source of all political power; that to be free and fulfilled, the individual must belong to a nation; that each nation must express its authentic nature by being autonomous; and that a world of peace and justice can only be built on autonomous nations. This 'core doctrine' of nationalist ideology emerged only in the eighteenth century, first in Europe and then elsewhere, although some of its components were foreshadowed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It was unknown before 1500 in Europe or elsewhere, and therefore anything resembling the modern mass nation (underpinned by nationalism) was likely to be fortuitous as well as rare. Modern nations implicitly subscribe to this nationalist ideology, and frequently evoke elements of it to underpin various claims and practices[109]

Hans Kohn, in listing the fundamental conditions for the growth of modern nationhood, highlights among other things, the evidence that the nationalist leaders had some sort of ideology or doctrine that they followed as a guideline in the processes of nationalism leading to the emergence of the polity as a nation. He said that the doctrinal text could be some standard doctrine or some sort of laid down principles recognised by the society or the leadership. Citing the Bible and poems as examples of such standard ideology or doctrine, he claims that the nationalist movement which led to the

emergence of England as a nation took shape in the Puritan Revolution led by Milton the poet and Cromwell the statesman and priest. He therefore claims that the English used the Old Testament text as the guiding ideology in pursuing liberty of citizens from the State and the Church[110].Although the premise for this development (England being God's chosen nation) is highly debatable, the birth of English nationalism in a religious matrix in the 16th century nevertheless led to the development and adoption of a biblically-based doctrine in the 17th century, and which subsequently led to the emergence of England as a nation in the 18th century. The birth and preparation in the 16th century was done under the Tudor Monarchs, and as a progression, this bore fruit in the 17th century with the emergence of the new classes, as a result of the "non-exclusive" opportunities in the expansion of trade and the accumulation of wealth in the pursuit of capitalism. This seems to explain why Kohn adopts the modernist view that 'nationalism is unthinkable before the emergence of the modern state in the period from the sixteenth century to the eighteenth century'[111].

What Kohn seems to have blatantly ignored is the fact that in centuries past, in antiquity, the Bible had been used by several peoples as a standard doctrine of guidance, the most glaring example being the Biblical Jews. As already stated, the Zealots of the 1st century AD in Judea sought for an independent Jewish nation devoid of Roman domination but with a Jewish political Messiah as the ruler of Jews[112]. It ought to be pointed out that not all religions are based in a Biblical matrix, and since all religions have a set doctrine, it would appear that any society that experienced nationalism and was religious at the same time, had a nationalist ideology so long as the torchbearers of the nationalist movement sought guidance from within the religious matrix of the said society. This fact is supported by Beecham, who made this very important observation about tribes in the former Gold Coast or Modern Ghana, that 'among the causes which contribute to the formation of national character, a principal place is to be assigned to religion. Religion is indeed the mould of character, and never fails to give a peculiar expression to those distinguishing features of a people, which other causes may have originated . . .'[113]. Two very significant examples in Ghana can be cited. First, the Fanti in Ghana are known to have had an ideology strictly adhered to by

their leaders in their nation-building, military and other nationalistic efforts. This ideology was religion-based. According to Casely Hayford, the Fantis had a destiny whose attainment they consciously worked towards[114], and Beecham reiterates how religious guidelines were appropriated for military purposes, in that, 'the measures prescribed to ensure success in war afford a striking proof of the direful influence exerted by the national superstitions . . . '[115]. The emergence of the Fanti as a nation took place sometime before the 17th century, and their religious matrix dates as far back as the 13th century[116], long before the 18th century modernist threshold of the doctrine of nationalism. Likewise, the Ashanti religious doctrine dates as far back as the same period with the Fantis (since both nations are of common ancestry), but the Ashanti emerged as a nation in 1701[117]. According to Beecham, throughout the history of the Ashanti, there was a closely and conscientiously followed agenda to pursue and fulfil 'national customs which have been handed down to the people from remote antiquity'[118]. It is therefore clear that there were ideologies and doctrines (not all of which had a religious basis) in existence long before 1500[119]. This therefore locates another major flaw in the modernist school of nationalism which postulates that nationalism (whether as a doctrine or occurrence) began with either the 16th or 18th century.

Examples of Pre-"Threshold" Nations

It would constitute an important exercise to assess from the checklists set out at the beginning of this chapter, whether certain pre-18th century nationalisms actually led to nation-formation, and whether there were nations before the 18th century threshold. The Fanti and Ashanti of Ghana will be used in this case.

The Fanti nation

Anthony Giddens recognizes the nationalistic endeavours of the Fanti in creating their own state without European influence[120]. However, he fails to indicate that this occurred before the eighteenth century threshold or that the Fanti assumed nationhood before then. A close examination of Fanti and Ashanti reveals that the above achievements are common to both groups.

The Fanti have undergone much evolution over the years. The current Fanti nation in modern Ghana, include some Eguafo, Djomo, Efutu, Djabi, Etsi, Agona and the original Fanti. They all have a common ancestry and belong to the Fanti sub-linguistic grouping of the Akan identity. The Central Region of Ghana is geographically a stand-alone Fanti territory although there are a number of *en bloc* Fanti residential enclaves in the bordering Western Region. A fuller discussion on the origins of the Fanti can be found in Chapter Three on the traditions of origin. A brief background on the Fanti reveals that the original Fanti are a group of Guan originating from the Djomo ruling class in Timbuktu who moved southwards to join the Bono and eventually settled with them as sanctioned during the reigns of King Asaman (1295-1325d) and King Ekumfi Ameyaw I (1328-1363d)[121]. The Bono, who formed the first Akan state in modern Ghana, originate from the 'Great White Desert' or Sahara. Their capital Bono-Mansu was founded in 1295 and destroyed by the Ashanti in 1742[122]. The geographical site of the Bono state was located in current Northern Ghana; however in the early years of its founding, the Eguafo, Afutu and some of the original Fanti deserted King Asaman in 1300 and moved southwards towards the coast. This resulted in the founding of the Efutu state by the Eguafo and Efutu in the fourteenth century under the leadership of the two brothers Bonde and Gyan. Kwaman was also founded around the shore-located Saltpond by the Fanti[123]. Kwaman became the capital of the Abuka Fanti state. A split from the Efutu led by Edwe and Etumpan resulted in the founding of Ogua (Cape Coast), which has become the overall capital city of the Fanti nation and the Central Region of Modern Ghana. Some citizens from Ogua left to found Dwemma near Mumford on the coast, and finally the Tumpa or Simpa state, which is now called Winneba[124]. Ephirim-Donkor argues that Bonde and Gyan were not brothers, and also that Edwe and Etumpan were one and the same person[125]. However these arguments neither discount traceability of the Fanti from Guan ancestry nor that of the Efutu to current Winneba.

Some time at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Adminadze Fanti and some Djomo from Bono territory moved southwards to join the Etsi Fanti, resulting in the founding of the Mankessim state. The merging of the aforementioned constituent

states and cities resulted in the emergence of the overall Fanti nation by the beginning of the seventeenth century, although the exact date is not fixed. Subsequent migrations added to their number. For example, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Djomo and some of the original Fanti who had previously settled with the Bono, moved southwards to join their relatives who had made the first move in 1300. Some Djomos and Fantis also delayed their move until 1740[126].

Much later, in 1870-1, an amended Fanti National Constitution was to become the Fanti nation's response to the political situation arising from the policies of the British colonialists who had come to settle. The amendments, which were made to protect the political and territorial interests of the Fanti nation in the colonial era, occurred several decades after the emergence of the Fanti states into nationhood. Prior to the amended constitution, the Fanti nation lived together in divisions of several states within the same territory, each with a chief and capital. Together, all these states were governed by a Paramountcy. The King or Paramount Chief had jurisdiction over all the Fanti states within the federated Fanti territory. The amendments to the existing constitution changed the polity into a Fanti Confederation of States or Fanti Confederacy, to deal with certain political, economic and social provisions which the Fanti bargained for under the new colonial arrangements[127]. Prior to, and after the emergence of the Ashanti nation in 1701, the Fantis traded with the Ashanti, other neighbouring political entities, and the Europeans on the coast, and controlled most of the trade between the Europeans and the interior. Trade items included gold, ivory, gun powder, clothing, alcohol, salt and pepper. Citizens of the Fanti nation felt that they belonged. In addition to a common language, the same citizenship rights and customs were shared by all the Fanti states. Subsequent migrations of the remainder of the Fanti tribes from Northern Ghana to the coast during the seventeenth century further increased the sense of history of the Fanti folk and enriched their myths of ancestry and origin. There was some sort of cohesion between the masses and aristocracy. Apart from kingship dynasties, public office was not restricted to any particular class. The Gold Coast "Emancipation Ordinance" of 1874 (which reflected the rights of the aborigines before

colonialism) states that anyone who could trace their ancestry to the Fanti nation was:

> eligible for any important office in the body politic, and he can always hold up his head among his fellows, however poor his condition. So dearly does the freeman prize his condition that, if by an act of folly on your part you call him a slave, he will bring you before a native tribunal, prove that he is a slave, and get you mulcted in heavy damages. The freemen formed the bulk of the people[128]

The public education system was embedded in their social system of livelihood and not bureaucratically organised. This is explained by the intermittent migrations and constant warfare, which did not give room for long-term establishment of educational institutions. Timbuktu, their base of origin is well known for elaborate and formally organised educational systems as well as the home for some of the world's most famous university systems prior to the Islamic onslaught which caused the Fanti to migrate.

The torchbearers of Fanti nationalism followed an ideology embedded in their religious system, in which was enshrined the vision and destiny of the Fanti nation, guidelines for military action and the constitution[129]. Hans Kohn, in listing the fundamental conditions for modern nationhood, highlights among other things that nationalist leaders identified an ideology or doctrine to which they adhered for taking forward the nationalist movement. Kohn claims the doctrinal text could constitute standard doctrine or laid down principles of the society or its leadership. Citing the Bible and poems as examples of such standard doctrine, he explains that the nationalist movement which led to the emergence of England as a nation took shape in the Puritan Revolution led by Milton the poet and Cromwell the statesman and priest. Consequently, the English used the Old Testament as the doctrinal basis in pursuing the liberty of citizens from State and Church[130]. The premise that England is God's chosen nation is false, however the birth of English nationalism in a religious matrix in the sixteenth century nevertheless led to the development and adoption of a biblically-based doctrine in the seventeenth century which subsequently led to the emergence of England as a nation in the eighteenth century.

The birth or preparation in the sixteenth century which occurred under the Tudor Monarchs progressed and bore fruit in the seventeenth century with the emergence of the new classes as a result of the non-exclusive opportunities in the expansion of trade and the accumulation of wealth in the pursuit of capitalism.

Not all religions are based in a biblical matrix, and since all religions have a set doctrine, it becomes automatic that every society which experienced nationalism and was religious at the same time had a nationalist ideology if the leaders of the nationalist movement sought guidance from their religious doctrine. This view is supported by Beecham who made a similar observation about certain polities in Ghana (especially the Fanti and Ashanti), that 'among the causes which contribute to the formation of national character, a principal place is to be assigned to religion. Religion is indeed the mould of character and never fails to give a peculiar expression to those distinguishing features of a people, which other causes may have originated'[131]. According to Casely Hayford, the Fantis had a destiny to which they assiduously worked towards[132]. Beecham further reiterates how religious guidelines were appropriated for military purposes, in that 'the measures prescribed to ensure success in war afford a striking proof of the direful influence exerted by the national superstitions'[133]. The emergence of the Fanti nation took place at the beginning of the seventeenth century and their religious matrix dates as far back as the thirteenth century[134], long before the eighteenth century modernist threshold of the doctrine of nationalism. This confirms the view that there were ideologies and doctrines of nationalism in existence long before 1500[135]. The Fanti had satisfied the checklist for nationhood long before the goal posts were set by the modernist scholars.

The Ashanti nation
When the inhabitants of the area around the Niger Bend - roughly between Djenne and Timbuktu - were rioted and forced out by Islamized Saharan Berbers at the beginning of the eleventh century[136] some of the refugees of the Dia (Dja), Libyan Berber and Gara tribes who fled from the Niger region managed to colonise aboriginals to the north-west and west of modern Ghana (the area in current La Cote d'Ivoire) and founded states including the Bona and Kimbu Kingdoms. After suffering defeat, these kingdoms

subsequently moved further south into the tropical rain forest of modern Ghana resulting in the founding of the Akyerekyere and Twifo-Heman kingdoms in AD 1500, the Akwamu kingdom around 1575 and Dormaa around 1600. Refugees from the Bona kingdom moved eastwards and northwards and settled in the Bono Kingdom, and their descendants subsequently founded the Ashanti kingdom in 1701 in the heart of the tropical forest. The *akyeneboa* or totem animal of the Ayoko clan of Dia descent was, and still remains the falcon[137].

The kingdom became a large confederation of states as a result of conquests and annexations. For example, Kokofu, Nsuta, Juabin and Aduman states, which later became part of the Ashanti confederacy, were founded before 1600. Later on, Mampong, Adansi and Bekwai also became part of the confederacy. Ivor Wilks confirms Eva Meyerowitz's account of the emergence of Ashanti as a nation in 1701, the date by which a number of tribes including the Denkyira had been conquered and their allegiance automatically transferred to King Osei Tutu[138]. Wilks maintains that by 1680, the national identity of the Ashanti kingdom had emerged[139], however, given that there existed surrounding tribes who were competing with Ashanti for supremacy in the area, and especially that the war between Ashanti and Adansi in 1680 ended in a stalemate[140], it is understandable why the emergence of the Ashanti as a nation is fixed not at 1680, but at 1701, the year of overall conquest and subjugation of all surrounding enemy tribes by the Ashanti. The battle of Feyiase in 1701 in which the Denkyira were defeated is noted in history as the deciding factor. In addition to the conquest of the last opponent, this made way for the Ashanti to have access to the Gold Coast. Even the Dutch settlers sent an ambassador to King Osei Tutu of Ashanti in 1701 from their headquarters in coastal Elmina[141].

Unlike the Fanti, the Ashanti nation had a much larger empire and territory as a result of the many successful conquests, and rightly so, a larger centralised government. Beecham claims that it was a kingdom of power, majesty and large geographical extent. Regarding the greatness of the Ashanti nation, Beecham states:

> the empire of Ashantee is not so much one State placed immediately under one government, as an assemblage of

States owing a kind of feudal obedience to the sovereign of Ashantee. According to Dupuis, the empire extends westward from the River Volta about four geographical degrees, and reckoning from the neighbourhood of the coast, four degrees of latitude; comprising an area of about sixty thousand miles. Over the whole of the countries within these limits, the King of Ashantee, he says, exercises supreme sway; all kings, viceroys, or caboceers, being his absolute and unconditional vassals, as tributaries or not; and most of them holding their governments by virtue of an appointment from the court[142].

The empire was also known for its great military might. According to Beecham, 'Bowdich calculates that Ashantee proper can alone send two hundred and four thousand soldiers into the field; and its disposable force, since the Ashantee invasions, has been estimated by old residents at upwards of one hundred and fifty thousand'[143]. The Ashanti had a very elaborate and vibrant economic life. In addition to Kumasi being a trade centre, their trade links (unlike the Fanti who controlled the coastal trade) stretched much further north and inland, even as far as Tripoli in North Africa[144]. There was cohesion between the masses and aristocracy as well as checks and balances on the king. It is stated that 'the king was not an absolute ruler but was controlled to a certain extent by a council comprising the queen mother, chiefs of the most important provinces, and the General of the Army'[145]. Thus, despite the pomp and majesty surrounding the throne, the political system of kingship ensured that the king had severe limitations. According to Beecham:

the king of Ashantee, (As-hanti,) although represented as a despotic monarch, having the lives and property of his subjects at his absolute disposal, is not, in all respects, beyond control. He is placed in a situation somewhat similar to the ancient Medes and Persians; among whom it was a principle, that what had once passed into law, the power of the sovereign himself could not change . . . Now, the king of Ashantee is under a somewhat similar obligation to observe the national customs which have been handed down to the people from remote antiquity; and a practical disregard of this

obligation, in the attempt to change some of the customs of their forefathers, cost Osai Quamina his throne[146]

Throughout Ashanti history, there has been a conscientious agenda to pursue and fulfil 'national customs which have been handed down to the people from remote antiquity'[147]. An ideology with origins from remote antiquity was followed by the Kings of Ashanti as a guide for rulership and leadership[148]. A public education system was also in place largely through oral tradition[149]. Therefore, judging from the checklist, the Ashanti were also not only a nation, but became so for almost a century before France and England emerged as nations. The modernist threshold argument is flawed, and does not apply, at least to the Fanti and Ashanti nations of the Gold Coast and Modern Ghana. The empirical evidence from Fanti and Ashanti history clearly indicate that nations and nationalisms had occurred in parts of the world other than Europe, and in countries other than England, France or Spain.

When was the First Nation?

It is quite straightforward to assume, that if the ensemble of components for the assessment of nationhood has been outlined, then one should by it easily identify when nationhood has assumed and which was the first. It is interesting to see that problems about dating the nation are a reflection of the complexity of the confusion characterising the theorizing itself, not least because some theorists are primordialists and others modernists. Using the common rights and duties for all citizens as an example, it is evident that after the 18th century, only very few English had the right to vote. Before 1832, only landlords were allowed to vote. After the Reform Bill of 1832, just over 3% of English males could vote. In 1867 when the franchise was extended, some 80% of adult males could then vote, and in 1918 when it was further extended to all males, only women over thirty years of age could vote[150]. The question to be asked is: where does England's nationhood status stand within the 18th century threshold argument? Also, national consciousness however assumed, is a mass phenomenon, and it becomes debatable how this is assessed especially as more often than not it is the elite and not the masses who chronicle history[151] whether or not cohesion between the two has assumed in the situation, however this is

measured. That there is both contention and frustration among scholars with regard to dating the nation is in no doubt[152]. Just to give you a taste of this frustration, I was among the privileged audience at the Nationalism Debate of April 2004 organised by the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism (ASEN) at the London School of Economics in honour of Smith who was retiring, and can testify to the apprehension demonstrated by the panelists who had presented their papers during the first session of the debate, when I said: 'my question is very simple: when was the first nation?'. A panelist's response was: my question was 'not helpful to the debate'! Judging from the theorizing, there is the temptation for the answer to be based on whether or not one is a primordialist or modernist, in other words whether one's answer would be sampled from the 18th century or prior, either position of which most scholars prefer not to self-label in order to avoid criticism. One can judge this from how deftly panelists and commentators tend to tackle the length and breadth of the nationalism minefield, arguing in between and around the positions without stating where they belong. My view is that there can be the antiquity about some nations, and indeed some modernity about others, but a strict antiquity or modernity of nations obscures the debate. Judging from history, the criteria does unfold and convene before and after the so-called threshold, and as to when was the first nation is certainly prior to modernity. Connor has recently concluded that national consciousness and identity are phenomena based on popular perceptions and defy dating, hence the timelessness of nations[153].

Secessionism/Separatism, Irredentism and Inter-"Nation"-alism

Secession and irredentism are two forms of nationalism revolving around the popular principle of national self-determination which 'was advanced as the new principle of international legitimacy after 1918'[154]. The doctrine of irredentism is derived from the Italian phrase *terra irredenta*, meaning "territory to be redeemed". An essential presupposition of the doctrine is that there must be a redeeming state as well as a known or targeted territory to be redeemed[155]. The term *irredenta* was first used to refer to those Italian-speaking territories, specifically Trente, Dalmatia, Trieste

and Fiume, which were culturally Italian but had remained under Austrian and Swiss rule after Italian unification during the nineteenth century. The Italian movement to annex these Italian-speaking areas became known as an irredentist movement. Subsequently, the current political usage of irredentism refers to any territorial claim or political effort made by a sovereign state to annex or incorporate geographical territory within another state, the occupants of whom the irredentist state claims to have commonality of background or purpose with, on the basis of past shared ethnicity or history. The irredentist aim is for geographical, ethnic and historical union with the related population segments in adjacent countries within a common political framework as proposed or presented by the irredentist state[156]. In all irredentist claims, the elements within the combination of sheer territoriality and genuine ethnic or national sentiments vary from case to case. The Argentinean claim on the Falklands is deemed as irredentist since the Falkland Islands or Malvinas do not contain an Argentinean population[157]. James Mayall argues that, irredentist claims not supported by strong secessionist movements were likely to face defeat if their case were submitted to international legal arbitration due to the lack of existing authoritative judicial ruling from either the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the United Nations (UN) to follow. The consistent refusal by Britain on one hand, and Argentina and Spain on the other, to submit the case of the Falklands/Malvinas to the ICJ's arbitration strongly suggests that both sides were not sure of what the outcome of the judicial ruling could be[158].

Two distinguishing types of irredentism are: 'the attempt to detach land and people from one state in order to incorporate them in another, as in the case of Somalia's recurrent irredenta against Ethiopia; and the attempt to detach land and people divided among more than one state in order to incorporate them into a single new state – a "Kurdistan", for example, composed of Kurds now living in Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey. Both forms of reconstituted boundaries would qualify as irredentist'[159]. Irredentism of the first type can be found in such historical examples as:

the Greeks in Albania and Turkey, the Germans in Czechoslovakia and Poland, and the Croats in Austria and

Yugoslavia. Contemporary cases abound: the Somalis in Ethiopia, the Muslims in Kashmir, the Swazis in the Republic of South Africa, or the Ewe in Ghana. It does not, however, refer to the efforts to reunite the two Germanys, Chinas, or Koreas, where political differences separate groups that view themselves as culturally or historically cohesive[160]

Irredentism of the second type includes such examples as:

the Slovenians in Austria and Yugoslavia; the Macedonians in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece; the Pushtans in Afghanistan and Pakistan; the Armenians in the Soviet Union, Turkey and Iran; the Tajiks and Uzbeks in the Soviet Union and Afghanistan; the Azerbayjanis in the Soviet Union and Iran; and the Kurds in Turkey, Iran and Iraq. In such cases, the ethnic group may seek union with one of the countries, or it may call for independent statehood (and, indeed, the group is frequently divided internally precisely on this question). A variant of this second type may be a situation in which components of multiethnic states have irredentist claims aimed at creating entirely new nation-states. The Kurdish demand for statehood falls directly into this category, as does the Armenian example. In both these instances, however, there is no parent state to press ethnic claims, and hence there is uncertainty regarding the classification of these states. Thus, although it is clear that not every border dispute is irredentist, the matter of recognition and identification of *irredenta* is not as clear cut as it might appear on the surface[161]

Irrespective of any theoretical or practical difficulties in the classification of irredentas, a distinction needs to be made between irredentism and secessionism or separatism. Whereas irredentism is more or less 'a movement by members of an ethnic group in one state to retrieve ethnically kindred people and their territory across borders'[162] secession is any attempt by an ethnic group with claims to a homeland to withdraw its territory from the jurisdiction of a larger state to which it belongs[163]. An example of a secessionist or separatist bid is Biafra versus the Nigerian Federation between 1967 and 1970. Like irredentisms, not all secessions or separatisms

are successful. Indeed, successful secessions are rarer than successful irredentisms, with few examples such as the creation of Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) from Pakistan in 1971[164] and the very latest - that of East Timor from Indonesia in 1999. As Mayall puts it, secession also refers to 'unsuccessful separatist rebellions against the state. Indeed it is frequently used to describe any attempt by a national minority to exercise its right to self-determination by breaking away either to join another state or more often to establish an independent state of its own, or at least an autonomous region within an existing state'[165]. Secessionist or separatist demands may therefore range from autonomy to full independence[166]. It must be noted that the success of the East Timor case depended very much on the authority and cooperation of the United Nations (UN). On August 30 1999, more than 90% of East Timorese voted in an UN-organised referendum to choose independence and autonomy from Indonesia since the latter forcibly took control of East Timor in 1975. Among a number of reasons, religion seems to be the most distinguishing driving force behind this move towards secession. East Timor's population is predominantly Catholic whereas Indonesia's is predominantly Muslim. The UN is the legitimate authority to officiate the designation of any people and related territory as a nation and a *bona fide* member of the international community.

The African Context of Theorizing on Nationalism

The Partition of Africa resulted in many ethnonational identity groups being divided by "international" boundaries, for example, 'the Yoruba in Nigeria and Benin; the Berbers in Algeria, Tunisia and Libya; the Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi; the Afars in Djibouti and Ethiopia; the Khoi-Khoisan in Botswana and Namibia; the Hausa in Nigeria, Niger and Ghana; the Akan in Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire; the Bakongo in Angola and Zaire; and many more'[167]. The long list of groups which were split up among several states continues with 'the Somalis, Bakongo, Ewe, Zande, Fulani, Ngoni, Chewa, Lunda and Yao'[168]. Given the scale of ethnic separation across the African continent, irredentism is comparatively low. This is attributable to a general consensus by African governments, stipulated through the Organization of African Unity (OAU) - now the African Union (AU) - to respect the sanctity of the inter-

"nation"-al borders created at independence. This consensus ideology is framed by the obligation of AU member states to respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity as enshrined in Clause III of the OAU Charter (1963), and reinforced by the Cairo Resolution of 1964[169]. But it must also be noted, that this consensus by AU member states to accept the frontiers of the colonial Partition has not resulted in a successful containment of potential ethnonational related political problems and violence, as some have spilled over the borders of the Partition.

The tension between the containment of identity related problems and their potential to spill over the borders of the Partition is, according to Basil Davidson, part of the institutional crisis the African continent is currently going through[170]. This underpins Davidson's point, that perhaps efforts 'to write into the early independence constitutions the notion that the colonial frontiers, now reborn as national frontiers, need not be immutable, unchangeable, traced as it were by the hand of God'[171], should have been heeded to. Added to the incongruity between ethnonational units and state boundaries, is the dilemma associated with the imposition of a single statehood over multinational communities. Fred Burke, in stating the practical dilemma which the nation-state project posed for Uganda, also mentioned the trickle-down effects which the colonial, incongruent, arbitrary, border demarcations had on local government as well, in that, 'in other areas of Uganda, however, the local government unit encompasses a number of small and antagonistic tribal groups'[172]. At the theoretical level, Burke reiterated the wrestle against this dilemma in earlier scholarship by such academics as Lloyd Fallers, who wrote:

> What, in this situation, is to be the unit of study? What, indeed, is the "real" unit, the unit which "matters"? Is it the tribe, because the colonial territory is simply an artificial boundary enclosing a congeries of people who feel no mutual loyalty or kinship, held together only by the superior force of a European power? Or is it in fact the colonial territory, because the tribes are too small and their institutions too foreign to the nation-state pattern to have a future . . .[173]

This dilemma is what commonly translates into the conflict between ethnonationalism and patriotism[174].

Contrary to popular perception and widespread commentary that the Partition occurred among the European colonial powers at the Berlin West Africa Conference of 1884-5[175], by 1884, many boundaries had already been set. The Berlin Conference was more or less convened as an attempt to reach 'some measure of agreed international control'[176] over what to do with a colony once it had been formally claimed as so. There was a consensus among Conference participants that the economic exploitation of colonies would be open to participation by all parties regardless of the coloniser, thus ensuring free trade and neutrality, especially in the Congo and Niger basins. The Conference itself did not set any specific territorial boundaries. In addition, one main participant (Germany) proposed the establishment of a 'clear criteria for international recognition of territorial claims'[177]. This criteria was never achieved, despite the developing myth that effective occupation, was to be a principle on which to validate a territorial claim. As set out in Chapter VI of the Conference's Final Act, effective occupation was limited to the coasts, which in any case, had already been partitioned before the Conference. Although the Berlin Act did not justify the principle of effective occupation universally, some participants, particularly Britain, abused the principle to pursue their own subsequent interests far removed from the aims of the Conference. The principle therefore made room for spurious legality for the exercise of partitioning[178], springing mainly out of the immediate perceptions of economic, political and strategic interests to individual European powers. It is a certainty that the "validating" of territory was not based on the internationally approved principles which Germany sought to achieve through the Conference, but instead through ad hoc negotiated agreements between the European powers, hence the arbitrary boundary divisions and groupings in Africa today[179].

The scenario explained accounts for the paradox of cartographic boundaries which do not reflect the political economy of geopolitical frontiers and the cultural homogeneity which spans across these borders[180]. However, as argued by Asiwaju, the phenomenon of artificially segregated national groupings or "transborder peoples" is not a feature restricted to Africa, but also

common to Europe and other parts of the world. Asiwaju argues that empirical data does not support J. R. V. Prescott's theory that the evolution of boundaries in Europe and the rest of the world, differs as a process, from the African experience. Asiwaju argues, for example, that there is no comparative difference, on one hand, in the experiences:

> of the Catalans, an ethnic group, neither French nor Spanish, split into two by the Franco-Spanish border drawn through their homeland in the Cerdanya valley of the Eastern Pyrenees; and on the other, the Yoruba, also an ethnic group, neither English nor French, split into two by the Anglo-French colonial (now international) boundary between British Nigeria and French Dahomey (now Republic of Benin) drawn through the homelands of specific subgroups in Western Yorubaland[181]

However, Asiwaju further argues that the boundaries instituted by the Partition are obstructionist to regional integration, and that there are advantages in Africa concentrating on the integrative aspects of the homogeneity of "transborder" peoples as against any artificial, divisive and inter-"nation"-al antagonisms and insecurities arising out of political boundary restrictions[182]. It would appear that, in the main, antagonisms revolving around colonial boundaries exist only between state authorities, and that border populations have little interest in the renegotiation of boundaries, due to the advantages they gain from maintenance of the status quo. Boundaries on maps are not as clear in geographical reality, and the fact that border zones have not been susceptible to rigorous and thorough surveillance has compounded the problem and increased their ambiguity, as well as made them havens of opportunity for both legitimate settlers and fugitives. "Transborder" families and identity groups choose to live on whichever side of a border can be comparatively exploited in terms of tax credits, facilities and opportunities for smuggling[183]. Both Asiwaju and Nugent conclude - as is already clear from some African examples – that as borders are permeable, it would be functionally advantageous for the continent's boundaries to be recognised more as conduits than barriers. The way forward should

be seen in the strengthening of regional cooperation such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), or the South African Development Community (SADC), if not an integral union of the whole continent[184].

It becomes clear, that whereas there is a broad agreement on what the solution to the problem should be, that is, any strategy which will result in: (a) a reinforcement of the 'underlying unities of Africa, rather than its obvious disunities'[185], and/or: (b) the integrative aspects of the homogeneity of "transborder" peoples as against any artificial, divisive and inter-"nation"-al antagonisms and insecurities arising out of political boundary restrictions[186], there seems to be different approaches to the goal. Davidson proposes a reorganization of the whole continent into the natural frontiers of the various identity groups as should have been done during the colonial period[187], and Asiwaju and Nugent propose regional economic blocs of integration which obviously ignore ethno-cultural identities[188].

Irrespective of any potential for: redrawing boundaries along the lines of natural identities; regional economic integration; the advantages which "transborder" communities might be reaping from ambiguous loyalties to neighbouring countries; irredentisms of subregional dimensions; the containment of different national groups under single statehoods; etc, the Partition has created a phenomenon of political competition among ethnonational identity groups, with the aim to control state power and resources along sectarian and clientelistic lines, in what has already been defined as figuration. Davidson attributes this problem to the European model of nationalism, and its associated imposition of a state upon a geographical territory. This has not profited Africa, especially where multiple national identities have been subjugated under single statehoods with the aim of forging an "all-embracing community"[189]. To use the example in modern Ghana, Nugent states that 'the legacy of the Gold Coast as a federation of "native states" is very obvious today'[190].

THE TRADITIONS OF ORIGIN: THE GHANA HYPOTHESIS

Introduction

This chapter seeks to elaborate on the ethnonational configuration of modern multinational Ghana, by tracing the ethno-geographic origins of identity groups to their current ethno-geographic locations in all the ten current politico-administrative Regions of the country[1]. Overall, the chapter offers the view that almost the whole of modern Ghana have migrated from the area occupied by the Old Ghana empire which in the height of its glory spanned the broad geographical area of the Western Sudan, a section of the Sahara, and the Djenne and Timbuktu regions. The only exception, the Ewes and non-Ewe "Togo remnants"[2] are not of Guan ancestry and do not share the above tradition. They are successfully traced to the geographical territory which spans the four countries of modern Ghana, Togo, modern Benin and Nigeria. A case is made for the Ewe irredentism that has existed in the West African sub-region since the Partition. The chapter engages in a discussion on the historical development of Ewe nationalism and how this relates to current politics within the sub-region, especially Ghanaian and Togolese politics. The chapter also explains the emergence of the identity of "Mabians" or "Northerners" (citizens from Northern Ghana) and how this relates to politics in Ghana.

This chapter has been necessitated by the simple fact of the relationship between ethnonational identities and politics on one hand, and how this influences figuration[3] in Ghana and generally Africa, on the other. It has therefore become necessary to examine the traditions of origins and their related influence on people's perceptions (real or imagined) as a means of explaining the linkages between them and the identity patterns in current Ghanaian politics. It is not so much the veracity or mythicality attached to

these traditions of origin that matters as the perceptions and subsequent identity patterns which have developed from them, plus their repercussions on the politics. For example, Nugent makes the point that the suggestion of ancient enmity between Ewes and Ashantis and any link of it to their political differences today are historically false, and rightly so, in that, pre-colonial Anlo-Ewes were Ashanti allies[4]. However, it cannot be ignored also that the recent enmity between the two groups, revolves around the perception that a minority Ewe with different origination from the majority of Modern Ghana are sharing a single statehood as a result of the Partition. Whether or not this is of remote or immediate import to the post-colonial era and current politics is immaterial to the perception of enmity resulting from the historical and political processes that led to the creation of Modern Ghana. Whereas there was no enmity in the historical past between the two groups, recent enmity has assumed as a result of recent histories.

If the historical backgrounds of individual ethnonational groups have a crucial influence over current perceptions of identity and politics vis-à-vis others, it becomes obvious therefore that any pre-colonial anthropological and historical evidence should be examined and given due consideration as a means of making sense of current politics. It has become popular for any academic focus on Ghanaian identity politics not to ignore the history and anthropology of the inherent peoples within the state and the potential linkage to political trends. Nugent and Lentz certainly ensured this was reflected in the recent work they edited.[5]

As already argued, perceptions assumed by individual ethnonational groups vis-à-vis others, do render arguments of veracity or mythicality to the traditions of origins a moot point. Besides, it would appear that due significance ought to be attached to the anthropological evidence than is usually accorded. Sandra Greene also made a point of this regarding her study of the Anlo-Ewe, emphasizing the importance of the relevant connections between the distant past and current trends[6]. Hence this chapter has been an exercise to establish a historical context from which identity patterns of political nature can be traced; a means of illuminating the historical processes underpinning these patterns.

The Genesis of the Ghana Hypothesis

For ages, the moot has been afoot that Modern Ghana is Ancient Ghana - that is, that inhabitants of the modern state of Ghana currently on the west coast of Africa are traceable to those of the Old Ghana Empire in the western Sudan. That the tradition has survived its evolutionary turbulence says something of the truth in the matter, which has been retained by a combination of sources including Arabic geographers, historians and travellers; Sudanese natives; and archaeologists. I do not attempt to present a full chronological sequence, but one logical enough to make some sense from the myriad of evidence. The tradition can stretch backwards to A.D. 721 on the basis that according to the Chronicle of the Seeker[7], the dynasty of Qayamanga died out during the first century of the Hegira (A.D. 622-721); the chronicler claims that the dynasty were not Negro even if there is no agreement as to their tribe. The Chronicle of the Sudan[8] also claims that Qayamanga was the first king to rule this territory of the western Sudan; that his capital was 'Ghana in the land of Baghena'[9]; and sides with the argument of the other chronicler that his dynasty were not Negro even if their subjects included the Wakore or Wangara who were mostly Fulani. A confusion tends to arise from the suggestion of the "whiteness" or "redness" of the Qayamangas[10] on the basis of Hamitic descent[11], given that Hamites are Black and not Caucasian; although therein also lies the hypothesis of this founding dynasty being of Judeo-Syrian origin, and it is significant that E. W. Bovill should also adopt this hypothesis[12]. However, the dynasty are conquered and replaced by a Malian dynasty of Sonninke ancestry and life goes on, along with the tradition and its intricate history of subsequent powers and rulers.

From the eighth to the seventeenth centuries, the tradition is maintained by such notable authors as Al-Fazari the astronomer, Al-Masudi the Baghdad geographer, Al-Bakri the Spanish writer from Cordoba, Al-Khwarezmi the geographer, Al-Hakam the Egyptian chronicler, Al-Yaqubi, Yakut the Baghdad researcher and author, Ibn Hawqal the native of Baghdad, Al-Ghanarti, Idrisi, Ibn Khaldun, Mahmoud Kati and Abderrahman Es-Sadi[13]. We note from Al Bakri's account of 1067-8[14] that Ghana was the king's title, and that when the kingdom moved from Audaghost to Awkar, the

king was Tankamanin, although when the audit trail re-emerges in modern print capitalism during the nineteenth century, W. D. Cooley states in 1841[15] that an ancient empire whose capital was Ghanah was to be found near Timbuktu, and further asserts that both the title of the king and his capital were called Ghanah[16] even if the Barbary Merchants referred to Aukar also as Ghanah[17]. The connexion between the old Ghana and the present is made definite by A B Ellis when he publishes in 1887 that 'In the beginning'[18], the Akans lived in an area beyond Salaga with a sahel landscape and inhabitants mainly herdsmen who were rioted by Mohammedans and as a result migrated southwards to modern Ghana. Reverend J. B. Anaman was hot on Ellis's heels when he also touched on the subject in his 1894 publication[19]. Subsequently, Flora Shaw Lugard translated form French to English[20] a detailed account and documented some useful comparisons between the old Ghana and the present. It was not long before Reverend W. T. Balmer began preaching similar messages to his students at Mfantsipim School[21], and eventually compiled his history sermons into a textbook which he published in 1925[22]. By this stage the hypothesis had become a theory.

R. A. Mauny showed how discontented he was that the theory had now taken root among Gold Coast authors[23]. After Balmer's theory, and from 1928, J. B. Danquah took interest and developed it further, hence culminating into a research he conducted in England from 1934-6[24]. Thereafter, Danquah debated extensively on the subject, for example, in his article of 20 July 1949[25] and succeeded in strongly impressing the hypothesis on the main political players of the time, that the adoption of the name "Ghana" had become a foregone conclusion as part of the struggle towards independence. The hypothesis encountered some criticisms from Mauny, who referred to it as a belief[26], and among other things claimed: that '. . . nothing is known of the origin of Ghana . . .'[27]; that 'all that can be said of the history of Ghana before the coming of the Arabs in the eighth century must, in the present state of our knowledge of West Africa, be merely speculation'[28]; that '. . . we know little of the pre-Islamic Ghana civilization'[29]; and that 'the real origins of the Akan are unknown'[30]. Mauny's claims were followed by rebuttals from Danquah[31] in which the latter deftly veered from repeating old grounds or the

evidence discussed above and known to Mauny, and argued that a second century map of the Greek geographer and astronomer Ptolemy 'included a town situate on the Niger, which he named Thamondakana in the country of the Nigritae'[32], and that Thamondakana shares the same geographical location with present day Timbuctoo[33]. Danquah argued that '. . . Ptolemy's Thamondakana must be referred to as the Ghana of ancient history, and that the name Kana (Akana) in that name is no other than a verbal variation of Akan'[34]. In rebutting Mauny's claims of lack of evidence on whether any ancient Mediterranean people knew the northern part of the Sahara or ever visited tropical West Africa[35], Danquah argued that:

- Herodotus records Pharoah Neco's Phoenician circumnavigation of the African continent which covered geographical areas of the Sahara beyond Libya;

- a Carthaginian voyage made by Hanno with sixty ships and 30,000 sailors passed around West Africa, and again;

- Herodotus records five Nasamonean youngmen from the Great Syrtis in the Mediterranean crossing the Sahara and coming into contact with the Niger[36].

Danquah provided sufficient evidence to deal with Mauny's criticisms but was also aware that some amount of scepticism remained. He held his ground but also stated that '. . . the Akan claim to origin in Ghana is only a hypothesis, not yet a theory. But that does not prevent those who have eyes to see to see its truth'[37]. Irrespective of the theory's evolutionary turbulence had, the end result was that 'at the time of independence the Gold Coast had become Ghana'[38]. Given that Nkrumah and Danquah no longer belonged to the same political party at the time of independence, it remains unclear exactly what ticked Nkrumah to finally settle on the name "Ghana", other than the fact that the force of Danquah's arguments had remained with the major political players of the time hence making the name choice a foregone conclusion. Several other authorships, both around the time of the Mauny-Danquah debates, and following that, prove the anthropo-historical connection between the majority of Modern Ghana and Ancient Ghana, as discussed in the remainder of this chapter and critiqued in the next.

Overview on the Traditions

Modern Ghana is divided into ten administrative Regions. It is a multi-national state with ethnonational and linguistic groups some of whose constituent sub-groups have similar geographical and historical origins. For example, the Akan who make up at least 50% of the population, comprises a number of ethnonational groups including the Akyem, Fanti, Ashanti and Bono. Non-Akan groups include the Mossi or Mole-Dagbani-Gurense, the Ewe, the Ga-Adangbe, and the Gurma. As already mentioned, apart from the CTMs or Togo Remnants and some Ewe-speaking peoples currently located in the Volta Region of south-eastern Ghana[39], the majority of the country are historically cited to originate from a common ancestry traced to the Djenne-Timbuktu area[40]. Ewes are traced from the Abomey dynasty in Dahomey (currently Benin) and may have Yoruba ancestry[41]. Also, over the last three centuries, as a result of migrations, conquest and resettlements, there have been some evolutionary patterns, resulting in some groups being engulfed and subsumed under new names, while others have been split into new and different groups. For example, currently, the Akan includes the Akuapem and Agona. However, Kyerepon-Guans and Late-Guans (based in the Eastern Region) – and who form part of the Akuapem – refer to themselves as Guans, and not Akan[42]. Also, the Efutu-Guans of Winneba whose current geographical location is based in Akan-Fanti territory in the Central Region, refer to themselves or are known as Guans. In addition, although the Efutus are originally a patrilineal people, they have been socially influenced by their matrilineal and dominant Akan-Fanti neighbours[43]. Senya-Guans of Senya Bereku, also in the Central Region, were Guans but have since become matrilineal after having contact with the surrounding dominant and matrilineal Akan-Fantis[44]. Although there is a wider and more ancient Guan ancestry incorporating the majority of Modern Ghana (including Akans), and although the evolution of group identities has resulted in the emergence of new identity names, there exists a few groups who have held onto the ancient Guan identity, name, or tag. Subsequently, the Guan name and identity has significance in:

- tracing the Guan ancestry of the majority of modern Ghanaian groups who currently do not use the Guan tag, as well as;

- having current and specific reference to the few groups who have held on to the Guan tag.

For example, Ga-Adangbes, although not Akan are also of Guan ancestry[45] but do not use the Guan tag. Therefore whereas the majority of Modern Ghana are of Guan ancestry, only a handful of groups currently use the Guan tag or refer to themselves as Guans. The Akuapem, *Aguan*a (or Agona), Bono, Ahafo, Ashanti, Fanti and Akyem who are all of Guan ancestry are all now classified as Akan. Even some Efutu-Guans refer to themselves as Akan and prefer to speak Fanti instead of Guan[46]. Some of the earlier Akan ethnonational-states were Bono, Asante, Akyerekyere, Twifo-Heman, Akwamu and Domaa, Kormante and Etsi[47]. The latter ones include the Fanti, Akyem and Akuapim. The Akerekyere and Twifo-Heman no longer exist as an ethnonational entity, having been overrun by more powerful neighbouring states. They would now be mixed up among any of the remaining earlier or later Akan sub-groups. The evolution of identity groups whether along political or linguistic lines has been countrywide, and therefore the current Akan-speaking and so-called Guan-speaking peoples of southern Ghana are not the only examples of current linguistic homogeneity. The Gur-speaking Nanumba, Dagomba and Mamprusi of northern Ghana are separate polities, but are culturally linked by the Gur language, which they share with some Mossi kingdoms south of Burkina Faso, a neighbouring country north of Modern Ghana[48].

According to Meyerowitz, the Akan people of the former Gold Coast have migrated from the area around the Niger Bend, roughly between Djenne and Timbuktu - their former dwelling site, until they were rioted and forced out by Islamized Saharan Berbers at the beginning of the 11th century by Assaud or Azawagh. I. Hrbek and J. Devisse argue that the ruler of Ancient Ghana – situated north of the Inland Niger Delta – was more accommodating to the Muslim Almoravids, and that Ancient Ghana officially became Islamic after the Almoravid conquest at the end of the 11th century[49]. Some of these Akan states are even able to trace their ancestry and geographical origins to a different area and era before Djenne and Timbuktu. The Bono-Takyiman or (Techiman-Brong) recall from their ancestral history that prior to the Niger area, they were settled farther north in the White Desert or "Sarem"

(translated the country of the sand), now called the Sahara[50]. The tradition as preserved by the Kormante and Etsi has the name of the place as Djadu, N'Djadum or Diadom (whose literal translation is Dja or Dia confederation)[51]. In current Akan, *dum* or *dom* literally means a confederation or crowd of people. According to Meyerowitz, the identification of the names Djadu, Djadom or Diadom may be with the Oasis of Djado (or Jado) located in the western Tibesti in Eastern Sahara. The Arab name of Djado seems to be *Agwas* - for the Tuaregs of Air; *Gua* - for the Tuaregs of Fezzan; and *Braun* (sounding like modern Brong) - for the Tebu. It is said therefore that the Akan have a mixed ancestry. The pre-11th century Agwas of the Eastern Sahara (or with prefix: Ilagwas) are also known as Agwatin, Ilagwatin, or Ilaguantan. The tradition follows that they were Eastern Libyans of the same stock as the Luata in North Africa[52]. [The Hamitic hypothesis - which suggests an extension of the myths of origin of some groups in Ghana 'from as far away as the Tigris and Euphrates in Mesopotamia'[53] – is very controversial and has been labelled by some historians as far-fetched. However, Wilson argues that the variation of the traditions of origin which suggests a migration from the Chad-Benue region has some validity][54].

The Dja, or Za/Zaga (Arabic *Zaghawa*) gave the Djado Oasis its third name, and their origins are believed to be Abyssinia, or Southern Arabia. The Zaga are known to have conquered the Eastern Sudan, Eastern Sahara and a large portion of North Africa sometime in the 1st century AD. Hence the Zaga or Zaghawa Kingdom was founded in the Tibesti area of the Eastern Sahara[55]. This is confirmed by the Arab writer Al Muhallebi (AD 903-963)[56]. The Fezzan-Lake Chad caravan route also spans this region. The pre-11th century Zaga Kingdom appears to be: (a) a confederation of the Za, Dja or Dia, who are believed to have formed the ruling aristocracy and also named the state as the Oasis of Djado which served as the seat of government; (b) the Agwas, Gwa (without prefix and suffix) or Gua, who are Libyan Berbers from Eastern Libya; and (c) the Gara, out of whom the Tibu and the Kora'an (called Garawan in the Fezzan – medieval descendants of the Garamantes of antiquity) emerge. Currently, Kora'an is still part of the Zaghawa, now populating Eastern Sudan. Tibu is the language of both present day Kora'an and Zaghawa peoples[57]. It appears

therefore that the founders of the Akan states descended from: (a) the Dia or Za (Diaga or Zaga); (b) the Libyan Berbers; and (c) the Gara of Tibesti who migrated southwards as a result of Arab conquests of North Africa, and their territory replaced with the Lemta Tuaregs who were displaced from the Fezzan by the Arabs.

The inter-tribal settlement along the Niger Bend between Djenne and Timbuktu ended up in the incorporation of the aboriginals in the area into the clanship of the settlers. As is unsurprising among matrilineally organised groups, the intermarriages with the aboriginals resulted in the tribal purity of the settlers from North Africa being corrupted. As part of the huge Islamic campaign which affected both the Sahara and sub-Sahara when the Islamized Berbers rioted the new Dia or Dja Kingdom near the Niger Bend, thousands of the Dja sought refuge further south, hence founding a number of states among the Mo (Grusi-speaking aboriginals). Subsequent defeat by the Mo just before AD 1300 caused a further southward movement into Gonja or Guan-Dja (the Northern territories in Modern Ghana). Movements further south by some others resulted in settlement around the Black Volta River known as the Bono Kingdom and founded by Asaman. The Bono Kingdom became the first Akan state in Ghana. Other refugees of the Dia, Libyan Berber and Gara tribes who fled from the Niger region managed to colonize aboriginals to the north-west and west of Modern Ghana (now La Cote d'Ivoire) and founded states including the Bona and Kumbu Kingdoms. These subsequent kingdoms, after suffering defeat also, moved further south into the tropical rain forest of Modern Ghana resulting in the founding of the Akyerekyere and Twifo-Heman kingdoms in AD 1500, Akwamu around 1575, and Domaa around 1600. Refugees from the Bona Kingdom moved eastwards and northwards and settled in the Bono Kingdom, and their descendants subsequently founded the Asante Kingdom in 1701 in the heart of the tropical forest[58]. According to Meyerowitz:

> the descendants of the Dia, Dja, or Za seem to be represented among the Akan by: (a) the Diala (Ayoko clan) who founded the Bono Kingdom at about AD 1295; (b) the Adiaka who founded the Dia-Mo (or Djomo) Kingdom at the same time; (c) the Diana (Ayoko clan) who founded the Juaben and

Bekwai States now in the Asante Confederacy; and (d) the Diara-N'Koran (Ayoko clan) who founded first the Bona Kingdom in the beginning of the eleventh century, then the Kokofu and Kumasi states (seventeenth century), and finally the Asante Kingdom. The *akyeneboa* or totem animal of the Ayoko of Dia descent was, and still remains the falcon[59].

The historical analysis continues that the descendants of the Libyan Berbers – A*gwa*s (Gua), A*gwa*tin, L*aguan*tan, or I*guan*tan - without the prefixes and plural suffixes – Gwa, Gua or Guan, became the most powerful clan in the Bono Kingdom, having "styled" themselves A*gwa*na (or descendants of Gwa). The letter *A* is the Akan prefix for living things. In other Akan states the name in the various districts became Aguana, Eguana, Agona, Akwona or Aguna. Their totem animal and state emblem, as from their remote ancestry, is the parrot, since the majority of the Bono people were by descent Gwa or Guan.

CTMs and the Volta Region of Modern Ghana
Paul Nugent states that:

> Out of a list of 28 separate Guan peoples compiled in 1980, no less than 14 were from the Volta Region. This included not just the Nkonya, but the Lolobi, Akpafu, Likpe, Santrokofi, Bowiri, Logba, Nyangbo, Tafi and Buem – although for some reason the Avatime were excluded from the list. This classification was a radical innovation in the sense that nobody had previously thought to label the so-called "Togo remnants" as Guan[60].

Nugent writes that the Volta Region is currently not occupied by only Ewes but also non-Ewe groups known as CTMs or "Togo remnants". CTMs are found in both Ghana and Togo[61]. For example, the Likpe encountered the Ewe-speaking Danyi and Wli (by sharing boundaries with them), but whereas the Likpe are currently based in Ghana, the Danyi are based in Togo. The Togoland hills which harbour the CTMs straddles the borders of both countries[62]. However, regarding the traditions of origins, there is common agreement between Nugent and other authors such as

Amenumey and Robin Law, that largely, current occupants of the Region have migrated westwards from an eastern location, perhaps close to the heart of Yoruba territory[63]. The origins of non-Ewes in the Region are debatable to a certain extent[64] but the common agreement between Amenumey, Law and Nugent leads to establish the point that at least Ewes in Ghana do not share the same anthropo-geographical origins with the remainder of the country. This may have contributed to any marginalization of Ewes in Ghana both historiographically and politically. Nugent offers a view that their marginalization is partly (if not wholly) due to the way in which historical knowledge about them has been constructed, but at the same time he exercises caution, in that: (a) his view, described by himself as a simple deduction, is based on an examination of evidence accumulated in the recent past; and also (b) Nugent is starkly aware of Sandra Greene's findings and argument that the "we-group definition" among Anlo-Ewes is steeped in distant pre-colonial evidence[65]. Therefore the pre-colonial development of the Ewe identity is not to be ignored. As Nugent himself states about the groups in the Region, 'there may, therefore, be greater continuities between the pre-colonial, colonial and indeed post-colonial periods than is commonly allowed for'[66].

The Guan Controversy Explained

As already established, according to Meyerowitz, some groups in Modern Ghana including the Akan are traced from the Niger Bend area - popularly referred to as the area between Djenne and Timbuktu. For example, the Gonja (or Guan-Dja) of Northern Ghana are traced to the Djenne-Timbuktu area[67]. Kwamena-Poh also refers to the Guans as part of the Niger-Congo family and relates them to some Akan groups such as the Fanti and Twi[68]. Ephirim-Donkor also traces the Efutu-Guans to Timbuktu[69]. As already discussed, some of the old Akan states such as the Bono, Etsi and Kormantse[70] trace their ancestry to a Saharan location as well as an era prior to Djenne-Timbuktu. Furthermore, Meyerowitz traces the etymology of the word "Guan" to the Saharan and Libyan Berbers[71]. There is therefore a wider, more ancient, inclusive and latent Guan ancestry than what amounts to the current exclusive usage of the Guan tag by a handful of groups in Modern Ghana such as the Efutu-Guans, Kyerepong-Guans, Late-

Guans, Anum-Guans and Kpesi-Guans. The wider Guan ancestry and identity includes such ethnonational groups as the Gonja (Guan-Dja) and Akan. It is therefore not surprising that some Akans and Gonjas refer to themselves as Guans and vice versa. For example, as already mentioned, some Efutu-Guans of Winneba see themselves as both Fanti and Guan since they live in Fanti territory and speak both Fanti and Guan[72]. The confusion within the Guan controversy is aptly summarised in the statement: 'whether I am Effutu or Fantse I am still an Akan'[73]. The Efutus are originally patrilineal but their patriliny has been socially influenced and threatened by a variety of factors inherent in proximity with their dominant Akan-Fanti neighbours[74]. Also, the Senya-Guans of Senya Bereku who are current occupants of Fanti territory in the Central Region were patrilineal Guans but are now practicing matriliny[75].

Second, in addition to the over-riding, wider and more inclusive Guan ancestry, plus the few confusing cases of evolutionary interchangeability between Akans and Guans, there are Guans who although have encountered Akans (or have perhaps even been under Akan jurisdiction), remain Guan-speaking, have kept and continue to keep a strong Guan identity. For example, the Kyerepon-Guans and Late-Guans[76]. Kwamena-Poh states that unlike the Kyerepon dialect which has been invaded by some Akan words, the Late dialect has remained "compact" and uncorrupted[77]. At the extreme end of the spectrum, we have the 'Kpesi-Guans - earliest settlers of Guan extraction'[78] who have never mixed with the Akan, have been based in the south-eastern tip of Modern Ghana, and were the original 'owners of the land and lagoons between Accra and the mouth of the Volta'[79]. The Kpesi-Guans are not Akan.

Third is the issue of patriliny and matriliny. Guans are originally a patrilineal people, but some who have entered Akan territory or mixed with Akans have become matrilineal. Guans who have never mixed with the Dja or Akan, or been under their jurisdiction, remain patrilineal[80], for example the Kpesi-Guan. Some Guans who have encountered the Akan have maintained their patriliny, for example the Late-Guans and Kyerepon-Guans. The Efutu-Guans have been socially influenced by the neighbouring Akan-Fanti matrilineal system and are undergoing a struggle between patriliny

and matriliny with serious ramifications to the Efutu political system and the process of electing the Efutu King[81]. However, others have converted to matriliny, for example the Senya-Guans of Senya Bereku[82]. Therefore any hard and fast distinction between a patriliny of Guans and a matriliny of Akans is not as universalistic as portrayed by authorships such as Michelle Gilbert[83].

The explanation of the Guan controversy amounts to the following conclusions. (1) Within the ethnonational configuration of Modern Ghana, it must therefore be seen that:

- there is a current remnant and exclusive usage of the Guan name and identity, as well as;
- a latent, wider and inclusive Guan ancestry.

(2) The Guan name and identity therefore has significance in:

- tracing the Guan ancestry of the overall majority of Ghanaian groups some of which do not currently use the Guan tag, as well as;
- having current and specific reference to a few groups who have held on to the Guan name and still use the Guan tag, for example the Kpesi-Guans, Kyerepong-Guans, Late-Guans and Efutu-Guans.

(3) At Independence in 1957, the name Ghana was chosen to replace the colonial name Gold Coast for reasons including the historical and anthropological evidence that the majority of Modern Ghana – of the wider Guan ancestry – have migrated from the geographical area of Ancient Ghana. This wider Guan ancestry therefore has a significant contribution towards the modern Ghanaian identity which over-rides any exclusive latter-day clings or allusions to the Guan tag by a few groups.

The Traditions by Region

The Bono Kingdom and the Brong-Ahafo Region

The capital city of the Bono kingdom, Bono-Mansu, is purported to be the 'oldest centre of Akan civilization south of the Black Volta river'[84]. The date for the founding of this city is fixed at 1295. The Bono kingdom was conquered by the Asante in 1740, and Bono-Mansu destroyed by the same in 1742[85]. The Bono ruling class (and the Bonos for that matter) are known by the Takyiman

tradition to have originated from the "Great White Desert" (the Sahara), from where they migrated to Diala or Diula, close to a big river, with their livestock, and later moved on to settle in Mo (or Mossi), the aboriginals of the region immediately north of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast.

Inspite of the great kingdom founded here by the Bonos, a defeat in war resulted in some of them fleeing southwards to Gonja as refugees along the military routes charted and led by their fleeting army. From Mo to Gonja in the Northern Territories, they were led by three men, two of whom died. The survivor was Nana Asaman. It is said that on reaching the fringes of the Black Volta, the remaining and surviving Bono folk under Nana Asaman defected from the main Bono body and crossed the Black Volta to the fringes of the tropical forest about 30 miles east of modern Takyiman - formerly the second largest city in the Bono kingdom after Bono-Mansu[86]. It is not known whether the split was initiated by Nana Asaman, but as the tradition continues, Nana Asaman led this defected group, and in a time of crises, led them to build two sites, first Yefri, and later Bono-Mansu, which later became the capital of the new Bono. One group of refugees who did not follow Nana Asaman broke away and wandered through the forest via the Afram, a tributary of the Volta, and finally reached the coast to found the town of Eguafo. The same Eguafo also founded Elmina[87]. Another group which also moved southwards to the coast, became the Afutu or Efutu people who founded Ogua - now also called Cape Coast, and Tumpa or Simpa - now also called Winneba[88]. Bono rose to wealth and fame as a result of gold discovered in its territory. Bono-Mansu became a market centre to which traders from Sudan, Egypt, North Africa and Arabia came via the caravan routes, and the main trade items were gold and kola nuts. In the first half of the 17th century, Bono-Mansu defeated and annexed Beeo-Nsoko. Later on, at the height of its power, the Bono kingdom was attacked by the Asante and Bono-Mansu was totally destroyed in the process by 1740. The Bono people, together with the Ahafos in the Ahafo district, form the Brong-Ahafo region of Modern Ghana, where Takyiman and Nkoranza are still prominent trading towns, the latter being next-in-line to Takyiman in terms of prominence in the Bono Kingdom. Brong is pronounced as in "Bono".

The Ahafo district is inhabited by the Ahafos, the allied Kukuom and the rival Mim. The settlement of the Ahafo dates from the middle of the 18th century[89], and in accordance with the literal meaning of Ahafo (hunters), oral tradition has it that they trickled into the area as isolated communities hunting for and gathering animals and forest produce[90]. Many Ahafos admit that they are "strangers" and also admit that their settlement is within the last two centuries, thereby proving that the Ahafos have no autochthons[91]. However, a more objective account has it that Ahafo settlement is a 'by-product of: (a) conflict during the eighteenth century between the rival states of Ashanti and Denkyira, and; (b) the expansion of Ashanti after the defeat of Denkyira in the epoch-making battle of Feyiase in 1701'[92]. Being part of the geographical and military union of the Ashanti confederacy, the Ahafos had to pay tribute to their Ashanti overlords. When the Ashanti Confederacy was abrogated in 1901, both the Ahafos and Kukuom (under the paramount leadership of the latter) enjoyed autonomy and independence until it was re-established in 1935[93]. Mim, a close associate of the Ashanti, prospered in the re-establishment of the Ashanti Confederacy in 1935. The Ahafo district as a whole seems to be fraught with political vicissitudes. In 1958, the Convention People's Party (CPP) of Nkrumah's government restored Kukuomhene (Chief of Kukuom) to paramountcy, and deposed the Mimhene (Chief of Mim). Mimhene re-gained the upper hand when Nkrumah's government was overthrown by a coup d'etat in February 1966, and the Kukuomhene was abrogated as a result[94]. This political see-saw has resulted into the two main political alliances in the Brong-Ahafo Region - the Kukuom faction and the Mim faction. The former advocated secession from Ashanti in order to form an independent Ahafo state, on the grounds that they originate from the Denkyiras (Ashanti's historic rival), whilst the latter aligns with Ashanti in support of a wider Ashanti union incorporating Ahafo[95].

Incidentally, both Mim and Kukuom are located in the Ahafo district of the Brong-Ahafo Region. Hence, Nkrumah's CPP government, and any other subsequent government which is opposed to the Ashanti-led Danquah-Busia tradition (for example, Rawlings' P/NDC government 1982-2000), usually plays upon this historic factional division to gain divisive foothold over the Ahafo

district of the Brong-Ahafo Region, as a political ploy against the Ashantis.

This ploy has had recurrences in Ghana's modern political history. The Danquah-Busia tradition – the Progress Party (PP) as it was called in 1969 - was led by Dr. Kofi Busia to electoral victory culminating in Ghana's Second Republic which began in 1969. Busia became the Prime Minister of the Second Republic. Busia however, hails from the Brong-Ahafo Region and is a descendant of the royal family of Wenchi (Wenkyi or Wankyi). But Wenchi is in the Bono (Brong) section of the Region and has not had any direct dealings with the Ahafo rivalries. Relations between the Brong-Ahafo and Ashanti Regions have always been erratic and sensitive, with each playing on the other's weaknesses. The loyalty and electoral alliances which are supposed to have been between them due to their common ancestry from the Djenne-Timbuktu area seem not to have crystallised, even after Busia's leadership of the PP to electoral victory in 1969. The Ashanti defeat of Bono in 1740 might be an explanation. Because as a vassal state to the Ashanti, the Bono (Brong) had to pay tribute from off their own land (now controlled by the Asantehene) to Kumasi, as well as accept settlers and hunters "posted" there by authorisation from Kumasi (the capital of Ashanti). Some Ashanti chiefs still assert rights to demand and allocate land in the Brong-Ahafo Region[96]. It would appear that the electoral results from 1992 and 1996 indicate that overall, the Brong-Ahafo Region has not supported the Ashanti-led Danquah-Busia tradition. Results of the 1992 Parliamentary elections reveal that out of the 21 constituencies in the Region, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) - the Danquah-Busia tradition as it assumed from 1992 – lost in as much as 20 of them, all to the rival and then ruling NDC[97]. There might also be a case that the Brong-Ahafo Region is comparatively neglected in national development. Hence, between the 1992 and 1996 elections, the ruling NDC government capitalised on the recurrent implications of the political see-saw, and courted the Brong-Ahafo Region with the allocation of development projects including electrification, pipe-borne water, increases in cocoa producer prices and the building of feeder roads. As Nugent states, 'Projects across the country were therefore timed to reach fruition in the immediate run-up to the poll' of 1996[98]. Subsequent elections in 2000 and

2004 have seen the NPP's fortunes overturned for a variety of reasons including the acute unpopularity of Jerry Rawlings and how this has impacted negatively on the NDC's performance; plus the general mood of the country for a change of government in 2000, and a related mood in 2004 that it was too early to change government soon after 2000. In 2000, the NPP won 13 parliamentary seats out of 21 in the Region, and the NDC won 7[99]. In 2004, the NPP won 14 out of 24, and the NDC won 10[100]. For the presidential results, the NPP candidates performed better than the NDC in both 2000 and 2004[101].

The "Gonja" Kingdom and the Northern, Upper-East and Upper-West Regions

The Gonja territory, as the analysis below would reveal, changed names form Gonja kingdom, to Kania kingdom, to Nta kingdom and finally to Gonja. The aborigines of the Gonja kingdom were the Mo (Mossi) people (commonly called Grunshi by the Europeans). The Dja-Mo or Djo-Mo or Ka-Dju-Mo, are Mossi people who had accepted the matrilineal organization of the N'Gwa from Dja[102]. The origins of the Gonja, according to tradition, dates from the 11th century. A section of the Gonja people – the Guan-Dja, claim that their ancestors, the N'Gwa or A'Gwa, came from the region called Dia or Dja known to be between Djenne and Timbuktu, in order to avoid compulsory "conversion" to Islam when the Moslem Assauano or Assaud (Azawagh), leader of the Islamized Berbers, invaded it at the beginning of the 11th century[103]. [Note that the Dia kings who succumbed to Islamic conversion as a result of the same rioting were also to be found in the "Niger Bend" area, their capital being transferred from Kukia to Gao on the Middle Niger from 1009 to 1010][104]. Between 1200 and 1300, the N'Gwa or A'Gwa states around the Niger Bend were conquered by the Bozamfri people from Zamfara in Northern Nigeria. The N'Gwa proper were rioted in 1200, the Mamprusi at about 1250 and four or five other states in Mossi at about 1300. These "Bozamfri refugees" from Mamprusi later conquered Dagomba in the latter half of the 14th century[105]. Hence the Gonja Kingdom, which occupies the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, was created from the refugees who came from Dia or Dja – the region between Djenne and Timbuktu[106].

In the middle half of the 15th century, under the leadership of King Darigudienda of the Dagomba, the Gonja kingdom was conquered by the Dagomba and Mamprusi. Darigudienda (whose descendants established the Kania kingdom) took the town of Bona, married the Bona princess and had a son called Bonkane. A generation or two after Bonkane had succeeded him, the Kania kingdom came into existence in Gonja resulting in the ousting of the Dagomba from the territory. The Kania or (Accany or Akan), according to the tradition of the Twifo-Heman, originated from the Kingdom of Kumbu – a confederated state of the great Mande Mali Kingdom. When Djenne, the capital state of Mali was conquered by the Songhai in 1473, Kumbu passed into the hands of the Songhai. The founders of Kania are therefore Akan from Kumbu in Mande who took refuge in Bona before settling finally in the Gbipe region on the Black Volta, immediately north of Bono-Mansu. The capital of Kania was Kania-se or Kaniamase, and the King of Kania's title was Kinimpase-Wura[107]. Sometime in 1591 (a date preserved in the Koran as "the 1000th year of the Hegira")[108], a Mande general named Djakpa, accompanied with a lot of refugees came and sought refuge for a brief period in Dja-Gbon (or the Bole area), after which he attacked the Kania kingdom. As King of Kania, Djakpa styled himself as Ndo-wura (Nda-Wura or Nta-wura), that is "Lord of the Ndo (Nda or Nta)". His people are therefore referred to in Fante language as Ntafo (meaning people of Nta). Djakpa, after consolidating his power, defeated the Dagomba and their capital Njani or Djani was transferred south into Konkomba territory. The name Njani or Djani was corrupted to Yandi or Yendi, as the town and its people are still called today.

To date, the Nta area is still called Gonja territory. Djakpa died through mortal wounds when he tried to invade and capture the Bono territory south of the Northern Territories[109]. In about 1600, the Mandingo people (called Mande or Mende by the Gonja and Bono people) came from Kangaba and Segu, conquered the whole Gonja country (or the Northern Territories), and established themselves as the ruling class till today[110]. On the administrative map of Modern Ghana, the "Northern Territories" are now the Northern, Upper-East and Upper-West Regions. Together, these three politico-administrative regions occupy a geographical section of Ghana usually referred to as Northern Ghana, and its occupants

as "Northerners". The Meyerowitz account is interspersed with phonological evidence which also helps to understand the origins of the Gonja[111].

Sometime after the final destruction of the Bono Kingdom by the Ashantis, the Ashanti hegemony and control of the hinterland extended to the Northern Territories. Ashanti controlled the trade between the coast and the hinterland, with the "Northerners" acting as middlemen between the Saharan trade routes and the Ashanti. Ashanti trade influence extended as far as Salaga in the Northern Territories, Salaga being the chief trade centre in the area. After the Ashanti had consolidated their gains from their central position in the coastal-interior trade, they began to militarily challenge the Northern neighbours, resulting in several wars being fought with the Gyaman, Gonja and Dagomba between the 17th and 18th centuries. The Ashanti also fought southwards against coastal tribes and the European establishments over trading rights and "free trade" between the coast and the Northern Territories, resulting in seven different wars in 1821, 1824, 1826, 1828, 1865, 1873-4 and 1894-6[112].

First contacts of colonial authorities with the Northern Territories took place after the Berlin Conference of 1884, the initial aims of contact being for the sole purposes of commercial treaties. The first were from the Germans in 1886 and 1888. Thereafter, Germany, intent on avoiding a conflict with either France or Britain, agreed with London on a neutral zone within which both colonial powers would 'abstain from protectorates or exclusive influence'[113]. Despite British overtures to the native authorities of Dagomba, Gonja, "Gurunsi" and Mossi, the Ya-Na of Yendi accepted protection from Germany in 1894, and subsequently all Anglo-German negotiations on trade influences broke in 1895 until the Anglo-German Border Treaty was signed in 1899[114]. The area east of the border was until 1914 administered by Germany as "Schutzgebiet Togoland", until British troops from the Gold Coast annexed it from 1919 till 1947, after which it became a UN-mandated area. Before this period the British colonial-cum-military officer - the Chief Commissioner of the Northern Territories (CCNT) - had joined the Gold Coast Executive Council in 1934 and the Gold Coast Legislative Council in 1946. The results of the plebiscite of 9 May 1956[115] released the "Togoland" area of

the Northern territories finally into the hands of the Gold Coast and thereafter Ghana[116].

The "Northern Territories" or the Northern, Upper-East and Upper-West Regions of Ghana have taken various active parts in the political history of Modern Ghana both in the pre-independence struggle and in the post-independence era. Among many other things, the late Hilla Limann[117] was President of Ghana's Third Republic and leader of the Nkrumahist People's National Party (PNP) which won the elections in 1979. Until his death, he was the Paramount Chief of Gwolu in "Gonja" country under the chieftaincy title Kuoro Hilla Limann III. In addition, due to the ethnic arithmetic in Ghanaian governments, there has always been a fairly good representation of "Northerners" at the political helm of affairs. As at May 1997, the cabinet of the ruling NDC government had six people hailing from Northern Ghana[118].

It can be argued from the common ancestry of the Gonja peoples, that their emergence as a nation would have occurred had had there not been a colonial intervention. Although the Ashanti conquered the Bono who were south of Gonja, they never conquered the Gonja even if they had trade influences and links with them. It is also likely that the Bono would have joined forces with their Gonja relatives of common ancestry against the Ashanti.

"Northerners" versus "Southerners"

From the colonial history of the Gold Coast, the associated development of the coastal Southern Ghana and the relative underdevelopment of the inland Northern Ghana, a somewhat common identity has forged among the "Northerners". As already mentioned, Northern Ghana means the geographical area currently spanning the current the Northern, Upper-West and Upper-East administrative regions of Ghana. References to Northerners as Mabians springs from the Northern Ghana traditional word "mabia" or "mmabia", meaning "my brother". Northerners see themselves as belonging to a common identity or "brotherhood" in a way that Southerners do not. Inter-tribal tensions in Northern Ghana, for example between the Nanumbas and Konkombas[119] do not have the same political sensitivities and connotations as what exists in Southern Ghana between Akans and Ewes.

The north is vastly savannah land which makes a clear vegetational distinction from the forestry south. Perhaps this adds to the development of the Northern identity with respect to the relatively dry weather and distinctive agricultural pursuits. Commonality of feeling among Northerners also derives from the relative underdevelopment of their location, as well as having a relatively predominant Muslim community in comparison with the south. Northern Ghana has very scarce educational resources whereas the best educational establishments in Ghana are located in the south. Educational activity in the north is comparatively low, and for several decades after independence, Northerners have been entitled to free education as an incentive. Despite sharing the Guan identity with most of Southerners, any combination of factors within the scenario outlined above has contributed to the "brotherhood" which has resulted in Northerners being Mabians. It must be noted, that in terms of citizenship, Northerners are no less Ghanaian than Southerners and "mabian-ness" ought to be admired. Table 1 which follows spells out the diversity of groupings in Northern Ghana

Table 1: Major tribes of Northern Ghana in their current politico-administrative Regions

Tribe	Language	Major city/town	Region
Dagomba	Dagbani	Tamale, Yendi, Tolon	Northern
Gonja	Gonja	Damongo, Salaga	Northern
Nanumba	Nanumba	Wulensi	Northern
Konkomba	Konkomba	Kpandai, Dambai	Northern
Bimoba	Bimoba	Nakpanduri	Northern
Mamprusi	Mampruli	Walewale, Gambaga	Northern
Frafra - Nabdams, Gurunses, Talensis	Nabke, Gurunne, Talene	Bolgatanga, Bongo, Zuarungu, Zorko	Upper-East

Source: George Atiah Nsoh (see acknowledgements)

Despite Northerners and Southerners sharing similar citizenship, the less fortunate history and ecology of the north, and the common Mabian identity which has evolved, has translated into several implications. For example, northern migrants living in any city, town or village in southern Ghana tend to cluster or ghetto-ise into common residential units referred to as "Zongo". Second, Ghanaian politics has tended to treat Northerners with another brush, especially where they are roped into the political arithmetic[120] when their votes are critical for electoral victories: as happened in 1979 when the choice of Dr Hilla Limann as the presidential candidate of the PNP became the crucial factor to the PNP's victory; or as happened in 2000 when all the major parties chose a Northerner as the running mate to their presidential candidates.

The "Northern" vote
As already mentioned, politicians have been cashing in on the northern votes, a tactic usually fraught with promises they never deliver. Therefore, in a pre-election development, discontent was expressed at what appeared to be a scheme by the top hierarchy of the incumbent NDC government to sideline Northerners as they bid for the vice-presidential candidacy for the December 2000 presidential elections. The Northerners complained that both past two elections in 1992 and 1996 had an Ewe president and an Akan vice-president. As the NDC's presidential candidate for the 2000 elections was an Akan-Fanti (John Ata Mills), Northerners deemed it as their bona fide right to field their candidate. Alhaji Salpawuni Alhassan, Executive member of the Chogo-Tishigu Constituency in Tamale, said 'the country has got to a stage where we think that the North should be given the chance'[121]. Hence all Zongos in the country had been put on the alert to fight against the trend in political discrimination against Northerners[122]. It became obvious that the general direction of northern votes depended very much on the ethnonational identities of the presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Subsequently, 'a union of citizens from the three northern regions and various Zongo communities throughout the country, calling itself COZONGO, dared the leadership of the NDC to make the right choice of a Northerner as a running mate

or face the consequences'[123]. Obviously, the rationality behind the ethnonationalism of the Northerners was dictating the direction of their votes. The COZONGO made it clear that they were not asking for a favour, and that this was a 'genuine demand', owing to the immense contribution and sacrifices which Northerners had made to the NDC's success[124].

Although some power brokers within the NDC were of the persuasion that the NDC's vice-presidential candidate should be an Ewe, and had in mind Dr Obed Asamoah, since the choice of running mate lay with Ata Mills, the NDC eventually bowed to the political pressure of the Northerners, as well as what seemed to be the political wisdom of the 2000 electoral season, and selected Alhaji Amidu as the party's vice-presidential candidate. Soon afterwards, the NPP also selected Alhaji Mahama Aliu, a Northerner, as the party's vice-presidential candidate. Professor George Hagan, the presidential candidate for the CPP also selected Alhaji Ibrahim Abubakr, a Northerner, as his running mate, and Goosie Tanoh the presidential candidate for the NRP also picked Cletus Kosiba, a Northerner, as his running mate. The competition for the Northern vote therefore became keener than expected. However, as the NDC was popularly approached by Northerners to field a Northern vice-presidential candidate, and it was the first party to do so, it would appear that the NDC's accession to the popular northern request paid off[125], in that, the party's presidential candidate won most of the northern vote in the first round ballot of the December 2000 presidential election[126], and in the run-off too[127]. The NDC winning pattern in the north continued in 2004[128].

Fantis and the Central Region
A brief point needs to be made, that just as the ethnonational composition of the Volta Region is not one hundred percent pure, so is that of the Central Region[129]. Hence, not all people in the Central Region are Fantis, or even Akans in the modern Ghanaian sense. Although the Central Region is generally deemed as Fanti territory as already discussed, some of the few groups in Ghana who have retained the Guan tag are currently located there, namely the Efutu-Guans of Winneba and the Senya-Guans of Senya Bereku. Interestingly, the area of the Central Region just behind

Winneba has been popularly known on 18th century European maps as A*Guan*a territory[130].

A group of refugees who split from the leadership of Nana Asaman at the time of the founding of the Bono Kingdom, moved further southwards through the forest, possibly alongside the route of the Afram - a tributary of the Volta, and founded the town known as Eguafo. Kobena Amankwa, a grandson of the first Eguafohene founded a village called Amankwa-kurom (translated as Amankwa town) between the sea and the lagoon. Amankwa-kurom, together with a nearby Afutu settlement at the opposite side of the lagoon and built around the same time, jointly became known as 'the village of two parts', and was named by the Portuguese and Dutch traders as El Mina, as it is called today. Another grandson of the first Eguafohene, called Akyene Takyi founded 'Little Eguafo', which was later called by the Dutch who built their fort there as Komenda, as it is still called today. The descendants of another grandson of Eguafohene later founded Djabi, and subsequently Shamaa. Tradition has it that among the followers of the Eguafo Prince, were a people called Djabi, who according to their remaining ancestors in ancient Djabi in the Djenne area, were among the founders of Wag'du, west of Timbuktu, and who later moved to the ancient town of Ghana, staying there until 1224. Ancestors of Shamaa also claim to have been Djabi from Walata, a town situated 100 miles north of the ancient town Ghana on the great caravan route which led to Morocco, and founded by emigrants from ancient Ghana in 1224. A Mohamedan people later drove them away, resulting in their return to rejoin some of their brothers in Timbuktu. They later moved southwards to Bono-Mansu during the reign of Akumfi-Ameyaw (1328-1363), one of the most notable chiefs of Bono. The Djabi later left Bono-Mansu to join the Eguafo, and subsequently founded Djabi, and Shamaa. An explanation of why the migrant Djabi called their second town Shamaa could be because Walata was situated in a region called Chama - or Ghana[131].

The Efutu claim to have come to the coast round about the middle of the 14th century at the foundation of Bono. They claim to have had no matrilineal ruling class and therefore elected their chiefs from the Dentzen and Tufua (the organizations of the old and young warriors respectively). As Guans, they are patrilineal, and

this is confirmed by Meyerowitz[132]. Under the leadership of two brothers Bonde and Gyan, they founded Awutu (called by the Fanti as Efutu and by the Ga as Obutu). A split from the Efutu led by Edwe and Etumpan resulted in the founding of Ogua, now also known as Cape Coast. Its large size and inadequate drinking water led some of its citizens off to found Dwemma near Mumford on the coast, and finally Tumpa or Simpa, now also called Winneba[133]. Cape Coast is currently the capital city of the Central Region.

The Etsi were the first Dja people to have settled along the coast of the Gold Coast. They lived up north with the Bono and left the region as a result of famine. As habitual fisherfolk in the "large river" (or Benue River) they followed their fishing career along this river and ended up in Nigeria. After being attacked by a people from a north-easterly direction, they came to settle in Benin City. After the conquest of Benin City, they came to southern Benin, and afterwards moved in a south-westerly direction to found Egya and Onyinatsiadze (now known as Anomabu). Kormantse (or Kormantin) was founded by Njadum people who had also fled from the Bono area and had also gone through Benin. A people of Fante dialect called Asebu who were neither of Dja nor Akan origin, and were "great lovers of fetish", came from Benin and founded Asebu and Moree. They are said to have originated from a desert area beyond Northern Nigeria[134]. Their love for fetish can be attributed to having passed through the Benin area. In the reign of the second King of Bono (Akumfi Ameyaw I), a group of Fante disserted the Bono folk for a southward direction towards the coast and founded Kwaman near the shore-located Saltpond. Kwaman became the capital of the Abuka state.

After the destruction of Kania by Djakpa sometime at the beginning of the 17th century, some Fante (known as the Adminadze Fante) and some Djomo people from Bono-Mansu also disserted the city for a southwards direction and settled with the Etsi by reason of linguistic similarity, resulting in the joint founding of Mankessim by all three groups. A quarrel between the Fante and the Djomo resulted in the latter moving on into deeper Etsi country to found Gomoaman (derived from Djomo-na-man). "Djomo" is the Gonja pronunciation, same as "Gyomo" or "Gomo". "Na" means "descendants of". (O)man means "state". The state is now known as Gomoa-Assin. With time, the stronger

Fante subdued the Etsi over the whole stretch of coast from Akumfi to Yamoranza, killed the Etsi chief in process, additionally conquered Afutu, Eguafo, Komenda, and Shamaa and finally founded Anomabu at Onyinatsiadze. When Bono-Mansu was destroyed by the Ashanti in 1742, the Fante and Djomo who had remained in Takyiman (the second largest city in the Bono Kingdom) had to move away, and as a result joined their brothers down south on the coast and finally settled in Akerakurom, which they renamed Mankesim. Again, the Etsi in the region were subdued in order to achieve this, during several individual battles at Etsi towns including Abakab, Aduoagyro, Sunkwaa, Anoo, Bosom Adwi (Atwe) and Gyrakan. Due to geographical insufficiency, the Djomo moved on to join their brothers in Gomoaman (Gomoa-Assin), and later founded the nearby Gomoa-Adwumako state. Osedzi is an Adwumako town, and Nyameyendam (translated "God is sharp") is its suburb. The Mosama practitioner Kobina Essel (a.k.a. Dougan) lived in this suburb and performed spiritual feats. The Djomo are also among the founders of Bono-Mansu.

The group of Fante - "the latter-day Fante" - who later came southwards from Bono-Mansu after its destruction by the Asante, seem to have subdued their brothers at the coast as well as the Etsi, and ruled such large capital states as Mankessim (capital Mankessim), Nkussukum (capital Saltpond), Abora Dunkwa (capital Abacrampa), Abora Abeadze (capital Domenase), Abora Kwamankase (capital Ayiredo) and Akumfi (capital Ebirem). Komenda was founded by a group of the "latter-day Fante" who first settled at Kormantin and later moved to Eguafo. The region behind Winneba (designated on 18th century European maps as Agwana, Aguna or Agonna), was inhabited by Guans from the North. These Guans were first conquered by the Akwamu during the 17th century, got their freedom after the fall of Akwamu in 1734, and were reconquered by the Mbooko from Ahafo in the Brong-Ahafo area. Following the capture of the Mbooko by the Asante in the Domaa-Asante war, both the Mbooko and the Agwana (or Guans) became servants of the Asante. They later escaped and hid in a settlement which they founded known as Kuntanase, near the forest area of Lake Bosumtwe. During the reign of Asantehene Opoku Ware, they were rediscovered, as a result of which they moved out of their hide-away settlement to

seek refuge in the Breman State. There, they founded Nyankurum, near Esikuma, the capital of the Breman State. A quarrel which arose between the Agwana (and Mbooko) and the Breman resulted in the conquest of Breman, and by this the rest of the towns within the Breman State including Kwaman, Asenka, Bobokuma (or Bobikuma), Abodom, Nsaban (or Nsabaa), Odabeng (or Odobeng), Brakwa, Akuntanase (or Kuntanase), Ochiso, and Okyi. With this large conquest, the Agona State was founded in 1750[135].

Finally, a group of Denkyira, while fighting their way through Adanse, joined the "latter-day Fante" at Mankessim, and later broke away to found Anyan-Denkyira on the Mankessim to Accra road[136]. Dunkwa is the current capital of the powerful Denkyira kingdom which was founded in the central forest in 1620 by the Asante. Denkyira was defeated first by the Asante in the famous battle at Feyiase in 1701. Subsequently, they migrated to an area adjacent to their Akwamu relatives in Wasa-Amanfi, and founded Dunkwa[137]. Thus, the current location of Dunkwa is not the origins of the Denkyira. The original Denkyira kingdom came out of the royal line of the Agona (Aguana) clan[138].

The Fanti vote
As already explained, the NDC's presidential candidate for the December 2000 elections (Mills) was a Fanti, and soon after his public endorsement as candidate, a Mills Brotherhood Club was inaugurated at Winneba in the Central Region by Dr Don Arthur - a key adviser to Rawlings, and one of four key Fanti figures within the NDC cabinet who formed a fan-club later to be dubbed as the "Fanti Confederacy". A perception had assumed, rightly or wrongly, that Mills's background could be used to whip up Fanti sentiments for the NDC. Panic therefore arose within the Mills camp when Professor George Hagan, a Fanti from Cape Coast, and a lecturer at the University of Ghana, also emerged as the presidential candidate for the Nkrumahist Convention People's Party (CPP)[139]; this meant a keener competition for the Fanti vote. Although Mills is a Fanti, and Kufour is Akan, Fantis in the Central Region seemed to be presented with an alternative choice in the CPP presidential candidate. Doubtless, anti-NDC-cum-Fanti-ethnonationalists preferred Professor Hagan[140], however, as a candidate of a minor party, he was not expected to pull a significant

percentage of votes away from even his own ethnonational group, especially if any candidate of the two major parties was Akan, or even so, Fanti. This was confirmed at the polls[141]. As the twists and turns of Ghanaian electoral behaviour would continue to unfold, Fantis shocked the electorate when 60% of the Central Region vote in the 2004 presidential election went to Kufuor and only 40% to Mills[142].

Nzimas and the Western Region
The Western Region of Ghana shares its western border and a thick forest region with the neighbouring country and French-speaking La Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast). The Western Region is populated mainly by the Nzima, Ahanta, Wasa, Anyi (or Brosa), Sewhi and other peoples. Ghana's first president, Kwame Nkrumah was an Nzima. The Ahanta state was founded by the ruling class of the Evalue people who claim to have been among the founders of Eguafo. The Nzima (N'Zi-mba) arrived from beyond Kankyeabo in the north of La Cote d'Ivoire, and settled west of Evalue between Cape Three Points and La Cote d'Ivoire's border. They also founded Axim, which became the capital of the Nzima state. Beyin, the capital of the Western Nzima state, is said to have been founded by Asebu from Anweamea. A group of refugees who fled to La Cote d'Ivoire from Takyiman after the fall of Bono-Mansu in 1740, later returned to the Gold Coast to join the Asebu. Refugees from besieged Bono who had also passed through La Cote d'Ivoire, founded Kabeku, and thereafter Atuabo, which became the capital of the Eastern Nzima state. Another group of Fante refugees from Takyiman, and of the Asona clan came to live in Wartrain and later Bentenase, both in Wasa country. They met the Erzohele people (Nzima from Axim), and together migrated seawards to found Miegwina. These latter-day Takyiman refugees also founded Asiama based on land given them by their brothers in Atuabo[143].

The Wasa-Amenfi State in the south-western forest of the Western Region was founded by some refugees of the Akwamu who were defeated in the Akyem area of the Eastern Region in 1734[144]. The Aowin (Anyin) State was founded by Brosa (Anyi) people from Anwianwia in the Ahafo district. They were refugees, and after founding Aowin, moved southwards and founded Enchi, the present capital of the Anyin State[145]. The northern part of the

Western Region is dominantly populated by the Sewhi people, forming the Sewhi State which is a confederation of three states: Sewhi-Wiawso, Sewhi-Anwiaso and Sewhi-Bekwai. The original royal house fled to La Cote d'Ivoire after the Asante defeat in 1743, and their descendants still live there. The Sewhi Anwiaso State was founded by refugees from Wankyi after the conquest of Wankyi by the Asante in 1740. Sewhi-Bekwai was founded as a result of a quarrel which broke out between Wiawso of the Ayoko clan and the Sewhis of the Koona clan. The two clans lived together under the jurisdiction of Asantehene Osei Yao. Therefore, after the quarrel, they were granted permission to leave for Bekwai[146]. The Western Region's main claim to fame is inherent in the fact that the first president of Ghana was Nzima. The Nzima are relatively fewer than most ethnonational groups in Ghana.

Ga-Adangbes and the Greater-Accra Region

The La or Ga Boni, another group of Guan, immigrated into the Gold Coast, towards the end of the 16th century, after making a detour to Nigeria[147], approaching modern Ghana through the Benin area, and settling among the Kpesi aborigines at the mouth of the Volta. Under their chief Okpolaebi, they founded, on their own La Doku and La Badi. But together with the Ga Wo and Ga Masi, who came with them from Benin, they founded Accra, which soon grew into importance[148]. These Guans can be traced to an area somewhat north of modern Ghana, from a territory that seem to lie between the White Volta and Red Volta and a part of the original Mossi territory north of the "Northern Territories"[149]. The Ga Boni are Adangbe-speaking people, and form part of the Ga-Adangbe group which currently occupies the Greater-Accra Region and some parts of the Eastern Region of Ghana. Details of the Ga-Adangbe role in Ghanaian ROE patterns are discussed in Chapters Eight and Nine.

The Eastern Region

The La or Ga Boni are Guans and aboriginals of Mossi territory. The Kyerepon-Guans are also aboriginals of the area around "a" tributary of the Black Volta[150]. The Anum people founded Senya after 1734 when the Akwamu overthrew the Akyem and Akwapem people[151]. Out of a quarrel between the Ga and La- or Ga-Boni,

around 1580-1600, the chief of the latter left with most of his people for some 30 or 40 miles inland and founded some 30 odd villages in the hilly country of Akwapem including Ahenase, Adiha, Dome, Sokorowanso, Dosu and Kubease. New Late, which exists today, is their chief town. Around the same period as stated, some La Boni families wandered further inland from the coast, and together with some Afutu, founded Obutu, near Senya-Bereku. As already mentioned, the La or Ga Boni are the actual aborigines of part of the Mossi territory further "North" in current Gonja territory between the White Volta and the Red Volta. When the Bono and some N'Gwa or Angwa vacated this region around 1300 (as a result of the rioting by the Bozamfri people from Zamfara in Northern Nigeria), they settled with some Kyerepon people beside a tributary of the Black Volta. The settlement is still known today as Laboni. This explanation – together with the names - have been given in retrospect, since the time of arrival of the Ga Boni from Benin to the coast is towards the end of the 16th century[152], three centuries after the Bozamfri invasion of Mossi territory. Unless of course when the Ga Boni left they first went to Benin and retracted later to the Gold Coast coastland, or better still unless they were known as La or Ga Boni when they were at their autochthonous region in Mossi territory. If this latter explanation is true, it would mean that they have maintained their name throughout their migrations around for three centuries before re-entering into Gold Coast territory. This is confirmed by Meyerowitz[153]. Some of the Ga Boni, after the "Bozamfri" invasion, went southwards into Gonja territory and settled with the Kyerepon beside a tributary of the Black Volta; others joined Nana Asaman's group into founding Bono-Mansu; and others left with the Afutu (one of the breakaway groups from Nana Asaman) to the coastal region[154].

It would appear that when the Adangbe-speaking and patrilineal Ga Boni, who stayed in Gonja with the Kyerepon, strayed from the area and detoured through Benin before returning to the Gold Coast, the Kyerepon migrated southwards and settled in Nsawam in a town known as Abotoase, about 25 miles north of Accra (which had probably not been built then). Louis Wilson also states that the Adangbe-speaking and patrilineal Krobos also trace their route as a migration from the direction of Benin and Togo[155], most probably, after having detoured from Gonja territory. With the

arrival of the Akwamu people at nearby Anyandawaase, the Kyerepon moved inland into the hills of Akuapem and founded the Kyerepon state, a confederation of five towns (or Amanonum), and which included Adukrom (the capital), Abonse, Abirin (or Aburi), Awukugua (capital of the current Akuapim state) and Odau[156]. It is therefore amazing that the "stray Ga Boni" (the former neighbours of the Kyerepon in Gonja territory) should also after three centuries, wander around through Benin and also come and settle in the same hilly country of Akwapem. It was simply the similarity of language - as highlighted by Meyerowitz[157] - as well as the common patriliny shared by the "non-stray Ga Boni" and the Afutu, which attracted the former to join up with the latter to found Obutu and live together. The Afutu came to the coast around the middle of the 14th century[158] and the Ga Boni also came to the coast towards the end of the 16th century[159]. Therefore, adding the time of the quarrel between the coastal Ga and "stray Ga Boni", as a result of which the latter moved inland to join the Afutu (and consequently the Kyerepon state in the same Akwapem area), we should be approaching some three centuries, and this corroborates the analysis.

But, it would also appear that a loophole has not been filled. The Afutu are said to be a mixed breed of people originating from different tribes in the "North" where there was a "big river"[160], and the Ga Boni are also said to originate from a part of Mossi territory north of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast[161]. If the "big river" is the Niger, then the loophole is not yet explained. If it is the Volta or part of it, then that explains it! According to Meyerowitz's explanation, there possibly was a Guan State in eastern Bono whose people (according to the traditions of Prang and Yeji), regarded themselves as brothers of Late, that is, the La Boni. Therefore since the Kwaman, Kumawu and Agogo people of Asante refer to these Guan as Bono-Ntwumu (Nchumu-ru), one may assume that the La Boni were originally a branch of the large tribe Guan. Kokofu is deemed as once the site of the Guan capital, and that the Guan king, Atele Firempon, lives on the traditions of Kwaman, Kumawu, Agogo and Kwahu. Also, the current geographical sites of towns such as Kumawu, Kwaman, Agogo, Atonso, Satenso, Atwea and Mampon are all on King Atele Firempon's land. Therefore, the Kyerepons are Guans.

Guans who have never come under the Dja or Akan, have remained a patrilineal people[162]. Despite any traceability of tribal groupings to autochthonous or common origins, the evolution of tribal names due to migratory reasons, has resulted in the Kyerepon-Guans "remaining" or "emerging" as part of the "remnant" or "latter-day" Guan ("in contrast" with the wider Guan ancestry traceable to Ancient Ghana territory). The Kyerepon-Guans are therefore only a part of the wider Guan ancestry. The Late-Guans were the aboriginals of the region which is part of the Mossi territory north of the Northern Territories[163], the same place where the Efutu-Guans of Winneba and the Ga Boni seem to have come from.

Nugent also confirms their autochthonous status in relation to the current geography of modern Ghana. The confusion created by the current restriction of the Guan tag to the "remnant" Kyerepon-Guans, Efutu-Guans, Late-Guans, Senya-Guans and Kpesi-Guans[164] (part of what I have termed as the Guan controversy) is confirmed by the fact that in 1985, a Festival of Arts and Culture which featured 'a Grand Durbar of "all Guan communities"', was held in Boso, their capital. This festival was meant to hold the political significance that these autochthonous Ghanaians had the potential to re-assert autonomy in Ghanaian traditional affairs[165]. They share a common patriliny with their neighbours (the Ewe)[166], as well as the Adangbe-speaking Krobos in the Eastern Region of Ghana[167]. Between the two patrilineal societies lies the official boundary which splits the Eastern Region from the Volta Region.

From the autochthonous area up-"North", some Guans moved directly southwards to the coast, whilst others wandered around to Benin and re-entered Gold Coast later on. The Akwamu State had its capital as Asaremankese (now known as Asamankese), with many towns and villages under its jurisdiction, including Apeda (or Apedwa), Apapam, Akyem-Asafo, Akyem-Kwaman, Tafo and Mbease. The Akwamu State came to an end in 1734 when the three neighbouring and subject Akyem States and their allies rebelled and defeated the Akwamu. The three Akyem states are Akyem-Abuakwa (capital Kibi or Kyebi), Akyem-Kotoku (capital Oda), and Akyem-Bosome. The two latter states are said to have been founded by emigrants from Denkyira[168].

The Krobo vote

Regarding pre-election developments, the Krobos in the Eastern Region, who are largely pro-NDC were said to have shifted camp in the period leading up to the December 2000 elections. The Yilo Krobos defied a heavy downpour of rain in order to attend an NPP election rally in the area. Thousands of them, who claimed to have supported the NDC in 1992 and 1996, had declared an intention 'to ignore the NDC's vain promises and test the NPP for the next four years come December 2000 elections'[169]. Incidentally, this election fever did not translate to reality at the polls, as the NDC candidate won in Yilo Krobo[170]. The Krobo area seems to be an NDC stronghold; in 2004, all three parliamentary seats in Lower Manya Krobo, Upper Manya Krobo and Yilo Krobo constituencies went to NDC candidates; furthermore, the NDC presidential candidate Mills won 61.6%, 64.1% and 60.7% of the presidential votes within these respective constituencies[171].

The Ashanti Region

Tradition has it that the Asante royal clan, the Ayoko clan also originates from the Timbuktu (Tumutu) area through the Queenmother Nyamkomduewuo who ruled a country in the region of Tumutu until it was destroyed by Moslems, as a result of which her son left southwards and founded the Bona Kingdom in northern La Cote d'Ivoire. Bona was later conquered by King Darigudienda of Dagbon (or Dagomba)[172] sometime in the latter half of the 15th century, and who was succeeded by his son Bonkane (a product of the Dagomba King Darigudienda and a Bona princess). The Kania or Akan (Accany/Acane) people, a Mande people originating from the Kumbu Kingdom (one of the confederate states of the Mande Mali Kingdom), also came around 1500 to establish political foundations, and as a result of this competition, the Dagomba disserted the Bona region. Much later, between 1591 and 1600, another group of Mande led by Djakpa conquered Bona. Djakpa's son and successor, Quattara introduced Islam, as a result of which three princesses left with a group each for other territories in the forest area southwards. These princesses and other people together established areas such as Kokofu, Juaben, Nsuta and Aduman, all of which later became part of the Asante Kingdom. Thus, around 1600, the first large Akan (or

Kania) group settled in Okumanyinase (later corrupted to Kumase) which later became the capital of the Asante.

The Asante grew through a succession of kings from Oti Akenten, Obiri Yeboa, Osei Tutu and to Opoku Ware. Since the Denkyira controlled vast portions of land, the Asante inherited a considerable geographical area after conquering Denkyira State, followed with the conquest of the Doma states of Abamperedase, Suman and Gyaman by 1730, followed with that of the Akwamu in 1734, and followed with that of the mighty Bono by 1740. Bono-Mansu, the capital of Bono was finally destroyed by the Asante in 1742. During the reign of Opoku Ware, Bono was destroyed by the Asante, and therefore all the tributary states of the Bono from Banda to Krakye on the Volta became Asante territory. The Nta in the north (which was under the Kania kingdom) and Dagomba, as well as the three Akyem states were all conquered by the Asante in less than 50 years from the founding of the Asante Kingdom by Osei Tutu in 1701. However, their imperialistic effort was frustrated by Europeans who lived by the coast. The British defeated the Asante in 1900 and the latter was annexed to the Gold Coast in 1901[173]. The Ashanti Region spans a large forest area suitable for the cultivation of cocoa, Ghana's top cash crop. In 1954, an agitation for a rise in the producer price of cocoa led to the emergence of a nationalist movement in Kumase known as the National Liberation Movement (NLM). This movement became the foundation for the Danquah-Busia political tradition, which represented itself as the Progress Party (PP) for the 1969 elections, Popular Front Party (PFP) for the 1979 elections, and the NPP for the 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004 elections. As is obvious in recent Ghanaian politics, the NPP has won both the 2000 and 2004 presidential and parliamentary elections. A fuller detail of Ashanti electoral behaviour is discussed in Chapters Eight and Nine.

Ewes and the Volta Region

The Ewe-speaking peoples occupy portions of the stretch of land in West Africa from the east of modern Ghana to as far as the west of Nigeria. Their locations therefore span the four countries of Ghana and Nigeria which are English-speaking, and Togo and Benin (formerly Dahomey) which are French-speaking, even if there are less of them in Ghana (occupying the region south-east of

the Volta river) and in Nigeria (mainly in the region west of the Niger Delta); their largest concentrations, both numerically and geographically, has always been in Togo and Benin. Some authors have either termed or linked this Ewe geographical stretch to what is known as the Slave Coast of West Africa [174]. Before and around the period 1890, the inhabitants of the Slave Coast consisted of the following tribes and states, commencing with the most westerly, and on the sea front: Awuna, Agbosomi, Aflao (or Flohow), Togoland, Geng, Great Popo, Dahomi, Kotonu, Fra and Appa; to the north of these and further inland are Anfueh, Krepe, Ewe-awo, Agotine, Krikor, Mahi (or Makki), Ewemi and Port Novo[175]. With the exception of the Agotine who speak Adanme, all the mentioned tribes speak dialects of the one language Ewe. Among these tribes, Togoland and Geng were under German colonial control, whereas Great Popo, Kotonu and Port Novo were under French control. Dahomi, Ewe-awo, Mahi (Makki) and Ewemi did not seem to be under any specifically-designated colonial control for any considerable length of time, although colonial control and influences over the surrounding tribes affected them in many significant ways. The rest of the tribes were under English control[176]. According to Ellis, 'the boundary between the German and French territories is a meridian passing through the west point of the island of Bayol, in the lagoon, and runs inland as far north as the ninth degree of north latitude'[177]. According to Amenumey, at the turn of the 20th century, there had evolved as many as 120 Ewe tribes or political chieftaincies which (to name just the few in south-east Gold Coast and southern Togo) included: eastwards from the River Volta, the Anlo, Some, Be, Ge; inland from the coast, the Peki, Adaklu, Ave, Tove, Ho; and further inland and north, the Kpando, Watsi and part of Atakpame[178].

Despite inter-tribal wars generated mostly by economic interests, especially jealousies over geographical salt, fishing rights and control over the slave trade, the Ewe tribes recognised or perceived themselves as 'one people sharing a common language and social customs'[179] or 'one nation with a common language, history and culture'[180], until colonial intervention effected some political separations. According to Robin Law, the Ewe in the Volta Region of modern Ghana were known in pre-nineteenth century sources to be called the Krepi. The "Peki" State in the interior of the Volta

Region was also known as "Krepi" State, however, the name "Krepi" was generically used for the whole Ewe group[181]. Although the Krepi or Ewe comprised of numerous autonomous groups (a fact which confirms Amenumey's point above), they are known to loosely or politically trace or associate their origins to the ruler of Notse (Nouatja), a region based 'in the interior to the north-east'[182]. This same Krepi polity also refers to "Anlo" on the coast. East of the interior Krepi/Ewe were two groups, the Aja, and Tado - or Sado[183]. According to Argyle, the traditions of origin of the Ewe-speaking peoples were kept by chroniclers, whose lives were on the line if they made any errors in their accounts, thus ensuring a much less variation over time. Argyle recounts about an observation made by Herskovits (1938), that there seems not to be any differences between Norris' version of 1789, Le Herrise's rendition of 1914 and other variants published in the interim regarding the origins and establishment of the Adja-Tado (or Adja-Sado) dynasty[184]. The royal families of the Slave Coast, moving eastwards from the "Krepi", Anlo, Aja, Hula (or Pla), Whydah (or Hueda), Allada, Fon (or Dahomey), are all of the same stock as the royal dynasty that established Abomey, since all originated from Adja-Tado (or Adja-Sado).

The people of Adja-Tado are themselves from Ketu in the east and according to Argyle, their royal kingship is related to Yoruba peoples. Adja-Tado is said to have been established at about 1300[185]. Abomey was the capital of Dahomey and Dahomey seems to have conquered Weme, Allada and Whydah between 1710 and 1730[186]. Sometime before 1600, the ancestors of the royal family of Abomey emigrated from Adja-Tado. In one version of the tradition, intercourse with a leopard encountered in the forest resulted in the wife or the daughter of the king of Adja-Tado giving birth to a son. This miraculous child was called Agasu and became the *tohwiyo* (super-natural founder) of the royal family of Abomey. Other varying versions of the tradition of origin also do not miss out on the incipient role of the leopard. It is said that either the descendants of the leopard or that of a Yoruba magician (who had married a vassal of the King of Adja-Tado) killed the King. Irrespective of whoever managed to kill the King of Adja-Tado, the "Agasuvi" (meaning, children of Agasu) were led into migration in Allada territory by "Adjahouto" (meaning, the one who killed

Adja), and settled there. When this leader died, he became the *tovodun* or "deified" ancestor of the "Agasuvi". Owing to this leader's superiority over Aida, the *tovodun* of the natives of Allada, his name became "Adja-to-hou-Aida" meaning, "the father of the Adja is greater than Aida"[187]. According to Argyle, 'the leopard is a common symbol of royalty in this part of West Africa, and to assert that they were descended from the animal was a claim by the Agasuvi for the right to kingship'[188]. After settling at Alladah, the Agasuvi prospered and dominated the surrounding territory through a succession of kings notably Dogbagri, and later occupied the plateau of nearby Abomey. The move to Abomey actually occurred after the death of Dogbagri. As the details of the lineage unfolds, around 1625, the headship of the Agasuvi, Dogbagri, died and a contest between his two sons Dako and Ganhesou ended up in the former becoming the leader. Dako is considered as the founder of the dynasty of Abomey[189].

The Partition versus related irredentism

British rule over Eweland in the Gold Coast, which began in 1850, did not actually encompass all the Ewe-populated regions even as at 1874, until the German presence in the Ewe-populated regions of modern Togoland in 1884 posed a threat to both colonial parties. A boundary agreement reached and signed between the colonial powers effected a split between the Ewe regions. The Ewe states of Anlo, Some, Klikor, Peki and Tongu were apportioned to the Gold Coast, and the remaining ones to the German Protectorate of Togoland. There were strong protests against the partition[190]. The Germans later lost the Protectorate, and a split of the Togoland territory between Britain and France resulted in British Togoland and French Togoland.

In the meantime, protests about the spilt generated into the Ewe Unification Movement, which aimed: mainly at bringing the Ewe people under one administration, and also to secure the release of the relations of "Gold Coast" Ewes in British Togoland who had now come under French administration in French Togoland as a result of the colonial split of boundaries[191]; and furthermore to avert certain developmental disabilities suffered by the Ewe 'which were directly attributable to the division' of Ewes among the two colonial powers[192]. It appeared that the Ewes generally preferred

British rule to French rule[193]. Activities of the Ewe Unification Movement eventually led to the formation of an All Ewe Conference (AEC) in June 1946[194]. In August 1946, the AEC protested to the newly-created UN and the British Government about the draft Trusteeship Agreement drawn by Britain and France for the administration of the divided Ewe territories under the two colonial powers. This protest was disregarded and the colonial agreement was approved[195]. French authorities in Togo campaigned in various ways against the unification movement[196]. It must be borne in mind that British Togoland included certain tribes in its northern territories who were non-Ewe, but because the Ewe straddled the boundaries of both colonies, the decisions of the formal annexation of British Togoland to the Gold Coast impinged more on the Ewe problem than on any considerations of other tribal groupings in the north. In the north, the Konkomba of the Gold Coast and the B'moba of British Togoland[197] were not of the same tribe.

Under UN General Assembly Resolution 944 (X), on 15 December 1955, the British were ordered to organise a plebiscite in British Togoland 'in order to ascertain the wishes of the majority of its inhabitants with regard to (a) the union of their territory with an independent Gold Coast or (b) separation of British Togoland from the Gold Coast and its continuance under trusteeship pending the ultimate determination of its political future'[198]. The plebiscite conducted in June 1956 resulted in 52% of voters for unification of British Togoland with the Gold Coast, and 42% for separation[199]. Consequently, on 13 December 1956, the UN passed Resolution 1044 (XI) sanctioning the unification. The annexed territories of Gold Coast and former British Togoland soon became independent in March 1957, together as modern Ghana. According to Amenumey, 'Since Britain had always administered British Togoland jointly with the Gold Coast, the difference between 1957 and the period preceding it was one of degree, but not of kind. The problem remained, as before, that of the relationship between the Ewe of French Togoland and the rest of the territory'[200].

The climax of irredentist, secessionist and territorialist claims
Despite the Ewe unification argument, the deterioration of the relationship between Ghana's Nkrumah and Togo's Sylvanus

Olympio made this impossible as both parties infuriated each other with irredentist claims made over one another's territory[201]. This was worsened when at independence in 1960, Togo began to harbour some of Nkrumah's political enemies by granting them political asylum[202]. Ghana's intention as revealed through its draft Republican Constitution in March 1960 was to welcome all peoples outside her borders with any racial, family or historical links into an integrated Ghanaian State[203]. This included the Ewes of Togo as well as Agnis from La Cote d'Ivoire[204] and of course the territories they occupied. With the background of a long-standing Ewe unification bid straddling over a territory wider than the newly-created boundaries of the two independent states, coupled with the political domination of the new Togolese government by Ewes under the leadership of the Ewe nationalist Olympio, Togo was 'a quasi Ewe nation-state'[205]. The tenure of pan-Eweist nationalism continued even during the post-Olympio, non-Ewe administration of Gnassingbe Eyadema. Togo under Eyadema supported the Togoland Liberation Movement's (TOLIMO) activities in Ghana in the period spanning the 1970s and 1980s. However, in the absence of an Ewe administration in Togo, it would seem that TOLIMO potential irredentism had lost much of the pan-Eweist sting that characterised Togolese territorialism[206]. Although at independence in 1960 the electoral victory of Ewe unificationists in Togo (Olympioists) meant brighter prospects for pan-Eweism, the impossibility for Nkrumah and Olympio to reach an agreement on a political *modus vivendi* meant disaster for Ewe unification.

In the absence of an Ewe-dominated state machinery post the Olympio administration, the potential irredentism by a Togolese government has waned. This is mainly because Olympioists now came to represent the Opposition in Togolese politics, and their wishes would not be carried out by Eyadema's administration. In theoretical terms, as Ewe unification ceased to have any de-facto state backing, it ceased to become an irredentist movement. Amenumey expresses both confusion and frustration when he states that Ewe attempts at self-determination were neither irredentist nor secessionist, a mere unification as against sovereignty[207]. It must be noted though, that Amenumey's statement on Ewe nationalism is restricted only to the Ewe tribes which occupied the geographical territory of the Togolands, and

not the original vast Eweland of the Slave Coast ranging from east of the Gold Coast to west of Nigeria.

But, in addition to any nationalistic drive which the Ewe lacked, or could have developed, an argument can be made that the advent and threat of colonialism, which resulted in the partitioning of the Ewe sub-tribes, is the main factor which damaged the emergence of the vast Ewe territory into a nation. Had the Ewe been left alone, national consciousness, and consequently national self-determination might have naturally emerged. Prior to colonialism, the cultural homogeneity of the Ewe peoples was clearly in shape even if they were a loose collection of chieftaincies, and political formations in Eweland were in the form of states of multi-tribal or mono-tribal units with varying geographical jurisdictions for each state[208]. As it were, the chance for the Ewes achieving any real political homogeneity and hegemony was disrupted by colonial intervention and the Partition. This confirms Basil Davidson's "wasted years" view and the role of colonialism in disrupting indigenous nation-formation processes in Africa. Davidson claims that 'wasted years because, in every crucial field of life, the British (and of course other colonial powers) had frozen the indigenous institutions while at the same time robbed colonised peoples of every scope and freedom for self-development'[209]. Somehow, the nature and destiny of the Ewe nationalism and peoples have been shaped by colonial politics in a very determinate way.

Given that 'the Ewe sub-tribes had never been one political unit'[210], and were antagonistic towards each other through inter-tribal wars, there is therefore no proof that any nascent Ewe national consciousness, political unification and self-determination would have eventually crystallised into a nation-state. However, the fact still remains that this chance was disrupted; the advent of colonialism has prevented history from determining whether or not this would have happened. One of modern Ghana's former presidents, Jerry Rawlings, is Ewe, and Ewes in modern Ghana have been referred to as being nepotistic and inward-looking[211]. In at least four successive presidential and parliamentary elections in the history of modern Ghana, 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004, the Ewes, who predominate the Volta Region, have massively supported Rawlings and his NDC party.

A CRITIQUE ON THE TRADITIONS OF ORIGIN

Introduction

A broad authorship is utilized in this critique. The traditions documented by the several authorships largely compliment each other and differ in style and dating but not substance. It is clear however, that in addition to providing the widest coverage on most of the country (except the Ewes and some CTMs), the works of Eva Meyerowitz are the most detailed and comprehensive. The other authors including Jan Vansina, Maxwell Owusu, Nehemiah Levtzion, Ivor Wilks, Madeleine Manoukian, Michael D Warren, K. Y. Daaku, Louis Wilson, Jack R Goody, Father J J Williams, David Kimble, Melville Herskovits, A B Ellis, J D Fage, Reverend J B Anaman, Paul Nugent, Michael Kwamena-Poh, Michelle Gilbert and lately Anthony Ephirim-Donkor, provide comparatively sketchy and patchy records of events, and for only one or two separate identity groups each. In order to present a coherent account therefore, Meyerowitz's works noticeably featured as the main commentary in Chapter Three, complimented by the others. In this chapter therefore, the accounts from the complimentary authors serve as the critique against Meyerowitz's accounts. Hence this chapter represents a lively discussion on authorships criticising, confirming and complimenting each other, interspersed with the occasional disagreement on dates. The authorships of Nugent, D.E.K. Amenumey and Robin Law are mainly utilised for the CTM traditions of origin.

Jan Vansina and Maxwell Owusu
Inspite of the fact that other academics regard the work of Meyerowitz on Ghana as a 'systematic account'[1] and also as 'one of the best works devoted to the past history of pre-literate peoples'[2],

there are other claims which discredit it. According to Maxwell Owusu, Meyerowitz's account on the Agona is a mistaken version because she neglected 'extant respectable recorded sources'[3] regarding the Agona people. Owusu asserts that, in addition to Meyerowitz's failure to examine another account on the Agona by A. B. Ellis, her major weakness is inherent in the fact that she also failed to speak to the elders of Nsaba who also have another version of the establishment of the Agona State. Nsaba is purported to be the seat of the Paramount Chief of Agona until 1931[4]. Owusu furthermore contends that, in addition to the medium of an interpreter being a stumbling block to relating truth, there was a deliberate attempt on the part of the elders (of Nyakrom) interviewed by Meyerowitz to withold or conceal some information from her regarding the defeat of the Agona by the Gomoa-Fante, and the loss of the paramountcy position of Agona, by Nyakrom to Nsaba. Owusu therefore argues that Meyerowitz received a distorted version of events as far as the establishment of Agona is concerned. He further argues out the possibility that Meyerowitz based the date of the establishment of the Agona State (1750) on her observation of the occurrence of the name Agwana, Aguna or Agonna on certain 18th century European maps. Owusu argues that a Dutch map dated 1670 also refers to the Agwanna Kingdom. Additionally, Owusu argues that a quote of Ellis regarding an occurrence on 28 May 1662, that 'the King of Aguna, instigated by the Dutch, had plundered their [English] factory at Winnebah'[5], also lends weight to the establishment of the Agona State prior to 1750. By this and other subsequent observations, Owusu makes the claim that less weight should be attached to the works of Meyerowitz on Akan origins.

Jan Vansina's critique of Meyerowitz's work falls mainly within source criticism and methodology. He admits that the innovations by which Meyerowitz arrived at her conclusions, and the processes through which she makes her deductions from oral sources are very rare indeed. Vansina recognises that the work is a masterpiece[6]. He also views the extent to which Meyerowitz utilises the rich sources of traditional specialists, like 'minstrels, masters of ceremony, royal drummers, royal hornblowers, the king's spokesman, his grave priest, his stool-carrier-chief, female soulbearers of the souls of the deceased queen mothers, masters of ceremonies to the state gods,

court functionaries and the administrator of the capital'[7], as not only a sign of great dedication, but also a demonstration of how specialised the duties of the functionaries are. But he also complains that Meyerowitz 'has not attempted to explore the reasons for this, nor has she exercised much critical judgement in her handling of her sources'[8]. A specific example Vansina uses is an account given by Meyerowitz about the separation in two of the twin city Beeo-Nsoko which was located in the Banda Kingdom[9]. In this account, Meyerowitz claims that the two sons of the King of Beeo and the Moslem chief of Nsoko, fell in love with the same girl, and in order to settle their jealousies and rage, literally cut her into two halves, one for the other, and this "split" thereby led to the destruction of the twin city through factional wars and ultimate destruction. According to Vansina, the story (or tradition) could have been thematic or proverbial, and therefore Meyerowitz's gullibility to the literal meaning of the story as an explanation to the destiny of the destruction of the city signifies a 'lack of critical judgement'[10] in the 'handling of her sources'[11]. Vansina's point is appreciated, however, he gives no reason why Meyerowitz should thematise or proverbialise what she has been made to understand as literal truth. Also, Vansina does not indicate by what yardstick Meyerowitz should exercise 'critical judgement'. The "barbarity" or irksomeness of the story is not a yardstick for claiming its falsity. Nor is there any proof that the details of the tradition as given did not actually occur. It would appear that Vansina's criticism is not fair.

Vansina makes further criticism about Meyerowitz's use of onomastics in tracing the origins of various ethnonational groups and the derivation of ethnonational names. Vansina criticises Meyerowitz's derivation of the term Guan form *Illagua* and *Laguantan*. She claims that in addition to these names being non-existent, their "false" deduction from the Arabic forms *Luvata* and *Lewata* make the derivation even more spurious, since no linguistic adducements could be derived as evidence to support the ultimate Guan derivation[12]. But it is also interesting to note that Vansina does not come up with what he thinks constitutes (or should constitute) the meaning of the Arabic forms *Luvata* or *Lewata*. Also, it would appear that Meyerowitz does arrive at other ethnonational names from *Laguantan*, for example *Agwana* or

(*Aguna* & *Agona*), and not only the *Guan*. Therefore this weakens the Vansina criticism. But ironically, the Agona are of Guan ancestry.

Nehemiah Levtzion

Levtzion suggests that Ghana was a kingdom of antiquity, although the date of its foundation is uncertain. He expresses certainty however, over the fact that Ghana was located in the Sahil (or Sahel/Sahara) – referred to as '"the shore" of the huge sea of sand'[13]. He infers and concludes from this, that Ancient Ghana (and its geographical location) 'is to be associated with the growth of traffic across the Sahara'[14]. He claims the main item for the traffic was gold. He refers to his sources as Arabic[15]. Sahil is the Arabic word for 'a shore'[16]. This seems to corroborate information from Meyerowitz, who maintains that a large chunk of the inhabitants of Modern Ghana (especially the Bonos) inhabited a region farther north in the Great White Desert or *Sarem* (Sahara) – 'the country of the sand'[17], before moving southwards to the Niger area. *Sarem* is the Akan word for a less vegetative region. According to the preserved tradition of the Kormantse and Etsi of Modern Ghana, this desert area was known as *Djadu* or *Zaghawa* (Arabic) or *Agwas* (Tuareg) or *Braun* (Tebu). All three names seem to be common to the modern Akan who seem to have had a mixed ancestry[18]. Levtzion accepts evidence given by al-Sadi, that Ghana was a capital town of Baghana, and the explanatory evidence from al-Bakri in 1067-8, that Awkar was a Berber name for a region known as Wagadu[19]. Wagadu seems to be a derivation of Djadu and Zaghawa, both of which mean and stand for the same people[20]. Both Meyerowitz and Levtzion give the zenith period of Ancient Ghana as the 11th century, the same century in which it was over-run by Islamic invaders. Although the Islamic campaigns begin with the 11th century[21], it was not until the 'the middle of the eleventh century'[22], and precisely 1076, that final conquest by the Arabic Almoravids occur[23]. The mid-eleventh century is also seen as the zenith and crucial period of Islamic campaigning in the Western Sudan. Levtzion explains that Ghana of the mid-eleventh century 'offered the example of resistance to Islam'[24].

Both Meyerowitz and Levtzion claim to have obtained their information from the same source – the Sudanese Tarikhs or

Tarikh-es-Sudan[25]. Also, al Sa'di (one of Levtzion's Islamic oral sources) was a native of Timbuktu[26]. Levtzion maintains that a king of Ghana resisted Islamic conversion and stuck to his ancestral religion[27]. Meyerowitz also submits that a large number of the people of Ghana (including some of the kings) migrated southwards in order to avoid compulsory Islamic "conversion"[28]. Hrbek and Devisse also argue that the ruler of Ancient Ghana managed to ward off Islamic control of his polity, was accommodating to the Almoravid Muslims and maintained excellent relations with them, and that, not until Ancient Ghana was conquered by the Almoravids towards the end of the 11th century, that it officially went over to Islam[29]. The conquest by the Almoravids therefore explains the southward migration of the citizens of Ancient Ghana, as compulsory conversion could not be resisted at this stage.

Ivor Wilks

Ivor Wilks does rely on the works of Meyerowitz in detailing some ecological underpinnings and the geographical location of the Akan and Bono peoples from Ancient to Modern Ghana. Apart from the lack of specificity in dates, there seems to be corroboration in the fact that some particular ethnonational groups in Modern Ghana have originated from the Western Sudan. Wilks states that the nucleus of the Gonja (Guan-Dja) kingdom is to be found in migrants from Western Sudan (and of Malinke culture) in the mid-sixteenth century[30]. Meyerowitz holds that the current Gonja ruling class came to the Black Volta area from Kanagba (Kanga) and Segu in the Western Sudan around 1600[31]. Wilks lists a number of communities or settlements which grew around the Dyula to include the Akan-speaking Bron, the Guan-speaking Dompo and the Senufo-speaking Nanfana. Wilks demonstrates clearly that the date given by Meyerowitz for the founding of the Bono kingdom is unacceptable. Notwithstanding a discrepancy in dates however, the essential trace of the Bono and Akan states from the Western Sudan is not disputed. The alternative story of Bono people originating from a cave in Takyiman (as supported by Wilks) also seems unacceptable, due not only to the impossibility of the account, but also to the fact that the evidence of migration from the Western Sudan is too enormous to set aside for any ridiculous

cave origins meant to substantiate an alternative autochthonous status. It would appear that the discrepancies in dating is only due to discrepancies in calendar calculations rather than the essential agreement in accounts on the origins of the Bono, Akan and other groups being of Western Sudanese ancestry. Nevertheless, Wilks relies heavily on Meyerowitz for other trade and migratory details of the Akan and other groups, and argues for the similarities in the Akan and Bono languages, a fact which can be observed currently. Wilks also argues that the Bono people of Modern Ghana speak Akan languages and practise Akan customs. However, he notes that, not only do they utilise Malinke language in performing their rituals, but also purify hammers and anvils (instead of ancestral stools) for their rituals. Furthermore, he maintains that current Bono masked dancing cults, for example the Sakrabundu, are of Malinke origin[32].

It is clear that Wilks' account of the traditions of origin is less rich than that of Meyerowitz. For example, the Wilks account of the origins of the Akwamu[33] is very sketchy when compared with the Meyerowitz account[34] which gives not only the origins of the Akwamu, but also details of their conquests and failures, relationships with other ethnonational groups, associated geographical locations, trade patterns and partners, as well as dates. Wilks also confirms the Meyerowitz account of the emergence of the Ashanti nation in 1701[35], the date by which a number of ethnonational groups including the Denkyira had been conquered and had subsequently transferred their allegiance to the Asantehene Osei Tutu[36]. Wilks maintains that by 1680, the Ashanti kingdom had emerged[37], however, in view of the fact that there were other surrounding ethnonational groups who were competing with Ashanti for supremacy in the area, and especially, that the war between Ashanti and Adanse in 1680 ended in a stalemate[38], it is understandable why the emergence of Ashanti as a nation is fixed not at 1680 but at 1701, the year by which all surrounding groups had been subdued and had as a result transferred their allegiance to the Asantehene as part of the Confederacy of states whose capital was at Kumasi, the capital of Ashanti. The battle of Feyiase in 1701 in which the Denkyira were defeated seems to be the deciding factor. In addition to the fact that the last opponent had been conquered, the defeat of the Denkyira made way for Ashanti to

have access to the Gold Coast. Even the Dutch settlers sent an ambassador to King Osei Tutu in 1701 from their headquarters in coastal Elmina[39]. In another example (the origins of the Fante), it can be seen that Wilks corroborates the Meyerowitz account. Wilks claims that the Borbor (or Bore) Fante came southwards from Bono-Takyiman, defeated the Etsi (who already lived south by the coast) and founded Mankessim[40]. This account is already given at least twice separately by Meyerowitz[41]. But it would appear that on this occasion, Wilks gets his dates wrong. Wilks maintains that the Borbor Fante defeated the Asebu in 1707-13, whereas the date given by Meyerowitz for this occurrence is 1740. Given: (a) that the Fante lived with the Bono; (b) that it was due to the conquest of the Bono kingdom in 1740 which caused the migration of the Fante southwards to re-establish contact with the Etsi and Asebu at the coast; and (c) that both the Etsi and the Asebu (former neighbours of the Bono and Fante) were actually living at the coast when the Fante re-"contacted" them[42], it seems that more authenticity is attributable to Meyerowitz's date than Wilks's. Other authors including Acquah also seem to agree with the Meyerowitz account[43]. Wilks' shaky account is further confirmed by his admission to having little knowledge of the Etsi, a people well traced by Meyerowitz[44]. Meyerowitz's grasp of the traditions of origin is clearly demonstrated, and it would appear that her version of events gives a fuller and more detailed picture of the origins of the ethnonational groups of Modern Ghana.

In addition to the fact that many authors rely on her account, the actual current geographical distribution of ethnonational groups in Ghana gives credence to her version of events, in that, their location matches the exact version as given by Meyerowitz, a feat which none of her critics has been able to accomplish. Inaccuracies in dating is not only peculiar to Meyerowitz but to the other authors as well, including Wilks. Given that date discrepancies have not in themselves resulted in wide dissimilarities in the accounts of origin, and also given that current ethno-geographic patterns of groups in Modern Ghana corroborate Meyerowitz's account, it must be said that her work, although not totally sacrosanct, seems to be more reliable than those of her opponents. As mentioned, other authorships, for example Wilks, also exhibit inaccuracies and flaws in dating.

Madeleine Manoukian

Madeline Manoukian, whose work[45] was published two years before that of Meyerowitz[46], is clear that the Niger bend was a migratory route of the Akan, as also affirmed by traditions compiled by the latter. Evidence from Manoukian's work[47] confirms the following facts: (a) that the Akan began to move towards Modern Ghana from the Niger Bend during the 11th century as a result of the Islamic invasion of Ancient Ghana (as already confirmed by Levtzion, Meyerowitz and Hrbek & Devisse); (b) that the Etsi were the first of the Dja tribes to settle in the Northern Territories, and that whereas some of their Bono, Fante and Afutu "brothers" moved directly southwards to the coast, some of the Etsi detoured to Nigeria and returned to the coastal regions of Modern Ghana through Benin[48]; (c) that although the Etsi were the first group from the Niger Bend to settle in the Northern Territories (at the beginning of the 13th century), the first of the ethnonational groups to become a state was the Bono, founded in 1295; (d) that some Guan, Afutu and Asebu people (who had settled in the Northern Territories) also detoured through Nigeria and later approached the forest and coastal regions of Modern Ghana through Benin[49], and; (e) that the Ga-Adangbe are people of Guan ancestry who migrated from the Northern Territories, detouring through Nigeria and approaching the coast of Modern Ghana from Benin[50]. Further evidence from Manoukian also harmonises with sections of the Meyerowitz account. Manoukian asserts that the Guans lived in the Northern Territories, and that most Akan are of Guan ancestry, including Akans in the Akwapim area and the Efutu in current Fanteland[51].

Michael D Warren

Michael Warren's paper is unique in that he sets out to provide a re-appraisal of the findings and methodology of Meyerowitz's research among the Techiman Bonos[52]. It ought to be mentioned however, that prior to and independent of the works of Meyerowitz (the first of which was published in 1952), there were other works and sources such as those of Danquah, Reverend Balmer (1925) and Manoukian (1950) which discuss the origins of ethnonational groups within Modern Ghana, tracing them to Old Ghana or Timbuktu. As already discussed: (a) Balmer published that the Akan

of Modern Ghana and the Ahantas are traceable to the ancient Negro kingdom, and theorized on the comparative history underpinning the Western Sudanese and the Akan, two groups of whom Balmer asserts are linked both in time and space[53]; (b) Manoukian was also independently clear about the Niger bend being a migratory route of the Akan, and the period she assigns to the event (the 11th century) synchronizes with when the Islamic invasion of the Old Ghana empire which sparked the migration took place[54]; (c) furthermore, Danquah, who began researching on this issue from the late 1920s, outlined the point that topographical evidence links the Akan to Timbuctoo. Given that research findings independent of and preceding Meyerowitz trace modern Ghanaians to the ancient empire, whether or not Warren's findings successively supplant those of Meyerowitz is a moot point in the grand debate. In addition to the relative impotence of Warren's critique, several authorships following its publication in 1970 have come out to confirm and strengthen Meyerowitz's thesis, for example Nehemia Levtzion (1971) - on the shore of the sea theory, and Ivor Wilks (1971) - who actually links the Techiman Bonos to the Western Sudanese and Malinke in similarity of language, customs and rituals[55]. Ephirim-Donkor has also firmly traced the Efutu-Guans of Winneba to Timbuktu[56].

Nevertheless it would be interesting to outline a few of the many flaws in Warren's critique. It is puzzling how Warren manages to misconstrue Meyerowitz's use of the phrase "White Desert" (also known as *Sarem*) to mean "white race"[57] even though the latter was simply referring to the colour of the sand on the landscape (as it were a beach) rather than the pigmentation of those who inhabited the landscape. Meyerowitz translated the word *Sarem* to mean 'country of the sand'[58]. A confirmation of this is where Levtzion emphatically states from his Arabic sources, that Old Ghana was firmly located in the Sahil (Sahel/Sahara) translated as "'the shore" of the huge sea of sand', and that *Sahil* is the Arabic word for 'a shore'[59]. *Sarem* is the Akan word for a less vegetative landscape, hence there is a firm deduction that when the Akan recount of their *Sarem* origins, they mean the *Sahel* or Sahara. Both Meyerowitz and Levtzion cite similar sources – the Sudanese Tarikhs or Tarikh-es-Sudan[60], and indeed al Sa'di, one of Levtzion's Islamic oral sources, was a native of Timbuktu[61]. It should be obvious to Warren right at

the onset that matching a white race to the hot and baked Sahara was rather farfetched, and it would appear that the substance of Warren's critique does not severely discount Meyerowitz's account, not to mention Warren's misapprehension of the indigenous language in the very areas where he tries to criticise Meyerowitz. Largely, Warren's pontification of Meyerowitz's 'Twi errors'[62] is erratic - as regards the translation of *Sarem*, and pedantic - on the so-called mis-spellings he lists[63].

Warren's criticism of Meyerowitz's account on the enactment of death and resurrection by a priestess in a state of possession at the Taa Kuntunu festival[64] is also shaky. There is a two decade time difference between the investigations of Meyerowitz and Warren, and as is common with tradition, re-enactments and accounts of events could suffer revision with time, and could even conflict (as Warren should know from his experience with some of his own informants)[65]. That said, in the face of human fallibility, there is no guarantee that any priest or priestess in a state of possession would stage an exact repeat performance over time, even on the shaky mythical assumptions that possession is by the spirit medium responsible for the original act; or whether that self same sprit medium would repeat a similar operation in sequential detail. Worse still, Warren's assertion is based on the subjectivity of what he does not believe about the performance of the priestess at the Taa Kuntunu festival[66].

Warren's other criticism of Meyerowitz's claim on "abosom" being bi-sexual is also unfortunate, in that, these gods are gender-neutral and therefore the names given to them could reflect either of the sexes, in very much the same way that the Twi word "okomfo" (priest/priestess) is gender-neutral – as used by Warren himself in the paragraphs preceding his criticism on the bisexuality of the gods[67]. Also, Warren's attack on Meyerowitz's attempt to shed light on the Akan Calendar or Adaduanan System, simply on the basis that he [Warren] failed to find anyone who recognised the word "*Nna-mmere-nson*" (seven-day week)[68], is rather unfortunate. It is difficult to accept that none of Warren's informants (even from the royal households) could recognise something as intrinsic among the Akan as the system for calculating times and seasons for fishing, farming and festivals, and this raises questions about the depth of his research. Besides, Warren's cynicism on the

determination of times and seasons by the galaxy or planetary system[69] raises other questions about his appreciation of calendar systems. Warren's failure to obtain information 'about planets being related to the days' and the Twi names for the planets[70] is no proof that there are none, and cannot be used to cast a slur on Meyerowitz's findings.

In another ridiculous example, Warren stakes a criticism of Meyerwotiz on the fact that he did not find some gold nuggets at a location which Meyerowitz claimed they existed[71]. Warren's failure to find the said nuggets several years after Meyerowitz's experience is no proof that they never existed any more than the fact that Warren's sources of information were providing conflicting information about the nuggets[72]. It is reassuring to know that Warren admits that his paper criticizing Meyerowitz's work has majored on the negatives[73], suffice to say, that even the so called negatives are not proven.

K Y Daaku

K. Y. Daaku has published works on both the Sefwi and Denkyira[74]. His account of the Sefwi people tends to be highly consonant with that of Meyerowitz. With regard to names and the political structure, Daaku presents Sefwi-Wiawso, Sefwi-Anwiaso and Sefwi-Bekwai as three mutually independent paramountcies of the Sefwi people, whereas Meyerowitz presents Sefwi generally as a confederation of the three states mentioned by Daaku[75]. Also, although on this occasion the Daaku account seems to be more elaborate, it would appear that the Meyerowitz account is a very sharp, concise and brief summary of the same events narrated by Daaku. Both Daaku and Meyerowitz agree to the roles played by Ashanti and Denkyira, as well as the chronology. For example they are both consonant on the following: (a) that the Sefwi-Wiawso people (of the Ayoko clan) are of Asante descent or were propped up by the Asante; (b) that the Sefwi-Anwiaso people (of the Asona clan) are descended from Wankyi; and (c) that the Sefwi-Bekwai people (of the Koona or Ekoona clan) are descendent from Adanse in Ashanti. Daaku asserts that the last phase of the Denkyira imperial campaigns could be pinned down to the period from 1680 to the end of the 17th century, and Meyerowitz also gives 1690 as a specific date of a particular Denkyira campaign led by Ntim

Gyakari against the Sefwi-Bekwai[76]. Although Daaku's account seems to be more authoritative, in that it is more elaborate, the account has a few factual and structural incoherencies. For example, in his introduction, Daaku claims that the Aowin people, the aboriginals of the current Sefwi territory were very scanty and therefore adopted an open door policy of welcoming and harbouring other migrating groups in order to increase their population. However, evidence in the Daaku account of wars between the Aowins and Sefwis and other neighbours tends to discount this "open door policy"[77]. This makes it even more confusing as regards Daaku's theory of the etymology of the word Sefwi (Sehwi) as *Esa-wie* or *Esa-hie*, meaning 'war is over'[78]. On the whole, looking at the fact that the publication dates of the Meyerowitz and Daaku accounts are 22 years apart, and also that they both consulted with different people (but from the same royal household), it is remarkable that they should both end up with such astounding similarities in account. This not only confirms the importance of the Meyerowitz account, but also lends some credence to traditional oral sources as important data sources. Daaku's account on the Denkyira[79], which is also based on oral tradition, does not seem to differ in substance from the accounts of Meyerowitz and other authors.

Louis Wilson, Jack R Goody & Father J J Williams
Louis Wilson states that any suggestion that the origins of Ghanaian groups are traceable 'from as far away as the Tigris and Euphrates in Mesopotamia'[80], is far-fetched, if not false. However, Wilson argues that the variation of the traditions of origin which suggests a migration from the Chad-Benue region has some validity[81]. Jack Goody, the eminent anthropologist who is clearly against crack anthropology and pseudo-history, and rightly so, has taken issue with the evolution of the Ghana hypothesis[82]. In particular, the deductions from linguistic resemblances, and the hypothesis of mass migration. I sincerely doubt whether Goody should lose sleep over whether (Hauasa, Cont, Gan) refer to (Houssa, Kong, Gana) or that (Aiba, Bakr Armah) refer to (Ayboo, Bakki, Arma)[83] anymore than the words (Ynglis, Inglis, English) can refer to (Anglian, Anglic, Anglais), or that Michael, Michel, Michelle, Mikhail, Michale are names of persons from regions

geographically wide apart but who can easily acquaint each other. Despite Goody's cantankerous and patronising criticism of Meyerowitz's work, he has many times admitted that modern Ghana had contacts with the medieval kingdoms of the Niger bend, and acknowledges the long-standing connexions between modern Ghana and the bend, and the further connexion with the Middle-East[84]. It would seem also that Goodys' comparison of Williams with Mrs Simon, Joseph Smith and British Israelites could be unfair, in particular as one can judge from the prelude to Williams' conclusions that he was mindful of scientific method, and had duly applied some rigour to his evidence base.[85]

David Kimble

The introduction to the monograph of Kimble's PhD thesis provides some interesting insights to the genesis of the Ghana hypothesis. We know from Mauny and others that reception to the hypothesis had been mixed. Although Goody mentions that Lady Lugard's work itemised some similarities between the culture and customs of the old and present Ghana[86], Kimble suggests that at the same time she suppressed the migratory origins of the coastal tribes of present Ghana even if she knew that W D Cooley's geographical account had this well documented. For reasons which could be surmised to reflect this mixed attitude towards the name Ghana, Kimble states in his monograph which was published a number of years after independence, that he still retained the name Gold Coast (instead of Ghana) throughout the book.[87].

J D Fage

By far, the best discussion on the subject is offered by J D Fage[88]. But I also find it strange that he should state so emphatically, both in 1955 and 1957 (as discussed above) that Wangara was outside Ghana's political control. In his review of 1957, Fage presents evidence from the Arabic scholars that the land of gold – Wangara to be precise – was next to, if not synonymous with Ghana. If Ghana did not have political control over Wangara, how had he then obtained his gold reserves? It is common to the vast literature that Ghana held political sway over the vast territory of the Western Desert, and it seems that Fage has either been misled by what the Arabic scholars meant with the word 'adjoin'[89] or has

underestimated the political remit of Ghanah which, according to Cooley, was the principal kingdom of Negroland[90].

A.B. Ellis

Melville Herskovits claims that Ellis visited the places he wrote about, and had actual experience in one of them (that is, the Gold Coast), but that Ellis is noted among Africanists for his notoriety in 'uncritical burrowing from other authors'[91]. However, it is Ellis who in 1887, published the emphatic connection between Wangara and Ghana, stating that Wangara belonged to Ghana; and Flora Shaw Lugard confirms in her translated work first published in 1905, that the Wangara were one of the peoples ruled by Ghana[92]. It looks as though Ellis had an insight of posterity that Kimble who would publish in 1963 could take advantage of Fage's misapprehension of what the Arabic scholars meant by the word 'adjoin'[93] and try to dissociate Wangara from Ghana's political control[94].

Reverend J B Anaman

Anaman published in 1894 that citizens of modern Ghana had migrated from Central Africa[95]. This is not to be confused with the modern Central African Republic, since Anaman might have burrowed the phrase 'Central Africa' from Cooley who had it in his book title as referring to the Negroland[96]. Anaman has it that the Ashanti and Fanti once settled in the Kong Mountains in the Wangara district, which on Cooley's map[97] is present day Northen Ghana. Whether the Wangara of the time shared a similar location with Kong Mountains on Cooley's map is open to discussion. Lady Lugard stated that present day Wangara located in Haussaland was named after their previous location in the old Ghana empire.

Paul Nugent

Paul Nugent presents a thesis that the non-Ewe occupants of the Volta Region and perhaps even the so-called Akan groups in the Region (altogether described as CTMs) have a pre-colonial history which seems to be more related to Ewes than Akans[98]. Geographically, the CTMs 'are presently to be found strung out along the Togoland hills on either side of the international border' between Ghana and Togo[99]. He also shares, with Amenumey and

Law, the common Ewe tradition of migrating westwards from an eastern Yoruba-related location[100], hence confirming the clear distinction between the origins of the Ewes and the remainder of Modern Ghana. Nugent and Law both agree on the Yoruba connection, as well as Ketu being a major location or springboard on the migratory route of the Ewes, but differ on the next destination from Ketu. Nugent has this as Notse, whereas Law's rendition of events points to Tado, and later on to Notse. Nugent attributes this difference in renditions to 'nothing more than a difference of oral traditions amongst the Aja-[Tado]/Ewe sub-groupings'[101]. It is clear from Amenumey, Law and Nugent (and others) that the Ewe/Krepi groups in the Volta Region are linked to Notse, but the link between the CTMs and Notse is not clear from Nugent's paper.

Nugent draws distinctions between the various groups within the Volta Region based on linguistic nomenclature, as self-defined by these groups. However, he is also aware of the dangers inherent in using language as the criteria of distinction, in that, languages can be learnt over time, thus masking actual ethnonational roots. He cites the example of the Yikpa, a currently Ewe-speaking people who may have been speaking Sekpele about a century ago[102]. Still on linguistic nomenclature, Nugent further reiterates that, although the general pattern of colonial historical discourse identified tribes as the main unit of group analysis, the autochthonous status accorded the CTMs was based on linguistic evidence[103]. Given that what exactly is autochthonous about this linguistic evidence is not explained, the validity of the assertion that the CTMs are/were autochthonous is somewhat shaky.

Nugent's oral sources on the Likpe (or Bakpele), especially what culminates into the "Atebubu tradition"[104], are to be cautiously considered, in that, the authenticity is based on the weak assumption that what Linguist Udzu says is true. There is also a contradiction or confusion in what appears to be Rattray having accepted the "Atebubu tradition" about Likpe, but at the same time 'apparently not taken in by it'[105]. It is noticeable that Nugent accepts a piece of oral tradition collected by Rattray[106], but should be skeptical about the piece of oral evidence given to Rattray by Linguist Udzu[107]; there is no evidence of established criteria for discriminating between the two. The evidence gleaned from

Nugent's paper is that the Likpe tradition is not yet settled[108] because of competing histories[109].

Michael Kwamena-Poh

Kwamena-Poh makes an essential contribution to the traditions of origin, especially on the few current Guan-speaking groups. He also refers the origins of the Guan to a "Niger-Congo family", and links the Guan language to some Akan dialects such as Fanti and Twi[110]. However, it would appear that Meyerowitz is the source of the more substantial, wider and far-reaching traceability and etymology of the people and word *Guan*. Meyerowitz claims her sources include the tradition of the Late-Guans[111]. As Kwamena-Poh is himself an Akuapem Guan, and has been deemed as having an interest in the rendition of the accounts of the "latter-day" Guans[112], it would appear that in addition to any views between his work and that of Meyerowitz, the main distinction is that Meyerowitz successfully deals with both the issue of a wider inclusive and latent Guan ancestry, as well as the current and remnant Guan tag.

Michelle Gilbert

Michelle Gilbert's entry into the debate comes with his attempt to draw a hard and fast line between a Guan patriliny and an Akan matriliny[113]. However, as already explained, this distinction is not universalistic. Although Guans are originally a patrilineal people, there are some who have entered Akan territory or mixed with Akans and have become matrilineal. Guans that have never mixed with the Dja or Akan, or been under their jurisdiction, remain patrilineal[114], for example the Kpesi-Guan. Also, some Guans who have encountered Akan have maintained their patriliny, for example the Late-Guans and Kyerepon-Guans. The Efutu-Guans of Winneba are currently struggling between patriliny and matriliny owing to proximity with the Akan-Fantis. However, the Senya-Guans of Senya Bereku, who were previously patrilineal, have converted to matriliny [115].

Anthony Ephirim-Donkor

As with Owusu and Vansina, Ephirim-Donkor also has a bone to pick with Meyerowitz. He claims that 'the 1530 date offered by

Meyerowitz as the founding of Winneba is incorrect'[116] and that 'the fundamental flaw in Meyerowitz's study was the distorted information provided her by the deposed king, Ayirebe Acquah III'[117]. Ephirm-Donkor argues that Meyerowitz was used by this king as a channel of misinformation to propagate a new political order through matrilineal succession, something which contravenes the Efutu past, and is a major contributor to the continual political conflict in Efutu. Despite any discrepancies in accounts, some of Ephirim-Donkor's arguments [for example, that Bonde and Gyan were not brothers, and/or that Edwe and Etumpan were one and the same person][118] do not essentially discount the import of Meyerowitz's message that the Efutu originally had a patrilineal ruling class, and as a people, have migrated through the centuries to their current location Winneba. Ephirim-Donkor confirms this, but would not forgive Meyerowitz for communicating the erroneous view that Efutu kings were elected from the militia or dentzen[119]. Readers must bear in mind that Ephirim-Donkor is no ordinary Efutu, but is also Nana Obrafo Owam X, the traditional ruler of Gomoa Mprumem[120]. Therefore, like Kwamena-Poh of the Akuapem, a totally impartial interest in the sensitive issues of Efutu cannot be attributed to him even if his account is to be considered superior to that of Meyerowitz as far as Efutu history is concerned. Ephirim-Donkor also traces the Efutu-Guans of Winneba to Timbuktu[121] and confirms the Ghana hypothesis already discussed in Chapter Three. Moreover, his book sheds light on the Guan controversy, the identity crisis of some Efutus as to whether they are Guan and/or Fanti, and the evolutionary struggle of the Efutu political and social system between patriliny and matriliny[122].

Conclusion

We can confine our critical discussion to the conclusion that the majority of modern Ghana are traceable to Ancient Ghana, and that naming the former Gold Coast as Ghana was not an act of political fantasy on the part of the politicians Danquah or Nkrumah, both of whom had researched this topic in their academic studies and therefore had some idea of the historical weight behind the decision. Outside the political arena, the fierce debates and various publications by colonial anthropologists to discredit the idea before and after independence have also failed.

5

THE NATION-STATE PROJECT

As already mentioned, the Ghanaian nation-state project has been to transform the colonial legacy of ethnonational heterogeneity within a single state jurisdiction into a homogeneity whereby both the political and ethnonational units and frontiers coincide[1] with the state acting as an incubator for the gestation of this homogenized nationhood[2]. ROE in response to the state of figuration seems to reflect the views of Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz when they reiterate the thoughts of an African - scholar Mwayila Tshiyembe, that '. . . since in Africa all countries (with a few exceptions such as Lesotho and Swaziland) are multi-ethnic nations, the only appropriate political order is one which makes space for a political framework grounded in this multi-ethnic reality'[3] whereby the heterogeneity of ethnonational identities accept and assume a homogenized identity within the single state, for example, a single Ghanaian identity.

On the other hand, for some African states, the prospects of national integration with subject groupings sharply antagonistic towards each other, and where the state system perpetuates these antagonisms through unfair political arithmetic motivated by ethno-sectarian interests, are not promising. This is because despite having jurisdictive authority over a piece of territory, the state fails to live up to its egalitarian expectations in the distribution of national opportunities, benefits and resource – the honey pot around which a homogenized identity within the said territory could be forged. Chabal and Daloz have pointed out that centralized power does not translate into a Weberian state unless it should overcome particularism[4]. This assessment is both true and extreme. As already mentioned, figuration is not restricted to Africa, and it would be naïve to argue that a true egalitarian state exists anywhere on the planet. It must be noted however, that the comparative stability of the Ghanaian state, vis-à-vis others in

Africa, can be attributed mainly to the presence of a demographically dominant *ethnie* - the wider Guan ancestry (or at least the emerged Akan identity). Furthermore, the less explosive degree of ethnonational antagonisms in Ghana, vis-à-vis other parts of Africa, for example Nigeria, Rwanda and the Congo, should be attributable to the general acceptability of ROE as practiced. ROE at the election is the individual citizen's payback time to the state of figuration; by it somehow the voter becomes satisfied that they have responded to the system as due.

Latent sub-regional secessionisms and irredentisms

At this stage, it is also useful to discuss some of the potential problems against homogeneity within the current territoriality of modern Ghana. In 1999, four non-Ewe districts of the Volta Region of Ghana, from which the 52% votes in favour of the annexation of British Togoland to Ghana largely emanated, and who form part of the "Central Togo Minorities"[5] made representations to the ruling NDC government for the creation of a separate administration from the Ewe-speaking area of the Region, on the basis that past governments have discriminated against them in terms of development planning. This potential new region would be called Oti Region, after the main Oti river which runs through the four districts. The chiefs of the area claimed that the 'Ewe-Akan rivalry, which has been a plague in the Volta Region for years, has resulted in deprivation of development in their areas which are Akan dominated'[6]. Agitation for a separate administrative region had been a recurrent feature for a few years running, without success. An attempt in 1997 was unsuccessful. A fresh attempt was made in April 2005 by Obrimpong Kanya II, Chief of Bejamse-Nchumuru in the Krachi-West District, of the Volta Region, when he addressed a durbar to climax the Sonkor festival of the chiefs and people of the Bejamse-Nchumuru Traditional Area. In his opinion, the current district demarcations of the region caused burdens for planning, monitoring and evaluating development projects, and had rendered the northern half of the region underdeveloped. He would like the northern districts to be called North-Volta Region, and even had suggestions for carving this up, that is, the Nkwanta, Kadjebi, Jasikan, Krachi West and the newly created Krachi East districts should be the constituent parts[7]. If the

Deputy Regional Minister's response to Chief Kanya is anything to rely on, then the increasing pressure of these renewed representations could one day yield the desired result. At the Sonkor festival, the government minister responded that 'the issue of a separate region for northern Volta was a constitutional one with an elaborate process that takes time to mature'[8]. The Member of Parliament for Nkwanta-North did not oppose the idea, and even commented on its constitutional potential. Added to the historiographical marginalization of Ewes, a constitutionally separated region of non-Ewes versus Ewes would spell further isolation of the latter, especially in a post-Rawlings Ghana, and could rejuvenate the potential for secession by Ghanaian Ewes to join their historical relatives in neighbouring Togo, depending on the nature of the powers that be in Togo.

In the 1956 plebiscite, 42% of the Volta Region, mainly the Ewe-speaking part of the Region, voted against their political annexation with Ghana. The unsteady relationship between Togo and Ghana since the annexation[9] has continued with periodical allegations against each other. In 1998, the Ghanaian Foreign Office had to officially disassociate itself from reported armed incursions into Togo from the common border between the two countries, and the Togolese Opposition Leader, Gilchrist Olympio (who sometimes resided in Ghana), also denied any knowledge or involvement with these incursions[10]. Subsequent joint military exercises between both countries to contain the security situation were inadequate to ease the strain. The Ghanaian Armed Forces have sometimes been on the edge to deal with Togolese threats including several instances of land encroachment, annexation and usage by Togolese, and violations of Ghanaian air-space by Togolese military aircraft[11]. In one example of what is clearly a border dispute, Togolese from Hanyigbatodzi had crossed at least two kilometres into Ghanaian territory, claiming that 'they recognised the old traditional boundaries and not the international frontier'[12]. Lt-Colonel John Forkuo, the Commanding Officer of the Ghana Artillery Regiment at Ho (capital of the Volta Region) subsequently disclosed that 'most of the pillars between Pillar I and Pillar 148, which the two countries erected jointly in 1974, to mark the international frontier between them, were recently destroyed by Togolese'[13]. The

situation is however not to the point of an armed international conflict between the two countries.

Dating from the time of Nkrumah (when the annexation took place) until now, the idea of an Ewe secession from Ghana to join their ancestral relatives in Togo is not only antithetical to governmental position because of the constraints of the 1963 OAU Charter and the 1964 Arusha Declaration[14], but also ironically antithetical to the history of pan-Eweist irredentism within the West African sub-region. Pan-Eweist irredentism has been stalled or stalemated due to the emergence of Eyadema's non-Ewe administration and its subsequent long period of rule. It is interesting to note that the main Togolese Opposition to the ruling Eyadema's party and government are Olympioists - proponents of pan-Eweism. It is even more interesting that both Ghana's Ewe Rawlings and Togo's non-Ewe Eyadema have been heads-of-states over the same period since the early 1980s until the end of 2000 when Rawlings ceased to be the Ghanaian leader. It is obvious that the prevalence of the non-Ewe Eyadema administration blocked any potential pan-Eweist irredentism in the West African sub-region during the same period that neighbouring Ghana had an Ewe leader. Owing to the uneasy relationship between Ghana and Togo since 1960, and also the suspicion between the governments of Eyadema and Rawlings, there has been a governmental commitment to tackle border disputes with the tact and sensitivity that it deserves. A secession of Ghanaian Ewes to Togo would automatically wipe out border incursions between neighbouring historical relatives, but a secession movement is not likely to be successful so long as either Eyadema or his non-Ewe power bloc remains the governing power in Togo. There is therefore a political stalemate in the sub-region as far as the potential for pan-Eweist irredentism is concerned. Since it is in the interests of the Eyadema power bloc to suppress the resurgence of pan-Eweism in the sub-region, a post-Rawlings and non-Ewe-dominated Ghana after the December 2000 election was an era which the Eyadema power bloc had been looking forward to. The complexity of the future political landscape is to be seen in the fact that the Eyadema power bloc is antithetical to any prospective secession bid by Ghanaian Ewes to join Togo; simply put, the fewer Ewes incorporated into Togo, the better for the bloc.

The analysis deduces that any potential apprehensions and frustration of Ghanaian Ewes could lie among any one or combination of the following:

- potential creation of a new Oti, Northern-Volta or similar Region to be separate from the rest of Volta Region;
- potential relative isolation vis-à-vis fellow Ghanaian ethnonational groups in a post-Rawlings era;
- a secessional stalemate; and
- the demise of pan-Eweist irredentism in the West African sub-region.

It can be seen that the future depends on how figuration unfolds vis-à-vis the mutual ethnonational antagonisms in modern Ghana, and subsequently the extent to which Ewes in Ghana feel they belong, in contradistinction with their historical affiliations to Togo, irrespective of or in conjunction with the nature of the Togolese political landscape. It becomes a huge responsibility how the Ghanaian state manages its citizens, and by what level of egalitarianism in statecraft this occurs. Having said that, it should be noted that just as Akans in modern Ghana are no more Ghanaian than the remaining citizens, and Northerners in Ghana no less Ghanaian, so Ewes in Ghana are no less Ghanaian.

In January 2001, soon after John Kufour was sworn into his first four-year term of the Ghanaian presidency, his first international trip was to visit Eyadema of neighbouring Togo. This trip attracted both speculation and condemnation: that the agenda for the visit would include the sensitive issues discussed above; and that a visit from the leader of exemplary and democratic Ghana did rubberstamp Eyadema's undemocratic record. In what can describe some of the anxieties characterising the Togolese political climate, hundreds of Togolese fearing potential violence and instability fled to neighbouring Ghana during bouts of political unrest in 2002, hence sparking the necessity for setting up refugee camps on certain points along the Ghana-Togo border under the UN's auspices. Reasons for the unrest in Togo included the scrapping of the electoral commission in May 2002 and the amendment of the Togolese constitution to allow Eyadema to run for an unlimited number of presidential terms. The period leading to Eyadema's re-

election on 1 June 2003 also witnessed the emergence of a new Ewe opposition candidate Emmanuel Bob Akitani, who took away significant votes from the incumbent in sensitive areas. Voting patterns reflected a broad distinction of an "Ewe south" and a "less-Ewe north" for the Opposition and incumbent respectively.

Fate would have it that on Friday 4 February 2005, the thirty-eight year rule of Gnassingbe Eyadema ended with his passing, and his thirty-nine year old son Faure Gnassinbge was unconstitutionally sworn in as president by the Togolese Armed Forces, side-stepping the Speaker of Parliament who should assume the role in the interim. Pressurised by the international community, in particular the ECOWAS and France, Gnassingbe stepped down on Friday 5 February, assumed leadership of his father's ruling Togo People's Rally (RPT), and contested the presidency through multi-party elections held on Sunday 24 April 2005. He became President by winning at least 60% of the votes cast; Bob Akitani won 38%.

Both the nature of the Ghanaian government's response and the domestic regional crisis arising soon after Eyadema's death contributes to understanding the continual sensitivity of relations between the two countries at the security and political level; tens of thousands of Togolese fled into neighbouring Ghana and Benin. Credited with hosting armed dissidents who made incursions into Togo in 1994 and 1998, and being at the receiving end of periodic surges of mass refugee movements from Togo to Ghana in 2002, 2005 and each other time Togolese politics sneezed, Ghana had reasons to be seen as taking diplomatic steps towards a solution to the sub-regional crisis. The Ghanaian government would not be taunted to make inflammatory statements that would infuriate the powers that be in Togo, nor did it wish to give the impression of having reservations towards criticising the Togolese situation, even if the latter became the public perception.

THE RATIONALIZATION OF ETHNONATIONALISM

Rationalized ethnonationalism is an observed electoral behaviour whereby ethnonationalism synchronizes with patriotism; whereby citizens demonstrate ethnonationalism as the most rational way of rendering their civic loyalties to the state; with the firm conviction that, for their own purposes, voting along the lines of ethnonational identity is in the best interests of the state, given the realities of the overall political context. It is important to set out what conditionalities make for the emergence of the phenomenon.

Figuration

"Politics of the belly" is a Cameroonian political phrase which summarises a status quo of unequal distribution and accumulation of public opportunity and wealth, aptly described by the term "figuration" burrowed by Jean-Francois Bayart from Norbert Elias[1], in which a system of social inequality operates through the political interdependence of allies (or opponents) within the political arena, along tribal or clientelistic contours, and supervised by the State[2]. In simple terms, the patron-client relationship operates such that, the holders of political power within the state (patrons) ensure that their supporters (clients) are rewarded within a framework by which state resources are accessed and appropriated as personal tribute along the circuit of corruption and reciprocity. Politics-of-the-belly operates within the backdrop of the characteristic personalized and traditionalized political arrangement termed as patrimonialism, a system whereby the holder of political power or 'the ruler allocates political office to his clients on the basis of patronage, rather than according to the criteria of professionalism and competence which characterize the civil service'[3]. In patrimonialism therefore, there does not seem to

be a clear cut demarcation between the private and public spheres of allocation, distribution and administration, and the clientele utilises political attention in distributing state resources to their benefit instead of restructuring society and bridging class gaps. It would seem that, 'for as long as the state engulfs society, ethnic strategy is but a legitimate response. Participation as it is, it remains available, prone to use and abuse'[4]. Subsequently, in its advanced form, neo-patrimonialism is the term which describes 'the personalized character of African politics, in which formal constitutions and organizations are subordinate to individual rulers (the president or "big man") . . .'[5]. The term neo-patrimonialism has assumed an approach which 'seeks to make sense of the (real or imaginary) contradictions to be found in the state in sub-Saharan Africa . . . and accounts for the undeniable fact that the public and the private spheres largely overlap. Second it helps to explain in which ways the operation of a political system is no longer "traditional" – hence the weight of the prefix *neo*'[6]. To underscore its murkiness is the dangerous precedent that 'criminal activities can serve the patrimonial purposes of patron-client relationships'[7], and that perhaps this situation is given support by the irony that 'there has always existed in Africa a wide range of activities (such as corruption) which, although illicit from a strictly constitutional point of view, have been regarded as patrimonially legitimate by the bulk of the population'[8]. The murky, shadowy and indistinctive nature of the private and public spheres renders the successful emergence and subsequent operation of civil society a difficult task. Civil society has been defined as 'an intermediate layer of associational structures occupying the space between the state, on the one hand, and tribal and ethnic networks, on the other. In this conception, civil society refers to the organizations and interests which act to influence public policy and moderate the authoritarian tendencies of both community and state'[9]. It has been argued that 'the notion of civil society would only apply if it could be shown that there were meaningful institutional separations between a well organized civil society and a relatively autonomous bureaucratic state'[10].

Although figuration and forms of patrimonialism are not unique to Africa[11], the roots of clientelism and African presidentialism are located in a combination of the nature of colonial development, the

transition from colonialism, as well as the performance of the post-colonial state within international stipulations[12]. But even more note-worthy, and perhaps the lesson to be learnt by Africa, is the fact that the experience of Japan and the other "Asian tigers" proves that development can occur irrespective of corruption and clientelistic patronage. It would appear that the difference between the Asian and African experience is that, Asian patrimonialists reinvested their booty locally and nationally, whereas their African counterparts often dissipated their wealth in local ostentation and stashed the remainder in Swiss and other foreign banks[13].

Given the 'dependence of accumulation and class formation on state power and public resources'[14], and that 'clientelism in this sense represents a politics of class domination as distinct from a politics of class struggle . . . a means of enabling propertied classes to legitimate their political dominance'[15], the critical question poses whether politics-of-the-belly is an essential stage in economic accumulation in Africa. It is only essential for the purposes of the selfish accumulation of assets to the advantage of those who hold political power, however, such economic accumulation (or the misappropriation of state/public wealth by a private few) does not necessarily denote economic accumulation for the continent, nor has it proved to offer Africa an economic advantage over the other continents. Hence, figuration and its related misuse of state resources and bad governance are not essential for the economic development of Africa, and have been aptly termed by Rene Dumont as the 'False Start in Africa'[16] - in other words, they are not the prerequisite for Africa's development. Dumont states that, together these phenomena 'remain large obstacles to the realistic policies which alone can produce essential socio-economic revolutions'[17]. As far back as the mid 1960s, Dumont had already identified Ghana (among other countries in Africa) as an example of where 'the dichotomy between progressive economic development and destructive misuse of resources can be seen most vividly'[18].

The Rationalization of Ethnonationalism (ROE):
a Rationality Paradox

As already mentioned, the term *ethnonationalism* has been introduced into the literature by Walker Connor in response to the general

misapplication of the word *nationalism* to convey patriotism rather than loyalty to the *ethnos* or national group[19] within a multinational state. Ethnonationalism is the solidarity demonstrated towards the ethnonational identity group, based primarily on shared tribal feeling[20]. Also traceable to Herder, this theorizing '. . . perceives the nation as a natural solidarity endowed with unique cultural characteristics'[21] hence the other usage *cultural nationalism*. Patriotism, on the other hand, is civic loyalty, or loyalty towards the state institution, and is often interchanged with *civic nationalism*, *political nationalism* or sometimes *official nationalism* whenever issues of civic loyalties are being discussed even if this contributes to misconveying it as a form of nationalism. It focuses on rationality and citizenship rights, or 'the belief in reason as the ethical basis of the community . . .'[22]. Hence, the phenomenon has been broadly defined as 'the nationalism of (or towards) the state, encompassing all those legally entitled to be citizens, irrespective of their ethnicity, national identity and culture'[23]. Patriotism can be perceived as idealistic. As Hutchinson states, 'of course, this is a cosmopolitan conception that logically looks forward to a common humanity transcending traditional differences'[24].

The trend in the literature[25] suggests that civic nationalism is often deemed rational and ethnonationalism irrational. In this mutually antagonistic relationship, ethnonationalism undermines patriotism and vice versa, simply because, each advances at the other's expense. In an ethnocracy or a nation-state – where the national and state boundaries are co-terminus[26], ethnonationalism equates with patriotism in both the theoretical and practical sense. In a multinational state - where more than one ethnonational group co-exist, ethnonationalism and patriotism are mutually competitive and at one another's expense, both theoretically and practically. However, as an antithesis to the dichotomy of a rationality of patriotism and an irrationality of ethnonationalism, a phenomenon known as the rationalization of ethnonationalism (ROE) suggests that in most African political scenarios, ethnonationalism synchronizes with patriotism simply because citizens demonstrate ethnonationalism as their civic loyalty within the realities of the local political rationality. This renders the mutual conflict simplistically theorized between ethnonationalism and patriotism anything but universalistic. ROE is a rational response to the state

of figuration within the estimation of the politics on the ground, and has become embedded as the default electoral behaviour in African politics, subject of course, to future fundamental changes in the African socio-political context. Within a political context fraught with figuration, political rationality is demonstrated by making political choices which would best serve the calculated interests of one's ethnonational group. Rationality here springs from the argument that the state of figuration leaves voters with no other political choices than those geared towards placing one's ethnonational group in state control. The logic here is in what would serve the ethnonational best interest, and by extension that of the state. Within the estimation of political realities therefore, for the majority of Ghanaians, the rational way of demonstrating their civic loyalties towards a state of figuration is through ethnonationalism. It seems the rational thing to do if one ought to be real. A rational response to figuration is what is meant by the rationalization of ethnonationalism (ROE). From a wider perspective, and within the meanings generally ascribed to rationality, a question arises: whose rationality is it? The simple answer is that it is the rationality of the local political reality. And who is the judge as to what is rational and what isn't?

The scenario is best described by the epistemological stalemate, between positivistic and antipositivistic social science, whereby the former is considered as quantitative, rational and objective, and the latter is characterised as qualitative, subjective and irrational. But of course the former, which sets out to understand the interpretations of behaviour as given by those under study, regards the latter with the cynicisms of majoring on generalisations, having the characteristic of not penetrating what lies behind social reality and people's deliberate intentions or actions, and therefore not revealing ultimate truth. And so never the twain shall meet. ROE has become embedded as the default electoral behaviour in most of Africa, subject to future fundamental changes in the African socio-political context. As an antithesis to the dichotomy of a rationality of patriotism and an irrationality of ethnonationalism (nationalism), ROE suggests that in some political scenarios (such as Ghana), and in most African states for that matter, ethnonationalism synchronizes with patriotism as dictated by the local political rationality. In being ethnonationalist, one becomes a patriot!

Therein lies the paradox between theory and reality. That nationalism and patriotism should synchronize where and when citizens demonstrate ethnonationalism as their civic loyalties within the realities of the local political rationality, renders the mutual conflict simplistically theorized between the two phenomena as not universalistic. Results of the 1999 survey of voter intent and the subsequent real elections of 2000 and 2004 have all confirmed ROE, with some twists, turns and variations of intensity, as the phenomenon evolves.

Tribalism versus Ethnonationalism

Contrary to the usual narrow restriction of tribalism to Africa by Western authorship and discourse[27] and the comparatively widespread application of the term to African examples, the occurrence of tribalism is just as universal across the globe as the existence of ethnonational groups[28] - in other words it is primordial - and that, not only is tribalism not peculiar to Africa, but also synonymous with nineteenth century European nationalism[29], and indeed twenty-first century European nationalism, and elsewhere across the globe. One would find[30], that negative ascriptions of one identity group against the other in the Irish identities crises, which has its roots from as far back as the 12th century, is termed as tribalism. In Northern Ireland, there has been 'a Catholic tribalism, an Anglican tribalism and a Presbyterian tribalism, which has further degenerated into "Catholic" and "Protestant", "Orange" and "Green"'.[31]

The distinction between tribalism and ethnonationalism can be blurred, and this contributes to the already complex nature of issues of identity politics. The terminological evolution has assigned to ethnonationalism the demonstration of loyalty towards one's ethnonational group, and to tribalism the negative usage and/or manipulation of ethnonationalistic potential for controversial purposes. The distinction can be more or less found in or reduced to the respective use and abuse of ethnonational potential in a variety of circumstances including figuration. For example, whereas diversity in political participation, and quests for national self-determination or autonomy are deemed as demonstrations of ethnonationalism, figuration[32] and the manipulation of ethnonational identity for electoral or other political purposes is

tribalism. Could this be loyalty to the tribe? Yes, but it is the use (or abuse) of it that is tribalism, and this is the distinction. The scenario becomes even more complex and confusing, in that, politicians often tend to malign legitimate expressions of political diversity, ethnonational self-determination and autonomy, as tribalism, with the intent to repress the former[33]. As usage of the term itself is abused, it has become the case therefore that ascribing or prescribing tribalism does occur in many shades including even the name callings. A current demonstration of the complexity of the dual occurrence of ethnonationalism and tribalism is what seems to have contributed to the strategic decision-making that as of the 2000 and 2004 elections, the vice-presidential candidates of the major political parties in Ghana should be Northerners[34]. At the same time as Northerners demonstrated ethnonationalism by campaigning for the vice-presidential slot (of the NDC for example), what actually underlies the intentionality for any party to appoint a Northerner as vice-presidential candidate, is the potential to manipulate Northern votes into their political baskets at the election – a demonstration of tribalism. Or one can equally argue that Northerners have been manipulating their ethnonational identity to their political advantage – also tribalism. It is fair to say that sometimes it becomes difficult to ascertain whether the politics demonstrating is ethnonationalism or tribalism.

Given the pervasiveness of figuration, it must be understood why some citizens demonstrate political rationality by making political choices geared towards their best-calculated ethnonationalistic interests, and also, why this should be seen as their civic loyalty towards the state. Individual political attitudes are political indicators. The benefits accruable from figuration arouse interest in the politics surrounding the distribution of opportunity, wealth and political power. As already mentioned, in Agyeman's study, citizens revealed their willingness 'to give up tribalism in favour of nationalism (only) if the social, political and the economic advantages derived from tribalism are removed'[35]. Agyeman's study further revealed that, politically, tribalism is seen as disadvantageous at the state level but advantageous at the sub-state level[36], and that 62.9% of Ghanaians admit that tribalism works against homogenization within the state, and ought to be suppressed[37].

THE 1999 SURVEY OF VOTER INTENT

Previous Research on Ghanaian Electoral and Political Attitudes

It would be useful to provide some context to surveys on electoral attitudes. As at 1999, no voters' register in the history of Ghana gave place to indicating ethnonational identity. Second, scientific post-election surveys conducted so far did not investigate ethnonationalism in politics as a stand-alone issue, but as one of many aspects of Ghanaian political attitudes. Results of these surveys had therefore not produced detailed analyses of the intricacies of ethnonationalism in electoral politics, and had limited predictive value for future trend setting. For example, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), in cooperation with the Electoral Commission of Ghana, subcontracted Research International (RI) to conduct a national survey of Ghanaian public opinion from February 26 to April 16 1997. The survey measured attitudes about the December 1996 elections, politics and the economy. Results of the survey revealed among other things, that about 'a quarter (26%) of all Ghanaians felt that relations between ethnonational groups ranged from 'somewhat bad' to 'very bad'. Pessimism about mutual ethnonational relations was highest in the Ashanti, Greater Accra, Western and Volta regions. Also, a fourth (25%) of Ghanaians claimed to have encountered ethnonational discrimination. This was highest among the Frafra and Ewe'[1]. This IFES survey did not investigate ethnonationalism in voting habits.

In another example, both a pre- and post-election survey conducted by the Department of Political Science of the University of Ghana, sought information on respondents' ethnonational identities, party alliances and votes in the 1996 elections. However,

this was circumstantial to the research in that the survey was not specifically aimed at investigating ethnonational patterns in voting behaviours alone, but rather, many variables. The Department's survey also investigated the combination of 'agential and structural variables that intricately combined to produce the particular pattern of results recorded in Ghana's 1992 and 1996 Presidential elections'[2]. The survey was based on the hypothesis that 'neither agency nor structure by itself can fully explain the election results of 1992 and 1996 . . . structural variables constitute the social, economic and political parameters within which agential factors operate. Structures then are the external bounds and limits within which Ghanaian voters exercised their free choices in the elections of 1992 and 1996'[3]. The survey identified the "structural" factors as the ethnic, industrial, urban-rural and regional structures of the country, and the "agential" factors as 'the recorded feelings, reasons and decisions of the Ghanaian electorate acting as free agents and exercising their free choices in elections generally considered to be free and fair'[4]. The research posited the broad overview that the former influenced the latter[5]. The Department's survey results reveal strong indications that 'ethnicity is a major factor that influenced Ghanaian voters in both the 1992 and 1996 Presidential elections'[6]; that a full understanding of the past elections cannot be gained 'without reference to the ethnic factor'[7] and that 'to ignore the ethnic factor is to ignore a major key to understanding the mind of the Ghanaian voter[8]. However, the survey had limited predictive value for the 2000 elections as far as gauging ethnonationalism and patriotism was concerned, since it failed to gather data on voters' intentions for the impending elections. Second, although its report covered mass, patriotic, block voting along ethnonational lines, it failed to demonstrate or detail the specific antagonisms between ethnonational groups, or the demonstrations of such antagonisms against presidential candidates. Third, the Department's survey did not investigate the intricacies in the ethnonationalistic behaviours of urbanites.

Results of the 1999 survey of voter intent, however: (a) had predictive value for the 2000 elections with regard to gauging the levels of ethnonationalism and patriotism; (b) reveals the specific antagonisms between which ethnonational groups; (c) and also reveals antagonisms against presidential candidates based on their

ethnonational identities. More interestingly, the study was conducted on urbanites, who are notioned to be detribalized, and are expected to be patriotic.

The Afrobarometer Rounds

The Afrobarometer series constitutes surveys on political attitudes conducted in a number of African countries and in Ghana under the auspices of the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD). CDD is an international organization and its Executive Director in Ghana is Professor Gyimah-Boadi, a lecturer at the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon. Round One involved as many as twelve countries and spanned a period from 1999 to 2001. Although the Afrobarometer Round One survey in Ghana occurred in 1999, the questionnaire is not among the selected ones available on the internet[9]; nor those of the subsequent rounds.

The credibility of the Afrobarometer has been recently damaged by a number of factors not least the perception that the exercise is being run mainly by researchers sympathetic to the New Patriotic Party (NPP) which came into government by winning the December 2000 Ghanaian elections. The summary balance of critique suggests that their analyses are loaded in favour of the NPP government. This has earned Professor Gyimah-Boadi and his colleagues the accolade "NPP academics". Among other things, Afrobarometer Round Three conducted during a two-week period from 10 to 23 March 2005 reported at a press conference organised by the CDD in Accra on 5 July 2005, that 52% of citizens would like to vote for the NPP and 22% for the main Opposition NDC; some other 22% were undecided. The survey also reported that popular perception of official corruption was on the rise from 40% of respondents in the Round Two Afrobarometer of 2002 to 52% in 2005. At the same time, 65% approved of the president's performance within the twelve months preceding the survey - (74% in 2002). Widespread reactions recorded in various sections of the media suggest the doubtful credibility of Round Three. The parliamentary Opposition rubbished the report as bogus, misleading and propagandist[10]. The Minority Leader argued that it was difficult to appreciate the high level of perception against government corruption and high level of support for the same

government. The Editor of The Gye Nyame Concord, Alfred Ogbamey, similarly criticised that '. . . higher perception of corruption at the presidency and the massive support for the President are irreconcilable'[11]. The timing of the survey – three months after the 2004 general election – was also criticized by Ogbamey as well as The Managing Editor of The Insight Newspaper, Kwesi Pratt Jnr. The survey, it seems, was a rather wasteful exercise. Some of the media criticism was that the CDD wanted to appear active to its donors. It would seem therefore, that the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the African Development Bank (AfDB) who sponsored the round three Afrobarometer might have to consider what value for money the funding has been. There have also been anecdotes that that even the 65% perception of official corruption is conservative to reality. The report has so far failed to explain why the Opposition who polled 44% at the December 2004 presidential election could suddenly sink to a staggering 22% in opinion poll in just three months. The criticisms have cast shadows on how accurately the barometer is measuring public opinion, to the extent that on Thursday 4 August 2005, the Opposition NDC issued a public announcement to denounce the CDD and sever relations. Among other things, the NDC stated that the barometer served the narrow interests of the ruling government and therefore could not be trusted[12]. Subsequently, the result of the 20 August 2005 parliamentary bye-election at Odododiodoo constituency in which the NDC candidate won 57.85% of the votes against the NPP's 39.9% further undermined the Afrobarometer "analysis" that the NDC was unpopular; and the CDD's comment that excessive security presence at the constituency intimidated the voting did not help the organization's image. When the NDC high office finally ratified the severing of relations with CDD on 9 September 2005, the above list of complaints factored in their excuses[13], and con-solidated the view that the CDD's paymasters were the ruling NPP[14].

The State of the Political Parties in 1999

The following cast was pretty much the scenario at the time of the survey of voter intent, even if regulations over pre-election party political activity meant that these were the ones with legal registration status, and had been issued with certificates as of 31

July 1999[15]; the cast list would remain so for the December 2000 election.

The ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC)

The NDC was the majority party with only one seat short of a two-thirds majority out of the 200 seats in Parliament (see Table 2). The party had two consecutive electoral victories in 1992 and 1996, and is of course the civilian metamorphosis of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) – the para-military government that had initially assumed power as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) through the June 4 coup d'etat led by Boakye Djan and Rawlings. The AFRC's purported agenda was to eliminate corruption and state mismanagement in order to bring accountability to government, and revival to a fast deteriorating economy. The AFRC ruled for only three months during which it organised multi-party elections and ushered in a democratically-elected government presided over by the late Dr. Hilla Limann from 1979. After a short interregnum of free and unchecked corruption in the handling of state affairs - much to the disappoint-ment of the AFRC - the latter reappeared through another coup d'etat on 31 December 1981 as the PNDC, under the original leadership. From then until the December 2000 electoral defeat featured the unbroken rulership of the PNDC and NDC; hence the acronym P/NDC where both governments apply in context.

The P/NDC has no political tradition and appeared to concentrate on maintaining a populist appeal. The 1996 presidential election results show that Jerry Rawlings polled 4,099,760 votes - 57.4% of the total, and the NDC won 133 parliamentary seats; but the results of two seats were disputed and subsequently lost by the NDC, leaving the party with 131 seats. Professor John Ata Mills (the 1996-2000 Vice-President) became the NDC's presidential candidate for the 2000 elections. As granted by the constitution, the vice-president assumes the president in the absence of the latter; hence there were apprehensions about the prospects of a Mrs Rawlings vice-candidacy for the 2000 elections; a potential political dynasty for the Rawlingses was to be avoided. After serious political tussles between several ethnosectarian interests within the party, Alhaji Amidu, a Northerner, was chosen as the running mate to Mills. The NDC lost the 2000 election and that of 2004.

Table 2: 1996 elections - Parliamentary seats

Region	NDC	NPP	PCP	PNC
Ashanti	5	28	0	0
B-Ahafo	17	4	0	0
Central	14	3	0	0
Eastern	15	11	0	0
G-Accra	13	9	0	0
Northern	18	3	1	1
U-East	12	0	0	0
U-West	8	0	0	0
Volta	19	0	0	0
Western	12	3	4	0
Total	**133**	**61**	**5**	**1**

Table 3: 1996 elections - Presidential votes by candidate

Region	Rawlings	%	Kufour	%	Mahama	%
Ashanti	412,475	32.8	827,821	65.8	17,736	1.4
B-Ahafo	395,382	61.7	230,457	36	14,635	2.3
Central	313,386	55.7	241,542	42.9	7,995	1.4
Eastern	459,090	53.8	384,597	45	10,251	1.2
G-Accra	658,826	54	528,484	43.3	32,723	2.7
Northern	370,330	62.1	190,621	32	35,318	5.9
U-East	230,791	69	54,041	17.4	45,696	13.7
U-West	145,812	74.6	21,871	11.2	27,754	14.2
Volta	690,421	94.5	34,538	4.7	5,292	0.8
Western	405,992	57.3	289,730	40.9	12,862	1.8
Total	**4,099,760**	**57.4**	**2,825,715**	**39.6**	**219,980**	**3**

I have to admit that I am not conclusive whether Mills is a Fanti since I do not have his quote regarding his hometown. Many sources say he is from Winneba and others say Tarkwa although none have been emphatic from which is the mum or dad, and in the light of the discussion in the previous chapters about the evolving patriliny/matriliny even in Efutu Winneba, I have difficulty placing him. I therefore submit, that until I know for sure, the common knowledge within the general context of Ghanaian politics is that Mills is Fanti, and so he is, and in this book at least.

The "Danquah-Busiaists": The New Patriotic Party (NPP)

This was the main Opposition Party to the NDC governments, and belonged to the Danquah-Busia political tradition which has a long standing history in Ghanaian politics, evolving from the pre-independence struggle of the 1950s and rooting from the National Liberation Movement (NLM)[16] and the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC). Along the route of evolution, this political tradition was the Progress Party (PP) led by Dr Kofi Busia which became the government of the Second Republic of Ghana when Busia won the 1969 multi-party elections to become Prime Minister. The tradition subsequently became the Popular Front Party (PFP) during the 1979 presidential elections, and finally NPP in 1996. John Kufour, the NPP presidential candidate for the 1996 elections, polled 2,825,715 votes (40.09%) and the NPP won 61 parliamentary seats (see Tables 2 and 3). The tradition would go on to win the 2000 and 2004 elections. At the national delegates' conference held in Sunyani on 24 October 1998, John Kufuor was re-elected as the party's presidential candidate for the 2000 elections by an overwhelming majority. Despite sharing some high profile party portfolios with personalities from other ethnonational groups, the NPP is widely perceived as an Ashanti party. At the time of the 1999 survey, the Party Chairman (Samuel Odoi-Sykes), General Secretary (Dan Botwe) and National Campaign Manager (Jake Obetsebi-Lamptey) were all Ga-Adangbes, and the National Youth Organiser (Courage Quashigah) was an Ewe and prominent defector from the Rawlings camp. Yet, owing to the party's Ashanti roots, it remains an open secret that one has to be at least Akan to be its flagbearer; the party's Ashanti image is predominant. For the 2000 election, both the NPP and NDC stalked each other about

the choice of running mate for the presidential candidate. Ultimately, as soon as the NDC announced Alhaji Amidu, the NPP also announced Alhaji Mahama Aliu as the running mate to Kufour. Kufour and Aliu Mahama would go on to win both the 2000 and 2004 elections.

The "Nkrumahists"

A political tradition had existed aligned mainly to the ideals of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, the first President of Ghana. At the time of the survey, a coalition of three political parties each pretending to be broadly sympathetic to Nkrumah's vision emerged as the People's Convention Party (PCP), with Mr. P. K. Donkor Ayifli as the acting National Chairman. The "Nkrumahist" group consisted of: (a) the old PCP originally led by Donkor Ayifli and which party's acronym was adopted for the coalition; (b) the People's National Convention (PNC) led By Dr Edward Mahama; and (c) the National Convention Party (NCP) led by Mr K. Sarpong-Kumankumah. Noticeably the word "convention" maintained itself from the original Convention People's Party (CPP) of Nkrumah; whether the coalition truly convened with similar motives is debatable. Despite the Nkrumahist overtones, the PCP was relatively small in terms of importance. In the last 1996 parliamentary election, the PNC won 1 seat and the NCP won 5. Dr. Edward Mahama, PNC's presidential candidate polled only 210,980 (3%) of the presidential votes (see Tables 2 and 3). After the 1996 elections, the first major unification event of all the Nkrumahist factions took place in November 1997. Not long after this, in April 1998, there were rumours that Dr Edward Mahama was being considered by the ruling NDC government as running mate for the 2000 presidential election. Mahama was booed as a traitor by his Nkrumahist colleagues, and subsequently refused to join the next round of PCP unification talks. Some reshuffle within the PCP coalition officially ousted Mahama from the race and paved way for the reconstitution of a new Nkrumahist coalition known as the Convention Party (CP) on Saturday June 13 1998 - remarkably the 49th anniversary of the formation of Nkrumah's CPP.

The constant metamorphosis of the "Nkrumahist" following became a source of confusion, allowing less room for the clear cut identification of the Nkrumahism label. As the metamorphosis

would unfold for the 2000 elections, the CP re-merged as Convention People's Party (CPP) with Professor George Panyin Hagan as their presidential candidate. A Fanti from Cape Coast, his entry into the presidential race raised the stakes for the Fanti vote between himself and Atta Mills, even if the perceived threat was minimal in reality; Hagan polled only 1.8% of the presidential countrywide vote and 3.19% of respective votes cast in the Central Region. Hagan also had Alhaji Ibrahim Abubakar, a Northerner, as his running mate. Edward Mahama remained leader of the PNC for the 2000 election, and as the analysis unfolds in Chapter Nine, his political capital played a crucial role in Kufour's victory during the second round of the 2000 presidential race.

The National Reform Party (NRP) - formerly The NDC "Reform Movement"

Serious disagreeing factions within the NDC jointly formed the NDC Reform Movement, led by Goosie Tanoh. The NRP received its certificate of party registration from the Electoral Commission in July 1999. Although this party did not command a substantial percentage of votes, its activities undermined the NDC to some strategic extent, and managed to attract some disaffected MPs and supporters from the NDC camp. The party's presidential candidate for the 2000 elections was Goosie Tanoh, and his running mate was Cletus Kosiba, also a Northerner.

The Democratic People's Party (DPP)

The DPP is one of a few minor parties set up by the NDC as a strategy to populate the political scene with many parties which could then divert votes from the Opposition camp. By 1999, the DPP was an established decoy party; it had received its certificate as a political party on 28 September 1992 under PNDC Political Parties Law (PNDCL 281), and had participated in the multi-party elections of 1992 and 1996. For the 1996 elections, the party's leader and deputy were President Rawlings and Vice-President John Ata Mills respectively. At some point in the electioneering towards the impending 2000 election, the DPP had threatened to sue the NPP's flagbearer for campaigning that the NDC used state funds to acquire campaign vehicles. The DPP claimed that the allegation could not be substantiated by the NPP[17] even if the DPP had itself

not substantiated the NPP allegation to be false. The popular argument of the day was that the onus lay on the alleged NDC to sue the NPP, and rightly so, the DPP was living up to its covert NDC status.

The Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere (EGLE) Party

The EGLE party is also one of the NDC's decoy parties for the 1992, 1996 and 2000 elections. As is usual with their contribution to the NDC campaign strategy, the party always joined forces with the NDC shortly before an election. For example, although it was registered to take part in the 2000 elections, it pulled out at the closing stages. It received its party certificate on 13 August 1992 under PNDCL 281. Together with the DPP, the EGLE party shared an electoral alliance with the NDC[18]. From inception to date, the party's presidential candidate at anytime has been the same as for the NDC.

The Great Consolidated Popular Party (GCPP)

This party became legal in 18 June 1996, and is perceived as one of the decoys. The presidential candidate for the 2000 elections was Dan Lartey. The Women Organiser is Madam Victoria Annan, a close relative of the Speaker of Parliament (Justice Annan) during the Rawlings government.

The United Ghana Movement (UGM)

The UGM is a breakaway faction of the NPP, headed by Dr Charles Wereko-Brobbey who was its founder, leader and flagbearer for the 2000 elections. Wereko-Brobbey would have preferred to be the NPP's flagbearer. The UGM's legal certificate as a party was issued on 10 January 1997, after the NPP lost the 1996 elections.

By 31 July 1999, all the parties discussed above had registered with the Electoral Commission and been issued with certificates as defacto parties for the 2000 electoral show down. Among the presidential candidates, the main competition was between the incumbent NDC's John Ata Mills and the Opposition NPP's John Agyekum Kufour.

Theoretical and Conceptual Formulation

Integration

Political expression, aspiration and participation take place through a variety of opportunities including short-lived acts such as voting, and long-term processes of integration. Political integration is seen to take place through 'a series of experiences and activities which lead to the development of linkages between national (state) and sub-national (sub-state) political units. The linkages are identified by positive and negative interactions which lead to increased flexibility between the national and sub-national units'[19]. Political integration is therefore defined as 'the development of linkages and flexibility in relations between the national government (the cosmopolitan state) and its sub-units'[20]. Therefore interaction with national (state) agencies, functional interdependence and shared values serve as indicators of political integration. It is assumed that 'the cumulative effect of interdependence and interactions lead to relationships which constitute a degree of integration', and that the acceptance and co-operation of a sub-national unit with the national government (the cosmopolitan state) indicates that the former has "value orientations" towards the latter[21].

Education, occupation and urbanization have been identified as some of the variables which influence not only social mobilization and/or integration, but also interaction with the state and political integration[22]. The ratio of political involvement between urbanites and non-urbanites varies from country to country but the widespread trend is that urbanite political involvement exceeds that of non-urbanites. For example, a report on urbanization and political involvement between France and USA confirms that 'intranational studies have persistently shown higher political involvement among urban residents and, more strongly still, among people of more advanced education'[23], and this within highly developed countries where the infrastructure for social development and political awareness exists fairly equally among both the areas away from the metropolis and the metropolis itself. The point is made therefore that urbanization and the status of the metropolis do enhance political involvement and that there seems to be some grounds for the existence of the notion that the urban exposure orientates its subjects towards involvement and interaction with the institutions of the cosmopolitan state, whose

political and logistical strength are usually concentrated in the metropolis.

It must be noted however that the notional trend that urbanites are detribalized and should therefore exercise stronger loyalties towards the state institution rather than the ethnonational group is not globally universalistic, and generally not consistent with Africa, or at the very least Ghana. As already argued, within the state of figuration in multinational African states, the local political rationality enhances ethnonationalism rather than patriotism. Despite the widespread notion that urbanization, with its concomitant integrative and modernizing opportunities contribute to detribalization, and subsequently that urban mobilization could lead to '. . . a transfer of primary allegiance from the ethnic group to the state . . .'[24], it seems that on the contrary, urbanites are only partially detribalized. Furthermore in certain urbanite situations, primary allegiance to ethnonational identity is actually rejuvenated. Morrison's case study of national (state) identity vis-à-vis Ashanti identity conducted from 1971 to 1974 revealed that any group perceiving discrimination (identity-based or otherwise) tended to reassert its ethnonational base in order to thwart country-wide integration[25].

Urbanization/detribalization

Detribalization is referred to by some authors as an actual alienation from autochthonous and tribal roots[26] and that its definition must necessarily be inherent in migration from an "uncontaminated" rural setting and subsistence life to urban industrial areas, plus an assimilation into an urban society and culture[27]. Other authors argue that detribalization is more attitudinal rather than any de-rooting from a tribal base, and that it should be seen as the process of attitudinal separation from general tribal or other sub-national attitudes as a result of urbanization and urban integration. Whereas the modernizing factors of urbanization such as education and integration do enhance detribalization, many authors do not see a constant correlation between these enhancing factors and detribalization. For example, Watson identifies that assimilation into urban culture 'does not necessarily imply "detribalization"'[28], a view corroborated by Agyeman who also claims that urbanization does not necessarily result in

detribalization[29]. This view is supported by the fact that 'in spite of the growing social distance between the educated and the illiterate masses, the educated are not detribalized or isolated from their kinship groups'[30]. The views of Watson and Agyeman are also corroborated by Lucy Mair, the famous anthropologist. According to Mair, 'as generally used nowadays, however, "detribalization" refers to the adoption of city ways of life in cities, and not to the rejection of traditional ways in the country'[31].

However, it would appear that the widespread notion that urbanization should lead to detribalization, is not simply because the modernizing factors associated with the former accelerates the latter, but also that the conceptualization of some authorship[32] does equate the two processes with each other, that is, that urbanization is detribalization. Hence the essential difference is not to be sought between the two terms or concepts, but instead, the depth of the phenomenon. Attempts at drawing a neat distinction between the rural lifestyle and the urban opposite have therefore been confused by the argument that detribalization is not just about physical or geographical alienation from tribal autochthons or bases – (geographical detribalization) - plus a change in lifestyle tailored to the urban setting, in that, so long as urbanites still maintain relations with tribal roots (irrespective of physical alienation), detribalization has not occurred. It is therefore argued by others that detribalization is only deemed to have occurred when an individual develops the attitude to reduce relationships and contact with tribal roots even when both parties are accessible to each other - (attitudinal detribalization). The extreme end of attitudinal detribalization is envisaged as when an individual ceases to have or cuts off relationships with tribal bases or autochthons, including communication and commuting. Given the various arguments from the polarized authorships, a distinction should be drawn between geographical and attitudinal detribalization.

In his comparative study of pre-modern and modern Northern Rhodesia, Godfrey Wilson draws a neat line between rural and urban life but also makes the important point that the process of detribalization begins with the process of urbanization or vice versa. Wilson describes the tribal setting as a world of its own, a we-group scenario within which the lifestyle and cycle of members largely depends upon and is restricted mainly to themselves, and

not between similar groups elsewhere[33]. Wilson equally paints the opposite scenario of the emerged social change in the urban setting[34] and argues that the process of social change which transforms tribespeople from the exigencies of the former to the latter scenario is termed as detribalization[35] or urbanization[36], and that the rising demand for labour in urbanized centres is one main push factor which causes migrant labour to become temporarily urbanized, or graduate into a state of permanent urbanization[37]. According to Wilson therefore the process of urbanization is itself the process of detribalization, and that so long as one is urbanized, one is detribalized. Using Broken Hill - an urban dwelling in Northern Rhodesia - as a case, the results of Wilson's study establishes a clear connection or linkage between urbanization and detribalization. Wilson identifies four main categories or shades of detribalized or urbanized folk: (1) peasant visitors '. . . come mainly from the nearer villages; they have spent most of their working lives in the country (village) but they pay occasional short visits to town (urban center) and there enter employment'[38]. 8.6% of Broken Hill belonged to this category; (2) a migrant labourer is 'one who has spent between one third and two thirds of his time in town and between two thirds and one third in the country since first leaving his tribal area'[39]. 20.5% of Broken Hill were migrant labourers; (3) temporarily urbanized folk are those who have 'been born and brought up in the country; they have spent most of their time, in long periods, in the towns since the age of fifteen and a half years; they pay occasional short visits to their rural homes and people from home come to visit them'[40]. A temporarily urbanized person is therefore 'one who spends the best of his (or her) working life in the towns but his childhood and old age in the country'[41]. 69.9% of Broken Hill consisted of temporarily urbanized folk[42]; (4) permanently urbanized folk are those 'who have been born and brought up in town and who know no other home'[43], that is, 'one who spends all his life in the towns'[44]. Only 1% of Broken Hill belonged to this category.

Wilson's findings revealed not only a demonstration of geographical detribalization but also the fact that social change sometimes resulted in attitudinal detribalization. Among the many factors which contributed to the processes of detribalization and/or the various stages of urbanization, marital status and

cohabitation had an influence on the attitudes of urban male dwellers towards their tribal roots, including spending patterns[45]. Wilson's findings revealed three different categories and their corresponding attitudes as follows: those married with wives in the urban area were the most stable in urbanism; those married with wives in non-urban areas were the least stable in urbanism; and single men and youths ranged between the two[46]. According to Wilson therefore, 'marriage is the closest of all personal relationships'[47] and the most important factor contributing towards attitudinal detribalization. The other factor working in conjunction with marriage, to stimulate attitudinal detribalization, is distance[48].

Another study completed on the Langa township near Cape Town, by Monica Wilson and Archie Mafeje, to investigate the character, mobility and turnover of the African labour force in the Cape Peninsula, from the periods 1955-7 and 1961-2, also resulted in similar conceptualization and findings to those of Godfrey Wilson[49]. Wilson and Mafeje also equate the 'process of urbanization'[50] - and/or absorption - with the processes of physical alienation of migrant labour from tribal bases into towns[51], and describes partly urbanized men as 'would-be townsmen who are "trying to push in and be absorbed", trying to imitate townsmen'[52]. Wilson and Mafeje conceptualise categories of urban folk as: (1) migrant labourers; (2) semi-urbanized, and; (3) urbanized folk[53]. Furthermore, their study also reveals changes in the attitudes and values of urbanized folk towards tribal bases, indicated by spending patterns and distance. Their findings also reveal attitudinal differences between the sexes[54].

In another study conducted by Philip Mayer on Xhosa society in East London, South Africa, Mayer clearly sets the distinction between rural and urban Xhosa society by revealing the effects caused by social mobility[55]. Mayer also equates urbanization with detribalization and depicts both terminologies as the process of social mobility - movement of individuals from the rural to the urban area[56]. Furthermore he makes a distinction between physical alienation from the rural area – (geographical detribalization) and changes in culture, values and attitudes – (attitudinal detribalization), by distinguishing between the "way of life" of the "town-rooted" and the "country-rooted"[57]. Mayer's conceptualization of changing identities within the process of

detribalization (or urbanization) is not too different from those of Godfrey Wilson, or Monica Wilson and Archie Mafeje, and ranges between migration and stabilization. Mayer points out that stabilization is a strong indicator for identifying those fully or genuinely urbanized, but not vice versa[58]. But in addition to a distinction between physical and attitudinal detribalization, Mayer makes the very important point that not all urbanites are detribalized. Irrespective of the terminological confusion, Mayer's message is clear about those who have become 'culturally "urbanized" without having been correspondingly "detribalized"'[59]. These, described by Mayer as "double-cultured", are adept in both rural and urban cultures, and not to the neglect of either. Mayer conceptualizes urbanization as both a state (condition) as well as a process[60].

The conceptualization and findings of the above-mentioned studies have varying degrees of relevance to the discussion on urbanization and detribalization. Godfrey Wilson's study does not investigate inter-tribal relationships, and therefore is unable to inform readers of the nature of such relationships as they existed in Rhodesia. The study did not offer participants the opportunity to demonstrate their nationalistic feelings vis-à-vis other groupings in a broad context of competition for territorial political power and wealth. At the time of Wilson's study, the political situation was different. Rhodesia was then (1940) under colonial administration but is now independent as Zimbabwe, and under an indigenous administration which may or not be a fair reflection of its subject groupings in terms of the control and distribution of political power and wealth. Wilson's study is therefore unable to inform us of the patterns of ethnonationalism versus patriotism and the competitive responses of the various subject groupings towards the post-colonial Zimbabwean state. The Wilson and Mafeje (1963) study also took place when South Africa was still apartheid. As the study was not about political attitudes, subjects were not offered the opportunity to express them. Philip Mayer's study also has no political ambitions to it.

However, in Agyeman's study conducted in 1970, which investigated Ghanaian attitudes on nationalism and ideological education, citizens revealed their willingness 'to give up tribalism in favour of [political] nationalism (only) if the social, political and

economic advantages derived from tribalism are removed'.[61] Agyeman's study further revealed that, politically, tribalism is seen as disadvantageous at the national (state) level but advantageous at the sub-national (substate) level[62], and that 62.9% of Ghanaians admit to the dysfunctional effects of tribalism on national integration, hence, the advocacy for the abolition of tribalism in order to prevent tribal favouritism[63], and in order that tribalism would cease to undermine the state. Also, Morrison's case study, conducted in Ghana from 1971 to 1974, on citizenship identity under a single Ghanaian state vis-à-vis Ashanti national identity, revealed that any ethnonational group perceiving discrimination (identity-based or not) tended to reassert its ethnonational base in order to thwart country-wide integration[64].

As already discussed, in a multi-national state, urbanization and integration contribute towards a shift of primary allegiance from tribal and autochthonous bases to the state and its institutions which are very well concentrated in the urban areas, and enhance the potential for patriotism; at the same time, in a state of figuration, ethnonationalism enhances at the expense of patriotism or actually becomes the patriotism. Hence the urban areas have potential to constitute just the ripe arena for the rejuvenation or entrenchment of ethnonational consciousness[65]. Connor makes the point when he concludes that '. . . social mobilization need not lead to a transfer of primary allegiance from the ethnic group to the state . . .'[66]. Where this has been the case, the result is immense difficulty at forging a single national identity and in some cases the split-up of such states.

Research Design and Methodology

Aims of the research

The survey of voter intent aimed: (a) at analyzing any connectivities between the ethnosectarian backgrounds of electoral candidates and those of prospective voters; (b) at examining the true nature of attitudinal shifts towards either ethnonationalism or civic loyalties by investigating how much of ethnonationalism ran through the veins of supposedly detribalized urbanites against the background of a socio-political context fraught with figuration; and (c) to see if the supposed urbanite prone-ness towards patriotism is imagined or real, of substance or style.

Methodology

Due to the immense advantages inherent in the combination of both quantitative and qualitative strategies in research[67], both methodologies were utilised as appropriate. The overall research strategy included: a questionnaire-administered survey; unstructured interviews; and analyses of media reports. As subsequently explained in much detail, the city of Tema was chosen for the field work because of its historical ethnonational neutrality. The survey data was analysed using the SPSS software. Qualitative data was examined and analysed through analytic induction. Themes and concepts which are 'grounded' to the research or 'closely and directly relevant to'[68] electoral politics in multi-national Ghana were derived via the grounded theory method developed by B Glaser and A L Strauss[69]. The idea was to develop 'grounded' rather than 'grand' concepts[70] for the political situation under investigation. Media sources included both print and cyberspace media.

The questionnaire

Facts are distinguishable from attitudes and viewpoints, however social science has proved that on issues such as ethnicity and identity, the boundary between fact and attitude is sometimes vague, blurred, subjective or even ambiguous[71]. This questionnaire (in Appendix One) was designed for both a factual and attitudinal survey, to yield factual and tentative responses. It accounted for the assumptions inherent in detribalization and sought the attitudes of urbanites towards ethnonationalism and patriotism by investigating their voting intentions. It also sought views on the extent to which urbanites felt detribalized, plus any efforts towards attitudinal detribalization, propensities to maintain association with roots or otherwise, and the rationale for such actions. Given that urbanites can also bond along ethnonational lines, or react negatively to group discrimination however perceived[72], the questionnaire sought views on tentative voting intentions against the ethnonational identities of presidential candidates and the ensuing political context. Individual and family backgrounds and political orientations were sought as part of forming a demographic picture on types of respondents. Respondents' interests and levels of engagement in politics were also sought in order to gauge their levels of familiarity with, and commitment to political activity. The

section on "freedom of expression" sought indications on how candid and bold respondents were on political expression.

Like all opinion polls, there is no guarantee that opinions are the truth (and even candid opinions could have changed by Election Day). However, profiling respondents helped to match them against questions 22 – 30. The section on "tentative votes – pressure or prevailing factors" sought views on how respondents were affected by public opinion and pressure, whether they had a mind of their own plus potential to stick to their own convictions. This section also aimed to test if respondents were ethno-nationalistic or otherwise. The section on "urbanized/detribalized" sought views on length of urban experience, ways of maintaining urban-rural relationships, and whether any form of attitudinal detribalization had been a natural urban experience or with effort. The section on "religious background" is straightforward but responses could serve as explanation to religious voting patterns regarding the choice of candidates. The section on "tribal derivation" was left at the end since its earlier appearance on the questionnaire might have alarmed some respondents. It was included for purposes of confirming the ethnonational identities of respondents as provided from question 3. Generally, a typical Ghanaian surname easily gives away one's ethnonational identity.

Tema
The survey was conducted in the city of Tema, which is essentially an artificial creation to suit the industrial need for a home location for urban workers. Unlike all the traditional capital cities in Ghana, for example Kumasi, Cape-Coast, Accra and Tamale, which were founded on the basis of ethnonational settlements by the Ashanti, Fanti, Ga-Adanbge and Dagomba respectively, Tema was founded strictly on migrant urban skilled workers without any specific ethnonational basis. Therefore, whereas there would always be more Ashantis in Kumasi, more Fantis in Cape-Coast, more Ga-Adangbes in Accra and subsequently more Dagombas in Tamale, any ethnonational skew in the population of Tema is artificial and circumstantial. Obviously, the ethnonational configuration of Tema is not equi-representative of all the groups, but this is circumstantial and not historically designed. As a result of a governmental decision in 1951 to construct a new deep water harbour in Tema

for the exchange of both imports and exports to augment the Volta River Electrification Scheme (meant essentially for the supply of electrical power to the aluminium smelting and other industries catering for Ghana's mineral and farm produce), a city was planned to host the potential migrant labour relating to the Scheme. Tema is therefore a joint project embracing the harbour, the city itself and related industries. The city is unique for the purposes of this research because it guarantees: an urban population not traditionally assembled on the basis of ethnonational settlement; and a multi-national and supposedly detribalized urban population whose political attitudes can be investigated.

A land area of 64 square miles (102.4 sq. kilometres) or 40,000 acres of stool land was procured by the Ministry of Housing, Town and Country Planning for the purposes of developing the city. In July 1952, Ordinance No. 35 established the Tema Development Corporation (TDC) entrusted to develop 24 Communities to house at least 250,000 people. The Master Plan was for the city to fully evolve over a 25-year period from 1961-1985, and to host 250,000 people. The average annual population growth rate for Tema was estimated at 12% for the first ten years and 7% for the following 15 years, or an average 9.1% over the 25-year period, compared with a 5% growth rate for Accra and 2.5% for the whole country. It was estimated that by 1985, Tema will be populated by 234,000 people. Reduced fiscal injections from a subsequent economic slump slowed down the progress of the Tema Project; noticeably, the 1984 census gave the city's population as 189,102. The project subsequently revived and currently has up to 24 Communities. Private housing development was introduced at some stage and plots allocated for this purpose. This has injected keen variety into the architectural landscape of the city.

Fieldwork

Methodological innovation to surmount the 'culture of silence'

Fieldwork was a combination of computerized questionnaire-based interviews and unstructured interviewing even if not all of the latter were recorded. A transcript of my unstructured interview schedule with the Member of Parliament for Tema West can be found in Appendix Two. Computerising the questionnaire handling became the innovation to surmount contextual political inhibitions such as

the 'culture of silence'[73] and the related potential for a low rate of
return to postal questionnaires. The computerised strategy was
instrumental in obtaining sufficient and satisfactory data within
record time from 22 January to 20 February 1999. Computerised
survey strategies are now widely used as the need for innovation
has prompted their adoption in the West since the late 1980s[74]. A
computerised survey was both revolutionary and innovative in
West Africa since none of the surveys conducted in Ghana had
their interview processes computerised.

The 'Culture of Silence'

The phrase 'culture of silence' derives from a speech by President
Rawlings in Sunyani during April 1987 to describe the development
of a political culture lacking in the freedom of political expression[75].
Ghana had been under oppressive and repressive military rule from
1981 until 1992 when multi-party democracy resumed. Although
the phenomenon had been waning since 1992, because the dust of
political intimidation had not fully settled, freedom of political
expression was not to be fully exercised. It demonstrated itself in
any variety of ways including: (a) refusal to air views critical to the
government for fear of political intimidation through detention,
liquidation of assets, or molestation; (b) murmuring instead of a
positive declaration of opinion; (c) selective media coverage
resulting from the media's fear to air views critical to government.
Some media houses, for example, the "Catholic Standard" and the
"Free Press" had closed down as a result of governmental
harassment; (d) silence, apathy and indifference - owing to any of
the above - as protest against government, rather than organised
demonstrations or media backlash; (e) a prevailing state of anomie,
alienation and lack of freedom of association[76]. The 'culture of
silence' finally broke from about August 1999 after parties had
registered and been given certificates for the 2000 elections, and
campaigning had hotted up.

Innovative strategy

The initial idea of postal questionnaires was discounted, as well as a
door-to-door approach. Finally, a strategy that will guarantee a fair
representation of the city, anonymity and confidentiality emerged.
Technological innovation is what amounted to the exercise which

derived sufficient and satisfactory data from 501 respondents within four weeks using a questionnaire of 53 questions each. Previously intended strategies would have taken several months and still not guarantee bias-free data. This survey made use of an innovative Computer Assisted Personal Interview (CAPI) technique to overcome the potential for a low response rate which also enabled respondents to air their views openly yet discreetly. The questionnaire was numerically coded and programmed into SPSS software. Hence respondents were invited to answer the questionnaire in coded numbers which were recorded live onto a laptop database. The spreadsheet mechanism of SPSS easily facilitated this exercise and the laptop was easy to carry around to street corners, factory plants, market places, classrooms and other nooks; the portable and battery-operated laptop was handy for such purposes. Respondents were engaged on a one-to-one basis with no third party interferences; eavesdropping was a chore for responses being recited in coded numbers. Hence respondents felt liberated from atmospheric pressures, knowing that their responses were not decipherable by others. The live aspect of this methodology also means that the database for questionnaire responses was simultaneously created and updated; by the end of all interviews, a full database already existed. This methodological approach can be used for other countries, and for research in locations with issues which counter freedom of expression, or where freedom of expression exists but the researcher aims to economise on time. The use of a laptop also provoked an interest of its own and raked in respondents.

Sampling

I visited at random factories, markets, shopping malls, schools and restaurants and a few houses along the way as the opportunity arose. You had to be eligible to vote by 2000, at least 17 years old, in order to be interviewed. Large factories which granted permission for workers to be approached and interviewed on site are Volta Aluminium Company Ltd (VALCO), Cocoa Processing Company Ltd (CPC), Ghana Textile Printing Company Ltd (GTP), Ghana Cement Works (GHACEM), Ghana Textile Manufacturing Company Ltd (GTMC), and Wahome Steel Industries Ltd. Interviewees included both management and factory hands. Final

year students of Tema Secondary School were also interviewed. Teachers from a number of schools also responded to the questionnaire[77]. Last but not least, shopkeepers, market traders and sailors from the harbour also took a keen interest in the research and responded to the questionnaire. Respondents reflected a wide age and class range even if the sample is not as typically representative as a population census. Any question of unrepresentativeness is balanced by a data-gathering procedure which eliminated political and other atmospheric pressures. Vital information was also obtained from unstructured interviews, most notably the one with the Member of Parliament for Tema West.

Problems to innovation

It would emerge later that citizens generally sympathetic to the ruling NDC were unhappy about the survey as it constituted a vehicle for assessing the ensuing public disaffection; any resulting revelations could be ammunition to the Opposition parties. Others were suspicious of the survey's intentions, some suspecting the CIA or other foreign collaboration. In most places, I produced covering letters on demand; once credibility was established, cooperation was easy. At Aluworks, I was refused clearance because the management was apprehensive about how they would be perceived by the NDC government for allowing such interviews. Such an excuse was absent at neighbouring Wahome Steel. Overall, the innovative strategy paid incalculable dividends and has positive implications for research methodology.

8

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE 1999 SURVEY

Analysis and Interpretation of Fieldwork Data

Introduction

The sample is not as typically representative of Tema as a census would be. Hence, the results of the survey have validity regarding relationships between the variables, but not absolute validity for the individual variables. The survey occurred in 1999 and the most recent Ghanaian Housing and Population Census in 2000; hence it relates closer to the 2000 census than its penultimate held in 1984. The 1984 census data is relatively out of date and not too relevant in the light of the rapid demographic and geographic changes Tema has experienced since then. As at 1990, TDC had developed twelve housing areas or Communities; at the time of this survey in 1999, Community 24 was in development; the 2000 census had Ghana's population at about 18.8 million. The full raw data from this survey of voter intent is available in SPSS[1], and the data extracted for the purposes of this monograph is made available in this chapter.

It must also be noted, that throughout the chapter, 'Akan' is the collective name for the collectivity of ethnonational groups which include the Fantis, Ashantis, Akyems, Bonos and Akwapims on the questionnaire. Similarly, the Bolga, Dagomba, Dagaaba and Gurenne groups are referred to collectively as "Northerners" or "Mabians". To avoid baffling respondents with terminology, the more common term *tribe* (instead of ethnonational group) appears on the questionnaire for identity. Subsequently, "level of tribalism" on the SPSS data refers to level of ethnonationalism, and "tribalistic" means ethnonationalistic.

Demographics

Out of 501 respondents to the questionnaire, 63.7% were male and 36.3% were female. Also, 49.5% of respondents were within the 17-30 age range, 27.5% within the 31-40 age range, 17.6% within the 41-50 age range, and 4.8% within the 51-60 age range. This reflects Tema, which mainly consists of an urban and industrial work force of vibrant age largely between the ages of 17 and 50; for obvious reasons, those nearing the retirement age of 60 are fewer in number. The high percentage of the 17-30 age group has something to do with the large number of young people in the city who if in education would be around final year secondary school age; 112 such students were interviewed and represent 22.4% of the sample; readers should bear in mind that anyone from the age of 17 qualified to be interviewed for the impending election in 2000 and some of these students were either in employment or apprenticeships. This also says something about the city fulfilling its original aims - a settlement city for workers. Settlers from the early 1960s had now emerged as parents or guardians of a younger generation of potential voting age and most of these young respondents were born and bred in the city. It is indicative that 55.7% of all respondents had lived in the city since 1961, and a further 18.8% had lived there within the nine years preceding this survey.

Occupational distribution

38.5% responded as engaged in some profession and hence considered themselves as professionals for example teachers; 2% described themselves as specialists; 2.8% were managers; 10.8% clerical staff; 3.8% administrative staff; 14.2% skilled workers; 4% semi-skilled; and only 1.6% unskilled.

Education

Levels of education were the three conventional and international basic demarcations – primary, secondary and tertiary. Any form of educational activity below secondary level automatically falls within primary. Secondary education broadly involves activity between primary and tertiary levels such as mainstream secondary, technical and vocational schooling, as well as teacher training for primary school teachers. Tertiary level activity included attending universities, polytechnics and professional awarding institutes for management,

journalism and other professions. The level of education seemed very high: 47.3% of respondents had studied to tertiary level; 47.5% to secondary level; and 5.2% had ended schooling at primary level.

Tribal (ethnonational) distribution

The tribal distribution of respondents in Table 4 indicates that 52.5% represented the Akan grouping of Fanti, Ashanti, Akyem, Akwapim and Bono, 21.2% represented the Ga-Adangbes, 19% represented Ewes, 4.2% represented Northerners and 3.2% represented Nzimas.

Table 4: (q3)

Tribe	Frequency	Valid %
Fanti	100	20
Ashanti	76	15.2
Akyem	39	7.8
Akwapim	45	9
Bono	3	0.6
Ga-Adangbe	106	21.2
Nzima	16	3.2
Bolga	10	2
Dagomba	7	1.4
Dagaaba	1	0.2
Gurenne	3	0.6
Ewe	95	19
Total	**501**	**100**

Party orientation

As already discussed in relation to the questionnaire, selected key characteristics of respondents (variables) which were considered relevant to unraveling their political backgrounds were investigated in order to examine what bearing they have on political attitudes. These are the traditional party orientation of respondents and their families; the current party orientation of respondents; political participation; and freedom of expression. Voting attitudes of respondents are later examined for 1996 and 2000, and comparisons made. This is followed by a critical examination of ethnonationalism on voting patterns. The political stability of respondents was also investigated in order to examine the stability of party loyalty and

potential for shiftability. Following from this, the investigation drills down to the true nature of respondents and the extent to which they are ethnonationalists or patriots, as well as the extent to which this is influenced by association with their ethnonational bases or tribal roots. This is done by establishing the type of voter (whether ethnonationalist or patriot); their level of ethnonationalism; and to what extent they are associated with their roots. Because of the mutuality between ethnonationalism and patriotism – one attitude gaining leverage at the expense of the other - the exercise of examining one attitude suffices for the other, simply because both attitudes highlight each other, the higher the one the lower the other and vice versa. Although variables such as gender, age, occupation and education do not form the main thrust of the thesis, their influences on political attitudes were also examined.

Party orientations (questions 6, 7 & 8)
As many as 28.5% indicated that their families were not traditionally orientated to any specific party. 24.2% indicated that their families were traditionally orientated to the NDC, 34.5% to the NPP and 10.6% to Nkrumahism. 2% of respondents indicated that their families were somewhat orientated towards parties other than any of the three mainstream political traditions.

   As many as 29.1% indicated that they (as individuals) had no past or traditional orientation towards any of the three mainstream political traditions. 23.6% were traditionally orientated towards the NDC, 34.5% NPP and 11% Nkrumahists. 2% did not have a traditional orientation towards any of the three mainstream political traditions.

   As many as 28.7% had no party orientation at all as at the time of the survey. 24.2% were orientated towards the NDC, 37.9% NPP, 6.4% Nkrumahism. Only 2.8% did not belong to any of the three mainstream political traditions.

   It seemed therefore that the general pattern of party orientation between respondents and their families were pretty much fixed more or less; in other words, a respondent was most likely to belong to a party simply because their family did. Having said that, it was also evident that the traditional party orientation of individuals and their families had more or less stabilised for all three mainstream political traditions plus or minus 0.2% - 0.6%. However, the data also

revealed that whereas the current party orientation of respondents and the traditional party orientation of their families had stabilised for individual NDC supporters (remaining at 24.2%), between those same variables, the NPP had an increase of 3.4%; "other" (that is, any non-mainstream or minor party) increased by 0.8%; and Nkrumahists had a decrease of 4.2%. Clearly the NPP and some minor parties had gained out of the seething leakage from the Nkrumahist support base at the time of the survey. As already discussed, the Nkrumahist coalition seemed divided and disorganized, while the NPP was shaping up and seemed more focused. Stability for the NDC also owed to the general feeling that although some NDC supporters were disillusioned about the party, they were nevertheless reluctant to shift support towards the NPP or some other minor party. Despite the "freeze" or stability in orientation and support base for the NDC, the actual voter intent for the impending 2000 elections indicated declining prospects for the party – as subsequent analyses would show.

Political participation
Political participation as used here, means any overt demonstration by respondents in the general political process. This would include a wide range of activities such as registration to vote, formal registered membership with a party, or activist support to a party to include distributing leaflets, sticking posters, and attending rallies and conferences without being a registered member of the party. The data reveal that 84.4% of respondents had registered to vote, 9.8% were ineligible to register as they were under eighteen at the time of the survey, 2.6% had no support for any of the candidates, and 3% were simply apolitical. Only 30.5% of respondents were registered members of any party. 7 % could not afford party registration, 14.6% were disillusioned about the parties, and a good 46% were apolitical and not interested in political party participation, or perhaps did not want to be identified with a party. This explains why only 27.7% participated in politics at the local level, as few as 8.4% each at both district and national levels, 1.2% at all levels, but 54.3% participated at no level at all. Some were registered party members but not activists. A cross-tabulation[2] of responses from party registration (q15) and level of party political participation (q18) reveals that some registered party members (to any party) had no

active involvement with a party at any level other than their party registration. Some activists were also unregistered members of a party. This means that just as some were registered party members and paid dues but did nothing more and were almost invisible, others were enthusiasts and activists without any party registration at all. This is an indication of the scope for both fluidity and ambiguity as far as partisanship is concerned. To what extent this amounted to the transfer of intelligence from one party to the other was not investigated by this survey. Nevertheless, there is a link between "party registration" (q15) and "level of party involvement" (q18), and it can be concluded that there is a significant association between the two variables. This is written as:

$$7 = 129.27; df = 4; p{<}0.01^3$$

The subtable for symmetric measures provides a measure of the strength of the association rather like that of the Pearson correlation coefficient. This is written as: $Phi = 0.508; p{<}0.01^4$. We can conclude that despite the enormous scope within Ghanaian politics for partisan prostitution, that is, fluidity and ambiguity of party loyalties, there is a significant association between party registration and level of party involvement.

Forms of registration
In Ghana, individuals of voting age eighteen register to vote via non-party means in contrast with what pertains in USA. The voters' register is opened every year, and country-wide elections take place every four years. 84.4% of respondents were registered voters; the remainder were not. Of all respondents with party registration, 13.4% were registered members of the NDC, 14.8% for NPP, 2.4% for Nkrumahists, and 0.2% for the other minor parties.

Levels of political participation
The levels of political participation are local, district and national, and individuals can be involved in any combination of these. Participation at the district level includes any form of participation above the local level but not at the national level. Participation could range from mere attendance at rallies to being part of actual decision-making such as election of officers or amendments to the party constitution. Some amount of participation is restricted to only registered party membership. For example, whereas anyone could

attend campaign rallies, only registered party members and officers could vote at the national conference to elect candidates for national elections. Most respondents (44.1%) acquainted or familiarised themselves with the politics through the media; only 16.8% attended political rallies; 6.8% fed from both rallies and the media; and 32.3% did none of these.

Freedom of expression
As shown in Tables 5 and 6, 66.5% said they freely shared their political opinions with others. The remainder who felt no such freedom confided in: none (13.8%); friends only (9.2%); spouse and unit family (5.2% each); and distant relations (0.4%). If 66.5% claimed they freely shared their political opinions, it can be safely concluded that largely, the opinions gathered from this survey were freely given.

Table 5: Do you freely share your views/opinions with everyone (q20)?

Answer	Frequency	Valid %
Yes	333	66.5
No	168	33.5
Total	**501**	**100**

Table 6: If 'no' (to q20), please state confidants and preference order (q21)

Preference	Frequency	Valid %
Spouse	26	5.2
Family	26	5.2
Friends	46	9.2
Distant relations	2	0.4
None	69	13.8
N/a	332	66.3
Total	**501**	**100**

Votes

1996
The survey revealed that during the 1996 parliamentary elections, 26.9% of respondents voted for the NDC parliamentary candidate,

42.1% for NPP, 3.2% for Nkrumahists and 1% for independent or other candidates. 15% could not vote for an MP either because they were too young or had not registered to vote. Another 11.8% did not vote at all either because they disliked the candidates, had not registered to vote, were apathetic or had some other reason. During the presidential elections, 34.7% voted for Rawlings (NDC), 43.7% for Kufour (NPP), and 1% for Mahama (Nkrumahism). 14.2% could not vote and 6.4% did not vote at all for any of the reasons already outlined.

2000

The data revealed that, for the 2000 parliamentary elections, 19.6% intended to vote for the NDC parliamentary candidate, 43.7% for NPP, 3.8% for Nkrumahist, 1.2% for the NRP ("new NDC"), and 1.8% for independent or other candidates. 23.2% were undecided. 0.8% could not vote and 6% would not vote for any of similar reasons outlined above. For the presidential elections, 26.9% intended to vote for Ata Mills (NDC), 44.5% for Kufour, 1% for Tanoh (NRP) and another 1% for independent or other candidates. 20.6% were undecided. 1.2% could not vote and 4.8% would not vote for any of similar reasons already outlined.

Whereas voter intent for the NPP parliamentary and presidential candidates for 2000 seemed to have stabilised with the 1996 figures (with meagre increments of 1.6% and 0.8% for parliamentary and presidential elections respectively), the same results for the NDC indicated drastic decrements of 7.3% and 7.8% for parliamentary and presidential elections respectively. This constituted a sure sign of reduction in urbanite votes for the NDC at the impending 2000 election. It is true that 23.2% and 20.6% were undecided about their choice of candidates for the 2000 parliamentary and presidential elections respectively. However, if party orientation or support for the NDC was stable during the time of the survey (as compared with family orientation), it becomes clear that slightly over a third of the remaining undecided urbanite voters would not vote NDC. This was considered as additional bad news for the ruling NDC as the NPP was already leading in the urban area. Furthermore, since January 1999, the NDC had become more unpopular due to the high spate of scandals, failed policies and political manipulations in Parliament;

hence the shift of undecided votes away from the NDC would increase among urbanites – who tend to be more politically aware.

The issue of the large percentage of undecided voters can also be explained further, in that, a percentage of the Ewe (and other non-Akan) solidarity for the NDC was on hold because the NDC presidential candidate Ata Mills for 2000 was not Ewe but Akan (Fanti). According to the survey, 11.4% of total respondents who voted for the NDC parliamentary candidate in 1996 were Ewes[5]. Voter intent for the impending 2000 parliamentary elections indicated that this had reduced to a mere 5.6%[6]. Also, although the 12.97% of total respondents who voted for the NDC candidate Rawlings in 1996 were Ewes, voter intent for the presidential elections in 2000 indicated that this figure had dwindled to 7.98%[7]. These constituted sure signs of ethnonationalism in voting attitudes. It would appear that one reason for this indecision on the part of some voters was the change in the NDC presidential candidate's ethnonational identity from Ewe to Akan. A cross-tabulation of responses from "tribe" (q3) and "choice of presidential candidate for the 2000" elections (q12)[8] indicated that the percentage of undecided voters was higher among Ewes than the other groups. Although, 20% of all respondents were Fantis and 19% Ewes (only 1% difference), the data reveal that 32.6% of Ewe respondents were undecided on which presidential candidate to vote for in 2000, as against 15% of Fanti respondents, or 14.5% of Ashanti respondents, or 20.8% of Ga-Adangbe respondents. The Dagombas register the highest percentage of undecideds (42.9%), but note that out of the total number of respondents (501) Dagombas numbered only 7 or 1.4%[9]. The discussed patterns of indecision could well have changed by the time of the actual election in December 2000, however it is interesting to note the patterns and nature of ethnonationalism emerging between the ethnonational identity of a presidential candidate and political indecision among potential voters.

The influence of ethnonationalism on voting habits
The survey tested for the extent to which a presidential candidate's ethnonational identity influenced urban voter attitudes, in other words the tendential response of the urban population towards a candidate's ethnonational background. Loyalty towards one's ethnonational group has been well documented and discussed,

however the attitudinal mutual opposite (ethnonational resentment) was taken for granted and not usually quantified; this survey made it possible. Although the state of figuration and ROE had cast a historical influence on voting habits, the deliberate intent for an urbanite to vote against any presidential candidate, or abstain from voting as a result of direct resentment towards the candidate's ethnonational identity group, points towards the extreme end of the ROE spectrum. Questions 26-30 of the questionnaire sought the voting attitudes of respondents vis-à-vis the ethnonational background of a presidential candidate. A vote against or abstention are both regarded as constituting a protest towards one's candidacy. The survey revealed that 16.6% of Ghanaian urbanites would outrightly not vote for a presidential candidate if he/she were a Fanti, 23.6% if the candidate were Ashanti, 34% if Ewe, 21.8% if Ga-Adangbe, and 21.8% if a Mabian or Northerner. Demonstrations of direct ethnonational antagonism was highest against the Ewe and Ashanti groups, the two groups also known to have the strongest mutually antagonistic relationship. Subsequently, in a cross-tabulation of the ethnonational identities of interviewees (q3) versus their tentative votes vis-à-vis a presidential candidate's ethnonational identity (q26-30), the highest among the patterns of mutually antagonistic identity relationships are represented as follows: a total 6.4% of Ewes (2.6% against and 3.8% abstain) and a total 6.2% of Ga-Adangbes would outrightly not vote for a candidate if he/she were an Ashanti; a total 7.8% of Fantis, 6.2% of Ashantis and 6.4% of Ga-Adangbes would outrightly not vote for a candidate if he/she were an Ewe[10].

A cross-tabulation of tribe versus voter intentions for parliamentary candidates for the impending 2000 election revealed that, among the total 23.2% undecided voters, 9.4% were Akan, 7.2% were Ewes, 4.8% were Ga-Adangbe, 1.4% were Northerners and 0.4% were Nzimas[11]. Also, a cross-tabulation of tribe versus voter intentions for the impending 2000 presidential election indicated that among the total 20.6% of undecided voters, 7.2% were Akan, 6.2% were Ewe, 4.4% were Ga-Adanbge, 1.6% were Northerners, and 1.2% were Nzima[12]. As already discussed, Akans were historically more prone to vote for an NPP presidential candidate; it could therefore be safely argued that irrespective of the reasons for the temporary indecision, the NPP would gain more

from the army of undecided voters. Within the same breadth of supposition, it could also be argued that some of the undecided voters at the time of this survey in 1999, who voted against Rawlings in 1996 because he was an Ewe, could now vote for the NDC presidential candidate in 2000, because he was not Ewe.

An explanation to the ethnos-charged voter attitudes
As already discussed, ethnonational resentment was highest towards Ashantis and Ewes. Furthermore, mutual ethnonational resentment was highest between the Ashanti and Ewe. Hence, the Ashanti and Ewe have the strongest mutually antagonistic relationship. A cross-tabulation of respondents' ethnonational identities versus their tentative votes vis-à-vis a presidential candidate's ethnonational identity, revealed the highest among the patterns of mutually antagonistic ethnonational relationships: 6.38% of Ewes and 6.18% of Ga-Adangbes would not vote for a candidate who was Ashanti; also, 7.78% of Fantis, 6.18% of Ashantis and 6.38% of Ga-Adangbes would not vote for an Ewe presidential candidate. A clear Akan versus non-Akan alignment is evident in these patterns of ethnonational resentment.

The exact explanation for the above phenomenon can be sought from within the perceptions of Ghanaians for several reasons embedded in a combination of the traditions of origin, recent politics and the ensuing figuration. It could be said that any mutual antagonism between the Ashanti and Ewe arises from the post-colonial period and was accentuated to a certain level when one political stalwart of the Ashanti-led Danquah-Busia political tradition, the late Victor Owusu, articulated in the Parliament of the Second Republic that Ewes were nepotistic and inward-looking[13]. This mutual antagonism reached its heights during the period of the so-called Ewe-led and ruling P/NDC government. Akans in general and Ashantis in particular, felt that the politics-of-the-belly had worked to their deficiency especially when the strategic ethnic arithmetic[14] had been heavily skewed towards the Ewes of Rawlings[15] and also when 94.5% of the Ewe-dominated Volta Region voted for Rawlings during the 1996 elections[16]. The P/NDC was also of the opinion that figuration during the 27-month Busia administration of the Second Republic benefited the Danquah-Busia political tradition, this view coming from President Rawlings

himself[17]. As we have no record of ancient enmity between Ewes and Ashantis[18], it becomes clear that political events within the post-colonial period which have touched on the sensitivities and insecurities of both groups exerted the most important influence on the current mutual antagonism demonstrating, which had in turn enhanced the invocation of the distant myths of origin in explaining present patterns of nationalism. The extremes of ethnonationalism demonstrated by the two groups perfectly fit Morrison's theory (ironically based on Ashanti nationalism), that any ethnonational group perceiving discrimination (identity-based or not) tended to reassert its ethnonational identity base in order to thwart country-wide integration or state patriotism[19]. It is interesting to note, that the late Victor Owusu who was the Attorney-General during Busia's administration, died in December 2000 and was given a state burial in March 2001 by the current Danquah-Busiaist Kufour administration. A state-burial for him would have been unthinkable if the P/NDC had won the presidential election of December 2000.

Stability of supporters

Respondents were quizzed to test for their political stability or potential shiftability as shaped by opinions about the political parties (q22 & 23). 28.3% said they would vote NDC if the party was riding highest in public opinion, and 41.5% would vote NPP. On the other hand, 49.9% said they would vote NPP if the party was riding highest in public opinion, and 19.4% would vote NDC[20]. A difference of 8.9% between the NDC high and low [28.3%-19.4%] and 8.4% [49.9%-41.5%] between the NPP high and low, meant that the NDC had only a 0.5% edge over the NPP on the luckiest days for both parties. However, it was also clear that the NPP would poll 49.9% of votes whereas the NDC would poll only 28.3%[21] on each party's luckiest day.

The Ga-Adangbe factor

Another issue of significance was the comparative unpredictability of Ga-Adangbe political attitudes in connection with the two main opposing parties (NDC and NPP). The Ga-Adangbe political complexion did not easily lend itself to analysis. To begin, Ga-Adangbes do not have historically predominant roles in the formation and maintenance of any of the three mainstream political

traditions. Second, the data showed that Ga-Adangbe support for the NDC and NPP was split on a near equal basis. It therefore became difficult to judge to any meaningful extent whether Ga-Adanbges as a collectivity were largely ethnonationalistic, patriotic or perhaps neither. Being non-Akan suggests a potential or tendency to lean towards the NDC. But there was no evidence to make any clear deduction. The survey results[22] indicate that during the 1996 parliamentary elections, 6.6% of total respondents who voted NDC were Ga-Adangbes, and 7.2% of Ga-Adangbes voted NPP - a difference of only 0.6%. For the impending 2000 parliamentary election, the survey revealed that 7% of total respondents who intended to vote NDC were Ga-Adangbes, and 6.6% of Ga-Adangbes intended to vote NPP - a difference of only 0.4%. For presidential elections, the survey revealed that in 1996, 9.78% of total respondents who voted NDC were Ga-Adangbes, and 6.6% of Ga-Adangbes voted NPP - difference of 3.2%. For 2000, 8.6% of total respondents who intended to vote NDC were Ga-Adangbes, and 6.8% of Ga-Adangbes intended to vote NPP - a difference of 1.8% and a reduction from 1996 of 1.4%[23].

As already hinted, the ethnonational skew of the Ga-Adangbe political complexion has been very narrow between the two parties. Both the NDC and NPP had been doing their best to woo Ga-Adangbes, with the NDC slightly in the lead. Given that urban support at the time generally swayed towards the NPP, the narrow Ga-Adangbe skew towards the NDC was an indication that Ga-Adangbe potential to identify with non-Akan sentiments should be taken seriously; hence Ga-Adangbe support for NDC was more likely in the bag simply because of the anti-Akan factor. This analysis might seem rather simplistic, but given the nature of the political context already discussed and the realities within, the analysis should not refrain from reflecting. That said, it was clear that any political forecasting for the December 2000 elections ought to examine very closely the Ga-Adangbe factor in order to be comprehensive and accurate. Despite the significant Ga-Adangbe presence among the NPP high echelons at the time (for example, the party Chairman, General Secretary and National Campaign Manager)[24], Ga-Adangbe anxiety to have total control over Ghana's capital city Accra, is one very important reason why they would prefer the NDC to any other party whose ethnonational composition reflects a predominance of

identity group(s) with no traditional links to the capital (for example, the NPP). Accra is also the traditional capital for Ga-Adangbes. Issues that fellow citizens harbour against Ga-Adangbes could be wide ranging; it seems the stickymost are first, the contentious and controversial land litigations in the capital city arising from the sale of similar plots of land by Ga-Adangbe traditional landowners to multiple "buyers". The second is of a more religious nature: the annual Ga-Adangbe 40-day drum ban in respect of the Homowo festival had caused serious controversies over the years and reached new heights in 1999. Non-Ga-Adangbe Accra citizens and several Charismatic churches (some of whose congregants are Ga-Adangbes) refused to comply with the drum ban. The Wulomo (Ga-Adanbge traditional priesthood) organised aggressive attacks against offenders resulting in bloody clashes in which church congregants were clubbed, knifed and beaten with other weapons. Reverend Tackie Yarboi, the Ga-Adangbe Pastor of Victory Bible Church who was also an heir apparent to the Ga-Adangbe throne in Accra, suffered a broken skull when his church was attacked for not observing the ban. The royal household claimed that as he is of royal blood he should have known better not to have transgressed. Both central government and the Accra Metropolitan Authority (AMA) negligently turned a blind eye to these criminal attacks, leaving the Ga-Adangbe traditionalists to carry out unconstitutional aggression against residents of Accra who had indulged in drumming[25].

Constitutionally, drumming is not a legal offence and no citizen is legally obliged to observe a traditional drum ban. The Police failed to protect attacked residents of the city even when they were tipped of impending attacks. However on one occasion in 1999, the Police moved in to prevent a subsequent counter-attack by city residents of Christian orientation against the Wulomoist shrine and priests. It would appear that the La Mantse, Nii Kpobey Tettey Tsuru III, ordered the Lakpa Wulomo to quit the Wulomoist shrine, not only because the former had Christian leanings, but also because he has disciplinary authority over the latter. The Police therefore intervened to avert clashes as two huge crowds, each in support of the La Mantse and the Wulomo priest, converged to observe how the quit order was to be effected[26]. Incidentally, the ruling NDC's Minister of Interior who also had ministerial control over the Police is a Ga-Adangbe royal, and the NDC government was not interested in

upsetting the Ga-Adanbge indigenes from whom a fair amount of its urban support would be derived. It is not surprising therefore that during the crucial pre-Homowo season in 1999, the government held "behind closed doors" meetings with the chiefs of the Accra Traditional area to dispel "wrong" impressions harboured by the traditionalists over the government's position on the chieftaincy's politics, as well as support for the Homowo festival. At the meeting, the government pledged adequate security protection and the maintenance of law and order during the Homowo celebrations[27].

To summarise, the Ga-Adangbe political complexion was difficult to decipher. It seems the general political history of Ghana made it easier for Ga-Adangbes to conceal their political complexion than all the other groups. 21.2% of total respondents were Ga-Adangbe (9.8% were ethnonationalists and 11.4% were not). This 11.4% were given the benefit of the doubt due to insufficient evidence to decipher their true political colours. Therefore as 46.2% of urbanite Ga-Adangbes were ethnonationalists, an uncertainty remained about a significant remainder. It was difficult to tell whether Ga-Adangbes as a collectivity were particularly skewed towards any political party, and both the historical and ensuing evidence made it difficult to decipher their political complexion. A further more subtle piece of research would be required to drill down and ascertain how Ga-Adangbes tick.

The religious factor
Most Ghanaians would claim they are Christian, even if they are not church attenders; 96.6% of all respondents to the survey claimed Christian. At the same time, syncretism is also rife and many people do observe conflicting traditional and Christian practices. But the fanatical Charismatics of the Christian Faith, whose numerical strength seems to be growing at an alarming rate, did not wish to observe the drum ban, and therefore became the main targets of aggression from the Ga-Adangbe Wulomo traditional priesthood. 41.1% of the survey's respondents were Charismatics[28], and most of the largest Charismatic churches are based in Accra and Tema. There was anxiety that any government and political party with no overt sympathies towards Ga-Adangbeness (for example NPP) would neither oblige residents of the capital with Ga-Adangbe religion (for example Wulomoism), nor any of the other political

scheming to control Accra in other forms. Simply put, Ga-Adangbes feared they would lose grip of their traditional control over the capital if the NPP should win the elections[29]. There had been speculation that most Charismatics would not vote for the NDC in the impending elections since the government failed to protect their religious interests with regard to the Homowo drum ban issue. The paradox of the scenario was that the NDC presidential candidate for 2000 (Ata Mills) is a Charismatic Christian and a regular attendant at the Assemblies of God Church. Mrs. Mills also regularly attended one of the pioneering Charismatic churches in Ghana – Christian Action Faith Ministries (CAFM). On the other hand, the NPP candidate (Kufour) does not attend a Charismatic church, and should perhaps be more sympathetic towards the Ga-Adangbe cause, but here he was - the presidential candidate of a party with a predominantly Akan support base. It could not be guaranteed that an NPP government would have sympathies for Ga-Adangbe traditional religion as had been demonstrated by the NDC. It was therefore very difficult to judge how the Charismatics, especially those within the Accra-Tema metropolitan area, would be voting in December 2000. Religion had not mattered much in Ghanaian politics, but it would appear that the clash between the Charismatic churches and Ga-Adangbe traditional priesthood had stirred up religious sentiments and definitely introduced a religious factor towards the outcome of the impending 2000 election results in Accra and Tema.

To summarise, although religion is usually not a key factor in Ghanaian voter choices, the clash between the Charismatic churches and Ga-Adangbe traditionalists on Christian freedoms during the traditional Homowo festival had stirred up religious sentiments which may well have had some bearing on the 2000 elections that followed after this survey, at least in the Accra-Tema metropolitan area. The Charismatic orientation of the NDC candidate Mills - flagbearer of a party politically sympathetic to Ga-Adanbge traditional religion; and the NPP candidate Kufour's orientation as flagbearer of a party unsympathetic towards Ga-Adangbe traditions, left some religious voters with difficult choices to make.

Nature of voters

Type of voter

The aim to gain more intricate revelations on the very nature of the respondents and unravel what types of political animal they were, prompted some further analytical work to be carried out on the survey data, which resulted in Tables 7 and 8.

Table 7: Type of voter

Voter	Frequency	Valid %
Tribalistic	361	72.1
non-tribalistic	140	27.9
Total	**501**	**100**

Table 8: Type of voter by group

	Tribalistic voters	%	Non-Tribalistic voters	%	Total	Cumulative %
Akan	211	42.1	52	10.4	263	52.5
Ga-Adangbe	49	9.8	57	11.4	106	21.2
Nzima	10	2	6	12	16	3.2
Northerners/ Mabian	12	2.4	9	1.8	21	4.2
Ewe	79	15.8	16	3.2	95	19
Total	**361**	**72.1**	**140**	**27.1**	**501**	**100**

In Tables 7 and 8[30], the frequencies for "type of voter" reveal that 72.1% of Ghanaian urbanites were ethnonationalistic voters and only 27.9% vote non-tribalistically or would like to be patriotic. A cross-tabulation of "tribe" and "type of voter" reveal that although Fantis constituted 20% of total respondents, 16% intended to vote as ethnonationalists, and only 4% were patriotic voters. Although Ashantis constituted 15.2% of total respondents, 12% intended to vote as ethnonationalists, and only 4% were patriots. Akyems constituted 7.8% of total respondents but 6.6% intended to vote as

ethnonationalists and only 1.2% were patriots. Akwapims constituted 9% of total respondents but 7.4% intended to vote as ethnonationalists and only 1.6% were patriots. Bonos constituted 0.6% of total respondents but 0.2% were ethnonationalistic and 0.4% patriots. Altogether, among the 52.5% of total respondents who are Akan, 42.09% demonstrated ethnonationalism, and only 10.41% were patriotic voters. Ga-Adangbes constituted 21.2% of total respondents. 9.8% intended to vote as ethnonationalists, and 11.4% were patriots – a difference of only 1.6%. Once again, the Ga-Adangbe leaning towards either ethnonationalism or patriotism, would not lend itself to an emphatic deduction. Nzimas made up only 3.2% of total respondents but 2% intended to vote as ethnonationalists and 1.2% were patriots. Mabians (Northerners) constituted 4.2% of total respondents but 2.4% intended to vote as ethnonationalists and 1.8% were patriotic voters. Ewes made up 19% of total respondents but as much as 15.8% intended to vote as ethnonationalists and only 3.2% wished to be patriotic voters. Of the total number of respondents, 42.1% demonstrating ethnonationalism by their vote were Akan, 15.8% were Ewes, and 9.78% were Ga-Adangbe[31].

From Table 8, we can calculate representation of the respective Akan, Ewe and Ga-Adangbe ethnonationalistic voters against their overall group representation in the survey as follows: for Akan 42.1%/52.5%=80%; for Ewe 15.8%/19%=83%; for Ga-Adangbe 9.78%/21.2%=43%. Whereas representation of ethnonationalism among Akans and Ewes are high, that for Ga-Adangbes seems low. It would seem again that the political complexion of Ga-Adangbes was not easily susceptible to analysis; the remaining 11.4% of overall voters who are Ga-Adangbes and for whom insufficient evidence made it impossible to decipher what type of voter they were, got the benefit of the doubt and became classified as patriotic voters. Hence most Ga-Adangbes had managed to conceal their votes. To be fair, if the politics of concealment is inputted against Ga-Adangbes, it becomes clear that they are largely not patriotic voters. In conclusion, the overall analyses reveal that Ghanaian urbanites are more of ethnonationalists than patriots and therefore the potential to demonstrate civil loyalties towards the state institution is more imagined than real, of style rather than the substance of Ghanaian politics.

Level of ethnonationalism:

The data reveal that among Ghanaian urbanites, 42.1% of respondents demonstrated extreme levels of ethnonationalism, 25.5% very high, 4.2% high, 0.8% low, 7.6% very low, and 19.8% had to be given the benefit of the doubt due to insufficient evidence, 11.4% of whom were Ga-Adangbes. A cross-tabulation of "tribe" and "level of tribalism"[32] reveals that among Ghanaian urbanites a total 22.6% of Akans exhibit extreme levels of ethnonationalism and a further 17.4% exhibit very high levels of it. The figures for Ewes are 7.2% and 7% respectively. Those for Ga-Adangbes are 9% and 0.6% respectively[33]. Representing these percentages against those of their respective overall group responses, we have for Akans (42.9% and 33% for "extreme" and "very high" levels of ethnonationalism respectively); Ewes (37.78% and 36.7% respectively); Ga-Adangbes (42.3% and 2.83% respectively). The analyses from the survey reveal that 21.2% of overall respondents were Ga-Adanbge; 9.8% could be deciphered politically, but 11.4% were indecipherable or given the benefit of the doubt; almost all of the 9.8% who were politically decipherable exhibited extreme levels of ethnonationalism. It becomes conclusive therefore that if all Ga-Adangbe respondents had not played the concealment game, we could safely deduce by inference that again almost all would be ethnonationalistic voters to the extreme or very high degree. The fact still remains however that the general political history of modern Ghana makes it easier for Ga-Adangbes to conceal their political complexion in comparison with the other ethnonational identity groups.

Association with roots

The survey revealed[34] that of all respondents, 74.5% said they lived in Tema; 55.7% since 1961 and 18.8% since 1990. Therefore 55.5% had lived in Tema for over 10 years, 10.2% for 4-10 years, 4.4% for 1-3 years, 3% for 4-12 months, and 1.2% for 3 months or under. 74.7% of respondents had tasted city life before coming to live in Tema, 27.3% of these in Accra and 10.4% in Kumasi, the two largest cities in Ghana. A further 17% had lived in any combination of the eleven cities in Ghana, and 58.1% had always lived in a city. 18.2% had tasted village or town life for over 10 years prior to coming into the city, 10.6% from 4-10 years, 7.4% 1-3 years, 2.6% from 4-12

months, and 2.8% for 3 months or under. It appears that Tema citizens are pretty much an urban crop. However, a good 90.4% visited their relatives, 55.5% wrote to them, 67.9% telephoned them, and 81.4% actually visited their respective villages or home towns[35].

Further analyses revealed that a lot of respondents (34.1%) registered "very high" levels of association with roots; that is, they visited relatives, wrote to them, telephoned them and also visited their individual villages or hometowns. A further 37.1% registered as "high" or demonstrated any three out of the four indicators of association with roots. Another 20.4% were "average" or demonstrated any two of the indicators. 5.2% registered "low" or demonstrated only one of the four indicators. Only 3.2% were "apathetic" in associating with their roots, or did not demonstrate any of the four indicators. The results therefore give a strong indication that generally urbanites are more highly inclined to be associated with their roots than otherwise, and that for the vast majority of Ghanaian urbanites, geographical detribalization would not lead to attitudinal detribalization. In other words the Ghanaian urbanite is generally not fully detribalized by urbanization, or that urbanization does not always lead to attitudinal detribalization. The research shows that it is not universalistic for the integrating and modernizing factors associated with urbanization to lead to attitudinal detribalization, and explains why most Ghanaian urbanites are ethnonationalists and unpatriotic. If 72.1% of Ghanaian urbanites are ethnonationalists and only 27.9% are patriotic[36], it can be concluded that civic loyalty is more of style rather than the substance of Ghanaian politics, and that most Ghanaian urbanites consider it more rationalistic to be ethnonationalists than patriots. Engagement with the metropolis and integration into the institutions of state and government have neither swayed Ghanaian urbanites towards attitudinal detribalization nor civic nationalism. The opposite ideal could have been possible without the state of figuration in the political context and its related ethnic arithmetic which results in a reciprocal voter behaviour that is rationalized calculatively towards ethnonational interests. The link between figuration and ethnonationalism is clear, but the idea that patriotism would prevail in the absence of figuration is yet to be proven in Ghana.

A cross-tabulation of tribe versus "association with roots"[37] also revealed that irrespective of one's ethnonational identity, most Ghanaian urbanites exhibit "very high" and "high" levels of association with their roots as against "average", "low" and "apathetic". However, a cross-tabulation of length of residence in Tema (q34) versus "association with roots"[38] astonishingly reveals that, generally the longer Ghanaians lived in the urban area the higher the association with their roots became. The cross-tabulation revealed that 18.2% and 20.2% of total respondents who had lived in Tema for more than 10 years demonstrated "very high" and "high" association with roots respectively, as against 12.8% for "average", 2.6% for "low" and 1.8% for "apathetic". For those who had lived in Tema from 4-10 years, 3.4% and 4.2% demonstrated "very high" and "high" association with roots respectively as against 2.2% for "average" and 0.2% each for "low" and "apathetic". For those who had lived there for 1-3 years, 1.6%, 1.8% and 0.6% demonstrated "very high", "high" and "average" association with roots respectively, and 0.4% for "low" and none for "apathetic". For those who had lived there for three months and under, only 0.8% and 0.2% demonstrated "very high" and "high" respectively, 0.2% for "apathetic" and none for "average" and "low"[39]. The data imply that association with roots would seem to diminish for those who had lived shortest in the city. For example, of the 6 respondents who had been in Tema for three months or under, 0.8% demonstrated "very high" association with roots, 0.2% demonstrated "high", 0.2% was "apathetic" and obviously none for "average" and "low"[40]. It is clear that even the most recent city residents had very high associations with their roots. However the data does not prove the existence of a direct relationship between length of stay in the city and association with roots. Also, even though the data suggest an association between length of stay in the city and association with roots, chi-square is not a suitable statistical test for measuring the strength of association if any.

Urbanization/detribalization and association with roots
To summarise, urbanites do not become fully detribalized as a result of urbanization, and this confirms the notion of geographical detribalization leading to attitudinal detribalization as not being universalistic. Indeed the longer Ghanaian urbanites became

exposed to urbanization the stronger the association with their roots became, although there is no direct association between ethnonationalism and association with roots. This signifies that ethnonationalism comes naturally for Ghanaian urbanites and does not have to be worked at or influenced by an individual's association with roots. Ethnonationalism is the rational Ghanaian urbanite response to the state of figuration. The research scientifically corroborates the view held by Agyeman, Mair and Watson, that there is no constant correlation between urbanization and attitudinal detribalization. In other words although urban factors such as modernization and its associated educational and occupational opportunities enhance social and political integration[41], they do not necessarily lead to a derooting from one's ethnonational origins and identity[42].

The data also reveal that Ghanaian urbanites are more highly inclined to be associated with their roots than otherwise. Within the matrix of the proven link between figuration and ethnonationalism, the absence of a direct association between the latter and association with roots only goes to signify: (a) that where figuration prevails in a multi-national state, ethnonationalism is of natural, rational and ethical consequence; and (b) that ethnonationalism is not consequential from citizens' association with their roots. The data reveal that: 34.1% exhibited "very high" association with their roots; 37.1% "high"; and 20.4% "average"; this means some total 91.6% of Ghanaian urbanites had at the very least some average association with or attachment to their roots. It becomes clear that detribalization is more attitudinal than any de-rooting from ethnonational authochthons, and that geographical alienation from roots, and integration within an urban melting pot of multiple identities, do not always detribalize urbanites. Agyeman's study on Ghanaians revealed that education and urban integration did not distance urbanites from their kin groups[43]. However this research goes further to reveal that the longer Ghanaian urbanites experienced urban life the higher the association with their roots became. As already mentioned, this research does not prove or offer the view that association between urbanites and their roots influences ethnonationalism. Rather, ethnonationalism is as a function or consequence of the prevailing state of figuration.

Ethnonationalism and association with roots

In another interesting finding, a cross-tabulation of "level of tribalism" and "association with roots"[44] reveals that the highest levels of ethnonationalism match with the highest levels of association with roots. The cross-tabulation reveals that 15%, 14.2% and 9.8% of total respondents who demonstrated "very high", "high" and "average" associations with roots respectively, also demonstrated "extreme" levels of ethnonationalism at the same time. A further 9.4%, 10% and 3.8% of total respondents who demonstrated "very high", "high" and "average" associations with roots respectively, demonstrated "very high" levels of ethnonationalism at the same time. Only 1.8%, 1.6% and 0.6% of those who demonstrated "very high", "high" and "average" associations with roots respectively, also demonstrated "high" levels of ethnonationalism at the same time. Even lower still, only 0.2%, 0.2% and 0.4% of those who demonstrated "very high", "high" and "average" associations with roots respectively, also demonstrated "low" levels of ethnonationalism at the same time[45]. However the data does not prove that levels of ethnonationalism are generally high because of urbanites' association with their roots. Although it is common knowledge that ethnonationalism is a calculative and rationalistic response to the state of figuration, there does not seem to be any direct relationship between ethnonationalism and association with roots.

It can be concluded therefore that as far as Ghanaian politics is concerned, ethnonationalism comes rather naturally, and rationalistically so, but does not have to be motivated by an urbanite's association with their tribal roots. It would appear to be psychological, more a self identification thing, regardless of whether or not one is attitudinally detribalized or geographically removed from autochthons; the psychological influence and reality of the pervasive state of figuration might just be an explanation. The evidence also clearly suggests that the notion that urbanization leads to attitudinal detribalization is more imagined than real, and that for most Ghanaian urbanites, civic loyalty is more of an idealistic style rather than the substance of politics. To summarise, if the highest levels of ethnonationalism match with the highest levels of association with roots, a suggestion is implied that some sort of association exists between levels of (ethnonationalism) and levels of

(association with roots), but the data does not reveal any direct relationship between the two, and therefore the research does not offer a view that there is a relationship between ethnonationalism and association with roots.

Gender and political attitudes

The survey revealed that females were more apathetic towards party political commitment than males. Overall, some 30.5% of respondents were registered members of any party[46]. It can be concluded that there is a significant association between the variables "gender" (q1) and "party registration" (q15). This is written as:

$$7 = 17.23; df = 1; p<0.01^{[47]}.$$

The subtable for symmetric measures also provides a measure of the strength of the association rather like that of the Pearson correlation coefficient. This is written as: Phi = 0.185; p<0.01[48].

The survey also revealed that males had a greater tendency to freely share their political views than females. Overall, 66.5% of all respondents indicated that they exercised freedom of political expression – as already shown in Table 5[49]. It can be concluded that there is a significant association between the variables "gender" (q1) and "freedom of political expression" (q20). This is written as:

$$7 = 9.87; df = 1; p<0.01^{[50]}.$$

The subtable for symmetric measures provides a measure of the strength of the association rather like that of the Pearson correlation coefficient. This is written as: Phi = 0.14; p<0.01[51].

A cross-tabulation of responses to question 1 (gender) and question 21 (confidants and preference order)[52] reveals that of those who did not freely share their political opinions, there existed an almost equal proportion for males and females who would share their opinions with no one at all - 6.8% and 7% respectively. For those who did not freely share their political opinions, females had a different preference order from males. Whereas the confiding order for males was, in descending order: "friends", "spouse" and "family", for females it was: "friends", family" and "spouse". Three times as many females 4.2% will share their political opinions with friends as against those who would share with spouses 1.4%. Therefore, among females who had difficulty sharing their political opinions, the tendency ratio of sharing them with friends, to spouses, is 3:1. Simply put, they will tell their friends rather than their husbands.

This survey did not investigate whether communication between female friends was an easier trajectory for gossip. Also, the tendency ratio for males sharing their political opinions with their spouses, to females doing the same, is 2.7:1. There is therefore a clear indication that between spouses, males felt freer to share their political opinions with their wives than females with their husbands. Again there is a suggestion that building trust seemed easier between female friends than with their spouses. We can deduce from the data[53] with a measure of certainty that whereas freedom of political expression seemed to be a rarity between spouses, males felt freer to share political opinions with their wives than females would with their husbands. There was a greater tendency for females to try as much as possible to conceal their political opinions from their husbands. Please note that this analysis assumes that spouses are members of the opposite sex. Within the matrix of a political context where the 'culture of silence' had not fully lifted as at February 1999, and where to a very large extent males are the main opinion leaders, it becomes difficult for females to freely air their views on many issues especially those as explosive as politics. Even in circumstances not specifically adverse, the intimidation posed by the male-dominated society contributes to the phenomenon of females hiding their feelings on certain issues including the political. However a cross tabulation of responses to question 1 (gender) and question 8 (current party orientation)[54] reveals that, out of the 28.7% who had no specific party orientation, the proportion of male to female is equal, that is 14.4% each. Is there some suggestion perhaps, that political coherence was a factor in marital partnerships?

Although the research did not set out to investigate a relationship between gender and politics, an interesting discussion is prompted by the data. As already mentioned, compared between the two sexes, there is a greater tendency for Ghanaian females to try as much as possible to conceal their political opinions. Within the male-dominated power relations of Ghanaian society, women generally seem to play second fiddle and are therefore not usually given to freely airing their views on politically-sensitive issues. Jette Bukh highlights the view that the traditional household structure in Ghanaian society secures for women a basis for subsistence production at the same time maintaining them in a secondary position. This difficult position for women is inherent in the societal

policy of the traditional African state, and it would appear that 'women's possibility for fighting back is very limited'[55]. Any argument that Bukh's views may be exclusive to rural women would not hold, in that, in a wider and more inclusive attempt, the findings and conclusions of the ISSER/DPPC Research Team's investigations on Ghanaian women[56] reveal that they have a subordinate image in Ghanaian society, and generally play secondary roles. The views of Bukh and the ISSER/DPPC team are also confirmed by Yaw Oheneba-Sakyi who also reveals that there are subordinate gender roles for women in Ghanaian society, and that this is a bi-product of the traditional system[57]. Perhaps the intimidation caused by this subordinate secondary image is an explanation to why there is a greater tendency for Ghanaian females to try as much as possible to conceal their political opinions. It could be argued that the opposite gender of the interviewer could have inhibited female respondents from fully revealing their political intentions. However this is not to be considered as a major issue, in that, in addition to the confidentiality and anonymity of the interview process, 66.5% of respondents indicated that they had freedom of expression. Besides, for females, it was the sharing of political views with their spouses that was a main problem, and not with friends, other family members, or an interviewer of the opposite sex. Within the intimidating male-dominated Ghanaian society, females generally preferred to conceal their political views particularly if they would differ from those of their spouses on issues as sensitive as politics.

It would appear that any explanations to the comparative political self-gagging of Ghanaian women in general and spouses in particular are to be sought from the countrywide image of the traditional household political system which also demonstrates among urbanites, and not from the 'culture of silence' at the time of the survey which is not gender-specific. This issue goes to strengthen the thesis that geographically-detribalized urbanites may not be detribalized attitudinally. It should be said that the active role of Mrs Rawlings and the December 31 Women's Group she founded brought changes to the relationship between gender and politics; in raising the political awareness of women and empowering them for political roles. Subsequently, the NPP seriously considered a female

as the vice-presidential candidate for the 2000 elections[58] even if it did not materialise eventually.

Age and political attitudes

Overall, the general data reveal that irrespective of age-group, there were consistently more votes for the NPP presidential candidate than that of the NDC candidate. There was only 1 respondent for the 61-70 age group. As already discussed, Tema is a place more for the vibrant and working age. The minimum voting age is eighteen, therefore only those aged at least seventeen years in 1999 and would be eligible to vote in 2000, qualified to be interviewed. As responses within the 17-30 age group were the most obvious to be affected, in that some respondents would have been ineligible to vote in 1996 due to age or other reasons, this analysis concentrates on them. The data reveal that in 1996, 27.4% of respondents in this age-group voted for Rawlings and 36.3% for Kufour - a gap of 8.9%. For the 2000 tentative votes, we had 26.2% and 46.8% respectively - a gap of 20.6%[59]. This signified a 2.2% [27.4%-26.2%] decrease in votes for Rawlings, and a 10.5% [46.8%-36.3%] increase for Kufour. This could be partially due to the increase in eligible voters for the 2000 elections. However, the general pattern across the data is maintained, that irrespective of age group, there were more votes for the NPP than the NDC, either for 1996 or 2000. This pattern is attributable to the generality that the NPP has more support than the NDC in Tema, and is comparatively stronger among urbanites than ruralites. This pattern does not reflect the whole country. A further analysis of the data indicated that: for the 31-40 age group, the NDC-NPP vote gaps for 1996 and 2000 measured 4.4% and 13.1% respectively; those for the 41-50 age group were 12.5% and 12.5%, respectively; and those for the 51-60 age group were 20.8% and 29.2%[60]. Therefore not only did the NPP generally have more vote potential in urban areas, but also that the gaps had widened or increased to their advantage for all the age groups represented within the survey, with the exception of 41-50. This signifies that the NPP's strength among urbanites had increased even further between 1996 and 2000 at the age levels represented regardless of the ethnonational identity connotations revolving around the dilemma of voter indecision exhibited by some respondents, as already explained. However the data does not prove the existence of a direct relationship between

age and voting habits, either for 1996 or 2000. Additionally chi-square is not a suitable test for measuring a strength of association between the two variables, if any, in that, 53.3% and 69% of cells from the output listings for age versus 1996 and 2000 votes respectively, have expected count less than 5, and the minimum expected count for both output listings is 0.01[61].

Occupation and political attitudes

The general pattern within the data reveals that the NPP commanded a majority of votes. This may not only be attributable to the simple reason that the NPP's stronghold is in the urban area, but also that priority to the choice of a presidential candidate had been given to party rather than personality. The rule of thumb seemed to be that potential voters chose whichever candidate their favourite party presented, and it seemed that the general outlook of the party politics had ethnosectarian connotations. That the NPP were champions in urbanite Tema seemed to mask any significance of association between occupation and politics. Perhaps a countrywide survey may reveal such an association. The gaps between the votes for the NDC and NPP across the occupations were generally close, with the exception of professionals, among whom there was a wide gap between presidential choices either for 1996 or 2000. Responses for the 1996 presidential votes (q10) indicate that 37.3% of all professional respondents voted for Rawlings whereas 52.8% voted for Kufour, a gap of 15.5%. For 2000, 24.9% of respondents intended to vote for Ata Mills (NDC) whereas 49.2% intended to vote for Kufour, a gap of 24.3%[62]. Although the gap has again increased to the NPP's advantage, there were decreases in votes for each party's candidate - 3.6% for the NPP candidate and 12.4% for the NDC candidate. The survey data reveal that 20.7% of professional respondents were still undecided on which presidential candidate to vote for in 2000[63]. Perhaps this should explain the decreases in votes for both party candidates, especially the NDC candidate. Previous analysis would suggest that this was partially attributable to the identity group connotations revolving around the dilemma of voter indecision demonstrated by some respondents, arising from the fact that the NDC candidate for 2000 was Akan and not Ewe. The data clearly shows that among the urban population in Tema, the NPP had more support among Ghanaian professionals

than the NDC. However it must be noted that this was not a countrywide survey. Besides, Tema was chosen due to the ethnonational neutrality of its origination or foundation, which is central to the thesis. Chi-square is not a suitable test for measuring the strength of association if any between occupation and choice of presidential candidates[64].

Education and political attitudes

The data reveal that for all levels of education, the NPP candidate commanded more votes than the NDC candidate, and that the gaps between votes for the candidates had accentuated for 2000. This is not a reflection of the whole country. For 1996, the gap between votes towards the NDC and NPP candidates were: 3.9% [46.2%-42.3%] for respondents with primary education, 7.9% [39%-31.1%] for secondary, and 12.6% [50.2%-37.6%] for tertiary. For 2000, the gap between tentative votes were: 38.4% for primary, 16.8% for secondary, and 16.1% for tertiary education[65]. In addition to the general increase in numerical strength for the NPP, it was also clear that the NPP generally had more support from people with higher education than the NDC. It must be noted that 14.2% of respondents were ineligible to vote in 1996 as against only 1.2% for 2000[66], and consequently it would be expected that this increase in voter eligibility should benefit both parties. But the data reveal a general reduction in votes for the NDC and an increase for the NPP. For 1996, the NDC's votes from respondents with: primary education was 42.3%, but for 2000, this had reduced to 15.4%; secondary education was 31.1%, but for 2000, this had reduced to 27.7%; tertiary education was 37.6%, but for 2000, this had reduced to 27.4%. For 1996, the NPP's votes from respondents with: primary education was 46.2%, but for 2000, this had increased to 53.8%; secondary education was 37%, but for 2000, this had increased to 44.5%; tertiary education was 50.2%, but for 2000, this had reduced to 43.5%[67]. There does not seem to be a pinpoint explanation to these undulating patterns, however it must be borne in mind that 20.6% of all respondents were undecided on which presidential candidate to vote for in 2000, and that the identity connotations revolving around the dilemma of voter indecision demonstrated by respondents from the various ethnonational groups had a role to play in the reduction of NDC votes. The lack of a

specific pattern is also highlighted by another interesting observation that at the same time as the NDC's highest drop in support was from respondents with only primary education (42.3% for 1996; 15.4% for 2000), the NPP's only drop in support was from respondents with tertiary education (50.2% for 1996; 43.5% for 2000). Chi square is not a suitable statistical test for measuring the strength of association if any between level of education and choice of presidential candidates[68].

9

THE REAL ELECTIONS: 2000 AND 2004

The striking similarities of the patterns between the 1999 survey of voter intent and the actual 2000 and 2008 elections confirm both the validity and relevance of the survey, that it had engaged the pulse of true political feeling, and the barometer was working.

The first round of the 2000 presidential election

Neither Mills nor Kufour had won a clear majority in the first round, hence the run-off between the two. Table 9 reveals about the first round ballot held on December 7 that 44.5% of the votes went to Mills and 48.2% to Kufour. Dan Lartey the GCPP presidential candidate polled 1%. The CPP's Professor George Hagan polled 1.8% of the countrywide vote and 3.19% of votes cast in the Central Region. As already analysed[1], Hagan was not a real threat to Mills despite any panic which his candidacy may have aroused in the Mills camp. Goosie Tanoh also won 1.2% of countrywide votes and his candidacy did not detract significantly from the NDC's votes despite being leader of the NRM which broke away from the former. Charles Wereko-Brobbey also won only 0.3% of the countrywide vote and did not detract a significant fraction of votes from the NPP despite being leader of the UGM which broke away from the former. Edward Mahama of the PNC won 2.9% of the countrywide vote but polled substantially from the three Regions in Northern Ghana. He bagged 8.12% of votes cast in Northern Region, 22.46% in Upper-East Region and 15.57% in Upper-West Region, an occurrence which can be attributed to his Northern Ghana roots, his hometown being Nanlerigu. Clearly Mahama's candidacy detracted significant votes from the major candidates, as would be discussed shortly. That noted, it is clear that the first round of the elections was largely a two-horse race

between Mills and Kufour. Voter turn out for the first round was 59.2% as against 77% for 1996. Altogether, 6.46 million out of 10.67 million registered voters voted from any of 20,112 polling stations[2].

**Table 9: Summary of the First Round of the
2000 Presidential election**

Candidate	Valid votes	Vote %
John Kufuor	3,131,739	48.2
John Ata Mills	2,895,575	44.5
Edward Mahama	189,659	2.9
George Hagan	115,641	1.8
Goosie Tanoh	78,629	1.2
Dan Lartey	67,504	1.0
Charles Wereko-Brobbey	22,123	0.3
Total valid votes	**6,500,870**	**99.9**

Total votes cast = 6,605,084
Total rejected votes = 104,214
Registered voters nationwide = 10,678,652
National turnout = 61.7%
Constituencies reported = 200

Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana

The 2000 ROE

In the first round ballot (see Table 10), 75.55% of votes in the Ashanti Region went to Kufour and 22.73% went to Mills. 88.81% of votes cast in the Volta Region went to Mills, and 6.94% to Kufour. The incumbent president and Ewe Rawlings was no longer a candidate but because he remained the leader of the NDC, Mills' Akan-Fanti background did not deter the Ewe-dominated Volta Region from delivering their vote to the NDC owing to the Rawlings factor. Besides, Ewes largely preferred to vote for the Fanti Mills rather than Ashanti Kufour, a phenomenon which characterises the nature of both: (a) the mutual antagonism between Ewes and Ashantis; and (b) the Rawlings factor.

The general pattern of votes for Kufour and Mills in the Ga-Adangbe-dominated Greater-Accra Region was not as skewed as that in the Ashanti and Volta Regions.

Table 10: 2000 First Round Presidential Ballot
(selected results)

Region	Mills	%	Kufour	%	Mahama	%	Tanoh	%
Ashanti	286,017	22.73	950,602	75.55	3,138	0.25	4,420	0.35
Brong-Ahafo	270,465	44.64	306,512	50.59	10,447	1.72	6,634	1.09
Central	237,227	43.73	269,501	49.68	2,791	0.51	7,291	1.34
Eastern	308,047	41.34	409,635	54.97	4,525	0.61	7,738	1.04
G-Accra	467,017	43.21	574,737	53.18	2,927	0.27	15,423	1.43
Northern	286,211	50.75	166,827	29.58	45,804	8.12	12,990	2.3
U-East	125,753	52.13	44,829	18.58	54,185	22.46	4,887	2.03
U-West	111,345	62.29	27,714	15.51	27,824	15.57	4,295	2.4
Volta	506,614	88.81	39,535	6.94	1,905	0.33	3,182	0.56
Western	273,355	43.93	314,501	50.54	4,873	2.90	4,735	0.76
Total	**2,871,051**	**44.8**	**3,104,393**	**48.4**	**158,419**	**2.5**	**71,595**	**1.1**

Source: GRi Newsreel 11/12/00; *http://www.ghanareview.com*

Mills won 43.21% of the votes in the Greater-Accra region and Kufour won 53.18% - a mere 10% difference compared to other polarities. It should be recalled that the 1999 survey of voter intent revealed that Ga-Adangbe voter patterns would not be strongly skewed towards either of the major parties.

The majority of votes from Northern Ghana went to the NDC in response to the party heeding the request from leading voices in Northern Ghana to field a vice-presidential candidate from the area. Notably the NDC set a precedent among the parties by nominating a candidate from Northern Ghana as their running mate for the presidency. As the election drama would unfold, final vote counts from the regions in Southern Ghana trickled into the Electoral Commission much earlier than those from Northern Ghana, and it would appear that Kufuor was maintaining a clear lead until vote counts from Northern Ghana were finalised and added to the total. It is clear that Northern Ghana votes contributed to Mills closing the gap with Kufuor and prevented the latter from maintaining a clear lead in the first round ballot. The results in Table 10 reveal that Mills had 50.75% of votes in Northern Region, 52.13% in Upper East Region, and 62.29% in Upper-West Region, whereas Kufuor polled 29.58%, 18.58 and 15.51% respectively in these three Regions of Northern Ghana. It is interesting to note that Dr Edward Mahama, the presidential candidate of a comparatively insignificant party (the PNC) beat Kufour in the Upper-East and Upper-West Regions by winning 22.46% and 15.57% of the votes respectively. Table 10 further reveals that any election threat the NRP posed to the NDC was not as serious as imagined since Tanoh the NRP candidate only managed to attract snippets of the countrywide votes.

The second round of the 2000 presidential election: the Mahama factor

Soon after the election, at least four of the opposition parties - PNC, NRP, UGM and CPP - pledged their support for Kufuor in the second round[3]. This seems to have made a lot of difference, for example, Edward Mahama's Northern Ghana votes would now be directed towards Kufuor. As the results in Table 11 reveal, Kufuor performed much better in Northern Ghana during the second round ballot held on December 28. Although Mills won 51.10%,

57.17% and 61.97% of votes in the Northern, Upper-West and Upper-East regions respectively, Kufuor won 48.90%, 42.83% and 38.03%. Clearly there was a significant improvement in Kufour's performance in the three regions during the run-off in comparison with his votes during first round ballot -29.58%, 18.58 and 15.51% respectively. Given that in both first and second round ballots, Kufuor won in each region with the exception of the three in Northern Ghana (and of course Volta Region in Southern Ghana), the strategic improvement in his Northern Ghana performance (in the absence of Edward Mahama) made a significant contribution to his final victory. A comparison between the first and second round ballots indicate that Mills' countrywide total decreased by a mere 1.7%, whereas Kufuor's increased by 7.46%. As there does not seem to be significant differences in Mills' performance in the Northern, Upper-East and Upper-West Regions between the first and second round ballots 50.75%[51.10%], 52.13%[57.17%] and 62.29%[61.97%] – run-off results in square brackets, it is evident that among other things yet unclear, Kufuor gained substantially from Mahama's pledge of support during the run-off.

Table 11: Summary of 2000 Presidential Run-off

Region	Kufour votes	%	Mills votes	%
Ashanti	1,027,132	79.89	258,623	20.11
B-Ahafo	342,961	58.30	245,300	41.70
Central	302,414	60.31	199,006	39.69
Eastern	447,154	62.41	269,270	37.59
G-Accra	631,506	59.95	421,954	40.05
Northern	265,076	48.90	277,038	51.10
U-East	115,880	42.83	154,703	57.17
U-West	64,163	38.03	104,533	61.97
Volta	76,839	11.53	589,719	88.47
Western	358,138	60.90	299,978	39.10
Total	**3,631,263**	**56.9**	**2,750,124**	**43.1**
Registered voters nationwide = 10,678,652				
Valid vote count = 6,381,387				
Constituency count = 200 of 200				

Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana

Further analyses of the data reveal that the Volta Region's overall support for the NDC in both rounds hardly changed: 88.81% [88.47%] but votes won by Kufuor from the same Region increased: 6.94% [11.53%], perhaps due to gains from the coalition of opposition parties within the region. Nevertheless, the staunch support of the Ewe-dominated Region for the NDC should not be missed. In a similar vein, Kufour's votes from the Ashanti Region during the run-off increased: 75.55% [79.89%] while Mills' votes decreased: 22.73% [20.11%]. Once again the Ewe-Ashanti mutual antagonism demonstrated itself in the polarity of voting patterns between the Volta and Ashanti Regions. The second round results in the Greater-Accra Region indicate that Mills' votes decreased slightly: 43.21% [40.5%] while Kufuor's votes increased: 53.18% [59.95%]. As with the 1999 survey, the general non-partisan impression from Ga-Adangbes repeated itself here.

Table 12: Selected Run-off Results by constituencies – Eastern Region

	Mills	%	Kufour	%	Total	Voters	Voted %
Lower Manya Krobo	12,336	53.4	10,771	46.6	23,107	47,091	49.4
Upper Manya Krobo	11,165	68.3	5,192	31.7	16,357	37,319	44.8
Yilo Krobo	13,673	64.3	11,494	45.7	25,167	49,834	51.2

Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana

It should also be pointed out that there is no constant relationship between election fever indicators and actual result on voting day as the story unfolded from electoral attitudes at Yilo Krobo in the Eastern Region. The media highlighted the pre-election fever of the Yilo Krobos and their general determination to switch camp from the NDC to NPP. However, the election result of Yilo Krobo constituency in Table 12 reveals that Mills won 54.3% of votes counted whereas Kufour won 45.7%. The results further reveal that only 51.2% of registered voters in the constituency

voted during the run-off. For a place classified as an NDC safe area, the NDC's performance was rather poor. However, the point is made that the pre-election popular outcry 'to ignore the NDC's vain promises and test the NPP for the next four years come December 2000 elections'[4] did not translate into reality. Noticeably, the election results of the Krobo area (including Lower and Upper Manya Krobo) show that they supported the NDC candidate Mills.

The 2004 presidential election

One of the many tests of the December 2004 election was not just whether democracy would have embedded, but also to what extent any change in the political context would have affected ROE. Logically, the interest in ethnonational patterns was high. The political landscape was also obviously different. But whether or not the Ashanti-Ewe relationship would not be as acutely antagonistic as previously; whether because it may no longer be strategic or possible for one or other ethnonational group to compete; or that ethnonational politics could be taking a different twist or depreciating in real terms in Ghanaian politics[5], can be gleaned from the analysis following. In 2003 I argued that 'should ethnonationalism play a lesser role in electioneering than it has in the past, then any emerging ethnonational patterns from 2004's elections would be more likely seen as happenstance rather than engineered'[6]. I also argued that the political wisdom of the 2000 electoral season dictated that a party's vice presidential candidate ought to be a Northerner[7]. This argument remained valid for 2004 even if the NDC experienced a serious setback with their first appointee who suffered an accident soon after being announced, and had to be substituted with another Northerner.

The four main presidential candidates were the incumbent president John Kufour of NPP, John Mills of the main Opposition NDC, Dr Edward Mahama of the PNC and George Aggudey of the CPP. Mahama was not expected to poll much this time despite being equipped with a clear analysis that his votes made the essential difference to bring President Kufour victory in the 2000 run-off. He had failed to capitalize on this valuable political capital and convert it to his gain even though the PNC party he led had a strong Nkrumahist affiliation; and despite the media commentaries that he would have to do more than just rely on a deficiency in

Kufour's performance during the 2000-2004 period. Furthermore the recurrent factional divisions among the Nkrumahist tradition since 1996, which split the faction into the two current parties of CPP and PNC, would contribute a little too much for the political energy which Mahama does not generally have. Hence majority of voters had already made up their minds not to waste their votes on Mahama, but instead channel them more strategically towards their key candidates. As it turned out this time, Mahama paid dearly with a pitiful performance: he did not get the highest vote in his own Nanlerigu; he polled just about 5.6% of votes in his own Northern Region; and just fewer than 2% of national votes.

The 2004 electoral analysis

The election was therefore clearly a two-horse race. As already mentioned, it appears voters did not want to waste their votes on less strategic candidates in the grand scheme of the politics. Among the approximately 18,800,000 Ghanaian population from the 2000 census, 10,354,970 registered as voters on the electoral roll nation-wide. Total votes cast were 8,615,306 representing 83.2% of the registered voters, and a presidential candidate needed 50% plus one vote to win and avoid a run-off. The incumbent Kufour was declared winner by the Electoral Commission while the certified count of five constituencies remained outstanding. These constituencies were Bia in the Western Region, Tolon, Yapei-Kusagwu and Zabzugu Tatale in the Northern Region and Pru in the Brong Ahafo Region. The declaration of the winner at this stage was based on the simple calculation that if all 220,216 votes from the five constituencies were prospectively awarded to Kufour's closest rival (Mills), the incumbent would still be the winner, being already ahead with 712,901 votes. Therefore Table 13 and the ensuing analysis are based on the certified totals from 225 constituencies officially declared as the winning result by the Electoral Commissioner on 9 December 2004. Some 2.14% of the votes cast were rejected, leaving the total valid votes at 8,462,710. A vote was certified as a reject if the ballot paper: did not bear the official ballot validation of the polling station; had anything other than a thumbprint; was blank without a mark; did not clearly indicate which candidate the voter has voted for; or was marked for more than one candidate among others.

Table 13: 2004 Presidential election: total certified count from 225 constituencies

Region	Mahama	%	Kufour	%	Mills	%	Aggudey	%
Western	6,407	0.84	447,351	58.45	298,959	39.06	12,677	1.66
Central	5,718	0.81	414,339	58.57	277,433	39.21	9,981	1.41
Greater-Accra	16,065	0.92	910,159	51.99	811,883	46.37	12,600	0.72
Volta	6,451	0.91	100,659	14.26	591,696	83.83	7,021	0.99
Eastern	5,532	0.60	554,933	60.27	353,356	38.38	6,851	0.74
Ashanti	14,082	0.85	1,235,395	74.61	398,362	24.06	7,921	0.48
Brong-Ahafo	8,866	1.21	386,821	52.58	334,334	45.45	5,601	0.76
Northern	37,761	5.6	239,833	35.54	384,363	56.96	12,780	1.89
Upper-East	42,460	12.68	106,003	31.66	180,462	53.90	5,860	1.75
Upper-West	20,306	9.59	68,238	32.23	119,982	56.67	3,209	1.52
Total	**163,648**	**1.93**	**4,463,731**	**52.75**	**3,750,830**	**44.32**	**84,501**	**1**

Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana

When Kufour won the second round of the 2000 presidential election, he had polled 56.9% of total votes; therefore his performance at 2004 of 52.75% indicates a drop of almost 4.2%. At the same time, Mills' electoral support in 2004 increased by some 1.2% (43.1% in 2000 and 44.32% in 2004). As the 2004 presidential election was completed in the first round, and given that the other candidates apart from the two main horses polled only 3% (compared with 7.2% in the 2000 first round), it appears that Mills benefited from Kufour's 4.2% drop.

It should be noted, that since some two million more people voted in 2004 than in 2000, the comparative performance is not impressive for an incumbent government despite being the overall winner. Within the short space of 2000-2004, the NPP government had progressed through some difficult and very tricky business and had made good progress: steering the country through a period of national reconciliation; steadying the economic ship and reducing inflation substantially; reversing a wide variety of bad governance indicators that had intimidated the political rights of citizens and culminated into the previous culture of silence; and generally courting a positive international image for the country. There is now freedom of speech and of association plus an atmosphere for debate, good politics and open political assessment.

A magical political feat was not expected, and it is reasonable to appreciate that four years is not enough for any government to drastically turn things around. However, Ghanaian citizens are anxious about the level of corruption with the NPP. Corruption is endemic in the Ghanaian socio-political culture but it seems the misuse and abuse of political office is a cause for much anxiety in the current political season, especially for a Third World government with fewer resources at its disposal and classified as presiding over a highly indebted poor country (HIPC); even more so when in 2000 the NPP campaigned itself into government on the moral high horse of anti-corruption. Ghanaians therefore expected better from the Kufour government or could have retained the equally corrupt NDC in 2000. Nevertheless, by the result of the 2004 elections, Ghanaians had indicated their level of (dis)satisfaction with Kufour's performance and at the same time clearly indicated that it was better for Ghana's democracy if he remained as president for another four years.

The 2004 ROE

That said, the general pattern of ROE repeated itself in 2004, albeit with some twists, turns and varying levels of intensity as the case may be. Kufour won massively in his Ashanti Region base and Mills did similarly in Volta Region for reasons already outlined. The Kufour versus Mills performance in the Ashanti and Volta regions respectively are 77% v 21.8% and 13.7% v 84.1%. In 2004 Kufour lost about 2% of votes in his Ashanti Region base and gained about the same percentage in the Volta Region. Mills more or less maintained his Ashanti Region performance and lost approximately 4% in his Volta base. The Brong-Ahafo region did not render an en-masse support for the NPP despite one of the NPP's most prominent forbearers (former Prime Minister Busia) being a Brong[8]. The performances of the NPP and NDC candidates were very close - 52.58% and 45.45% respectively. Obviously, the historical disaffection between Ahafos and the Ashanti still resonates[9], and it seems the developmental projects brought to the Brong-Ahafo region by the NDC government between 1992 and 2000 is not lost on the region's citizens.

More dramatically, Fantis in the Central Region denied their Fanti Mills the swing vote for victory, largely because of the Rawlings/Ewe image of the NDC already outlined. It has therefore been suggested that Fantis are perhaps the most patriotic of ethnonational groups within the civic nationalism of modern Ghana. This would be very much tested in 2008: if the Rawlings image of the NDC has sufficiently faded out; if Mills or some other Fanti should be the NDC's presidential candidate; plus of course to what extent the Central Region estimates to benefit from the ensuing state of figuration. The Opposition NDC won quite comfortably in the three Northern Ghana regions of Northern, Upper-East and Upper-West Regions, not least because of the perceived incompetence (or complicity) of the NPP government in handling Northern Ghana's Dagbon crisis relating to the passing of the late Ya Na Yakubu Andani II the former Paramount Chief of the Dagbon. The closest gap between Kufour and Mills' performance was in the Ga-Adangbe dominated Greater-Accra region (51.7% and 46.6% respectively) - a 5.1% difference. Once again the political patterns of the region seem comparatively indecipherable as evidenced from the 1999 survey of voter intent.

Two of Ghana's largest cities (Accra and Tema) are in this region. Hence the metropolitan and melting pot attributes of the region may be a contributory factor to the near equal spread of voting alliances.

2004 progressive outcomes

The outcome of the 2004 elections spells good progress for Ghanaian democracy overall. There are indications that Ghanaians have become more sensitive and responsible voters. The general principle that it would be too soon to allow the discredited NDC back into power; and the persistence of former President Rawlings' image during the last four years had already sealed the NDC's fate. Indeed the former president was seen to be commandeering the NDC's 2004 election campaign, which seems to have undermined the party as a whole. Nevertheless, the NDC's stable and solid performance in 2004 suggests that they are highly electable, and that perhaps it would not take much to reappear in government if their image is restored; and if the related image of the former president fades away sufficiently enough. The NPP's profile is similarly at stake depending on the extent to which the party would be seen to be taking advantage of the state of figuration.

Both Kufour and Mills command a substantial amount of hard earned respect from their own individual profiles and accrued political capital. It seems therefore that the foibles of each candidate's party functionaries contributed to the deduction of votes: Kufour as a result of corruption among his NPP ranks, and Mills, mainly from several gaffes and other utterances of the former president plus his looming profile. An overall vote split of 52.75% v 43.7% is an indication of the maturing of Ghanaian politics - that there is stability of identification with the two main parties, and the existence of an Opposition. Mills (or whoever the NDC's leader might be) would now have the respectable job of nurturing the remainder of the party into an emerging and enduring political tradition rooted in the recent history of Ghana (from 1979), as well as grooming into maturity the culture of a responsible Opposition for Ghana's modern democracy. There seems to be quite a healthy and open political competition between both Government and Opposition unlike the deep and vitriolic antagonism which characterised the US Republican and Democratic sides during the

Bush versus Kerry political season of 2004. With a run-off in 2000 and such a narrow win in 2004, the incumbent Kufour now holds respect for the Ghanaian Opposition, who would perhaps simply understand that destiny was not theirs to rule during the last two elections, and perhaps that they should exist to check, balance and shape the ruling governance until the tables would turn. Ghanaians now feel more relaxed, confident and safe within the current political matrix, and the national feeling is more buoyant even if hardship is still to be contended with among a greater percentage of citizens. No doubt those facing undue hardship would express their feelings at the next elections.

Prospects for 2008

It remains to be seen what the context would be like for 2008. This would very much depend on a number of factors including the progress of the Ghanaian Opposition generally; the conduct of the ruling NPP and the Ghanaian economy; and the opinions of the Ghanaian diaspora whom I hope would be enfranchised. Given the growing sophistication of the Ghanaian voter, there is now increasing potential for voter considerations to focus on issues; evasion or incompetence from any political party might just dictate the direction of votes. With democracy now embedded, and if the influence of Rawlings has sufficiently fizzled out, political stability would not be too high on the minds of voters; they would simply be looking for the alternative best. The NPP now faces the mammoth task of finding a successor with sufficient political capital to match Mills, should the latter remain the NDC leader. Therefore, the crucial factors to consider for election 2008 would be: the profiles of the next presidential candidates; the competing performances of both Government and Opposition; the live issues at stake; the role of the media; and the views of the Ghanaian diaspora. The cash-strapped Opposition's good performance in the 2004 election suggests that the Ghanaian voter would not be bought with hand-outs. And the ruling party would be reminded that the hegemony of any ethnonational group in Ghanaian politics is not a favourable recipe in the political manuals, if the voting statistics from Northern Ghana, the swing potential of the Fanti Central Region, and the current strategy of concealment among Ga-Adangbes, should mean anything.

10

CONCLUSION

I will not rehearse all the arguments. One thing is clear, that ethnonationalism is more the substance of Ghanaian politics than style even among urbanites and furthermore that despite the enhancement of socio-political integration by urban interactive agents, ethnonationalism has become the patriotism in response to figuration. It is also unrealistic to assume that geographical detribalization might always lead to attitudinal detribalization. Despite the pretence among Ghanaian urbanites, and the often false impression given that ethnonationalism is not a consideration when it comes to voting, the opposite is rather the case, and for most it is the main issue. The comparative stability of the Ghanaian state as opposed to other African examples where conflicting ethnonational and/or inter-ethnic issues have been highly explosive can be attributed to a number of factors including:

- the presence of predominant core *ethnies* and the wider Guan ancestry;
- the ROE irrespective of the extent to which figuration is approved or disapproved of by citizens.

Pursuing national homogeneity is a chore for any multi-national state; however over time a single Ghanaian national identity has assumed despite ethnonational heterogeneity; this potential exists for all multinational states, but in varying degrees and perspectives obviously. And of course natural nation-states can as they see fit also reconstruct or rebrand their image, profile, identity and historiography in robustness to both the ensuing internal and international dynamics.

It now becomes a huge responsibility how the modern Ghanaian state (and any African state for that matter) manages its affairs and by what level of egalitarianism in statecraft this occurs, if figuration

is to reverse. Real economic development is a must, hence a new crop of leadership that is above particularistic board ought to emerge. For Ghana, the opportunity presents itself to experience brain gain from the store of expertise among the global diaspora, although it seems that local politicians are in no mood to make strategic room for this category of people who they feel "deserted" the country when things were tough, even if most diasporans are abroad for the right reasons. The resident academic community is another constituency of people with the caliber to pull particularism and corruption out of the governance mess even if it is difficult to envisage how they can effectively assume political leadership over the country within the ensuing party politics; but this is not impossible, and is certainly a task worth pursuing.

While the clock ticks, the effects of global warming means the earth could warm up by a further three degrees celsius and beyond within the next one hundred years. The ecological implications are that Africa in particular will experience further drought and famine. More than ever before, the obligation for serious and strategic long term planning stares in the face of the African leadership, and this is not the season to be experimenting under the guise of democratization. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) under the monitoring of the AU should be rigorously implemented to make it work; to ensure that development, poverty reduction targets and governance goals are being comprehensively pursued and achieved. The AU should regularly posit a clear voice on global issues and member states should exercise confidence in taking foreign policy postures which demonstrate sensitive balance and independence from external badgering. Countries which took positions against USA about the 2003 invasion of Iraq have by that contributed to a more interesting international politics, and the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan's articulation that acting unilaterally is not a way forward to world peace, has certainly won due respect.

At the global level, the historical imbalances inherent in world trade agreements ought to be addressed in order to level the playing field. This means serious consideration of Third World proposals at the several ongoing rounds of trade talks; the postcolonial arrangements do not have to be neocolonial. Among other things, the politics of oil, nuclear technology and carbon dioxide emissions should be looked at more closely.

NOTES

Chapter One

[1] As broadly expressed in Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities*. (See bibliography for full citation).

[2] As broadly outlined in Eric Hobsbawm's *The Invention of Tradition*. (See bibliography for full citation).

[3] When a national feeling or such a view emerges among citizenship which then translates into a demonstration of national consciousness (Seton-Watson 1977, p. 5).

[4] See groupings outlined in Nugent 1997:1-3; Lentz & Nugent ed.:162 & 178

[5] Michael Amoah, *Ethnonationalism Versus Political Nationalism in Ghanaian Electoral Politics: 1996 – 2000 – PhD*, (Middlesex University, School of Humanities and Cultural Studies, London 2001), 71-72.

[6] Aggrey it seems had plans to research the theory of linking the Gold Coast to the Mali, Songhai and Ghana empires, and to Egypt. See page 277 of E W Smith's *Aggrey of Africa* (Ayer Co Publishers, 1929); also see Kimble 1963:xvii).

[7] Briefly, ethnonationalism is the form of nationalism demonstrated in solidarity with, or towards one's ethnonational identity group, and civic nationalism is patriotism towards the state institution (Hutchinson 1994: 42 & 43; Kellas 1991: 51 & 52 or 2nd edition 1998:66). Where there is a nation-state, ethnonationalism is equated with civic or political nationalism at both the theoretical and practical levels. But within a multi-national state such as Ghana, a paradox exists whereby, although the two political attitudes are theoretically mutually antagonistic, they synchronize within the realities of the local political rationality (Amoah 2003:149-50)

[8] Smith 1991:59

[9] Amoah 2003:155

[10] See Amoah 2003:150, or Amoah 2001:2. The rationalization of ethnonationalism (ROE) is further explained throughout this monograph.

[11] This concise definition is first developed and fully explained in pages 143-6 of my PhD thesis, and appears in Amoah 2003:150-51. A fuller explanation and outworking runs throughout this monograph and especially in Chapter Six. Also, see Elias 1978:130; Bayart 1993:ix-x & 55.

[12] Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument*, (International African Institute in association with James Currey, London 1999), page 104.

[13] Connor 1994: 35

[14] Ghanaian citizens' nationalistic and socio-political attitudes were investigated in 1999 through a survey on their tentative votes for the impending 2000 multi-party presidential and parliamentary elections, with a view to sifting out any patterns between the ethno-sectarian backgrounds of electoral candidates and those of individual voters. The survey aimed at examining the true nature of attitudinal shifts towards ethnonationalism or civic nationalism by investigating how much of ethnonationalism ran through the veins of supposedly detribalized urbanites against the background of a socio-political context fraught with figuration.

[15] The 1999 survey of nationalistic attitudes revealed this majority to be 72.1%

[16] This view emerges in the debate on political arithmetic. See page 3 of British Journal of Sociology, Vol 55, Issue 1, March 2004. This edition of the journal features the ensuing debate between academic researchers and government policy makers, about holding governments accountable for their policies and related theoretical assumptions.

Chapter Two

[1] Piddington 1950:164

[2] This list has assumed over time from the debates on the subject of nationalism and is accumulated primarily from books written by Anthony Smith, in particular Smith 1983 and Smith 1991:21

[3] This quote is from Smith 2000:65 but fully explained in Smith 1986:22-30 where he first sets out details of the attributes of an *ethnie*, and of course Smith 2004:17-23.

[4] See list of definitions in Walker Connor's paper 'The timelessness of nations', *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol 10 (1/2), 2004, 38-39.

[5] See Smith 1986:21

[6] See Smith 1986:21 and Connor 1994:38. The latter reference forms part of the contribution of rebuttals to Smith as part of his "retirement gift" in the special edition of the journal *Nations and Nationalism* Vol 10, 1/2 which was compiled in his honour.

[7] Piddington 1950:164

[8] Lucy Mair, *An Introduction to Social Anthropology,* (Clarendon, Oxford 1965), page 62.

[9] E K Francis, *Interethnic Relations*, (Elsevier, New York 1976), page 6.

[10] Francis 1976:6

[11] Francis 1976:6

[12] Smith 1991:11

[13] Mair 1965:13

[14] See list of definitions in: Connor, Walker, 'The timelessness of nations', *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol 10 (1/2), 2004, 38-39.

[15] Francis 1976:6

[16] See pages 32 and 98 of *Nationalism* edited by John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith (Oxford University Press, 1994).

[17] Pierre Van Den Berghe, 'A Socio-biological perspective', in John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith (eds.), *Nationalism*, (Oxford University Press, 1994), page 98.

[18] Seton-Watson 1977:1 & 5

[19] Kedourie 1966:120

[20] Connor 1994:xi

[21] Naomi Chazan, 'Introduction: approaches to the study of irredentism', *Irredentism and International Politics,* edited by Naomi Chazan (Adamantine, Twickenham 1991), page 1.

[22] See M D Kammari, *The Development by J. V. Stalin of the Marxist-Leninist Theory of the National Question*, (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1951), pages 12-13.

[23] Smith 1983:175

[24] Smith 2000:3

[25] Hans Kohn, 'The genesis and character of English nationalism', in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 1, 1 (1940), pages 69-85

[26] Kohn 1946:69-91 & 156

[27] See Camilleri et al (ed.) 1995:22; Pierson 1996:8; Smith 1983: 178; and Weber 1970a: 78.

[28] Naomi Chazan, 'Introduction: approaches to the study of irredentism', *Irredentism and International Politics,* edited by Naomi Chazan (Adamantine, Twickenham 1991), page 1.

[29] Anthony Smith, *National Identity* (Penguin, London 1991), page 14.

[30] Seton-Watson 1977:1

[31] Seton-Watson 1977:1

[32] This list has accrued from the wide variety of authorships; the full list of criteria as assembled here is not found elsewhere; although Smith makes a good attempt in his books, and his definitions of a nation do come closer to this ensembled criteria, he omits common language.

[33] Smith 1986a:21

[34] See Smith 1986a:13-18.

[35] As in Smith 1986a:22-30; and Smith 1991:21.

[36] Eriksen 2004;56. For a development of the full arguments, see whole paper: Eriksen, Thomas Hylland, 'Place, kinship and the case for non-ethnic nations', *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol 10, (1/2) 2004, pp. 49-62.

[37] Ibid:58

[38] Kedourie 1966:9

[39] See Smith 1991:43-4; 1995:29 & 35; Seton-Watson 1977:6; and Kohn 1946: 1 & 4

[40] See Kohn 1940; and Kohn 1946: 4.

[41] Seton-Watson 1977:1

[42] See Hutchinson and Smith (eds.) 1994: 5.

[43] Smith 1991: 59.

[44] Ibid

[45] Hans Kohn, 'The genesis and character of English nationalism', in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 1, 1 (1940), page 93.

[46] Smith 1991:60

[47] See Kohn 1940; and Seton-Watson 1965:5.

[48] Smith 1991:61.

[49] Seton-Watson 1977:3

[50] Seton-Watson 1977:3

[51] Seton-Watson 1977:6

[52] Smith 1983:175

[53] See Smith 2000:3

[54] Smith 1995:35

[55] Seton-Watson 1977:5

[56] See Chazan ed. 1991:1; or Gellner 1983: 1.

[57] Smith 1983:175-76

[58] Smith 1983:175-76

[59] Smith 1983:175-76

[60] Anthony Giddens, *The Third Way: The Revival of Social Democracy* (Polity Press, Cambridge 1998) page 28.

[61] Anthony Giddens, *The Third Way: The Revival of Social Democracy* (Polity Press, Cambridge 1998) page 31.

[62] Anthony Giddens, *The Third Way: The Revival of Social Democracy* (Polity Press, Cambridge 1998) pags 31-33.

[63] Smith 1991:44

[64] Smith 1983:171

[65] Smith 1991:44

[66] Smith 1991:44

[67] Smith 1995:29 & 35

[68] Smith 1991:44

[69] Smith 1991:45-46

[70] Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nationalism: Old and New* (Sydney University Press 1965), page 4.

[71] Smith 1991:46

[72] Smith 1991:68

[73] Smith 1991:68

[74] Anthony Giddens, *Social Theory and Modern Sociology* (Polity Press, Cambridge 1987), page 177

[75] Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence: Volume Two of a Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* (Polity Press, Cambridge 1985), page 273.

[76] Smith 1995:31-32

[77] Smith 1995:31-32

[78] Gellner 1983:1

[79] See list of definitions in: Connor, Walker, 'The timelessness of nations', *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol 10 (1/2), 2004, 38-39.

[80] Smith 1986a:13-18

[81] Smith 1995:32

[82] Smith 1991:20

[83] Smith 1991:20; 1995:31-32

[84] Smith 1995:30

[85] Morrison 1982:90

[86] Morrison 1982:90

[87] Francis 1976:209

[88] Francis 1976:210

[89] See Smith 1995:39

[90] Morrison 1982:139.

[91] For more on the NPP, see section on the state of the Ghanaian political parties in 1999, chapter seven.

[92] Morrison 1982: 186

[93] See Smith 1995:39

[94] See Smith 1995:40

[95] Ibid

[96] Smith ed. 1976: 7

[97] Kedourie 1966:120

[98] Smith 1991:46

[99] See Seton-Watson 1977: 5

[100] For more on these two examples, see Beecham 1968; Giddens 1985; Hayford 1903; Meyerowitz 1952 & 1958; and Wilks 1971. The point is subsequently fully explained in this chapter.

[101] Smith 1991, p. 51

[102] Smith 1991, p. 106

[103] See Yarak 1990, p. 96

[104] Smith 1991, p. 14

[105] See Seton-Watson 1977, p. 4.

[106] Kohn 1940, p. 69.

[107] Seton-Watson 1965, p. 5

[108] Smith 1995, p. 38

[109] Smith 1995, p. 55

[110] See Kohn 1940, pp. 79-94; and Smith ed. 1976, p. 3

[111] See Kohn 1946, p. 4

[112] See Smith 1991, p. 49

[113] Beecham 1968, pp. 170-1

[114] See Hayford 1903, p.80

[115] Beecham 1968, p. 206

[116] See Meyerowitz 1952

[117] Ibid

[118] Beecham 1968, p. 91

[119] Smith 1995, p. 55

[120] See Giddens 1985, p. 273

[121] See Meyerowitz 1952, p. 81; and 1958, p. 8

[122] See Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 29-33

[123] See Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 77 & 130

[124] See Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 74-5

[125] See Ephirim-Donkor 2000, pp. 23-4

[126] See Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 81-2

[127] See Hayford 1903, pp. 327-44

[128] Hayford 1903, p. 82

[129] See Beecham 1968, pp. 170-1; and Hayford 1903, pp. 327-44

[130] See Kohn 1940, pp. 79-94; and Smith ed. 1976, p. 3

[131] Beecham 1968, pp. 170-1

[132] See Hayford 1903, p. 80

[133] Beecham 1968, p. 206

[134] Meyerowitz 1952

[135] See Smith 1995, p. 55

[136] Both Meyerowitz and Levtzion give the zenith period of Ancient Ghana as the eleventh century, the same century in which it was over-run by Islamic invaders. Although the Islamic campaigns begin with the eleventh century (Meyerowitz 1958, p. 17), it was not until 'the middle of the eleventh century', and precisely 1076, that the final conquest by the Arabic Almoravids occurred (Levtzion 1971, p. 127). The mid-eleventh century is also seen as the zenith and crucial period of Islamic campaign in the Western Sudan. Levtzion explains that Ghana of the mid-eleventh century 'offered the example of resistance to Islam' (Levtzion 1971, p. 153). Both Meyerowitz and Levtzion claim to have obtained their information from the same source – the Sudanese Tarikhs or Tarikh-es-

Sudan (Levtzion 1971, p. 122; Meyerowitz 1952, p. 51). Also, al Sa'di (one of Levtzion's Islamic oral sources) was a native of Timbuktu (Levtzion 1971, p. 140). Levtzion maintains that a king of Ghana resisted Islamic conversion and stuck to his ancestral religion (Levtzion 1971, p. 153). Meyerowitz also submits that a large number of the people of Ghana (including some of the kings) migrated southwards in order to avoid compulsory Islamic 'conversion' (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 51).

[137] See Meyerowitz 1952, p. 106; and 1958, pp. 19-20

[138] See Wilks 1971, p. 370

[139] See Wilks 1971, p. 373

[140] See Meyerowitz 1952, p. 109

[141] See Wilks 1971, p. 373

[142] Beecham 1968, pp. 85-6

[143] Beecham 1968, p. 108

[144] Beecham 1968, pp. 144-60

[145] Ajayi & Crowder 1976, p. 25

[146] Beecham 1968, pp. 90-1

[147] Ibid

[148] See Ibid

[149] See Ibid, p. 167

[150] See Walker Connor's article 'When Is a Nation?', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol 13, January 1990, pp. 92-103; or page 158 of the same article reproduced in *Nationalism,* edited by John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith, 1994, Oxford University Press.

[151] Fuller details of this argument can be obtained from Walker Connor's article cited above.

[152] For fuller details of the extent of this contention, see Anthony Smith's article 'Dating the Nation', in *Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World*, edited by Daniel Conversi, London, Routledge, 2002.

[153] The full debate on this can be found in: Connor, Walker, 'The timelessness of nations', *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol 10 (1/2), 2004, 35-47.

[154] Mayall 1990, p. 50

[155] See Neurberger 1991, p. 97; or Chazan ed. 1991, p. 97

[156] See Chazan ed. 1991, p. 1; and Mayall 1990, p. 57

[157] See Chazan ed. 1991, p. 3; Mayall 1990, p. 57

[158] See Mayall 1990, p. 62

[159] Chazan ed. 1991, p. 10; Howoritz 1991, p. 10

[160] Chazan ed. 1991, p. 2

[161] Chazan ed. 1991, pp. 2-3

[162] Horowitz 1991, p. 10; Chazan ed. 1991, p. 10

[163] Chazan ed. 1991, pp. 9-10

164 Mayall 1990, p. 61

165 Ibid

166 Chazan ed. 1991, p. 1

167 Chazan ed. 1991, p. 5

168 Neurberger 1991, p. 98; Chazan ed. 1991, p. 98

169 Neuberger 1991, p. 107; Chazan ed. 1991, p. 107; I. M. Lewis ed. 1983, p. 91

170 See Davidson 1987, p. 5

171 See Davidson 1987, p. 6

172 Burke 1964, p. 1

173 World Politics, 9 (2), 1957; Burke 1964, p. vii

174 As briefly discussed above; fuller and detailed explanation can be found in Chapter Six

175 See Hargreaves 1974, p. 5

176 Asiwaju & Nugent eds. 1996, p. 21

177 Asiwaju & Nugent eds. 1996, pp. 21-2

178 Asiwaju & Nugent eds. 1996, pp. 22-3

179 Asiwaju & Nugent eds. 1996, p. 31

180 Asiwaju & Nugent eds. 1996, pp. 1-17

181 Asiwaju & Nugent eds. 1996, pp. 255-6

182 Asiwaju & Nugent eds. 1996, p. 260

183 Asiwaju & Nugent eds. 1996, pp. 268-9

184 Asiwaju & Nugent eds. 1996, pp. 269-71

185 As in Davidson 1987, p. 6

186 As in Asiwaju & Nugent eds. 1996, p. 260,

187 See Davidson 1987, pp. 5-6

188 See Asiwaju & Nugent eds. 1996, pp. 269-71

189 See Davidson 1994, pp. 259-60

190 See Lentz & Nugent eds. 2000, p. 23

Chapter Three

1 For copyright reasons, the relevant maps including those showing the ten administrative regions, as well as current ethnogeographic locations are not reproduced here; they are easily obtainable from the internet.

2 As discussed in Nugent 1997, pp. 1-3; Lentz & Nugent eds. 2000, pp. 162 and 178

3 See (Bayart 1993, pp. ix-x, 55)

4 See Nugent 1999, pp. 307-8

5 See comments in Lentz & Nugent eds. 2000, p. 2

6 Greene 2000, pp. 29-30; or Lentz & Nugent (eds.) 2000, pp. 29-30

7 Also known as the *Tarikh el-Fettach*, authored by Mahmoud Kati in

Arabic, and later translated and edited by Maurice Delafosse and O. Houdas who published their edition in Paris in 1913.; in particular, see pages 75-79 of the *Tarikh*; or page 88 of Fage, J. D. 'Ancient Ghana: A Review of the Evidence, *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana*, Vol III, Part 2, 1957, (Achimota).

[8] Also known as the *Tarikh el-Soudan*, authored by Abderrahman El-Sadi in Arabic, and later translated and edited by Maurice Delafosse and O. Houdas who published their edition in Paris in 1900.

[9] See pages 18-19 of the *Tarikh es-Soudan*; or page 89 of Fage, J. D. 'Ancient Ghana: A Review of the Evidence, *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana*, Vol III, Part 2, 1957, (Achimota).

[10] See pages 75-79 of the *Tarikh al-Fattach*; or page 89 of Fage's review of the evidence, cited above.

[11] See pages 18-19 of the *Tarikh as-Sudan*

[12] See page 89 of Fage's review of the evidence, cited above.

[13] See pages 77-90 of Fage's review of the evidence, cited above

[14] See page 80 of Fage's review of the evidence, cited above; also see Cooley 1841:6.

[15] Cooley, W.D. The Negroland of the Arabs Examined and Explained, (London, 1841)

[16] See Cooley 1841:5-6

[17] Cooley 1841:6; also see page 323 of Meyerowitz, Eva L. R. 'A Note on the Origins of Ghana', *African Affairs*, Vol 51, No 205, (October 1952),

[18] For the remainder of this tradition, see Ellis 1887: 331-34

[19] Anaman, J. B. *The Gold Coast Guide for the Year 1895-96*, (London, Charles Kelly, 1894).

[20] Lugard, Flora S. *A Tropical Dependency*, (Baltimore, Black Classic Press, 1997; 1st edn in 1905); the version in French is sourced from the original detail given by Islamic or Arabic scribes of the medieval period.

[21] A former headmaster of Mfantsipim School in Cape Coast, the capital of the Fanti nation. Mfantsipim is the premier secondary school, of which I am a product. Up to O-level, I was in Balmer house, named after Reverend Balmer, which also had the sneakiest exit into town after dark via the bathhouse – my favourite route. My mind does wonder sometimes whether there is a connection between having been in this dormitory and completing the Ghana hypothesis picked upon by Balmer.

[22] Balmer, W. T. *A History of the Akan Peoples of the Gold Coast*, (London, The Atlantis Press, 1925).

[23] R. A. Mauny, 'The Question of Ghana', *Africa*, **XXIV** (1954), 200-13.

[24] See page 29, I. H. Ofosu-Appiah, *The Life and Times of J. B. Danquah,* (Accra, Waterville Publishing House, 1974).

[25] J. B. Danquah, 'Ghana and the Gold Coast', *Journey to Independence and After – Volume II 1949 1951*, compiled by H. K. Akyeampong, 1971, (Waterville Publishing, Accra), 45-7. This article originally appeared in the African Morning Post.

[26] Mauny 1954, p. 200

[27] Mauny 1954, p. 205

[28] Mauny 1954, p. 207

[29] Mauny 1954, p. 209

[30] Mauny 1954, p. 211

[31] J. B. Danquah 'Origin of the Ghana Hypothesis', *West African Review*, November-December 1957, or J. B. Danquah, 'Origin of the Ghana Hypothesis', *Historic Speeches and Writings on Ghana*, compiled by H.K. Akyeampong, (George Boakye Publishing, Accra 1970), pp. 108-121.

[32] Ibid, p. 113

[33] Ibid

[34] Ibid, p. 114

[35] See Mauny 1954, pp. 200-1

[36] See H.K Akyeampong ed. 1970, p. 113; also see pages 46-53 and 383 of George Rawlinson (ed.), *History of Herodotus Vol II,* (London, John Murray, 1875), and pages 142-9 of George Rawlinson (ed.), *History of Herodotus Vol III,* (London, John Murray, 1875).

[37] See H.K. Akyeampong ed. 1970, p. 121

[38] Ofosu-Appiah 1974, p. 29

[39] See Nugent 1997, pp. 1-3; Lentz & Nugent eds. 2000, pp. 162 and 178

[40] Meyerowitz 1952 & 1958

[41] Argylle, 1966, pp. 3-5; Amenumey 1989, pp. 1-3; Law 1991, p. 26; Nugent 1997, p. 13

[42] Kwamena-Poh 1973, pp. 3 & 8; Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 77-9

[43] Ephirim-Donkor 2000, p. 2

[44] Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 74-9; An interview with Andrew Asamoah, who hails from Senya Bereku, and whose father is a sub-chief of the town, confirms that although the Senya Guans originally practised patriliny, the traditional lineage practice has switched to matriliny since being in close proximity with the matrilineal Akan-Fantis. Andrew also analyzed that although the current traditional position is matrilineal, the details of inheritance vary on a case by case basis as a result of influencing factors such as the stipulation of a will, adherence to the Intestate Succession Law of 1985, and/or the political strength of the external family; This conversation with Asamoah is first recorded on p 74 of my PhD thesis.

[45] Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 77-8

[46] Ephirim-Donkor 2000, pp. 10 & 13

[47] Meyerowitz 1958 p. 17

[48] Susan Drucker-Brown, 'The grandchildren's play at the Mamprusi king's funeral: Ritual rebellion revisited in northern Ghana', *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 5, (1999), 181.

[49] I. Hrbek and J. Devisse, 'The Almoravids', *UNESCO General History of Africa Volume III*, (Paris, UNESCO & London, Heinemann, 1988), 354-61

[50] Meyerowitz 1952, p. 33; Meyerowitz 1958, pp. 17-8.

[51] Meyerowitz 1952, p. 64; Meyerowitz 1958, pp. 17-8.

[52] Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 63-9; Meyerowitz 1958, pp. 17-20

[53] Louis Wilson, *The Krobo People of Ghana to 1892: A Political and Social History*, (Ohio University Centre for International Studies, 1992), p. 12

[54] Ibid.

[55] Meyerowitz 1958, pp. 17-8.

[56] Richmond Palmer, *Bornu, Sahara and Sudan,* (London,1936), p. 156

[57] Meyerowitz 1958, pp. 17-8.

[58] Ibid, pp. 19-20

[59] Ibid, p. 20

[60] Lentz & Nugent eds. 2000, pp. 178 & 162; also, Nugent 1997, pp. 1-3

[61] Ibid.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Argylle, 1966, pp. 3-5; Amenumey 1989, pp. 1-3; Law 1991, p. 26; Nugent 1997, p. 13

[64] Nugent 1997

[65] Nugent 1997, p. 26; Sandra Greene, *Gender, Ethnicity and Social Change on The Upper Slave Coast: A History of the Anlo-Ewe*, (London, James Currey, 1996); Lentz & Nugent 2000, pp. 29-30

[66] Nugent 1997, p. 26

[67] Meyerowitz 1952, p. 51; Meyerowitz 1958, p. 17

[68] Kwamena-Poh 1973, p. 12

[69] Ephirim-Donkor 2000, pp. 25-7

[70] Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 33 & 63-5; Meyerowitz 1958

[71] Ibid 1952; Ibid 1958, pp. 17-20.

[72] Ephirim-Donkor 2000, pp. 10 & 13

[73] Ephirim-Donkor 2000 p. 13

[74] Ephirim-Donkor 2000, p. 2

[75] Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 74-80; Meyerowitz 1958; also see p. 74 of my PhD thesis, or Andrew Asamoah's response (in above note) to my interview.

[76] Kwamena-Poh 1973, pp. 3 & 8

[77] Kwamenha-Poh 1973, p. 10

[78] Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 76-7

[79] Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 64-5; Field 1940, pp. 82-4

[80] Meyerowitz 1952, p. 77

[81] Ephirim-Donkor 2000, p. 2

[82] Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 76 & 79.

[83] See the following two citations authored by Michelle Gilbert: 'Aesthetic strategies: the politics of a royal ritual', *Africa*, 64, 1 (1994), page 100; and 'No condition is permanent: ethnic construction and the use of history in Akuapem', *Africa*, 67, 4 (1997), pages 501-2.

[84] Manoukian 1950, p. 13; Meyerowitz 1952, p. 29.

[85] Ibid; Ibid

[86] Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 33-4

[87] Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 70-1

[88] Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 74-5

[89] Dunn & Robertson 1973, p. 10

[90] Dunn & Robertson 1973, p. 10

[91] Dunn & Robertson 1973, p. 12

[92] Dunn & Robertson 1973, p. 12

[93] Dunn & Robertson 1973, p. 13

[94] Dunn & Robertson 1973, p. 13

[95] Ibid

[96] Dunn & Robertson 1973, p. 12

[97] Nugent 1993, pp. 54-8

[98] Nugent 1999, p. 297

[99] These results are now obtainable on the internet via the Ghanaweb pages *www.ghanaweb.com*

[100] These results are now obtainable on the internet via the Ghanaweb pages *www.ghanaweb.com*

[101] For both the 2000 and 2004 presidential results, see Chapter Nine.

[102] Meyerowitz 1952, p. 53

[103] Meyerowitz 1952, p. 51; 1958, p. 17

[104] Meyerowitz 1952, p. 51

[105] Meyerowitz 1952, p. 49

[106] Ibid

[107] Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 54-5

[108] Ibid

[109] Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 55-9

[110] Meyerowitz 1952, p. 54

[111] For a fuller detail of this, see Meyerowitz 1952, pp 52-3

[112] Massing 1994, p. 16

[113] Massing 1994, p. 17

[114] Massing 1994, p. 19

[115] Further detail of this is found in the traditions on the Ewes and the Volta Region – also in this chapter

[116] Massing 1994, p. 20

[117] Dr Limann died on 23 January 1998.

[118] See page 742 of the 12-18 May 1997 edition of *West Africa*. Also, see page 149 of my 2003 publication on Ghana's 2000 presidential elections.

[119] See Lentz & Nugent eds. 2000

[120] "Political arithmetic" as used here means something about the strategic share of the political calculation to serve an intended purpose, in a similar spirit as the term "ethnic arithmetic". The usage here has a different meaning from elsewhere, such as Britain, where the phrase refers to holding governments to account for their policies and the theoretical assumptions underpinning them – even if this tradition is not far removed from "political accountability" whose modern problems are tied up with figuration in modern Britain. A fuller discussion on "political arithmetic" ensuing between academic researchers and government policy makers in Britain is obtainable in the British Journal of Sociology (Vol 55, No 1, March 2004).

[121] See the 28 March 2000 edition of the Ghanaian Online Chronicle, Vol. 8 No. 83.

[122] Ibid

[123] See report from Ghanaian Chronicle in 24 March 2000 edition of GRi Press Review – also obtainable via the following url *http://www.mclglobal.com/History/May2000/24e2000/24e0r.html* or via *http://www.mcglobal.com*

[124] Ibid.

[125] see Amoah 2003, p. 152

[126] See Amoah 2003, p. 153 or Chapter Nine of this monograph; Mills won 50.75%, 52.13% and 62.29% of votes from the Northern, Upper East and Upper-West regions respectively.

[127] As in similar citations in the above note, Mills won 51.1%, 57.17% and 61.97% of votes in the Northern Upper East and Upper West regions respectively.

[128] In 2004, Mills won 56.96%, 53.9% and 56.67% of votes in the Northern Upper East and Upper West regions respectively; for more detail, see Chapter Nine of this monograph.

[129] Paul Nugent has discussed the "Central Togo Minorities" or "Togo Remnants" of the Volta Region; for fuller detail, see pages 1-3 of Nugent 1997; and pages 162 and 178 of Lentz & Nugent eds. 2000, or the section in this chapter on Volta Region

[130] See Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 74-80

131 Meyerowitz 1952, p. 74

132 See Meyerowitz 1952, p. 77.

133 Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 74-5

134 Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 63-9

135 Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 79-80

136 Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 81-3

137 Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 94-5

138 Meyerowitz 1952, p. 104

139 See The Free Press article entitled "NDC's tribal politics backfires" in the 14 June 2000 edition of GRi Press Review; also obtainable at *http://www.mclglobal.com* or at the following url
http://www.mclglobal.com/History/Jun2000/14f2000/14f0r.html

140 Ibid.

141 See Amoah 2003, p. 152 or Chapter Nine of this monograph.

142For the speculation and analysis on this strange out-turn, see Chapter Nine of this monograph.

143 Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 84-6

144 Meyerowitz 1952, p. 99

145 Meyerowitz 1952, p. 117

146 Meyerowitz 1952, p. 118

147 see Manoukian 1950, p. 13; Meyerowitz 1952

148 see Meyerowitz 1952, p. 77

149 Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 77-9

150 Meyerowitz 1952, p. 78

151 Meyerowitz 1952, p. 76

152 Meyerowitz 1952, p. 77

153 Meyerowitz 1952, p. 79

154 Meyerowitz 1952, p. 77-8

155 Wilson 1992, p. 12

156 Meyerowitz 1952, p. 79

157 Meyerowitz 1952, p. 77

158 Meyerowitz 1952, p. 74

159 Meyerowitz 1952, p. 77

160 Meyerowitz 1952, p. 75

161 Meyerowitz 1952, p. 78

162 Meyerowitz 1952, p. 77

163 Meyerowitz 1952, p. 78

164 See Kwamena-Poh 1973; and Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 74-80

165 Nugent 1997, p. 19

166 Ibid

167 Wilson 1992, p. 12

[168] Meyerowitz 1952, p. 99

[169] See The Free Press article entitled "NDC's second World Bank collapses" in the 2 June 2000 edition of GRi Press Review; *http://www.mclglobal.com/History/Jun2000/02f2000/02f0r.html* or via *http://www.mclglobal.com*

[170] Only 51.2% of registered voters in the Yilo Krobo constituency voted. Mills won 54.3% of the votes while Kufour won 45.7%. For full details, see Amoah 2003, pp.155-56, or Chapter Nine of this monograph.

[171] Results obtainable via the 2004 election webpages of *www.Ghanaweb.com*

[172] Meyerowitz 1952, p. 54

[173] Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 104-11 & 54-9

[174] Argyle 1991, p. 14; Ellis 1890, p.1

[175] Ellis 1890, pp. 5-7

[176] Ellis 1890, p. 7

[177] Ellis 1890, pp. 7-8

[178] Amenumey 1989, p. 1; Bukh 1979, p. 15

[179] Amenumey 1989, p. 3

[180] Bukh 1979, p. 18

[181] Law 1991, p. 14

[182] Ibid

[183] Law 1991, pp. 14-15

[184] Argyle 1966, p. 2

[185] Argyle 1996, pp. 3-5

[186] Law 1991, p. 17

[187] Argyle 1966, pp. 4-5

[188] Argyle 1966, p. 5

[189] Argyle 1966, pp. 6-7

[190] Amenumey 1989, pp. 3-4

[191] Amenumey 1989, p. 1

[192] Amenumey 1989, p. 47

[193] Amenumey 1989, pp. 12-13

[194] Amenumey 1989, p. 43

[195] Amenumey 1989, pp. 46-7

[196] Amenumey 1989, pp. 62-3

[197] Amenumey 1989, p. 337

[198] Amenumey 1989, p. 259

[199] Amenumey 1989, p. 266

[200] Amenumey 1989, pp. 274-5

[201] Amenumey 1989, pp. 39, 337-45; Zartman 1969, p. 82

[202] Amenumey 1989, p. 344

[203] Amenumey 1989, p. 342

[204] Neuberger 1991, p. 100

[205] Ibid

[206] Ibid

[207] Amenumey 1989, p. 348

[208] See Amenumey 1989, p. 3; Bukh 1979, pp. 15 & 18; Ellis 1890, pp. 5-8

[209] Davidson 1992, p. 72

[210] Bukh 1979, p. 18

[211] See Smock & Smock, 1975, p. 247; Lentz & Nugent (eds.) 2000, p. 24

Chapter Four

[1] See page 16 of Maxwell Owusu, *Uses and Abuses of Political Power*, (University of Chicago Press, 1970).

[2] See page 15 of Jan Vansina, *Oral Tradition: A Study in Historical Methodology*, (Edinburgh, R & R Clark, 1965)

[3] Owusu 1970:17

[4] Owusu 1970:17

[5] Owusu 1970:17-19; Ellis1893:55

[6] Vansina 1965:15

[7] Vansina 1965:33

[8] Vansina 1965:33

[9] Meyerowitz 1952:46-8

[10] Vansina 1965:15

[11] Vansina 1965:15

[12] Vansina 1965:16

[13] See Nehemia Levtzion's paper 'The early states of the western Sudan to 1500', *History of West Africa Vol.1*, edited by J. F. A Ajayi & Michael Crowder, (London, Longman, 1971)

[14] Levtzion 1971:120

[15] Levtzion 1971:120

[16] Levtzion 1971:122

[17] Meyerowitz 1952:33; 1958:17-18

[18] Meyerowitz 1952:17; Meyerowitz 1958:33

[19] Levtzion 1971:125

[20] Meyerowitz 1958:17-18

[21] Meyerowitz 1958:17

[22] Levtzion 1971:127

[23] Levtzion 1971:127

[24] Levtzion 1971:153

[25] Levtzion 1971:122; Meyerowitz 1952:51

[26] Levtzion 1971:140

[27] Levtzion 1971:153

[28] Meyerowitz 1952:51

[29] See pages 354-61 of paper by I. Hrbek & J. Devisse: 'The Almoravids', *UNESCO General History of Africa Volume III*, (Paris, UNESCO & London, Heinemann, 1988)

[30] See pages 344-45 of Ivor Wilks, 'The Mossi and the Akan states 1500-1800', *History of West Africa Vol. 1*, edited by J. F. A. Ajayi and Michael Crowder, (1971, Longman Group, London)

[31] Meyerowitz 1952:54

[32] Wilks 1971:355-59.

[33] Wilks 1971: 365

[34] Meyerowitz 1952:98

[35] Meyerowitz 1952:106

[36] Wilks 1971:370

[37] Wilks 1971:373

[38] Meyerowitz 1952:109

[39] Wilks 1971:373

[40] Wilks 1971:370

[41] Meyerowitz 1952:68 & 82

[42] Meyerowitz 1952:63-8 & 82

[43] See pages 15-18 of George Acquah, *The Fantse of Ghana: A History,* (S.I. 1959?)

[44] Meyerowitz 1952:63-69

[45] Madeleine Manoukian, *The Akan and Ga-Adangbe Peoples of the Gold Coast*, (London, Oxford University Press, 1950)

[46] Merowitz 1952

[47] Manoukian 1950, p. 13

[48] Meyerowitz 1952:63-64

[49] Meyerowitz 1952: 66-69

[50] Meyerowitz 1952: 77-79

[51] See Manoukian 1950, p. 9; Manoukian's assertions are subsequently confirmed in Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 74-77

[52] See pages 53-76 of D. M. Warren's paper: 'A Re-Appraisal of Mrs. Eva Meyerowitz's Work on the Brong', *Research Review*, 7 (1970)

[53] See pages 27-30 of W.T. Balmer: *A History of the Akan Peoples of the Gold Coast*, (London, The Atlantis Press, 1925

[54] Manoukian 1950:13

[55] Levtzion 1971:122; Wilks 1971:344-45

[56] See pages 8 and 25-27 of Anthony Ephirim-Donkor's book: *The Making of an African King: Patrilineal and Matrilineal Struggle Among the Efutu of Ghana,* (Asmara, Africa World Press, 2000)

[57] Warren 1970:56

58 Meyerowitz 1952:33; Meyerowitz 1958:17-18

59 Levtzion 1971:122

60 Ibid; Meyerowitz 1952 :51

61 Levtzion 1971:140

62 Warren 1970:64

63 Warren 1970:64-65

64 Warren 1970:66

65 Warren 1970:69-70

66 Warren 1970:66

67 Warren 1970:66

68 Warren 1970:67

69 Warren 1970:67

70 Warren 1970:67

71 Warren 1970:69

72 Warren 1970:69-70

73 Warren 1970:71

74 K. Y. Daaku, *UNESCO Research Project on Oral Traditions No.4, Part II: Sefwi Wiawso*, (Legon, Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, 1974); *UNESCO Research Project on Oral Traditions No.2: Denkyira*, (Legon, Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, 1970).

75 Daaku 1974:v; Meyerowitz 1952:117

76 Daaku 1974:vii-x; Meyerowitz 1952:117-18

77 Daaku 1974:10

78 Daaku 1974 :vi

79 Daaku 1970

80 See page 12 of Louis Wilson's book: *The Krobo People of Ghana to 1892: A Political and Social History*, (Ohio University Centre for International Studies, 1992)

81 Wilson 1992:12

82 See Goody, Jack R. 'The Myth of a State', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol 6, No 4 (Dec 1968), pp461-73.

83 See page 466 of Goody 1968

84 See pages 77 and 79 of Goody's critique in *Africa* Vol XXIX, 1959; and page 472 of Goody's 'Myth of the State' in *JMAS*.

85 See page 467 of Goody's 'Myth of the State'; also see pages 319-20 of Williams, Joseph, J. *Hebrewisms of West Africa*, (London, Allen and Unwin, 1930).

86 See page 468 of Goody's article: 'The Myth of a State', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol 6, No 4 (Dec 1968),

87 See Kimble 1963:xv

88 Fage, J. D. 'Ancient Ghana: A Review of the Evidence, *Transactions of the*

Historical Society of Ghana, Vol III, Part 2, 1957, pp77-98 (Achimota).

[89] See notes 93 and 94 below

[90] See Cooley 1841:4

[91] See pages 55-56 of Melville J. Herskovits, *The Myth of the Negro Past*, (New York, Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1941)

[92] See Ellis 1887:333; and Lugard 1905:94

[93] For the Arabic scholars' use of the word 'adjoin' in their description of Ghana and the gold trade, see page 79 (Al Masudi) and page 83 (Idrisi and Ibn Klahdum) of Fage's review of the evidence, cited above.

[94] Ibid, page 79, see also Fage's interpretation of Al-Masudi's use of the word 'adjoin' regarding Ghana and 'the land of the gold mines' (or Wangara); and Kimble 1963:xv-xvi

[95] Anaman 1894:19

[96] The full title of Cooley 1841 is *The Negroland of the Arabs Examined and Explained*, or *An Inquiry into the Early History and Geography of Central Africa.*

[97] See cartographic map hand-sketched by Cooley in his 1841 book.

[98] Nugent 1997

[99] Nugent 1997:2

[100] See Argylle 1966:3-5; Amenumey 1989:1-3; Law 1991:26; Nugent 1997:13

[101] Nugent 1997:13

[102] Nugent 1997:3

[103] Nugent 1997:6

[104] Nugent 1997:9 & 14

[105] Nugent 1997:14

[106] Nugent 1997:4

[107] Nugent 1997:14

[108] Nugent 1997:12

[109] Nugent 1997:26

[110] Kwamena-Poh 1973:12

[111] Meyerowitz 1952

[112] See page 509 of Michelle Gilbert's paper: 'No Condition is Permanent: Ethnic Construction and the Use of History in Akuapem', *Africa*, **67**, 4 (1997)

[113] Gilbert 1997:501-2; also see page 100 of Gilbert's other paper: 'Aesthetic strategies: the politics of a royal ritual', *Africa*, 64, 1 (1994)

[114] Meyerowitz 1952:77

[115] Meyerowitz 1952:76 & 79; Ephirim-Donkor 2000

[116] Ephirim-Donkor 2000:22

[117] Ephirim-Donkor 2000:22

[118] Ephirim-Donkor 2000:22-3; Meyerowitz 1952:75

[119] Ephirim-Donkor 2000:24; Meyerowitz 1952:75

[120] See Ephirim-Donkor 1997

[121] Ephirim-Donkor 2000:8 & 25-7

[122] Ephirim-Donkor 2000:2, 10 &13

Chapter Five

[1] Gellner 1983:1; Chazan ed. 1991:1

[2] Smith 1991, p. 59

[3] Chabal and Daloz 1999, p. 62

[4] Chabal and Daloz 1999, p. 13.

[5] Nugent 1997, pp. 1-3

[6] See the 29 July 1999 edition of the Ghanaian Independent, or the Ghana Review International (GRi) Press Review of the same date.

[7] For further detail, see Ghana News Agency (GNA) news report featured by Ghanaweb on Monday 11 April 2005; *www.ghanaweb.com*

[8] Ibid.

[9] See Amenumey 1989, pp. 337-45

[10] See the 17 August 1998 edition of the Pan-African News Agency online news.

[11] This was reported in the 18 August 1999 issue of the Ghanaian Chronicle.

[12] This was reported in the 20 August 1999 issue of the Ghanaian Times.

[13] Ibid.

[14] See Chazan ed. 1991, p. 107, or Neurberger 1991, p. 107

Chapter Six

[1] See Elias 1978, p. 130

[2] See Bayart 1993, pp. ix-x & 55

[3] Chabal and Daloz 1999, p. 6

[4] Hameso 1997, p. 41

[5] See page 235 of Morris Szeftel's paper: 'Misunderstanding African Politics: Corruption and the Governance Agenda', *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 76, 1998

[6] Chabal and Daloz 1999, p. 9

[7] Chabal and Daloz 1999, p. 79

[8] Chabal and Daloz 1999, p. 79

[9] See page 432 of Morris Szeftel's paper: 'Clientelism, Corruption & Catastrophe', *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 85, 2000

[10] Chabal and Daloz 1999, p. 17

[11] See page 237 of Morris Szeftel's paper: 'Misunderstanding African Politics: Corruption and the Governance Agenda', *Review of African Political*

Economy, No. 76, 1998); also see Chapter One of this book about political accountability/arithmetic in Britain.

[12] See pages 430 and 432 of Morris Szeftel's paper: 'Clientelism, Corruption & Catastrophe', *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 85, 2000

[13] Chabal and Daloz 1999, pp. 106-8

[14] See page 429 of Morris Szeftel's paper: 'Clientelism, Corruption & Catastrophe', *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 85, 2000

[15] See page 435 of Morris Szeftel's paper: 'Clientelism, Corruption & Catastrophe', *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 85, 2000

[16] Dumont 1966

[17] Dumont 1966, p. 292

[18] Dumont 1966, p. 293

[19] See list of definitions in: Connor, Walker, 'The timelessness of nations', *Nations and Nationalism*, Volt 10 (1/2), 2004, 38-39.

[20] See Connor 2004:39; Kellas 1991:51; 1998:66

[21] See Hutchinson 1994:42

[22] See Hutchinson 1994:43

[23] Kellas 1991:52; 1998:66

[24] Hutchinson 1994:43

[25] Hutchinson 1994: 42 & 43; Kellas 1991: 51 & 52; or 2nd edition 1998:66

[26] On the theory of the co-terminus existence of nation and state boundaries, see page Gellner 1983:1; also see list of definitions in Walker Connor's paper, 'The timelessness of nations', *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol 10 (1/2), 2004, 38-39.

[27] Curtin et al 1978, p. 579; Hameso 1997, p. 8

[28] Hameso 1997, pp. 4-5

[29] Davidson 1992, pp. 74-5

[30] See the New Ulster Movement's *Tribalism or Christianity in Ireland?*, NUM, 1973 (Publication No. 9), p. 7

[31] Ibid.

[32] Hameso 1997, p. 40

[33] Hameso 1997, pp. 38-43

[34] See section on political parties in Chapter Seven

[35] Agyeman 1988, p. 45

[36] Agyeman 1988, p. 44

[37] Agyeman 1988, p. 42

Chapter Seven

[1] McCarty 1997, p. 3

[2] Ayee (ed.) 1998:229; Jonah 1998:229

[3] Ayee (ed.) 1998:229

[4] Ayee (ed.) 1998:229

[5] Ayee (ed.) 1998:229-55

[6] Ayee (ed.) 1998:246

[7] Ayee (ed.) 1998:246

[8] Ayee (ed.) 1998:246

[9] As at the time of publication of this book, Afrobarometer round one questionnaires available at *www.afrobarometer.org* were only those on South Africa and Mali where the surveys took place in 2000 and 2001 respectively.

[10] See general news of 11 July 2005 at *www.ghanaweb.com*

[11] See general news of 11 July 2005 at *www.ghanaweb.com*

[12] This announcement circulated in the media via the Ghana News Agency; also see following url:

http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=8730 1

[13] See Ghanaweb general news of 30 August 2005 for details of the bye-election; general news of 1 September for the CDD's comments about the bye-election; and the general news of 9 September about the NDC's ratification to sever relations with the CDD; *http://www.ghanaweb.com*

[14] A member of the ECOWAS parliament, Michael Teye Nyaunu was quite emphatic about this view; see Ghanaweb general news of 5 September 2005; *http://www.ghanaweb.com*

[15] The list of registered parties with certificates also obtainable at *http://www.ghanareview.com/Elect2000.html* ; *http://www.ghanareview.com*

[16] For brief details on the roots of the NLM, see sub-sections on 'Instrumentalism' in Chapter Two, and subsection under 'The Ashanti Region' in Chapter Three.

[17] See GRi Newsreel of 12 September 2000

[18] Mike Oquaye confirms in his latest book published in 2003, that the EGLE party was part of the "Progressive Alliance" of political parties which summarily supported Rawlings. See Oquaye 2003:522 & 530.

[19] Morrison 1982, p. 89

[20] Morrison 1982, p. 183

[21] Morrison 1982, p. 13

[22] Morrison 1982, p. 104

[23] Campbell et al 1966, p. 270

[24] Connor 1994, p. 35

[25] Morrison 1982, p. 186

[26] Francis 1976, p. 404

[27] Watson 1958, pp. 3-8

[28] Watson 1958, p. 5

[29] Agyeman 1988, pp. 35-6
[30] Agyeman 1988, p. 36
[31] Mair 1965, pp. 11-2
[32] See Wilson 1941, pp. 12 & 16; Mayer 1961, pp. 4-6; Wilson and Mafeje 1963, pp. 13-46 & 53
[33] See Wilson, 1941, pp. 9-12
[34] See Wilson, 1941, pp. 12-13
[35] Wilson, 1941, p. 12
[36] Wilson, 1941, p. 16
[37] Wilson, 1941, pp. 46-71
[38] Wilson, 1941, p. 46
[39] Ibid
[40] Ibid
[41] Wilson, 1941, p. 54
[42] Wilson, 1941, p. 47
[43] Ibid
[44] Wilson, 1941, p. 54
[45] Wilson, 1941, pp. 48-65
[46] For further detail, see Wilson, 1941, pp. 58-63
[47] Wilson, 1941, p. 62
[48] Wilson, 1941, pp. 62-69
[49] Monica Wilson and Archie Mafeje 1963
[50] Wilson and Mafeje 1963, p. 53
[51] Wilson and Mafeje 1963, pp. 13-46
[52] Wilson and Mafeje 1963, p. 21
[53] Wilson and Mafeje 1963, p. 15
[54] Wilson and Mafeje 1963, pp. 15-16
[55] Mayer 1961
[56] Mayer 1961, pp. 4-6
[57] Mayer 1961, p. 6
[58] Mayer 1961, pp. 4-6
[59] Mayer 1961, p. 10
[60] Mayer 1961, pp. 5 & 10-11
[61] Agyeman 1988, p. 45
[62] Agyeman 1988, p. 44
[63] Agyeman 1988, p. 42
[64] Morrison 1982, p. 186
[65] Morrison 1982, p. 186
[66] Connor 1994, p. 35
[67] Brannen ed. 1992
[68] Nachmias & Nachmias 1992, p. 284

[69] See Glaser, B. G. & Strauss, A. L. *The Discovery of Grounded Theory*, (Chicago, Aldine, 1967)

[70] Gilbert ed. 1993, p. 168

[71] Converse & Presser 1986, p. 17

[72] Morrison 1982, p.186

[73] Boahen 1989, p. 1

[74] See pages 11-12 of the Middlesex University Survey Methods Centre Newsletter of Summer 1989

[75] Boahen 1989:1&54

[76] Boahen 1989, pp. 51-58

[77] To those interested, Appendix VI(a) of my PhD thesis has a list of names and official addresses of headteachers of some of the schools visited. Please note that not all schools visited were happy for their identity to be made public.

Chapter Eight

[1] SPSS - the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 10.1, the software with which the survey was computerised. The raw data produced by the SPSS data editor including basic frequencies, and more complex operations such as cross tabulations and chi square, are available for substantive reference in Appendices XI – XXI of my thesis. For aesthetic publishing reasons, the whole quantity of raw data is not included in this monograph. Authenticity of the data to which the analysis refers was verified within the PhD. My personal collection of the raw data is currently in the latest SPSS 11.

[2] Raw SPSS data on cross-tabulation available in Appendix XII of my PhD thesis.

[3] Raw SPSS data including Pearson Chi-Square results available in Appendix XII of my PhD thesis

[4] See Kinnear and Gray 1999, p. 284; raw SPSS data including Symmetric Measures available in Appendix XII of my PhD thesis.

[5] Raw SPSS data on cross-tabulations available in Appendix XIII of my PhD thesis

[6] Raw SPSS data on cross-tabulations available in Appendix XIII of my PhD thesis

[7] Raw SPSS data on cross-tabulations in Appendix XIII of my PhD thesis

[8] Raw SPSS data of cross-tabulations available in Appendix XIII of my PhD thesis

[9] Raw SPSS data of cross-tabulations available in Appendix XIII of my PhD thesis

[10] Raw SPSS data of cross-tabulations available in Appendix XIV of my

PhD thesis
[11] Raw SPSS data of cross-tabulations available in Appendix XIII of my PhD thesis
[12] Raw SPSS data of cross-tabulations available in Appendix XIII of my PhD thesis
[13] See Smock & Smock, 1975:247; Lentz & Nugent (eds.) 2000:24; also note that the ruling Progress Party (PP) of the Second Republic, of which Busia was Prime Minister, was of the Danquah-Busia political tradition.
[14] Nugent 1995:43
[15] Adjei 1993:262; Herbst 1993:86-7; Shillington 1992:144-5; Yeebo 1992:52
[16] Nugent 1999:306
[17] The Crusading Guide newspaper of 14 March 2001 carried the story entitled "NPP Dares Rawlings", which stated that: 'the NPP has challenged President Jerry Rawlings to tell Ghanaians what State enterprises were sold by the Busia administration, and the persons to whom they were sold. "The party expects the President to accept this challenge to substantiate his allegation with facts and figures", the party is quoted as saying. The paper in a story on its back-page, said the NPP's sentiments were expressed in a statement signed by the national chairman, Mr S.A. Odoi-Sykes, in reaction to President Rawlings' Declaration at a rally in Bolgatanga, the Upper East Regional capital, that "the NPP is richer than the NDC because during Busia's 27 months of administration, the NPP were able to sell state enterprises to themselves and they grew richer". According to Mr Odoi-Sykes, this statement is false and completely unfounded. "Every Ghanaian knows that it is rather the NDC, which is sitting on ever-rising mountain of money amassed from dubious and questionable sources", he is quoted as saying. The NDC, Mr Odoi-Sykes maintained, "uses the money to form a multiplicity of political groups as allies of the NDC, and also uses its enormous wealth to influence and rig national elections'.
[18] Nugent 1999:307-8
[19] Morrison 1982:186
[20] Raw SPSS data available in Appendix XI of my PhD thesis
[21] Raw SPSS data available in Appendix XI of my PhD thesis
[22] See raw SPSS data in Appendix XIII of my PhD thesis
[23] See raw SPSS data in Appendix XIII of my PhD thesis
[24] See under NPP in section on political parties in Chapter Seven
[25] Ghana Review International, Newsreel, 21 May 1999
[26] See the Daily Graphic of 2 August 1999
[27] Ibid

[28] See Appendix XI of my PhD thesis

[29] To confirm their fears, when the NPP came into government, the Accra Sports Stadium was renamed as Ohene-Djan Sports Stadium

[30] This data also available in raw SPSS print out available in Appendices XI and XV of my PhD thesis

[31] Raw SPSS data available in Appendix XV of my PhD thesis

[32] Raw SPSS data available in Appendix XV of my PhD thesis

[33] Raw SPSS data available in Appendix XV of my PhD thesis

[34] Further detail can be obtained from Appendix XI of my PhD thesis

[35] Frequencies extracted from raw SPSS data in Appendix XI of my PhD thesis

[36] Obtained from Appendix XV of my PhD thesis

[37] Raw SPSS data available in Appendix XV of my PhD thesis

[38] Raw SPSS data available in Appendix XVI of my PhD thesis

[39] Data from Appendix XVI of my PhD thesis

[40] See Appendix XVI of my PhD thesis

[41] Morrison 1982, p. 104

[42] Agyeman 1988, pp. 35-36; Mair 1965, pp. 11-12; Watson 1958, p. 5

[43] Agyeman 1988, p. 36

[44] Raw SPSS data available in Appendix XVI of my PhD thesis

[45] See raw SPSS data from Appendix XVI of my PhD thesis

[46] Similar data available in Appendix XI of my PhD thesis.

[47] Full raw SPSS data including Pearson Chi-Square results available in Appendix XVII of my PhD thesis

[48] See Kinnear and Gray 1999, p. 284; raw SPSS data of Symmetric Measures available in Appendix XVII of my PhD thesis

[49] Similar data available in Appendix XI of my PhD thesis

[50] Raw SPSS data including Pearson Chi- Square results available in Appendix XVII of my PhD thesis

[51] See Kinnear and Gray 1999, p. 284; the raw SPSS data of Symmetric Measures available in Appendix XVII of my PhD thesis

[52] Raw SPSS data available in Appendix XVII of my PhD thesis

[53] In Appendix XVII of my PhD thesis

[54] Raw SPSS data from cross-tabulation available in Appendix XVIII of my PhD thesis

[55] Bukh 1979, p. 89

[56] This is to be found on pages xiii and xiv of a report entitled *Women in Public Life in Ghana*, presented to the Department for International Development (DfID) of the British Government by a joint research team comprising of members of the Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER) of the University of Ghana, and the

Development and Project Planning Centre (DPPC) of the University of
Bradford. For citation, see section B.1.3 in the bibliography.

[57] Oheneba-Sakyi 1999, pp. 119-43

[58] See GRi Press Review, 24/05/00; *http://www.ghanareview.com*

[59] See Appendix XIX of my PhD thesis

[60] See Appendix XIX of my PhD thesis

[61] See Kinnear and Gray 1999, p. 281; raw SPSS data available in
Appendix XIX of my PhD thesis

[62] See Appendix XX of my PhD thesis

[63] See Appendix XX of my PhD thesis

[64] See Kinnear and Gray 1999, p. 281; raw SPSS data available in
Appendix XX of my PhD thesis

[65] See raw data in Appendix XXI of my PhD thesis

[66] See Appendix XXI of my PhD thesis

[67] Appendix XXI of my PhD thesis

[68] See Kinnear and Gray 1999, p. 281; the raw SPSS data can be found in
Appendix XXI of my PhD thesis

Chapter Nine

[1] Similar statistics are discussed on page 152 of Michael Amoah,
'Nationalism in Africa: Ghana's Presidential Election', *Review of African
Political Economy* Vol 30, No 95 (2003).

[2] See story from the Ghanaian Times in Ghana Review International
(GRi) Online Press Review of 12 December 2000, obtainable via
http://ghanareview.com

[3] Both the Daily Graphic and The Independent featured headline stories
of Mahama, Tanoh, Hagan and Brobbey's support for Kufour. Also, see
GRi Online Press Review of 12 December 2000, obtainable via
http://ghanareview.com

[4] This quote is taken from GRi Online Press Review of 2 June 2000 in a
story from The Free Press entitled "NDC's Second World Bank
Collapses", obtainable via *http://ghanareview.com*

[5] See page 154 of my 2003 publication on Ghana's 2000 elections (cited
above). Offprint online at the following url:
http://www.sosig.ac.uk/resource?database=SOSIG&query=1092220149-9082

[6] See page 154 of my 2003 publication on Ghana's 2000 elections.
(offprint at url as above).

[7] See page 149 of my 2003 publication.

[8] For further discussion on Brong-Ahafo politics, see Chapter Three.

[9] Ibid

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APPENDIX ONE

QUESTIONNAIRE

Section (a) - BASIC BACKGROUND

(1). What is your gender?
1. Male
2. Female

(2). How old are you?
1. 0-16
2. 17-30
3. 31-40
4. 41-50
5. 51-60
6. 61-70
7. 71-80
8. 81-90
9. 91-100

(3). What is your tribe?
1. Fanti
2. Ashanti
3. Akyem
4. Akwapim
5. Bono
6. Ga/Adangbe
7. Nzima
8. Bolga
9. Dagomba
10. Dagaaba
11. Gurenne
12. Mampruli
13. Gonja
14. Hausa
15. Ewe

(4). What is your occupation?
1. Unskilled
2. Semi-skilled

3. Skilled
4. Clerical
5. Administrative
6. Managerial
7. Professional
8. Specialist
9. Pensioner
10. Student

(5). What is your level of education?
1. primary
2. secondary
3. tertiary

Section (b) - POLITICAL ORIENTATION

(6). What is the traditional party orientation of your family?
1. ndc
2. npp
3. "nkrumahist"
4. other
5. none

(7). What has been the traditional party orientation of yourself?
1. ndc
2. npp
3. "nkrumahist"
4. other
5. none

(8). What is your current party orientation?
1. ndc
2. npp
3. "nkrumahist"
4. other
5. none

(9). What is the party of the MP you voted for in the 1996
Parliamentary elections?
1. ndc
2. npp
3. "nkrumahist"
4. other

5. none
6. not eligible

(10). Which Presidential candidate did you vote for in the 1996
Presidential elections?
1. Rawlings
2. Kufour
3. Mahama
4. None
5. Ineligible

(11). What would be the party of your choice MP in the 2000
Parliamentary elections?
1. ndc
2. npp
3. "nkrumahist"
4. "new ndc"
5. other
6. none
7. not eligible
8. undecided

(12). Which Presidential candidate would you vote for in the
2000 Presidential elections?
1. Atta Mills
2. Kufour
3. Tanor
4. Other
5. None
6. Ineligible
7. Undecided

Section (c) - INTEREST/ENGAGEMENT IN POLITICS
(13). Are you a registered voter?
1. yes
2. no

(14). If No, why are you not registered?
1. Ineligible or under 18 currently
2. I support no particular party or candidate
3. I am not interested in politics

4. N/A

(15). Are you a registered member of any party?
1. Yes
2. No

(16). If Yes, which party?
1. ndc
2. npp
3. "nkrumahist"
4. other
5. N/A

(17). If No, why are you not a registered member of any party?
1. lack of pre-requisite resources to become a registered member of any party
2. disinterested/disillusioned about the parties and politics for whatever reason
3. no apparent reason
4. N/A

(18). What is your level of party political participation?
1. local
2. district
3. national
4. all of the above
5. none of the above

(19). How do you familiarise yourself with the politics?
1. attend political rallies and meetings
2. follow the agenda of parties from the media
3. all of the above
4. none of the above

Section (d) – FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
(20). Do you freely share your political opinions/views with everyone?
1. Yes
2. No

(21). If No, please state confidants and preference order:-
1. spouse
2. close family members

3. friends and peers
4. distant relatives
5. no one at all
6. N/A

Section (e) - TENTATIVE VOTES - PRESSURE OR PREVAILING FACTORS

(22). How would you vote if there is a major public endorsement of the NDC?
1. ndc
2. npp
3. "nkrumahists"
4. "new ndc"
5. other
6. none
7. not eligible

(23). How would you vote if there is a major public endorsement of the NPP?
1. ndc
2. npp
3. "nkrumahists"
4. "new ndc"
5. other
6. none
7. not eligible

(24). How would you vote if there is a major public endorsement of the "nkrumahist" coalition?
1. ndc
2. npp
3. "nkrumahist"
4. "new ndc"
5. other
6. none
7. not eligible

(25). How would you vote if there is a major public endorsement of the "new ndc"?
1. ndc
2. npp
3. "nkrumahist"

4. "new ndc"
5. other
6. none
7. not eligible

(26). How would you vote if a Presidential candidate is a Fanti?
1. For
2. Against
3. Abstain
4. Not eligible

(27). How would you vote if a Presidential candidate is an Ashanti?
1. For
2. Against
3. Abstain
4. Not eligible

(28). How would you vote if a Presidential candidate is an Ewe?
1. For
2. Against
3. Abstain
4. Not eligible

(29). How would you vote if a Presidential candidate is a Ga?
1. For
2. Against
3. Abstain
4. Not eligible

(30). How would you vote if a Presidential candidate is a Mabian/Northerner?
1. For
2. Against
3. Abstain
4. Not eligible

Section (f) - URBANISED/DETRIBALISED?
(31). Do you live in Tema?
1. Yes
2. No

(32). If Yes, during which time period?
1. 1961-1990
2. post 1990
3. both
4. N/A

(33). If No, are you a
1. visitor?
2. job-seeker?
3. student?
4. N/A

(34). For how long have you lived in Tema?
1. 0-3 months
2. 4-12 months
3. 1-3 years
4. 4-10 years
5. Over 10 years
6. N/A

(35). Have you lived in another city before?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Not sure

(36). If Yes, which one?
1. Accra
2. Tema
3. Kumasi
4. Tamale
5. Bolgatanga
6. Wa
7. Sunyani
8. Koforidua
9. Takoradi
10. Cape-Coast
11. Ho
12. Combination
13. N/A

(37). Have you always lived in a city?
1. Yes
2. No

(38). If No, state how long you've lived in a village/town prior to city life:
1. 0-3 months
2. 4-12 months
3. 1-3 years
4. 4-10 years
5. Over 10 years
6. N/A

(39). Do you visit your relatives?
1. yes
2. no

(40). If Yes, do they live in:-
1. urban areas?
2. rural areas?
3. Both?
4. N/A

(41). If no, why do you not visit them?
1. they visit me
2. not necessary
3. at loggerheads with relatives
4. too expensive to travel
5. e-mail usage
6. aim towards detribalisation
7. detribalised
8. N/A

(42). Do you write to relatives? - (snail mail)
1. Yes
2. No

(43). If Yes, how often?
1. once a month
2. once a year
3. once every 3-5 years

4. once every 10 years
5. N/A

(44). If No, why do you not write to them? - (snail mail)
1. they write to me - (snail mail)
2. not necessary
3. preference for physical contact
4. letter writing is boring and tedious
5. lack of postal services in the village
6. snail mail postage too expensive
7. e-mail usage
8. aim towards detribalisation
9. detribalised
10. N/A

(45). Do you telephone relatives?
1. Yes
2. No

(46). If yes, how often?
1. daily
2. once a week
3. once a month
4. once a quarter
5. once a year
6. only during emergencies, Christmas and Easter celebrations
7. N/A

(47). If No, why do you not telephone them?
1. Relatives have no phone contact
2. They phone me
3. Not necessary
4. Preference for physical contact
5. Too expensive
6. e-mail usage
7. Aim towards detribalisation
8. Detribalised
9. N/A

(48). Do you visit your village/hometown?
1. Yes
2. No

(49). If Yes, how often?
1. once or more a year
2. once every three years
3. once every 4-10 years
4. N/A

(50). If No, why do you not visit your village/hometown?
1. they visit me
2. not necessary
3. too expensive to travel
4. no relatives left in village/hometown
5. e-mail usage
6. aim towards detribalisation
7. detribalised
8. N/A

Section (g) – RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION
(51). What is your religious orientation?
1. Christian
2. Moslem
3. Traditionalist
4. Other
5. A-religious

(52). If Christian,
1. Orthodox
2. Charismatic
3. N/A

Section (h) - TRIBAL/ETHNIC DERIVATION
(53). What's your surname?
1. Fanti
2. Ashanti
3. Akyem
4. Akwapim
5. Bono
6. Ga/Adangbe
7. Nzima
8. Bolga
9. Dagomba
10. Dagaaba

11. Gurenne
12. Mampruli
13. Gonja
14. Hausa
15. Ewe
16. African
17. European
18. American
19. Asian
20. Australian
21. Other

APPENDIX TWO

Transcript of Interview with Tema West MP

Note:
This unstructured interview with the MP for Tema West, Mr Ossei Aidooh, a lawyer by profession, yielded a very interesting view regarding what he figured was the source and nature of the ethno-rivalry in mainstream politics. Mr Aidooh is an MP for the NPP, which is generally viewed as being Akan or Ashanti dominated. He is himself an Ashanti. I met him at the famous Big Base restaurant in Community Two, which he frequented. His answer to one of my questions posited the view that Ewes do not join Akan-dominated parties because Ewes in general are not open. Below is an excerpt from the interview.

Question:
'It is common to hear that the Opposition NPP is Ashanti dominated, and the NDC is Ewe dominated, and generally Ashantis should support the NPP whereas Ewes should support the NDC. Having observed the exceptions to the rule, it is noticeable that more Ashantis have freely joined the NDC than more Ewes would join the NPP. Even in Kumasi, the capital of Ashanti, you find that a substantial percentage voted for the NDC in the 1996 elections, whereas in the Ewe Volta Region 94.5% of votes were cast in favour of the NDC. It seems clear that a comparatively greater number of Ashantis identify with the NDC than Ewes would identify with the NPP. Would you attribute this phenomenon to the NDC being more open to other groups than the NPP?'

Answer:
'No. The answer to your question is this: Ashantis are more open, liberal and enterprising. That is why Ashantis are free to join other parties which are not Ashanti-led or Ashanti-dominated, and would not face any persecution from fellow Ashantis. However, Ewes would not freely join any party which has the history of Akan origins or even Akan leadership because they would be persecuted for doing so by fellow Ewes. Many people claim that Ashantis are generally rich, loud and braggarty by attitude. However, I would say that Ashanti culture is more liberating and allows freedom of expression, association and enterprise. It is this free, enterprising spirit of embarking on challenges which has made Ashantis more successful and loud. It is unfortunate that any negativity should be associated with this. I think it is prejudicial. I understand that your research is seeking to investigate the role of tribalism in Ghanaian politics and any associated

tribal patterns. Contrary to the usual and common views which people would have about tribes and politics in Ghana, I would like to stress that in your analysis, you make the distinction clear that, Ashantis are more open, more embracing and more liberal. Also, Ashanti culture embraces and encourages dissent, freedom of speech and of association. This is why we can condone division within our camp. Also, this is why you would notice that Ashantis are freer to join other parties not controlled by their tribe, for example the NDC, whereas Ewes would generally not want to affiliate or identify with the NPP for reasons best known to themselves'.

Comment:
In his explanation, the Tema West MP gives the impression that Ashantis are open to other groups. However, this view is not shared by many people in Ghana. Contrary to the attribution of openness, the perception (whether right or wrong) is widespread that the NPP is Ashanti-dominated, and an open secret is perceived that an Akan would always be preferred as the party's flagbearer. Despite the representation of other ethnonational groups in the party's hierarchy, the Akan lobby remains the strongest. This in itself is not worrying, except for the widespread perception about the open secret of the leadership role.

INDEX