

Poverty and Support for Militant Politics: Evidence from Pakistan¹

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Abstract

Policy debates on strategies to end extremist violence frequently cite poverty as a root cause of support for the perpetrating groups. There is little evidence to support this contention, particularly in the Pakistani case. Pakistan's urban poor are more exposed to the negative externalities of militant violence, and may in fact be less supportive of the groups. To test these hypotheses we conducted a 6000-person, nationally representative survey of Pakistanis that measured affect towards four militant organizations. By applying a novel measurement strategy, we mitigate the item non-response and social desirability biases that plagued previous studies due to the sensitive nature of militancy. Contrary to expectations, poor Pakistanis dislike militants more than middle-class citizens. This dislike is strongest among the urban poor, particularly those in violent districts, suggesting that exposure to terrorist attacks reduces support for militants. Longstanding arguments tying support for violent organizations to income may require substantial revision.

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Combating militant violence, particularly within South Asia and the Middle East, stands at the top of the international security agenda. Economic development aid has become a central tool in prosecuting this agenda on the belief that “...underlying conditions such as poverty, corruption, religious conflict and ethnic strife create opportunities for terrorists to exploit....Terrorists use these conditions to justify their actions and expand their support” (U.S. State Department 2003).² Beyond terrorism, there is a widespread expectation in the policy and academic literatures that poorer people are either more susceptible to the appeals of violent groups (DFID 2005) or are more likely to participate in violence (see e.g. Aziz 2009).³

Drawing on this perception, policies intended to combat militant violence have focused on using aid to reduce poverty and move people into the middle class. Underlying this approach is the assumption that the correlation between poverty and support for militant politics is sufficiently strong such that changes in income achieved through external aid will have a meaningful impact on support for violent groups. The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, for example, linked increased economic assistance for Pakistan with efforts to combat violent extremism (House 2009; Senate 2009). In testimony on the bill before the U.S. House, then U.S. Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke argued that Washington should “target the economic and social roots of extremism in western Pakistan with more economic aid” (Holbrooke 2009). This view also played a pivotal role in the April 2009 donors’ conference in Tokyo, where nearly thirty countries and international organizations pledged some \$5 billion in development aid explicitly intended to “enable Pakistan to fight off Islamic extremism” (BBC 2009).⁴ These policies reflect a belief that poverty is a root cause of support for militant groups, or at least that poorer and less-educated individuals are more prone

² Similar arguments are made in policy documents by other donors. The UK Department for International Development’s (DFID) “Fighting Poverty to Build a Safer World” policy statement, for example, argues that “poverty and lack of access to basic services contribute to perceptions of injustice that can motivate people to violence” (DFID 2005).

³ Sambanis (2004) reviews arguments about the link between poverty and participation in violent political organizations. In this paper, we focus on the relationship between poverty and support for militant groups, not the act of committing violence.

⁴ See also Wood (2009).

to militants' appeals.⁵

Despite the strong beliefs about links between poverty and support for militancy that these aggressive policy bets reveal, there is little solid evidence to support this contention, particularly for the case of Islamist militant organizations.⁶ To evaluate these hypothesized relationships we conducted a 6,000-person provincially representative survey in Pakistan, a country plagued by militant violence. Our April 2009 survey breaks important methodological ground in numerous respects (explained in more detail below). We apply a novel form of an “endorsement experiment” to assess support for specific groups without asking respondents directly how they feel about them. Doing so is critical because attitudes toward these groups can be highly sensitive and asking about them directly is dangerous in some areas. The conditions in Pakistan, even more than in other contexts, may cause respondents to offer what they believe to be the socially desirable response or to simply not respond to certain questions at all.

Using this approach we find first that poor individuals hold militants in *lower* regard than middle-class Pakistanis, even after controlling for a wide range of potentially confounding factors. We further find no evidence that those living in poorer areas are more supportive of militants than others and the relationship between support and individual-level poverty does not change when we control for community-level income measures. Rather, the contextual factor that matters appears to be exposure to the externalities of militant violence. Leveraging a new dataset of violent incidents, we find first that violence is heavily concentrated in urban areas and second that dislike of militant groups is nearly three times stronger among the urban poor living in districts that have experienced violence than among the poor living in non-violent districts. It is not that people are vulnerable to

⁵ These arguments are reflected in both Pakistani and Western discourse. On the Pakistani side, officials called for a Pakistani version of the Marshall Plan (*Washington Times* 2009). On the Western side, see the 9/11 Commission's claim that “Pakistan's endemic poverty, widespread corruption, and often ineffective government create opportunities for Islamist recruitment” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004). USAID (2009) dissects the thinking behind these arguments. A more nuanced argument is that Pakistan's derelict public schools and poverty compel Pakistani families to send their children to the madaris (religious schools), which then provide recruits for militant groups (Stern 2000). For an alternative view, see Fair (2008).

⁶ The poverty-militancy link has recently come under scrutiny in the policy community (e.g. USAID 2009).

militants' appeals because they are poor and dissatisfied. Rather, it appears that the urban poor suffer most from militants' violent activities and so most intensely dislike them.⁷

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The first section presents a theoretical overview of the relationship between poverty and support for militancy which summarizes the extant literature and constructs testable hypotheses. The following section describes our survey and measurement strategy. The final two sections present the results and discuss their implications.

1. Theoretical Overview

While some policy makers presume a positive relationship between popular support for terrorism and poverty, extant empirical scholarship is underdeveloped (Blattman and Miguel 2010) and offers little support for this belief (Fair and Shepherd 2006; Von Hippel 2008; Shapiro and Fair 2010; Jo 2011).⁸ Poverty, at the individual level, has long been thought to make people more susceptible to militants' political appeals, thereby predicting greater support for such groups (Esposito and Voll 1996). Individuals who feel powerless and disenfranchised or unsatisfied by the performance of formal political institutions may be more likely to turn to extra-state organizations or to be manipulated by groups who exploit individual political and economic frustrations (Abadie 2006; Esposito and Voll 1996; Piazza 2007; Tessler and Robins 2007). These arguments have roots in an older literature which proposed a range of psychological and sociological reasons for why poverty and inequality—most strongly felt by the poor—correlate with support for violent politics (see Gurr 1970 on dashed economic expectations; Nagel 1974 on inequality; and Snyder 1978 for a contemporaneous review).

Several recent studies using survey data to examine the relationship between individual economic characteristics and support for militancy yield contradictory findings. Tessler and Robbins

⁷ DFID (2005) argues there is a correlation between poverty and exposure to physical insecurity but does not posit a further link between that exposure and attitudes towards militant groups.

⁸ In terms of violent behavior (not support for violent political organizations), the perpetrators of militant violence are predominantly from middle class or wealthy families (Krueger and Malečková 2003). Selection of operatives by terrorist groups plays a role here, as predicted by Bueno de Mesquita (2005) and shown empirically by Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor (2010).

(2007) find that “neither personal nor societal economic circumstances, by themselves, are important determinants of attitudes toward terrorism directed at the United States” (323). Using Pew’s Global Attitudes Survey (GATS) data from 2005, Shafiq and Sinno (2010) show that the relationship between income (as well as education) and support for suicide bombings varies across countries and targets. Chiozza (2011), also using the GATS data, finds that individual-level income and support for suicide bombing varies across countries. Mousseau (2011), using GATS data for 2002 from 14 Muslim nations, finds that support for Islamist terrorism is highest among the urban poor.⁹ This produces a first hypothesis, which is the dominant view in existing policy debates: *Low-income individuals support violent militant groups more than higher-income individuals.*

Support for violent organizations need not correlate with poverty at an individual level but it may instead be more sociotropic in nature, covarying with community- or nation-wide economic characteristics such as income or inequality (Esposito and Voll 1996; Huband 1998; Crenshaw 1990; Burgoon 2006). Piazza (2011) suggests that economic discrimination against minority groups may explain support for domestic terrorist groups. Such sociotropic effects may make persons more supportive of militant groups either because the groups’ rhetoric is more likely to resonate with those disappointed by traditional politics, or because they offer an alternative method for achieving valued policy goals when the state cannot.¹⁰ In other words, even if a person is not personally burdened with economic hardship, observing poverty may be sufficient. Thus, our second testable hypothesis is: *Individuals living in low-income areas support violent militant groups more than people living in higher-income areas.*

Unfortunately, scholarship tends not to account for the actual level of violence in explaining the relationship between support for violent political organizations and other explanatory variables such as poverty (at individual or community levels). Doing so is important for two reasons. First, the

⁹ Mousseau’s approach differs from ours in that (1) he does not ask about specific groups; (2) 9 of 14 countries in his data have little experience with Islamist militancy and only one has seen it at the levels Pakistan has suffered; and (3) item non-response on the dependent variable was 39%.

¹⁰ Gurr (1970) also discusses how poor social economic performance increases the likelihood of individuals looking outside the system for solutions.

literature paints a mixed picture of the relationship between overall poverty and violence.¹¹ While some scholars observe a positive correlation between poverty and violence (see review by Burgoon 2006), others have found a mixed or negative relationship between indicators of poverty such as unemployment and rates of militant violence within countries (e.g., Dube and Vargas 2011; Berman et. al. 2011). Within countries scholars have found that political violence is increasing in: short-term poverty (Miguel, Satayanth, and Serengeti 2004); dashed expectations for material gain (Gurr 1970); and income inequality (Sigelman and Simpson 1977; Muller 1985). Yet a broad consensus on links between income and violence remain elusive (Blattman and Miguel 2010). Second, the negative externalities of militant violence fall unevenly across income categories. The direct health impact of civil wars and insurgency fall disproportionately on the poor (Ghorbarah, Huth, and Russett 2003; Collier 2009), while terrorism reduces economic growth for a host of reasons (see, e.g., review in Gaibullov and Sandler 2011) and distorts domestic spending (Blomberg and Hess 2004).¹² Militant violence may be particularly damaging to those living at the bottom of the income spectrum.

This general pattern is likely to be particularly strong in Pakistani society, particularly with respect to the interaction between urbanity and violence. Most of the violence occurs in urbanized areas and while the disruptions to economic activity that inevitably result from attacks are small (leaving aside the potential long-term deterrent of foreign direct investment), they can be expected to most acutely affect poor urban Pakistanis who have little in the way of an effective social safety net. Many of the recent attacks have taken place in locations such as Saddar Bazaar in Peshawar, for example, or in the traditional markets in and around Pakistan's Mughal-era "walled cities" such as Lahore and Rawalpindi. Saddar Bazaar is populated by poor vendors and serves mostly poor and middle-class customers. With the formation of modern suburbs in Pakistan, the wealthy and middle

¹¹ Bueno de Mesquita (2011) provides one possible explanation with a model of rebel tactical choice in which the correlation between economic activity and terrorism is positive for countries with active insurgencies because rebel leaders substitute out of symmetric tactics and into terrorism when an improved economy reduces their ability to get recruits.

¹² The impact of terrorism on foreign aid is an open question. Recent evidence suggests countries experiencing terrorism receive more total aid, but terrorism's impact on the type of aid, and thus whether this shift is a net benefit to the poor, is ambiguous (Dreher and Fuchs 2011).

class have moved out of the “old cities” where violence has been concentrated and into these newer conurbations with their various amenities.¹³ The burden of militant violence thus falls unevenly on the poor living in urban areas, where the negative externalities of violence are greatest. Rural areas are relatively more insulated from the negative economic effects of attacks because they are more sparsely populated. Thus, our third hypothesis is: *Low-income individuals living in urban, violent areas are the most supportive of violent militant groups.*

2. The Survey

Many organizations have conducted surveys on Pakistani attitudes towards extremism since 2001, including Gallup, Zogby, The Pew Foundation, World Public Opinion.org (WPO), the International Republican Institute (IRI), and Terror Free Tomorrow among others. None of these surveys, however, provide solid leverage on the empirical questions we address.

Three specific limitations stand out. First, respondent level-data are not available for most of the extant surveys.¹⁴ Second, the existing surveys generally do not measure attitudes towards specific Pakistani militant organizations, but rather the tactics used by these groups or violence more generally. This does not get at the political question of which constituencies the groups rely on to effectively function. Surveys that do so tend to focus upon al-Qa’ida, the Afghan Taliban, and increasingly on the Pakistan Taliban. However, these surveys ask directly about groups and obtain high don’t know/no opinion rates in the range of 40% (Terror Free Tomorrow 2008; Pew 2009). Surveys that indirectly measure attitudes by asking whether groups “operating in Pakistan are a problem” (IRI 2009) or pose “a threat to the vital interests of Pakistan” (WPO 2009) are also hard to interpret and still suffer high item non-response.¹⁵ Third, existing surveys are not designed to

¹³ Author fieldwork in Pakistan provides the qualitative assessment of the nature of the targets and victims. Details of the hundreds of attacks in recent years can be found in the various monthly and annual “Security Reports,” published by the Pak Institute of Peace Studies, http://san-pips.com/index.php?action=reports&id=psr_1.

¹⁴ Gallup and Zogby are proprietary without any pre-purchase means to assess the quality of the data and limit access to top-line results. IRI and Terror Free Tomorrow do not release respondent-level data. Pew and WPO do provide access to respondent-level data but their samples are limited in important ways.

¹⁵ Item non-response rates on indirect measures of support on IRI’s 2009 survey were as high as 31%.

identify sub-national variation and are not representative of several areas of the country. Most either exclusively or disproportionately include urban respondents and all include too few respondents to make reliable inferences about sub-national variation in support, let alone identifying sub-national variation in the correlates of support.

We therefore fielded a 6,000-person survey designed to achieve three goals. First, we wanted a representative sample of the rural and urban areas of each of Pakistan's four main provinces. Second, we sought to measure attitudes towards specific militant organizations, which is distinct from support for violence generally but is the more policy-relevant dependent variable since each of the groups relies on mass-level support to function. Third, we wanted to minimize item non-response and social desirability bias in measuring affect towards militants.

As is well known, respondents in many survey settings anticipate the views of the enumerator and thus answer in particular ways to please him or her, or in other ways seem high-status (Krosnick 1999; Marlowe and Crowne 1964). These tendencies may be exacerbated on sensitive issues where fear and the desire to avoid embarrassment are operating. In the Pakistani setting respondents can determine significant information about class, ethnicity, and sectarian orientation based on the name and accent of the enumerators. This makes social desirability concerns even stronger for surveys studying the politics of militancy in Pakistan, since respondents may be wary to signal pro-militant views to high-status enumerators.

Working with our Pakistani partners, Socio-Economic Development Consultants (SEDCO), we drew a random sample of 6,000 adult Pakistani men and women from the four "normal" provinces¹⁶ of the country (Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), and Balochistan) using the Pakistan Federal Bureau of Statistics sample frame. The respondents were selected randomly within 500 primary sampling units (PSUs), 332 in rural areas and 168 in urban ones (following the rural-

¹⁶ Pakistan is comprised of four provinces enumerated in its constitution. These are the "normal" provinces. In addition, Pakistan has several territories that have extra-constitutional status including the Federally-Administered Tribal Agencies, Gilgit-Baltistan, and Azad Kashmir.

urban breakdown in the Pakistan census). We substantially oversampled in Balochistan and KP to ensure we could generate valid estimates in these provinces, which have small populations in spatially concentrated ethnic enclaves owing to their rugged terrain. We calculated post-stratification survey weights based on population figures from the 1998 census, the most recent available. Following procedures outlined by Lee and Forthofer (2006), all analyses reported below were weighted and clustered to account for survey design effects.

The face-to-face questionnaire was fielded by six mixed-gender teams between April 21, 2009 and May 25, 2009. Females surveyed females and males surveyed males, consistent with Pakistani norms. The AAPOR RR1 response rate was 71.8 percent, exceeding the response rates achieved by high-quality academic studies such as the American National Election Study. Online Appendix Table 1 reports the sample demographics and randomization checks for the endorsement experiment described below. Question wordings are provided in Online Appendix A. All variables were coded to lie between 0 and 1, so that we can easily interpret a regression coefficient as representing a $100 \times \beta$ percentage-point change in the dependent variable associated with moving from the lowest possible value to the highest possible value of the independent variable.

Measuring Support for Islamist Militant Organizations: The Endorsement Experiment

Asking respondents directly whether they support militant organizations leads to numerous problems in places suffering from political violence. First, and perhaps most importantly, it can be unsafe for enumerators and respondents to discuss these issues. Second, as noted above, item non-response rates to such sensitive questions are often quite high given that respondents fear that providing the “wrong” answer will threaten his or her personal or family’s safety. We therefore used an endorsement experiment to measure support for specific Islamist militant organizations.

The experiment involves assessing support for real policies which are relatively well known but about which Pakistanis do not have strong feelings (each confirmed during pre-test surveys).

The experiment works as follows:

- Respondents are randomly assigned to treatment or control groups (one-half of the sample is assigned to each group).
- Respondents in the control group were asked their level of support for four policies, measured on a five-point scale, recoded to lie between 0 and 1 for analysis.
- Respondents in the treatment group were asked identical questions but were then told that one of four militant organizations supports the policy in question. Which organization was associated with which of the four policies was randomized within the treatment group.
- The difference in means between treatment and control groups provides a measure of affect towards the militant groups, since the only difference between the treatment and control conditions is the group endorsement.

Figure 1 provides a sample question, showing the treatment and control questions, and illustrates the randomization procedure visually.¹⁷

The core idea behind the endorsement experiment is that because we randomize both assignment to the group endorsement and the pairing of issues with groups, any difference in policy support can be attributed solely to the group. When the object of evaluation is a policy (as opposed to a group), social desirability concerns are lessened because respondents (particularly those of lower class, ethnicity, or social status) are not asked to explicitly and directly divulge their beliefs about militants. For this approach to improve on direct questioning, respondents cannot view being asked about a policy endorsed by a group as substantially more sensitive than if they were asked about the policy alone, or at least that the difference in sensitivity is much less than for direct questions. We assess these assumptions empirically below by examining non-response rates.¹⁸

This approach draws on extensive research on persuasion in social psychology (see Petty and

¹⁷ Online Appendix A includes the four endorsement questions. Online Appendix B describes the procedure for carrying out the design on paper forms to ensure proper random assignment.

¹⁸ One concern is whether poor or illiterate respondents were able to understand some of the issues in the questionnaire. Both poor/illiterate respondents and wealthier/literate respondents produced highly reliable responses as measured by Cronbach's alpha (see Online Appendix Table 2) and did not exhibit substantially higher non-response rates (see Online Appendix Table 3).

Wegener 1998 for a review).¹⁹ Individuals are more likely to be persuaded and influenced by likeable sources (Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Cialdini 1993). Endorsements of policies and positions are much more effective when an individual has positive affect toward the source of the endorsement (Wood and Kallgren 1988; Chaiken 1980; Petty et al. 1983). As O’Keefe (1990) summarizes: “Liked sources should prove more persuasive than disliked sources” (107). Accordingly, the effectiveness of an endorsement in shifting views on a policy indicates the level of support for the endorser.²⁰

We see a clear reduction in sensitivity in our survey when we examine the difference in item non-response rates between the endorsement questions and direct ones about the groups (i.e., those without an endorsement experiment) such as “What is the effect group X’s actions on their cause?” Non-response on the direct items ranged from 22% for al-Qa’ida to 6% for the Kashmir Tanzeem. Item non-response on the endorsement experiment questions, by contrast, ranged from a high of 7.6% for al-Qa’ida endorsing Frontier Crimes Regulation reform to a meager 0.6% for the *firqavarana tanzeems* endorsing polio vaccinations. While this approach is not perfect, the low item non-response rate in our survey provides *prima facie* evidence that this technique reduced respondents’ concerns about reporting sensitive information.²¹ That the endorsement experiment drives down item non-

¹⁹ In a political science application, Lupia and McCubbins (1998) also employ an endorsement experiment to explore how citizens can use cues to approximate full information.

²⁰ One potential concern with the endorsement experiment is how to interpret why respondents dislike the groups. For example, it could be that low-income respondents dislike the groups because of activities the group undertakes besides violence or because of greater distrust in political organizations more generally. To assess this, we asked respondents five questions about what the groups’ objectives are—justice, democracy, fighting jihad, ridding society of apostates, and freeing Kashmir—and five questions about what they are actually doing—providing social services, enhancing social awareness, providing religious education, providing secular education, and fighting jihad. Average responses on these items differed only very slightly between the poor and other respondents and the differences are never statistically significant (see Online Appendix Figure 1).

²¹ Compared to other surveys, the contrast between direct questions and this approach is even starker. The WorldPublicOpinion.org 2007 survey of urban Pakistanis, for example, had a DK/NR rate of around 20% on most of the questions but for questions about the activities of Pakistan-based militant groups, the DK/NR rate was sometimes in excess of 50%. When they asked different samples of Pakistanis “How do you feel about al Qaeda?” in 2007, 2008 and 2009, DK/NR rates were 68%, 47% and 13%, respectively. When Pakistanis were asked who perpetrated the 9/11 attacks, DK/NR rates were 63% and 72% in 2007 and 2008, respectively (Fair et al. 2008). The Pew Global Attitudes Survey encountered similar problems when they asked (predominantly urban) Pakistanis whether they have “a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion” of al Qa’ida. In 2008 and 2009, the DK/NR rates were 41% and 30%, respectively. When the same question was posed about the Taliban in 2008 and 2009, the DK/NR rates were 40% and 20%, respectively (Pew 2009).

response is not necessarily evidence that it also ameliorates social desirability bias. Nonetheless, a fairly contorted story would be required to explain why a technique that drives down item non-response so dramatically would fail to address social desirability biases that stem from respondents' concerns about how enumerators will react to their answers.

We used this method to measure support for four groups: the Kashmiri tanzeems, the Afghan Taliban, al-Qa'ida, and the sectarian tanzeems.²² This required asking about four policy issues: polio vaccinations, reforming the frontier crimes regulation (the colonial-era legal code governing the FATA), redefining the Durand line (the border separating Pakistan from Afghanistan, which the latter contests), and requiring madrassas to teach math and science.²³ By randomizing which group is associated with which policy within the treatment group, we control for question order effects.²⁴ This allows us to identify treatment effects for multiple groups that are unlikely to be biased by the details of any specific policy.

For an endorsement experiment like this to work the policies need to have two characteristics. First, they must be ones about which respondents do not have overly strong prior opinions so that a group's endorsement can affect their evaluation of the policy. This method would not work in the U.S., for example, if one asked about banning abortion, a policy about which prior attitudes are strong. Second, the policies must be somewhat familiar to respondents for the group endorsement to be meaningful and salient. In the U.S., for instance, asking about an obscure mining regulation would not work because respondents might not provide meaningful responses and endorsements might have a limited impact. While the policies we studied may seem high valence to professional students of politics, they do not appear to be so for most Pakistanis based on intensive

²² Additional details about the groups as well as a background of militancy in Pakistan are provided in Online Appendix C.

²³ All these four policies exhibit a certain degree of controversy in Pakistan. This includes the issue of polio vaccinations. The religious scholars (*ulema*) in Pakistan have long maintained that polio vaccines are a conspiracy by the West to diminish Muslim fecundity (Nazir 2011). Moreover, as explained below, our results are not dependent on the inclusion of any particular policy.

²⁴ In this context, order effects refer to people systematically giving a higher rating to the first policy or their support for a given policy being affected by which other policy came before it.

pre-testing with 200 residents of Islamabad, Peshawar, and Rawalpindi between March 20 and 26, 2009.²⁵

To construct our dependent variable of support for militant political organizations, we measure the average support the respondent reports for the four policies. Recall that one of the four militant groups was randomly assigned to be associated with each policy in the treatment group. We leverage random assignment into treatment (endorsement) and control to measure differential support for militancy, as proxied for by support for the policies. The main dependent variable therefore is a twenty-point scale, recoded to lie between 0 (no support for all four policies) and 1 (a great deal of support for all four policies). In the control group, the policy scale had a mean value of .79 (s.d. = .15). As described below, we also examined support for each of the groups individually.

Independent Variables

Based on the hypotheses presented in Section 1, our three key independent variables are: (1) individual-level economic status; (2) district-level economic status; and (3) district-level violence.

Measuring economic status is complicated. In Pakistan, as in most countries, both wages and the cost of living vary widely across regions as well as between urban and rural areas. A useful way to see this variation is to look at how the income distribution varies across provinces. The mean household income for the third quintile of the income distribution (40th-60th percentile) in urban areas of Sindh in 2007-8 was Rs 12,664 (Pakistan Federal Bureau of Statistics 2009).²⁶ The same income would place a household well above the mean for the fourth income quintile (60th-80th percentile) in urban Punjab or rural Sindh, but below the mean for the second income quintile (20th-40th percentile) in urban Balochistan.

²⁵ There is empirical evidence in the survey that attests to the validity of the policies as well. Online Appendix Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of support for policies in the control group. The policies exhibit sufficient variation such that responses are meaningful but attitudes may not be hardened.

²⁶ 2007-8 is the most recent year for which provincial income and expenditure data are available. Similar variation across provinces and regions is found in the expenditure data and in the cost of key commodities, the cost of housing, and the like. Although the sample design for the Pakistan Household Integrated Economic Survey (HIES) was not designed to provide district-level inference, we have run key regressions using district-level estimates based on the micro-data. Because those estimates are so noisy (some districts are missing or have only one PSU) we do not report them here.

Given this variation, using a measure of nominal income to measure economic status seems misguided due to the inconsistent relationship between nominal and relative income. Instead we code individual income as a trichotomous variable, placing respondents into high, middle, or low-income categories given their province and strata (urban or rural). Those in the top quintile for their province-strata are coded as high income, those in the bottom quintile for their province-strata are coded as low income, and all others are coded as middle income.²⁷ In the analysis we use dummy variables representing high- and low-income respondents to capture a potentially non-monotonic relationship (i.e. middle-income respondents may view groups more or less favorably than others).

We employ a similar strategy to construct a trichotomous measure of community-level income at the district level using data from the 2007-8 Government of Pakistan Labor Force Survey (LFS). The 2007-8 LFS sampled 36,272 households in four quarterly waves, each of which was nationally representative. Districts whose average monthly household income places them in the top quintile of all districts in their province are coded as high-income districts and those in the bottom quintile for their province are coded as low-income districts.²⁸ As an additional test of the sociotropic hypothesis, we used a question from our survey measuring respondents' subjective assessments of how their area had performed economically.²⁹

In order to assess levels of violence by district and province in Pakistan we collected data on 27,570 incidents of political violence in Pakistan from January 1, 1988, through December 31, 2010.³⁰ We coded both the number of incidents of militant violence per district and the number of casualties from militant violence the year before our survey was fielded (April 1, 2008, through March 31, 2009). Militant violence here is defined as any incident which: (1) is perpetrated by

²⁷ As explained below, we assess the robustness of our results to various cut offs and definitions of poverty.

²⁸ District-level income data were not available for 10 districts in our survey, representing 17.6% of the sample.

²⁹ The question read: "Now thinking about the financial situation of your area, would you say that over the past year it has gotten much better, gotten a little better, stayed about the same, gotten a little worse, or gotten much worse?"

³⁰ A team at the Lahore University of Management Sciences collected the data by reviewing each day of the major English-language daily in Pakistan, *The Dawn*. Codebook available upon request.

organized armed groups that use violence against civilians or the state in pursuit of pre-defined political goals; and (2) employs terrorist tactics (e.g. suicide bombings) or those associated with conventional or guerilla warfare (e.g. rocket fire and ambushes). During the survey administration period, sampled districts suffered 787 incidents of militant violence causing 4,525 casualties.

We measured several additional covariates, which we include in our models both additively and multiplicatively: gender; marital status; age; access to the Internet; whether respondents possessed a cell phone; ability to read, write, and do math; education level; and sectarian affiliation (Sunni or Shi'a). These variables have all been cited as potential correlates of support for violent politics including: age (Russel and Miller 1977), marriage (Berrebi 2007), media access (Bell 1978; Dowling 2006), education (Becker 1968), and religion (Juergensmeyer 2003). We also controlled for attitudinal variables which could impact support for militancy, including attitudes towards democracy, views on the U.S. government's influence on the world, views on the U.S. government's influence on Pakistan, and belief that sharia law is about physical punishment.

All variables are balanced between treatment and control groups in the endorsement experiment (see Online Appendix Table 1). We include province fixed effects to account for regional differences not captured by our controls. Online Appendix A includes question wordings for all the variables. Online Appendix D describes codings of variables that combine multiple items.

Methods of Analysis

Our measure of support for the militant organizations is the treatment effect of the endorsement which we estimate for a given militant organization j by comparing the overall policy support (P_i) in the control group (i.e., the average support across all four policies) to policy support in the treatment group for those responses associated with group j .³¹ We estimate the following regression via ordinary least squares (OLS) separately for each group, j , and for the pooled average across groups:

$$P_i = \beta T_i + \alpha_p + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

³¹ We only include respondents who provided responses to all four policy questions. 10.1% of respondents did not provide complete data.

where T_i is a dummy variable indicating that respondent i is in the treatment condition, α_p are province fixed effects, and ε_i represents random error. The coefficient estimate on β represents overall support for group j .

Some policies will exhibit greater treatment effects than others because prior attitudes are less well-formed. We use the variance of the responses in the control group to proxy looseness of pre-treatment attitudes and weight each policy response by this variance. Accordingly, we place greater weight on policies where we expect there to be a greater likelihood that attitudes will be shifted in response to the endorsements.³²

To assess which individual-level characteristics drive support for militancy, we estimate various versions of the following regression specification via OLS:

$$P_i = \beta T_i + \eta \mathbf{x}_i + \gamma T_i \mathbf{x}_i + \alpha_p + T_i \alpha_p + \varepsilon_i \quad (2)$$

where \mathbf{x}_i represents a vector of the individual-level characteristics mentioned above (including income), η represents how these characteristics impact support for policies in the control group, and $T_i \alpha_p$ accounts for the possibility that there are province-specific treatment effects.³³ The parameters of interest are represented by the vector γ , which captures how the treatment effects vary by the individual-level characteristics. This is simply the standard difference-in-differences estimator for identifying heterogeneous treatment effects controlling for potentially confounding factors. To simplify interpretation, all tables report total treatment effects for key groups (e.g. low-income respondents) along with their standard errors and significance levels.

3. Results

Support for Militant Organizations

³² The results are substantively similar without this weighting and so we report weighted results throughout as we believe they more accurately capture the impact of cues on attitudes. The weight vector \mathbf{w} for the four policies (vaccination plan, FCR reforms, Durand line, curriculum reform) was: (.983, 1.15, 1.28, 1.18), meaning that the weight for the control group was the average of these four individual weights (1.15). The post-stratification weight was multiplied by \mathbf{w} to produce the overall sampling weight.

³³ In estimating some versions of equation (2), we lose an additional 5.0% of the sample who did not provide complete data on the individual-level characteristics.

Before testing our three main hypotheses, we briefly review the top line findings of the survey, which is arguably the first valid, national measurement of attitudes toward militant groups in Pakistan. Due to the hypothesized treatment heterogeneity, the overall treatment effects from the endorsement experiment are substantively small relative to the variation in support for policies in the control group. Nonetheless, they provide useful benchmarks for assessing the effect of poverty on views towards militant groups.

We find that Pakistanis in general are weakly negative towards Islamist militant organizations, as shown in Table 1. β_i in the Panel A shows the unconditional difference in means between treatment and control groups. Each column presents the results for a particular militant group. The coefficients are negative and statistically significant at the 10% level for all but the sectarian tanzeems, suggesting that Pakistanis hold militant groups in low regard. The effect is statistically and substantively strongest for the Afghan Taliban, where the treatment reduces support by 1.5%, roughly 10% of a standard deviation in support for policies in the control group. Although this is a substantively small effect, there is meaningful heterogeneity by poverty level as discussed below. Moreover, consistent with random assignment, the treatment effects are substantively unchanged and statistically stronger once we control for differences in demographic factors (e.g., gender, age, marital status, education, media exposure, and sectarian affiliation) and attitudinal variables (views of the United States, beliefs about sharia law, and attitudes towards democracy) (see Panel B). As the results of the basic endorsement experiment are consistently negative across all four groups, for simplicity the subsequent analyses analyze average support across groups.

Individual-Level Poverty and Support for Militant Organizations

The poor in Pakistan hold militant groups in much lower regard than do middle-class Pakistanis, challenging the conventional wisdom that expanding the size of the middle class via economic development will decrease the viability of violent groups. The treatment effect of the endorsement cue—our measurement of mean affect towards militant groups—is much more

strongly negative for the poor, leading us to reject our first hypothesis. Table 2 presents several model specifications based on equation (2). The treatment effect for the middle class across all four groups (β) is close to zero and statistically insignificant, ranging between -0.6% and 0.1% across specifications. However, low-income respondents exhibit a treatment effect ($\beta + \gamma_1$) of between -1.9 to -2.6 percentage points across specifications, up to one-fifth the standard deviation of the dependent variable in the control group. To put this effect in perspective, the poor are up to 23 times more negative about militants than their middle class counterparts.

Accordingly, the difference between the treatment effect for the middle class and for the poor (represented by γ_1) is large and statistically strong (see shaded row of Table 2). Low-income Pakistanis are roughly 2 percentage points less supportive of policies endorsed by militant groups than are middle-class respondents. The leftmost part of Figure 2 depicts the treatment effects for the poor and for the middle class in the full sample, and shows that mean support for militant groups is much lower among the poor than among the middle class in Pakistan as a whole.

This finding is consistent in magnitude and statistical significance across a wide range of model specifications, and is robust to controls for differences across provinces and demographic factors. Column (1) of Table 2 presents the simple difference-in-differences estimates including provincial fixed effects. The other specifications presented in Table 2 include additional covariates: demographic controls (column 2), attitudinal controls (column 3), and all main and interactive effects for these factors as well as region-specific treatment effects (column 4). Note that the key parameter of interest (γ_1)—the difference in the treatment effect between poor and middle-class respondents—is significant and stable across all specifications.

Several other robustness checks confirm that lower-income individuals are least supportive of the groups. First, our results are not sensitive to the particular cutoffs used in defining poor respondents (see Online Appendix Table 4). As we move the relative income threshold that defines low-income individuals downward, the negative interaction between low-income status and the

treatment dummy becomes stronger, as one would expect. The effect becomes a bit weaker above the 20% threshold, but the total treatment effect for the poor remains negative and statistically significant. Second, the results are not sensitive to the inclusion of any particular policy. The key interaction term of interest remains statistically significant in specifications iteratively dropping each of the four policies used in the endorsement experiment (see Online Appendix Table 5).

Community-Level Poverty and Support for Militancy

Our second hypothesis suggests it may not be individual-level poverty that influences support for violent groups but instead sociotropic poverty is the relevant variable. However, we observe no meaningful difference between Pakistanis living in poor districts and those living in richer districts when we substitute average community-level income for the individual-level measure (see shaded row of Table 3). Pakistanis from both poor and wealthy districts are less supportive of militants on average than those from middle-income districts, but the differences are not statistically significant in any specification. Even controlling for district-level poverty, the negative treatment effect among low-income individuals remains significant, confirming that our key results on individual-level income are not confounded by sociotropic variables (see Online Appendix Table 6).

Given that community-level poverty is measured at the district level, we also tested various specifications to deal with complexities in estimating standard errors: (1) clustering standard errors at the district-level (to conservatively allow for correlated errors at the highest level of geographic aggregation for which we measure income); (2) multi-stage clustering of standard errors (to allow for both district- and PSU-level clustering); and (3) a hierarchical-linear model (HLM) that explicitly models the impact of violence at the district-level as distinct from the impact of poverty at the individual level. In all three models, the interaction between district-level poverty and the treatment effect is statistically insignificant (see Online Appendix Table 7).

As an additional measure of sociotropic poverty, we asked respondents to report how they perceived their community's economic conditions to have changed over the past year. Substituting

this measure for individual-level poverty, we again find no evidence that individuals who perceived that the economy was worsening exhibiting statistically different treatment effects from those who perceived an improving local economy (see Online Appendix Table 8). Hence, we find no evidence in these data that poverty is correlated with support for militant groups as a sociotropic phenomenon. Further, the results we report suggesting a negative relationship between individual-level income and support for militancy are similar when controlling for sociotropic perceptions of economic wellbeing (see Online Appendix Table 9).

Violent Externalities and Support for Militancy

Our third hypothesis was that the urban poor are less supportive of militant groups because they are more heavily impacted by the negative externalities associated with militant violence. If terrorist attacks suppress commercial activity in urban areas (for example, in street markets) for the short or medium term, it is the poor selling wares in those markets that will be most affected. Middle-class Pakistanis, whose incomes are more likely to be dependent on salaries from firms or the government (and who do not need to do much shopping for themselves, since most middle-class households in Pakistan have domestic employees who run such errands), may not be directly or at least immediately affected by these localized economic shocks.

In order to test this hypothesis we need to determine where violence in Pakistan was concentrated during the year before our survey was fielded. Unfortunately, the precise geographic locations of Pakistani militant attacks in relation to urban and rural areas within districts are often unreported. Only 32% of the incidents in the year before our survey was fielded could be reliably coded to the *tehsils* level, the next level of administrative subdivision below the district, and 24% of reported incidents contain no sub-district information whatsoever.³⁴ The imprecise nature of press reporting makes directly attributing attacks to urban or rural areas impossible, but we can identify the district of each attack.

³⁴ The same problem exists with other potential data sources as well (e.g. the Worldwide Incident Tracking System).

That identification allows us to conduct two tests. First, we leverage the stratified nature of our survey design to learn about the distribution of violence across urban and rural areas of Pakistan. Second, we directly test whether the relationship between poverty and attitudes toward militant groups differs between violent and non-violent areas.

The first test takes advantage of the fact that our survey is stratified by province and urbanity, which means that we have eight random samples of respondent clusters, one for rural areas and one for urban areas within each of the four “normal” Pakistani provinces. We can therefore compare the proportion of urban versus rural PSUs that are in violent districts. Although this approach does not provide direct evidence about whether violence occurs more frequently in specific PSUs in our survey, it does provide evidence as to whether urban residents are more likely to be exposed to violent militant attacks than are rural residents.

As anecdotal accounts suggest, militant violence in Pakistan appears to be disproportionately concentrated in urban areas. In Punjab Province, only 8.6% of rural PSUs are in violent districts, whereas 37.7% of urban PSUs are. A two-group difference-in-proportions test confirms that these proportions are statistically significantly different ($p < 0.001$), suggesting that urban PSUs (and therefore urban respondents) are much more likely to live in violent districts than are rural PSUs/respondents. No rural PSUs in Sindh Province are in violent districts, while 17.5% of urban PSUs are, a significant difference ($p < 0.001$). Though we fail to reject the null hypothesis that urban and rural PSUs are equally likely to be in violent districts in KP and Balochistan, these provinces are very small compared to Punjab and Sindh (17 million and 6 million, respectively, as compared with 74 million and 30 million, respectively, according to the 1998 Pakistan census). For the entire country only 22.6% of rural PSUs are in violent districts, compared to 35.5% of urban PSUs, a statistically significant difference ($p = 0.002$).

Given these patterns, if the externalities of violence are driving the attitudes of the poor, we should expect attitudes towards militant groups to be much more negative among the urban poor

than the rural poor, which is exactly what we find (see Table 4). Here we extend our earlier results by allowing the treatment effect to vary across both income groups and by urban or rural residence. The results show that the relationship between poverty and dislike of militant groups is driven in large part by the disdain of the urban poor toward these groups. These results are illustrated in Figure 2, which shows a large gap in the treatment effect between low-income and middle-income respondents in urban areas but not in rural areas. The point estimate on the three-way interaction between urbanity, low income, and the treatment dummy is $-.059$ ($p < .02$) in the model including a full set of controls and their interactions with the treatment dummy (column 4).³⁵ This means that the difference-in-differences estimate described above (i.e., the difference in the endorsement treatment effect between low-income and middle-income Pakistanis) is 5.9 percentage points larger in urban areas as compared to rural areas. The gap in support between low-income and middle-income respondents is about 20 times larger in urban areas than rural areas. Among the urban poor, the total treatment effect ($\beta + \gamma_3 + \gamma_5 + \gamma_6$) also looks quite large at 4.2% ($p < 0.01$, see third column), roughly two-thirds of the standard deviation in support for policies in the control group.

Turning to a more direct test of the third hypothesis, we find that the negative relationship between poverty and support for the groups is much stronger in urban areas that experienced violence in the year before our survey was fielded compared to other areas (see Table 5). Here we divide respondents into three categories according to how much militant violence their district suffered: (1) those from urban areas of districts with at least one incident of militant violence; (2) those from rural areas of districts with at least one incident of militant violence; and (3) those from districts with no violent incidents.³⁶ We also examine models examining the effect of casualties in addition to incidents. All models employ the specification from Table 2, column (3), which includes provincial fixed-effects as well as a broad range of controls. The total treatment effect among the

³⁵ This result is also robust to various cutoffs in the definition of low-income respondents (see Online Appendix Table 10).

³⁶ Unfortunately, too few districts in our sample experienced no violence for us to divide them between rural and urban respondents. The cell sizes in the interactions we are studying become too small.

poor living in urban PSUs ($\beta + \gamma_1$) within violent districts is -3.6% if we categorize districts according to rates of attacks and -4.8% if we categorize them by casualties from militant attacks. Both treatment effects are large and statistically significant and the latter is almost three times the total treatment effect for the poor in non-violent districts. These effects are stronger when we use casualties to categorize districts, as we should expect if casualties more accurately capture the size of the externalities from violence than does the simple number of attacks, which does not account for severity. The three-way interaction term between district-level violence (i.e., a dummy for the presence of an urban violent incident), the endorsement cue, and individual-level poverty is negative and statistically significant ($-0.40, p = .054$) (see Online Appendix Table 11). Using casualties instead of incidents, the three-way interaction is stronger ($-0.44, p = .034$).³⁷ These results are consistent with the poor disliking militant groups because they bear the brunt of the consequences of militancy. The presence of violence caused by militant organizations is a key contextual factor that moderates the relationship between individual-level poverty and support for groups that employ violence.

4. Conclusion

To better understand the relationship between economic status and support for militancy in Pakistan, and to shed light on larger theories about political attitudes, we designed and conducted a 6,000-person nationally representative survey of Pakistani adults, measuring affect towards four specific militant organizations. We applied a novel measurement strategy within a groundbreaking survey to mitigate social desirability bias and non-response given the sensitive nature of militancy.

Using this approach, we uncover three important empirical patterns. First, Pakistanis are weakly negative towards a range of militant groups. Second, poor Pakistanis dislike militant groups

³⁷ Given that community-level violence is measured at the district level (in which respondents are embedded), we also tested various specifications to deal with complexities in estimating correct standard errors: (1) clustering standard errors at the district-level; (2) multi-stage clustering of standard errors; and (3) a hierarchical-linear model (HLM). In all three models, the three-way interaction between district-level violence (incidents and casualties), individual-level poverty, and the treatment is negative. In four of our six cases, the interaction term achieves statistical significance at conventional levels and in the other two cases it is close ($p < .15$) (see Online Appendix Table 12).

more than their middle-class counterparts. Third, this effect is likely driven by exposure to the externalities of militant violence as it is: (1) stronger among the urban poor, who are most exposed to the negative externalities of terrorist violence; and (2) stronger among the poor living in urban areas that suffered militant violence in the year before our survey. These results call into question conventional views about the perceived correlation between economic status and militant attitudes in Pakistan and other countries.

Several implications follow from these results. First, efforts to study the correlates of support for terrorism and militancy should aim to shed light both on how support varies with individuals' characteristics and how it varies depending on prior experiences of violence. Identifying causal relationships in this arena will be challenging but our results suggest that studies which do not account for the influence of past violence on attitudes risk making serious mistakes. If our results hold true in other countries they suggest that it is the poor who may be the most natural allies in campaigns to delegitimize militant groups. More broadly, our analysis shows the value of studying the interaction of contextual and individual variables, while much of the extant literature studies them separately.

Second, it is unlikely that improving the material wellbeing of individuals will reduce support for violent political organizations. The poorest respondents in our survey are already less supportive of militant groups than others (at least those living in urban areas). While this is not direct evidence of a causal effect, it begs the question of why past changes in socioeconomic status, which are reflected in current incomes, did not have those effects.

More generally, this research shows that nuanced studies of sensitive political attitudes are possible in even the hardest contexts. Scholars are aware of the pitfalls of measuring such attitudes in developed countries, mostly in the United States. However, they know far less about issues involved in studying such attitudes in the developing world, especially in countries ravaged by enduring violence. The fields of security studies and political behavior would be well served by

focusing more attention in this area.

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Figure 1: Illustration of The Endorsement Experiment





Figure 2: Treatment Effects by Income and Strata



Note: Difference-in-means estimates averaged across groups for the endorsement experiment, controlling for demographic and attitudinal characteristics. Demographic controls include: gender, marital status, age, access to Internet, possession of cellular phone, ability to read, ability to write, ability to perform arithmetic, formal education level, and religious sect. Attitudinal controls include measures of attitudes toward United States, views of sharia law, and attitudes towards democracy. Individuals below the 20th percentile within an individual's province-urban/rural strata group are classified as "low income." Individuals above the 80th percentile are classified as "high income."

Table 1: Support for Militant Groups

Panel A. Unconditional mean support levels				
	(1) <u>Kashmeer</u> <u>Tanzeem</u>	(2) <u>Afghan</u> <u>Taliban</u>	(3) <u>Al Qaeda</u>	(4) <u>Sectarian</u> <u>Tanzeem</u>
Group Cue	-0.011+ (0.006)	-0.015** (0.006)	-0.010+ (0.005)	-0.008 (0.005)
Constant	0.796*** (0.006)	0.796*** (0.006)	0.796*** (0.006)	0.796*** (0.006)
R ²	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000
N	5358	5358	5358	5358
Panel B. Conditional mean support levels				
	(1) <u>Kashmeer</u> <u>Tanzeem</u>	(2) <u>Afghan</u> <u>Taliban</u>	(3) <u>Al Qaeda</u>	(4) <u>Sectarian</u> <u>Tanzeem</u>
Group Cue	-0.010* (0.005)	-0.015** (0.006)	-0.009* (0.005)	-0.008+ (0.005)
Constant	0.798*** (0.031)	0.783*** (0.032)	0.791*** (0.032)	0.808*** (0.033)
R ²	0.150	0.137	0.142	0.148
N	5243	5243	5243	5243
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Attitudinal Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	N
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interactions	N	N	N	N
Group Cue-Region Interactions	N	N	N	N

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$ (two-tailed). Standard errors in parentheses.

Note: Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic controls include: gender, marital status, age, access to Internet, possession of cellular phone, ability to read, ability to write, ability to perform arithmetic, formal education level, and religious sect. Attitudinal controls include two measures of attitudes toward United States, attitudes towards democracy, and views of sharia law.

Table 2: Individual-Level Income and Support for Militant Groups

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
β : Group Cue	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.028)
η_1 : Low Income	0.039*** (0.010)	0.042*** (0.009)	0.047*** (0.009)	0.045*** (0.009)
η_2 : High Income	0.007 (0.011)	-0.000 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.010)
γ_1 : Group Cue x Low Income	-0.018+ (0.010)	-0.020* (0.010)	-0.023* (0.009)	-0.020* (0.009)
γ_2 : Group Cue x High Income	-0.002 (0.013)	-0.005 (0.012)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.013)
Constant	0.813*** (0.010)	0.886*** (0.019)	0.770*** (0.030)	0.773*** (0.032)
R ²	0.058	0.184	0.249	0.257
N	5067	5067	4978	4978
Low Income Treatment Effect ($\beta + \gamma_1$)	-0.019* (0.008)	-0.022** (0.008)	-0.022** (0.008)	—— 1
Middle Income Treatment Effect (β)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)	—— 1
High Income Treatment Effect ($\beta + \gamma_2$)	-0.003 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.011)	—— 1
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	N	Y	Y	Y
Attitudinal Controls	N	N	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interactions	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Region Interactions	N	N	N	Y

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$ (two-tailed). Standard errors in parentheses.

Note: Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic and attitudinal controls same as in Table 1. Individuals below the 20th percentile within an individual's province-urban/rural strata group are classified as "low income." Individuals above the 80th percentile are classified as "high income."

1. Inclusion of multiple interaction terms precludes calculation of treatment effect for income groups.

Table 3: District-Level Income and Support for Militant Groups

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
β : Group Cue	0.002 (0.006)	-0.000 (0.006)	-0.000 (0.005)	-0.025 (0.029)
η_1 : Low Income (District)	-0.033* (0.015)	-0.024+ (0.013)	-0.025* (0.012)	-0.025* (0.012)
η_2 : High Income (District)	-0.028 (0.023)	-0.019 (0.019)	-0.029+ (0.017)	-0.036* (0.018)
γ_1 : Group Cue x Low Income (District)	-0.016 (0.010)	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.010 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.010)
γ_2 : Group Cue x High Income (District)	-0.017 (0.015)	-0.021 (0.013)	-0.020 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.017)
Constant	0.837*** (0.012)	0.885*** (0.021)	0.773*** (0.032)	0.784*** (0.033)
R ²	0.037	0.177	0.235	0.245
N	4404	4404	4325	4325
Low Income Treatment Effect ($\beta + \gamma_1$)	-0.014+ (0.008)	-0.012 (0.008)	-0.010 (0.008)	—
Middle Income Treatment Effect (β)	0.002 (0.006)	0.000 (0.006)	0.000 (0.005)	—
High Income Treatment Effect ($\beta + \gamma_2$)	-0.014 (0.013)	-0.021+ (0.012)	-0.020+ (0.011)	—
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	N	Y	Y	Y
Attitudinal Controls	N	N	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interactions	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Region Interactions	N	N	N	Y

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$ (two-tailed). Standard errors in parentheses.

Note: Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic and attitudinal controls same as in Table 1.

Individuals in districts below the 20th percentile of district median incomes are classified as “low income.” Individuals in districts above the 80th percentile of district median incomes are classified as “high income.”

Table 4: Individual-Level Income, Urban Residence, and Support for Militant Groups

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
β : Group Cue	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.012 (0.029)
η_1 : Low Income	0.021+ (0.012)	0.025* (0.011)	0.032** (0.010)	0.030** (0.011)
η_2 : High Income	0.023+ (0.013)	0.009 (0.012)	0.003 (0.012)	0.000 (0.012)
η_3 : Urban	-0.048** (0.015)	-0.038** (0.013)	-0.033* (0.014)	-0.030* (0.014)
γ_1 : Low Income x Urban	0.061** (0.022)	0.059** (0.020)	0.053** (0.019)	0.053** (0.019)
γ_2 : High Income x Urban	-0.025 (0.021)	-0.015 (0.020)	-0.015 (0.019)	-0.013 (0.019)
γ_3 : Group Cue x Low Income	0.001 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.011)
γ_4 : Group Cue x High Income	-0.014 (0.015)	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.015 (0.015)	-0.009 (0.015)
γ_5 : Group Cue x Urban	0.029* (0.012)	0.021+ (0.012)	0.026* (0.011)	0.023* (0.012)
γ_6 : Group Cue x Low Income x Urban	-0.060** (0.021)	-0.051** (0.020)	-0.055** (0.020)	-0.059** (0.020)
γ_7 : Group Cue x High Income x Urban	0.015 (0.029)	0.018 (0.027)	0.003 (0.027)	-0.005 (0.027)
Constant	0.827*** (0.011)	0.887*** (0.019)	0.773*** (0.030)	0.775*** (0.032)
R ²	0.071	0.191	0.254	0.262
N	5067	5067	4978	4978
Low Income Treatment Effect (Urban) ($\beta + \gamma_3 + \gamma_5 + \gamma_6$)	-0.039** (0.014)	-0.042** (0.013)	-0.042** 0.013	—
Middle Income Treatment Effect (Urban) ($\beta + \gamma_5$)	0.020+ (0.010)	0.013 (0.010)	0.019* (0.009)	—
High Income Treatment Effect (Urban) ($\beta + \gamma_4 + \gamma_5 + \gamma_7$)	0.020 (0.023)	0.015 (0.020)	0.007 (0.020)	—
Low Income Treatment Effect (Rural) ($\beta + \gamma_3$)	-0.009 (0.010)	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.013 (0.009)	—
Middle Income Treatment Effect (Rural) (β)	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)	—
High Income Treatment Effect (Rural) ($\beta + \gamma_4$)	-0.024+ (0.014)	-0.024+ (0.013)	-0.021 (0.013)	—
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	N	Y	Y	Y
Attitudinal Controls	N	N	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interactions	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Region Interactions	N	N	N	Y

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$ (two-tailed). Standard errors in parentheses.

Note: Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic and attitudinal controls same as in Table 1. Classification of “low income” and “high income” individuals same as in Table 2.

Table 5: Individual-Level Income, Exposure to Violence, and Support for Militant Groups

	Incidents			Casualties		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Urban PSU, Violent District	Rural PSU, Violent District	Non- Violent District	Urban PSU, Violent District	Rural PSU, Violent District	Non- Violent District
β : Group Cue	0.016+ (0.009)	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.009)	0.013 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.008)
η_1 : Low Income	0.075*** (0.015)	0.034** (0.013)	0.045** (0.014)	0.055*** (0.013)	0.018 (0.015)	0.053*** (0.013)
η_2 : High Income	-0.009 (0.016)	0.004 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.018)	-0.006 (0.015)	0.008 (0.017)	-0.009 (0.015)
γ_1 : Group Cue x Low Income	-0.052** (0.015)	-0.011 (0.017)	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.061*** (0.015)	-0.009 (0.020)	-0.014 (0.013)
γ_2 : Group Cue x High Income	-0.008 (0.022)	-0.001 (0.018)	-0.014 (0.022)	0.002 (0.021)	-0.010 (0.023)	-0.010 (0.019)
Constant	0.794*** (0.047)	0.760*** (0.033)	0.787*** (0.049)	0.810*** (0.044)	0.740*** (0.035)	0.745*** (0.041)
R ²	0.290	0.321	0.206	0.356	0.359	0.199
N	1265	1810	1903	1117	1359	2502
Low Income Treatment Effect ($\beta + \gamma_1$)	-0.036** (0.012)	-0.019 (0.015)	-0.016 (0.012)	-0.048*** (0.013)	-0.015 (0.018)	-0.017 (0.010)
Middle Income Treatment Effect (β)	0.016+ (0.009)	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.009)	0.013 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.008)
High Income Treatment Effect ($\beta + \gamma_2$)	0.007 (0.021)	-0.009 (0.018)	-0.016 (0.018)	0.015 (0.019)	-0.016 (0.022)	-0.013 (0.016)
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Attitudinal Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	N	N	N
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interactions	N	N	N	N	N	N
Group Cue-Region Interactions	N	N	N	N	N	N

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$ (two-tailed). Standard errors in parentheses.

Note: Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic and attitudinal controls same as in Table 1.

Classification of “low income” and “high income” individuals same as in Table 2. “Violent district” indicates presence of at least one incident or casualty in the year preceding the administration of the survey.

Online Appendix
for
Poverty and Support for Militant Politics: Evidence from Pakistan

Online Appendix A: Question Wordings

Policies for Endorsement Experiment

The World Health Organizations recently announced a plan to introduced universal Polio vaccination across Pakistan. How much do you support such a plan?

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- Not at all

The newly-elected national government has proposed reforming the Frontier Crimes Regulation and making tribal areas equal to other provinces of the country. How much do you support such a plan?

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- Not at all

Governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan have explored using peace jirgas to resolve their disputes for example the location of the boundary [Durand line/Sarhad]. How much do you support such a plan?

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- Not at all

In recent years the government of Pakistan has proposed curriculum reform for madaris to minimize sectarian discord. How much do you support such a plan?

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- Not at all

Sociotropic Economic Assessment

Now thinking about the financial situation of your area, would you say that over the past year it has gotten much better, gotten a little better, stayed about the same, gotten a little worse, or gotten much worse?

Gotten much better

Gotten a little better
Stayed about the same
Gotten a little worse
Gotten much worse

Democratic Values

How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed by representatives elected by the people?

Extremely important
Very important
Moderately important
Slightly important
Not important at all

How important is it for you to live in a country where the decisions of the courts are independent from influence by political and military authorities?

Extremely important
Very important
Moderately important
Slightly important
Not important at all

How important is it that individuals be able to express their political views, even though other people may not agree with them?

Extremely important
Very important
Moderately important
Slightly important
Not important at all

How important is it that individuals be able to meet with others to work on political issues?

Extremely important
Very important
Moderately important
Slightly important
Not important at all

How important is it that individual property rights be secure? This means the state cannot take away their things without proper court proceedings?

Extremely important
Very important
Moderately important

Slightly important
Not important at all

The 1973 Constitution of Pakistan says civilians should control the military. This means the military cannot take action without orders from civilian leaders. In your opinion, how much control should civilians have over the military?

Complete control
A lot of control
A moderate amount of control
A little control
No control at all

Views of United States

Please tell us about the U.S. government's influence on the world, if it is: extremely positive, somewhat positive, neither positive nor negative, somewhat negative, or extremely negative?

Extremely positive
Somewhat positive
Neither positive nor negative
Somewhat negative
Extremely negative

Please tell us about the U.S. government's influence on Pakistan's politics, if it is: extremely positive, somewhat positive, neither positive nor negative, somewhat negative, or extremely negative?

Extremely positive
Somewhat positive
Neither positive nor negative
Somewhat negative
Extremely negative

Views of Shari'a

Here is a list of things some people say about Shari'a. Tell us which ones you agree with.
Shari'a government means:

Good governance, a government that provides services.
A government that does not have corruption.
A government that provides personal security.
A government that provides justice through functioning non-corrupt courts
A government that uses physical punishments (stoning, cutting off of hands, whipping) to make sure people obey the law

Demographics

Are you Sunni or Shi'ite?

Sunni
Shi'ite
Non-Muslim [WRITTEN IN BY INTERVIEWER IF NON-MUSLIM]

What is your age in years?

What was the highest class you completed?

Primary
Middle
Matriculant
Intermediate (F.A/F.Sc)
Graduate (B.A/B.Sc.)
Professionals (M.S.C., M.A., Ph.D. or other professional degree)
Illiterate

How much money in cash did you and your family earn in the last month?

Are you married?

Yes
No

Do you ever go online to access the Internet, do web site browsing, or to send and receive email?

Yes
No

Do you have a personal cell phone?

Yes
No

Can you read in any language with understanding?

Yes
No

Can you write in any language, more than signing your name?

Yes
No

Can you solve simple math (addition, subtraction) problems? Like 10 plus 7, or 30 divided by 5?

Yes
No

Perceptions of Groups Objectives and Activities

We're now going to ask you about a number of different groups. For each group, please answer to the best of your ability.

The first/second/third/fourth group is Pakistani militant groups fighting in Kashmir/Militant groups fighting in Afghanistan/Al-Qa'ida/Firqavarana Tanzeem

What do you think is the group's objectives? Please tell us all that apply. [GET ANSWER FOR EACH LINE BEFORE READING THE NEXT LINE.]

Justice

Democracy

Protecting muslims

Ridding the Muslim umma of people who have moved away from their religion

Freeing Occupied Kashmir [Option only given for Pakistani militant groups fighting in Kashmir]

How is the group advancing these objectives? Please tell us all that apply. [GET ANSWER FOR EACH LINE BEFORE READING THE NEXT LINE.]

Providing social services such as schools, hospitals, and medical clinics

Raising social awareness

Providing religious education

Providing worldly education

Fighting jihad

Online Appendix B: Randomization Protocol

Since our enumerators were not able to bring computers into the field—doing so was culturally inappropriate, physically risky, and complicated by severe and sustained power outages—we developed a procedure that allowed our field team to conduct the randomization with printed survey forms. There were 25 experimental conditions: 1 control questionnaire form, and $4! = 24$ possible treatment forms. We assigned the control form number 1 and the remaining forms numbers 2 to 25. Using a random number generator we randomized the order of these forms, repeating the control form 24 times. SEDCO's team then laid out the 48 boxes with these forms in randomized order and proceeded to staple them one-at-a-time onto the serialized base forms. This procedure effectively randomized across treatment and control as well as within treatment. We then randomly ordered the 500 PSUs and assigned the serialized forms to PSU in order, so form 1 went to PSU 1, form 2 went to PSU 2, etc. This added another layer of randomization. We audited every survey form in 10% of PSUs before they went into the field and found that SEDCO carried out the randomization perfectly, as the balance tests in Table 1 attest.

Online Appendix C: Overview of Militancy in Pakistan

As is well known, Pakistan has employed Islamist militancy in India and Afghanistan as a tool of foreign policy since the early weeks of statehood and has continued to date (Swami 2007; Rubin 2002; Hussain 2005; Jamal 2009). Consistent with this history, the militant landscape in Pakistan is extremely complex and populated by groups that vary in their sectarian commitments, targeting choices, theatre of operations, ethnicity of operatives, and political objectives. To understand patterns of popular support for these groups, a fairly nuanced picture of Pakistani militant organizations is in order and so this section summarizes the main active groups.

While we did not assess support for the Pakistani Taliban in the survey, we provide background on them here as the difference between them and the Afghan Taliban is important for understanding the landscape of militancy in Pakistan. Within our budget for the survey we could only interview 6,000 respondents (twice as large as any other extant survey of Pakistani public opinion). This meant we could only study four groups (i.e., divide the sample into four cells) while getting reasonable precision at the provincial level. Given this constraint, we omitted an endorsement experiment on the Pakistan Taliban because: (1) at the time the survey was designed, the group was not as prominent as it has since become; and (2) there were safety concerns of asking about this group for enumerators.

Militants Fighting in Kashmir

There are several organizations Pakistanis group under the title of “Kashmiri tanzeems” (Kashmiri groups). Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM), Harkat-ul-Ansar/Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUA/HUM), and their splinter groups have traditionally focused upon Kashmir and while they recruit within Pakistan, their recruitment materials describe their mission as “liberating” Indian-administered Kashmir from India’s dominion. In recent years, JM has become intimately involved with the Pakistan Taliban and has provided suicide attackers for assaults on Pakistani and international targets within Pakistan.

There are also several Kashmiri groups tied to the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) (a religious political party with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood), which include Hizbol Mujahideen, al Badr, and related factions. They tend to recruit Kashmiris and operate mostly in Kashmir with the goal of wresting Kashmir from India (Fair 2011).

The most prominent of the so-called “Kashmiri groups” is the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which was formed in 1986 to fight in the Kunar province of Afghanistan (Zahab 2007). After 1990, LeT shifted operational focus to Indian-administered Kashmir and subsequently expanded operations throughout India. LeT is responsible for the November 2008 Mumbai hotel attacks. Since 2004, LeT has attacked U.S. and allied forces fighting in Afghanistan. In contrast to the Deobandi groups, LeT has not targeted the Pakistani state, nor has it pursued western targets within Pakistan, and it remains generally under the control of the Interservices Intelligence Directorate (ISI) (Fair 2011).

Afghan Taliban

The Taliban government achieved dominance over most of Afghanistan by 1996 with the assistance of the ISI (Rubin 2002). The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks made it impossible for Islamabad to continue supporting the Taliban (Musharraf 2006) and when the United States-led coalition routed the Taliban in late-2001 many fled to Pakistan’s tribal areas to regroup. In 2005, the Afghan Taliban launched a renewed insurgent campaign run by leadership *shuras* in Quetta, Peshawar, and Karachi (Levin 2009). The Afghan Taliban, despite considerable organizational changes since 2001, remain focused on ousting foreign forces, aid workers, and other foreign civilians from Afghanistan, overthrowing the Karzai regime, and restoring their role in governing Afghanistan (Giustozzi 2009).

Pakistan Taliban

Since circa 2004 clusters of Pakistani militant groups began describing themselves as “Pakistani Taliban.” In the fall of 2007, Baitullah Mehsood announced the formation of the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP, Pakistani Taliban), which is a confederation of several militant commanders then

operating under his leadership.¹ While we were unable to measure support for these groups due to the combination of sample size limitations and the high level of political sensitivity surrounding them when our survey was fielded, understanding the differences between them and the Afghan Taliban is important for interpreting our results.

The goals of the militants grouped by Pakistanis as the “Pakistan Taliban” are focused on undermining the Pakistani state in select areas and establishing their own parallel governance structures organized around commanders’ particular understanding of shari’a. At the time our survey was in the field these groups had conducted few operations outside of attacking police forces in the FATA and parts of the Khyber Paktunkhwa (KP), formerly the Northwest Frontier Province or NWFP). This has unfortunately changed in subsequent months as TTP-affiliated militants have conducted attacks across Pakistan in response to government offensives against them in the FATA.

Al-Qa’ida

The most important militant group operating in Pakistan to Western policy makers and politicians is al-Qa’ida, the group responsible for the September 11, 2001, attacks. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown summed up these concerns when he reported that “three quarters of the most serious plots investigated by the British authorities have links to al-Qa’ida in Pakistan” (Coates and Page 2008). Important al-Qa’ida leaders remain in the FATA and many al-Qa’ida operatives—Abu Zubaidah, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, and others—have been arrested in Pakistani cities (Negroponte 2007).

Al-Qa’ida operatives in Pakistan have targeted the Pakistani state and executed terrorist plots targeting the West and allies. The July 7, 2005, bombings in London have been linked to al-Qa’ida in Pakistan, for example, as have numerous foiled plots since 2004 (Jones and Fair 2010). Importantly,

¹ Militant commanders and their cadres began operating under the moniker “Pakistan Taliban” as early as 2004 when the Pakistan military began military operations in South Waziristan. The so-called Talibanization of the tribal areas began in North and South Waziristan, but quickly spread to parts of the other tribal agencies as well as parts of KP. After Baitullah Mehsood’s death in August 2009, Hakimullah Mehsood leads the network of militants (Jones and Fair 2010).

few Pakistanis link al-Qa'ida to its most important actions: the 9/11 attacks on the United States. In 2009, only 4% of Pakistanis said al-Qaida was responsible those attacks while 29% blamed the United States, and 4% blamed Israel (Kull et al. 2009). Many Pakistanis are also dubious about the existence of al-Qa'ida *per se*. Perhaps part of the confusion stems from the fact that Pakistanis regularly understand "Qa'ida" to mean a "grammar book." All focus group participants in our pre-testing, however, understood what we were referring to when we explained that al-Qa'ida was "Osama bin Laden's militia." For this reason, our enumerators *always* explained this to respondents.

Sectarian Tanzeems

Pakistan is also home to a number of militant groups seeking to advance a sectarian agenda. These *firqavarana tanzeems* ("sectarian groups") include the anti-Shi'a Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP).² The Sunni sectarian groups grew to prominence in the 1980s and are now a well-established part of Pakistan's political landscape (Nasr 2000). In the past, Shi'a sectarian groups targeted Sunni Muslims, although these groups have largely disappeared.

The anti-Shi'a groups all claim to be fighting for a Sunni Deobandi Pakistan by purging the country of Shi'a, whom they view as apostates.³ Their actions typically take the form of attacks on Shi'ite mosques and community gatherings and they have increasingly attacked Christian, Sufi and Ahmediya places of worship and even individuals as well. In reality, a great deal of the anti-Shi'a violence is motivated by class issues and urbanization. The large land-holding families in Pakistan have historically been Shi'a and have not treated their tenant farmers well. Thus a class agenda has been executed through a narrative of apostasy (Nasr 2000; Zaman 1988).

² Many of these groups have been proscribed numerous times only to re-emerge. Many now operate under new names. We use the names that are likely to be most familiar to readers.

³ While an exact accounting of Shi'a in Pakistan is impossible because the Pakistani census is not fielded in areas where Shi'a are populous (e.g. the Northern Areas), they are believed to comprise 20% of the population (CIA 2011).

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Online Appendix D: Covariate Definitions

Income. We measured nominal income by asking “How much money in cash did you and your family earn in the last month?” using the same question wording in Urdu as the Pakistan Federal Bureau of Statistics does in its surveys. We divided responses into three levels (low, middle, and high) and used dummy variables for each level to capture possible non-linearities in the relationship between attitudes and income. Respondents from households making below the 20th percentile of monthly household case income in their province (e.g. KP/urban) were coded as 1 on the variable *lowincome*. Respondents making above the 75th percentile of monthly case income in their province/strata were coded as 1 on the variable *highincome*. We take this approach because theories relating income to political attitudes are usually based on relative income and so our measure should account for the fact that purchasing power and the proportion of household income in cash vary systematically across provinces and across urban and rural areas.

Educational Attainment. We measure education as a continuous indicator of the highest education level completed by the respondent, scaled to range between zero (no education) and one (master’s degree).

Support for Democratic Values. To measure support for democratic values we created an index based on the extent to which six core principles were considered important features of society to respondents: property rights, free speech, independent courts, being governed by elected representatives, having civilian control over the military, and freedom of assembly. For each aspect of liberal democratic governance we asked respondents to rate on a five-point scale how important it was to live in a country where that right was respected. All respondents who stated it was “extremely important” for a given right were assigned a 1 for that right and then we simply created an additive index of their scores across the rights (rescaled to lie between 0 and 1) to create our measure *democraticvalues*.

Views of sharia law. We include an indicator for whether the respondent believes that “sharia is a

government uses physical punishments.”

All other variables are measured straightforwardly.

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
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Table 11. Individual-Level Income, Exposure to Violence, and Support for Militant Groups


Table 12. Individual-Level Income, Exposure to Violence, and Support for Militant Groups (Varying Model Selection)

Online Appendix Figure 1: Beliefs About Groups' Objectives and Activities



Note: Mean and 95% confidence interval for responses on questions about group objectives and activities. All responses scaled to lie in [0,1].

Online Appendix Figure 2: Distribution of Support for Policies in Control Group



**Online Appendix Table 1:
Sample Demographics and Randomization Checks**

	<u>Full Sample</u>	<u>Control</u>	<u>Treatment</u>
<u>Gender (F: $p=.99$, N = 6000)</u>			
Male	53.1%	53.1%	53.1%
Female	46.9	46.9	46.9
<u>Strata (F: $p=.78$, N = 6000)</u>			
Urban	32.5%	32.6%	32.3%
Rural	67.6	67.4	67.7
<u>Province (F: $p=.72$, N = 6000)</u>			
Punjab	55.6%	55.8%	55.3%
Sindh	24.3	24.4	24.1
NWFP	13.9	13.5	14.3
Balochistan	6.3	6.3	6.2
<u>Religious Sect (F: $p=.51$, N = 6000)</u>			
Sunni	96.2%	96.3%	96.0%
Shi'ite	3.9	3.7	4.0
<u>Age (F: $p=.63$, N = 6000)</u>			
18-24	22.9%	23.2%	22.5%
25-29	18.7	19.3	18.2
30-39	29.1	28.2	29.9
40-49	17.5	17.5	17.4
50-59	7.8	7.9	7.6
60+	4.1	3.9	4.3
<u>Education (F: $p=.21$, N = 6000)</u>			
Illiterate	32.2%	32.4%	31.9%
Primary	13.1	13.7	12.6
Middle	14.9	13.8	15.9
Matriculant	19.3	19.6	19.0
Intermediate	12.3	12.8	11.9
Graduate	6.4	6.1	6.7
Professional	1.9	1.7	2.1
<u>Monthly Income (F: $p=.31$, N = 5779)</u>			
Less than 3000 PKR	9.7%	9.7%	9.6%
3,000-10,000 PKR	54.7	55.8	53.6
10,001-15,000 PKR	24.3	23.9	24.7
15,001-25,000 PKR	9.3	8.8	9.8
More than 25,000 PKR	2.0	1.8	2.2
<u>Categorical Individual-Level Income (F: $p=.16$, N = 5636)</u>			
Low income	23.7%	23.9%	23.4%
Middle income	62.9	63.5	62.9
High income	13.5	12.6	14.3
<u>Categorical District-Level Income (F: $p=.91$, N = 4944)</u>			
Low income district	29.1%	28.8%	29.3%
Middle income district	62.7	62.9	62.6
High income district	8.2	8.3	8.2

Note: Balance tests calculated on all respondents who provided data on the variable. F-stats are joint tests of equality across treatment and control conditions.

Online Appendix Table 2: Reliability of Responses by Literacy and Poverty

	<u>Illiterate</u>	<u>Literate</u>	<u>Low Income</u>	<u>Not Low Income</u>
<u>Group Objectives</u>				
Kashmeer Tanzeem	.84	.84	.81	.86
Afghan Taliban	.87	.84	.80	.87
Al Qaeda	.89	.86	.84	.88
Sectarian Tanzeem	.90	.89	.86	.91
<u>Group Activities</u>				
Kashmeer Tanzeem	.88	.85	.84	.86
Afghan Taliban	.88	.85	.82	.87
Al Qaeda	.91	.84	.84	.86
Sectarian Tanzeem	.92	.89	.87	.91
Democratic Values	.68	.73	.75	.69
N	1715	4285	1350	4286

Note: Cronbach's alpha scale reliability coefficients presented in table. Illiterate respondents defined as those who cannot read or write. Individuals below the 20th percentile within an individual's province-urban/rural strata group are classified as "low income." Respondents were asked whether the groups were pursuing three objectives with positive connotations: justice, democracy, and protecting Muslims. Respondents were asked whether the groups engaged in four activities with positive connotations: providing social services, raising social awareness, providing religious education, and providing worldly education. Respondents were asked about how important it was to live in a country with six democratic values: free speech, freedom of assembly, independent courts, being governed by elected representatives, civilian control of the military, and property rights.

Online Appendix Table 3: Non-Response Rates by Literacy and Poverty

	<u>Illiterate</u>	<u>Literate</u>	<u>p-value</u>	<u>Low Income</u>	<u>Not Low Income</u>	<u>p-value</u>
<u>Full Sample</u>						
Polio Vaccinations	1.3%	1.4%	.78	1.8%	1.0%	.02
FCR Reforms	6.4	4.8	.02	4.1	5.1	.12
Peace Jirga	4.5	3.2	.01	3.6	2.9	.19
Madrassa Reform	3.2	3.0	.73	4.0	2.2	<.001
N	1715	4285		1350	4286	
<u>Control</u>						
Polio Vaccinations	1.6%	1.4%	.69	1.9%	1.0%	.06
FCR Reforms	4.8	3.9	.25	3.5	3.7	.81
Peace Jirga	3.6	2.7	.18	3.6	2.2	.03
Madrassa Reform	2.8	2.9	.85	3.9	1.9	.002
N	854	2146		694	2137	
<u>Treatment</u>						
Polio Vaccinations	0.9%	1.3%	.39	1.7%	1.0%	.17
FCR Reforms	7.9	5.8	.03	4.7	6.6	.08
Peace Jirga	5.3	3.7	.03	3.7	3.7	.98
Madrassa Reform	3.6	3.1	.51	4.1	2.6	.04
N	861	2139		656	2149	

Note: Percentages indicate percent of respondents not answering policy question in full sample, control condition of the endorsement experiment, and treatment condition of the endorsement experiment. Classification of illiterate and low-income respondents same as in Online Appendix 2. P-values from difference-in-proportions tests.

Online Appendix Table 4:
Individual-Level Income and Support for Militant Groups (Varying Definition of Poverty)

	(1) <i>10% cutoff</i>	(2) <i>15% cutoff</i>	(3) <i>20% cutoff</i>	(4) <i>25% cutoff</i>	(5) <i>30% cutoff</i>
Group Cue	-0.001 (0.005)	0.000 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.006)
Low Income	0.039*** (0.011)	0.046*** (0.009)	0.047*** (0.009)	0.043*** (0.008)	0.045*** (0.008)
High Income	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.010)
Group Cue x Low Income	-0.026* (0.012)	-0.026* (0.010)	-0.023* (0.009)	-0.010 (0.009)	-0.013 (0.008)
Group Cue x High Income	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.013)	-0.008 (0.013)
Constant	0.781*** (0.030)	0.774*** (0.030)	0.770*** (0.030)	0.768*** (0.030)	0.763*** (0.030)
R ²	0.243	0.246	0.249	0.251	0.251
N	4978	4978	4978	4978	4978
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Attitudinal Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	N	N
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interactions	N	N	N	N	N
Group Cue-Region Interactions	N	N	N	N	N

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$ (two-tailed). Standard errors in parentheses.

Note: Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic controls include: gender, marital status, age, access to Internet, possession of cellular phone, ability to read, ability to write, ability to perform arithmetic, formal education level, and religious sect. Attitudinal controls include two measures of attitudes toward United States, attitudes towards democracy, and views of sharia law. The table shows cutoffs for the “low income” group ranging from the 10th-30th percentiles, with analogous cutoffs for the “high income” group ranging from the 70th-90th percentiles.

Online Appendix Table 5:
Individual-Level Income and Support for Militant Groups (Dropping Individual Policies)

	None Dropped	Policy Dropped			
		Polio Vaccinations	FCR Reform	Redefining Durand Line	Madrassas Curriculum Reform
Group Cue	0.001 (0.005)	-0.186*** (0.006)	-0.200*** (0.004)	-0.203*** (0.004)	-0.196*** (0.006)
Low Income	0.047*** (0.009)	0.062*** (0.011)	0.038*** (0.008)	0.029*** (0.008)	0.053*** (0.010)
High Income	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.011)
Group Cue x Low Income	-0.023* (0.009)	-0.038*** (0.011)	-0.022** (0.008)	-0.022** (0.008)	-0.026** (0.010)
Group Cue x High Income	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.014)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.010 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.012)
Constant	0.770*** (0.030)	0.755*** (0.032)	0.782*** (0.026)	0.788*** (0.027)	0.765*** (0.028)
R ²	0.249	0.424	0.535	0.556	0.480
N	4978	4978	4978	4978	4978
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Attitudinal Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	N	N
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interactions	N	N	N	N	N
Group Cue-Region Interactions	N	N	N	N	N

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$ (two-tailed). Standard errors in parentheses.

Note: Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic and attitudinal controls same as in Online Appendix Table 4. Individuals below the 20th percentile within an individual's province-urban/rural strata group are classified as "low income." Individuals above the 80th percentile are classified as "high income."

Online Appendix Table 6:
Individual-Level Income and Support for Militant Groups (Controlling for District Wealth)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Group Cue	0.009 (0.008)	0.007 (0.007)	0.007 (0.007)	-0.012 (0.030)
Low Income (Individual)	0.040*** (0.011)	0.044*** (0.010)	0.047*** (0.009)	0.045*** (0.009)
High Income (Individual)	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.014 (0.011)	-0.015 (0.011)	-0.017 (0.011)
Low Income (District)	-0.035* (0.015)	-0.027* (0.013)	-0.028* (0.012)	-0.028* (0.012)
High Income (District)	-0.022 (0.023)	-0.012 (0.019)	-0.022 (0.017)	-0.027 (0.017)
Group Cue x Low Income (Individual)	-0.021+ (0.011)	-0.023* (0.010)	-0.024* (0.010)	-0.020* (0.010)
Group Cue x High Income (Individual)	-0.000 (0.015)	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.002 (0.014)	0.000 (0.014)
Group Cue x Low Income (District)	-0.017+ (0.010)	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.010 (0.009)	-0.010 (0.010)
Group Cue x High Income (District)	-0.017 (0.014)	-0.021 (0.013)	-0.020 (0.013)	-0.012 (0.017)
Constant	0.828*** (0.013)	0.868*** (0.021)	0.751*** (0.032)	0.759*** (0.034)
R ²	0.044	0.193	0.251	0.260
N	4221	4221	4150	4150
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	N	Y	Y	Y
Attitudinal Controls	N	N	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interactions	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Region Interactions	N	N	N	Y

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$ (two-tailed). Standard errors in parentheses.

Note: Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic and attitudinal controls same as in Online Appendix Table 4. Classification of “low income” and “high income” individuals same as in Online Appendix Table 5. Individuals in districts below the 20th percentile of district median incomes are classified as “low income.” Individuals in districts above the 80th percentile of district median incomes are classified as “high income.”

Online Appendix Table 7:
District-Level Income and Support for Militant Groups (Varying Model Selection)

	(1) <u>Clustering by</u> <u>District</u>	(2) <u>Multistage</u> <u>Clustering</u>	(3) <u>Hierarchical</u> <u>Model</u>
Group Cue	-0.000 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.013)	-0.010* (0.004)
Low Income (District)	-0.025+ (0.014)	-0.017 (0.020)	-0.016 (0.017)
High Income (District)	-0.029+ (0.015)	-0.030*** (0.005)	-0.022 (0.029)
Group Cue x Low Income (District)	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.010)	0.002 (0.007)
Group Cue x High Income (District)	-0.019 (0.017)	-0.015 (0.019)	-0.013 (0.008)
Constant	0.774*** (0.038)	0.753*** (0.044)	0.820*** (0.020)
R ²	0.235	0.241	—
N	4325	4325	4325
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y
Attitudinal Controls	Y	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	N
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interactions	N	N	N
Group Cue-Region Interactions	N	N	N

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$ (two-tailed). Standard errors in parentheses.

Note: Demographic and attitudinal controls same as in Online Appendix Table 4. Classification of “low income” and “high income” individuals same as in Online Appendix Table 5. Classification of “low income” and “high income” districts same as in Online Appendix Table 6.

Online Appendix Table 8:
Sociotropic Economic Perceptions and Support for Militant Groups

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Group Cue	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.011)	-0.026 (0.031)
Sociotropic Perception	0.013*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.011** (0.003)
Group Cue x Sociotropic Perception	0.000 (0.004)	0.000 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)
Constant	0.785*** (0.014)	0.858*** (0.022)	0.759*** (0.032)	0.771*** (0.034)
R ²	0.064	0.186	0.238	0.245
N	5186	5186	5080	5080
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	N	Y	Y	Y
Attitudinal Controls	N	N	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interactions	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Region Interactions	N	N	N	Y

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$ (two-tailed). Standard errors in parentheses.

Note: Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic and attitudinal controls same as in Online Appendix Table 4. Sociotropic perception measured on five-point scale ranging from “gotten much worse” to “gotten much better.”

Online Appendix Table 9:
Individual-Level Income and Support for Militant Groups (Controlling for Sociotropic Perceptions)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Group Cue	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.012)	0.000 (0.012)	-0.012 (0.031)
Low Income	0.038*** (0.010)	0.040*** (0.009)	0.046*** (0.009)	0.044*** (0.009)
High Income	0.006 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.009 (0.010)
Sociotropic Perception	0.013*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.011** (0.003)	0.011** (0.003)
Group Cue x Low Income	-0.017+ (0.010)	-0.019+ (0.010)	-0.022* (0.009)	-0.019* (0.009)
Group Cue x High Income	-0.005 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.011 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.013)
Group Cue x Sociotropic Perception	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.000 (0.004)
Constant	0.774*** (0.014)	0.843*** (0.022)	0.738*** (0.033)	0.744*** (0.035)
R ²	0.066	0.194	0.250	0.258
N	4913	4913	4828	4828
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	N	Y	Y	Y
Attitudinal Controls	N	N	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interactions	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Region Interactions	N	N	N	Y

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$ (two-tailed). Standard errors in parentheses.

Note: Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic and attitudinal controls same as in Online Appendix Table 4. Classification of “low income” and “high income” individuals same as in Online Appendix Table 5. Sociotropic perception measured on five-point scale ranging from “gotten much worse” to “gotten much better.”

Online Appendix Table 10:
Individual-Level Income, Urban Residence, and Support for Militant Groups
(Varying Definition of Poverty)

	(1) <i>10% cutoff</i>	(2) <i>15% cutoff</i>	(3) <i>20% cutoff</i>	(4) <i>25% cutoff</i>	(5) <i>30% cutoff</i>
Group Cue	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.010 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.007)
Low Income	0.019 (0.014)	0.025* (0.011)	0.032** (0.010)	0.029** (0.010)	0.032*** (0.009)
High Income	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.000 (0.012)	0.003 (0.012)	0.003 (0.012)	0.005 (0.012)
Urban	-0.028* (0.013)	-0.033* (0.013)	-0.033* (0.014)	-0.036* (0.014)	-0.038* (0.015)
Low Income x Urban	0.070*** (0.021)	0.073*** (0.020)	0.053** (0.019)	0.051** (0.019)	0.048** (0.018)
High Income x Urban	-0.018 (0.019)	-0.014 (0.019)	-0.015 (0.019)	-0.012 (0.019)	-0.011 (0.019)
Group Cue x Low Income	-0.001 (0.014)	-0.010 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.011)	0.005 (0.011)	-0.002 (0.010)
Group Cue x High Income	-0.013 (0.015)	-0.015 (0.015)	-0.015 (0.015)	-0.012 (0.015)	-0.014 (0.015)
Group Cue x Urban	0.024* (0.010)	0.022* (0.011)	0.026* (0.011)	0.026* (0.012)	0.022 (0.013)
Group Cue x Low Income x Urban	-0.081** (0.027)	-0.054* (0.023)	-0.055** (0.020)	-0.047* (0.020)	-0.033+ (0.019)
Group Cue x High Income x Urban	0.005 (0.026)	0.007 (0.026)	0.003 (0.027)	0.003 (0.027)	0.007 (0.028)
Constant	0.782*** (0.029)	0.778*** (0.029)	0.773*** (0.030)	0.770*** (0.030)	0.766*** (0.030)
R ²	0.248	0.253	0.254	0.256	0.257
N	4978	4978	4978	4978	4978
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Attitudinal Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	N	N
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interactions	N	N	N	N	N
Group Cue-Region Interactions	N	N	N	N	N

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$ (two-tailed). Standard errors in parentheses.

Note: Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic and attitudinal controls same as in Online Appendix Table 4. Classification of “low income” and “high income” individuals same as in Online Appendix Table 5.

**Online Appendix Table 11:
Individual-Level Income, Exposure to Violence, and Support for Militant Groups**

	Incidents			Casualties		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Group Cue	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.029)	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.028)
Low Income	0.027* (0.012)	0.037*** (0.010)	0.035** (0.010)	0.032** (0.012)	0.043*** (0.010)	0.042*** (0.010)
High Income	0.015 (0.013)	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.012)	0.013 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.012)
Violence	-0.025 (0.016)	-0.011 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.013)	-0.039* (0.016)	-0.028* (0.014)	-0.025+ (0.013)
Low Income x Violence	0.051* (0.022)	0.044* (0.019)	0.044* (0.020)	0.032 (0.022)	0.023 (0.018)	0.020 (0.018)
High Income x Violence	-0.025 (0.023)	-0.014 (0.020)	-0.012 (0.020)	-0.015 (0.023)	-0.006 (0.020)	-0.004 (0.020)
Group Cue x Low Income	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.015 (0.011)	-0.012 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.015 (0.011)	-0.013 (0.011)
Group Cue x High Income	-0.007 (0.015)	-0.012 (0.015)	-0.008 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.015)	-0.012 (0.015)	-0.008 (0.015)
Group Cue x Violence	0.023+ (0.012)	0.015 (0.011)	0.014 (0.011)	0.023* (0.012)	0.016 (0.011)	0.014 (0.011)
Group Cue x Low Income x Violence	-0.040+ (0.021)	-0.034+ (0.019)	-0.036+ (0.019)	-0.044* (0.021)	-0.040* (0.019)	-0.039+ (0.020)
Group Cue x High Income x Violence	0.013 (0.031)	0.011 (0.027)	0.000 (0.027)	0.010 (0.031)	0.010 (0.027)	-0.001 (0.027)
Constant	0.818*** (0.010)	0.774*** (0.030)	0.776*** (0.032)	0.820*** (0.010)	0.768*** (0.030)	0.769*** (0.032)
R ²	0.062	0.251	0.259	0.065	0.252	0.259
N	5067	4978	4978	5067	4978	4978
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Attitudinal Controls	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interactions	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Region Interactions	N	N	Y	N	N	Y

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$ (two-tailed). Standard errors in parentheses.

Note: Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic and attitudinal controls same as in Online Appendix Table 4. Classification of “low income” and “high income” individuals same as in Online Appendix Table 5. “Violence” indicates district in urban PSUs with at least one incident or causality in the year preceding administration of the survey.

**Online Appendix Table 12:
Individual-Level Income, Exposure to Violence, and Support for Militant Groups
(Varying Model Selection)**

	Incidents			Casualties		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Group Cue	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.012** (0.004)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.013** (0.004)
Low Income	0.037** (0.014)	0.027 (0.019)	0.004 (0.006)	0.043** (0.015)	0.033+ (0.020)	0.004 (0.006)
High Income	-0.002 (0.012)	0.002 (0.014)	0.003 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.012)	0.003 (0.007)
Violence	-0.011 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.011)	0.003 (0.014)	-0.028* (0.013)	-0.026+ (0.014)	-0.022 (0.015)
Low Income x Violence	0.044 (0.027)	0.038*** (0.010)	0.008 (0.011)	0.023 (0.021)	0.018 (0.013)	0.013 (0.012)
High Income x Violence	-0.014 (0.023)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.007 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.026)	-0.002 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.014)
Group Cue x Low Income	-0.015 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.011)	0.001 (0.008)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.010 (0.012)	0.003 (0.007)
Group Cue x High Income	-0.012 (0.012)	-0.018 (0.016)	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.012)	-0.018 (0.016)	-0.012 (0.009)
Group Cue x Violence	0.015 (0.010)	0.015** (0.005)	0.015+ (0.008)	0.016+ (0.009)	0.017+ (0.009)	0.018* (0.008)
Group Cue x Low Income x Violence	-0.034 (0.022)	-0.026* (0.012)	-0.022 (0.015)	-0.040* (0.020)	-0.033** (0.011)	-0.034* (0.016)
Group Cue x High Income x Violence	0.011 (0.024)	0.007 (0.020)	0.002 (0.018)	0.010 (0.025)	0.006 (0.018)	0.006 (0.019)
Constant	0.774*** (0.040)	0.763*** (0.019)	0.819*** (0.019)	0.768*** (0.041)	0.757*** (0.018)	0.821*** (0.019)
R ²	0.251	0.259	—	0.252	0.260	—
N	4978	4978	4978	4978	4978	4978
Model	Dist. Clust.	Multi- Way	HLM	Dist. Clust.	Multi- Way	HLM
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Attitudinal Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	N	N	N
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interactions	N	N	N	N	N	N
Group Cue-Region Interactions	N	N	N	N	N	N

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$ (two-tailed). Standard errors in parentheses.

Note: Demographic and attitudinal controls same as in Online Appendix Table 4. Classification of “low income” and “high income” individuals same as in Online Appendix Table 5. “Violence” indicates district in urban PSUs with at least one incident or causality in the year preceding administration of the survey.