Does Community Policing Build Trust in Police and Reduce Crime? Evidence from Six Coordinated Field Experiments in the Global South

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Is it possible for societies to reduce crime without creating or exacerbating adversarial relationships between the police and citizens? Community-oriented policing is a widely celebrated reform that aims to do so, and advocates are calling for its adoption around the world. However, the evidence base is limited to a small number of countries, does not generally study the bundle of practices commonly implemented together, and is largely silent on effects on trust. We designed six field experiments with police agencies in the Global South to study locally designed models of community policing, with coordinated measures of crime and the attitudes and behaviors of citizens and police from both surveys and administrative data. In a preregistered meta-analysis, we find that these interventions largely failed to improve citizen-police relations and do not reduce crime. Structural reforms to police agencies may be required for incremental reforms such as community policing to succeed.

Introduction

Over the past quarter century, the death toll from war dramatically declined (*1*). In its place, other forms of violence surged. Today, more than one quarter of the world's population lives in conditions of insecurity due to high levels of crime and violence unrelated to war, especially in the Global South (*2*). Even where crime rates are falling, including in North America and Europe, crime victimization remains highly unequal, falling disproportionately on marginalized groups (*3*). Importantly, insecurity is driven not just by criminals, but also by police, who victimize citizens physically (*4–6*) and financially (*7*).

Reducing crime and insecurity now stands at the top of the global policy agenda. The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, adopted in 2015, commit countries to achieve "just, peaceful, and inclusive societies," with a focus on insecurity due to crime and violence. At the same time, with widespread Black Lives Matter protests against police abuse in the United States and around the world, including most recently in Nigeria, the issue of how to address inequalities in the criminal justice system and rein in police abuse has never been more salient.

How can societies effectively reduce crime and insecurity? One important answer

to this challenge begins with the police (*8, 9*). Since the origins of modern policing in the early 1800s, societies around the world have relied on a professional, uniformed, and regulated authority to prevent crime and maintain order (*10*). But the creation of modern policing generated problems of its own: the lack of independence of police from political influence (*11, 12*), the misuse of their coercive capability (*13, 14*), and the challenges of maintaining the respect, approval, and cooperation of the public (*15–17*). These problems are particularly severe in the Global South where modern policing had its origins in coercive institutions of colonial control.

Mistrust of the police is widespread (*18*), though it takes a different form in different regions. In the US and Europe, while the majority express confidence in the capability and fairness of the police, this view is not shared by people of color and marginalized groups who feel unfairly targeted and victimized by police misconduct (*19, 20*). In the Global South, confidence in the police is generally low (*21, 22*). Concerns that the police misuse their authority to enrich themselves or to advance the political interests of the government are broadly shared. This underlines a central tension in efforts to address widespread crime and insecurity, especially as greater investments are made in police capability. Many policing innovations intended to reduce crime have backfired by eroding citizen trust and cooperation with the police, including stop-and-frisk, zero-tolerance policies, broken windows policing, and militarized policing (*18, 23–26*).[1] In this paper, we ask: can community policing reduce crime *and* build trust in the police?

In recent decades, perhaps the most celebrated reform to address both crime and citizen-police trust has been the introduction of community policing. Broadly, community policing departs from traditional policing by "involv[ing] average citizens directly in the police process" to build channels of dialogue and improve police-citizen collaboration (*28*). Community policing programs often involve increasing the frequency of beat patrols; decentralized decision-making; community engagement programs, such as

[1]The evidence on whether these strategies succeed in the goal of reducing crime is contested (*27*).

town halls; and problem-oriented policing programs to act on information from citizens to prevent crime (*29, 30*). By expanding opportunities for communication and engagement, community policing is designed to generate trust and build more effective police agencies in environments of low trust (*28, 29, 31*). A reform that had its origins in new practices pioneered in the U.S. and United Kingdom is increasingly advanced as a solution to the mistrust that characterizes police-community relations in many countries in the Global South. Community policing has been implemented by police agencies on all seven continents, and is promoted by many international donors including the European Union (*32*) in police reform efforts across its member states, the US in its "train-and-equip" programs that built new police forces after the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (*33*), and the United Nations in training programs in its peacekeeping missions around the world. The UN calls community policing "an essential part of peacebuilding" (*34*). The International Council of Chiefs of Police encourages police agencies to adopt community policing as "the key operational philosophy in mission statements, strategic plans, and leadership development programs" (*35*).

However, despite the great enthusiasm of professionals for adopting community policing around the world, the evidence is mixed and incomplete. Through a systematic review, we identified 37 randomized trials, the majority of which study two important sub-components of community policing: increasing the presence of police in communities, e.g., more frequent foot patrols (20 studies); and problem-oriented policing (7). The weight of evidence suggests these interventions reduce crime, but a number of studies find mixed or null results especially for community presence interventions. There is little evidence on how these interventions impact perceptions of insecurity or the frequency of police abuse. Moreover, there is little evidence on other common components of community policing including community meetings and tip-lines. Most notably, the studies are nearly all from the U.S., the U.K., and Australia. A very small number come from the Global South (*36–42*). In short, our analysis is in line with a National Academy

of Sciences panel on improving the fairness and effectiveness of police, which concluded that there is "not yet enough evidence" on the effectiveness of community policing (*43*), especially at a time when reformers consider adopting these new practices in contexts starkly different from those where it was pioneered.

In this paper, we report on the results of a multi-site randomized trial of community policing in six contexts. The trials were conducted in Santa Catarina State in Brazil; the city of Medellín in Colombia; Liberia's capital city, Monrovia; Sorgoson Province in the Philippines; in rural areas throughout Uganda; and in two populous districts in Punjab province in Pakistan. In each site, we collaborated directly with the relevant local police agency, which implemented a locally appropriate community policing intervention. Informed by global best practices, the interventions had a core set of common elements across all six contexts, but also included elements that built on existing approaches in each agency. In addition, the six research teams coordinated on an empirical strategy and harmonized outcome measures of crime, insecurity, and trust in the police, all of which were pre-registered. In total, community policing interventions were implemented in 598 neighborhoods, districts, and villages reaching approximately 6.6 million people. Across the coordinated studies, we ask whether the implementation of these community policing practices generated changes in the level of trust in the police, observed cooperation by citizens with the police, and the rate of crime, among other outcomes. We measure these outcomes through harmonized surveys of citizens and police officers and with administrative data from the police on crime and citizen cooperation. 16,869 citizens and 664 police officers were interviewed in our post-intervention surveys.

The main contribution of this study is the systematic evaluation of locally appropriate community policing practices across a set of highly diverse contexts in the Global South. In doing so, we address four particular shortcomings of the existing evidence base. First, we measure a harmonized and comprehensive set of outcomes including crime rates, citizen perceptions of and cooperation with the police, and police abuse. Without evidence

on all of these outcomes from the same studies, it is difficult to determine whether decreases in crime rates (if any) are accompanied by an erosion of trust as in past police reform efforts, or whether community policing improves police-community relations. Second, we examine local programs that strive to adopt multiple practices advanced by advocates of community policing, including police-community forums, increased police presence in communities, and problem-oriented policing. When studied in isolation, the interactive and cumulative effects of these programs, which tend to be implemented together in actual practice, would be missed. Third, these studies were designed jointly, preregistered, and implemented during the same period, thus increasing our confidence in the comparability of the results and avoiding the widespread challenge of publication bias (*44*). Finally, this project expands the scope of evidence on community policing to the Global South, where these reforms are increasingly deployed and where there is considerable policy momentum to address high levels of crime and police abuse. By reporting on simultaneous trials in multiple sites, the study provides evidence of the external validity of its findings unusual in the social sciences (*45–47*).

Our preregistered meta-analysis finds that these community policing interventions do not generate greater trust between citizens and the police or reduce crime: we are able to reject even small improvements in our primary outcomes measures. We are also able to reject even small backfire effects. We detected evidence of compliance with the interventions, including stepped up foot patrols and regular community meetings, in all sites except in Brazil.[2] Across the sites, even in those with the highest levels of compliance, community policing practices did not lead to changes in our primary outcomes: crime victimization, perceived future insecurity, perceptions of police, police perceptions of citizens, police abuse, crime reporting, crime tips, or the reporting of police abuse. We see some changes in secondary attitudinal outcomes in terms of perceived police capacity (Colombia) and perceived police intentions toward citizens (Liberia and Pakistan).

[2]The Brazil study relies on an encouragement design, unlike the other sites which randomize community policing practices directly.

In sum, however, locally designed increases in community policing did not lead to the expected changes in any of our six sites, in high or low crime communities, or among individuals with high or low baseline levels of trust in the police. Moreover, crime displacement does not appear to explain our results. In short, as implemented in practice, community policing practices do not deliver the benefits claimed by their advocates. In contexts with limited incentive and resources to change, incremental reforms to police practices such as community policing may have to be preceded or complemented by structural reforms in order to be successful.

Prior evidence on community policing

To assess the existing literature on community policing, we conducted a systematic review of studies on the effectiveness of the component parts of community policing, such as foot patrols and problem-oriented policing.[3] The review identified a total of 1,963 studies, of which 177 were deemed relevant. From these studies, 238 estimates of effectiveness were analyzed.[4] We classified the type of intervention and the type of outcome each study examines as well as whether results suggested an increase or decrease, were null, or were mixed with some positive, negative, and null. Details on the search protocol, filtering, and coding are in the Supplementary Materials.

The 177 studies include 37 randomized trials, whose results we describe in Table 1, as well as 140 observational studies described in the Supplementary Materials. 22 of the randomized trials are published in peer-reviewed journals. Only two of the trials were preregistered. The bulk of experimental evidence comes from three countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia (82%). More than two-thirds of observational

[3]We follow the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines for reporting. The review includes English-language studies published on or after 1970. In addition to published articles, unpublished studies are included to reduce the impact of publication bias against null findings. The review also covers articles with a range of methodological approaches from randomized controlled trials to observational analyses and qualitative cases studies.

[4]Studies with multiple interventions and outcomes are treated as separate estimates to evaluate an intervention's individual effect on each outcome.

evidence was also collected in these three countries.

We find that problem-oriented policing likely reduces crime (*48*). In addition, 10 randomized trials find that community presence reduces crime incidence, but four trials find null results and eight yield mixed results (68%). The evidence is not conclusive given the small number of studies, but the balance of evidence suggests increasing community presence does not significantly impact citizen perceptions of safety or their views of the police. It appears, again with limited evidence, that problem-oriented policing may increase perceptions of safety.

More broadly, as illustrated by the "evidence gap map" in Table 1, there remains a great deal to learn about the impacts of community policing. Few studies examine multiple families of outcomes (e.g., crime and perceptions of the police). Though we have collected substantial evidence on how components of community policing affect crime rates, we know little about how perceived insecurity, police abuse, and citizen cooperation with the police are affected.

Perhaps most importantly for this study, the evidence on community policing in the Global South is limited. We identified only five randomized trials, conducted in Colombia, India, and Liberia. Because each study focused on a unique intervention with their own preferred outcome variables–e.g. hot spot policing in Colombia, changes in management practices in India, and increased community patrols in Liberia–comparison is difficult, underscoring the need for a coordinated approach.

Crime and policing in the Global South

This study examines community policing in six contexts that differ substantially from the developed countries where it has been tested in prior research. Some of the six are less democratic (indeed, two are autocracies); less wealthy; and most share a recent history of armed conflict. Police share law enforcement responsibility with other formal authorities such as auxiliary police or with vigilante groups in several of them. As

a result, the impact of community policing may differ from estimates in past studies. Instead, our goal is to provide probative evidence about whether community policing practices are an appropriate policy in the Global South. The six contexts represent a range of political and economic circumstances and baseline experience with the police is representative of variation across the Global South, though particularly in places with a history of conflict.

The first study site is a set of urban municipalities in Santa Catarina State in southern Brazil. Santa Catarina is a wealthy part of Brazil, a hub of industry and tourism. However, it is not immune to either the high crime rates or victimization by a highly-militarized police force. São José, one municipality in the study, has a higher rate of death at the hands of the police than Honduras, the world's most violent country in terms of crime. Organized crime is also present in Santa Catarina, accused of involvement in widespread attacks on buses, public buildings, and security agents. We partner with the military police, responsible for public safety in the state.

In Colombia, we partner with the national police in its second-largest city, Medellín, home to three million people. The city, nestled in the Andes mountains in South America, was the home of Pablo Escobar's drug cartel and in the 1980s it was known as the most violent city in the world. Its police also had a fearsome reputation. Since then, there has been a marked decrease in crime victimization and police abuse. However, the police have seen little improvement in citizen trust in that period.

Our third site is Monrovia, the capital city of Liberia, a West African country that was plagued by a decade of civil war ending in 2003. Residents are subject to high crime rates and ongoing vigilante violence. 24% of residents report an active local security group unaffiliated with the police in their neighborhood. Moreover, the limited reach of the state over decades has left many unfamiliar with the laws and how to report violations to the police.

In Pakistan, we partnered with the police in two mixed urban-rural districts in Sheikhupura

Region in Punjab Province near the Indian border. Sheikhupura and Nankana Sahab districts are home to five million people. Sheikhupura has lower crime rates than our other contexts, but the police are among the least trusted institutions in Pakistan. The police are constrained in their ability to investigate crimes: many crimes require magistrate approval for investigation, which makes the process cumbersome, and eyewitness testimony is a de facto requirement for prosecution. Driven by the perception that police effort is tied to political connections, citizen cooperation is extremely low.

Sorsogon Province, the southernmost province in the populous island of Luzon, is the site of our partnership in the Philippines. Most of the province is rural, with its largest urban center, Sorsogon City, home to 20% of the Province's 800,000 people. The national police provide security alongside a semi-professional auxiliary police called tanods appointed by local leaders. Tanods deal with minor crimes and disputes and day-to-day tasks such as directing traffic. The police are widely present in urban centers, but less so in rural areas (45% reported to us that they see a police officer once a month or less, but they report seeing tanods daily). Importantly, though the Philippines National Police are associated with President Rodrigo Duterte's war on drugs, there is little drug or anti-drug related violence in Sorsogon. However, the reputation of the Philippines police for extrajudicial violence in other provinces erodes the trust of Sorsogon residents. Crime and interpersonal disputes were common at baseline, notably theft. Traffic accidents were also very common. Sorsogon Province is also home to a long-running communist rebellion of the New People's Army in rural areas.

Finally, we partnered with the national police in rural parts of Uganda in East Africa. Led by longtime President Yoweri Museveni, Uganda is the only country we study that Freedom House ranks as "not free," though it holds regular elections with some limited competition. As in many authoritarian contexts, the Uganda Police Force serves dual roles: preventing and responding to crime, and maintaining the power of the ruling National Resistance Movement. As a result, levels of trust are low, but rank in the

middle of the distribution for African states. Theft, sex-related crimes, financial crimes, and child-related crimes such as neglect are most common. Crime is less common in the rural areas we study than in cities, but is still high.

In terms of political institutions, there is considerable range among the six, but they also differ substantially from the contexts where community policing has been tested in the past. Two are classified as electoral autocracies and Freedom House ranked five as only partly free or worse (see Table 2). The six all rank in the bottom half of the world in terms of government corruption (they range in rank from near the top of that group, the Philippines, to near the bottom, Pakistan). In terms of the quality of criminal justice institutions, all six are in the bottom fifth, but span that grouping.

Wealth is a key driver of the capacity of states to provide services including policing. All six countries are significantly poorer than the typical context studied in past research. In terms of the distribution of global income, they range from low income (Liberia and Uganda) to lower middle income (Pakistan and the Philippines) to upper middle income (Brazil and Colombia). Wealth inequality, however, also affects crime outcomes. Brazil and Colombia are among the 20 most unequal economies in the world.

Crime and policing are shaped by past experience with violence. Unlike past studies in the West, five of six of our cases have a recent history of armed civil conflict, a feature common to many countries in the Global South. Low-level civil conflict is still present in the region in which we worked in the Philippines, and fighting continues in others parts of the country in Colombia, Pakistan, and Uganda. Decades of civil war in Liberia came to end in 2003.

Despite these commonalities, our six contexts do vary considerably in the crime and policing conditions at baseline. They vary in terms of initial rates of crime victimization, trust in police, officer intentions toward citizens, citizen cooperation with police, and police capacity (see Table 2). Our harmonized measure of trust in police ranged at baseline from 19% (Colombia) to 86% (Philippines). Violent crime was frequent in some

contexts (9% in Uganda reported having a murder committed in their community) and rare in others (only 1% reported a murder in the community in the past year in the Philippines). Police ranged widely from high-capacity forces in Brazil (annual budget per officer of $56,000) to those in which police officers did not have regular access to a gun, radio, or vehicle (Liberia).

If community policing practices work in some, but not all of these environments, it may be due to the variation in institutional settings and baseline conditions. If these practices yield little progress in all of the contexts, it may provide evidence that community policing interventions may not address the core challenges of crime and insecurity in the Global South.

Community policing across contexts

An implicit theory of citizen-police relations underlies community policing. Citizens are a critical source of valuable information about where crime is happening, who is committing it, and the concerns they have about suspicious people or activities. This kind of information, when provided consistently, helps the police allocate their time and attention in ways that will prevent crime and improve public safety (*49*).

When citizens consider whether to cooperate with the police, they weigh the costs of this cooperation against the expected returns (*50*). Citizens often face search costs: they may not know how or on what issues to engage the police, may need to travel long distances to reach police stations, or may lack access to telephones to call the police. They may also fear retaliation (and judge the police to be unable to protect them). In terms of benefits, citizens have expectations about their capacity or willingness to act in response to reports. In environments of high corruption, low capacity, or predatory police behavior, citizens may calculate that the costs of engaging the police exceed the benefits. When citizens do not cooperate with police, police may be less effective, which may affect citizen perceptions of police intentions, generating a vicious cycle.

Community policing aims to break this cycle, by affecting the costs and benefits of cooperation and directly affecting police behaviors. Costs are brought down by significantly increasing the visibility and accessibility of police officers, and creating an environment in which it becomes accepted to engage and work closely with the security forces. Formal meetings and regular lines of communication reinforce this new norm. Expected benefits are increased by changing perceptions about both the intentions and capacity of the police. By increasing interaction with citizens, community policing may also more directly affect police behavior, by increasing the risks to abusing their positions and victimizing citizens or simply by improving intentions toward citizens.

We approach community policing from the perspective that trust in the police is causally connected with effective policing and the incidence of crime. But we note that not all practitioners of community policing go this far: indeed some have a simpler goal of increasing trust between citizens and the police, whether or not this generates improvements in security. We are motivated, however, by the advocates who suggest that community policing can initiate a virtuous cycle of citizen cooperation, improved police behavior, and increased security. For example, the Obama Administration's 21st Century Policing Task Force opened its report by saying, "Trust between law enforcement agencies and the people they protect and serve is essential in a democracy," highlighting the importance of trust for police effectiveness, but also in shaping citizen perceptions of the integrity of the criminal justice system overall (*51*). The International Association of Chiefs of Police, a prominent advocate of community policing, similarly argues that "[t]rust and transparency between law enforcement agencies and the people they serve is vital to community stability, officer safety, and effective policing" (*35*). The United Nations promotes community policing with partner police forces, and implements these practices in its own police forces working in post-conflict settings. They argue that UN police who implement community policing practices such as foot patrols can "build confidence and trust in populations that have suffered at the hands of abusive security

forces, thereby laying the foundations for the resuscitation of this important element of the social contract and ushering in the eventual return of host-state police" (*52*).

A wide range of individual programs are labeled community policing, including local beat patrols; townhall meetings between police and citizens; citizen crime reporting hotlines; frequent confidence-building patrols; citizen ombuds-persons; home visits by police; neighborhood watches; and government oversight of non-criminal issues, such as building code enforcement. Yet four principles are common to many programs identified by experts as exemplars: (1) implementation of beat patrols in which officers are assigned to patrol small neighborhoods or villages, (2) decentralization of decision-making authority to those beat officers and their supervisors, (3) community engagement programs to solicit information on community problems from citizens and transmit information about police programs to citizens; and (4) problem-oriented policing programs, in which police address problems identified through community engagement programs directly with dedicated budgets for small projects and/or indirectly with the assistance of other public or private agencies (*29, 30*).

To understand the efficacy of community policing practices in the Global South, independent research teams coordinated on the design and implementation of randomized trials working with the police agencies in six different contexts — all of which experience pervasive insecurity and high levels of mistrust in the police. Each study included an intervention that was coordinated across teams ("common arm") as well as a study-specific treatment. Table 3 summarizes the six interventions.

At each site, we worked with the police agency to develop a locally appropriate community policing intervention informed by global best practices. In some contexts, this meant building on existing approaches, while in others a community orientation was largely new. Regardless of the baseline practices, however, the locally appropriate interventions were designed to represent a meaningful increase in community policing practices.

Given the different baseline conditions across the country contexts, several aspects of the core intervention vary. Although it might be ideal to launch identical interventions across contexts, that was unrealistic in the context of actual police work. Instead, each team focused on working with their respective police department to identify specific and concrete ways they could increase their commitment to community- and problem-oriented policing. The result is a set of interventions with core features in common, and complementary elements that differ across contexts.

We changed policing practices in each site at the level of police beats as defined by the police, or in settings without well-defined beats, the smallest police or administrative unit (detailed descriptions of interventions in each site are included in SM A.). In several, we focused on areas identified by the police as suitable for community policing.[5] Units ranged in size from small small police beats in Colombia to large rural police station catchment areas in Uganda. We studied rural, urban, and mixed areas, with population densities from 338 people per square kilometer in Pakistan to over 25,000 in Colombia.

Officers were reassigned from other duties to carry out the new community policing activities. In some cases, this meant reassignment to another station, but in others they were selected from among local officers. In all sites except Colombia and Uganda, these officers were dedicated to community policing during the course of the study. Training was provided to officers in Pakistan, Philippines, and Uganda, and sporadically but not systematically in the other sites. In Pakistan, for example, a four day, eight hours a day training was held on community policing, police rules, the SARA method and other strategies for problem solving, and on how to hold successful townhall meetings. In some, the training was considerably shorter and less structured.

Working with our partners, we introduced or increased the intensity of community policing practices in five different ways. First, to increase community engagement, we

[5]Commanders selected urban neighborhoods to prioritize in Brazil; half of communities in Liberia were selected by the police as high crime areas; and the Ugandan Police Force decided to focus the intervention on rural areas.

held between one and six townhall meetings with citizens and the police in each context. These 1-3 hour convenings took the form of prescheduled meetings advertised through flyers, online ads, by patrolling officers, and other means.[6] Meetings were organized by the police themselves and in some cases other government officials also attended.[7] Average attendance ranged across sites from 18 to 51 (see SM Table SM1) but some meetings included hundreds of individuals. At most sites, facilitators or trained officers ensured a common agenda was followed. Content often included a presentation on the roles of the police and procedures for reporting crime and police abuse, and an open discussion in which citizens raised concerns related to crime, problems in the community, and concerns about police behavior and performance. In some cases, community leaders were present among citizen participants.

An additional tool for increasing community engagement was the community watch forum: meetings with neighborhood watch groups. Community or neighborhood watches exist in many settings, and formal police engagement with them took place sporadically at three of our sites: Liberia, Pakistan, and Uganda. Our intervention expanded this formalization in both countries. During watch forum meetings, the groups share information about crime and discuss strategies to reduce crime in collaboration with police. The watch groups themselves also work to educate citizens about the police and in some cases serve as auxiliary patrols in high crime areas. A small amount of training was provided to the watch groups during the first meetings. In all settings, the aim was to create or support one watch group per area, but in some cases more than one formed or already existed and in a small number a group failed to form at all.

Foot patrols are the third element of our intervention. Police foot patrols took place at least occasionally at baseline in all six settings,[8] and the police increased their frequency

[6]However, in the Philippines, these meetings were unscheduled engagements with small groups of citizens (avg. = 6) during patrols.

[7]A civil society organization convened the meetings in Colombia, inviting police and citizens; in Uganda, meetings were organized by the police with support from a civil society organization as well as local government officials.

[8]In Colombia, they take place daily in treatment and control.

to bimonthly or weekly at three sites as part of the intervention (Liberia, Pakistan, and the Philippines). Patrols were typically by small teams of officers, but in some cases officers patrolled alone.

In three sites, new mechanisms for citizens to report crime and police abuse were introduced or widely marketed. These took the form of new citizen-police WhatsApp groups (Brazil) and existing but little-used telephone hotlines that were widely marketed (Pakistan and the Philippines). The reporting mechanisms were announced in townhall meetings as well as in broader advertising campaigns.

Problem-oriented policing strategies were implemented in three sites (Brazil, Pakistan, and the Philippines).[9] During townhall meetings in these settings, a four-step process was followed: 1) identify problems that lead to crime, drawing on police crime data and community-voiced concerns; 2) prioritize and select top problems to address together; 3) introduce and apply the scanning, analysis, response, and assessment (SARA) algorithm for assessing the problem (*53*); 4) make an action plan involving the police and citizens to solve it. Officers were assigned to take action on the plans as part of their duties; in some cases, additional financial resources were provided. Police responses included stepped-up patrols in high crime areas; expanded patrols in remote areas; and infrastructure improvements, such as installing street lights or road safety signs. Typically, there was a followup meeting about the problems, in which police reported back on their actions.

Importantly, these interventions were hypothesized to impact community-level outcomes and attitudes, not only the outcomes for individuals who encountered the police or participated in a community meeting. These knock-on effects may happen through others in the neighborhood learning about community meeting events from participants, from the changes to police behavior, or other general equilibrium effects.

We interpret our effects as estimates of what happens when a police agency decides to

[9]Problem-oriented policing strategies were already in regular use in Colombia.

increase its commitment to community policing, tailored based on their existing policing practices and local context. Indeed, variation in the interventions selected in our six sites reflects the diversity of implementation of community policing around the world (*32*).

Experimental design

The six studies use experimental designs to test whether the introduction of community policing programs changed citizen, police, and crime outcomes. The randomization procedures differed. In each study, urban neighborhoods or rural districts were randomly-assigned into a control group (with no changes to police practices) and a treatment group in which community policing practices were introduced.[10] We measured changes in crime rates and in the attitudes and behaviors of citizens and the police. To do so, we draw on unique, rich data from the six contexts including detailed surveys of citizens and police officers and administrative data on citizen and police behaviors collected through our partnerships with the police agencies. Each of the studies as well as the meta-analysis was preregistered before data analysis.

In what follows, we detail the sampling and treatment assignment procedures and outcome measures as well as the meta-analysis design.[11]

Outcome measurement

We collected four sets of harmonized outcome measures across all sites: crime, citizen attitudes toward the police, citizen cooperation with the police, and police behavior.[12] Building on past surveys of crime victimization and police trust (*50*, *54*), we aimed to measure a comprehensive set of outcomes, all of those community policing is hypoth-

[10] In Brazil, the design differed slightly. In treated areas, a citizen-police meeting was held, encouraging the formation of citizen-police groups.

[11] In the Supplementary Materials, we include a table summarizing key features of the designs (SM Table SM2); provide study-specific details on sampling and treatment assignment procedures (SM Section B.); as well as a codebook of the outcome measures (Table SM32).

[12] These outcome measures directly relate to the nine different categories of hypotheses included in SM Section F.. Details on the construction of these outcome indices are included in Table SM32.

esized both by academics and police practitioners to affect. As our systematic review demonstrates, we are one of the very few studies that measures both crime and citizen trust outcomes together. Moreover, very few studies survey officers in addition to citizens. We outline our primary outcomes in Table 4.[13]

To develop these outcome measures, we rely on several data sources:

Surveys of citizens. Citizen surveys were conducted at two times in each study: a pre-treatment baseline survey and a post-treatment endline survey.[14] Surveys were, in all cases, conducted in person. We coordinated the surveys across countries to maximize comparability. In each study, we translated the questionnaire into local language(s) and pretested the question wordings. We adjusted the wording of question and answer options to fit local contexts when necessary. The wording of questions and answer options for items used in the meta-analysis are presented in Table SM32.

Estimating treatment effects on crime reporting presents a special problem and requires additional theoretical assumptions, as emphasized in (*55*). To avoid post-treatment bias by analyzing reporting conditional on crime victimization, we examined two sets of average treatment effects: the effect of treatment on crime victimization rates; and the effect of treatment on a recoded reporting variable where zero represents either not being victimized or being victimized and not reporting and one represents victimization and reporting.

We can interpret our effects on this variable in tandem with the effects on crime victimization: if there are null effects on crime victimization then a null effect on our reporting variable is interpreted as a null on victimization. If there is a positive effect on victimization, then further assumptions are required in order to interpret the effect

[13]In some cases, index items could not be collected or had to be collected in ways that deviated from our harmonized items and indices. We detail these differences in Table SM31. We present analyses based on the subsets of sites we can analyze the exactly harmonized items and indices in Table SM7. No results change substantially.

[14]In the Philippines study, an additional survey wave was collected at midline, after the community engagement intervention was implemented and before the problem-oriented policing intervention commenced. Following our preanalysis plan, we do not analyze that midline data in this paper.

of the reporting variable.

Administrative data. In each study, three main sets of outcomes were constructed from police administrative records provided through agreements with our partner police agencies. We collect reported crime incidence; crime prevention tips; and reports of abuse by the police. We do not rely on administrative data as a primary measure of the incidence of crime, because they confound incidence and reporting. In Table SM6, we present secondary analyses using these data.

Surveys of police officers. Unusual in randomized trials of police practices, we collected surveys of officers in each setting. In Colombia, Pakistan, and Uganda, by virtue of the randomization of neighborhoods and police stations, officers were randomized into treated areas and control areas. In these settings, we estimate the effect of community policing on officer attitudes.[15]

Sampling procedures

We study targeted areas our police partners believed community policing would be most effective in. In Brazil, we study large municipalities in Santa Catarina State. In Colombia, we study all populated areas of Medell'in. In the Philippines, we study all barangays in Sorsogon Province that were deemed safe from insurgent activity by the Philippines military. In Pakistan, we draw a random sample of all areas in the two study districts. In Liberia, we select a set of high-crime geographic areas as well as a random sample of other areas. In Uganda, we studied a purposive sample of rural areas across the country. Citizens are randomly sampled in study areas to participate in surveys.

[15]In the other sites some officers work in multiple jurisdictions making separation of officers that work in treated and control areas impossible. In these cases, we draw on officer surveys for descriptive analyses, but not for estimating effects of community policing.

Treatment assignment

The studies rely on randomization of neighborhoods, districts, or police stations to a control condition or the common community policing treatment arm, in some cases blocking on pretreatment covariates measured in baseline surveys and from administrative crime data. In most studies, there was also a third treatment group that we will not analyze in this study.[16] In the Philippines site, a community engagement program was rolled out first and then a problem-oriented policing program;[17] in the other five the intervention was rolled out all at once. In Brazil, the treatment is an encouragement to form community-police groups. We note that by assigning community policing at the neighborhood or district level, this presents a hard test of the model. There may be large effects on citizens directly exposed to increased officer interaction that are swamped by low effects for others. In our view, this is a virtue of the design: if community policing is to be used cost-effectively, it must reduce crime and increase trust in the community broadly, not only on the relatively small number directly exposed.

Estimation strategy

Study effects. To estimate the effects of treatment in each study, we use linear regressions with an indicator for the common treatment arm[18] controlling, when possible, for baseline outcomes and, if assignment is block-randomized, block fixed effects. We interpret these effects as intent-to-treat effects, given the imperfect compliance with assigned treatment we document. In Brazil, we estimate the complier average causal effect using instrumental variables estimation with block fixed effects and baseline outcomes.[19] We

[16] We preregistered that these additional arms would be reported on in separate papers by each site's authors.

[17] We estimate the combined effect of the two components by comparing the common treatment condition to control at endline after both programs have been implemented.

[18] In the Philippines study, we include treatment indicators for crossed treatment conditions due to its factorial design.

[19] We elected to combine estimates of complier effects in Brazil with intent-to-treat effects in other studies due to the nature of the treatment. The randomized encouragement consisted of a single meeting with a police commander in which residents were provided information about how to form a community forum. The endogenous treatment is the forum being formed, which is similar to treatment in the other

weight the regressions by the inverse of the product of the probability of inclusion in the sample and assignment to treatment, if either varied across blocks (*56*). We report robust standard errors clustered at the level of treatment assignment.

Meta-analysis. We pool the results from each study. We rely on the random effects meta-analysis model, which weights estimates according to both the within-study variance and the between-study variance.[20] Variance in effects in this meta-analysis are implied by variation in study context, including different police organizations and different baseline levels of crime, citizen trust, and cooperation with the police.[21] We use the restricted maximum likelihood random-effects model for estimation. In each analysis, we present the average effect among our six studies (μ from the random effects model) and a 95% confidence interval. In the SM, we also present the estimated variances across studies (τ).

Given the large number of hypotheses and of outcomes measured in this study, the risk of false discovery (rejecting a true null hypothesis) is high. We address this risk by following the Benjamini-Hochberg (*58*) adjustment to p-values, which controls the false discovery rate, in our case to 5%. We adjust the tests for our primary hypotheses, constructing eight indices testing H1 through H4c. Together, these represent the test of a grand hypothesis that community policing is effective.[22] In addition, we construct indices of related outcomes for several hypotheses to reduce the number of comparisons.

Ethics

The experiments described in this paper raise an important and unique set of ethical considerations (see SM Section C. for a longer discussion of ethical issues). Each ex-

sites in which watch forums were created and community meetings held throughout the treatment period.

[20]This model is derived from an interpretation of effect sizes across studies that are drawn from a common distribution and the aim is to estimate the moments of that distribution (*57*).

[21]In the case where in fact there is no between-study variance in effects, the random effects reduces to the fixed effects meta-analysis model.

[22]We adjust with the same procedure each set of p-values within the hypothesis, for example all of the outcomes representing H1 and, separately, all of the outcomes representing H4c.

periment was motivated by high levels of citizen mistrust in the police, as well as concerns about police behavior including corruption and abuse of power. Yet all of the experiments involved direct collaboration between research teams and these same police agencies. Although in each case we had a shared goal of understanding how potential reforms to police practices might change police behavior and police-citizen interactions, we were also highly attentive to concerns that these partnerships might implicate us as researchers in actions that might cause harm to individuals. For this reason, the research teams went beyond the traditional standards imposed by Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) and national laws. As part of this joint project, each site's team weighed seriously the costs and benefits of partnering with each police agency, focused on how to minimize the risk of any potential harm from the intervention, and sought to provide transparency and informed consent to all participants in the research.

A number of best practices emerged in the process. First, the appropriateness of the local context was carefully considered in the design of each field experiment. For example, with obvious concerns about police complicity in the abusive war on drugs in the Philippines, the research team focused their collaboration with the police in Sorsogon, a province in which drug trafficking is not a salient issue. More broadly, teams engaged in significant pre-vetting of both police units and areas to ensure the work was being done in places where risks to citizens were relatively low. Second, significant care was taken to provide comprehensive training for local police partners as part of the intervention. This went beyond securing the high-level buy-in of police authorities. The focus was on developing meaningful training practices that could influence how police officers think about their relationship to citizens and carry out community policing activities. Third, and perhaps most importantly, each team developed an extensive risk mitigation plan. The teams often deployed monitors on-the-ground to observe police activities, and each team developed clear redlines that would guide decisions about whether to end participation in the experiment/partnership as a function of concerns about public safety and

police behavior. Finally, teams were fully committed to transparency about the research and the protection of confidentiality for research subjects. Given the sensitivity of survey responses about police behavior and abuse, it was important that the information we collected be fully anonymized and presented only in the aggregate to our police partners.

Importantly, although we worked in partnership with the police, we did not see this as transferring our ethical responsibilities to the third party. Throughout, we were careful to evaluate the risks associated with these partnerships, the potential of the research to improve police practices for the better, and the ways in which we could identify and mitigate potential harms throughout the research process.

Results

The police complied with the assigned community policing practices, holding community meetings and increasing the frequency of patrols in treatment areas in five of our six studies. In each of these studies, our index measure of citizen awareness of community meetings and police patrol frequency increased (Figure 1). In Liberia, there was a 1.7 standard deviation increase ($p = 0.000$) in the compliance index; in the other cases the increases were smaller, between 0.16 and 0.45 s.d. (all statistically distinguishable from no effect at the 0.05 level). However, our measures of compliance are imperfect. Several sites did not aim to increase foot or vehicle patrol frequency (for example, in Colombia, where frequent foot patrols were already in place). Compliance in several dimensions of treatment, including problem-oriented policing work and watch fora, are not measured. We see large changes in awareness of community meetings that we cannot distinguish from zero (estimate = 0.99 s.d., $p = 0.1$) and small increases in foot patrols (est. = 0.064, $p = 0.239$) and vehicle patrol frequency (est. = 0.091, $p = 0.064$).

In Brazil, however, the encouragement design did not translate into higher take-up of the community policing program, which is evidenced by the failure to reject the null of

zero effects in the first stage (see Table SM21). One explanation for the Rede de Vizinhos program had expanded substantially when our study began, compared to when we planned our encouragement. In addition, there was noncompliance in the administration of the encouragement: the police did not hold meetings in eleven locations where they were randomly assigned to hold meetings. We present the meta-analysis results including Brazil as we preregistered, but they are essentially unchanged with Brazil excluded given the low precision of the estimates.

Community policing generated none of the main effects we hypothesized. In the meta-analysis, we find no effects of community policing practices on any of our primary outcomes: crime victimization, perceptions of insecurity, citizen perceptions of police, police abuse, or citizen cooperation with police (Figure 2 top panel).[23] Community policing also does not appear to backfire.

We are able to rule out even very small effects in a positive or negative direction for most outcomes.[24] The meta-analysis confidence intervals rules out reductions in crime larger than -0.071 standard deviations (and increases larger than 0.04). In terms of overall perceptions of police, there was a 0.053 standard deviation increase (p = 0.065). In terms of minimum detectable effect sizes, the standard posthoc rule of thumb of 2.8 times the standard error suggests we can rule out improvements (or backlash) of more than 0.081 standard deviations in crime victimization and 0.109 standard deviations in police perceptions. Given the narrow confidence intervals and small minimum detectable effects, if there are effects of community policing that we failed to detect, they are likely to be very small. We do not find the large effects observed in contexts in the Global North or the effects expected by practitioners who advocate community policing in the Global South.

The null effects do not hide heterogeneity across sites: community policing did not

[23]In the Supplementary Materials, we present tables of estimated effects, standard errors, confidence intervals, raw p-values, and adjusted p-values.

[24]The meta-analysis results include the Brazil site, but note that we cannot rule out even large effects for that site due to low compliance.

lead to the expected changes across our eight hypotheses in any of the six sites (Figure 3). We see no effects distinguishable from zero in our eight primary outcomes in any of the six sites. We do, however, find effects on secondary measures of citizen attitudes toward the police in three sites. In Liberia and Pakistan, we find sizable shifts in our measure of perceived police intentions (Liberia: 0.760 s.d., p = 0.001; Pakistan: 1.323 s.d., p = 0.000). In Colombia, perceptions of police capacity increase (0.115 s.d.; p = 0.006). We note that in Brazil, we are not able to rule out large changes from community policing for any outcome, due to the low compliance rate which leads to very wide estimated confidence intervals.

Our results also do not hide heterogeneity in index components: there are no effects of community policing on any index item in the eight primary indices (Figure 3). Within each site, the null effects do not reflect cross-cutting effects in opposing directions: we do not find heterogeneous effects by baseline crime rate, trust in police, community trust, or perceived state legitimacy in any of our primary outcomes. Moreover, we find no evidence of heterogeneous effects across any factor in tests of equal variances across treatment and control groups in any site (SM Section I.1).

In addition, there are no effects on any of the intermediate outcomes we hypothesized as mechanisms for improving citizen trust and effectiveness of the police (Figure 2 middle panel). Community policing did not increase citizen perceptions of police intentions, knowledge of criminal justice procedures, norms of cooperation with police, perceptions of police capacity, or perceptions of the responsiveness of police. Community policing also did not affect trust in the state or communal trust, our secondary outcomes (Figure 2 bottom panel).

Why did community policing fail to increase cooperation and reduce crime victimization? We can rule out several explanations. We do not see evidence that citizens refused to cooperate with police because of a mismatch between raised citizen expectations and the police's inability to deliver on promised changes in practice: there was no change,

positive or negative, in citizen perceptions of police capacity or intentions (p = 0.332; p = 0.136). We also see no evidence that community policing, by increasing contact between police who may engage in abuse or extortion and citizens, crowded out positive changes: the rate of police abuse did not change (p = 0.882).

Crime displacement also does not appear to drive our results. If community policing reduced crime by pushing criminal activity out to other places, we would expect to see reductions in treated areas between baseline and endline and increases in control areas. We do not observe this pattern in crime victimization measured in citizen surveys or police data in any site. We fail to reject the null of no difference at the $\alpha = 0.05$ level.

We designed our outcome measurement to capture the impact of community policing broadly, whether or not our theory of citizen-police relations underlies its effects. We obtained extraordinary access to the police's internal data to measure crime, citizen cooperation, and police behaviors. We conducted surveys of both citizens and the police, including a gold-standard crime victimization survey. We measured all five families of outcomes our systematic review identified in past studies — crime incidence, perceptions of safety, perceptions of police, police accountability, and citizen reporting — as well as a number that were not measured in past work. As a result, our null results imply that if community policing has effects in these contexts, it is on peripheral outcomes that have not been identified by scholars as of central importance.

Community policing in the Global South does not, by and large, deliver the benefits claimed by its advocates. It does not appear to reduce crime, and it does not in most cases lead to improvements in citizen trust in the police. At least in the short term, community policing as it is implemented in the Global South does not lead to a virtuous cycle of citizen cooperation with police efforts to fight crime.

Discussion

We studied community policing in six varied contexts. We found it did not lead to the main expected changes in any of them. Given their heterogeneity, it is unlikely that we simply selected hard cases in which community policing was unlikely to be effective. Why then did community policing fail to deliver across all these sites?

One possibility is that our community policing interventions were not sufficiently strong to generate the hypothesized effects. We are able to compare the intensity of several components of our intervention to past studies. The duration of our treatment, between 6 months (Pakistan) and 17 months (Philippines) is comparable to past studies which have a median duration of 7 months and largely range between 1 and 12 months. The police in our sites appear to patrol on foot less intensely at baseline and in treatment areas than prominent past studies in the U.S. In the Philadelphia Foot Patrol experiment, for example, officers patrolled 16 hours a day five days a week in treatment areas (*59*). We do not have direct measures of foot patrol frequency, but we surveyed citizens about how frequently they see officers patrolling on foot. At the low end, 25% of citizens in the Philippines report seeing officers daily. The rest range from 63% (Colombia) to 83% (Uganda). There was not a large increase in foot patrol frequency.

By contrast with foot patrols, our six sites compare favorably to recent tests of increased citizen-police contact in the Global South, including 20-30 minute face-to-face visits with 25 households over single 1-3 day visits to rural villages in Liberia (*42*) and town hall meetings with citizens 4-5 times over 14 months lasting 1.5 to 3 hours in rural Liberia (*39*). In our sites, town hall meetings were held semi-annually (Brazil), bimonthly (Colombia, Liberia, and Uganda), or monthly (Pakistan). In the Philippines, the community engagement treatment was not community meetings, but more intensive interactions in small groups during foot patrols. Additional meetings as part of community watch forums were held in Liberia and Uganda.

We cannot compare directly the strength of our treatment overall to past studies,

because past evidence focuses on individual components of community policing in isolation. Our interventions were instead designed to test the bundled set of changes to police practices commonly implemented by police agencies (*29*, *30*). We chose this design for two reasons: we need evidence on the effectiveness of community policing as practiced in the real world and there may be interaction effects between components that are missed when studied alone. The fact that foot patrols are less frequent in our intervention, as a result, reflects the choices of police agencies in the Global South who decide how to implement locally appropriate community policing.

Another possibility is that our treatment had large effects on those directly affected, i.e. community meeting participants, but none on others. Our surveys measured outcomes for all residents in treated and control areas, not only meeting attendees. If this is the case, we would expect to see null effects overall, because our sample of meeting participants is (intentionally) small. We leave this question to further research. But we note that this is not the theory of change proposed by advocates of community policing, who argue that community policing practices lead to changes in citizen cooperation, police attitudes toward citizens, and crime that reinforce one another. Our results, at a minimum, suggest that the effects of community policing on communities as a whole will be small.

A third possibility is that other conditions needed for community policing to be effective were not in place. After running the experiments, we identified three structural constraints that may have prevented substantive change: a lack of prioritization of community policing by police leadership; the rotation of community policing officers and of the police leaders championing the reform; and limited resources to follow-up on concerns identified by citizens.

The first problem was prioritizing community policing among the other responsibilities of the police. Police agencies that chose to partner with us were interested in implementing community policing reforms and also interested in learning whether com-

munity policing was an effective tool. At the outset, we believed these partnerships represented a best-case in terms of police buy-in, and that compliance would if anything be higher than in typical practice. Instead, in our observations and interviews with citizens and the police, it was clear in several sites that this was not the case. In Uganda, senior leadership in the Uganda Police Force did not ultimately commit substantial political capital to the project, and in general have limited ability (and will) to supervise station-level officers. As a result, station leadership could safely not prioritize community policing responsibilities.

Prioritizing tasks not traditionally within the police remit was a particular problem. In community meetings, citizens often raised local issues distinct from the major crimes that often occupied police effort. Though sharing concerns that reflect underlying causes of insecurity is a core component of community policing, there were formal and informal barriers to spending time on them. In the Philippines, officers received the message from commanders that "major" crimes related to murder, drugs, and a local insurgency were higher priority than the "local" issues often raised by citizens. In Pakistan, the barriers are institutional: police could not by law respond to many of the problems consistently identified by the community during their forum discussions because they involved non-cognizable crimes such as domestic abuse, harassment, and financial malfeasance.[25] As one community policing officer put it, "We take these problems to our [station lead officer] and instead of helping us implement the agreed actions, he ignores them and gives us other tasks to do."[26] Similarly, officers in the Philippines often referred issues not in the remit of the police to other government agencies, but it was common knowledge that these other agencies had low capacity for addressing the referrals.

[25]Cognizable offenses in Pakistan include robbery, murder, kidnapping, and other serious crimes for which officers can arrest the perpetrator and begin the investigative process without warrant from a magistrate. Non-cognizable offenses are those offences for which officers cannot directly register a case, conduct an arrest, or investigate without permission from a magistrate. They include most forms of domestic violence, lesser crimes against persons such as simple assault without serious bodily injury, and property crimes such as fraud, and forgery.

[26]Administrative records of community meetings in the Pakistan site confirm this pattern: less than 25 percent of the problems selected by the forums were followed up.

The regular rotation of police leadership in several contexts also interrupted initially strong interest. In Pakistan, regional and district level leaders were transferred multiple times during the study period, which led to further changes at the station house level and transfers of community police officers. In the Philippines, our primary partner in the Sorsogon provincial police was promoted out of the province weeks into the implementation of the study, reducing buy-in for the intervention. Municipal police leaders were also rotated out.

Rotation was even more frequent for local station chiefs and rank-and-file officers in many sites. We depended on local leaders to align incentives and provide resources for rank-and-file officers in their stations to carry out community policing tasks. Turnover in officers assigned to carry out community policing tasks may be a problem for two reasons: (1) a lack of training for officers who join the program after its inception; (2) difficulty establishing rapport with citizens and local leaders during short assignments.[27] In Uganda, officers rotate between police posts on average every 17 months, in Colombia every 15 months, and in Pakistan every month. There, the police did not have resources to train up new officers rotated into treated posts, so many did not receive direct training in community policing practices. In the Philippines, we estimate that only 25% of officers in our study area at midline were still in the same post at endline, just 11 months later.

Effects may be also muted due to capacity constraints. Officers in some cases reported that they were asked to carry out additional duties related to community policing, such as investigating concerns raised by citizens in community fora, but not provided additional resources to do so. In others, the resource constraint was already binding in terms of salary, transportation, or materials for investigation.[28] If the police cannot investigate

[27]Rotation could theoretically have opposing effects, by exposing citizens to a larger number of community policing officers, increasing perceptions of officer intentions.

[28]In Pakistan, an officer told us: "Yesterday, I was on beat patrolling all night that was unconnected to the program. Today I was asked by the SHO to travel to Lahore on my own expense to appear in court in connection with a case that is unconnected to the program. I haven't eaten anything since the morning, it is unfair to expect me to me punctual and behave well in community meetings with such a tough work routine."

crimes and concerns raised by citizens, community policing is unlikely to lead either to reductions in crime or to build citizen trust. In Liberia, Pakistan, and Uganda, a lack of funds for investigations and even for travel appear to have been binding constraints. In Liberia, for example, after taking into account salaries, funds for all non-salary expenses such as fuel amount to just US $4 million for the entire country.[29] In Uganda, only 10% of police stations in urban areas receive a monthly fuel allowance; none of the posts in rural areas do. The average Ugandan police station has a single motorbike for transportation and rural posts less than one.

At a time when police departments in the United States and around the world are considering reforms efforts to foster greater trust between citizens and the police, it is more important than ever to ask hard questions about the evidence base for some of the most popular reform proposals.

The evidence from our experiments suggests caution is warranted when considering whether to implement community policing. Future research should identify whether community policing is effective when implemented alongside structural changes to police departments that prioritize openness to citizen input, incentivize unit commanders and rank-and-file officers to change how they engage with the community, and provide officers with the resources they need to respond to concerns raised by citizens. It is possible that the beneficial effects of community policing observed in some settings in rich countries reflect not only the intervention itself, but these important background conditions. However, the structural constraints we identify are not unique to contexts in the Global South. These are shared with some places where police reforms such as community policing are being proposed in the U.S. and other rich countries.

More broadly, community policing is one of a number of incremental reforms to police practices that have been proposed to reduce crime, improve citizen-police trust, and reduce police abuse. The use of bodyworn cameras is another example. The policy is

[29]Government of the Republic of Liberia Draft National Budget FY 2017-18.

designed to mitigate principal-agent problems between police leadership and rank-and-file officers and provide a mechanism for citizens to hold officers accountable in court proceedings. As in our study of community policing, however, recent experimental evidence finds no effect of cameras (*60*). One interpretation of this finding is that officers are rarely charged, convicted, or professionally reprimanded after abuse and so the cameras changed the evidence that could be brought in judicial proceedings but did not fundamentally alter a key structural constraint to reform: the role of police unions and contracts in making it difficult for the judicial system to hold officers accountable for abuse.

The bottom line is that individual reforms are implemented in complex institutional environments. On their own, community policing practices appear unable to address the systemic barriers to more effective policing and greater trust between citizens and police officers. The challenge going forward is to identify the conditions that must be in place for incremental reforms to matter, or to refocus attention on the major structural changes in police departments that are needed.

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Figures and tables

Table 1: Systematic Evidence Review on Community Policing

Intervention Effect direction	*Outcome measure* Crime incidence	Perceptions of safety	Perceptions of police	Police accountability	Citizen reporting
Community Fora					
Increase	–	–	1	–	–
Null	–	1	–	–	–
Community Presence					
Increase	–	2	2	1	1
Null	4	3	4	–	1
Decrease	10	–	–	–	–
Mixed	8 (7 -/o; 1 -/+)	1 (+/o)	1 (+/o)	1 (+/o)	–
Citizen Feedback					
Null	–	–	1	–	–
Mixed	–	–	1 (+/o)	–	–
Problem-Oriented Policing					
Increase	–	2	1	–	–
Null	1	1	1	–	–
Decrease	6	–	–	–	–

We present the results of a systematic review of 37 randomized-control trials on the effectiveness of components of community policing. The count of estimates with a given effect direction (rows) on a given outcome (column) are presented for four sets of community policing interventions (row groups in italics). The "mixed" effect direction indicates that the study provided mixed evidence of the effect direction for a given outcome. In mixed cases, the number of estimates is indicated first and then in parentheses a count of the mixed effects that were found (i.e., - / o indicates that both negative and null effects were found). A study may provide more than one number in the table if effects of an intervention are estimated for multiple outcomes or if multiple interventions are tested or both.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Study Sites

	Brazil	Colombia	Liberia	Pakistan	Philippines	Uganda
Political freedoms[a]	Partly free	Partly free	Partly free	Partly free	Partly free	Not free
Regime type[b]	Democracy	Democracy	Democracy	Autocracy	Democracy	Autocracy
Corruption score[c]	45 / 100	39	32	31	46	26
Criminal justice score[d]	34 / 100	34	31	35	31	31
Income category[e]	Upper mid.	Upper mid.	Low	Lower mid.	Lower mid.	Low
Inequality (Gini coef.)[f]	54	50	35	33	44	42
Study site	Santa Caterina	Medellín	Monrovia	Punjab Province	Sorgoson Province	–
Type	State	Large city	Large city	Two districts	Province	Country
Rate of crime victimization (pct.)[g]						
Simple assault	1	5	6	5	3	6
Burglary	4	15	17	16	2	19
Armed robbery	0	6	3	10	0	2
Murder	1	9	7	–	1	9
Trust in police (pct.)[h]	79	47	46	23	86	62
Citizen cooperation (pct.)[i]	1	5	-	2	1	5
Police capacity indicators[j]						
Vehicle	✓					
Motorbike	✓	✓			✓	✓
Gun	✓	✓		✓	✓	
Radio	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Computer	✓	✓			✓	
Printer	✓	✓			✓	
Camera	✓	✓			✓	
Officers per capita	1:473	1:333	1:950	1:560[k]	1:991[m]	1:910[o]
Budget per officer	$56,000	$18,000	$3,642	$3,400[k]	$18,000	-
Citizens per station	-	143,000[l]	21,428	500,000[m]	44,444	-
Officer rotation rate	-	15 months	-	1 month	2.75 months[p]	17 months

We present descriptive statistics for study sites for the six studies. We present political and economic characteristics of the countries; the name and geographic extent of the study site within that country; crime rates at baseline for each study site; measures of citizen attitudes and behaviors at baseline from our citizen surveys; measures of police capacity from study team observations; information on the budget and density of officers in each study site from police agency data and other sources; and the estimated rate of officer turnover, calculated from our officer survey data. Sources: [a]Freedom in the World 2020, Freedom House; [b]Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Version 10; [c]World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2020, "Absence of Corruption" item; [d]Ibid, "Criminal Justice" item; [e]World Bank lending groups as of August 2020; [f]Most recent Gini coefficient (varying years), World Bank Open Data portal, August 2020; [g]Citizen survey question: were you or a member of your household have a victim of the crime at least once. From baseline data except for Philippines and Brazil (control data at endline is used instead); [h]Citizen survey question: do you agree or disagree with the following statement "I generally trust the police." Proportion who agree with the statement. From baseline data for all studies except Philippines and Brazil (control data at endline is used instead); [i]Respondents who were victimized for each crime were asked whether they reported these crimes to the police. We report here the proportion who were victimized (personal or family) and reported that crime from baseline data except Philippines and Brazil (control data at endline is used instead); [j]Study team observations during implementation; [k]Census 2017 and Punjab Police Statuary Annual Report 2018-19; [l]In Medellín, there are seventeen stations and 2.47 million residents (1:143,000). There are many more small Centros de Atención Integral, where residents can speak with police. There are about 47 of these, or one per 52,000 residents; [m]Census 2017 and Pakistan Bureau of Statistics; [n]Census 2015; [o]World Internal Security and Police Index Report 2016; [p]Only 25% of officers in the Philippines' study area at midline were still in the same post at endline, 11 months later.

Table 3: Community Policing Policies by Experimental Condition

	Brazil		Colombia		Liberia		Pakistan		Philippines		Uganda	
Study units	Neighborhoods		Beats		Communities		Beats		Barangays[a]		Police stations	
People per km^2	445		26,341		7,811		338		529		–	
Special training	No		No		No		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Dedicated officers	Yes		No		Yes		Yes		Yes		No	
Duration of program	7 months		12 months		11 months		6 months		17 months		13 months	
Community policing practices by treatment condition (elements of study intervention highlighted in gray)												
	Control	*Treatment*	*Control*	*Treatment*	*Control*	*Treatment*	*Control*	*Treatment*	*Control*	*Treatment*	*Control*	*Treatment*
Town hall meetings	Never	Semi-annual	None	Bi-monthly	Occasional	Bi-monthly	No	Monthly	No	No	No	Bi-monthly
Watch forum	No	No	No	No	Some	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Some	Yes
Foot patrols	Occasional	Occasional	Daily	Daily	Occasional	Bi-monthly	Occasional	Frequent	Occasional	Weekly	Occasional	Occasional
Citizen feedback	No	WhatsApp	Hotline; Mobile application	Hotline; Mobile application	No	No	Hotline	Hotline (use encouraged)	No	Hotline[a]	No	No
Problem-oriented policing	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No

For each of the six study sites, we outline the presence (or absence) of six elements of policing practices in the experimental control group (with no changes from status quo policing practices) and in the experimental treatment group (with locally appropriate increases in community policing practices). In some sites, *town hall meetings* were held between local police officers and citizens; in some the frequency of *foot patrols* by officers was increased; in several a *problem-oriented policing* intervention was implemented to provide resources for the police to address underlying causes of crime; some initiated new modes for *citizen feedback*; and in several a new *watch forum* was started to formalize oversight of community watch groups. In all sites, officers were recruited to participate in these special duties from among the existing officer corps, and were provided community policing training before starting these duties.

[a] In the Philippines, a hotline was advertised to half of treated units.

Table 4: Outcome Measures and Data Sources

Hyp.	Outcome index	Index components	Data source
Primary outcomes			
1a.	Crime victimization index[a]	Violent crime (personal); Nonviolent crime (personal); Violent crime (community); Non-violent crime (community)	Citizen survey
1b.	Perceived future insecurity index	Feared violent crime; Feared walking	Citizen survey
2.	Overall perceptions of police index	Trust in police; Trust in service of police	Citizen survey
3a.	Police perceptions of citizens index[b]	Abuse index; Accountability index; Corruption index; Empathy index	Officer survey
3b.	Police abuse	Abuse (binary); Bribe amount; Bribe frequency	Citizen survey
4a.	Crime reporting index	Violent crime (personal); Violent crime (community); Nonviolent crime reporting (community); Nonviolent crime reporting (personal); Resolution of crime index	Citizen survey
4b.	Crime tips index	Crime tips index	Citizen survey
		Tips count (hotline); Tips count (comment box)	Administrative
4c.	Police abuse reporting index	Beating community member; Verbal abuse	Citizen survey
Mechanism outcomes			
M1a.	Perceived police intentions index	Corruption; Treat fairly; Treat seriously	Citizen survey
M1b.	Knowledge of criminal justice[c]	Legal knowledge; Knowledge of how to report crimes	Citizen survey
M1c.	Cooperation norms index	Reporting norm (theft); Reporting norm (domestic abuse); Obey police norm	Citizen survey
M2a.	Perceived police capacity index	Police timeliness; Police investigation capacity	Citizen survey
M2b.	Perceived police responsiveness		Citizen survey
Secondary outcomes			
S1.	Perceived state legitimacy[d]		Citizen survey
S2.	Community trust		Citizen survey
C.	Compliance index	Foot patrol frequency; Vehicle patrol frequency; Community meeting awareness	Citizen survey

We preregistered four sets of outcomes: our eight primary outcomes; five outcomes that we would use to interpret the causal mechanisms of any main effects; two secondary outcomes; and a measure of compliance with treatment. We specify the name of the outcome index for each of the outcomes, the main component items of each index, and the data source. We report meta-analysis effect estimates on compliance with treatment in Figure 1, on outcome indices in Figure 2, and finally effects on index component items in Figure 4. In Figure 3, we present outcome index effects by site.

[a] Colombia estimates not included in meta-estimate, due to a difference in measurement. A common measure of crime victimization with all estimates is included in the Supplementary Materials.

[b] Brazil, Liberia, and Philippines sites not included in meta-analysis, because officers were not randomized into participation in community policing or control due to the organizational structure of the police agency.

[c] Philippines' estimates not included due to a difference in measurement.

[d] Uganda and Pakistan sites not included in the meta-analysis; state legitimacy was not measured in these two cases.



Figure 1: Compliance with treatment. We report the meta-analytic estimate and country estimates of the average compliance rates, measured using three variables measuring the frequency of patrols, frequency of encounters with police, and citizen knowledge of community engagement community meetings with police along with 95% confidence intervals. The x-axis is restricted for readability due to the wide confidence intervals for Brazil.



Figure 2: Community policing does not improve (or harm) crime victimization, citizen perceptions of the police, police perceptions of citizens, or citizen-police cooperation. We report meta-analytic estimates of average treatment effects pooling across contexts for each of the primary outcomes, mechanism outcomes we use to evaluate the channel of effects, and secondary outcomes along with 95% confidence intervals. Meta-analysis p-values are reported for all outcomes. The p-values for the eight primary outcomes are adjusted for multiple testing.



Figure 3: Null average effects do not hide substantial variation across sites. We report the country-level estimates of average treatment effects for each main effect estimate presented in Figure 2 along with 95% confidence intervals. We see evidence of effects on citizen perceptions of police (Pakistan), police intentions toward citizens (Liberia and Pakistan), and police capacity (Colombia), but no other effects in any site. The p-values for the eight primary outcomes are adjusted for multiple testing within site. Other p-values are presented unadjusted. The x-axis is restricted for readability due to the wide confidence intervals for Brazil.



Figure 4: Null average effects do not hide variation across index components. We report meta-analytic estimates of average treatment effects pooling across contexts for the constituent items of the main outcome indices along with 95% confidence intervals.

Supplementary Materials for

Community Policing Does Not Build Trust or Reduce Crime: Evidence from Six Coordinated Field Experiments

Materials and Methods

A. Community policing interventions

Table SM1: Implementation Details by Site

	Brazil	Colombia	Liberia	Pakistan	Philippines	Uganda
Average meetings per study unit	1	3	5	8	11	10
Total meetings	109	456	221	808	808	352
Average meeting attendance	30	18	25	11	10	51

A.1 Brazil

Officer recruitment and training. This process is determined at the local level and varies from precinct to precinct. In some cases, the police officers were dedicated to Rede de Vizinhos (RdV) and work with all, or most, RdV groups in their precincts. In other cases, police officers dedicate a fraction of their time to the programme, and otherwise operate on regular duties and patrols. There is no centralized information regarding the allocation of human resources at the precinct level. In several cases, however, we learned that participation in the community-policing program was a voluntary activity for the police officers, and thus certain types of officers may have selected into the program.

Townhall meetings. In the encouragement phase, exactly one meeting per centroid was held. Confirmation of attendance to the Facebook events was, on average, 85 individuals by event. An attendance sheet was in most cases circulated in the meetings themselves, but were not shared with the research team due to privacy concerns. The police reported to us that meetings averaged 30 to 35 individuals, with some reaching substantially higher numbers, depending on factors including population density. The meetings had a standard structure at the police precinct level. They typically featured a presentation of the general objectives of the program, the role of the police and the improvement in community-police relations that were sought, and the specific mechanisms through which Rede de Vizinhos would operate. At the end of the meeting, the police officer in charge collected a list of names and signatures of those who are interested in participating. The outcome of this process may or may not seed creation of a new group,

depending on the level of engagement, the definition of specific geographic boundaries, and the choice of participants and group leader.

If the group is established, a second meeting is held exclusively with the selected participants. All adult individuals are eligible to participate, as long as they have a clean criminal record. This meeting then establishes specific rules for usage of WhatsApp groups; discusses prevention techniques; lays out norms for detecting and reporting suspicious behaviour. The meetings then address specific policing problems at the community policing group level. The topics are brought forth by the members, and a specific plan of action is drafted. The police officers then collaborate with citizens to identify the root cause of the problem, and develop a tangible solution. In some cases, the police officer may direct the citizens to other government branches — e.g., when lighting needs fixing or improving, or other aspects of the urban infrastructure. From this meeting onwards, frequent communications are held via WhatsApp groups. In-person meetings are repeated every six months, during which the problems and solutions raised in the previous meetings are discussed and reviewed; and new issues might be brought forward and the cycle repeats itself.

Problem-oriented policing. There is no centralized system to collect the responses across places, nor whether other government units were involved in the process of problem-solving. Typically, the police officers would not involve themselves as an active participant in the process of solving the problem; but rather would act as an catalyst to organize and systematize the problems, work together with the participants to find a solution and ultimately make them responsible for acting on those solutions (if no direct police involvement is necessary or required) or liaise with other police officers where police involvement was called for.

Citizen feedback mechanisms. Chat groups on WhatsApp, a free instant chat application for mobile phones, were the main medium of communication between police officers and citizens. Suggestions and concerns raised in the groups were collected by the police officers assigned to the groups, who constantly monitored them.

A.2 Colombia

Officer recruitment and training. Station chiefs were recruited into the study through outreach from the research team and local support from Estrategia y Territorio and individuals within MEVAL, the metropolitan police branch. Station chiefs agreed to send two patrol officers to meetings and added the meetings to the TAMIR, a document that outlines station chiefs' expectations for each patrol officer on each day. Patrol officers received no specialized training but were given guides for community meetings by meeting facilitators.

Townhall meetings. Town hall meetings were organized by research assistants using the affiliation of Estrategia y Territorio.

The aim was to hold three meetings in each beat, approximately once every three months. Citizens were invited to meetings through fliers as well as messages from community leaders. Fliers were also left at community centers by facilitators. In total 80,873 fliers were handed out and 66,434 left at doors during the intervention.

Two patrol officers were requested to attend the meetings, though higher-ranking officers and representatives of other state institutions were sometimes present. An agenda was set out beforehand.

The police officer shared pre-prepared remarks that outlined the role of the police, provided the mechanisms to report crime and police abuse, and then the remainder of the meeting was to be open discussion with citizens. Most meetings concluded with the signing of a Cooperation Agreement. In these agreements participants and officers agreed on the three top problems identified during the meeting as well as actions each party would engage in the address these problems.

These documents could be used in the following meeting to evaluate if the police complied with expectations set out in the agreement. However, because most participants did not attend more than one meeting and different police officers were sent to first, second, and third meetings in practice it was difficult to assess officers' compliance.

Our initial goal was to organize 522 meetings (173 quadrantes x 3 meetings per quadrant). However, due to lack of participation in some meetings and security concerns in others we canceled 66 of these meetings. In total, we organized 456 meetings over an average of 3 months (range: two months to five months). Average attendance was 17.9 citizens per meeting, or 53.2 citizens per neighborhood over two or three meetings. The minimum cumulative (over meetings) attendance was two, and the maximum was 118. Because meetings were organized throughout the city in lower, middle, and upper-class neighborhoods class composition varied across meetings. For example, descriptions of meetings in the El Poblado commune – with some of the most affluent neighborhoods in the city – indicated that that participants were middle and upper class. In contrast descriptions in other communes suggested participants belonged to the working or managerial classes. Local community leaders were often present at meetings, including priests and heads of neighborhood organizations.

A.3 Liberia

Officer recruitment and training. The community policing activities were led by the community policing officer with support from rank-and-file officers available on the scheduled day of activities. Community policing officers attend occasional trainings, usually organized by international NGOs such as the United Nations. Accurate data on the frequency and intensity of these trainings is not available. No special training was provided for officers involved in the intervention. Participation came at the expense of their regular tasks and duties.

Townhall meetings. Townhall meetings were organized by the CPO in partnership with the research team. The aim was to hold meetings on a bimonthly basis for a period of 10 to 12 months. Meetings were hosted by communities at the main meeting

spot for community meetings, usually a Gazebo at the center of town, or a school or church. Meetings were held on the weekends. Citizens were informed about the meetings by police officers during a foot patrol carried out the week preceding each meeting. Community leaders also helped inform members about the meeting. There was no set agenda for the meetings, but they all followed the same format: an introduction by community leaders, one to two 10 minute lectures by police officers, and about 30 minutes of discussion and Q&A. Topics covered during the lectures included: basic guidelines for reporting crimes, the 'concept' of community policing and the importance of police/-community partnerships, explanation of the LNP's various units, including the women and child protection unit; the Professional Standards Division of the LNP and its role in handling incidents of police misconduct; introduction to the watch forum initiative, and warnings against mob violence and domestic abuse.

Commitments for follow-up action were usually related to next steps in the process of vetting and certifying community watch forums, and providing t-shirts and ID cards. Communities, for their part, committed to organizing watch forums and submitting the list of proposed members to the police. While many communities submitted lists to the police, the police seldom followed through on vetting members (a central database of convicted criminals does not exist, but they may have run their names past officers familiar with the community, to make sure no one was a known criminal). The police also did not follow through on providing ID cards or t-shirts.

Attendance at the meetings ranged from as little as 10 to as many as 60, but most meetings were attended by between 20 and 30 residents.

Foot patrols. Teams of 4-6 police officers conducted foot patrols before each community meeting, usually during the week. The patrols lasted about an hour. During that time, officers raised awareness of the upcoming meeting, handed out pamphlets and talked informally with residents. They seldom conducted searches or arrests. Data on the precise number of face to face engagements is not available. Pamphlets contained information about how to contact the local police department, the community watch forum initiative, sensitization against mob violence, and information about the police's women and child protection units.

Problem-oriented policing. As far as the research team is aware, no problem-oriented policing activities took place.

Citizen feedback mechanisms. No feedback mechanisms were created or provided besides the townhall meetings.

Community watch forum . The CPOs use the townhall meetings as a forum through which to engage in problem-oriented policing around the central challenge facing most communities: lack of police capacity and presence. The CPOs seek to address this challenge by (re)introducing communities to the police's Watch Forum initiative. They explain that watch forums are composed of groups of concerned citizens who support the police to address security problems in their communities. Exactly which functions the

watch forums perform depend on the particular problems faced by the communities they serve, but common activities include sharing information about security threats; meeting regularly with the police to design proactive, collaborative strategies to combat crime; educating fellow community members of police services and how to access them; facilitating police investigations in their communities; and conducting nighttime security patrols during periods of peak crime.

For communities that elected to form a group, there was only one group per community. Some communities had a group or remnants of a group prior to the start of the intervention. In these cases, the intervention served to reenergize group activities. In practice, vetting was the responsibility of the Town Chairman/woman and whomever s/he assigned to lead the watch forum. In many communities, members were drawn from pre-existing security groups that had been operating independently of the police. Training was minimal, and consisted mainly of lectures delivered either as part of the intervention or through separate security meetings organized between CPOs and Forum leaders.

A.4 Pakistan

Officer recruitment and training. While a selection criteria for officers was provided as part of the program that advised the induction of one officer of the rank of ASI or SI and one officer of the rank Constable or Head Constable, the actual selection of officers in a particular beat was entirely determined by each District Police's Establishment (OSI) Branch. The selection process, in effect, gave preference to those ASI/SIs who were already assigned to the treatment beats. The responsibilities given as part of the community policing program were additional responsibilities that added to their existing tasks.

The community policing training program was developed by a team consisting of an experienced officer of the rank of Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP, an officer of the rank district police head) who had trained in Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, the Chief Law Instructor of the Police Training College at Chung and a set of master trainers from the training college[30] The training manual consisted of the following modules:

- Introduction of community policing and its relationship with problem-oriented policing
- Differences between reactive policing and community policing
- Introduction to the SARA model and the problem-solving approach in policing
- Detailed overview of the SARA model and its practical applications

[30]Police Training College Lahore is one of the oldest police training institute in the country. It's the premier training college in Punjab Police providing training to field officers and senior police leadership in various aspects of policing in Punjab.

In order to develop problem solving capacity of the officers, three caselets were developed in close coordination with Chief Law Instructor and the Master Trainer of the Police Training College at Chung, a highly reputable officer who has served as the Police Station Head in high crime police stations in the Metropolitan City of Lahore, which lies within a thirty minute distance of the two districts where the community policing program was being implemented. All training materials were translated into the local language and a copy of all documents was supplied to the trainers and trainees.

The training consisted of two components Component 1 consisted of a four-day (8 hours per day) long in-house training session that included the following sessions:

Day 1 Introduction to community policing and the difference between community policing and reactive policing

Day 2 Refresher around existing police rules

Day 3 Introduction to SARA and problem solving in policing. This module used caselets to teach problem solving techniques and drew on the refresher on police rules to discuss how problem-oriented actions can be implemented within the existing set of rules

Day 4 Step by step training of operationalizing community policing forums at the beat level

Component 2 (Day-5) was a practical module where officers were instructed to go to a pilot beat in their district that did not fall within the experimental beats and implement what they had learnt. This consisted of conducting a community policing forum, formulating a community policing plan and devising response strategies in collaboration with the community. Following this, officers were required to attend a debrief session where officers engaged in a moderated discussion, led by the trainers, on the effectiveness of the strategies used to engage and mobilize the community and analyze the strengths and weaknesses of their proposed response plans.

The content and format of the training was piloted in the district of Kasur which is the third district in the same policing range that was not a part of the community policing program. Following the pilot training, feedback was incorporated from field officers of Kasur district and the first two days of training were merged into one to make the training program into a 3 day (8 hours per day) long in-class module and 1 day field practical module. In the study districts, training for DBU officers assigned to treatment beats was conducted at the district level in classes of 20 trainees that were taught by a team of two instructors from the Police Training College in Chung.

After every training session, the trainers assessed the training cohort using a feedback form that trainers had to fill. Those individuals who lacked problem solving capacity were identified and excluded from the program.

Townhall meetings. Community police forums (town hall meetings) were organized by the DBU team in partnership with the local residents of villages and urban neighborhoods in the treatment beats. The community policing program required each DBU

to hold monthly beat meetings at randomly drawn villages and urban neighborhoods within beats. However, monthly meetings were cancelled during periods of public religious events (Eid and Moharram) and during periods of political and civil unrest when community police officers were reallocated to security duties. During the period of February 2019 till February 2020, a total of 808 meetings took place, an average of 0.85 per beat (range: 0 to 1.4). Attendance averaged 10 people (range: 5 to 40). Meetings were held within villages and urban neighborhoods in a diverse set of locations including local markets, private house of local community members and the local village or neighborhood council office. The mobilization of residents to attend the meetings involved public messaging through mosques and information shared through residents involved in community activities in the area. One beat meeting per month was held in CPOP beats and in the alternative arm (CPOP-G) separate monthly meetings were conducted in each village and neighborhood for men by the male members of the DBU team and for women by the female constable.

Foot patrols. Foot patrols were not a mandatory component of the community policing program in Pakistan. They were introduced if they were considered an effective response to the problems identified in the community policing forums.

Citizen feedback mechanisms. During the forums, citizens were encouraged to report the complaints and feedback on the IG Punjab 8787 police complaints hotline.

Problem-oriented policing. The beat meeting involved an open discussion of problems (where a problem was defined as "Any condition that alarms, harms, threatens, causes fear, or has potential for disorder in the community, particularly incidents that may appear as isolated, but share certain characteristics such as common pattern, victim or geographic location and/or impose a disproportionate social, economic or psychological burden on members of the community."). This was followed by a discussion around prioritization and potential responses that were documented as a mutually agreed community policing plan. The meetings followed the structure below:

1. The first step involved discussion to identify and list the problems faced by the community.

2. The second step involved ranking problems based on severity and selecting the top three problems that fell within the domain of the police as the focus of the community policing plans.

3. The third step involved the analysis of the underlying causes of the priority problems using the SARA approach. This involved a detailed discussion about challenges related to place, time, repeat offenders, repeat victimization and the absence of guardianship.

4. The fourth step involved formulating the action plan where the roles and responsibilities of the police and the community in mitigating these problems was agreed

and documented. For problems that lay outside the ambit of the police (like sewerage and municipal issues) general guidance was provided by the community policing officers about which office to approach and the most effective way to escalate the problem. In cases where these issues were salient for the community the police enabled access to relevant municipal officers to enable a response strategy.

5. The attendance and proceedings of these meetings were documented by the DBU and they were required to fill two forms: Form 1 or an attendance roster that documented the basic demographics of forum attendees and Form II or the community policing plan document.

6. After the end of the meeting, police officers decided the time and date of the next meeting in consultation with the community members. The next meeting in the same location was designed to be a follow-up meeting where police officers debriefed the forum about the steps that the police had taken in terms of the community policing plan and discussed their efficacy in terms of solving the identified problems. The community members also discussed steps they took to solve the problems and if any change were needed to the previous action plan. The details of these meetings were recorded in the Community Policing Form III.

The field officers who conducted the meeting were instructed to submit the hard copies of the form at the front desk of each police station. The officers were also instructed to append each forum in a separate file so that in case of transfers, the incoming officer can be debriefed on the progress of these forums. The front desk officers were tasked to scan the forms and stored it on a dedicated folder on Google Drive, which was shared with the SDPO, DPO, and the research team. Random audits of these forums were conducted by members of the research team who acted as third-party monitors in this capacity.

The schedule of beat-level forums with dates and times was decided in a meeting by the Sub-District Police Officer (SDPO) of the rank Assistant Superintendent (ASP) or Deputy Superintendent (DSP) of Police along with the DSP legal. During the meeting field officers of the relevant circle were invited to finalize the community policing forum schedule of the coming month keeping in view that the routine policing activities are not affected. The presence of the research team during these meetings ensured compliance with research designs in terms of police officers not scheduling a forum in control beats. The agreed schedule was notified in the form of an official schedule that was authorized by the District Police officer and the relevant SDPO and circulated to each police station registrar who ensured that the forums were held as per schedule.

Community watch forum. During the officer training, one session was dedicated to the usefulness of watch forums. The treatment required community police officers to use this training to educate the community about the effectiveness of watch forums and to encourage communities to create and manage watch forums where they were not functional.

A.5 Philippines

Officer recruitment and training. The first stage of our intervention (CEP) originated with the provincial police chief, therefore the intervention became part of officers' normal duties. The overwhelming majority of officers participated in this stage of the intervention, which involved generated tens of thousands of informal contacts with citizens and distributing 110,000 stickers. The operations staff at each MPS were given lists of which barangays should receive the treatment and were told to schedule "One Sorsogon Patrols" in treatment barangays. For these patrols, the barangay leadership was contacted ahead of time and then groups of officers visited the barangay, passed out stickers, engaged in one-on-one conversations, attended meetings with barangay leadership, and held impromptu meetings with groups of citizens. A police-community relations (PCR) officer attended each barangay visit and tracked officer attendance and activities. Because CEP was largely a police initiative, ranking officers in the province gave a directive for patrol officers to implement the intervention we describe and passed the directive through standard channels (daily briefings, written directives, etc.). Before the rollout of the intervention, the PNP organized a training session for all municipal chiefs of police and lead municipal PCR officers so that they could explain the activities to officers.

For the second (POP) stage, the PNP provided a list of all officers assigned to the province. We randomly selected two officers from the MPS associated with each treatment barangay and requested their participation. We proceeded to select randomly from the list of remaining officers as replacements were needed. Officers participated in the POP meetings and implemented solutions during their off-duty time, and received a stipend to compensate for their extra time. POP meetings involving PNP officers took place at the MPS, and the operations staff at each MPS generally tried to schedule meetings during times when the officer was already scheduled to be at the station. They were encouraged to conduct additional patrols in their assigned barangay on-duty whenever possible, and to maintain extra contact with their assigned barangay's leadership. However, our observation was that few officers changed their behavior beyond attending the assigned meetings.

Officials from the local government unit (LGU) opted into the intervention, within our guidelines: we requested the participation of the chief tanod (head of the community security officers appointed by the barangay kapitan, the highest elected official in the barangay), the kagawad (elected official) in charge of peace and order, and up to 5 additional barangay tanods (most participating barangays had 10-15 tanods). These officials participated as part of their normal duties, and received a small stipend from the research team for their participation. Because the POP intervention aligned so well with the tanods' and kagawad's normal duties, we found that they were enthusiastic about participating. Those whose teams included PNP officers were also appreciative of the PNP's enhanced attention to their barangay. In contrast, since PNP officers are assigned to municipalities, many (but not all) participating officers found the intervention in specific barangays to be a distraction from their normal duties, especially those assigned to more remote barangays that they would not otherwise have visited.

Before the problem-oriented policing stage described below, all PNP officers assigned

to POP teams and one representative from the (LGU) from each participating barangay attended a day-long training workshop in Sorsogon City. The training allowed participating PNP officers to meet an LGU representative from their assigned barangay, explained the theory of change behind Problem Oriented Policing, and provided an overview of the POP meetings in which officers and LGU representatives would participate over the subsequent six months. The PIs developed the training materials along with PNP leadership, and a Manila-based consultant who specializes in team-building and other group-oriented training led the training sessions.

Foot patrols. In the Philippines, activities during the foot patrols were designed to match the community engagement components of the other six contexts. In each beat, foot patrols were conducted by approximately 800 officers of 9 ranks. On average, officers conducted approximately 14 barangay visits over the 14-week period of CEP (some of which were re-visits). This averages out to one CEP patrol per officer per week. While we do not have official data on the duration of these CEP patrols, we believe they lasted approximately 2-3 hours. After arriving at the barangay via police vehicle or public transportation, the officers patrolled on foot. Officers generally patrolled in groups of 2-5, though some officers patrolled on their own. We estimate that total of 28,000 officer hours were spent patrolling during the intervention (35 hours per officer for 800 officers). This comes out to about 8,000 total officer hours per month and 10 hours/month for each officer. The vast majority of officers assigned to patrols had other duties, though PCR officers likely spent more than 25% of their time on One Sorsogon over the period of the intervention. On patrol, officers were instructed to engage citizens they encountered, make stops at businesses and schools, make home visit, attend barangay assembly meetings, and hold informal gatherings with groups of citizens. While the exact nature of these visits was left up to the discretion of the One Sorsogon patrol team, on average each officer attended 3 barangay assemblies per month, visited 10 businesses or schools per month, and recorded speaking with 57 citizens per month. Reports and information gathered during patrols were reported to the municipal police station at the discretion of the officers. No formal procedures were put in place for taking action on information learned during patrols.

The impetus for our CEP program originated with then- PNP Provincial Police Director in charge of Sorsogon Province, Ronaldo Cabral, in early 2016. As part of the "One Sorsogon" program, the PNP directed officers to engage with citizens in non-emergency settings in order to relay information about ongoing PNP crime-reduction efforts, gather information about the most pressing problems in the community, and invite citizens to participate in a signature drive to indicate their solidarity with the fight against crime in Sorsogon. This program was a PNP initiative utilizing on-duty officers, and so participating officers were not compensated beyond their normal salaries. During barangay visits that were scheduled as part of the intervention, many officers chose to hold impromptu "town-hall" style meetings with small or medium-sized groups in the community, but the majority of interactions were one-on-one discussions with available citizens. The community engagement program occurred over the course of two months in early 2017, during which time PNP officers engaged more than 138,000 citizens through vis-

its to homes and schools, barangay assemblies, and dialogues with individuals passing through public locations.

Problem-oriented policing. Monthly POP meetings were organized by the operations staff at each MPS, in collaboration with members of our research team. In LGU-only POP meetings were organized by the barangay captain, in collaboration with members of our research team. The aim was to hold 6 meetings for each barangay (plus a culminating activity held at the barangay hall), approximately once a month. Meetings were held at the MPS for PNP+LGU teams and at the barangay hall for LGU-only teams. LGU leaders (including the barangay captain, kagawad, and tanods) were invited to meetings through SMS messages and phone calls to the barangay captain or kagawad in charge; 198 invitations were sent out (1 to each barangay captain) for each of the six POP meetings (1,188 total). For the culminating activity, ordinary citizens were invited to the meeting via announcements posted around the barangay and through informal networks of the barangay leadership. Two police officers were assigned to attend the meeting, where possible one senior police officer (SPO1 – SPO4) and one junior police officer (PO1 – PO3) (in some cases availability dictated that both officers come from lower ranks). An agenda was set out beforehand with specific topics and time allocations.

At POP meetings, the LGU leaders began with updates on progress towards resolving the barangay-specific issues and the remainder of the meeting was dedicated to discussion about how to further resolve the issue. At the culminating activity, the police officers (or barangay leaders in LGU-only barangays) shared preprepared remarks that outlined the role of the police, provided the mechanisms to report crime and police abuse, and then the remainder of the meeting was to be open discussion with citizens. At the POP meetings involving PNP officers, plans were sometimes discussed that involved specific actions that were to be undertaken by the PNP, though at other meetings the planned actions only involved the LGU leadership. There were no formal mechanisms in place to ensure that the PNP actually took action, aside from the fact that the barangay leadership might lodge a complaint with PNP leadership if action was not taken. For the LGU-only POP meetings, the planned responses most commonly involved actions by tanods, who are accountable to the barangay captain (who has the power to dismiss them from their jobs).

1,386 meetings took place (including the culminating activities), an average of 73 per municipal police station (range: 35 to 161). Attendance at POP meetings averaged 6.5 people (range: 3 to 20). Attendance at culminating activities averaged 80 people (range: 14 to 276). The five most common issues discussed in meetings were 1) juvenile delinquency, 2) traffic accidents, 3) public intoxication, 4) theft, and 5) family feuds and neighbor disputes, with a roughly even number of barangays choosing to focus on these five issues. Of the PNP officers, approximately 72

On average, meetings lasted 2 hours. This means that just over 2,000 PNP officer hours (99 barangays, 1.5 officers/meeting, 7 meetings) were dedicated to POP meetings over the course of 6 months, or approximately 340 officer-hours per month. We do not have a credible way of tracking the number of officer hours spent addressing the issues raised during POP. Tanods (barangay-level security personnel) dedicated approximately

11,000 hours to the program over the course of the POP intervention (198 barangays, 4 tanods/meeting, 7 meetings), or approximately 1,500 tanod-hours per month. We have strong reason to believe that tanods also spent a large portion of their on-duty time addressing issues raised during POP, given that their main duty involves addressing the types of issues raised at POP meetings.

Our POP intervention centered around the creation of problem oriented policing teams in each treatment barangay. We randomly varied the composition of the teams as one of our study's cross-randomized alternative arms. All teams included the Barangay Captain, the Chief Tanod, three regular tanods, and the Kagawad (elected barangay councilor) in charge of peace and order. A random subset of POP teams also included two randomly selected PNP officers from the Barangay's municipality. We provided participating local officials and police officers with a small stipend to offset the time they devoted to each meeting. Thus, all teams had local knowledge, and some had additional resources and expertise of the PNP. Preexisting channels of communication between the tanods and the PNP remained open and available to all POP teams.

We implemented the POP treatment from December 2017 through May 2018. Each POP team involving the PNP met once per month at the MPS. Each LGU-only POP team met once per month in a suitable location within the barangay, usually the barangay hall. A member of the research staff attended and monitored each meeting but did not participate in it. Teams used Meeting 1 to review information about problems in the barangay and identify a relevant issue that the team would focus on over the course of the intervention. We provided each team with aggregate statistics from our midline survey and from police blotters detailing the types of crime that citizens in their barangay experienced most often and the issues they said were most important to them. We also provided anonymized logs of any SMS tips sent to the PNP during the preceding months that referenced their barangay, though these were unavailable in the majority of barangays because so few messages included the sender's barangay. The team reviewed this information during the meeting and was tasked with interviewing citizens in their barangay about public safety before the start of Meeting 2. At Meeting 2, teams decided on which issue they would focus and began crafting a strategy to address the issue. By the end of Meeting 3, teams provided our research staff with a proposed budget of up to 5,000 pesos (approximately $100 US) for implementing their strategy. The PIs reviewed the budgets to ensure compliance with funder regulations.

Many teams focused on stepping up foot patrols in problematic areas, and spent their budgets on basic equipment like flashlights, whistles, and rain ponchos that would allow tanods to conduct more extensive patrols. A few barangays created minor infrastructure improvements. For instance, to discourage vagrancy and combat public intoxication, several barangays erected street lights in strategic locations. Cabigaan, Bulusan built fences on either side of the main highway to prevent stray dogs from wandering into the road and causing vehicle accidents, a problem which they identified as particularly severe. Several barangays also installed road safety signage. Finally, many POP teams addressed problems like juvenile delinquency and public intoxication by creating activities in which at-risk individuals could participate. The POP team in Cogon, Gubat purchased sports equipment that school-age children could loan from the barangay hall after school. Pamurayan, Sorsogon used their funds to create a community garden

tended to by at-risk youth.

Teams spent months 4, 5, and 6 of the intervention implementing their strategies. They met monthly to report on progress and discuss any issues. At the end of the six-month intervention, each participating barangay held a culminating event to reinforce public knowledge of their activities and discuss ways to continue activities that would improve public safety in the future.

Citizen feedback mechanisms. Our harmonized intervention did not include any new feedback mechanisms, though citizens may have taken the opportunity of increased police presence and informal contacts to report information. However, we implemented a massive advertisement campaign around a little-used provincial voice and sms hotline as an alternative treatment arm. Phone calls and sms messages only cost citizens the amount of "load" or "minutes" required to make the call. Reports to the provincial police office via the hotline are received by a dedicated officer at the provincial police station and then shared with the operations office at the municipal police station. Municipal police stations also have their own hotlines, which are more commonly used than the provincial police hotline, though we were unable to collect reliable data on the number of messages to the MPS.

A.6 Uganda

Officer recruitment and training. Officers were reassigned from other tasks in order to participate in community policing activities. Training was conducted by our implementing partner, YIDO. YIDO trained a total of 122 officers on community policing principles and strategies, and on the various components of the intervention (town hall meetings, door-to-door visits, night patrols, and formation of neighborhood watch teams). YIDO also instructed officers in data collection and management for tracking their activities during the intervention. Participating officers generally included the District Police Commanders (DPC), District Community Liaisons Officers (DCLO), District Child and Family Protection Officers (CFPU), Officers in Charge (O/C) of each treatment police post, and Community Liaisons Officers (CLO) from each treatment police post. In most cases LC1 chairpersons and Community Development Officers also participated in these trainings. Each training lasted two days. All trainings were conducted between July and September, 2018. Most trainings were held at a police post, a youth center, a hotel, or a district or subcounty hall. The number of officers trained in each district ranged from five to 25.

YIDO also organized two higher level meetings for senior officials and supervising officers, including the RPC, RCLO, DPC, and DCLO from each district and regional police headquarters. The goal of these trainings was to increase buy-in for the intervention and encourage senior officials to instruct the officers under their command to participate more actively in community policing activities. These meetings were held in May 2019.

Townhall meetings. Town hall meetings were organized by police officers in coordination with YIDO and the LC1 chairperson of each treatment village. The aim was to

hold four meetings in each village over the duration of the study, approximately once every two months. Meetings were held in the village. Citizens were invited to meetings through word of mouth; to the best of our knowledge, LC1 chairpersons did not issue formal / written invitations. In general, the Officer-in-Charge (O/C) of the police station or post with jurisdiction over the village was invited to participate. If the O/C was unavailable, another officer from the same police station or post was invited to participate instead. In many cases, however, communities organized their own town hall meetings, especially to discuss formation, recruitment, and standard operating procedures for neighborhood watch teams. In many cases the police did not attend these meetings. Our best estimate is that police were physically present at roughly two-thirds of all meetings.

Topics of discussion ranged widely. The most common topics related to the formation and functioning of neighborhood watch teams. According to qualitative field reports compiled by our implementing partners, this topic was discussed in over half of all meetings. But other topics were variable, and sometimes only indirectly related to issues of conflict, crime, and violence: truancy and the need to educate local youths (roughly one-third of all meetings); drug and alcohol abuse (roughly one-quarter of all meetings); health and sanitation (roughly one-fifth of all meetings); domestic abuse and sexual and gender-based violence (roughly one-fifth of all meetings); gambling (roughly one-seventh of all meetings); and a variety of other topics from traffic accidents to savings groups to stray dogs.

A total of 353 town hall meetings were held as part of the intervention between June 2, 2018 and November 17, 2019. The number of attendees ranged widely, from a low of five to a high of 224. Men tended to outnumber women, with a male-to-female ratio greater than 1 in roughly 75

Foot patrols. While the intervention was designed to include door-to-door visits and night patrols, to the best of our knowledge, these occurred only very sporadically. We are aware of 26 occasions on which officers conducted door-to-door visits in treatment communities, all early in the intervention. In some cases, it appears that these visits were conducted in response to citizens call for service. In most cases visits were conducted by a single officer. The number of households visited ranged widely, from one to 15. The ranks of the officers varied as well, though most are from junior management. From bottom to top of the police hierarchy, ranks of the officers involved in door-to-door visits included PC, CPL, SGT, AIP, IP, and CP.

The officers conducted these visits on foot. We do not know how long each visit lasted. After each visit, officers were instructed to complete a form documenting the location and time of the visit, the names and ranks of the participating officers, the names of the residents with whom the officers interacted, comments about the visits, and recommendations. (We have 26 of these forms. It is possible that other visits occurred without the officers completing a form.) In almost all cases, the comments merely refer to the reception that the officers received. In most cases they described the reception as welcoming; in four of the 26 reports, however, the officer also mentions fear among residents who were unaccustomed to police presence in their communities.

We are also aware of 11 occasions on which officers conducted night patrols, all early in the intervention. Between one and four officers participated in each patrol. All patrols were conducted on foot. Officers reported interacting with between six and 20 residents per patrol. In at least one case it appears that the officers asked members of the NWT to join them on patrol; on at least two other occasions the NWT conducted a night patrol without police accompaniment. (We believe NWT night patrols likely occurred more frequently than this.) We are unaware of any case in which a night patrol yielded information that the patrolling officers reported up the chain of command.

Community watch forum. All treatment villages should have created a neighborhood watch team (NWT) as part of the primary treatment arm. Half of all villages assigned to the primary treatment were also randomly assigned to our secondary treatment arm, which involved additional training and logistical support for NWTs. In principle, each village should be divided into "cells," and each cell should have its own NWT with a chairperson, a secretary, a defense mobilizer/coordinator, and seven members selected from among the households in the cell. In practice, the number of members varied somewhat across cells and villages. On December 7, 2018, we recorded that 114 of 144 treatment villages were confirmed to have NWTs. In eight of the remaining villages, the community rejected the proposal to form a NWT. In one other village, the community claimed the police discouraged them from forming a NWT. (We are unable to confirm this claim, though it is inconsistent with the goals of the intervention.) We do not know how many hours members spend on NWT-related activities each week.

B. Study experimental designs

We provide declarations of the experimental design for each of the six sites in words and in code using DeclareDesign (*SM1*). This code is also included in the replication materials.

B.1 Brazil

Sample frame. The sample frame is a set of 196 physical locations, and the 300 meter circles surrounding them, selected by commanders in 24 participating municipalities in Santa Catarina State in Brazil.

Sampling. The study is conducted in all of the 196 locations. A random walk pattern is used to select 68 households for locations in the treatment group and 34 households in locations the control group (an average of 43 and 33 were found in the study).[31] Whenever there were not a sufficient number of households found through the random walk pattern at a location, all households were interviewed. When that insufficient, we

[31]The aim of oversampling households in treatment locations was to increase the likelihood of capturing households that eventually will participate in Rede de Vizinhos groups.

Table SM2: Study Site Experimental Designs

	Brazil	Colombia	Liberia	Pakistan	Philippines	Uganda
Random assignment strategy	Two-arm (control, CP[b])	Factorial (control, CP, alt.[c], CP + alt.)	Two-arm (control, CP)	Three-arm (control, CP, alt.[d])	Two-arm (control, CP) with addl. cross-randomizations[e]	Three arm (Control, CP, CP+alt.[f])
Blocking variables[g]	Municipality	Police station	Police zone	Police station	Municipality, baseline crime rate	Baseline covariates
Number of study units	196	347	100	108	298	72
Officers randomized[h]	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓
Citizen survey design	Panel	Panel	Cross-section	Panel	Cross-section	Panel
Officer survey design	Cross-section	Cross-section	Cross-section	Cross-section	Cross-section	Panel

We summarize the experimental designs for the six sites, including details of the random assignment procedure, the duration of treatment, and details of our three measurement strategies.

[a] Barangays are the lowest level of the police hierarchy, equivalent to rural villages and urban neighborhoods.

[b] Harmonized common community policing treatment.

[c] In Colombia, an additional treatment arm involved distributing flyers about (i) resources for victims of domestic violence; (b) Colombia's new Police Code; (c) community-level crime trends; and (d) information on crime reporting. We do not analyze the effects of this treatment following our pre-analysis plan.

[d] In Pakistan, an additional treatment group involved the harmonized common community policing treatment but involved additional training provided to citizens to address gender-related and family crimes. These sessions involved a female police officer who regularly interacted with female members of the community by engaging female union councilors, female school teachers and lady health worker alongside.

[e] In Philippines, the study teams included multiple alternate treatment arms, all of which involved the harmonized common community policing treatment along with the creation of problem oriented policing teams which identified and addressed the most pressing issues in each treated barangay. In the first alternative arm, officers are supplied with promotional stickers to pass out during their engagement that include the new PNP provincial hotline number, along with a call for citizens to text/call in reports, complaints, or suggestions. In the second alternative arm, officers are told that they will be evaluated based on their performance during the community engagement program, and that the top performers will be recognized at a public ceremony. In the third and fourth alternative arms, the policing teams are either composed of local government members or local government members and police officers. In the fifth alternative arm, the teams are told that they are being evaluated by one of two political principals, the Mayor's Office of the corresponding municipality and the Department of Interior and Local Government.

[f] In Uganda, we implement the harmonized common community policing treatment with follow-up meetings focused on reiteration of the earlier meeting and addressing any follow-up questions/concerns that citizens would have.

[g] Variables used to group units into similar blocks, within which treatment is assigned.

[h] In three sites, by virtue of the randomization scheme police officers (or their organization unit, such as a station) were randomly assigned into treatment or control. We only provide estimates of the effects of community policing on officer-level outcomes for these three sites. In the others, officers were assigned to units that spanned multiple study units and so were not necessarily in a single treatment condition.

expanded the radius to 350m or 400m. If a sufficient number of households was still not found, no further interviews were conducted at the location.

Four locations were replaced by the police with new locations far from the original after being assigned to treatment (two were treated and two were controls). Unfortunately, data was not collected in the original locations (data was instead collected in the replacement points). We exclude the outcome data from the new points, as they were not part of our original experimental sample. The fact that we do not have data from the four points in the original sample may result in bias due to differential attrition (one control was dropped in Joinville municipality; in Florianopolis, two treated units were

dropped and one control).

Outcome measurement. Outcomes are measured at baseline and endline in citizen surveys and at endline in officer surveys. Police crime data was provided a point level and spatially matched to points, and collapsed into preintervention (Jan 2017 to May 2018) and postintervention (Jun 2018 to Feb 2019) periods.

Citizens surveys were conducted as a panel, but with a replacement protocol. Interviewers attempted to find the exact person over multiple attempts (25% succeeded). When that person could not be interviewed, another person within the household (50%), another person from another household in the same structure (10%), or a neighbor (15%) were substituted.

At the start of the baseline survey, it became clear that it was not possible to obtain a reach sample size targets in the short time between agreement by the police to hold a meeting and the meeting itself. As a result, we randomly sampled a subset of locations in which to conduct baseline and endline data collection. We report results for survey outcomes only for this subset of randomly sampled locations.

Treatment assignment. We randomly assigned the 196 locations with equal probability to the encouragement treatment (hold meeting and advertise on Facebook) or control (no meeting or advertisement) via block randomization within participating municipalities.

Due to a transcription error during implementation, four units received a different treatment status than the one they were assigned (two are untreated treatment units and two are treated controls). Two are in Balneário Camboriu and two in Rio do Sul municipalities. We analyze the data using the assigned treatment status, meaning that this is an additional source of noncompliance. (This issue only affects administrative data outcomes; these four units were not selected in the random sample of units for survey measurement.)

Estimation. *Administrative data outcomes*

```
iv_robust(acrime_num ~ groupformed + acrime_num_baseline +
          as.factor(municipalities) | Z + acrime_num_baseline + as.factor(municipalities
          data = bra_data_crime)
# coefficient of interest: groupformed
```

Citizen Survey outcomes

```
iv_robust(responsive_act ~ groupformed + responsive_act_baseline +
          as.factor(municipalities) | Z + responsive_act_baseline + as.factor(municipali
          clusters = locations,
          weights = 1 / S_citizens_inclusion_prob,
          data = bra_data_citizen)
# coefficient of interest: Z
```

Design declaration.

```
sd_Y0 <- 1
encouragement_effect_size <- 0.5
std_effect_size <- 0.1

bra_design <-
  declare_population(
    municipalities = add_level(
      N = 24,
      municipality_fx = rnorm(N, sd = 5),
      N_locations = c(2, 10, 10, 10, 3, 10, 10, 10, 4, 15, 10, 10, 10, 20, 5, 8, 4, 3, 2
    ),
    locations = add_level(N = N_locations, location_fx = rnorm(N, sd = 5)),
    citizens = add_level(N = 68, Y_baseline = rnorm(N, sd = sqrt(0.5)), u = rnorm(N, sd
  ) +
  declare_potential_outcomes(
    D ~ if_else(encouragement_effect_size * Z + Y_baseline + u > 0, 1, 0),
    assignment_variables = Z
  ) +
  declare_potential_outcomes(Y ~ std_effect_size * D + u, assignment_variables = D) +
  declare_assignment(
    clusters = locations,
    blocks = municipalities,
    prob = 0.5
  ) +
  declare_sampling(strata = locations, n_unit = if_else(Z == 1, 68, 34)) +
  declare_reveal(D, Z) +
  declare_reveal(Y, D) +
  declare_estimator(
    Y ~ D | Z + Y_baseline + as.factor(municipalities),
    clusters = locations,
    model = iv_robust
  )
```

B.2 Colombia

Sample frame. We study the 413 *cuadrantes* (police beats) in the city of Medellin. We defined a "prioritized neighborhood" around each beat as the set of inhabited, contiguous city blocks closest to the centroid of the police beat. Each prioritized neighborhood comprised about four blocks, depending on the residential density, so as to ensure similar populations. When the centroid of the police beat fell in (for example) a park, we began the prioritized neighborhood at the inhabited block closest to the centroid. There are 413 *cuadrantes* in the city; 66 were excluded that were (a) located in remote areas of the city, or (b) non-residential (e.g., the local airport).

Sampling. The study is conducted in all 347 selected *cuadrantes*. We surveyed 15 respondents per prioritized neighborhood. Households are surveyed randomly within each neighborhood through a random walk method, with a random starting point. At endline, we found a low recontact rate for baseline survey respondents. 620 respondents were re-contacted and 298 new interviewees were found.

Outcome measurement. Outcomes are measured at baseline and endline in citizen surveys (as noted, 298 endline respondent do not have baseline outcomes recorded) and at endline in officer surveys. Police crime data was provided a point level and spatially matched to *cuadrantes*, and collapsed into preintervention (XX time) and postintervention (XX time) periods.

Treatment assignment. We randomly assigned the 387 *cuadrantes* with equal probability into one of four groups in a factorial design: (1) control, with no changes to status quo policing; (2) the harmonized community policing treatment; (3) informational flyers; and (4) both harmonized community policing and informational flyers.

Estimation. Due to research constraints, we do not control for outcomes at baseline in the officer survey. In addition, we are only able to control for some baseline outcomes from the citizen survey.[32]

Administrative data outcomes (Controlling for baseline outcome if available.)

```
lm_robust(
  acrime_num ~ Z_common + Z_alt + acrime_num_baseline + as.factor(block_ID),
  data = col_data_crime)
# coefficient of interest: Z_common
```

Citizen survey outcomes (Controlling for baseline outcome if available.)

```
lm_robust(
  responsive_act ~ Z_common + Z_alt + responsive_act_baseline + as.factor(block_ID),
  clusters = cuadrantes,
  weights = 1 / S_citizens_inclusion_prob,
  data = col_data_citizen)
# coefficient of interest: Z_common
```

Officer survey outcomes (Note an officer baseline was not conducted, so not controlling for baseline outcome).

[32]Outcomes for which we are unable to control for at baseline include: `polcasefair`, `burglaryres`, `bribe_whatfor`, `bribe_amt`, `armedrob_satisfied`, `burglary_satisfied`, `simpleassault_satisfied`, `other_any`, `other_report`, `other_satisfied`, `caggassault_any`, `caggassault_num`, `caggassault_report`, `cmurder_num`, `cmurder_report`, `cother_any`, `cother_report`, `fear_violent`, `know_law_suspect`, `know_law_lawyer`, `know_law_fees`, `know_law_vaw`, `know_report_station`, and `obeynorm`. All other outcomes are controlled for at baseline.

```
lm_robust(
  empathy_idx ~ Z_common + Z_alt + as.factor(block_ID),
  weights = 1 / S_inclusion_prob,
  data = col_data_officer)
# coefficient of interest: Z_common
```

Design declaration.

```
col_design <-
 declare_population(
  cuadrantes = add_level(N = 347, block_fx = rnorm(N, sd = 5)),
  citizens = add_level(N = 15,
                       Y_baseline = rnorm(N, sd = sqrt(0.5)),
                       u = rnorm(N, sd = sqrt(0.5)))) +
 declare_potential_outcomes(
  Y_Z_0 = Y_baseline + u,
  Y_Z_1 = Y_baseline + std_effect_size + u,
  Y_Z_2 = Y_baseline + std_effect_size + u,
  Y_Z_3 = Y_baseline + std_effect_size + u) +
 declare_assignment(
  # within each block, we will assign each micro-neighborhood to one of four groups:
  # (0) pure control (no intervention);
  # (1) treated only with police-community meetings;
  # (2) treated only with information provision;
  # (3) treated with both police-community meetings and information provision.
  # blocked by block, clustered by micro_neighborhood_ID (b/c multiple months)
  clusters = cuadrantes,
  # blocks = block_ID,
  prob_each = rep(1/4, 4),
  conditions = c(0, # control
                 1, # common arm
                 2, # alt
                 3)) + # both
 declare_step(
  # recode treatment status for analysis
  Z_common = if_else(Z == 1 | Z == 3, 1, 0),
  Z_alt = if_else(Z == 2 | Z == 3, 1, 0),
  handler = mutate) +
  declare_reveal(Y, Z) +
  declare_estimator(
    Y ~ Z_common + Z_alt + Y_baseline, # + as.factor(block_ID),
    clusters = cuadrantes,
    # weights = 1 / S_citizens_inclusion_prob,
    model = lm_robust)
```

B.3 Liberia

Sample frame. Monrovia is divided into ten administrative police zones, which are akin to police precincts in major U.S. cities and typically composed of between 15 and 40 communities or neighborhoods. Communities are sub-divided into anywhere from three to six blocks, which are akin to small neighborhoods or street blocks in the United States. The intervention targeted the most central block in each community plus the largest two adjacent blocks.

Sampling. Within each zone, local research assistants worked with the police to identify any "high priority" communities to be nominated for the intervention based on assessments of crime rates, police-community relations, or other factors. This process identified 35 high priority communities. Because this sample size was smaller than anticipated and would have resulted in an under-powered study, an additional 65 communities were randomly sampled from the remaining population of communities for a total of 100 communities. During the baseline survey and before treatment assignment, two communities were found to be duplicates of other communities and were dropped. During implementation, staffing constraints within the research team required that the smallest police zone (Zone 6) be dropped. Within each community, 20 respondents for the survey were randomly sampled from the selected blocks following a random walk procedure.

Outcome measurement. Outcomes are measured at baseline and endline in citizen surveys. Officer surveys were not conducted. Police crime data was provided at the community level, and collapsed into preintervention (August 2016 to January 2017) and postintervention (January 2018 to July 2018) periods.

Treatment assignment. Half of the communities within each zone were randomly assigned to treatment via block randomization.[33]

Estimation. *Administrative data outcomes* (Controlling for baseline outcome if available.)

```
lm_robust(acrime_num ~ Z + acrime_num_baseline + as.factor(police_zones),
          weights = 1 / S_communities_inclusion_prob,
          data = lbr_data_crime)
# coefficient of interest: Z
```

Citizen Survey outcomes (Controlling for baseline outcome if available.)

[33]In zones with an odd number of communities, $(N_b - 1)/2$ communities were assigned to treatment, where N_b denotes the number of communities in block b, resulting in a slightly less or slightly higher than $1/2$ probability of assignment to treatment, depending on rounding. We account for this in the analysis by weighting observations by the inverse of the probability of assignment.

```
lm_robust(responsive_act ~ Z + responsive_act_baseline + as.factor(police_zones),
          clusters = communities,
          weights = 1 / (S_communities_inclusion_prob *
                           S_citizens_inclusion_prob),
          data = lbr_data_citizen)
# coefficient of interest: Z
```

Design declaration.

```
sd_Y0 <- 1
std_effect_size <- 0.1

lbr_design <-
  declare_population(
    police_zones = add_level(
    N = 10,
    N_communities = c(22, 43, 29, 32, 16, 12, 16, 20, 35, 19),
    zone_fx = rnorm(N, sd = 5)),
    communities = add_level(N = N_communities,
                            high_crime = c(rep(1, 35),
                            rep(0, 209))),
    blocks = add_level(N = 3, block_fx = rnorm(N, sd = 5)),
    citizens = add_level(N = 20,
                         Y_baseline = rnorm(N, sd = sqrt(0.5)),
                         u = rnorm(N, sd = sqrt(0.5)))) +
  declare_potential_outcomes(
    Y_Z_0 = Y_baseline + u,
    Y_Z_1 = Y_baseline + std_effect_size + u,
    Y_Z_2 = Y_baseline + std_effect_size + u,
    Y_Z_3 = Y_baseline + std_effect_size + u) +
  declare_sampling(
    handler = function(data) {
     # randomly sample 65 communities from among communities not prioritized
     data$S_remainder <- NA
     data$S_remainder[data$high_crime == FALSE] <-
     cluster_rs(clusters = data$communities[data$high_crime == FALSE], n = 65)
     # select prioritized communities plus the 65 sampled communities
     data %>% filter(high_crime == TRUE | S_remainder == 1) %>% select(-S_remainder)
    }
  ) +
  declare_assignment(clusters = communities, prob = 0.5, blocks = police_zones) +
  declare_reveal(Y, Z) +
  declare_estimator(
    Y ~ Z + Y_baseline + as.factor(police_zones),
    clusters = communities,
```

```
# weights = 1 / S_citizens_inclusion_prob,
model = lm_robust)
```

B.4 Pakistan

Sample frame. We study community policing in Sheikhupura and Nankana districts in Sheikhupura Region of Pakistan's Punjab Province. Sheikhupura and Nankana districts have a combined population size of 4.6 million people. These two districts consist of 27 police stations and 151 beats consisting of 1053 villages and 516 urban neighborhoods. Sheikhupura and Nankana have roughly 340 police officers at the Sub-Inspector (SI) and Assistant Sub-Inspector (ASI) rank.

Sampling. We draw two independent samples of beats and combine them. First, within each of the 27 police stations we randomly sample three beats for a total of 81 sampled beats. Second, excluding those 81 beats we conduct a probability-proportional-to-size sample of 27 additional beats across all stations in Sheikhupura and Nankana districts, based on AsiaPop grid-cell data on population. (The sampling takes place as part of the random assignment of beats, described below.)

We draw a random sample of 3,456 individuals in the 108 sampled beats, stratified by beat with 32 sampled per beat. We then independently draw an additional sample of 864 respondents (8 per beat) with the same beat-stratified method. We use probability-proportional-to-size sampling for sampling respondents within beats. We take the AsiaPop 100-meter grid cell population data, aggregate to 500x500 meter grid cells, and draw a population-proportional-to-size sample of four grid cells within each beat. We then choose a random starting point within each sampled grid, and then use a left-hand rule from the starting point for eight houses. This yields a sample of 3,456 individuals in the 108 sampled beats. We repeat this exercise, sampling one grid cell within each beat and eight households within each cell, to draw an additional sample of 864 respondents to be used as replacements.

Outcome measurement. Outcomes are measured at baseline and endline in citizen and officer surveys. Police crime data was provided at the beat level, and collapsed into preintervention (January 2017 to March 2019) and postintervention (March to November 2019) periods.

Random assignment. We randomly assign beats through two independent randomizations. First, we randomly assign the stratified sample of three beats per station using randomization blocked on stations: one beat assigned to control, one to the common arm, and one to the alternative arm. We then randomize the sample of 27 additional beats into the three conditions using complete random assignment with nine beats assigned to each condition. Note that the assignment process includes the sampling process. The treatment variable then is calculated by combining the two indicators: if the beat is not assigned to a treatment in the first stage, it is available in the second stage; if it selected in neither, it is not sampled.

Estimation. *Administrative data outcomes* (Controlling for baseline outcome if available.)

```
lm_robust(acrime_num ~ Z_common + Z_alt + acrime_num_baseline + as.factor(stations),
          weights = 1 / (Z_multistage_assignment_prob *
                           S_multistage_inclusion_prob),
          data = pak_data_crime)
# coefficient of interest: Z_common
```

Citizen Survey outcomes (Controlling for baseline outcome if available.)

```
lm_robust(
    responsive_act ~ Z_common + Z_alt + responsive_act_baseline + as.factor(stations),
    clusters = beats,
    weights = 1 / (Z_multistage_assignment_prob * S_multistage_inclusion_prob_survey),
    data = pak_data_citizen)
# coefficient of interest: Z_common
```

Officer survey outcomes (Controlling for baseline outcome if available.)

```
lm_robust(empathy_idx ~ Z_common + Z_alt + empathy_idx_baseline + as.factor(stations),
          clusters = beats,
          weights = 1 / (Z_multistage_assignment_prob *
                           S_multistage_inclusion_prob),
          data = pak_data_officer)
# coefficient of interest: Z_common
```

Design declaration.

```
std_effect_size <- 0.1
beats_per_station <-
    c(rep(3, 3),
      rep(4, 5),
      rep(5, 5),
      rep(6, 2),
      rep(7, 3),
      rep(8, 5),
      rep(9, 2),
      rep(3, 2))

pak_design <-
 declare_population(
    districts = add_level(
      N = 2,
      district_name = c("Sheikhupura", "Nankana"),
      N_stations = c(16, 11)),
    stations = add_level(
```

```
    N = N_stations,
    N_beats = beats_per_station),
  beats = add_level(
    N = N_beats,
    beat_population = sample(1000:2000, N, replace = TRUE)),
  citizen_ID = add_level(
    N = beat_population,
    Y_baseline = rnorm(N, sd = sqrt(0.5)),
    u = rnorm(N, sd = sqrt(0.5)))) +
 declare_potential_outcomes(
  Y_Z_0 = Y_baseline + u,
  Y_Z_1 = Y_baseline + std_effect_size + u,
  Y_Z_2 = Y_baseline + std_effect_size + u) +
 # declare_sampling(handler = filter) +
declare_assignment(
  #  assign ~1/3 beats to common arm treatment (Z = 1),
  #  assign ~1/3 beats to ADR alternative arm treatment (Z == 2),
  #  assign ~1/3 beats to control (Z = 0)
  clusters = beats, blocks = stations,
  block_m_each =
   cbind(matrix(rep(1, 3),
         ncol = 3,
         nrow = 27),
         beats_per_station - 3),
  conditions = c(0, # control
                 1, # common arm
                 2, # alternative arm (ADR)
                 99), # available to assign in second stage
  assignment_variable = "S1") +
declare_assignment(
  clusters = beats, blocks = S1,
  block_m_each = rbind(c(rep(0, 3), 27, 0),
                       c(rep(0, 3), 27, 0),
                       c(rep(0, 3), 27, 0),
                       c(rep(9, 3), 0, 43)),
  conditions = c(0, # control
                 1, # common arm
                 2, # alternative arm (ADR)
                 99, # assigned in first stage
                 88), # not sampled
  assignment_variable = "S2") +
declare_step(handler = function(data){
 prob_mat <-
  block_and_cluster_ra_probabilities(
      clusters = data$beats,
```

```
      blocks = data$stations,
      block_m_each =
       cbind(matrix(rep(1, 3),
             ncol = 3,
             nrow = 27),
             beats_per_station - 3),
      conditions =
       c(0, # control
         1, # common arm
         2 # alternative arm)) # available to assign in second stage
  colnames(prob_mat) <- paste0("S1_", colnames(prob_mat))
  data <- cbind(data, prob_mat)

prob_mat <-
  block_and_cluster_ra_probabilities(
      clusters = data$beats,
      blocks = data$S1,
      block_m_each =
       rbind(c(rep(0, 3), 27, 0),
             c(rep(0, 3), 27, 0),
             c(rep(0, 3), 27, 0),
             c(rep(9, 3), 0, 43)),
      conditions =
       c(0, # control
       1, # common arm
       2, # alternative arm (ADR)
       99, # assigned in first stage
       88)) # not sampled)
  colnames(prob_mat)
  cbind(data, prob_mat)
}) +
declare_step(filter, S2 != 88) +
declare_sampling(
  # sample 32 citizens for baseline from each community + 8 replacements
  # independently, survey 32 + 8 citizens for endline from each community
  strata = beats, n = 40,
  sampling_variable = "S_citizen") +
declare_sampling(
  # assign 8 / 40 per beat-wave as replacements
  # 32 to be used first
  strata = beats, n = 32,
  sampling_variable = "S_primary_respondents") +
# calculate probability of inclusion in sample from two-stage sampling procedure
  # and then citizen sampling
declare_step(mutate,
```

```
            S_multistage_inclusion_prob_survey =
                 (1 - S1_prob_99 * S2_prob_88) *
                  S_citizen_inclusion_prob *
                  S_primary_respondents_inclusion_prob) +
# construct single assignment variable, whether beat assigned in stage 1 or 2
declare_step(mutate, Z = ifelse(S1 == 99, S2, S1)) +
# calculate probability of assignment from two-stage sampling procedure
declare_step(mutate,
  Z_multistage_assignment_prob =
   ifelse(S1 == 99,
          S1_cond_prob * S2_cond_prob,
          S1_cond_prob)) +
declare_step(mutate,
             Z_common = if_else(Z == 1, 1, 0),
             Z_alt = if_else(Z == 2, 1, 0)) +
declare_reveal(Y, Z) +
declare_estimator(
  Y ~ Z_common + Z_alt + Y_baseline + as.factor(stations),
  clusters = beats,
  weights = 1 / (Z_multistage_assignment_prob * S_multistage_inclusion_prob_survey),
  model = lm_robust)
```

B.5 Philippines

Sample frame. We study policing in the 541 barangays (neighborhoods or villages) in Sorsogon Province in the Philippines. The Philippines National Police is organized in three hierarchical levels: Provincial, Municipal, and Barangay. The Provincial office includes the police chief, administrative staff, and special duty officers. The 15 Municipal offices include all rank-and- file officers along with a Municipal Police Chief and administrative staff. In Sorsogon City (the provincial capital), there are three district offices that serve similar functions to the municipal office.

Sampling. The Armed Forces of the Philippines 9th Infantry Division declared 298 barangays in Sorsogon Province to be safe enough for our enumerators to operate. We conduct our evaluation in all 298 of these barangays. Within each barangay, citizens were randomly sampled from the full roster of certified voters at midline and form a panel for the midline and endline survey. For the midline survey, we randomly selected 10 respondents per barangay. (A small baseline survey was conducted in a subsample of areas; this baseline is not analyzed in the study.) If the selected individual's household could not be located, the enumerator moved on to the next randomly-selected name. If the enumerator located the selected individual's household, but the respondent was unavailable and not expected to return in the same day (or was unwilling to participate), the enumerator interviewed an available adult member of the same household. For the endline, we first attempted to re-contact the individuals surveyed at midline. Enu-

merators succeeded in interviewing 63.9% of midline respondents. We then randomly selected additional respondents in each barangay from the list of registered voters and contacted them using the same procedures as used during midline until we had achieved 15 responses per barangay.

Outcome measurement. Outcomes are measured in citizen surveys at midline (after implementing the community engagement program) and endline (after implementing the problem-oriented policing program). Following the preanalysis plan, we do not analyze the midline data, which is reported on separately. Officer surveys were conducted at endline, but are only analyzed descriptively here as officers were not randomized into the common treatment in this site. Police crime data was provided at the barangay level, and collapsed into preintervention (August 2016 to February 2017) and postintervention (January to July 2018) periods.

Random assignment. We use a factorial experimental design implemented in two phases: a CEP phase and a POP phase. In the first phase (CEP), barangays are randomly assigned to 1) a control condition, 2) a treatment condition in which CEP is implemented along with an encouragement to use the SMS tip line, and 3) a treatment condition in which CEP is implemented without an encouragement to use the SMS tip line. In addition, CEP-treated barangays are assigned to either A) a control condition, or B) a treatment condition in which police officers have a chance to be given a certificate of recognition conditional on performance.

In the second phase (POP), CEP-treated barangays are randomly assigned to 1) a treatment condition in which POP is implemented by Barangay Council and Tanods alone, and 2) a treatment condition in which POP is implemented by PNP and Barangay Council and Tanods in coordination with each other. The pure control group is common across CEP and POP phases. In addition, villages treated with POP are assigned to either A) a control condition or B) a treatment condition in which POP teams receive top-down accountability from the Mayor's office, or C) a treatment condition in which POP teams receive top-down accountability from the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Provincial Office.

The procedure for this initial randomization unintentionally led to two deviations from the planned design. In particular, most units were put into a single large block due to the way the Stata *randtreat* command treats missing values and several units were put into blocks of size 1. As a result, we do not include blocked fixed effects. We estimated the probabilities of assignment through simulation and found they varied across blocks only within a very narrow range (very close to 0.33), so we do not reweight our estimates based on the assignment probabilities. (This plan was registered in a PAP amendment before analysis.)

Estimation. *Administrative data outcomes* (Not controlling for baseline)

```
lm_robust(acrime_num ~ Z_common + Z_officer + Z_mayor + Z_dilg,
          data = phl_data_crime)
```

```
# coefficient of interest: Z_common
```

Citizen Survey outcomes (Not controlling for baseline)

```
lm_robust(responsive_act ~ Z_common + Z_officer + Z_mayor + Z_dilg,
          clusters = barangay,
          data = phl_data_citizen)
# coefficient of interest: Z_common
```

Design declaration.

```
    sd_Y0 <- 1
std_effect_size <- 0.1

phl_design <-
  declare_population(
    barangays = add_level(N = 298),
    citizens = add_level(N = 15, Y_baseline = rnorm(N, sd = sqrt(0.5)),
                         u = rnorm(N, sd = sqrt(0.5)))) +
  declare_potential_outcomes(
    Y_Z_common_0 = Y_baseline + u,
    Y_Z_common_1 = Y_baseline + std_effect_size + u,
    Y_Z_common_2 = Y_baseline + std_effect_size + u) +
  declare_assignment(
    # assign 1/3 of barnagays to control, 1/3 to CEP intervention plus tipline,
    # 1/3 to CEP intervention with no tipline (both are common arm)
    clusters = barangays, prob_each = c(1/3, 1/3, 1/3),
    conditions =
    c(0,  # control
      1,  # CEP without tipline (common arm)
      2), # CEP with tipline (common arm)
    assignment_variable = Z_cep) +
  declare_assignment(
    # within CEP treatment status, assign
    # half to officer recognition program
    # half to no officer recognition (control)
    clusters = barangays, blocks = Z_cep, block_prob = c(0, 0.5, 0.5),
    assignment_variable = Z_officer) +
  # Phase 2 of study - POP intervention after midline survey
  declare_assignment(
    # within CEP treatment status,
    # assign 1/3 of barnagays to tanod, 1/3 to tanod+ police,
    # 1/3 to control
    clusters = barangays, blocks = Z_cep,
    # block_prob_each = matrix(c(1, 0, 0, rep(1/3, 3), rep(1/3, 3)),
```

```
  # nrow = 3, ncol = 3, byrow = TRUE),
  block_prob_each =
   matrix(c(1, 0, 0,
            0, 1/2, 1/2,
            0, 1/2, 1/2),
            nrow = 3,
            ncol = 3,
            byrow = TRUE),
  conditions =
   c(0,  # control
     1,  # PNP_LGU - police & tanod
     2), # LGU - tanod
  assignment_variable = Z_pop) +

declare_assignment(
  # within POP treatment status, assign 1/3 of barnagays to have no accountability,
  # 1/3 with top-down accountability (Mayor),
  # and 1/3 with top-down accountability (DILG)
  clusters = barangays, blocks = Z_pop,
  block_prob_each =
   matrix(c(1, 0, 0, rep(1/3, 3), rep(1/3, 3)),
          nrow = 3, ncol = 3, byrow = TRUE),
  conditions =
   c(0,  # no accountability
     1,  # top-down accountability (Mayor)
     2), # top-down accountability (DILG)
  assignment_variable = Z_accountability) +
declare_step(
  mutate,
  Z_common = if_else(Z_cep != 0 & Z_pop != 0, 1, 0),
  Z_tipline = if_else(Z_cep == 2, 1, 0),
  Z_lgu_only = if_else(Z_pop == 2, 1, 0),
  Z_lgu_pnp = if_else(Z_pop == 1, 1, 0),
  Z_dilg = if_else(Z_accountability == 2, 1, 0),
  Z_mayor = if_else(Z_accountability == 1, 1, 0)) +
declare_reveal(Y, Z_common) +
declare_estimator(
  Y ~ Z_common + Z_officer + Z_mayor + Z_dilg,
  clusters = barangays,
  model = lm_robust)
```

B.6 Uganda

Sample frame. We study the 380 police units of the Uganda Police Force (UPF), which are a mixture of stations (124) and sub-station posts (256). The UPF is organized with

district level central police stations; each district has one. Central police stations supervise sub-county level stations. Some sub-county level stations supervise police posts covering a few parishes; some have no posts under them. Posts are analogous to beats in the US, with 2-4 police officers deployed to each post.

Sampling. We purposively selected 72 police stations. Out of the 134 districts of Uganda, UPF selected 13 for the study. UPF applied two inclusion criteria in selecting these districts: equal representation of Uganda's four regions (North, Central, East, and West), and, within each region, relatively high crime rate based on the 2014 UPF national crime report. Of the 23 highest-crime districts in the country, two were excluded because they were too close to Kampala and thus peri-urban;[34] six were excluded because they were located in regions that were over-represented in the sample;[35] and two were excluded due to high levels of insecurity, and correspondingly high military presence.[36] UPF determined that community policing would not be an appropriate strategy in these districts.

We listed all police stations in the 13 districts and non-randomly selected 72, dropping the most urban ones. Where available, we selected one post under the jurisdiction of each station. For stations that do not have a post under them, we used the station itself. We sampled a total of 72 units (44 posts and 28 stations). We focus the study on the parish where the unit is physically located. Out of all the villages in the selected parish, we randomly select four to participate. In each village, we randomly sampled six men and six women during the baseline survey. The endline survey was a panel in which we re-interviewed these same 12 respondents in each village. We were unable to recontact some respondents and sampled 500 replacements from the same villages.

In each of the 72 police stations and posts, we interviewed the Officer in Charge (OC) and, whenever possible, the Community Liaison Officer (CLO) and the Child and Family Protection Unit (CFPU) officer. Then among all the more junior officers, we randomly selected as many as needed to reach 5 officers. (53 of the 72 stations and posts have five or fewer officers. We survey all officers in these cases.) We interviewed the same officers during the endline survey. Among the 198 officers we interviewed at endline, only 44 were also interviewed at baseline (for an attrition rate of 80%); the rest were randomly-selected replacement officers.

Outcome measurement. Outcomes are measured at baseline and endline in citizen and officer surveys. Police crime data was provided at the police station level, and collapsed into preintervention (XX) and postintervention (XX) periods.

[34] Luwero and Mpigi.

[35] Masindi, Mubende, Kamwenge (Central Region), Soroti, Palissa (Eastern Region), and Amuru (Northern Region).

[36] Masaka and Kasese.

Random assignment. A two-stage randomization procedure was used. Police stations were formed into blocks of four within regions, based on baseline covariates.[37] Half of each block was assigned to control and half to treatment. We then randomized assignment to the secondary treatment arm, additional training for community watch teams, at the village level. Within each of the 36 police stations that were assigned to the primary treatment arm, we assigned two of the four study villages to receive our secondary treatment arm.

Estimation. *Administrative data outcomes* (Controlling for baseline outcome if available.)

```
lm_robust(acrime_num ~ Z_common + acrime_num_baseline + as.factor(block_ID),
          data = uga_data_crime)
# coefficient of interest: Z_common
```

Citizen Survey outcomes (Controlling for baseline outcome if available.)

```
lm_robust(responsive_act ~ Z_common + responsive_act_baseline + as.factor(block_ID),
          clusters = station_id,
          data = uga_data_citizen)
# coefficient of interest: Z_common
```

Officer survey outcomes (Controlling for baseline outcome if available.)

```
lm_robust(empathy_idx ~ Z_common + empathy_idx_baseline + as.factor(block_ID),
          clusters = station_id,
          data = uga_data_officer)
# coefficient of interest: Z_common
```

Design declaration.

```
sd_Y0 <- 1
std_effect_size <- 0.1

uga_design <-
  declare_population(
    districts = add_level(
      N = 13,
      district_name =
      c('Arua', 'Gulu', 'Iganga',
```

[37] Stations were blocked on the number of police posts, parishes, villages, and officers under the jurisdiction of the station, as well as a set of demographic indicators from the 2014 Census including population size, percent male, average age, percent literate, mean household size, mean years of education, mean number of meals eaten per day, percent involved in an occupation other than subsistence agriculture, a standardized household asset index, a standardized household quality index, and a standardized index of social services available.

```
      'Jinja', 'Kabale', 'Kamuli',
      'Lira', 'Mbale', 'Mbarara',
      'Mityana', 'Ntungamo', 'Rakai',
      'Tororo'),
    N_stations = c(1, 1, 14, 12, 1, 13, 2, 11, 16, 3, 4, 10, 2),
    district_fx = rnorm(N, sd = 5)),
  police_stations = add_level(
    N = N_stations,
    police_station_fx = rnorm(N, sd = 5),
    block_ID = cut(police_station_fx, breaks = 4)),
  # parishes =
     add_level(N = N_communities,
               high_crime = c(rep(1, 35), rep(0, 209))),
  villages = add_level(N = 4, village_fx = rnorm(N, sd = 5)),
  citizens = add_level(
    N = 12,
    female = c(rep(0, 6), rep(1, 6)),
    Y_baseline = rnorm(N, sd = sqrt(0.5)),
    u = rnorm(N, sd = sqrt(0.5)))) +
declare_potential_outcomes(
  Y_Z_0 = Y_baseline + u,
  Y_Z_1 = Y_baseline + std_effect_size + u,
  Y_Z_2 = Y_baseline + std_effect_size + u) +
# declare_sampling(handler = filter) +
declare_assignment(
  blocks = block_ID,
  clusters = police_stations,
  assignment_variable = "Z_common") +
# declare_assignment(
#   blocks = police_stations_Z, clusters = villages, block_m = ) +
declare_assignment(
  Z_alt =
   block_and_cluster_ra(blocks = police_stations,
                        clusters = villages,
                        m = 2),
  Z_alt_cond_prob =
      obtain_condition_probabilities(assignment = Z_alt,
      blocks = police_stations,
      clusters = villages, m = 2),
  Z_alt = if_else(Z_common == 1, Z_alt, 0L),
  Z_multistage_cond_prob =
      if_else(Z_common == 1,
              Z_common_cond_prob * Z_alt_cond_prob,
              Z_common_cond_prob),
  handler = mutate) +
```

```
declare_step(
  mutate,
  Z = case_when(Z_common == 1 & Z_alt == 1 ~ 2L,
                Z_common == 1 & Z_alt == 0 ~ 1L,
                Z_common == 0 ~ 0L)) +
declare_reveal(Y, Z) +
declare_estimator(
  Y ~ Z_common + Y_baseline + as.factor(block_ID),
  clusters = police_stations,
  model = lm_robust
)
```

C. Ethics

As with any field experiment, the consideration of ethics was key in both the design and implementation of this effort. From the start, our teams worked carefully to ensure the alignment of our police partnerships with the Belmont principles of respect for persons, beneficence, and justice. This required that we first assess whether a partnership with a particular police agency had the potential to yield appropriate and meaningful benefits for treated communities. Police-researcher partnerships have increasingly been the subject of scholarly attention. Importantly, recent scholarship has found that working with the local police can help to broker healthier exchanges between police departments and community members, which can result in greater trust in these localities (*SM2*).

In addition, we carefully considered the burdens that the police would shoulder in carrying out community policing, as well as practices that would minimize risk to both police officers and citizens. We developed protocols for informed consent of research subjects, and obtained approval for our protocols from the universities where our participating scholars are affiliated. We also developed a set of best practices to address and mitigate potential harms. These included:

- Careful Consideration of Local Context. The aim of any field experiment is for researchers and police departments to "share skills and experiences, trade information, and produce answers that can inform sustainable policies that make safety and legitimacy that much more possible (*SM3*, *SM4*). Therefore, it was important for each of our teams to tailor their program directly to the context faced by each country's police agencies. In Pakistan, for example, researchers conducted focus groups in the study districts to generate qualitative evidence to frame the appropriate design within the local context. Additionally, in Colombia, the research team altered police-community meetings by including local beat cops, rather than only police leadership, to facilitate opportunities for neighborhood-level conversations that citizens had been lacking. While the teams standardized many of their procedures, these tailored components ensured that we were increasing the likelihood that the treatment would be beneficial in each context.

- Training for Local Police Partners. Working with any police agency requires buy-in at the highest level. But this does not always mean that local officers will follow orders and accommodate any kind of policy change. Therefore, our research teams worked to provide comprehensive training to local officers. In designing the Ugandan intervention, for example, the researchers helped facilitate a working group that included police officers from the CP department and from the Research and Planning directorate, as well their partner NGO. That working group sought to codify what constitutes community policing in Uganda by writing up a set standard operating procedures. Similarly, in Pakistan we worked with the Premier Training College of the Police in designing a substantial officer training program on community policing. In the Philippines, field officers received extensive training in detecting and reporting anything that might have been indicative of abuses being associated with activities related to the intervention.

- Extensive Risk Mitigation Plan. It is critically important that police researchers should not be seen as "ethnographic referees" who constantly are stepping in to modify police behavior (*SM5*). That being said, our teams also recognized that they needed to take steps to protect citizens from harm by clearly delineating the point at which they would have stopped the experiment. All teams created detailed plans for ending their partnership in case of any kind of police violence or risk to public safety. Additionally, each team deployed researchers to monitor the intervention over time. In Liberia, for example, members of the research team embedded within the LNP for the duration of the study, to both observe the intervention and to establish independent communication with community leaders, in case of misconduct.

- Sensitive Handling of Administrative Data. In designing and implementing baseline, midline, and endline surveys, our teams prioritized the protection of administrative data and confidentiality for data collected from citizens. For example, in Pakistan, the research team worked with the officer heading the IT department for the province to develop protocols for data sharing. The protocol included receiving vehicle logs data at the office of the Inspector General, where a member of the research team would conduct proposed analyses and retrieve only analysis results, leaving the raw data safely at the main office.

In addition to these steps taken across our intervention sites, the research teams were careful to address ethical considerations specific to each of their countries. For example, as we mentioned, the team in the Philippines recognized that their most important ethical concern was to find an appropriate way to engage with the police during President Duterte's War on Drugs. After carefully selecting Sorsogon as an appropriate setting for the intervention, the research team also ensured that a field officer was also present at each police meeting in the Philippines study. They also conducted spot checks during implementation.

In Uganda too, the police have often been seen as an instrument to advance the President's political agenda. Therefore, the research team was careful to avoid asking questions that were too politically sensitive and sought to draw distinctions between

local officers and political operatives. Additionally, the team prioritized working in rural areas, which are both underserved and where police officers are seen to be less politicized, and carried out the intervention in between elections.

Colombia faced a similar challenge, given citizen distrust of the police. As recently as the early 1990s, the Colombian police committed hundreds, if not thousands, of extrajudicial murders every year. While today they rank as one of the least violent in Latin America, the research team recognized that they needed to look at more micro-relationships within neighborhoods, rather than across localities. These smaller interventions ensured the researchers could better monitor the behavior of individual officers and quickly surface any citizen concerns.

While all field experiments present ethical challenges, our partnerships with the police demanded special attention to these issues. Each of our teams carefully weighed the issues at stake, while setting in place protocols to ensure the safety and well-being of subjects. By working with police directly, our goal was to develop and test a community policing strategy that could generate sustainable improvements in citizen security.

In the course of the study, two incidents occurred in which we considered whether and how to continue the studies. First, in the Brazil site, our police partner informed us that one of our survey enumerators had a criminal background. The research team decided to fire the enumerator. Second, in Colombia, our research team noticed people taking photographs outside one of the community meetings that was taking place as part of the intervention. The incident was immediately reported to the police partner and also the research manager. The possibility of suspending the intervention was discussed, but the police partner recommended temporarily suspending community meetings in the neighborhood where the incident occurred. (As it turned out, there were no meeting scheduled.) The research team decided to implement stricter safety protocols, including reporting concerning activity to supervisors immediately; taking taxis to neighborhoods with security concerns; and coordinating with a member of the local neighborhood council to walk to and from meetings. No further issues occurred.

D. Pre-registered outcome measures

Table SM3: Outcome Measures and Data Sources

Hyp.	Primary outcome index	Index components	Data source
1a.	Crime victimization index[a]	Violent crime (personal); Nonviolent crime (personal); Violent crime (community);[b] Non-violent crime (community)	Citizen survey
1b.	Perceived future insecurity index	Feared violent crime; Feared non-violent crime;[c] Feared walking	Citizen survey
2.	Overall perceptions of police index	Trust in police; Trust in service of police	Citizen survey
3a.	Police perceptions of citizens index[d]	Abuse index; Accountability index; Corruption index; Empathy index	Officer survey
3b.	Police abuse	Abuse (binary); Abuse (counts);[e] Bribe amount; Bribe frequency	Citizen survey
4a.	Crime reporting index	Violent crime (personal);[f] Violent crime (community);[f] Nonviolent crime reporting (community);[g] Nonviolent crime reporting (personal);[f] Resolution of crime index	Citizen survey
4b.	Crime tips index	Crime tips index	Citizen survey
		Tips count (hotline);[h] Tips count (comment box)[h]	Administrative
4c.	Police abuse reporting index	Beating community member; Verbal abuse; Physical abuse;[i] Drinking on duty;[i] Victimization reports (hotline);[h] Victimization reports (comment box);[h] Victimization reports (police station)[h]	Citizen survey
M1a.	Perceived police intentions index	Corruption; Treat fairly; Treat seriously	Citizen survey
M1b.	Knowledge of criminal justice[j]	Legal knowledge;[k] Knowledge of how to report crimes[l]	Citizen survey
M1c.	Cooperation norms index	Reporting norm (theft); Reporting norm (domestic abuse); Obey police norm	Citizen survey
M2a.	Perceived police capacity index	Police timeliness; Police investigation capacity	Citizen survey
M2b.	Perceived police responsiveness		Citizen survey
S1.	Perceived state legitimacy[m]		Citizen survey
S2.	Community trust		Citizen survey
C.	Compliance index	Foot patrol frequency; Vehicle patrol frequency; Community meeting awareness	Citizen survey

[a] Colombia estimates not included in meta-estimate, due to a difference in measurement. A common measure of crime victimization with all estimates is included in the Supplementary Materials.
[b] Murder count was not included in the primary meta-analysis since it was not collected in Liberia.
[c] Feared non-violent crime was not included in the primary meta-analysis since it was not collected in Colombia.
[d] Brazil, Liberia, and Philippines sites not included in the primary meta-analysis, because officers were not randomized into participation in community policing or control due to the organizational structure of the police agency.
[e] Counts of police abuse were dropped in the meta-analysis since they were not collected in Colombia.
[f] Report of other crimes were dropped in the meta-analysis since they were not collected in Colombia.
[g] Report of other crimes were dropped in the meta-analysis since they were not collected in Colombia. Report of all murder crimes were also dropped since they were not collected in Liberia.
[h] These items were not included since they were not collected in any of the sites.
[i] Physical abuse and drinking on duty were not included in the primary meta-analysis since they were not collected in Colombia.
[j] Philippines' estimates for this index were not included in the primary meta-analysis; Knowledge of criminal justice was measured differently in this site.
[k] Knowledge about domestic abuse was not included in the primary meta-analysis because it was not collected in Liberia.
[l] Knowledge about domestic abuse and knowledge of police officers' duties to follow-up on reported crimes was not included in the primary meta-analysis because these were not collected in Liberia and Pakistan.
[m] Uganda and Pakistan sites were not included in the primary meta-analysis; state legitimacy was not measured in these two cases.

Supplementary Materials References

SM1. G. Blair, J. Cooper, A. Coppock, M. Humphreys, *American Political Science Review* **113**, 838 (2019).

SM2. G. P. Alpert, J. Rojek, , J. A. Hansen, *US Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, Washington, DC* (2013).

SM3. E. M. Kerrison, P. A. Goff, C. Burbank, , J. M. Hyatt, *Police Practice and Research* **20** (2019).

SM4. J. R. Greene, *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice* **8**, 379 (2014).

SM5. L. Westmarland, *British journal of criminology* **41**, 523 (2001). National Institute of Justice Research in Brief.

SM6. A. S. Gerber, D. P. Green, *Field experiments: Design, analysis, and interpretation* (W.W. Norton, 2012).

E. Balance table

Figure SM5: Balance on pretreatment covariates by study. We report an omnibus two-sided p-value based on randomization inference from an F-test of the null hypothesis of equal means across treatment groups.



F. Meta-analysis results

F.1 Compliance results

Table SM4: Compliance results

Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
Compliance	0.571	0.256	(0.069, 1.074)	0.026
Vehicle patrol frequency	0.091	0.049	(-0.005, 0.187)	0.064
Foot patrol frequency	0.064	0.054	(-0.043, 0.171)	0.239
Community meeting awareness	0.995	0.605	(-0.192, 2.181)	0.100

F.2 Primary hypotheses

Table SM5: Primary hypotheses results

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value	Tau^2	Tau^2 S.E.
1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.016	0.028	(-0.071, 0.040)	0.581	0.882	0.001	0.003
1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.026	0.035	(-0.042, 0.094)	0.453	0.882	0.002	0.004
2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.053	0.029	(-0.003, 0.109)	0.065	0.272	0.000	0.003
3a	Police perceptions of citizens idx.	0.068	0.141	(-0.207, 0.344)	0.628	0.882	0.039	0.060
3b	Police abuse idx.	-0.010	0.040	(-0.088, 0.068)	0.806	0.882	0.004	0.005
4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.005	0.031	(-0.057, 0.066)	0.882	0.882	0.001	0.003
4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.042	0.023	(-0.087, 0.003)	0.068	0.272	0.001	0.002
4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.008	0.022	(-0.035, 0.051)	0.725	0.882	0.000	0.002
M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	0.403	0.270	(-0.127, 0.933)	0.136		0.352	0.258
M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	0.049	0.033	(-0.015, 0.113)	0.136		0.000	0.003
M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	-0.009	0.023	(-0.053, 0.035)	0.693		0.000	0.002
M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	0.041	0.043	(-0.042, 0.125)	0.332		0.005	0.006
M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.032	0.031	(-0.028, 0.092)	0.294		0.000	0.003
S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.045	0.034	(-0.022, 0.112)	0.191		0.000	0.004
S2	Community trust	0.028	0.025	(-0.021, 0.076)	0.261		0.000	0.002

F.3 Secondary hypotheses

Table SM6: Secondary hypotheses results

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Tau^2
1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	0.166	0.103	(-0.037, 0.369)	0.109	0.037
1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization idx. (expanded crimes)	-0.035	0.126	(-0.282, 0.211)	0.778	0.017
1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	-0.022	0.025	(-0.071, 0.027)	0.382	0.001

F.4 Primary hypotheses (as pre-registered)

Table SM7: Primary hypotheses results (as pre-registered)

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value	Tau^2	Tau^2 S.
1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.012	0.021	(-0.054, 0.029)	0.559	0.767	0.000	0.0
1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	-0.024	0.079	(-0.178, 0.131)	0.766	0.767	0.025	0.0
2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.053	0.029	(-0.003, 0.109)	0.065	0.272	0.000	0.0
3a	Police perceptions of citizens idx.	0.068	0.141	(-0.207, 0.344)	0.628	0.767	0.039	0.0
3b	Police abuse idx.	-0.012	0.040	(-0.090, 0.067)	0.767	0.767	0.004	0.0
4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.011	0.026	(-0.040, 0.061)	0.675	0.767	0.000	0.0
4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.042	0.023	(-0.087, 0.003)	0.068	0.272	0.001	0.0
4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.020	0.027	(-0.034, 0.073)	0.469	0.767	0.000	0.0
M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	0.403	0.270	(-0.127, 0.933)	0.136		0.352	0.2
M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	0.065	0.031	(0.005, 0.125)	0.033		0.000	0.0
M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	-0.009	0.023	(-0.053, 0.035)	0.693		0.000	0.0
M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	0.041	0.043	(-0.042, 0.125)	0.332		0.005	0.0
M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.032	0.031	(-0.028, 0.092)	0.294		0.000	0.0
S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.045	0.034	(-0.022, 0.112)	0.191		0.000	0.0
S2	Community trust	0.028	0.025	(-0.021, 0.076)	0.261		0.000	0.0

F.5 Secondary hypotheses (as pre-registered)

Table SM8: Secondary hypotheses results (as pre-registered)

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Tau^2
1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	0.166	0.103	(-0.037, 0.369)	0.109	0.037
1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization idx. (expanded crimes)	-0.035	0.126	(-0.282, 0.211)	0.778	0.017
1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	-0.022	0.025	(-0.071, 0.027)	0.382	0.001

F.6 Primary hypotheses (using list-wise deletion)

Table SM9: Primary hypotheses results (listwise deletion)

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value	Tau^2	Tau^2 S.
1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.016	0.028	(-0.071, 0.040)	0.581	0.882	0.001	0.0
1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.022	0.038	(-0.052, 0.096)	0.561	0.882	0.003	0.0
2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.056	0.029	(-0.000, 0.112)	0.051	0.261	0.000	0.0
3a	Abuse	0.040	0.073	(-0.103, 0.184)	0.581	0.882	0.000	0.0
3a	Accountability	-0.087	0.046	(-0.177, 0.004)	0.060	0.261	0.000	0.0
3a	Corruption	0.091	0.188	(-0.278, 0.460)	0.629	0.882	0.092	0.1
3a	Empathy	-0.015	0.086	(-0.184, 0.154)	0.865	0.882	0.000	0.0
3b	Police abuse idx.	-0.012	0.041	(-0.093, 0.068)	0.761	0.882	0.004	0.0
4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.005	0.031	(-0.057, 0.066)	0.882	0.882	0.001	0.0
4a	Resolution of crime	-0.016	0.016	(-0.047, 0.015)	0.314	0.882	0.000	0.0
4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.041	0.022	(-0.085, 0.003)	0.065	0.261	0.000	0.0
4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.007	0.020	(-0.032, 0.047)	0.715	0.882	0.000	0.0
M1a	Corruption	-0.007	0.021	(-0.047, 0.034)	0.744		0.000	0.0
M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	0.316	0.255	(-0.183, 0.816)	0.215		0.313	0.2
M1b	Crime reporting	0.058	0.025	(0.009, 0.108)	0.022		0.000	0.0
M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	1.000		0.000	0.0
M1b	Law	-0.003	0.028	(-0.057, 0.052)	0.919		0.001	0.0
M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	-0.011	0.022	(-0.055, 0.032)	0.609		0.000	0.0
M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	0.045	0.042	(-0.038, 0.128)	0.288		0.005	0.0
M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.032	0.031	(-0.028, 0.092)	0.294		0.000	0.0
S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.045	0.034	(-0.022, 0.112)	0.191		0.000	0.0
S2	Community trust	0.028	0.025	(-0.021, 0.076)	0.261		0.000	0.0

F.7 Secondary hypotheses (using list-wise deletion)

Table SM10: Secondary hypotheses results (listwise deletion)

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Tau^2
1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	0.155	0.106	(-0.052, 0.362)	0.143	0.037
1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization idx. (expanded crimes)	-0.034	0.128	(-0.285, 0.217)	0.789	0.018
1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	-0.022	0.025	(-0.071, 0.027)	0.382	0.001

F.8 Primary hypotheses by item

Table SM11: Primary hypotheses by index item

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value	
1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.012	0.021	(-0.054, 0.029)	0.559		
1a	Violent crimes (personal)	0.008	0.016	(-0.023, 0.040)	0.606	0.804	
1a	Armed robbery (personal)	0.003	0.020	(-0.037, 0.042)	0.897		
1a	Simple assault (personal)	0.005	0.015	(-0.025, 0.035)	0.728		
1a	Other violent crimes (personal)	0.011	0.022	(-0.032, 0.054)	0.618		
1a	Non-violent crimes (personal)	-0.007	0.015	(-0.037, 0.022)	0.625	0.804	
1a	Burglary (personal)	-0.007	0.014	(-0.034, 0.020)	0.613		
1a	Other non-violent crimes (personal)	-0.059	0.015	(-0.088, -0.030)	0.000		
1a	Violent crimes (community)	0.007	0.029	(-0.050, 0.065)	0.804	0.804	
1a	Armed robbery (community)	0.019	0.024	(-0.027, 0.065)	0.420		
1a	Aggravated assault (community)	0.006	0.022	(-0.037, 0.049)	0.772		
1a	Simple assault (community)	-0.001	0.022	(-0.044, 0.042)	0.962		
1a	Sexual assault (community)	0.002	0.021	(-0.040, 0.044)	0.917		
1a	Domestic abuse (community)	0.005	0.026	(-0.047, 0.056)	0.850		
1a	Murder (community)	0.012	0.029	(-0.044, 0.069)	0.674		
1a	Other violent crimes (community)	-0.005	0.016	(-0.037, 0.027)	0.769		
1a	Non-violent crimes (community)	-0.043	0.029	(-0.099, 0.013)	0.131	0.523	
1a	Burglary (community)	-0.046	0.030	(-0.105, 0.013)	0.130		
1a	Other non-violent crimes (community)	0.046	0.033	(-0.017, 0.110)	0.155		
1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	-0.024	0.079	(-0.178, 0.131)	0.766		
1b	Feared violent crime	0.043	0.026	(-0.008, 0.094)	0.095		
1b	Fear non-violent crime	-0.093	0.130	(-0.348, 0.163)	0.477		
1b	Feared walking	-0.021	0.064	(-0.146, 0.104)	0.739		
2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.053	0.029	(-0.003, 0.109)	0.065		
2	Trust in police	0.048	0.030	(-0.011, 0.108)	0.113		
2	Trust in service of police	0.099	0.062	(-0.024, 0.221)	0.113		
3a	Police perceptions of citizens idx.	0.068	0.141	(-0.207, 0.344)	0.628		
3a	Emapthy idx.	-0.015	0.086	(-0.184, 0.154)	0.865	0.865	
3a	Empathy (complaints)	0.034	0.096	(-0.155, 0.222)	0.726		
3a	Empathy (reports)	-0.070	0.177	(-0.418, 0.277)	0.691		
3a	Police accountability idx.	-0.087	0.046	(-0.177, 0.004)	0.060	0.239	
3a	Police takes complaints seriously	-0.065	0.080	(-0.221, 0.091)	0.416		
3a	Hypothetical 2: discipliniary punishment	-0.143	0.088	(-0.316, 0.030)	0.106		

Table SM11: Primary hypotheses by index item *(continued)*

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value	
3a	Hypothetical 2: report fellow officer	-0.088	0.079	(-0.243, 0.067)	0.264		
3a	Hypothetical 2: reports by other officers	-0.040	0.084	(-0.205, 0.124)	0.630		
3a	Hypothetical 3: discipliniary punishment	-0.115	0.066	(-0.245, 0.016)	0.084		
3a	Hypothetical 3: report fellow officer	-0.126	0.137	(-0.395, 0.143)	0.358		
3a	Hypothetical 3: reports by other officers	-0.066	0.098	(-0.257, 0.126)	0.502		
3a	Hypothetical 5: discipliniary punishment	-0.019	0.081	(-0.179, 0.141)	0.817		
3a	Hypothetical 5: report fellow officer	0.050	0.084	(-0.115, 0.214)	0.552		
3a	Hypothetical 5: reports by other officers	0.022	0.084	(-0.143, 0.186)	0.797		
3a	Police abuse idx.	0.040	0.073	(-0.103, 0.184)	0.581	0.839	
3a	Hypothetical 5: own misconduct	0.008	0.078	(-0.144, 0.161)	0.913		
3a	Hypothetical 5: others' misconduct	0.047	0.079	(-0.107, 0.201)	0.551		
3a	Police corruption idx.	0.091	0.188	(-0.278, 0.460)	0.629	0.839	
3a	Hypothetical 2: own misconduct (corruption)	0.040	0.071	(-0.100, 0.179)	0.576		
3a	Hypothetical 2: others' misconduct (corruption)	0.201	0.325	(-0.436, 0.837)	0.536		
3a	Hypothetical 3: own misconduct (corruption)	-0.017	0.142	(-0.295, 0.262)	0.907		
3a	Hypothetical 3: others' misconduct (corruption)	0.092	0.223	(-0.346, 0.530)	0.680		
3b	Police abuse idx.	-0.012	0.040	(-0.090, 0.067)	0.767		
3b	Police abuse	-0.017	0.019	(-0.054, 0.020)	0.376	0.419	
3b	Police abuse	-0.025	0.028	(-0.080, 0.030)	0.375	0.419	
3b	Bribe frequency	0.022	0.027	(-0.031, 0.076)	0.419	0.419	
3b	Bribe amount	-0.009	0.008	(-0.024, 0.007)	0.275	0.419	
4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.011	0.026	(-0.040, 0.061)	0.675		
4a	Violent crimes reported (personal)	-0.004	0.006	(-0.015, 0.007)	0.459	0.627	
4a	Armed robbery reported (personal)	-0.003	0.008	(-0.019, 0.014)	0.736		
4a	Simple assault reported (personal)	-0.001	0.004	(-0.009, 0.007)	0.806		
4a	Other violent crimes reported (personal)	0.000	0.037	(-0.072, 0.071)	0.996		
4a	Non-violent crimes reported (personal)	0.012	0.018	(-0.023, 0.047)	0.501	0.627	
4a	Burglary reported (personal)	0.025	0.026	(-0.027, 0.077)	0.342		
4a	Other non-violent crimes reported (personal)	-0.043	0.030	(-0.101, 0.016)	0.155		
4a	Violent crimes reported (community)	0.001	0.016	(-0.030, 0.033)	0.940	0.94	
4a	Armed robbery reported (community)	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.298		
4a	Aggravated assault reported (community)	0.007	0.016	(-0.025, 0.039)	0.664		
4a	Simple assault reported (community)	-0.001	0.010	(-0.021, 0.019)	0.934		
4a	Sexual assault reported (community)	-0.005	0.011	(-0.027, 0.016)	0.616		
4a	Domestic physical abuse reported (community)	0.004	0.004	(-0.003, 0.012)	0.252		
4a	Other violent crime reported (community)	0.006	0.018	(-0.028, 0.041)	0.716		

Table SM11: Primary hypotheses by index item *(continued)*

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value	
4a	Non-violent crime reported (community)	-0.019	0.019	(-0.056, 0.018)	0.317	0.627	
4a	Burglary reported (community)	-0.006	0.021	(-0.048, 0.036)	0.776		
4a	Other non-violent crime reported (community)	0.038	0.040	(-0.041, 0.116)	0.346		
4a	Resolution of crime index	-0.016	0.016	(-0.047, 0.015)	0.314	0.627	
4a	Burglary resolution	-0.019	0.020	(-0.059, 0.022)	0.364		
4a	Domestic abuse resolution	-0.003	0.031	(-0.064, 0.058)	0.914		
4a	Armed robbery resolution	-0.055	0.022	(-0.098, -0.012)	0.012		
4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.042	0.023	(-0.087, 0.003)	0.068		
4b	Contacted police for suspicious activity	-0.053	0.024	(-0.100, -0.006)	0.026		
4b	Gave information to police	-0.027	0.024	(-0.075, 0.021)	0.271		
4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.020	0.027	(-0.034, 0.073)	0.469		
4c	Reported drinking on duty	0.027	0.031	(-0.034, 0.087)	0.388	0.434	
4c	Reported police beating	0.019	0.025	(-0.029, 0.068)	0.434	0.434	
4c	Reported police abuse	-0.024	0.029	(-0.082, 0.033)	0.404	0.434	
4c	Victimization reported to police station	0.833	0.408	(0.034, 1.632)	0.041		
M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	0.403	0.270	(-0.127, 0.933)	0.136		
M1a	Police will investigate	0.325	0.276	(-0.217, 0.867)	0.240		
M1a	Police will be fair	0.053	0.031	(-0.008, 0.113)	0.089		
M1a	Political interest idx.	-0.007	0.021	(-0.047, 0.034)	0.744		
M1a	Police are corrupt	-0.030	0.023	(-0.075, 0.015)	0.195		
M1a	Police serve equally	0.032	0.046	(-0.059, 0.123)	0.491		
M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	0.065	0.031	(0.005, 0.125)	0.033		
M1b	Legal knowledge idx.	-0.003	0.028	(-0.057, 0.052)	0.919		
M1b	Legal Knowledge (suspect)	-0.009	0.079	(-0.163, 0.146)	0.914		
M1b	Legal Knowledge (lawyer)	0.025	0.026	(-0.026, 0.076)	0.339		
M1b	Legal Knowledge (fees)	0.023	0.071	(-0.117, 0.163)	0.745		
M1b	Legal Knowledge (domestic abuse)	-0.033	0.036	(-0.104, 0.038)	0.364		
M1b	Reporting knowledge idx.	0.058	0.025	(0.009, 0.108)	0.022		
M1b	Police Knowledge (followup)	0.063	0.035	(-0.005, 0.131)	0.069		
M1b	Police Knowledge (where is station)	0.023	0.052	(-0.080, 0.125)	0.665		
M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	-0.009	0.023	(-0.053, 0.035)	0.693		
M1c	Reporting norm (theft)	-0.025	0.038	(-0.100, 0.051)	0.523		
M1c	Reporting norm (domestic abuse)	0.017	0.027	(-0.035, 0.070)	0.513		
M1c	Obey police norm	0.019	0.025	(-0.029, 0.067)	0.442		
M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	0.041	0.043	(-0.042, 0.125)	0.332		
M2a	Police timeliness	0.038	0.046	(-0.052, 0.128)	0.406		

Table SM11: Primary hypotheses by index item *(continued)*

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value	
M2a	Police investigation capacity	0.041	0.036	(-0.030, 0.113)	0.255		
M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.032	0.031	(-0.028, 0.092)	0.294		
S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.045	0.034	(-0.022, 0.112)	0.191		
S2	Community trust	0.028	0.025	(-0.021, 0.076)	0.261		

G. Study Results

G.1 Compliance results

Table SM12: Compliance results

Study	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Prop. Missing	Differential attrition p-value
Uganda	Compliance	0.159	0.064	(0.031, 0.286)	0.016	0.000	–
Philippines	Compliance	0.276	0.111	(0.056, 0.496)	0.014	0.000	0.317
Pakistan	Compliance	0.429	0.143	(0.001, 0.857)	0.050	0.004	0.202
Liberia	Compliance	1.662	0.216	(1.232, 2.093)	0.000	0.000	–
Colombia	Compliance	0.447	0.070	(0.308, 0.587)	0.000	0.000	–
Brazil	Compliance	-5.159	35.324	(-77.454, 67.135)	0.885	0.001	0.388
Brazil	Community meeting awareness	0.143	3.216	(-6.442, 6.729)	0.965	0.011	0.396
Colombia	Community meeting awareness	0.838	0.092	(0.655, 1.021)	0.000	0.000	–
Liberia	Community meeting awareness	3.639	0.394	(2.854, 4.424)	0.000	0.000	–
Pakistan	Community meeting awareness	0.401	0.136	(-0.003, 0.804)	0.051	0.023	0.526
Philippines	Community meeting awareness	0.107	0.068	(-0.028, 0.242)	0.119	0.002	0.028
Uganda	Community meeting awareness	0.311	0.070	(0.171, 0.451)	0.000	0.001	0.627
Brazil	Foot patrol frequency	-6.053	35.124	(-77.902, 65.797)	0.864	0.004	0.269
Colombia	Foot patrol frequency	0.003	0.049	(-0.094, 0.101)	0.945	0.071	0.084
Liberia	Foot patrol frequency	0.080	0.148	(-0.216, 0.376)	0.593	0.004	0.649
Pakistan	Foot patrol frequency	0.293	0.132	(-0.105, 0.692)	0.104	0.026	0.431
Philippines	Foot patrol frequency	0.163	0.102	(-0.039, 0.366)	0.113	0.029	0.001
Uganda	Foot patrol frequency	-0.039	0.069	(-0.177, 0.099)	0.574	0.001	0.044
Colombia	Vehicle patrol frequency	0.003	0.050	(-0.097, 0.102)	0.960	0.024	0.797
Liberia	Vehicle patrol frequency	0.019	0.146	(-0.271, 0.309)	0.897	0.006	0.855
Pakistan	Vehicle patrol frequency	0.209	0.072	(-0.007, 0.425)	0.055	0.011	0.617
Philippines	Vehicle patrol frequency	0.233	0.127	(-0.018, 0.483)	0.069	0.009	0.520
Uganda	Vehicle patrol frequency	0.056	0.061	(-0.067, 0.179)	0.365	0.001	0.058

G.2 Primary hypotheses

Table SM13: Results Table for Main Hypotheses (by study)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Brazil	1a	Crime victimization	-0.364	2.838	(-6.170, 5.441)	0.899	0.899
Colombia	1a	Crime victimization	0.047	0.047	(-0.046, 0.140)	0.317	0.507
Liberia	1a	Crime victimization	1.514	1.193	(-0.867, 3.895)	0.209	0.585
Pakistan	1a	Crime victimization	-0.029	0.062	(-0.209, 0.151)	0.670	0.698
Philippines	1a	Crime victimization	-0.075	0.046	(-0.165, 0.016)	0.105	0.57
Uganda	1a	Crime victimization	-0.012	0.048	(-0.109, 0.085)	0.809	0.882
Colombia	1b	Perceived future insecurity	0.086	0.046	(-0.005, 0.177)	0.064	0.258
Liberia	1b	Perceived future insecurity	0.033	0.201	(-0.369, 0.435)	0.870	0.87
Pakistan	1b	Perceived future insecurity	-0.141	0.082	(-0.372, 0.091)	0.164	0.295
Philippines	1b	Perceived future insecurity	0.037	0.058	(-0.077, 0.151)	0.525	0.735
Uganda	1b	Perceived future insecurity	0.036	0.048	(-0.060, 0.131)	0.455	0.882
Brazil	2	Overall perceptions of police	-4.264	24.104	(-53.575, 45.046)	0.861	0.899
Colombia	2	Overall perceptions of police	0.059	0.043	(-0.025, 0.144)	0.168	0.361
Liberia	2	Overall perceptions of police	0.162	0.227	(-0.291, 0.615)	0.477	0.668
Pakistan	2	Overall perceptions of police	0.464	0.151	(0.035, 0.892)	0.040	0.295
Philippines	2	Overall perceptions of police	0.020	0.066	(-0.110, 0.150)	0.762	0.86
Uganda	2	Overall perceptions of police	0.010	0.052	(-0.093, 0.113)	0.847	0.882
Colombia	3a	Police perceptions of citizens	0.362	0.183	(-0.002, 0.727)	0.051	0.258
Pakistan	3a	Police perceptions of citizens	0.071	0.084	(-0.098, 0.239)	0.404	0.538
Uganda	3a	Police perceptions of citizens	-0.199	0.161	(-0.524, 0.126)	0.223	0.882
Brazil	3b	Police abuse	0.668	3.618	(-6.733, 8.069)	0.855	0.899
Colombia	3b	Police abuse	-0.025	0.038	(-0.102, 0.051)	0.511	0.584
Liberia	3b	Police abuse	0.031	0.175	(-0.319, 0.380)	0.861	0.87
Pakistan	3b	Police abuse	-0.163	0.100	(-0.452, 0.126)	0.185	0.295
Philippines	3b	Police abuse	-0.036	0.034	(-0.103, 0.031)	0.292	0.681
Uganda	3b	Police abuse	0.108	0.051	(0.004, 0.211)	0.041	0.331
Brazil	4a	Crime reporting	-0.678	4.042	(-8.946, 7.591)	0.868	0.899
Colombia	4a	Crime reporting	0.063	0.046	(-0.030, 0.155)	0.181	0.361
Liberia	4a	Crime reporting	-0.088	0.067	(-0.222, 0.046)	0.196	0.585
Pakistan	4a	Crime reporting	0.047	0.112	(-0.284, 0.379)	0.698	0.698
Philippines	4a	Crime reporting	-0.040	0.058	(-0.155, 0.075)	0.496	0.735
Uganda	4a	Crime reporting	0.031	0.063	(-0.096, 0.158)	0.624	0.882

Table SM13: Results Table for Main Hypotheses (by study) *(continued)*

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Brazil	4b	Crime tips	-2.778	15.162	(-33.797, 28.242)	0.856	0.899
Colombia	4b	Crime tips	-0.011	0.041	(-0.092, 0.069)	0.783	0.783
Liberia	4b	Crime tips	-0.225	0.194	(-0.611, 0.162)	0.251	0.585
Pakistan	4b	Crime tips	-0.101	0.044	(-0.231, 0.029)	0.095	0.295
Philippines	4b	Crime tips	-0.065	0.047	(-0.158, 0.027)	0.163	0.57
Uganda	4b	Crime tips	-0.005	0.033	(-0.071, 0.061)	0.882	0.882
Colombia	4c	Police abuse reporting	0.027	0.038	(-0.049, 0.103)	0.485	0.584
Liberia	4c	Police abuse reporting	0.108	0.128	(-0.146, 0.363)	0.399	0.668
Pakistan	4c	Police abuse reporting	-0.182	0.086	(-0.435, 0.070)	0.111	0.295
Philippines	4c	Police abuse reporting	-0.007	0.038	(-0.081, 0.068)	0.860	0.86
Uganda	4c	Police abuse reporting	0.042	0.045	(-0.048, 0.133)	0.353	0.882
Brazil	M1a	Perceived police intentions	-2.470	12.414	(-27.867, 22.927)	0.844	
Colombia	M1a	Perceived police intentions	0.065	0.045	(-0.024, 0.154)	0.152	
Liberia	M1a	Perceived police intentions	0.760	0.223	(0.311, 1.208)	0.001	
Pakistan	M1a	Perceived police intentions	1.323	0.119	(0.997, 1.649)	0.000	
Philippines	M1a	Perceived police intentions	-0.036	0.060	(-0.154, 0.082)	0.551	
Uganda	M1a	Perceived police intentions	-0.018	0.049	(-0.116, 0.079)	0.711	
Colombia	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice	0.041	0.044	(-0.048, 0.129)	0.364	
Liberia	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice	-0.258	0.247	(-0.751, 0.236)	0.301	
Pakistan	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice	0.028	0.131	(-0.354, 0.410)	0.842	
Uganda	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice	0.079	0.054	(-0.029, 0.186)	0.147	
Brazil	M1c	Cooperation norms	-0.311	2.232	(-4.878, 4.255)	0.890	
Colombia	M1c	Cooperation norms	-0.021	0.031	(-0.083, 0.041)	0.499	
Liberia	M1c	Cooperation norms	0.470	0.243	(-0.015, 0.956)	0.057	
Pakistan	M1c	Cooperation norms	0.160	0.120	(-0.182, 0.503)	0.258	
Philippines	M1c	Cooperation norms	0.010	0.054	(-0.097, 0.116)	0.859	
Uganda	M1c	Cooperation norms	-0.036	0.045	(-0.127, 0.054)	0.425	
Brazil	M2a	Perceived police capacity	-2.654	16.431	(-36.289, 30.980)	0.873	
Colombia	M2a	Perceived police capacity	0.115	0.041	(0.034, 0.196)	0.006	
Liberia	M2a	Perceived police capacity	0.323	0.174	(-0.025, 0.671)	0.069	
Pakistan	M2a	Perceived police capacity	0.032	0.087	(-0.224, 0.287)	0.735	
Philippines	M2a	Perceived police capacity	-0.004	0.068	(-0.137, 0.130)	0.956	
Uganda	M2a	Perceived police capacity	-0.039	0.033	(-0.105, 0.027)	0.241	
Brazil	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.418	2.872	(-6.296, 5.460)	0.885	

Table SM13: Results Table for Main Hypotheses (by study) *(continued)*

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Colombia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.051	0.045	(-0.038, 0.140)	0.257	
Liberia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.040	0.248	(-0.535, 0.455)	0.872	
Pakistan	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.030	0.113	(-0.292, 0.353)	0.803	
Uganda	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.015	0.046	(-0.077, 0.107)	0.746	
Brazil	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	1.615	6.900	(-12.497, 15.728)	0.817	
Colombia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.065	0.046	(-0.027, 0.157)	0.165	
Liberia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	-0.186	0.215	(-0.616, 0.243)	0.390	
Pakistan	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.113	0.104	(-0.185, 0.411)	0.343	
Philippines	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.005	0.061	(-0.115, 0.125)	0.933	
Brazil	S2	Community trust	-1.078	8.136	(-17.721, 15.565)	0.896	
Colombia	S2	Community trust	0.070	0.039	(-0.008, 0.147)	0.078	
Liberia	S2	Community trust	-0.218	0.210	(-0.636, 0.201)	0.303	
Pakistan	S2	Community trust	-0.037	0.173	(-0.554, 0.480)	0.843	
Philippines	S2	Community trust	-0.029	0.065	(-0.157, 0.100)	0.659	
Uganda	S2	Community trust	0.019	0.038	(-0.058, 0.095)	0.629	

G.3 Secondary hypotheses

Table SM14: Results Table for Secondary Hypotheses (by study)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
Brazil	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization (administrative data)	0.562	0.588	(-0.604, 1.729)	0.341
Colombia	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization (administrative data)	0.059	0.065	(-0.069, 0.186)	0.365
Liberia	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization (administrative data)	0.082	0.327	(-0.574, 0.738)	0.802
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization (administrative data)	0.169	0.199	(-0.227, 0.566)	0.397
Philippines	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization (administrative data)	-0.008	0.039	(-0.084, 0.069)	0.845
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization (administrative data)	0.494	0.112	(0.273, 0.715)	0.000
Brazil	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization (expanded crimes)	-0.584	4.550	(-9.894, 8.725)	0.899
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization (expanded crimes)	-0.523	1.550	(-3.618, 2.573)	0.737
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization (expanded crimes)	-0.584	0.526	(-2.095, 0.926)	0.334
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization (expanded crimes)	-0.069	0.047	(-0.163, 0.025)	0.147
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization (expanded crimes)	0.417	0.319	(-0.223, 1.057)	0.197
Brazil	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization (binary survey measures)	1.438	9.281	(-17.551, 20.427)	0.878
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization (binary survey measures)	0.045	0.043	(-0.040, 0.131)	0.292
Liberia	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization (binary survey measures)	-0.062	0.066	(-0.193, 0.069)	0.346
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization (binary survey measures)	-0.068	0.044	(-0.196, 0.061)	0.208
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization (binary survey measures)	-0.036	0.054	(-0.143, 0.072)	0.511
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization (binary survey measures)	-0.013	0.057	(-0.127, 0.101)	0.821

G.4 Primary hypotheses (as pre-registered)

Table SM15: Results Table for Primary Hypotheses (based on original indices)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Colombia	1a	Crime victimization idx.	0.051	0.047	(-0.043, 0.144)	0.284	0.454
Liberia	1a	Crime victimization idx.	1.433	1.169	(-0.900, 3.767)	0.224	0.835
Pakistan	1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.035	0.059	(-0.205, 0.135)	0.588	0.672
Philippines	1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.069	0.047	(-0.163, 0.025)	0.147	0.495
Uganda	1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.010	0.031	(-0.072, 0.051)	0.739	0.882
Brazil	1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.235	2.246	(-4.359, 4.829)	0.917	0.917
Colombia	1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.086	0.046	(-0.005, 0.177)	0.064	0.258
Liberia	1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	-0.010	0.195	(-0.401, 0.380)	0.957	0.957
Pakistan	1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	-0.300	0.062	(-0.475, -0.126)	0.009	0.073
Philippines	1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.053	0.060	(-0.065, 0.172)	0.375	0.495
Uganda	1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.050	0.053	(-0.057, 0.156)	0.358	0.715
Brazil	2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	-4.264	24.104	(-53.575, 45.046)	0.861	0.899
Colombia	2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.059	0.043	(-0.025, 0.144)	0.168	0.361
Liberia	2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.162	0.227	(-0.291, 0.615)	0.477	0.668
Pakistan	2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.464	0.151	(0.035, 0.892)	0.040	0.295
Philippines	2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.020	0.066	(-0.110, 0.150)	0.762	0.86
Uganda	2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.010	0.052	(-0.093, 0.113)	0.847	0.882
Colombia	3a	Police perceptions of citizens idx.	0.362	0.183	(-0.002, 0.727)	0.051	0.258
Pakistan	3a	Police perceptions of citizens idx.	0.071	0.084	(-0.098, 0.239)	0.404	0.538
Uganda	3a	Police perceptions of citizens idx.	-0.199	0.161	(-0.524, 0.126)	0.223	0.882
Colombia	3b	Police abuse idx.	-0.025	0.038	(-0.102, 0.051)	0.511	0.584
Liberia	3b	Police abuse idx.	0.011	0.135	(-0.259, 0.281)	0.933	0.957
Pakistan	3b	Police abuse idx.	-0.195	0.106	(-0.505, 0.115)	0.149	0.297
Philippines	3b	Police abuse idx.	-0.036	0.036	(-0.107, 0.036)	0.328	0.495
Uganda	3b	Police abuse idx.	0.099	0.046	(0.007, 0.191)	0.036	0.145
Colombia	4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.063	0.046	(-0.030, 0.155)	0.181	0.361
Liberia	4a	Crime reporting idx.	-0.022	0.048	(-0.118, 0.074)	0.648	0.907
Pakistan	4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.055	0.123	(-0.308, 0.417)	0.683	0.683
Philippines	4a	Crime reporting idx.	-0.047	0.059	(-0.163, 0.069)	0.425	0.495
Uganda	4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.026	0.061	(-0.097, 0.148)	0.679	0.882
Brazil	4b	Crime tips idx.	-2.778	15.162	(-33.797, 28.242)	0.856	0.899
Colombia	4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.011	0.041	(-0.092, 0.069)	0.783	0.783
Liberia	4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.225	0.194	(-0.611, 0.162)	0.251	0.585
Pakistan	4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.101	0.044	(-0.231, 0.029)	0.095	0.295
Philippines	4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.065	0.047	(-0.158, 0.027)	0.163	0.57
Uganda	4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.005	0.033	(-0.071, 0.061)	0.882	0.882
Colombia	4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.027	0.038	(-0.049, 0.103)	0.485	0.584
Liberia	4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	-0.132	0.155	(-0.441, 0.177)	0.396	0.835
Pakistan	4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	-0.152	0.093	(-0.424, 0.120)	0.188	0.3
Philippines	4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.038	0.046	(-0.053, 0.128)	0.412	0.495
Uganda	4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.352	0.163	(0.025, 0.678)	0.036	0.145
Brazil	M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	-2.470	12.414	(-27.867, 22.927)	0.844	

Table SM15: Results Table for Primary Hypotheses (based on original indices) *(continued)*

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Colombia	M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	0.065	0.045	(-0.024, 0.154)	0.152	
Liberia	M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	0.760	0.223	(0.311, 1.208)	0.001	
Pakistan	M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	1.323	0.119	(0.997, 1.649)	0.000	
Philippines	M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	-0.036	0.060	(-0.154, 0.082)	0.551	
Uganda	M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	-0.018	0.049	(-0.116, 0.079)	0.711	
Colombia	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	0.046	0.044	(-0.042, 0.135)	0.302	
Liberia	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	-0.258	0.247	(-0.751, 0.236)	0.301	
Pakistan	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	0.020	0.117	(-0.323, 0.362)	0.875	
Uganda	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	0.104	0.046	(0.011, 0.196)	0.028	
Brazil	M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	-0.311	2.232	(-4.878, 4.255)	0.890	
Colombia	M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	-0.021	0.031	(-0.083, 0.041)	0.499	
Liberia	M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	0.470	0.243	(-0.015, 0.956)	0.057	
Pakistan	M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	0.160	0.120	(-0.182, 0.503)	0.258	
Philippines	M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	0.010	0.054	(-0.097, 0.116)	0.859	
Uganda	M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	-0.036	0.045	(-0.127, 0.054)	0.425	
Brazil	M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	-2.654	16.431	(-36.289, 30.980)	0.873	
Colombia	M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	0.115	0.041	(0.034, 0.196)	0.006	
Liberia	M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	0.323	0.174	(-0.025, 0.671)	0.069	
Pakistan	M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	0.032	0.087	(-0.224, 0.287)	0.735	
Philippines	M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	-0.004	0.068	(-0.137, 0.130)	0.956	
Uganda	M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	-0.039	0.033	(-0.105, 0.027)	0.241	
Brazil	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.418	2.872	(-6.296, 5.460)	0.885	
Colombia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.051	0.045	(-0.038, 0.140)	0.257	
Liberia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.040	0.248	(-0.535, 0.455)	0.872	
Pakistan	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.030	0.113	(-0.292, 0.353)	0.803	
Uganda	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.015	0.046	(-0.077, 0.107)	0.746	
Brazil	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	1.615	6.900	(-12.497, 15.728)	0.817	
Colombia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.065	0.046	(-0.027, 0.157)	0.165	
Liberia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	-0.186	0.215	(-0.616, 0.243)	0.390	
Pakistan	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.113	0.104	(-0.185, 0.411)	0.343	
Philippines	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.005	0.061	(-0.115, 0.125)	0.933	
Brazil	S2	Community trust	-1.078	8.136	(-17.721, 15.565)	0.896	
Colombia	S2	Community trust	0.070	0.039	(-0.008, 0.147)	0.078	
Liberia	S2	Community trust	-0.218	0.210	(-0.636, 0.201)	0.303	
Pakistan	S2	Community trust	-0.037	0.173	(-0.554, 0.480)	0.843	
Philippines	S2	Community trust	-0.029	0.065	(-0.157, 0.100)	0.659	
Uganda	S2	Community trust	0.019	0.038	(-0.058, 0.095)	0.629	

G.5 Secondary hypotheses (as pre-registered)

Table SM16: Results Table for Secondary Hypotheses (by study)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
Brazil	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization (administrative data)	0.562	0.588	(-0.604, 1.729)	0.341
Colombia	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization (administrative data)	0.059	0.065	(-0.069, 0.186)	0.365
Liberia	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization (administrative data)	0.082	0.327	(-0.574, 0.738)	0.802
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization (administrative data)	0.169	0.199	(-0.227, 0.566)	0.397
Philippines	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization (administrative data)	-0.008	0.039	(-0.084, 0.069)	0.845
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization (administrative data)	0.494	0.112	(0.273, 0.715)	0.000
Brazil	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization (expanded crimes)	-0.584	4.550	(-9.894, 8.725)	0.899
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization (expanded crimes)	-0.523	1.550	(-3.618, 2.573)	0.737
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization (expanded crimes)	-0.584	0.526	(-2.095, 0.926)	0.334
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization (expanded crimes)	-0.069	0.047	(-0.163, 0.025)	0.147
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization (expanded crimes)	0.417	0.319	(-0.223, 1.057)	0.197
Brazil	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization (binary survey measures)	1.438	9.281	(-17.551, 20.427)	0.878
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization (binary survey measures)	0.045	0.043	(-0.040, 0.131)	0.292
Liberia	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization (binary survey measures)	-0.062	0.066	(-0.193, 0.069)	0.346
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization (binary survey measures)	-0.068	0.044	(-0.196, 0.061)	0.208
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization (binary survey measures)	-0.036	0.054	(-0.143, 0.072)	0.511
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization (binary survey measures)	-0.013	0.057	(-0.127, 0.101)	0.821

G.6 Primary hypotheses (using list-wise deletion)

Table SM17: Results Table for all indices (based on listwise indices)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Brazil	1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.584	4.550	(-9.894, 8.725)	0.899	0.899
Colombia	1a	Crime victimization idx.	0.047	0.047	(-0.046, 0.140)	0.317	0.554
Liberia	1a	Crime victimization idx.	1.514	1.193	(-0.867, 3.895)	0.209	0.588
Pakistan	1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.029	0.062	(-0.209, 0.151)	0.670	0.698
Philippines	1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.075	0.046	(-0.165, 0.016)	0.105	0.372
Uganda	1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.012	0.048	(-0.109, 0.085)	0.809	0.887
Brazil	1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.520	3.722	(-7.092, 8.131)	0.890	0.899
Colombia	1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.088	0.046	(-0.004, 0.179)	0.061	0.422
Liberia	1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.033	0.201	(-0.369, 0.435)	0.870	0.87
Pakistan	1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	-0.142	0.079	(-0.367, 0.083)	0.151	0.255
Philippines	1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.033	0.059	(-0.084, 0.150)	0.580	0.812
Uganda	1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.035	0.048	(-0.061, 0.131)	0.465	0.887
Brazil	2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	-4.814	32.980	(-72.300, 62.672)	0.885	0.899
Colombia	2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.064	0.043	(-0.021, 0.149)	0.137	0.422
Liberia	2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.181	0.225	(-0.268, 0.630)	0.423	0.593
Pakistan	2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.464	0.151	(0.035, 0.893)	0.040	0.255
Philippines	2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.023	0.066	(-0.109, 0.154)	0.734	0.851
Uganda	2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.010	0.051	(-0.093, 0.114)	0.841	0.887
Colombia	3a	Corruption	0.465	0.138	(0.190, 0.741)	0.001	0.005
Colombia	3a	Abuse	0.155	0.134	(-0.112, 0.422)	0.250	0.334
Colombia	3a	Accountability	-0.114	0.078	(-0.270, 0.043)	0.151	0.302
Colombia	3a	Empathy	-0.074	0.153	(-0.378, 0.230)	0.630	0.63
Pakistan	3a	Corruption	0.014	0.098	(-0.182, 0.211)	0.883	0.971
Pakistan	3a	Abuse	0.004	0.105	(-0.207, 0.215)	0.971	0.971
Pakistan	3a	Accountability	-0.036	0.074	(-0.185, 0.113)	0.628	0.971
Pakistan	3a	Empathy	0.109	0.147	(-0.187, 0.406)	0.461	0.971
Uganda	3a	Corruption	-0.189	0.122	(-0.434, 0.057)	0.129	0.333
Uganda	3a	Abuse	-0.037	0.158	(-0.356, 0.282)	0.818	0.818
Uganda	3a	Accountability	-0.126	0.089	(-0.306, 0.054)	0.167	0.333
Uganda	3a	Empathy	-0.084	0.148	(-0.382, 0.214)	0.573	0.764
Brazil	3b	Police abuse idx.	0.704	3.795	(-7.060, 8.468)	0.854	0.899
Colombia	3b	Police abuse idx.	-0.025	0.038	(-0.102, 0.051)	0.511	0.664
Liberia	3b	Police abuse idx.	0.046	0.175	(-0.304, 0.397)	0.793	0.87
Pakistan	3b	Police abuse idx.	-0.160	0.097	(-0.440, 0.120)	0.182	0.255
Philippines	3b	Police abuse idx.	-0.045	0.032	(-0.108, 0.018)	0.160	0.372
Uganda	3b	Police abuse idx.	0.109	0.052	(0.005, 0.212)	0.041	0.284
Brazil	4a	Crime reporting idx.	-0.678	4.042	(-8.946, 7.591)	0.868	0.899
Brazil	4a	Resolution of crime	-1.186	6.072	(-13.610, 11.238)	0.847	0.885
Colombia	4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.063	0.046	(-0.030, 0.155)	0.181	0.422
Colombia	4a	Resolution of crime	-0.007	0.024	(-0.055, 0.041)	0.761	0.94
Liberia	4a	Crime reporting idx.	-0.088	0.067	(-0.222, 0.046)	0.196	0.588
Liberia	4a	Resolution of crime	-0.063	0.121	(-0.305, 0.178)	0.602	0.862

Table SM17: Results Table for all indices (based on listwise indices) *(continued)*

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Pakistan	4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.047	0.112	(-0.284, 0.379)	0.698	0.698
Pakistan	4a	Resolution of crime	0.007	0.037	(-0.103, 0.116)	0.870	0.87
Philippines	4a	Crime reporting idx.	-0.040	0.058	(-0.155, 0.075)	0.496	0.812
Philippines	4a	Resolution of crime	-0.138	0.056	(-0.250, -0.027)	0.016	0.078
Uganda	4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.031	0.063	(-0.096, 0.158)	0.624	0.887
Uganda	4a	Resolution of crime	-0.007	0.029	(-0.065, 0.051)	0.810	0.938
Brazil	4b	Crime tips idx.	-6.232	26.048	(-61.666, 49.203)	0.814	0.899
Colombia	4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.011	0.041	(-0.092, 0.069)	0.783	0.783
Liberia	4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.224	0.194	(-0.610, 0.163)	0.252	0.588
Pakistan	4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.094	0.042	(-0.219, 0.032)	0.102	0.255
Philippines	4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.068	0.048	(-0.163, 0.026)	0.154	0.372
Uganda	4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.005	0.033	(-0.071, 0.061)	0.887	0.887
Colombia	4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.018	0.032	(-0.045, 0.082)	0.569	0.664
Liberia	4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.108	0.128	(-0.148, 0.364)	0.402	0.593
Pakistan	4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	-0.174	0.086	(-0.430, 0.081)	0.125	0.255
Philippines	4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	-0.007	0.038	(-0.082, 0.068)	0.851	0.851
Uganda	4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.039	0.042	(-0.046, 0.123)	0.363	0.887
Brazil	M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	-0.683	2.277	(-5.362, 3.997)	0.767	
Brazil	M1a	Corruption	-0.928	4.703	(-10.549, 8.694)	0.845	
Colombia	M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	0.063	0.044	(-0.025, 0.151)	0.159	
Colombia	M1a	Corruption	-0.018	0.030	(-0.077, 0.041)	0.540	
Liberia	M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	0.320	0.261	(-0.204, 0.843)	0.226	
Liberia	M1a	Corruption	0.474	0.208	(0.058, 0.890)	0.026	
Pakistan	M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	1.325	0.122	(0.983, 1.666)	0.000	
Pakistan	M1a	Corruption	0.741	0.244	(0.028, 1.453)	0.045	
Philippines	M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	-0.013	0.061	(-0.133, 0.108)	0.838	
Philippines	M1a	Corruption	-0.050	0.057	(-0.164, 0.063)	0.383	
Uganda	M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	-0.017	0.048	(-0.113, 0.079)	0.725	
Uganda	M1a	Corruption	-0.004	0.034	(-0.072, 0.065)	0.914	
Colombia	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	0.046	0.044	(-0.042, 0.135)	0.302	
Colombia	M1b	Law	-0.029	0.023	(-0.074, 0.017)	0.216	
Colombia	M1b	Crime reporting	0.081	0.042	(-0.003, 0.166)	0.059	
Liberia	M1b	Law	-0.094	0.168	(-0.429, 0.240)	0.575	
Pakistan	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.998	
Pakistan	M1b	Law	-0.041	0.059	(-0.210, 0.129)	0.531	
Pakistan	M1b	Crime reporting	0.057	0.089	(-0.209, 0.323)	0.563	
Uganda	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.566	
Uganda	M1b	Law	0.041	0.020	(0.000, 0.082)	0.048	
Uganda	M1b	Crime reporting	0.044	0.034	(-0.024, 0.111)	0.202	
Colombia	M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	-0.023	0.031	(-0.085, 0.038)	0.451	
Liberia	M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	0.430	0.244	(-0.058, 0.918)	0.083	
Pakistan	M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	0.067	0.097	(-0.204, 0.338)	0.528	
Philippines	M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	0.015	0.054	(-0.093, 0.122)	0.787	
Uganda	M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	-0.036	0.045	(-0.125, 0.054)	0.430	
Brazil	M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	0.069	0.833	(-1.642, 1.779)	0.935	

Table SM17: Results Table for all indices (based on listwise indices) *(continued)*

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Colombia	M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	0.115	0.041	(0.034, 0.196)	0.006	
Liberia	M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	0.326	0.175	(-0.022, 0.675)	0.066	
Pakistan	M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	0.043	0.089	(-0.221, 0.307)	0.660	
Philippines	M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	-0.001	0.069	(-0.137, 0.135)	0.990	
Uganda	M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	-0.035	0.033	(-0.101, 0.031)	0.294	
Brazil	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.418	2.872	(-6.296, 5.460)	0.885	
Colombia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.051	0.045	(-0.038, 0.140)	0.257	
Liberia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.040	0.248	(-0.535, 0.455)	0.872	
Pakistan	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.030	0.113	(-0.292, 0.353)	0.803	
Uganda	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.015	0.046	(-0.077, 0.107)	0.746	
Brazil	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	1.615	6.900	(-12.497, 15.728)	0.817	
Colombia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.065	0.046	(-0.027, 0.157)	0.165	
Liberia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	-0.186	0.215	(-0.616, 0.243)	0.390	
Pakistan	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.113	0.104	(-0.185, 0.411)	0.343	
Philippines	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.005	0.061	(-0.115, 0.125)	0.933	
Brazil	S2	Community trust	-1.078	8.136	(-17.721, 15.565)	0.896	
Colombia	S2	Community trust	0.070	0.039	(-0.008, 0.147)	0.078	
Liberia	S2	Community trust	-0.218	0.210	(-0.636, 0.201)	0.303	
Pakistan	S2	Community trust	-0.037	0.173	(-0.554, 0.480)	0.843	
Philippines	S2	Community trust	-0.029	0.065	(-0.157, 0.100)	0.659	
Uganda	S2	Community trust	0.019	0.038	(-0.058, 0.095)	0.629	

G.7 Secondary hypotheses (using list-wise deletion)

Table SM18: Results Table for Secondary Hypotheses

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	0.045	0.043	(-0.040, 0.131)	0.292
Colombia	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	0.059	0.065	(-0.069, 0.186)	0.365
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization idx. (expanded crimes)	-0.523	1.550	(-3.618, 2.573)	0.737
Liberia	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	-0.062	0.066	(-0.193, 0.069)	0.346
Liberia	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	0.082	0.327	(-0.574, 0.738)	0.802
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization idx. (expanded crimes)	-0.584	0.526	(-2.095, 0.926)	0.334
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	-0.068	0.044	(-0.196, 0.061)	0.208
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	0.169	0.199	(-0.227, 0.566)	0.397
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization idx. (expanded crimes)	-0.069	0.047	(-0.163, 0.025)	0.147
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	-0.036	0.054	(-0.143, 0.072)	0.511
Philippines	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	-0.008	0.039	(-0.084, 0.069)	0.845
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization idx. (expanded crimes)	0.417	0.319	(-0.223, 1.057)	0.197
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	-0.013	0.057	(-0.127, 0.101)	0.821
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	0.494	0.112	(0.273, 0.715)	0.000

G.8 Primary hypotheses by item

Table SM19: All components

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Prop. Missing	Differential attrition p-value
Brazil	1a	Violent crimes (personal)	1.225	7.714	(-14.558, 17.007)	0.875	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Violent crimes (personal)	0.009	0.042	(-0.075, 0.092)	0.838	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Violent crimes (personal)	0.594	0.613	(-0.632, 1.820)	0.337	0.000	–
Pakistan	1a	Violent crimes (personal)	0.005	0.051	(-0.145, 0.155)	0.931	0.000	–
Philippines	1a	Violent crimes (personal)	-0.001	0.035	(-0.070, 0.069)	0.986	0.000	–
Uganda	1a	Violent crimes (personal)	0.012	0.022	(-0.032, 0.056)	0.599	0.000	–
Brazil	1a	Armed robbery (personal)	1.640	8.883	(-16.531, 19.811)	0.855	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Armed robbery (personal)	-0.024	0.042	(-0.108, 0.061)	0.579	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Armed robbery (personal)	0.165	0.470	(-0.775, 1.105)	0.727	0.000	–
Pakistan	1a	Armed robbery (personal)	0.050	0.061	(-0.131, 0.232)	0.466	0.006	0.769
Philippines	1a	Armed robbery (personal)	-0.029	0.027	(-0.083, 0.024)	0.281	0.000	0.317
Uganda	1a	Armed robbery (personal)	0.032	0.025	(-0.019, 0.083)	0.215	0.000	–
Brazil	1a	Simple assault (personal)	-1.459	7.572	(-16.949, 14.031)	0.849	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Simple assault (personal)	0.036	0.034	(-0.032, 0.103)	0.296	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Simple assault (personal)	0.745	0.761	(-0.775, 2.264)	0.331	0.001	0.313
Pakistan	1a	Simple assault (personal)	-0.089	0.057	(-0.259, 0.082)	0.208	0.013	0.635
Philippines	1a	Simple assault (personal)	0.082	0.068	(-0.052, 0.217)	0.229	0.001	0.038
Uganda	1a	Simple assault (personal)	0.000	0.019	(-0.037, 0.037)	0.999	0.000	–
Brazil	1a	Other violent crimes (personal)	0.096	0.550	(-1.030, 1.221)	0.863	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Other violent crimes (personal)	-0.074	0.158	(-0.390, 0.243)	0.644	0.003	0.209
Pakistan	1a	Other violent crimes (personal)	0.078	0.055	(-0.084, 0.241)	0.237	0.000	–
Philippines	1a	Other violent crimes (personal)	-0.024	0.037	(-0.096, 0.048)	0.513	0.000	–
Uganda	1a	Other violent crimes (personal)	0.019	0.033	(-0.047, 0.085)	0.574	0.000	0.322
Brazil	1a	Non-violent crimes (personal)	-0.679	5.695	(-12.330, 10.973)	0.906	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Non-violent crimes (personal)	0.021	0.049	(-0.077, 0.118)	0.675	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Non-violent crimes (personal)	2.032	2.013	(-1.988, 6.052)	0.317	0.000	–
Pakistan	1a	Non-violent crimes (personal)	-0.024	0.045	(-0.157, 0.109)	0.626	0.000	–
Philippines	1a	Non-violent crimes (personal)	-0.033	0.031	(-0.096, 0.029)	0.288	0.000	–
Uganda	1a	Non-violent crimes (personal)	0.002	0.021	(-0.039, 0.043)	0.920	0.000	–
Brazil	1a	Burglary (personal)	-0.627	4.794	(-10.434, 9.180)	0.897	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Burglary (personal)	0.017	0.041	(-0.065, 0.099)	0.687	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Burglary (personal)	1.854	1.918	(-1.973, 5.682)	0.337	0.002	0.829
Pakistan	1a	Burglary (personal)	-0.035	0.040	(-0.152, 0.083)	0.437	0.009	0.260
Philippines	1a	Burglary (personal)	-0.033	0.031	(-0.094, 0.029)	0.298	0.000	0.640
Uganda	1a	Burglary (personal)	0.003	0.019	(-0.034, 0.040)	0.868	0.000	–
Brazil	1a	Other non-violent crimes (personal)	-0.067	0.000	(-0.067, -0.067)	0.000	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Other non-violent crimes (personal)	-0.295	0.164	(-0.623, 0.032)	0.076	0.003	0.103
Pakistan	1a	Other non-violent crimes (personal)	0.154	0.194	(-0.423, 0.732)	0.478	0.000	–
Philippines	1a	Other non-violent crimes (personal)	-0.010	0.051	(-0.111, 0.091)	0.850	0.000	0.186
Uganda	1a	Other non-violent crimes (personal)	-0.028	0.040	(-0.107, 0.052)	0.488	0.000	0.321
Brazil	1a	Violent crimes (community)	0.228	2.634	(-5.161, 5.617)	0.932	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Violent crimes (community)	0.037	0.044	(-0.050, 0.123)	0.401	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Violent crimes (community)	0.682	0.904	(-1.125, 2.488)	0.454	0.000	–
Pakistan	1a	Violent crimes (community)	-0.062	0.112	(-0.389, 0.265)	0.611	0.000	–
Philippines	1a	Violent crimes (community)	-0.027	0.058	(-0.143, 0.088)	0.642	0.000	–
Uganda	1a	Violent crimes (community)	0.004	0.063	(-0.122, 0.131)	0.945	0.000	–
Brazil	1a	Armed robbery (community)	-7.119	39.761	(-88.456, 74.217)	0.859	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Armed robbery (community)	0.040	0.041	(-0.042, 0.122)	0.335	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Armed robbery (community)	-0.012	0.242	(-0.496, 0.473)	0.961	0.002	0.625
Pakistan	1a	Armed robbery (community)	0.025	0.088	(-0.233, 0.283)	0.792	0.005	0.809
Philippines	1a	Armed robbery (community)	-0.015	0.041	(-0.095, 0.065)	0.710	0.001	0.362
Uganda	1a	Armed robbery (community)	0.037	0.047	(-0.057, 0.131)	0.434	0.001	1.000
Liberia	1a	Aggravated assault (community)	0.721	1.236	(-1.753, 3.196)	0.562	0.002	0.776
Pakistan	1a	Aggravated assault (community)	-5.694	5.200	(-21.142, 9.753)	0.344	0.017	0.157

Table SM19: All components *(continued)*

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Prop. Missing	Differential attrition p-value
Philippines	1a	Aggravated assault (community)	-0.019	0.041	(-0.099, 0.062)	0.642	0.001	0.361
Uganda	1a	Aggravated assault (community)	0.016	0.026	(-0.035, 0.068)	0.528	0.001	0.564
Brazil	1a	Simple assault (community)	0.091	0.767	(-1.477, 1.660)	0.906	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Simple assault (community)	-0.012	0.040	(-0.092, 0.068)	0.769	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Simple assault (community)	1.522	1.623	(-1.716, 4.760)	0.352	0.000	–
Pakistan	1a	Simple assault (community)	0.055	0.068	(-0.147, 0.257)	0.471	0.012	0.532
Philippines	1a	Simple assault (community)	-0.064	0.048	(-0.158, 0.030)	0.180	0.005	0.890
Uganda	1a	Simple assault (community)	0.025	0.034	(-0.044, 0.094)	0.476	0.002	0.243
Brazil	1a	Sexual assault (community)	-0.067	0.418	(-0.922, 0.788)	0.874	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Sexual assault (community)	-0.011	0.038	(-0.086, 0.065)	0.783	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Sexual assault (community)	-0.150	0.267	(-0.683, 0.384)	0.577	0.000	–
Pakistan	1a	Sexual assault (community)	0.009	0.033	(-0.091, 0.109)	0.806	0.027	0.548
Philippines	1a	Sexual assault (community)	-0.001	0.064	(-0.128, 0.125)	0.984	0.003	0.418
Uganda	1a	Sexual assault (community)	0.021	0.055	(-0.089, 0.131)	0.705	0.001	0.179
Brazil	1a	Domestic abuse (community)	12.101	67.854	(-126.713, 150.915)	0.860	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Domestic abuse (community)	0.022	0.041	(-0.060, 0.104)	0.589	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Domestic abuse (community)	1.029	1.749	(-2.461, 4.519)	0.558	0.000	–
Pakistan	1a	Domestic abuse (community)	-0.112	0.233	(-0.807, 0.583)	0.661	0.029	0.961
Philippines	1a	Domestic abuse (community)	0.000	0.040	(-0.079, 0.079)	0.997	0.002	0.738
Uganda	1a	Domestic abuse (community)	-0.021	0.069	(-0.159, 0.117)	0.766	0.005	0.188
Brazil	1a	Murder (community)	2.478	13.513	(-25.167, 30.122)	0.856	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Murder (community)	0.032	0.046	(-0.059, 0.123)	0.487	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Murder (community)	0.135	0.138	(-0.140, 0.410)	0.331	0.000	–
Pakistan	1a	Murder (community)	-0.018	0.046	(-0.156, 0.120)	0.713	0.019	0.977
Philippines	1a	Murder (community)	0.074	0.111	(-0.147, 0.294)	0.510	0.002	0.041
Uganda	1a	Murder (community)	-0.042	0.092	(-0.226, 0.141)	0.645	0.001	0.645
Brazil	1a	Other violent crimes (community)	0.023	0.164	(-0.314, 0.359)	0.892	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Other violent crimes (community)	0.013	0.048	(-0.083, 0.108)	0.792	0.001	0.654
Pakistan	1a	Other violent crimes (community)	0.323	0.413	(-0.907, 1.554)	0.485	0.000	–
Philippines	1a	Other violent crimes (community)	0.066	0.073	(-0.079, 0.210)	0.370	0.000	–
Uganda	1a	Other violent crimes (community)	-0.013	0.018	(-0.049, 0.024)	0.488	0.004	0.807
Brazil	1a	Non-violent crimes (community)	-2.272	12.628	(-28.110, 23.565)	0.858	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Non-violent crimes (community)	0.049	0.057	(-0.065, 0.162)	0.394	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Non-violent crimes (community)	0.621	0.749	(-0.877, 2.119)	0.410	0.000	–
Pakistan	1a	Non-violent crimes (community)	-0.043	0.052	(-0.192, 0.106)	0.459	0.000	–
Philippines	1a	Non-violent crimes (community)	-0.097	0.046	(-0.189, -0.006)	0.037	0.000	–
Uganda	1a	Non-violent crimes (community)	-0.059	0.047	(-0.154, 0.035)	0.212	0.000	–
Brazil	1a	Burglary (community)	-1.772	9.474	(-21.154, 17.610)	0.853	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Burglary (community)	0.043	0.051	(-0.059, 0.144)	0.405	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Burglary (community)	0.640	0.795	(-0.951, 2.231)	0.424	0.000	–
Pakistan	1a	Burglary (community)	-0.061	0.054	(-0.214, 0.092)	0.325	0.014	0.679
Philippines	1a	Burglary (community)	-0.101	0.047	(-0.193, -0.009)	0.032	0.004	0.815
Uganda	1a	Burglary (community)	-0.060	0.046	(-0.151, 0.032)	0.195	0.001	0.160
Brazil	1a	Other non-violent crimes (community)	4.220	22.144	(-41.080, 49.519)	0.850	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Other non-violent crimes (community)	0.068	0.126	(-0.183, 0.319)	0.590	0.001	0.641
Pakistan	1a	Other non-violent crimes (community)	0.037	0.508	(-1.474, 1.549)	0.945	0.000	–
Philippines	1a	Other non-violent crimes (community)	0.014	0.061	(-0.107, 0.135)	0.816	0.001	0.054
Uganda	1a	Other non-violent crimes (community)	0.058	0.040	(-0.023, 0.139)	0.157	0.004	0.836
Brazil	1b	Feared violent crime	0.050	2.634	(-5.338, 5.437)	0.985	0.003	0.208
Colombia	1b	Feared violent crime	0.044	0.041	(-0.038, 0.126)	0.286	0.013	0.103
Liberia	1b	Feared violent crime	-0.051	0.188	(-0.426, 0.324)	0.787	0.001	0.325
Pakistan	1b	Feared violent crime	0.034	0.064	(-0.149, 0.216)	0.627	0.000	–
Philippines	1b	Feared violent crime	0.058	0.064	(-0.070, 0.185)	0.371	0.015	0.977
Uganda	1b	Feared violent crime	0.046	0.051	(-0.056, 0.148)	0.373	0.005	0.004
Brazil	1b	Fear non-violent crime	-0.458	4.567	(-9.798, 8.882)	0.921	0.004	0.082
Liberia	1b	Fear non-violent crime	-0.084	0.210	(-0.504, 0.336)	0.691	0.001	0.326
Pakistan	1b	Fear non-violent crime	-0.424	0.060	(-0.596, -0.252)	0.003	0.000	–

Table SM19: All components *(continued)*

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Prop. Missing	Differential attrition p-value
Philippines	1b	Fear non-violent crime	0.071	0.062	(-0.052, 0.194)	0.254	0.013	0.672
Uganda	1b	Fear non-violent crime	0.070	0.056	(-0.042, 0.182)	0.213	0.005	0.022
Brazil	1b	Feared walking	0.844	5.525	(-10.458, 12.145)	0.880	0.004	0.156
Colombia	1b	Feared walking	0.087	0.042	(0.003, 0.171)	0.043	0.009	0.679
Liberia	1b	Feared walking	0.124	0.243	(-0.362, 0.611)	0.611	0.001	0.395
Pakistan	1b	Feared walking	-0.239	0.060	(-0.418, -0.061)	0.022	0.014	0.443
Philippines	1b	Feared walking	0.001	0.053	(-0.103, 0.105)	0.986	0.014	0.878
Uganda	1b	Feared walking	0.012	0.037	(-0.062, 0.086)	0.745	0.000	–
Brazil	2	Trust in police	-4.831	30.639	(-67.516, 57.854)	0.876	0.005	0.116
Colombia	2	Trust in police	0.045	0.051	(-0.056, 0.146)	0.376	0.004	0.535
Liberia	2	Trust in police	0.082	0.247	(-0.410, 0.575)	0.740	0.005	0.182
Pakistan	2	Trust in police	0.431	0.140	(0.027, 0.836)	0.042	0.008	0.302
Philippines	2	Trust in police	0.007	0.066	(-0.125, 0.138)	0.921	0.010	0.240
Uganda	2	Trust in police	0.025	0.050	(-0.075, 0.124)	0.623	0.001	0.938
Brazil	2	Trust in service of police	-3.680	22.605	(-49.932, 42.571)	0.872	0.007	0.060
Colombia	2	Trust in service of police	0.086	0.045	(-0.005, 0.176)	0.062	0.007	0.041
Liberia	2	Trust in service of police	0.235	0.213	(-0.191, 0.661)	0.275	0.004	0.721
Pakistan	2	Trust in service of police	0.458	0.149	(0.040, 0.876)	0.038	0.011	0.224
Philippines	2	Trust in service of police	0.031	0.059	(-0.086, 0.148)	0.600	0.021	0.630
Uganda	2	Trust in service of police	-0.008	0.051	(-0.110, 0.095)	0.879	0.001	0.654
Colombia	3a	Empathy (complaints)	0.008	0.155	(-0.300, 0.316)	0.961	0.398	0.502
Pakistan	3a	Empathy (complaints)	-0.028	0.159	(-0.347, 0.291)	0.861	0.193	0.001
Uganda	3a	Empathy (complaints)	0.166	0.194	(-0.224, 0.556)	0.396	0.005	0.345
Colombia	3a	Empathy (reports)	-0.162	0.206	(-0.572, 0.248)	0.433	0.393	0.500
Pakistan	3a	Empathy (reports)	0.238	0.168	(-0.100, 0.575)	0.163	0.193	0.000
Uganda	3a	Empathy (reports)	-0.338	0.206	(-0.754, 0.078)	0.108	0.005	0.345
Colombia	3a	Police takes complaints seriously	-0.061	0.163	(-0.386, 0.264)	0.711	0.391	0.401
Pakistan	3a	Police takes complaints seriously	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.716	0.197	0.278
Uganda	3a	Police takes complaints seriously	-0.276	0.149	(-0.576, 0.025)	0.071	0.005	0.347
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 2: discipliniary punishment	-0.167	0.126	(-0.418, 0.084)	0.189	0.384	0.447
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 2: discipliniary punishment	-0.241	0.222	(-0.688, 0.205)	0.282	0.209	0.734
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 2: discipliniary punishment	-0.064	0.150	(-0.366, 0.237)	0.669	0.005	0.346
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 2: report fellow officer	-0.047	0.121	(-0.289, 0.194)	0.697	0.400	0.278
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 2: report fellow officer	-0.075	0.126	(-0.328, 0.177)	0.552	0.201	0.067
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 2: report fellow officer	-0.208	0.184	(-0.579, 0.162)	0.263	0.005	0.347
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 2: reports by other officers	0.004	0.127	(-0.247, 0.256)	0.972	0.398	0.342
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 2: reports by other officers	0.000	0.157	(-0.316, 0.317)	0.998	0.236	0.304
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 2: reports by other officers	-0.153	0.159	(-0.473, 0.168)	0.342	0.005	0.343
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 3: discipliniary punishment	-0.210	0.116	(-0.442, 0.021)	0.074	0.384	0.447
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 3: discipliniary punishment	-0.070	0.154	(-0.379, 0.239)	0.650	0.217	0.155
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 3: discipliniary punishment	-0.067	0.095	(-0.260, 0.125)	0.484	0.010	0.737
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 3: report fellow officer	-0.297	0.156	(-0.608, 0.014)	0.061	0.398	0.211
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 3: report fellow officer	0.118	0.129	(-0.141, 0.378)	0.364	0.213	0.560
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 3: report fellow officer	-0.242	0.165	(-0.574, 0.090)	0.149	0.005	0.345
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 3: reports by other officers	-0.145	0.151	(-0.446, 0.157)	0.342	0.398	0.233
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 3: reports by other officers	0.072	0.165	(-0.260, 0.403)	0.666	0.220	0.814
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 3: reports by other officers	-0.133	0.204	(-0.544, 0.279)	0.519	0.010	0.722
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 5: discipliniary punishment	0.042	0.135	(-0.226, 0.310)	0.756	0.384	0.447
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 5: discipliniary punishment	-0.046	0.156	(-0.360, 0.269)	0.771	0.189	
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 5: discipliniary punishment	-0.060	0.135	(-0.333, 0.213)	0.659	0.010	0.744
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 5: report fellow officer	0.029	0.132	(-0.235, 0.293)	0.825	0.393	0.235
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 5: report fellow officer	0.083	0.125	(-0.167, 0.334)	0.507	0.197	0.127
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 5: report fellow officer	0.003	0.219	(-0.439, 0.445)	0.991	0.005	0.345
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 5: reports by other officers	0.022	0.142	(-0.261, 0.305)	0.878	0.391	0.286
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 5: reports by other officers	0.070	0.137	(-0.205, 0.345)	0.610	0.213	0.001
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 5: reports by other officers	-0.045	0.160	(-0.367, 0.277)	0.778	0.005	0.346
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 5: own misconduct	0.135	0.157	(-0.177, 0.447)	0.392	0.391	0.286
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 5: own misconduct	0.013	0.118	(-0.224, 0.250)	0.912	0.205	0.589

Table SM19: All components *(continued)*

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Prop. Missing	Differential attrition p-value
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 5: own misconduct	-0.095	0.137	(-0.372, 0.182)	0.494	0.005	0.346
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 5: others' misconduct	0.169	0.133	(-0.096, 0.434)	0.207	0.393	0.265
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 5: others' misconduct	-0.031	0.112	(-0.257, 0.195)	0.783	0.228	0.000
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 5: others' misconduct	0.018	0.197	(-0.378, 0.415)	0.926	0.005	0.345
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 2: own misconduct (corruption)	0.123	0.110	(-0.095, 0.341)	0.266	0.400	0.336
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 2: own misconduct (corruption)	0.022	0.115	(-0.208, 0.253)	0.847	0.189	
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 2: own misconduct (corruption)	-0.108	0.163	(-0.437, 0.221)	0.511	0.005	0.346
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 2: others' misconduct (corruption)	0.890	0.234	(0.425, 1.356)	0.000	0.398	0.439
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 2: others' misconduct (corruption)	-0.098	0.120	(-0.339, 0.143)	0.419	0.217	0.041
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 2: others' misconduct (corruption)	-0.132	0.195	(-0.526, 0.261)	0.501	0.005	0.348
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 3: own misconduct (corruption)	0.149	0.160	(-0.169, 0.467)	0.352	0.396	0.189
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 3: own misconduct (corruption)	0.107	0.123	(-0.139, 0.354)	0.385	0.244	0.811
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 3: own misconduct (corruption)	-0.296	0.136	(-0.570, -0.023)	0.035	0.005	0.346
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 3: others' misconduct (corruption)	0.572	0.213	(0.148, 0.995)	0.009	0.393	0.232
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 3: others' misconduct (corruption)	-0.016	0.152	(-0.321, 0.290)	0.919	0.268	0.590
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 3: others' misconduct (corruption)	-0.206	0.135	(-0.477, 0.066)	0.134	0.005	0.347
Brazil	3b	Police abuse	-0.067	0.336	(-0.755, 0.621)	0.843	0.000	–
Colombia	3b	Police abuse	0.009	0.037	(-0.065, 0.083)	0.801	0.000	–
Liberia	3b	Police abuse	-0.033	0.034	(-0.100, 0.035)	0.340	0.001	0.326
Pakistan	3b	Police abuse	-0.289	0.143	(-0.711, 0.134)	0.125	0.037	0.935
Philippines	3b	Police abuse	-0.035	0.043	(-0.121, 0.050)	0.416	0.000	–
Uganda	3b	Police abuse	0.015	0.041	(-0.068, 0.098)	0.723	0.000	0.322
Brazil	3b	Police abuse	-0.067	0.336	(-0.755, 0.621)	0.843	0.000	–
Liberia	3b	Police abuse	-0.055	0.047	(-0.150, 0.039)	0.248	0.000	–
Pakistan	3b	Police abuse	-0.147	0.074	(-0.366, 0.072)	0.129	0.000	–
Philippines	3b	Police abuse	-0.015	0.039	(-0.091, 0.062)	0.701	0.000	–
Uganda	3b	Police abuse	0.018	0.019	(-0.021, 0.057)	0.349	0.000	–
Brazil	3b	Bribe frequency	1.348	7.262	(-13.508, 16.203)	0.854	0.000	–
Colombia	3b	Bribe frequency	-0.008	0.049	(-0.105, 0.089)	0.870	0.000	–
Liberia	3b	Bribe frequency	0.082	0.317	(-0.550, 0.714)	0.797	0.000	–
Pakistan	3b	Bribe frequency	-0.032	0.067	(-0.223, 0.160)	0.664	0.021	0.265
Philippines	3b	Bribe frequency	0.003	0.046	(-0.088, 0.093)	0.955	0.001	0.673
Uganda	3b	Bribe frequency	0.083	0.041	(0.002, 0.165)	0.045	0.000	0.322
Brazil	3b	Bribe amount	0.012	0.063	(-0.117, 0.141)	0.855	0.000	–
Colombia	3b	Bribe amount	-0.088	0.084	(-0.255, 0.078)	0.294	0.000	–
Liberia	3b	Bribe amount	0.005	0.020	(-0.035, 0.046)	0.792	0.000	–
Pakistan	3b	Bribe amount	-0.009	0.009	(-0.036, 0.018)	0.392	0.021	0.165
Philippines	3b	Bribe amount	-0.040	0.026	(-0.092, 0.012)	0.131	0.002	0.785
Uganda	3b	Bribe amount	0.121	0.080	(-0.040, 0.282)	0.137	0.000	0.322
Brazil	4a	Violent crimes reported (personal)	1.832	11.022	(-20.720, 24.383)	0.869	0.000	–
Colombia	4a	Violent crimes reported (personal)	0.037	0.048	(-0.058, 0.132)	0.437	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Violent crimes reported (personal)	-0.005	0.006	(-0.017, 0.006)	0.371	0.000	–
Pakistan	4a	Violent crimes reported (personal)	0.228	0.218	(-0.418, 0.874)	0.364	0.000	–
Philippines	4a	Violent crimes reported (personal)	0.012	0.047	(-0.081, 0.105)	0.798	0.000	–
Uganda	4a	Violent crimes reported (personal)	-0.003	0.038	(-0.080, 0.074)	0.936	0.000	–
Colombia	4a	Armed robbery reported (personal)	0.036	0.040	(-0.043, 0.115)	0.367	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Armed robbery reported (personal)	-0.005	0.009	(-0.022, 0.013)	0.582	0.007	0.555
Uganda	4a	Armed robbery reported (personal)	0.000	0.039	(-0.079, 0.079)	0.997	0.003	0.598
Colombia	4a	Simple assault reported (personal)	-0.002	0.050	(-0.101, 0.097)	0.969	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Simple assault reported (personal)	-0.001	0.004	(-0.009, 0.007)	0.818	0.025	0.712
Uganda	4a	Simple assault reported (personal)	-0.003	0.028	(-0.060, 0.054)	0.915	0.018	0.416
Uganda	4a	Other violent crimes reported (personal)	0.000	0.037	(-0.073, 0.073)	0.996	0.000	–
Brazil	4a	Non-violent crimes reported (personal)	-1.703	9.972	(-22.107, 18.702)	0.866	0.000	–
Colombia	4a	Non-violent crimes reported (personal)	0.033	0.045	(-0.057, 0.123)	0.470	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Non-violent crimes reported (personal)	-0.007	0.019	(-0.044, 0.030)	0.716	0.000	–
Philippines	4a	Non-violent crimes reported (personal)	0.006	0.046	(-0.086, 0.097)	0.905	0.000	–
Uganda	4a	Non-violent crimes reported (personal)	0.066	0.042	(-0.019, 0.151)	0.123	0.000	–

Table SM19: All components *(continued)*

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Prop. Missing	Differential attrition p-value
Colombia	4a	Burglary reported (personal)	0.027	0.037	(-0.047, 0.102)	0.466	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Burglary reported (personal)	-0.007	0.019	(-0.046, 0.031)	0.711	0.037	0.293
Uganda	4a	Burglary reported (personal)	0.083	0.041	(0.001, 0.166)	0.047	0.052	0.714
Uganda	4a	Other non-violent crimes reported (personal)	-0.043	0.030	(-0.103, 0.018)	0.161	0.000	–
Brazil	4a	Violent crimes reported (community)	1.209	8.272	(-15.715, 18.132)	0.885	0.000	–
Colombia	4a	Violent crimes reported (community)	-0.003	0.041	(-0.084, 0.078)	0.940	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Violent crimes reported (community)	-0.003	0.019	(-0.041, 0.034)	0.862	0.000	–
Pakistan	4a	Violent crimes reported (community)	0.037	0.099	(-0.257, 0.331)	0.730	0.000	–
Philippines	4a	Violent crimes reported (community)	0.074	0.099	(-0.121, 0.270)	0.453	0.000	–
Uganda	4a	Violent crimes reported (community)	0.021	0.068	(-0.117, 0.158)	0.764	0.000	–
Colombia	4a	Armed robbery reported (community)	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.301	0.332	0.947
Liberia	4a	Armed robbery reported (community)	-0.028	0.036	(-0.100, 0.043)	0.434	0.022	0.756
Uganda	4a	Armed robbery reported (community)	0.039	0.052	(-0.065, 0.144)	0.453	0.010	0.371
Liberia	4a	Aggravated assault reported (community)	0.006	0.018	(-0.030, 0.042)	0.737	0.021	0.146
Uganda	4a	Aggravated assault reported (community)	0.011	0.037	(-0.063, 0.086)	0.765	0.009	0.367
Colombia	4a	Simple assault reported (community)	-0.018	0.039	(-0.095, 0.058)	0.636	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Simple assault reported (community)	-0.001	0.011	(-0.023, 0.022)	0.947	0.042	0.321
Uganda	4a	Simple assault reported (community)	0.013	0.036	(-0.058, 0.084)	0.718	0.038	0.110
Colombia	4a	Sexual assault reported (community)	-0.010	0.038	(-0.086, 0.065)	0.782	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Sexual assault reported (community)	-0.007	0.011	(-0.030, 0.016)	0.552	0.009	0.686
Uganda	4a	Sexual assault reported (community)	0.061	0.068	(-0.076, 0.198)	0.374	0.010	0.889
Colombia	4a	Domestic physical abuse reported (community)	0.006	0.041	(-0.074, 0.087)	0.876	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Domestic physical abuse reported (community)	0.004	0.004	(-0.003, 0.012)	0.246	0.057	0.888
Uganda	4a	Domestic physical abuse reported (community)	-0.017	0.044	(-0.105, 0.072)	0.707	0.070	0.666
Uganda	4a	Other violent crime reported (community)	0.006	0.018	(-0.029, 0.042)	0.718	0.000	–
Brazil	4a	Non-violent crime reported (community)	-1.699	9.326	(-20.775, 17.377)	0.857	0.000	–
Colombia	4a	Non-violent crime reported (community)	0.095	0.080	(-0.064, 0.255)	0.239	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Non-violent crime reported (community)	-0.015	0.024	(-0.063, 0.033)	0.525	0.000	–
Philippines	4a	Non-violent crime reported (community)	-0.081	0.044	(-0.167, 0.005)	0.066	0.000	–
Uganda	4a	Non-violent crime reported (community)	0.004	0.052	(-0.100, 0.108)	0.938	0.000	–
Colombia	4a	Burglary reported (community)	0.078	0.066	(-0.053, 0.209)	0.241	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Burglary reported (community)	-0.017	0.025	(-0.066, 0.033)	0.506	0.045	0.704
Uganda	4a	Burglary reported (community)	-0.013	0.053	(-0.119, 0.094)	0.814	0.121	0.223
Uganda	4a	Other non-violent crime reported (community)	0.038	0.040	(-0.042, 0.118)	0.350	0.000	–
Brazil	4a	Resolution of crime index	-1.186	6.072	(-13.610, 11.238)	0.847	0.000	–
Colombia	4a	Resolution of crime index	-0.007	0.024	(-0.055, 0.041)	0.761	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Resolution of crime index	-0.063	0.121	(-0.305, 0.178)	0.602	0.000	–
Pakistan	4a	Resolution of crime index	0.007	0.037	(-0.103, 0.116)	0.870	0.000	–
Philippines	4a	Resolution of crime index	-0.138	0.056	(-0.250, -0.027)	0.016	0.000	–
Uganda	4a	Resolution of crime index	-0.007	0.029	(-0.065, 0.051)	0.810	0.000	–
Brazil	4a	Burglary resolution	-2.514	13.273	(-29.671, 24.642)	0.851	0.000	–
Colombia	4a	Burglary resolution	-0.007	0.035	(-0.076, 0.062)	0.837	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Burglary resolution	0.003	0.108	(-0.213, 0.220)	0.977	0.000	–
Pakistan	4a	Burglary resolution	0.045	0.047	(-0.095, 0.185)	0.401	0.000	–
Philippines	4a	Burglary resolution	-0.095	0.055	(-0.203, 0.014)	0.087	0.000	–
Uganda	4a	Burglary resolution	-0.040	0.038	(-0.116, 0.036)	0.300	0.000	–
Brazil	4a	Domestic abuse resolution	-0.498	2.364	(-5.335, 4.340)	0.835	0.000	–
Colombia	4a	Domestic abuse resolution	-0.007	0.029	(-0.063, 0.050)	0.816	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Domestic abuse resolution	0.091	0.081	(-0.071, 0.253)	0.266	0.000	–
Pakistan	4a	Domestic abuse resolution	-0.006	0.089	(-0.272, 0.260)	0.949	0.000	–
Philippines	4a	Domestic abuse resolution	-0.097	0.049	(-0.193, -0.001)	0.049	0.000	–
Uganda	4a	Domestic abuse resolution	0.061	0.057	(-0.054, 0.176)	0.290	0.000	–
Brazil	4a	Armed robbery resolution	-0.459	3.075	(-6.751, 5.832)	0.882	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Armed robbery resolution	-0.207	0.115	(-0.436, 0.022)	0.076	0.000	–
Pakistan	4a	Armed robbery resolution	-0.012	0.061	(-0.193, 0.169)	0.856	0.000	–
Philippines	4a	Armed robbery resolution	-0.109	0.054	(-0.215, -0.002)	0.045	0.000	–
Uganda	4a	Armed robbery resolution	-0.042	0.027	(-0.096, 0.012)	0.128	0.000	–
Brazil	4b	Contacted police for suspicious activity	-0.279	3.459	(-7.356, 6.799)	0.936	0.003	0.827

Table SM19: All components *(continued)*

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Prop. Missing	Differential attrition p-value
Colombia	4b	Contacted police for suspicious activity	-0.062	0.043	(-0.147, 0.024)	0.156	0.000	–
Liberia	4b	Contacted police for suspicious activity	-0.181	0.173	(-0.526, 0.164)	0.299	0.000	–
Pakistan	4b	Contacted police for suspicious activity	-0.099	0.043	(-0.228, 0.030)	0.096	0.018	0.323
Philippines	4b	Contacted police for suspicious activity	-0.060	0.049	(-0.156, 0.037)	0.223	0.008	0.316
Uganda	4b	Contacted police for suspicious activity	0.006	0.039	(-0.072, 0.083)	0.883	0.001	0.990
Brazil	4b	Gave information to police	-2.025	5.423	(-13.586, 9.535)	0.714	0.925	0.838
Colombia	4b	Gave information to police	0.039	0.039	(-0.038, 0.117)	0.317	0.000	–
Liberia	4b	Gave information to police	-0.228	0.215	(-0.657, 0.201)	0.294	0.001	0.902
Pakistan	4b	Gave information to police	-0.074	0.042	(-0.199, 0.052)	0.168	0.017	0.876
Philippines	4b	Gave information to police	-0.059	0.042	(-0.142, 0.025)	0.170	0.013	0.052
Uganda	4b	Gave information to police	-0.014	0.034	(-0.083, 0.054)	0.672	0.000	–
Liberia	4c	Reported drinking on duty	-0.433	0.199	(-0.831, -0.036)	0.033	0.006	0.462
Pakistan	4c	Reported drinking on duty	-0.032	0.124	(-0.391, 0.328)	0.813	0.037	0.727
Philippines	4c	Reported drinking on duty	0.059	0.044	(-0.028, 0.146)	0.180	0.013	0.199
Uganda	4c	Reported drinking on duty	0.023	0.048	(-0.073, 0.119)	0.628	0.003	0.978
Colombia	4c	Reported police beating	0.019	0.039	(-0.058, 0.097)	0.624	0.010	0.919
Liberia	4c	Reported police beating	0.186	0.194	(-0.202, 0.574)	0.342	0.003	0.701
Pakistan	4c	Reported police beating	-0.111	0.091	(-0.380, 0.158)	0.301	0.041	0.909
Philippines	4c	Reported police beating	0.025	0.047	(-0.068, 0.117)	0.599	0.009	0.668
Uganda	4c	Reported police beating	0.042	0.051	(-0.060, 0.145)	0.412	0.002	0.503
Colombia	4c	Reported police abuse	0.018	0.026	(-0.035, 0.070)	0.507	0.000	–
Liberia	4c	Reported police abuse	-0.016	0.012	(-0.039, 0.007)	0.177	0.000	–
Pakistan	4c	Reported police abuse	-0.158	0.045	(-0.293, -0.024)	0.032	0.000	–
Philippines	4c	Reported police abuse	-0.009	0.047	(-0.101, 0.084)	0.856	0.000	–
Uganda	4c	Reported police abuse	0.024	0.047	(-0.071, 0.119)	0.614	0.000	–
Uganda	4c	Victimization reported to police station	0.833	0.408	(0.016, 1.651)	0.046	0.000	–
Brazil	M1a	Police will investigate	-0.618	1.872	(-4.466, 3.230)	0.744	0.150	0.224
Colombia	M1a	Police will investigate	0.066	0.043	(-0.020, 0.152)	0.131	0.019	0.546
Liberia	M1a	Police will investigate	0.330	0.225	(-0.120, 0.780)	0.148	0.016	0.824
Pakistan	M1a	Police will investigate	1.440	0.120	(1.104, 1.775)	0.000	0.017	0.164
Philippines	M1a	Police will investigate	-0.021	0.061	(-0.142, 0.100)	0.733	0.008	0.454
Uganda	M1a	Police will investigate	-0.063	0.048	(-0.158, 0.033)	0.192	0.003	0.279
Brazil	M1a	Police will be fair	-2.298	9.680	(-22.110, 17.513)	0.814	0.043	0.571
Colombia	M1a	Police will be fair	0.086	0.045	(-0.003, 0.175)	0.058	0.032	0.247
Liberia	M1a	Police will be fair	0.114	0.191	(-0.269, 0.497)	0.554	0.019	0.544
Pakistan	M1a	Police will be fair	0.667	0.213	(0.064, 1.270)	0.037	0.024	0.480
Philippines	M1a	Police will be fair	0.001	0.050	(-0.097, 0.099)	0.986	0.023	0.410
Uganda	M1a	Police will be fair	0.017	0.051	(-0.085, 0.119)	0.738	0.003	0.501
Brazil	M1a	Police are corrupt	-0.303	3.011	(-6.463, 5.856)	0.920	0.050	0.639
Colombia	M1a	Police are corrupt	-0.064	0.042	(-0.148, 0.020)	0.135	0.044	0.046
Liberia	M1a	Police are corrupt	0.408	0.224	(-0.039, 0.856)	0.073	0.085	0.843
Pakistan	M1a	Police are corrupt	0.333	0.123	(-0.033, 0.699)	0.064	0.009	0.416
Philippines	M1a	Police are corrupt	-0.059	0.066	(-0.189, 0.070)	0.366	0.070	0.028
Uganda	M1a	Police are corrupt	-0.037	0.032	(-0.101, 0.027)	0.249	0.007	0.282
Brazil	M1a	Police serve equally	-1.703	9.342	(-20.822, 17.416)	0.857	0.022	0.066
Uganda	M1a	Police serve equally	0.032	0.046	(-0.061, 0.125)	0.494	0.002	0.674
Colombia	M1b	Legal Knowledge (suspect)	-0.096	0.038	(-0.171, -0.021)	0.013	0.000	–
Liberia	M1b	Legal Knowledge (suspect)	-0.002	0.317	(-0.637, 0.632)	0.994	0.087	0.970
Uganda	M1b	Legal Knowledge (suspect)	0.079	0.040	(-0.000, 0.159)	0.051	0.012	0.728
Colombia	M1b	Legal Knowledge (lawyer)	0.046	0.040	(-0.034, 0.126)	0.253	0.000	–
Liberia	M1b	Legal Knowledge (lawyer)	-0.250	0.185	(-0.620, 0.120)	0.182	0.034	0.702
Uganda	M1b	Legal Knowledge (lawyer)	0.018	0.035	(-0.051, 0.088)	0.595	0.064	0.765
Colombia	M1b	Legal Knowledge (fees)	-0.050	0.047	(-0.144, 0.043)	0.289	0.000	–
Liberia	M1b	Legal Knowledge (fees)	-0.045	0.299	(-0.641, 0.552)	0.882	0.050	0.035
Uganda	M1b	Legal Knowledge (fees)	0.107	0.051	(0.004, 0.210)	0.042	0.017	0.556
Uganda	M1b	Legal Knowledge (domestic abuse)	-0.033	0.036	(-0.106, 0.040)	0.369	0.003	0.496
Uganda	M1b	Police Knowledge (followup)	0.063	0.035	(-0.006, 0.132)	0.074	0.021	0.532

Table SM19: All components *(continued)*

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Prop. Missing	Differential attrition p-value
Uganda	M1b	Police Knowledge (where is station)	0.023	0.052	(-0.082, 0.127)	0.666	0.000	–
Colombia	M1c	Reporting norm (theft)	-0.080	0.046	(-0.172, 0.012)	0.087	0.046	0.618
Liberia	M1c	Reporting norm (theft)	0.135	0.273	(-0.411, 0.680)	0.624	0.015	0.012
Pakistan	M1c	Reporting norm (theft)	0.099	0.083	(-0.127, 0.325)	0.295	0.022	0.730
Philippines	M1c	Reporting norm (theft)	0.022	0.053	(-0.084, 0.127)	0.682	0.016	0.746
Uganda	M1c	Reporting norm (theft)	-0.091	0.053	(-0.197, 0.016)	0.093	0.001	0.558
Colombia	M1c	Reporting norm (domestic abuse)	-0.022	0.042	(-0.106, 0.063)	0.609	0.023	0.211
Liberia	M1c	Reporting norm (domestic abuse)	0.363	0.193	(-0.023, 0.748)	0.065	0.024	0.344
Pakistan	M1c	Reporting norm (domestic abuse)	0.173	0.114	(-0.140, 0.487)	0.202	0.010	0.274
Philippines	M1c	Reporting norm (domestic abuse)	0.015	0.057	(-0.097, 0.127)	0.789	0.014	0.055
Uganda	M1c	Reporting norm (domestic abuse)	0.020	0.047	(-0.075, 0.115)	0.673	0.002	0.210
Brazil	M1c	Obey police norm	-0.311	2.232	(-4.878, 4.255)	0.890	0.006	0.733
Colombia	M1c	Obey police norm	0.063	0.041	(-0.019, 0.145)	0.132	0.016	0.721
Liberia	M1c	Obey police norm	0.188	0.162	(-0.136, 0.512)	0.251	0.004	0.710
Pakistan	M1c	Obey police norm	-0.102	0.126	(-0.462, 0.258)	0.466	0.004	0.263
Philippines	M1c	Obey police norm	-0.014	0.046	(-0.104, 0.077)	0.767	0.012	0.281
Uganda	M1c	Obey police norm	0.001	0.045	(-0.090, 0.091)	0.989	0.001	0.677
Brazil	M2a	Police timeliness	-4.699	34.471	(-75.238, 65.840)	0.893	0.050	0.901
Colombia	M2a	Police timeliness	0.111	0.042	(0.027, 0.194)	0.010	0.014	0.681
Liberia	M2a	Police timeliness	0.403	0.177	(0.049, 0.757)	0.026	0.015	0.485
Pakistan	M2a	Police timeliness	-0.029	0.097	(-0.318, 0.260)	0.783	0.016	0.257
Philippines	M2a	Police timeliness	-0.001	0.065	(-0.130, 0.129)	0.992	0.018	0.806
Uganda	M2a	Police timeliness	-0.041	0.037	(-0.115, 0.033)	0.276	0.005	0.307
Brazil	M2a	Police investigation capacity	-0.435	2.648	(-5.856, 4.986)	0.871	0.036	0.511
Colombia	M2a	Police investigation capacity	0.100	0.036	(0.027, 0.172)	0.008	0.017	0.103
Liberia	M2a	Police investigation capacity	0.173	0.171	(-0.167, 0.514)	0.314	0.014	0.323
Pakistan	M2a	Police investigation capacity	0.095	0.081	(-0.142, 0.332)	0.313	0.019	0.854
Philippines	M2a	Police investigation capacity	-0.004	0.064	(-0.132, 0.123)	0.949	0.029	0.538
Uganda	M2a	Police investigation capacity	-0.028	0.034	(-0.095, 0.040)	0.414	0.003	0.243
Brazil	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.418	2.872	(-6.296, 5.460)	0.885	0.017	0.094
Colombia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.051	0.045	(-0.038, 0.140)	0.257	0.009	0.722
Liberia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.040	0.248	(-0.535, 0.455)	0.872	0.019	0.894
Pakistan	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.030	0.113	(-0.292, 0.353)	0.803	0.025	0.062
Uganda	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.015	0.046	(-0.077, 0.107)	0.746	0.002	0.454
Brazil	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	1.615	6.900	(-12.497, 15.728)	0.817	0.091	0.848
Colombia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.065	0.046	(-0.027, 0.157)	0.165	0.013	0.136
Liberia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	-0.186	0.215	(-0.616, 0.243)	0.390	0.025	0.449
Pakistan	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.113	0.104	(-0.185, 0.411)	0.343	0.015	0.483
Philippines	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.005	0.061	(-0.115, 0.125)	0.933	0.014	0.008
Brazil	S2	Community trust	-1.078	8.136	(-17.721, 15.565)	0.896	0.006	0.899
Colombia	S2	Community trust	0.070	0.039	(-0.008, 0.147)	0.078	0.019	0.976
Liberia	S2	Community trust	-0.218	0.210	(-0.636, 0.201)	0.303	0.006	0.138
Pakistan	S2	Community trust	-0.037	0.173	(-0.554, 0.480)	0.843	0.005	0.460
Philippines	S2	Community trust	-0.029	0.065	(-0.157, 0.100)	0.659	0.014	0.323
Uganda	S2	Community trust	0.019	0.038	(-0.058, 0.095)	0.629	0.000	0.326
Brazil	C	Foot patrol frequency	-6.053	35.124	(-77.902, 65.797)	0.864	0.004	0.269
Colombia	C	Foot patrol frequency	0.003	0.049	(-0.094, 0.101)	0.945	0.071	0.084
Liberia	C	Foot patrol frequency	0.080	0.148	(-0.216, 0.376)	0.593	0.004	0.649
Pakistan	C	Foot patrol frequency	0.293	0.132	(-0.105, 0.692)	0.104	0.026	0.431
Philippines	C	Foot patrol frequency	0.163	0.102	(-0.039, 0.366)	0.113	0.029	0.001
Uganda	C	Foot patrol frequency	-0.039	0.069	(-0.177, 0.099)	0.574	0.001	0.044
Colombia	C	Vehicle patrol frequency	0.003	0.050	(-0.097, 0.102)	0.960	0.024	0.797
Liberia	C	Vehicle patrol frequency	0.019	0.146	(-0.271, 0.309)	0.897	0.006	0.855
Pakistan	C	Vehicle patrol frequency	0.209	0.072	(-0.007, 0.425)	0.055	0.011	0.617
Philippines	C	Vehicle patrol frequency	0.233	0.127	(-0.018, 0.483)	0.069	0.009	0.520
Uganda	C	Vehicle patrol frequency	0.056	0.061	(-0.067, 0.179)	0.365	0.001	0.058
Brazil	C	Community meeting awareness	0.143	3.216	(-6.442, 6.729)	0.965	0.011	0.396
Colombia	C	Community meeting awareness	0.838	0.092	(0.655, 1.021)	0.000	0.000	–

Table SM19: All components *(continued)*

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Prop. Missing	Differential attrition p-value
Liberia	C	Community meeting awareness	3.639	0.394	(2.854, 4.424)	0.000	0.000	–
Pakistan	C	Community meeting awareness	0.401	0.136	(-0.003, 0.804)	0.051	0.023	0.526
Philippines	C	Community meeting awareness	0.107	0.068	(-0.028, 0.242)	0.119	0.002	0.028
Uganda	C	Community meeting awareness	0.311	0.070	(0.171, 0.451)	0.000	0.001	0.627

G.9 Secondary hypotheses by item[38]

Table SM20: Components Table for Secondary Hypotheses

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
Brazil	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	0.562	0.588	(-0.604, 1.729)	0.341
Colombia	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	0.059	0.065	(-0.069, 0.186)	0.365
Liberia	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	0.082	0.327	(-0.574, 0.738)	0.802
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	0.169	0.199	(-0.227, 0.566)	0.397
Philippines	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	-0.008	0.039	(-0.084, 0.069)	0.845
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	0.494	0.112	(0.273, 0.715)	0
Brazil	1a. (alt. i)	Violent crimes (administrative data)	0.648	0.717	(-0.773, 2.069)	0.368
Colombia	1a. (alt. i)	Violent crimes (administrative data)	0.007	0.081	(-0.153, 0.167)	0.934
Liberia	1a. (alt. i)	Violent crimes (administrative data)	0.069	0.336	(-0.605, 0.743)	0.838
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Violent crimes (administrative data)	0.255	0.247	(-0.236, 0.746)	0.304
Philippines	1a. (alt. i)	Violent crimes (administrative data)	-0.013	0.078	(-0.167, 0.141)	0.866
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Violent crimes (administrative data)	0.524	0.108	(0.312, 0.737)	0
Brazil	1a. (alt. i)	Armed robbery (administrative data)	0.244	-	(-, -)	-
Liberia	1a. (alt. i)	Armed robbery (administrative data)	0.362	0.277	(-0.193, 0.917)	0.196
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Armed robbery (administrative data)	0.022	0.408	(-0.805, 0.849)	0.958
Philippines	1a. (alt. i)	Armed robbery (administrative data)	-0.036	0.049	(-0.132, 0.06)	0.461
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Armed robbery (administrative data)	0.532	0.182	(0.174, 0.889)	0.004
Brazil	1a. (alt. i)	Aggravated assault (administrative data)	0.648	-	(-, -)	-
Liberia	1a. (alt. i)	Aggravated assault (administrative data)	-0.033	0.239	(-0.513, 0.446)	0.889
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Aggravated assault (administrative data)	1.09	0.861	(-0.655, 2.836)	0.213
Philippines	1a. (alt. i)	Aggravated assault (administrative data)	-0.036	0.068	(-0.169, 0.097)	0.59
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Aggravated assault (administrative data)	0.453	0.099	(0.257, 0.649)	0
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Simple assault (administrative data)	-0.024	0.345	(-0.724, 0.675)	0.945
Brazil	1a. (alt. i)	Sexual assault (administrative data)	1.927	-	(-, -)	-
Liberia	1a. (alt. i)	Sexual assault (administrative data)	0.768	0.47	(-0.175, 1.712)	0.108
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Sexual assault (administrative data)	-0.202	0.808	(-1.84, 1.437)	0.804
Philippines	1a. (alt. i)	Sexual assault (administrative data)	-	-	(-, -)	-
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Sexual assault (administrative data)	0.371	0.138	(0.099, 0.644)	0.008
Colombia	1a. (alt. i)	Domestic abuse (physical) (administrative data)	-0.005	0.085	(-0.172, 0.163)	0.957
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Domestic abuse (physical) (administrative data)	0.266	0.282	(-0.306, 0.837)	0.352
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Domestic abuse (physical) (administrative data)	0.162	0.099	(-0.032, 0.356)	0.102
Brazil	1a. (alt. i)	Murder (administrative data)	1.382	1.336	(-1.266, 4.031)	0.303
Liberia	1a. (alt. i)	Murder (administrative data)	0.525	0.512	(-0.502, 1.552)	0.31
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Murder (administrative data)	0.338	0.431	(-0.535, 1.212)	0.437
Philippines	1a. (alt. i)	Murder (administrative data)	0.036	0.14	(-0.24, 0.311)	0.798
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Murder (administrative data)	0.636	0.151	(0.339, 0.933)	0
Brazil	1a. (alt. i)	Other violent crimes (administrative data)	0.996	-	(-, -)	-
Colombia	1a. (alt. i)	Other violent crimes (administrative data)	0.07	0.082	(-0.091, 0.232)	0.393
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Other violent crimes (administrative data)	0.745	0.183	(0.384, 1.106)	0
Brazil	1a. (alt. i)	Non-violent crimes (administrative data)	0.478	0.528	(-0.569, 1.524)	0.368

[38]NA in this table are unavailable results due to very little ariation in outcomes.

Table SM20: Components Table for Secondary Hypotheses *(continued)*

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
Colombia	1a. (alt. i)	Non-violent crimes (administrative data)	0.086	0.037	(0.013, 0.158)	0.021
Liberia	1a. (alt. i)	Non-violent crimes (administrative data)	0.002	0.269	(-0.538, 0.542)	0.994
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Non-violent crimes (administrative data)	0.086	0.15	(-0.212, 0.384)	0.566
Philippines	1a. (alt. i)	Non-violent crimes (administrative data)	0	0	(0, 0)	0.386
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Non-violent crimes (administrative data)	0.387	0.122	(0.147, 0.626)	0.002
Brazil	1a. (alt. i)	Burglary (administrative data)	0.468	0.582	(-0.686, 1.623)	0.423
Colombia	1a. (alt. i)	Burglary (administrative data)	0.08	0.037	(0.007, 0.153)	0.032
Liberia	1a. (alt. i)	Burglary (administrative data)	0.002	0.269	(-0.538, 0.542)	0.994
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Burglary (administrative data)	0.343	0.646	(-0.967, 1.653)	0.599
Philippines	1a. (alt. i)	Burglary (administrative data)	0	0	(0, 0)	0.386
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Burglary (administrative data)	0.636	0.154	(0.334, 0.939)	0
Brazil	1a. (alt. i)	Other non-violent crimes (administrative data)	0.468	0.72	(-0.959, 1.894)	0.517
Colombia	1a. (alt. i)	Other non-violent crimes (administrative data)	0.059	0.056	(-0.051, 0.168)	0.292
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Other non-violent crimes (administrative data)	-0.055	0.156	(-0.362, 0.252)	0.725
Brazil	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization idx. (expanded crimes)	-0.584	4.55	(-9.894, 8.725)	0.899
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization idx. (expanded crimes)	-0.523	1.55	(-3.618, 2.573)	0.737
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization idx. (expanded crimes)	-0.584	0.526	(-2.095, 0.926)	0.334
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization idx. (expanded crimes)	-0.069	0.047	(-0.163, 0.025)	0.147
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization idx. (expanded crimes)	0.417	0.319	(-0.223, 1.057)	0.197
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Violent crimes (expanded, personal)	-0.001	0.035	(-0.07, 0.069)	0.986
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Violent crimes (expanded, personal)	0.026	0.032	(-0.038, 0.09)	0.419
Brazil	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed Robbery (expanded, personal)	1.64	8.883	(-16.531, 19.811)	0.855
Colombia	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed Robbery (expanded, personal)	-0.024	0.042	(-0.108, 0.061)	0.579
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed Robbery (expanded, personal)	0.165	0.47	(-0.775, 1.105)	0.727
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed Robbery (expanded, personal)	0.05	0.061	(-0.131, 0.232)	0.466
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed Robbery (expanded, personal)	-0.029	0.027	(-0.083, 0.024)	0.281
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed Robbery (expanded, personal)	0.032	0.025	(-0.019, 0.083)	0.215
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Aggravated assault (expanded, personal)	-0.114	0.513	(-1.145, 0.917)	0.825
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Aggravated assault (expanded, personal)	-0.028	0.264	(-0.577, 0.522)	0.918
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Sexual assault (expanded, personal)	-0.036	0.48	(-0.996, 0.923)	0.94
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Sexual assault (expanded, personal)	0.617	0.457	(-0.394, 1.628)	0.205
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (expanded, personal)	0.362	1.138	(-1.958, 2.681)	0.753
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (expanded, personal)	-0.574	0.208	(-1.002, -0.146)	0.011
Brazil	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (expanded, personal)	-1.459	7.572	(-16.949, 14.031)	0.849
Colombia	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (expanded, personal)	0.036	0.034	(-0.032, 0.103)	0.296
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (expanded, personal)	0.745	0.761	(-0.775, 2.264)	0.331
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (expanded, personal)	-0.089	0.057	(-0.259, 0.082)	0.208
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (expanded, personal)	0.082	0.068	(-0.052, 0.217)	0.229
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (expanded, personal)	0	0.019	(-0.037, 0.037)	0.999
Brazil	1a. (alt. ii)	Other violent crimes (expanded, personal)	0.096	0.55	(-1.03, 1.221)	0.863
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Other violent crimes (expanded, personal)	-0.074	0.158	(-0.39, 0.243)	0.644
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Other violent crimes (expanded, personal)	0.078	0.055	(-0.084, 0.241)	0.237
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Other violent crimes (expanded, personal)	-0.024	0.037	(-0.096, 0.048)	0.513
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Other violent crimes (expanded, personal)	0.019	0.033	(-0.047, 0.085)	0.574
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Non-violent crimes (expanded, personal)	-0.033	0.031	(-0.096, 0.029)	0.288

Table SM20: Components Table for Secondary Hypotheses *(continued)*

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Non-violent crimes (expanded, personal)	0.239	0.23	(-0.223, 0.701)	0.305
Brazil	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (expanded, personal)	-0.627	4.794	(-10.434, 9.18)	0.897
Colombia	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (expanded, personal)	0.017	0.041	(-0.065, 0.099)	0.687
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (expanded, personal)	1.854	1.918	(-1.973, 5.682)	0.337
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (expanded, personal)	-0.035	0.04	(-0.152, 0.083)	0.437
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (expanded, personal)	-0.033	0.031	(-0.094, 0.029)	0.298
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (expanded, personal)	0.003	0.019	(-0.034, 0.04)	0.868
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (verbal) (expanded, personal)	2.542	8.02	(-13.712, 18.796)	0.753
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (verbal) (expanded, personal)	-0.064	0.115	(-0.296, 0.168)	0.582
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Land crimes (expanded, personal)	-0.003	0.022	(-0.068, 0.062)	0.905
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Land crimes (expanded, personal)	1.881	1.832	(-1.794, 5.557)	0.309
Brazil	1a. (alt. ii)	Other non-violent crimes (expanded, personal)	-0.067	0	(-0.067, -0.067)	0
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Other non-violent crimes (expanded, personal)	-0.295	0.164	(-0.623, 0.032)	0.076
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Other non-violent crimes (expanded, personal)	0.154	0.194	(-0.423, 0.732)	0.478
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Other non-violent crimes (expanded, personal)	-0.01	0.051	(-0.111, 0.091)	0.85
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Other non-violent crimes (expanded, personal)	-0.028	0.04	(-0.107, 0.052)	0.488
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Violent crimes (community, expanded)	-0.027	0.058	(-0.143, 0.088)	0.642
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Violent crimes (community, expanded)	0.01	0.058	(-0.107, 0.127)	0.862
Brazil	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed robbery (community, expanded)	-7.119	39.761	(-88.456, 74.217)	0.859
Colombia	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed robbery (community, expanded)	0.04	0.041	(-0.042, 0.122)	0.335
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed robbery (community, expanded)	-0.012	0.242	(-0.496, 0.473)	0.961
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed robbery (community, expanded)	0.025	0.088	(-0.233, 0.283)	0.792
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed robbery (community, expanded)	-0.015	0.041	(-0.095, 0.065)	0.71
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed robbery (community, expanded)	0.037	0.047	(-0.057, 0.131)	0.434
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Aggravated assault (community, expanded)	0.721	1.236	(-1.753, 3.196)	0.562
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Aggravated assault (community, expanded)	-5.694	5.2	(-21.142, 9.753)	0.344
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Aggravated assault (community, expanded)	-0.019	0.041	(-0.099, 0.062)	0.642
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Aggravated assault (community, expanded)	0.016	0.026	(-0.035, 0.068)	0.528
Brazil	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (community, expanded)	0.091	0.767	(-1.477, 1.66)	0.906
Colombia	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (community, expanded)	-0.012	0.04	(-0.092, 0.068)	0.769
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (community, expanded)	1.522	1.623	(-1.716, 4.76)	0.352
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (community, expanded)	0.055	0.068	(-0.147, 0.257)	0.471
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (community, expanded)	-0.064	0.048	(-0.158, 0.03)	0.18
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (community, expanded)	0.025	0.034	(-0.044, 0.094)	0.476
Brazil	1a. (alt. ii)	Sexual assault (community, expanded)	-0.067	0.418	(-0.922, 0.788)	0.874
Colombia	1a. (alt. ii)	Sexual assault (community, expanded)	-0.011	0.038	(-0.086, 0.065)	0.783
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Sexual assault (community, expanded)	-0.15	0.267	(-0.683, 0.384)	0.577
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Sexual assault (community, expanded)	0.009	0.033	(-0.091, 0.109)	0.806
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Sexual assault (community, expanded)	-0.001	0.064	(-0.128, 0.125)	0.984
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Sexual assault (community, expanded)	0.021	0.055	(-0.089, 0.131)	0.705
Brazil	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (community, expanded)	12.101	67.854	(-126.713, 150.915)	0.86
Colombia	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (community, expanded)	0.022	0.041	(-0.06, 0.104)	0.589
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (community, expanded)	1.029	1.749	(-2.461, 4.519)	0.558
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (community, expanded)	-0.112	0.233	(-0.807, 0.583)	0.661
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (community, expanded)	0	0.04	(-0.079, 0.079)	0.997

Table SM20: Components Table for Secondary Hypotheses *(continued)*

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (community, expanded)	-0.021	0.069	(-0.159, 0.117)	0.766
Brazil	1a. (alt. ii)	Murder (community, expanded)	2.478	13.513	(-25.167, 30.122)	0.856
Colombia	1a. (alt. ii)	Murder (community, expanded)	0.032	0.046	(-0.059, 0.123)	0.487
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Murder (community, expanded)	0.135	0.138	(-0.14, 0.41)	0.331
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Murder (community, expanded)	-0.018	0.046	(-0.156, 0.12)	0.713
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Murder (community, expanded)	0.074	0.111	(-0.147, 0.294)	0.51
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Murder (community, expanded)	-0.042	0.092	(-0.226, 0.141)	0.645
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Mob (community, expanded)	0.083	0.296	(-0.51, 0.677)	0.779
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Mob (community, expanded)	-0.119	0.589	(-2.234, 1.996)	0.855
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Mob (community, expanded)	-0.018	0.047	(-0.114, 0.078)	0.71
Brazil	1a. (alt. ii)	Other violent crimes (community, expanded)	0.023	0.164	(-0.314, 0.359)	0.892
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Other violent crimes (community, expanded)	0.013	0.048	(-0.083, 0.108)	0.792
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Other violent crimes (community, expanded)	0.323	0.413	(-0.907, 1.554)	0.485
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Other violent crimes (community, expanded)	0.066	0.073	(-0.079, 0.21)	0.37
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Other violent crimes (community, expanded)	-0.013	0.018	(-0.049, 0.024)	0.488
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Non-violent crimes (community, expanded)	-0.097	0.046	(-0.189, -0.006)	0.037
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Non-violent crimes (community, expanded)	0.743	0.727	(-0.714, 2.2)	0.311
Brazil	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (community, expanded)	-1.772	9.474	(-21.154, 17.61)	0.853
Colombia	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (community, expanded)	0.043	0.051	(-0.059, 0.144)	0.405
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (community, expanded)	0.64	0.795	(-0.951, 2.231)	0.424
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (community, expanded)	-0.061	0.054	(-0.214, 0.092)	0.325
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (community, expanded)	-0.101	0.047	(-0.193, -0.009)	0.032
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (community, expanded)	-0.06	0.046	(-0.151, 0.032)	0.195
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Land crimes (community, expanded)	2.875	2.133	(-1.403, 7.154)	0.183
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (verbal) (community, expanded)	0.448	1.344	(-2.271, 3.167)	0.741
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (verbal) (community, expanded)	-0.082	0.054	(-0.191, 0.026)	0.135
Brazil	1a. (alt. ii)	Other non-violent crimes (community, expanded)	4.22	22.144	(-41.08, 49.519)	0.85
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Other non-violent crimes (community, expanded)	0.068	0.126	(-0.183, 0.319)	0.59
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Other non-violent crimes (community, expanded)	0.037	0.508	(-1.474, 1.549)	0.945
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Other non-violent crimes (community, expanded)	0.014	0.061	(-0.107, 0.135)	0.816
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Other non-violent crimes (community, expanded)	0.058	0.04	(-0.023, 0.139)	0.157
Brazil	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	1.438	9.281	(-17.551, 20.427)	0.878
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	0.045	0.043	(-0.04, 0.131)	0.292
Liberia	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	-0.062	0.066	(-0.193, 0.069)	0.346
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	-0.068	0.044	(-0.196, 0.061)	0.208
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	-0.036	0.054	(-0.143, 0.072)	0.511
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	-0.013	0.057	(-0.127, 0.101)	0.821
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Violent crime (personal, binary)	0.006	0.035	(-0.063, 0.076)	0.854
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Violent crime (personal, binary)	0.008	0.048	(-0.136, 0.151)	0.88
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Violent crime (personal, binary)	-0.008	0.047	(-0.1, 0.085)	0.87
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Violent crime (personal, binary)	0.019	0.034	(-0.049, 0.087)	0.574
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Armed robbery (personal, binary)	-0.024	0.042	(-0.108, 0.061)	0.579
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Armed robbery (personal, binary)	0.064	0.086	(-0.19, 0.318)	0.503
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Armed robbery (personal, binary)	-0.057	0.037	(-0.129, 0.015)	0.121
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Armed robbery (personal, binary)	0.011	0.035	(-0.06, 0.082)	0.754

Table SM20: Components Table for Secondary Hypotheses *(continued)*

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Simple assault (personal, binary)	0.036	0.034	(-0.032, 0.103)	0.296
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Simple assault (personal, binary)	-0.084	0.053	(-0.243, 0.076)	0.206
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Simple assault (personal, binary)	0.016	0.046	(-0.076, 0.107)	0.735
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Simple assault (personal, binary)	0.012	0.027	(-0.043, 0.067)	0.665
Brazil	1a. (alt. iii)	Other violent crimes (personal, binary)	0.096	0.55	(-1.03, 1.221)	0.863
Liberia	1a. (alt. iii)	Other violent crimes (personal, binary)	-0.074	0.158	(-0.39, 0.243)	0.644
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Other violent crimes (personal, binary)	0.078	0.055	(-0.084, 0.241)	0.237
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Other violent crimes (personal, binary)	-0.024	0.037	(-0.096, 0.048)	0.513
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Other violent crimes (personal, binary)	0.019	0.033	(-0.047, 0.085)	0.574
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Non-violent crimes (personal, binary)	0.017	0.041	(-0.065, 0.099)	0.687
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Non-violent crimes (personal, binary)	-0.04	0.047	(-0.18, 0.1)	0.451
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Non-violent crimes (personal, binary)	0.004	0.052	(-0.098, 0.107)	0.932
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Non-violent crimes (personal, binary)	0	0.041	(-0.082, 0.082)	0.997
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Burglary (personal, binary)	0.017	0.041	(-0.065, 0.099)	0.687
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Burglary (personal, binary)	-0.053	0.039	(-0.17, 0.064)	0.26
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Burglary (personal, binary)	0.012	0.052	(-0.091, 0.115)	0.817
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Burglary (personal, binary)	0.007	0.036	(-0.066, 0.08)	0.855
Brazil	1a. (alt. iii)	Other non-violent crimes (personal, binary)	-0.067	0	(-0.067, -0.067)	0
Liberia	1a. (alt. iii)	Other non-violent crimes (personal, binary)	-0.295	0.164	(-0.623, 0.032)	0.076
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Other non-violent crimes (personal, binary)	0.154	0.194	(-0.423, 0.732)	0.478
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Other non-violent crimes (personal, binary)	-0.01	0.051	(-0.111, 0.091)	0.85
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Other non-violent crimes (personal, binary)	-0.028	0.04	(-0.107, 0.052)	0.488
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Violent crimes (community, binary)	0.029	0.037	(-0.044, 0.103)	0.429
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Violent crimes (community, binary)	-0.071	0.078	(-0.301, 0.159)	0.422
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Violent crimes (community, binary)	-0.006	0.073	(-0.15, 0.137)	0.933
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Violent crimes (community, binary)	-0.003	0.063	(-0.13, 0.124)	0.963
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Armed Robbery (community, binary)	0.04	0.041	(-0.042, 0.122)	0.335
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Armed Robbery (community, binary)	0.005	0.098	(-0.285, 0.294)	0.966
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Armed Robbery (community, binary)	-0.007	0.044	(-0.093, 0.079)	0.876
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Armed Robbery (community, binary)	0.027	0.051	(-0.075, 0.129)	0.6
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Aggravated assault (community, binary)	-0.056	0.056	(-0.223, 0.111)	0.382
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Aggravated assault (community, binary)	0.001	0.051	(-0.099, 0.102)	0.98
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Simple assault (community, binary)	-0.012	0.04	(-0.092, 0.068)	0.769
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Simple assault (community, binary)	0.055	0.038	(-0.057, 0.167)	0.227
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Simple assault (community, binary)	-0.08	0.046	(-0.172, 0.012)	0.087
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Sexual assault (community, binary)	-0.011	0.038	(-0.086, 0.065)	0.783
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Sexual assault (community, binary)	-0.039	0.061	(-0.221, 0.143)	0.558
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Sexual assault (community, binary)	0.008	0.082	(-0.153, 0.17)	0.92
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Sexual assault (community, binary)	0.023	0.064	(-0.106, 0.151)	0.723
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (community, binary)	0.022	0.041	(-0.06, 0.104)	0.589
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (community, binary)	-0.088	0.21	(-0.708, 0.532)	0.701
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (community, binary)	0.029	0.05	(-0.069, 0.128)	0.555
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (community, binary)	-0.027	0.061	(-0.149, 0.095)	0.657
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Murder (community, binary)	0.032	0.046	(-0.059, 0.123)	0.487
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Murder (community, binary)	-0.027	0.062	(-0.213, 0.16)	0.696

Table SM20: Components Table for Secondary Hypotheses *(continued)*

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Murder (community, binary)	0.089	0.135	(-0.178, 0.356)	0.51
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Murder (community, binary)	-0.05	0.088	(-0.226, 0.126)	0.572
Brazil	1a. (alt. iii)	Other violent crimes (community, binary)	0.023	0.164	(-0.314, 0.359)	0.892
Liberia	1a. (alt. iii)	Other violent crimes (community, binary)	0.013	0.048	(-0.083, 0.108)	0.792
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Other violent crimes (community, binary)	0.323	0.413	(-0.907, 1.554)	0.485
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Other violent crimes (community, binary)	0.066	0.073	(-0.079, 0.21)	0.37
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Other violent crimes (community, binary)	-0.013	0.018	(-0.049, 0.024)	0.488
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Non-violent crimes (community, binary)	0.043	0.051	(-0.059, 0.144)	0.405
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Non-violent crimes (community, binary)	-0.121	0.05	(-0.266, 0.024)	0.08
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Non-violent crimes (community, binary)	-0.078	0.049	(-0.176, 0.019)	0.114
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Non-violent crimes (community, binary)	-0.031	0.05	(-0.131, 0.069)	0.532
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Burglary (community, binary)	0.043	0.051	(-0.059, 0.144)	0.405
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Burglary (community, binary)	-0.13	0.054	(-0.285, 0.024)	0.078
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Burglary (community, binary)	-0.086	0.049	(-0.184, 0.011)	0.083
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Burglary (community, binary)	-0.043	0.051	(-0.145, 0.06)	0.405
Brazil	1a. (alt. iii)	Other non-violent crimes (community, binary)	4.22	22.144	(-41.08, 49.519)	0.85
Liberia	1a. (alt. iii)	Other non-violent crimes (community, binary)	0.068	0.126	(-0.183, 0.319)	0.59
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Other non-violent crimes (community, binary)	0.037	0.508	(-1.474, 1.549)	0.945
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Other non-violent crimes (community, binary)	0.014	0.061	(-0.107, 0.135)	0.816
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Other non-violent crimes (community, binary)	0.058	0.04	(-0.023, 0.139)	0.157

H. Brazil study: First stage results

Table SM21: First stage results by endogenous variable

Group formed var.	Estimate	S.E.	p-value	Conf. Int.	F test statistic	F test p-value
Presence of meeting: June 2018	-0.005	0.128	0.968	(-0.267, 0.257)	0.002	0.968
Presence of meeting: Oct 2018	-0.025	0.139	0.856	(-0.310, 0.259)	0.033	0.855
Share of area under RdV: June 2018	0.015	0.054	0.781	(-0.095, 0.126)	0.079	0.779
Share of area under RdV: Oct 2018	0.043	0.055	0.444	(-0.070, 0.155)	0.603	0.438
Know about RdV	-0.015	0.055	0.793	(-0.127, 0.098)	0.070	0.791

I. Heterogeneous effects

I.1 Test for Heterogeneous effects

We conduct an F-test for equal variances between the treatment and control group (comparing the common treatment group to the control group) following Gerber and Green (*SM6*) (pg. 292-293) in each site for each of the eight primary outcomes. We provide a two-sided p-value for the null of no difference in variances (no effect heterogeneity) using randomization inference. We correct for multiple comparisons following the same Benjamini-Hochberg procedure used in the main results ("Adj. p-value" represents the corrected p-value).

Table SM22: Omnibus Heterogeneity Test (Test for Equal Variances)

Study	Measure	Ratio of variances	p-value	Adj. p-value
Brazil	Crime reporting idx.	1.465	0.253	0.506
Brazil	Crime victimization idx.	0.819	0.635	0.953
Brazil	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.833	1.000	1.000
Brazil	Police abuse idx.	32.527	0.111	0.333
Brazil	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.798	0.994	1.000
Brazil	Crime tips idx.	1.288	0.025	0.150
Colombia	Crime reporting idx.	1.087	0.241	0.581
Colombia	Crime victimization idx.	1.068	0.234	0.581
Colombia	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.977	0.702	0.831
Colombia	Police abuse idx.	0.361	0.824	0.831
Colombia	Police abuse reporting idx.	1.095	0.249	0.581
Colombia	Overall perceptions of police idx.	1.022	0.347	0.607
Colombia	Crime tips idx.	0.884	0.831	0.831
Liberia	Crime reporting idx.	1.144	0.095	0.430
Liberia	Crime victimization idx.	9.833	0.123	0.430
Liberia	Perceived future insecurity idx.	1.041	0.251	0.439
Liberia	Police abuse idx.	0.880	0.698	0.814
Liberia	Police abuse reporting idx.	1.065	0.209	0.439
Liberia	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.971	0.657	0.814
Liberia	Crime tips idx.	0.844	0.880	0.880
Pakistan	Crime reporting idx.	0.601	0.914	0.949

Pakistan	Crime victimization idx.	1.230	0.195	0.682
Pakistan	Perceived future insecurity idx.	1.144	0.110	0.682
Pakistan	Police abuse idx.	0.828	0.875	0.949
Pakistan	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.932	0.728	0.949
Pakistan	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.953	0.773	0.949
Pakistan	Crime tips idx.	0.758	0.949	0.949
Philippines	Crime reporting idx.	1.370	0.159	0.958
Philippines	Crime victimization idx.	0.698	0.785	0.958
Philippines	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.908	0.867	0.958
Philippines	Police abuse idx.	0.233	0.958	0.958
Philippines	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.891	0.698	0.958
Philippines	Overall perceptions of police idx.	1.010	0.422	0.958
Philippines	Crime tips idx.	0.880	0.729	0.958
Uganda	Crime reporting idx.	1.056	0.339	0.690
Uganda	Crime victimization idx.	1.032	0.436	0.690
Uganda	Perceived future insecurity idx.	1.082	0.137	0.480
Uganda	Police abuse idx.	1.254	0.493	0.690
Uganda	Police abuse reporting idx.	1.686	0.016	0.112
Uganda	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.888	0.995	0.995
Uganda	Crime tips idx.	0.962	0.705	0.823

I.2 Heterogeneous effects by crime victimization index (baseline)

Table SM23: Results Table for heterogenous effects for meta-estimates

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.084	0.104	(-0.289, 0.120)	0.419	0.864
1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	-0.018	0.114	(-0.242, 0.206)	0.875	0.958
2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.025	0.100	(-0.171, 0.220)	0.805	0.909
3b	Police abuse idx.	-0.136	0.078	(-0.289, 0.018)	0.083	0.579
4a	Crime reporting idx.	-0.110	0.102	(-0.311, 0.091)	0.284	0.864
4b	Crime tips idx.	0.008	0.095	(-0.179, 0.194)	0.935	0.962
4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.081	0.124	(-0.163, 0.324)	0.516	0.864
M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	-0.097	0.100	(-0.292, 0.099)	0.332	
M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	0.081	0.368	(-0.641, 0.803)	0.826	
M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	0.016	0.095	(-0.170, 0.203)	0.863	
M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	0.095	0.075	(-0.052, 0.242)	0.205	
M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.062	0.113	(-0.284, 0.159)	0.580	
S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.162	0.175	(-0.180, 0.504)	0.353	
S2	Community trust	-0.063	0.089	(-0.236, 0.111)	0.480	

Table SM24: Results Table for heterogenous effects for study-estimates

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Colombia	1a	Crime victimization	-0.173	0.167	(-0.506, 0.159)	0.302	0.733
Pakistan	1a	Crime victimization	-0.064	0.181	(-0.537, 0.408)	0.737	0.989
Uganda	1a	Crime victimization	0.019	0.200	(-0.404, 0.442)	0.925	0.999
Colombia	1b	Perceived future insecurity	0.001	0.152	(-0.304, 0.305)	0.996	0.996
Pakistan	1b	Perceived future insecurity	0.174	0.184	(-0.302, 0.650)	0.387	0.686
Uganda	1b	Perceived future insecurity	-0.286	0.208	(-0.727, 0.155)	0.189	0.999
Colombia	2	Overall perceptions of police	-0.027	0.133	(-0.292, 0.238)	0.840	0.966
Pakistan	2	Overall perceptions of police	0.199	0.199	(-0.319, 0.717)	0.365	0.686
Uganda	2	Overall perceptions of police	-0.055	0.231	(-0.544, 0.435)	0.816	0.999
Colombia	3b	Police abuse	-0.202	0.085	(-0.372, -0.032)	0.021	0.291
Pakistan	3b	Police abuse	-0.002	0.170	(-0.446, 0.442)	0.989	0.989
Uganda	3b	Police abuse	0.006	0.217	(-0.454, 0.465)	0.980	0.999
Colombia	4a	Crime reporting	-0.272	0.162	(-0.595, 0.052)	0.098	0.549
Pakistan	4a	Crime reporting	-0.057	0.156	(-0.465, 0.351)	0.730	0.989
Uganda	4a	Crime reporting	0.142	0.250	(-0.388, 0.672)	0.579	0.999
Colombia	4b	Crime tips	-0.122	0.141	(-0.404, 0.161)	0.393	0.733
Pakistan	4b	Crime tips	0.160	0.081	(-0.049, 0.369)	0.106	0.634
Uganda	4b	Crime tips	-0.082	0.109	(-0.312, 0.149)	0.465	0.999
Colombia	4c	Police abuse reporting	-0.087	0.134	(-0.354, 0.180)	0.519	0.812
Pakistan	4c	Police abuse reporting	0.299	0.207	(-0.243, 0.840)	0.212	0.659
Uganda	4c	Police abuse reporting	0.156	0.207	(-0.281, 0.594)	0.460	0.999

Table SM24: Results Table for heterogenous effects for study-estimates *(continued)*

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Colombia	M1a	Perceived police intentions	-0.191	0.149	(-0.490, 0.107)	0.205	
Pakistan	M1a	Perceived police intentions	-0.008	0.191	(-0.498, 0.482)	0.968	
Uganda	M1a	Perceived police intentions	-0.033	0.189	(-0.433, 0.367)	0.863	
Pakistan	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice	0.557	0.447	(-0.600, 1.714)	0.269	
Uganda	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice	-0.204	0.234	(-0.700, 0.292)	0.396	
Colombia	M1c	Cooperation norms	-0.091	0.108	(-0.307, 0.125)	0.405	
Pakistan	M1c	Cooperation norms	0.183	0.158	(-0.229, 0.595)	0.300	
Uganda	M1c	Cooperation norms	0.050	0.207	(-0.388, 0.487)	0.813	
Colombia	M2a	Perceived police capacity	0.055	0.123	(-0.191, 0.302)	0.656	
Pakistan	M2a	Perceived police capacity	0.173	0.128	(-0.163, 0.510)	0.238	
Uganda	M2a	Perceived police capacity	0.053	0.139	(-0.242, 0.347)	0.710	
Colombia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.014	0.159	(-0.332, 0.304)	0.930	
Pakistan	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.291	0.305	(-1.076, 0.493)	0.383	
Uganda	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.043	0.188	(-0.442, 0.356)	0.823	
Colombia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	-0.013	0.171	(-0.353, 0.328)	0.942	
Pakistan	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.337	0.170	(-0.106, 0.779)	0.107	
Colombia	S2	Community trust	-0.061	0.131	(-0.323, 0.201)	0.644	
Pakistan	S2	Community trust	-0.062	0.257	(-0.724, 0.600)	0.818	
Uganda	S2	Community trust	-0.064	0.136	(-0.352, 0.223)	0.641	

I.3 Heterogeneous effects by trust in police (baseline)

Table SM25: Results Table for heterogenous effects for meta-estimates

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
1a	Crime victimization idx.	0.005	0.018	(-0.031, 0.041)	0.776	0.909
1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	-0.014	0.018	(-0.049, 0.021)	0.436	0.864
2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.019	0.027	(-0.033, 0.071)	0.478	0.864
3b	Police abuse idx.	0.018	0.029	(-0.039, 0.074)	0.543	0.864
4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.042	0.023	(-0.002, 0.086)	0.064	0.579
4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.018	0.018	(-0.054, 0.017)	0.317	0.864
4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	-0.041	0.047	(-0.132, 0.051)	0.383	0.864
M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	0.017	0.021	(-0.024, 0.058)	0.420	
M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	0.007	0.027	(-0.046, 0.060)	0.790	
M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	0.007	0.021	(-0.035, 0.048)	0.752	
M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	-0.013	0.020	(-0.052, 0.026)	0.507	
M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.013	0.023	(-0.058, 0.032)	0.571	
S1	Perceived state legitimacy	-0.051	0.051	(-0.152, 0.049)	0.315	
S2	Community trust	-0.012	0.043	(-0.097, 0.073)	0.782	

Table SM26: Results Table for heterogenous effects for study-estimates

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Colombia	1a	Crime victimization	-0.012	0.047	(-0.105, 0.081)	0.802	0.966
Pakistan	1a	Crime victimization	0.005	0.034	(-0.107, 0.118)	0.887	0.989
Uganda	1a	Crime victimization	0.010	0.024	(-0.039, 0.058)	0.691	0.999
Colombia	1b	Perceived future insecurity	-0.051	0.054	(-0.159, 0.056)	0.343	0.733
Pakistan	1b	Perceived future insecurity	-0.052	0.048	(-0.196, 0.092)	0.352	0.686
Uganda	1b	Perceived future insecurity	-0.002	0.020	(-0.041, 0.037)	0.933	0.999
Colombia	2	Overall perceptions of police	0.059	0.044	(-0.030, 0.147)	0.191	0.733
Pakistan	2	Overall perceptions of police	0.044	0.112	(-0.322, 0.411)	0.722	0.989
Uganda	2	Overall perceptions of police	-0.003	0.029	(-0.062, 0.055)	0.912	0.999
Colombia	3b	Police abuse	0.028	0.070	(-0.110, 0.167)	0.688	0.963
Pakistan	3b	Police abuse	0.025	0.084	(-0.251, 0.300)	0.791	0.989
Uganda	3b	Police abuse	0.014	0.034	(-0.054, 0.082)	0.686	0.999
Colombia	4a	Crime reporting	-0.026	0.048	(-0.121, 0.069)	0.584	0.86
Pakistan	4a	Crime reporting	0.047	0.038	(-0.076, 0.170)	0.303	0.686
Uganda	4a	Crime reporting	0.064	0.026	(0.013, 0.115)	0.015	0.547
Colombia	4b	Crime tips	-0.008	0.048	(-0.104, 0.087)	0.863	0.966
Pakistan	4b	Crime tips	0.004	0.037	(-0.119, 0.126)	0.928	0.989
Uganda	4b	Crime tips	-0.029	0.023	(-0.075, 0.017)	0.215	0.999
Colombia	4c	Police abuse reporting	-0.127	0.042	(-0.211, -0.043)	0.003	0.098
Pakistan	4c	Police abuse reporting	0.004	0.068	(-0.218, 0.226)	0.957	0.989
Uganda	4c	Police abuse reporting	0.007	0.031	(-0.054, 0.069)	0.813	0.999

Table SM26: Results Table for heterogenous effects for study-estimates *(continued)*

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Colombia	M1a	Perceived police intentions	0.016	0.052	(-0.086, 0.119)	0.751	
Pakistan	M1a	Perceived police intentions	-0.011	0.060	(-0.207, 0.186)	0.871	
Uganda	M1a	Perceived police intentions	0.022	0.025	(-0.028, 0.072)	0.383	
Pakistan	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice	0.030	0.060	(-0.165, 0.224)	0.656	
Uganda	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice	0.001	0.030	(-0.059, 0.062)	0.962	
Colombia	M1c	Cooperation norms	-0.007	0.034	(-0.075, 0.060)	0.828	
Pakistan	M1c	Cooperation norms	0.068	0.050	(-0.095, 0.230)	0.270	
Uganda	M1c	Cooperation norms	-0.006	0.031	(-0.068, 0.057)	0.855	
Colombia	M2a	Perceived police capacity	0.000	0.045	(-0.089, 0.089)	0.996	
Pakistan	M2a	Perceived police capacity	-0.017	0.049	(-0.180, 0.147)	0.759	
Uganda	M2a	Perceived police capacity	-0.016	0.025	(-0.065, 0.033)	0.516	
Colombia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.015	0.055	(-0.095, 0.124)	0.788	
Pakistan	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.235	0.133	(-0.672, 0.203)	0.181	
Uganda	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.011	0.025	(-0.062, 0.040)	0.676	
Colombia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	-0.052	0.060	(-0.171, 0.067)	0.387	
Pakistan	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	-0.050	0.099	(-0.365, 0.266)	0.649	
Colombia	S2	Community trust	-0.067	0.048	(-0.163, 0.030)	0.173	
Pakistan	S2	Community trust	-0.079	0.198	(-0.717, 0.559)	0.717	
Uganda	S2	Community trust	0.029	0.024	(-0.020, 0.077)	0.245	

I.4 Heterogeneous effects by community trust (baseline)

Table SM27: Results Table for heterogenous effects for meta-estimates

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.041	0.025	(-0.091, 0.008)	0.099	0.579
1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.010	0.025	(-0.039, 0.058)	0.689	0.909
2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	-0.045	0.070	(-0.182, 0.093)	0.526	0.864
3b	Police abuse idx.	-0.028	0.029	(-0.085, 0.029)	0.329	0.864
4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.045	0.022	(0.001, 0.088)	0.043	0.579
4b	Crime tips idx.	0.001	0.026	(-0.051, 0.053)	0.963	0.963
4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	-0.012	0.033	(-0.078, 0.053)	0.712	0.909
M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	-0.013	0.029	(-0.070, 0.043)	0.639	
M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	-0.038	0.068	(-0.172, 0.095)	0.575	
M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	0.008	0.021	(-0.033, 0.048)	0.714	
M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	-0.008	0.030	(-0.066, 0.050)	0.791	
M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.019	0.028	(-0.036, 0.074)	0.490	
S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.032	0.023	(-0.013, 0.077)	0.165	
S2	Community trust	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.853	

Table SM28: Results Table for heterogenous effects for study-estimates

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Colombia	1a	Crime victimization	-0.039	0.044	(-0.126, 0.048)	0.374	0.733
Pakistan	1a	Crime victimization	-0.104	0.053	(-0.319, 0.111)	0.181	0.634
Uganda	1a	Crime victimization	-0.012	0.037	(-0.087, 0.063)	0.756	0.999
Colombia	1b	Perceived future insecurity	0.039	0.041	(-0.043, 0.121)	0.349	0.733
Pakistan	1b	Perceived future insecurity	-0.048	0.042	(-0.212, 0.116)	0.364	0.686
Uganda	1b	Perceived future insecurity	0.028	0.032	(-0.036, 0.093)	0.383	0.999
Colombia	2	Overall perceptions of police	0.050	0.040	(-0.030, 0.130)	0.219	0.733
Pakistan	2	Overall perceptions of police	-0.198	0.065	(-0.460, 0.064)	0.085	0.634
Uganda	2	Overall perceptions of police	-0.010	0.036	(-0.083, 0.063)	0.782	0.999
Colombia	3b	Police abuse	0.003	0.039	(-0.075, 0.081)	0.934	0.975
Pakistan	3b	Police abuse	-0.061	0.057	(-0.286, 0.165)	0.392	0.686
Uganda	3b	Police abuse	-0.075	0.066	(-0.206, 0.056)	0.260	0.999
Colombia	4a	Crime reporting	0.008	0.044	(-0.080, 0.096)	0.860	0.966
Pakistan	4a	Crime reporting	0.066	0.030	(-0.055, 0.187)	0.150	0.634
Uganda	4a	Crime reporting	0.033	0.049	(-0.065, 0.131)	0.506	0.999
Colombia	4b	Crime tips	-0.008	0.043	(-0.094, 0.078)	0.855	0.966
Pakistan	4b	Crime tips	-0.014	0.055	(-0.237, 0.210)	0.825	0.989
Uganda	4b	Crime tips	0.018	0.042	(-0.065, 0.102)	0.662	0.999
Colombia	4c	Police abuse reporting	-0.066	0.038	(-0.142, 0.010)	0.088	0.549
Pakistan	4c	Police abuse reporting	0.054	0.067	(-0.207, 0.316)	0.494	0.814
Uganda	4c	Police abuse reporting	0.009	0.039	(-0.067, 0.086)	0.806	0.999

Table SM28: Results Table for heterogenous effects for study-estimates *(continued)*

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Colombia	M1a	Perceived police intentions	0.005	0.049	(-0.093, 0.102)	0.925	
Pakistan	M1a	Perceived police intentions	-0.071	0.064	(-0.330, 0.188)	0.376	
Uganda	M1a	Perceived police intentions	-0.002	0.042	(-0.086, 0.083)	0.970	
Pakistan	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice	0.037	0.068	(-0.220, 0.294)	0.630	
Uganda	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice	-0.100	0.052	(-0.203, 0.003)	0.057	
Colombia	M1c	Cooperation norms	-0.009	0.029	(-0.066, 0.049)	0.765	
Pakistan	M1c	Cooperation norms	0.049	0.038	(-0.099, 0.197)	0.317	
Uganda	M1c	Cooperation norms	-0.011	0.046	(-0.102, 0.080)	0.810	
Colombia	M2a	Perceived police capacity	0.021	0.045	(-0.068, 0.111)	0.636	
Pakistan	M2a	Perceived police capacity	0.021	0.120	(-0.464, 0.507)	0.875	
Uganda	M2a	Perceived police capacity	-0.036	0.042	(-0.119, 0.047)	0.387	
Colombia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.001	0.045	(-0.091, 0.089)	0.988	
Pakistan	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.040	0.077	(-0.273, 0.354)	0.648	
Uganda	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.029	0.040	(-0.051, 0.109)	0.471	
Colombia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.013	0.045	(-0.076, 0.103)	0.768	
Pakistan	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.039	0.027	(-0.070, 0.147)	0.279	
Colombia	S2	Community trust	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.854	
Pakistan	S2	Community trust	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.977	
Uganda	S2	Community trust	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.952	

I.5 Heterogeneous effects by perceived state legitimacy baseline)

Table SM29: Results Table for heterogenous effects for meta-estimates

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.067	0.045	(-0.156, 0.022)	0.142	0.708
1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	-0.027	0.033	(-0.091, 0.038)	0.416	0.864
2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	-0.105	0.172	(-0.442, 0.233)	0.543	0.864
3b	Police abuse idx.	-0.027	0.070	(-0.164, 0.111)	0.703	0.909
4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.017	0.067	(-0.115, 0.149)	0.800	0.909
4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.038	0.043	(-0.122, 0.046)	0.374	0.864
4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	-0.042	0.023	(-0.086, 0.003)	0.067	0.579
M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	-0.004	0.036	(-0.075, 0.067)	0.916	
M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	-0.029	0.171	(-0.364, 0.306)	0.865	
M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	0.001	0.026	(-0.050, 0.052)	0.974	
M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	0.042	0.033	(-0.024, 0.107)	0.211	
M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.029	0.039	(-0.047, 0.105)	0.448	
S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.797	
S2	Community trust	-0.007	0.035	(-0.075, 0.062)	0.851	

Table SM30: Results Table for heterogenous effects for study-estimates

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Colombia	1a	Crime victimization	-0.037	0.037	(-0.111, 0.037)	0.321	0.733
Pakistan	1a	Crime victimization	-0.136	0.073	(-0.382, 0.110)	0.168	0.634
Colombia	1b	Perceived future insecurity	-0.027	0.033	(-0.093, 0.039)	0.425	0.743
Pakistan	1b	Perceived future insecurity	-0.026	0.181	(-0.619, 0.568)	0.896	0.989
Colombia	2	Overall perceptions of police	0.034	0.033	(-0.032, 0.100)	0.310	0.733
Pakistan	2	Overall perceptions of police	-0.318	0.166	(-0.868, 0.232)	0.157	0.634
Colombia	3b	Police abuse	0.028	0.044	(-0.059, 0.116)	0.522	0.812
Pakistan	3b	Police abuse	-0.116	0.083	(-0.393, 0.161)	0.264	0.686
Colombia	4a	Crime reporting	-0.048	0.038	(-0.123, 0.026)	0.201	0.733
Pakistan	4a	Crime reporting	0.087	0.045	(-0.064, 0.237)	0.157	0.634
Colombia	4b	Crime tips	0.003	0.037	(-0.070, 0.075)	0.940	0.975
Pakistan	4b	Crime tips	-0.083	0.041	(-0.221, 0.054)	0.144	0.634
Colombia	4c	Police abuse reporting	-0.052	0.026	(-0.105, 0.000)	0.050	0.471
Pakistan	4c	Police abuse reporting	-0.012	0.044	(-0.156, 0.132)	0.808	0.989
Colombia	M1a	Perceived police intentions	0.004	0.038	(-0.072, 0.080)	0.909	
Pakistan	M1a	Perceived police intentions	-0.074	0.112	(-0.450, 0.303)	0.560	
Pakistan	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice	-0.029	0.171	(-0.590, 0.532)	0.876	
Colombia	M1c	Cooperation norms	0.000	0.026	(-0.052, 0.052)	0.996	
Pakistan	M1c	Cooperation norms	0.020	0.138	(-0.444, 0.485)	0.893	
Colombia	M2a	Perceived police capacity	0.038	0.040	(-0.041, 0.117)	0.345	
Pakistan	M2a	Perceived police capacity	0.050	0.060	(-0.152, 0.252)	0.472	

Table SM30: Results Table for heterogenous effects for study-estimates *(continued)*

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Colombia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.025	0.039	(-0.053, 0.103)	0.523	
Pakistan	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.135	0.200	(-0.544, 0.813)	0.553	
Colombia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.782	
Pakistan	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.987	
Colombia	S2	Community trust	-0.014	0.031	(-0.075, 0.048)	0.657	
Pakistan	S2	Community trust	0.160	0.169	(-0.394, 0.714)	0.418	

J. Deviations from preanalysis plan

Table SM31: Variable construction deviations from the pre-analysis plan

Hyp.	Index	Constituent item	Meta-analysis	Brazil	Colombia	Liberia	Pakistan	Philippines	Uganda
1a	crime_victim_idx	armedrob_num	Yes		Asked as a binary response item; excluded Colombia's items from meta-analysis				
		simpleassault_num	Yes		Asked as a binary response item; excluded Colombia's items from meta-analysis				
		other_any_violent	Yes		Asked as a binary response item; excluded Colombia's items from meta-analysis				
		burglary_num,	Yes		Asked as a binary response item; excluded Colombia's items from meta-analysis				
		other_any_nonviolent	Yes		Asked as a binary response item; excluded Colombia's items from meta-analysis				
		carmedrob_num	Yes		Asked as a binary response item; excluded Colombia's items from meta-analysis				

Table SM31: Variable construction deviations from the pre-analysis plan *(continued)*

Hyp.	Index	Constituent item	Meta-analysis	Brazil	Colombia	Liberia	Pakistan	Philippines	Uganda
		caggassault_num	Yes	Not collected.	Asked as a binary response item; excluded Colombia's items from meta-analysis				
		csimpleassault_num	Yes	Collected as only assault	Asked as a binary response item; excluded Colombia's items from meta-analysis				
		csexual_num	Yes		Asked as a binary response item; excluded Colombia's items from meta-analysis				
		cdomestic_phys_num	Yes		Asked as a binary response item; excluded Colombia's items from meta-analysis				
		cmurder_num	Yes		Asked as a binary response item; excluded Colombia's items from meta-analysis	Not collected			
		cother_any_violent	Yes		Asked as a binary response item; excluded Colombia's items from meta-analysis				
1b	future_insecurity_idx	fear_violent	Yes						
		fear_nonviolent	No		Not collected				
		feared_walk	Yes						

Table SM31: Variable construction deviations from the pre-analysis plan *(continued)*

Hyp.	Index	Constituent item	Meta-analysis	Brazil	Colombia	Liberia	Pakistan	Philippines	Uganda
2	satis_idx	satis_trust	Yes		satis_trust_rescalec = case_when(satis_trust == 0 ~ 0L, satis_trust == 1 ~ 1L, satis_trust == 2 ~ 3L, satis_trust == 3 ~ 4L, TRUE ~ satis_trust),				
		satis_general	Yes						
3a	officer_attitude_idx	empathy_complaints	Yes	Not collected	empathy_complain = case_when(empa-thy_complaints == 1 ~ 0L, empa-thy_complaints == 2 ~ 1L, empa-thy_complaints == 3 ~ 2L, empa-thy_complaints == 4 ~ 3L, TRUE ~ empa-thy_complaints),	Not collected		Not collected	Different options and one category omitted in error; Included in meta-analysis for all studies
		empathy_reports	Yes	Not collected	empathy_reports_r = case_when(empathy_reports == 1 ~ 0L, empathy_reports == 2 ~ 1L, empathy_reports == 3 ~ 2L, empathy_reports == 4 ~ 3L, TRUE ~ empa-thy_reports),	Not collected		Not collected	Different options and one category omitted in error; Included in meta-analysis for all studies
		account_pol_matter	Yes	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	

Table SM31: Variable construction deviations from the pre-analysis plan *(continued)*

Hyp.	Index	Constituent item	Meta-analysis	Brazil	Colombia	Liberia	Pakistan	Philippines	Uganda
		hypothetical2_punishmen	Yes	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	Measured as multiple response; included in meta-analysis for all studies
		hypothetical2_reportself	Yes	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	
		hypothetical2_reportother	Yes	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	
		hypothetical3_punishmen	Yes	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	Measured as multiple response; included in meta-analysis for all studies
		hypothetical3_reportself	Yes	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	
		hypothetical3_reportother	Yes	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	
		hypothetical5_punishmen	Yes	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	Measured as multiple response; included in meta-analysis for all studies
		hypothetical5_reportself	Yes	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	
		hypothetical5_reportother	Yes	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	
		hypothetical5_abuseself	Yes	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	
		hypothetical5_abuseother	Yes	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	
		hypothetical2_corruptself	Yes	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	
		hypothetical2_corruptothe	Yes	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	
		hypothetical3_corruptself	Yes	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	
		hypothetical3_corruptothe	Yes	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	
3b	police_abuse_idx	policeabuse_verbal_any	Yes	Collected as cpoliceabuse at the community level; Not disaggregated as verbal or physical abuse					

Table SM31: Variable construction deviations from the pre-analysis plan *(continued)*

Hyp.	Index	Constituent item	Meta-analysis	Brazil	Colombia	Liberia	Pakistan	Philippines	Uganda
		policeabuse_phys_any	Yes	Collected as cpoliceabuse at the community level; Not disaggregated as verbal or physical abuse					
		policeabuse_verbal_num	No	Collected as cpoliceabuse at the community level; Not disaggregated as verbal or physical abuse	Not collected				
		policeabuse_phys_num	No	Collected as cpoliceabuse at the community level; Not disaggregated as verbal or physical abuse	Not collected				
		bribe_freq	Yes		Only measured in baseline				
		bribe_amt	Yes		Only measured in baseline; Re scaled at endline as bribe_amt = bribe_amt / 3333, bribe_amt = if_else(bribe_freq == 1, 0, bribe_amt),				
4a	crime_reporting_idx	armedrob_report	Yes						
		simpleassault_report	Yes						
		other_report_violent	No		Not collected				
		burglary_report	Yes						
		other_report_nonviolent	No		Not collected				
		carmedrob_report	Yes						

Table SM31: Variable construction deviations from the pre-analysis plan *(continued)*

Hyp.	Index	Constituent item	Meta-analysis	Brazil	Colombia	Liberia	Pakistan	Philippines	Uganda
		caggassault_report	Yes	Not collected.					
		csimpleassault_report	Yes	Collected as only assault					
		csexual_report	Yes						
		cdomestic_phys_report	Yes						
		cmurder_report	No			Not collected			
		cother_report_violent	No		Not collected				
		cburglary_report	Yes						
		cother_report_nonviolent	No		Not collected				
		burglaryres	Yes						
		dviolres	Yes						
		armedrobres	No		Not collected				
4b	tips_idx	contact_pol_susp_activity	Yes						
		give_info_pol_investigatio	Yes						
		atips_hline	No	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected
		atips_box	No	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected
4c	police_abuse_report_idx	policeabuse_verbal_report	Yes	Collected as cpoliceabuse_report at the community level; Not disaggregated as verbal or physical abuse					
		policeabuse_phys_report	No	Collected as cpoliceabuse_report at the community level; Not disaggregated as verbal or physical abuse	Not collected				
		dutydrink_report	No		Not collected				
		policebeating_report	Yes						
		apolvtm_hline	No	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected

Table SM31: Variable construction deviations from the pre-analysis plan *(continued)*

Hyp.	Index	Constituent item	Meta-analysis	Brazil	Colombia	Liberia	Pakistan	Philippines	Uganda
		apolvtm_cmtbox	No	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected
		apolvtm_station	No	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected	
M1a	intentions_idx	polcaseserious	Yes						
		polcasefair	Yes	Not collected at baseline			Different response items		
		polint_corrupt	Yes		polint_corrupt_res = case_when(polint_corrupt == 1 ~ 4L, polint_corrupt == 2 ~ 3L, polint_corrupt == 3 ~ 2L, polint_corrupt == 4 ~ 1L, polint_corrupt == 5 ~ 0L, TRUE ~ polint_corrupt),		Different response items		
		polint_quality	Yes						
M1b	know_idx	know_law_suspect	Yes	Not collected	Not collected at baseline			Not collected	
		know_law_lawyer	Yes	Not collected at baseline	Not collected at baseline			Not collected	
		know_law_fees	Yes	Not collected at baseline	Not collected at baseline			Not collected	
		know_law_vaw	No	Not collected at baseline	Not collected at baseline	Not collected		Not collected	
		know_report_followup	No	Not collected	Not collected at baseline	Not collected	Not collected		
		know_report_station	Yes	Not collected at baseline	Not collected at baseline				
M1c	norm_idx	reportnorm_theft	Yes	Not collected	Different response items				
		reportnorm_abuse	Yes	Not collected					
		obeynorm	No		Not collected				
M2a	police_capacity_idx	polcap_timely	Yes	Not collected					

Table SM31: Variable construction deviations from the pre-analysis plan *(continued)*

Hyp.	Index	Constituent item	Meta-analysis	Brazil	Colombia	Liberia	Pakistan	Philippines	Uganda
		polcap_investigate	Yes	Not collected					
		polcap_timely	Yes	Not collected					
		polcap_investigate	Yes	Not collected					
M2b	responsive_act	responsive_act	Yes						
S1	legit_trust	legit_trust	Yes				Not collected		Not collected
S2	trust_community	trust_community	Yes				Different response items	Different response items	Different response items
C	compliance_idx	compliance_patrol	Yes				Different response items		Different response items
		compliance_freq	Yes	Not collected			Different response items		Different response items
		compliance_meeting	Yes						

Table SM32: Variable Coding and Survey Questionnaire

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
Primary Outcome Family 1: Security of Life and Property				
1a. Negative effect on incidence of crime				
`armedrob_num`[39]	In the past 6 months, were you or any member of your household the victim of any ARMED ROBBERY? [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	Numeric		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident.[40]			
`armedrob_bin`		Numeric	Recoded 1 if `armedrob_num` > 0; 0 if `armedrob_num` = 0	Citizen survey
`burglary_num`[41]	Besides any armed robbery, in the past 6 months, were you or any member of your household the victim of BURGLARY or THEFT? [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	Numeric		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident.[42]	Freeform		

[39] Adapted from Blair et al. (2017); Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.
[40] Blair et al. (2017).
[41] Adapted from Blair et al. (2017); Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.
[42] Blair et al. (2017).

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
`burglary_bin`		Numeric	Recoded 1 if `burglary_num` > 0; 0 if `burglary_num` = 0	Citizen survey
`simpleassault_num`[43]	In the past 6 months, has anyone attacked you or any member of your household WITHOUT a weapon? [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	Numeric		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident.[44]	Freeform		Citizen survey
`simpleassault_bin`		Numeric	Recoded 1 if `simpleassault_num` > 0; 0 if `simpleassault_num` = 0	Citizen survey
`aggassault_num`[45]	Besides any armed robbery, in the past 6 months, has anyone attacked you or any member of your household WITH A WEAPON? (INCLUDING GUNS, CUTLASSES, STICKS, ETC.) [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	Numeric		Citizen survey

[43] Adapted from Blair et al. (2017); Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.
[44] Blair et al. (2017).
[45] Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
`sexual_num`[46]	In the past 6 months, have you or any member of your household been a victim of SEXUAL ABUSE OR RAPE? (INCLUDING RAPE) [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	Numeric		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident.	Freeform		Citizen survey
`domestic_phys_num`[47]	Besides any sexual abuse, in the past 6 months, has anyone in your household ever PHYSICALLY ABUSED you? (INCLUDING PUSHING, SLAPPING, PUNCHING, KICKING, CHOKING, ETC.) (IF YES:) How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	Numeric		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident.	Freeform		Citizen survey
`domestic_verbal_num`[48]	Besides any physical abuse, in the past 6 months, has anyone in your household ever VERBALLY ABUSED you? [INCLUDING SHOUTING, CUSSING, THREATS OF ABUSE, ETC.]	Numeric		Citizen survey

[46]Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.
[47]Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.
[48]Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident.	Freeform		Citizen survey
land_any[49]	In the past 6 months, did you or a member of your household have a LAND DISPUTE over your house land or farm land? This include disputes that ended in the past 6 months or disputes that are still ongoing up to now. [IF YES:] Was there any violence or property destruction due to this dispute?	Numeric		Citizen survey
other_any[50]	In the past 6 months, were you or any member of your household a victim of any OTHER CRIME that we haven't mentioned already?	0-No; 1-Yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
	[IF YES:] What was the crime?	Freeform		Citizen survey
other_any_violent	Coded as other_any if other_any is a violent crime	Freeform		Citizen survey
other_any_nonviolent	Coded as other_any if other_any is a non-violent crime	Freeform		Citizen survey
violentcrime_num			Sum of armedrob_num, simpleassault_num, other_any_violent	Citizen survey

[49]Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.
[50]Not collected in the Colombia study.

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
nonviolentcrime_num			Sum of burglary_num, other_any_nonviolent	Citizen survey
violentcrime_num_exp			Sum of armedrob_num, aggassault_num, sexual_num, domestic_phys_num, simpleassault_num, other_any_violent	Citizen survey
nonviolentcrime_num_ex			Sum of burglary_num, domestic_verbal_num, land_any, other_any_nonviolent	Citizen survey
violentcrime_bin			Sum of armedrob_bin, simpleassault_bin, other_any_violent	Citizen survey
nonviolentcrime_bin			Sum of burglary_bin, other_any_nonviolent	Citizen survey

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
	Now I want to ask you some questions about different types of crimes that may have happened to SOMEONE ELSE IN THIS COMMUNITY. This can include your neighbors, friends, relatives, or any other person you know that's living IN THIS COMMUNITY.[51]			
`carmedrob_num`[52]	In the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community a victim of ARMED ROBBERY? (ROBBERY WITH ANY KIND OF WEAPON, INCLUDING GUNS, CUTLASSES, STICKS, ETC.) [IF YES:] As far as you know, how many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	1-Once; 2-Two to three times; 3-Four to five times; 4-Six to ten times; 5-More than ten times; 97-Do not know		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident.			Citizen survey
`carmedrob_bin`		Numeric	Recoded 1 if `carmedrob_num` > 0; 0 if `carmedrob_num` = 0	Citizen survey

[51] Adapted from Blair et al. (2017).
[52] Adapted from Blair et al. (2017); Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
`cburglary_num`[53]	Besides any armed robbery, in the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community a victim of BURGLARY or THEFT? (ROBBERY WITHOUT WEAPON]) [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	1-Once; 2-Two to three times; 3-Four to five times; 4-Six to ten times; 5-More than ten times; 97-Do not know		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident.[54]			
`cburglary_bin`		Numeric	Recoded 1 if `cburglary_num` > 0; 0 if `cburglary_num` = 0	Citizen survey
`caggassault_num`[55]	Besides any armed robbery, in the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community attacked WITH A WEAPON? (INCLUDING GUNS, CUTLASSES, STICKS, ETC.) [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	1-Once; 2-Two to three times; 3-Four to five times; 4-Six to ten times; 5-More than ten times; 97-Do not know		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident.[56]			

[53] Adapted from Blair et al. (2017); Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.
[54] Adapted from Blair et al. (2017).
[55] Adapted from Blair et al. (2017); Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.
[56] Adapted from Blair et al. (2017).

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
caggassault_bin		Numeric	Recoded 1 if caggassault_num > 0; 0 if caggassault_num = 0	Citizen survey
csimpleassault_num[57]	In the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community attacked WITHOUT a weapon? [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	1-Once; 2-Two to three times; 3-Four to five times; 4-Six to ten times; 5-More than ten times; 97-Do not know		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident.[58]			
csimpleassault_bin		Numeric	Recoded 1 if csimpleassault_num > 0; 0 if csimpleassault_num = 0	Citizen survey
csexual_num[59]	In the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community SEXUALLY ABUSED? (INCLUDING RAPE) [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	1-Once; 2-Two to three times; 3-Four to five times; 4-Six to ten times; 5-More than ten times; 97-Do not know		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident.			

[57] Adapted from Blair et al. (2017); Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.
[58] Adapted from Blair et al. (2017).
[59] Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
csexual_bin		Numeric	Recoded 1 if csexual_num > 0; 0 if csexual_num = 0	Citizen survey
cdomestic_phys_num[60]	Besides any sexual abuse, in the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community PHYSICALLY ABUSED by someone in their own household? (INCLUDING PUSHING, SLAPPING, PUNCHING, KICKING, CHOKING, ETC.) [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	1-Once; 2-Two to three times; 3-Four to five times; 4-Six to ten times; 5-More than ten times; 97-Do not know		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident.			
cdomestic_phys_bin		Numeric	Recoded 1 if cdomestic_phys_num > 0; 0 if cdomestic_phys_num = 0	Citizen survey
cmurder_num[61]	In the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community MURDERED? [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	1-Once; 2-Two to three times; 3-Four to five times; 4-Six to ten times; 5-More than ten times; 97-Do not know		Citizen survey

[60] Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.
[61] Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident.			
`cmurder_bin`		Numeric	Recoded 1 if `cmurder_num` > 0; 0 if `cmurder_num` = 0	Citizen survey
`cland_any`	In the past 6 months, did anyone you know in this community have a LAND DISPUTE over their house land or farm land? This includes disputes that ended in the past 6 months or disputes that are still ongoing up to now.	0-No; 1-Yes		Citizen survey
`cdomestic_verbal_any`	Besides any physical abuse, in the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community been VERBALLY ABUSED by someone in their own household? [INCLUDING SHOUTING, CUSSING, THREATS OF ABUSE, ETC.]	0-No; 1-Yes		Citizen survey
`cmob_num`[62]	In the past 6 months, were there any incidents of MOB JUSTICE in this community (i.e. beating of flogging of someone suspected of committing a crime)? [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	1-Once; 2-Two to three times; 3-Four to five times; 4-Six to ten times; 5-More than ten times		Citizen survey

[62]Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
cother_any[63]	In the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community a victim of any OTHER CRIME that we haven't mentioned already?	0-No; 1-Yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
	[IF YES:] What was the crime?	Freeform	To be added to the relevant dummies and indices, depending on whether the crime is violent or non-violent	Citizen survey
cother_any_violent	Coded as cother_any if cother_any is a violent crime (see general coding rule for violent crimes)			
cother_any_nonviolent	Coded as cother_any if cother_any is a non-violent crime (see general coding rule for non-violent crimes)			
cviolentcrime_num			Sum of carmedrob_num, caggassault_num, csimpleassault_num, csexual_num, cdomestic_phys_num, cmurder_num, cother_any_violent	

[63] Only collected at endline in the Colombia study.

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
cnonviolentcrime_num			Sum of cburglary_num, cother_any_nonviolen	
cviolentcrime_num_exp			Sum of carmedrob_num, caggassault_num, csimpleassault_num, csexual_num, cdomestic_phys_num, cmurder_num, cmob_num, cother_any_violent	
cnonviolentcrime_num_e			Sum of cburglary_num, cland_any, cdomestic_verbal_num cother_any_nonviolen	
cviolentcrime_bin			Sum of carmedrob_bin, caggassault_bin, csimpleassault_bin, csexual_bin, cdomestic_phys_bin, cmurder_bin, cother_any_violent	
cnonviolentcrime_bin			Sum of cburglary_bin, cother_any_nonviolen	

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
crime_victim_idx			Index of violentcrime_num, nonviolentcrime_num, cviolentcrime_num, cnonviolentcrime_num	
crime_victim_idx_exp			Index of violentcrime_num_exp nonviolentcrime_num_ cviolentcrime_num_ex cnonviolentcrime_num	
crime_victim_idx_bin			Index of violentcrime_bin, nonviolentcrime_bin, cviolentcrime_bin, cnonviolentcrime_bin	
aarmedrob_num	Number of reports of armed robbery in community in past 6 months			Administrative
aburglary_num	Number of reports of burglary or theft in community in past 6 months			Administrative
aaggassault_num	Number of reports of aggravated assault in community in past 6 months			Administrative
asimpleassault_num	Number of reports of simple assault in community in past 6 months			Administrative
asexual_num	Number of reports of sexual abuse in community in past 6 months			Administrative

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
adomestic_phys_num	Number of reports of domestic violence (physical) in community in past 6 months			Administrative
adomestic_verbal_num	Number of reports of domestic violence (verbal) in community in past 6 months			Administrative
aland_num	Number of reports of land disputes in community in past 6 months			Administrative
aland_violent_num	Number of reports of violent land disputes in community in past 6 months			Administrative
amob_num	Number of reports of mob justice in community in past 6 months			Administrative
ariot_num	Number of reports of riots in community in past 6 months			Administrative
amurder_num	Number of reports of murder in community in past 6 months			Administrative
aother_num	Number of reports of other crimes in community in past 6 months			Administrative
aother_num_violent	Coded as aother_num if aother_num is a violent crime (see general coding rule for violent crimes)			Administrative
aother_num_nonviolent	Coded as aother_num if aother_num is a non-violent crime (see general coding rule for violent crimes)			Administrative

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
aviolentcrime_num	Sum of aarmedrob_num, aaggassault_num, asimpleassault_num, asexual_num, adomestic_phys_num, amurder_num, aother_num_violent			
anonviolentcrime_num	Sum of aburglary_num, aother_num_nonviolent			
1b. Positive effect on perceptions of safety (personal, land, and possessions)				
fear_violent[64]	How worried are you that you or a member of your household will be the victim of a VIOLENT CRIME in the coming year? [INCLUDING ARMED ROBBERY, ASSAULT WITH A WEAPON, ASSAULT WITHOUT A WEAPON, ETC.]	0-Not at all worried; 1-Somewhat worried; 2-Worried; 3-Very worried		Citizen survey
fear_nonviolent[65]	How worried are you that you or a member of your household will be the victim of a NON-VIOLENT CRIME in the coming year? [INCLUDING BURGLARY, THEFT, ETC.]	0-Not at all worried; 1-Somewhat worried; 2-Worried; 3-Very worried		Citizen survey

[64] Adapted from Cheema et al. (2017)

[65] Adapted from Cheema et al. (2017); Not collected for Colombia.

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
feared_walk[66]	In the past 6 months, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family felt unsafe walking in your neighborhood?	0-Never; 1-Just once or twice; 2-Several times; 3-Many times; 4-Always		Citizen survey
future_insecurity_idx			Index of fear_violent, fear_nonviolent, feared_walk	Citizen survey
Primary Outcome Family 2: Citizen Perceptions of the Police				
2. Positive effect on citizen perceptions of police				
satis_trust[67]	I generally trust the police. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
satis_general[68]	I am satisfied with the service that the police provide. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
satis_idx			Index of satis_trust and satis_general	Citizen survey
Primary Outcome Family 3: Police Perceptions of and Behaviors Toward Citizens				
3a. Positive effect on perceptions of police empathy, accountability, and abuse and corruption concerns				

[66] Adapted from Afrobarometer (2016).

[67] The question text and responses recorded for Colombia are as follows: "How much do you trust the following institutions or groups? National Police of Colombia." 1-do not trust at all; 2-trust very little; 3-trust somewhat; 4-trust a lot

[68] Not collected for Colombia at baseline.

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
empathy_complaints[69]	When people complain about the police, they usually have a good reason. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Agree; 3-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
empathy_reports	Most things that people report to the police are worth taking seriously. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Agree; 3-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
empathy_idx			Index of empathy_complaints, empathy_reports	
account_pol_matter	The police leadership takes citizen complaints about officers seriously. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Agree; 3-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
hypothetical2_punishme	If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if any discipline do YOU think WILL follow?	0-None; 1-Verbal reprimand; 2-Written reprimand; 3-Period of suspension without pay; 4-Demotion in rank; 5-Dismissal; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
hypothetical2_reportse	Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?	0-Definitely not; 1-Probably not; 2-Probably yes; 3-Definitely yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer; 99-other		Officer survey

[69] In Uganda the category "3-Strongly agree" was not measured for some respondents.
[70] This was collected in Uganda as a multiple response item.

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
hypothetical2_reportot	Do you think MOST POLICE OFFICERS would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?	0-Definitely not; 1-Probably not; 2-Probably yes; 3-Definitely yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
hypothetical3_punishme	If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if any discipline do YOU think WILL follow?	0-None; 1-Verbal reprimand; 2-Written reprimand; 3-Period of suspension without pay; 4-Demotion in rank; 5-Dismissal; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
hypothetical3_reportse	Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?	0-Definitely not; 1-Probably not; 2-Probably yes; 3-Definitely yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
hypothetical3_reportot	Do you think MOST POLICE OFFICERS would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?	0-Definitely not; 1-Probably not; 2-Probably yes; 3-Definitely yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
hypothetical5_punishme	If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if any discipline do YOU think WILL follow?	0-None; 1-Verbal reprimand; 2-Written reprimand; 3-Period of suspension without pay; 4-Demotion in rank; 5-Dismissal; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey

[71]This was collected in Uganda as a multiple response item.
[72]This was collected in Uganda as a multiple response item.

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
hypothetical5_reportse	Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?	0-Definitely not; 1-Probably not; 2-Probably yes; 3-Definitely yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
hypothetical5_reportot	Do you think MOST POLICE OFFICERS would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?	0-Definitely not; 1-Probably not; 2-Probably yes; 3-Definitely yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
accountability_idx			Index of account_pol_matter, hypothetical2_punishm hypothetical2_reports hypothetical2_reporte hypothetical3_punishm hypothetical3_reports hypothetical3_reporte hypothetical5_punishm hypothetical5_reports hypothetical5_reporte	

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
hypothetical5_abusesel	Two police officers on foot patrol surprise a man who is attempting to break into an automobile. The man flees. They chase him for about two blocks before apprehending him by tackling him and wrestling him to the ground. After he is under control, both officers punch him a couple of times in the stomach as punishment for fleeing and resisting. Do you consider this behavior to be serious misconduct?	0-Not at all serious; 1-Somewhat serious; 2-Serious; 3-Very serious; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
hypothetical5_abuseoth	Do MOST POLICE OFFICERS consider this behavior to be serious misconduct?	0-Not at all serious; 1-Somewhat serious; 2-Serious; 3-Very serious; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
abuse_idx			Index of hypothetical5_abuses hypothetical5_abuseo	

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
hypothetical2_corrupts	A police officer routinely accepts free meals, cigarettes, and other items of small value from merchants on his beat. He does not solicit these gifts and is careful not to abuse the generosity of those who give gifts to him. Do you consider this behavior to be serious misconduct?	0-Not at all serious; 1-Somewhat serious; 2-Serious; 3-Very serious; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
hypothetical2_corrupto	A police officer routinely accepts free meals, cigarettes, and other items of small value from merchants on his beat. He does not solicit these gifts and is careful not to abuse the generosity of those who give gifts to him. Do MOST POLICE OFFICERS consider this behavior to be serious misconduct?	0-Not at all serious; 1-Somewhat serious; 2-Serious; 3-Very serious; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
hypothetical3_corrupts	A police officer stops a motorist for speeding. The officer agrees to accept a personal gift of half of the amount of the fine in exchange for not issuing a citation. Do you consider this behavior to be serious misconduct?	0-Not at all serious; 1-Somewhat serious; 2-Serious; 3-Very serious; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
hypothetical3_corrupt(	A police officer stops a motorist for speeding. The officer agrees to accept a personal gift of half of the amount of the fine in exchange for not issuing a citation. Do MOST POLICE OFFICERS consider this behavior to be serious misconduct?	0-Not at all serious; 1-Somewhat serious; 2-Serious; 3-Very serious; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
corrupt_idx			Index of hypothetical2_corrup hypothetical2_corrup hypothetical3_corrup hypothetical3_corrup	
officer_attitude_idx			Index of corrupt_idx, abuse_idx, accountability_idx, empathy_idx	
3a. Negative effect reporting of police abuse and bribery				
policeabuse_phys_any[73]	In the past 6 months, have you ever witnessed or heard about police officers PHYSICALLY ABUSING people from your community? [INCLUDING PUSHING, SLAPPING, PUNCHING, KICKING, CHOKING, ETC.]	0-No; 1-Yes; 97- Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey

[73] Adapted from Blair et al. (2017).

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
policeabuse_verbal_any	Besides any incidents of physical abuse, in the past 6 months, have you ever witnessed or heard about police officers VERBALLY ABUSING people from your community? [INCLUDING SHOUTING, CUSSING, ETC.] This includes verbal abuse against you or someone in your family.	0-No; 1-Yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
policeabuse_any			Recoded 0 if policeabuse_verbal_a = 0 and policeabuse_phys_any = 0; 1 if policeabuse_verbal_a = 1 or policeabuse_phys_any = 1	
policeabuse_phys_num[75]	In the past 6 months, have you ever witnessed or heard about police officers PHYSICALLY ABUSING people from your community? (INCLUDING PUSHING, SLAPPING, PUNCHING, KICKING, CHOKING, ETC.) [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	Numeric		Citizen survey

[74] Adapted from Blair et al. (2017).
[75] Adapted from Blair et al. (2017); Not collected in Colombia.

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident.[76]			
policeabuse_verbal_num	Besides any incidents of physical abuse, in the past 6 months, have you ever witnessed or heard about police officers VERBALLY ABUSING people from your community? [INCLUDING SHOUTING, CUSSING, ETC.] This includes verbal abuse against you or someone in your family. [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	Numeric		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident.[78]			
policeabuse_num			Sum of number of incidents of verbal (policeabuse_verbal_r or physical abuse (policeabuse_phys_num by police officers in the past 6 months	

[76] Blair et al. (2017).
[77] Adapted from Blair et al. (2017); Not collected in Colombia.
[78] Blair et al. (2017).

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
policeabuse_verbal_rep	To the best of your knowledge, was this incident reported to anyone? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-No; 1-Community leaders; 2-Police station or police commander; 3-Any other government agency; 4-NGO; 5-Journalist; 6-[OTHER COUNTRY-SPECIFIC VENUES]; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer	Recoded 0 if policeabuse_verbal_n = 0 or policeabuse_verbal_r = 0; 1 if policeabuse_verbal_n > 0 and policeabuse_verbal_r = 2	Citizen survey
policeabuse_phys_repor	To the best of your knowledge, was this incident reported to anyone? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-No; 1-Community leaders; 2-Police station or police commander; 3-Any other government agency; 4-NGO; 5-Journalist; 6-[OTHER COUNTRY-SPECIFIC VENUES]; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer	Recoded 0 if policeabuse_phys_num = 0 or policeabuse_phys_rep = 0; 1 if policeabuse_phys_num > 0 and policeabuse_phys_rep = 2	Citizen survey
policeabuse_report			Recoded 0 if policeabuse_verbal_r = 0 and policeabuse_phys_rep = 0; 1 if policeabuse_verbal_r > 0 or policeabuse_phys_rep > 0	

[79]Not collected in the Colombia study.

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
bribe_freq[80]	How many times in the past 6 months have you made an unofficial payment to the police?	1-None; 2-Once; 3-Between 2 and 5 times; 4-More than 5 times; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer	Categorical variable for frequency of unofficial payments to the police in the past 6 months	Citizen survey
bribe_amt[81]	[IF ANY:] The last time you made an unofficial payment to the police, how much was it?[82]	Numeric	Recoded bribe_amt = 0 if bribe_freq == 0	Citizen survey
police_abuse_idx			Index of policeabuse_any, policeabuse_num, bribe_freq, bribe_amt	
Primary Outcome Family 4: Behavioral Cooperation of Citizens with the Police				
4a. Positive effect on reporting of crime victimization				
acrime_hline	Total number of reports of crimes to hotline			Administrative
aviolent_hline	Number of reports of violent crimes to hotline			Administrative
anonviolent_hline	Number of reports of non-violent crimes to hotline			Administrative
acrime_station	Total number of reports of crimes to nearest police station			Administrative

[80] Adapted from Cheema et al. (2017); Not collected for Colombia at baseline.

[81] Not collected for Colombia at baseline. For the variable bribe_amt, we replace to 0 for any observations where bribe_freq = 0. We mistakenly did not include this rule in the PAP as we did for other similar

[82] We standardize the amount for bribes to be in USD for exchange rates at November 1st, 2019.

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
aviolent_station	Number of reports of violent crimes to nearest police station			Administrative
anonviolent_station	Number of reports of non-violent crimes to nearest police station			Administrative
aburglary_hline	Number of reports of burglary to hotline			Administrative
aarmedrob_hline	Number of reports of armed robbery to hotline			Administrative
arape_hline	Number of reports of rape to hotline			Administrative
amurder_hline	Number of reports of murder to hotline			Administrative
asimpleassault_hline	Number of reports of simple assault to hotline			Administrative
aaggassault_hline	Number of reports of aggravated assault to hotline			Administrative
atheft_hline	Number of reports of theft to hotline			Administrative
aburglary_station	Number of reports of burglary to nearest police station			Administrative
aarmedrob_station	Number of reports of armed robbery to nearest police station			Administrative
arape_station	Number of reports of rape to nearest police station			Administrative
amurder_station	Number of reports of murder to nearest police station			Administrative

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
asimpleassault_station	Number of reports of simple assault to nearest police station			Administrative
aaggassault_station	Number of reports of aggravated assault to nearest police station			Administrative
atheft_station	Number of reports of theft to nearest police station			Administrative
Actual crime (survey)				
armedrob_report[83]	In the past 6 months, were you or any member of your household the victim of any ARMED ROBBERY? (ROBBERY WITH ANY KIND OF WEAPON, INCLUDING GUNS, CUTLASSES, STICKS, ETC.) Where did you report this case? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other; 98-Refuse to Answer	Recoded 0 if armedrob_num = 0 or armedrob_report = 0; 1 if armedrob_num > 0 and armedrob_report = 1	Citizen survey
burglary_report[84]	Besides any armed robbery, in the past 6 months, were you or any member of your household the victim of BURGLARY or THEFT? [ROBBERY WITHOUT WEAPON]. Where did you report this case? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other	Recoded 0 if burglary_num = 0 or burglary_report = 0; 1 if burglary_num > 0 and burglary_report = 1	Citizen survey

[83] Adapted from Blair et al. (2017).
[84] Blair et al. (2017).

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
`simpleassault_report`[85]	Besides any armed robbery, in the past 6 months, has anyone attacked you or any member of your household WITH A WEAPON? [INCLUDING GUNS, CUTLASSES, STICKS, ETC.] Where did you report this case? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other	Recoded 0 if `simpleassault_num` = 0 or `simpleassault_report` = 0; 1 if `simpleassault_num` > 0 and `simpleassault_report` = 1	Citizen survey
`other_report`[86]	In the past 6 months, were you or any member of your household a victim of any OTHER CRIME that we haven't mentioned already? Where did you report this case? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other	Recoded 0 if `other_num` = 0 or `other_report` = 0; 1 if `other_num` > 0 and `other_report` = 1	Citizen survey
`other_report_violent`			Coded as `other_report` if `other_any` is a violent crime	
`other_report_nonviole`			Coded as `other_report` if `other_any` is a non-violent crime	

[85] Blair et al. (2017).
[86] Blair et al. (2017); Not collected in the Colombia study.

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
violentcrime_report_nu			Sum of armedrob_report, simpleassault_report other_report_violent	
nonviolentcrime_report			Sum of burglary_report, other_report_nonviol	
carmedrob_report[87]	In the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community a victim of ARMED ROBBERY and [ROBBERY WITH ANY KIND OF WEAPON, INCLUDING GUNS, CUTLASSES, STICKS, ETC.] to the best of your knowledge, was this incident reported to anyone? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other	Recoded 0 if carmedrob_num = 0 or carmedrob_report = 0; 1 if carmedrob_num > 0 and carmedrob_report = 1	Citizen survey
cburglary_report[88]	Besides any armed robbery, in the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community a victim of BURGLARY or THEFT and [ROBBERY WITHOUT WEAPON] to the best of your knowledge, was this incident reported to anyone? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other	Recoded 0 if cburglary_num = 0 or cburglary_report = 0; 1 if cburglary_num > 0 and cburglary_report = 1	Citizen survey

[87] Adapted from Blair et al. (2017).
[88] Adapted from Blair et al. (2017).

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
caggassault_report[89]	Besides any armed robbery, in the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community attacked WITH A WEAPON and [INCLUDING GUNS, CUTLASSES, STICKS, ETC.] to the best of your knowledge, was this incident reported to anyone? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other	Recoded 0 if caggassault_num = 0 or caggassault_report = 0; 1 if caggassault_num > 0 and caggassault_report = 1	Citizen survey
csimpleassault_report[9	In the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community attacked WITHOUT a weapon and to the best of your knowledge, was this incident reported to anyone? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other	Recoded 0 if csimpleassault_num = 0 or csimpleassault_repor = 0; 1 if csimpleassault_num > 0 and csimpleassault_repor = 1	Citizen survey
csexual_report	In the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community SEXUALLY ABUSED? [INCLUDING RAPE] and to the best of your knowledge, was this incident reported to anyone? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other	Recoded 0 if csexual_num = 0 or csexual_report = 0; 1 if csexual_num > 0 and csexual_report = 1	Citizen survey

[89]Adapted from Blair et al. (2017); Not collected in the Colombia study.
[90]Adapted from Blair et al. (2017).

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
cdomestic_phys_report	Besides any sexual abuse, in the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community PHYSICALLY ABUSED by someone in their own household and [INCLUDING PUSHING, SLAPPING, PUNCHING, KICKING, CHOKING, ETC.] to the best of your knowledge, was this incident reported to anyone? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other	Recoded 0 if cdomestic_phys_num = 0 or cdomestic_phys_repor = 0; 1 if cdomestic_phys_num > 0 and cdomestic_phys_repor = 1	Citizen survey
cmurder_report[91]	In the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community MURDERED and to the best of your knowledge, was this incident reported to anyone? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other	Recoded 0 if cmurder_num = 0 or cmurder_report = 0; 1 if cmurder_num > 0 and cmurder_report = 1	Citizen survey

[91] Not collected in the Colombia study.

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
cother_report[92]	In the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community a victim of any OTHER CRIME that we haven't mentioned already? To the best of your knowledge, was this incident reported to anyone? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other	Recoded 0 if cother_num = 0 or cother_report = 0; 1 if cother_num > 0 and cother_report = 1	Citizen survey
cother_report_violent	Coded as cother_report if cother_any is a violent crime (see general coding rule for violent crimes)		Recoded such that a zero represents either that the person responded that the community did not experience any other violent crimes or they did not report the crime. E.g., 0 if cother_num_violent = 0 or cother_report_violen = 0; 1 if cother_num_violent > 0 and cother_report_violen = 1	

[92]Not collected in the Colombia study.

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
cother_report_nonviole	Coded as cother_report if cother_any is a non-violent crime (see general coding rule for non-violent crimes)		Recoded such that a zero represents either that the person responded that the community did not experience any other non-violent crimes or they did not report the crime. E.g., 0 if cother_num_nonviolen = 0 or cother_report_nonvio = 0; 1 if cother_num_nonviolen > 0 and cother_report_nonvio = 1	
cviolentcrime_report_r			Sum of carmedrob_report, caggassault_report, csimpleassault_repor csexual_report, cdomestic_phys_repor cmurder_report, cother_report_violen	
cnonviolentcrime_repor			Sum of cburglary_report, cother_report_nonvio	

Hypothetical crime (survey)

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
	There are many places you can go to solve your crime here in [COUNTRY]. We got the POLICE, community leaders, [COUNTRY SPECIFIC FORUM 1], and [COUNTRY SPECIFIC FORUM 2]. Now I want to ask about what you think should happen for different types of crime that might happen in your community.[93]			
`burglaryres`[94]	If there's a BURGLARY in your community, who you would most like to resolve the situation? [DO NOT READ OPTIONS]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-[Town chief or elders]; 4-[Community watch group]; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 97-Don't know; 98-Refuse to answer	Recoded such that `burglaryres` = 1 if respondent prefers the police or courts to resolve the situation; `burglaryres` = 0 if otherwise.	Citizen survey

[93] Blair et al. (2017).

[94] Blair et al. (2017); Only collected at endline in the Colombia study.

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
`dviolres`[95]	If a MAN BEAT HIS WOMAN in your community, who you would most like to resolve the situation? [DO NOT READ OPTIONS]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 97-Don't know; 98-Refuse to answer	Recoded such that `dviolres` = 1 if respondent prefers the police or courts to resolve the situation; `dviolres` = 0 if otherwise.	Citizen survey
`armedrobres`[96]	If there's an ARMED ROBBERY in your community, who you would most like to resolve the situation? [DO NOT READ OPTIONS]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 97-Don't know; 98-Refuse to answer	Recoded such that `armedrobres` = 1 if respondent prefers the police or courts to resolve the situation; `armedrobres` = 0 if otherwise.	Citizen survey
`crimeres_idx`			Index of `burglaryres`, `dviolres`, and `armedrobres`	Citizen survey

[95] Blair et al. (2017).

[96] Blair et al. (2017); Not collected in the Colombia study.

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
crime_reporting_idx			Index of violentcrime_report_1 nonviolentcrime_repo cviolentcrime_report cnonviolentcrime_rep crimeres_idx	Citizen survey
4b. Positive effect on reporting of crime prevention tips[97]				
atips_hline[98]	Number of crime prevention tips reported via hotline (if available in both T and C locations)		Number of crime prevention tips reported	Administrative
atips_box[99]	ADMIN: Number of crime prevention tips reported via comment boxes (if available in both T and C locations)		Number of crime prevention tips reported	Administrative
contact_pol_susp_activ	In the past 6 months, have you ever contacted the police to alert them to suspicious or criminal activity in your community?	0-No; 1-Yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
give_info_pol_investig	In the past 6 months, have you ever given information to the police to assist with an investigation?	0-No; 1-Yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
crime_tips_idx			Index of contact_pol_susp_act and give_info_pol_invest	

[97]Not collected for Philippines.
[98]Not collected in Liberia.
[99]Not collected in Liberia or the Philippines.

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
tips_idx			Index of atips_hline, atips_box, crime_tips_idx	
4c. Positive effect on reporting of victimization by the police				
apolvtm_hline	Number of incidents of victimization by the police reported via hotline (if available in both T and C locations)			Administrative
apolvtm_cmtbox[100]	Number of incidents of victimization by the police reported via comment boxes (if available in both T and C locations)			Administrative
apolvtm_station[101]	Number of incidents of victimization by the police reported to nearest station			Administrative
	See Section 3a.i. Incidence of victimization by police on reporting of police abuse.			Administrative
Reporting of victimization by the police (hypothetical)				
dutydrink_report[102]	Suppose you see a uniformed police officer drinking alcohol in your community. How likely would you be to report that situation?	1-Very unlikely; 2-Unlikely; 3-Likely; 4-Very likely; 97-Don't know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey

[100]Not collected in Liberia or the Philippines.
[101]Only collected for Uganda.
[102]Not collected in Colombia, because officers often wear uniforms off-duty so distinguishing on-duty drinking is difficult.

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
`policebeating_report`	Suppose you see a group of officers unjustifiably beating someone in your community. How likely would you be to report that situation?	1-Very unlikely; 2-Unlikely; 3-Likely; 4-Very likely; 97-Don't know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
`police_abuse_report_ic`			Index of `dutydrink_report`, `policebeating_report` `policeabuse_report`, `apolvtm_hline`, `apolvtm_cmtbox`, `apolvtm_station`	
Mechanism Family 1: Perceived Cost to Citizens Cooperating with the Police				
M1a. Positive effect on beliefs about police intentions				
Perceptions of police intentions (case management)				
	Imagine someone is a VICTIM of an armed robbery in your community and they take the case to the POLICE. I want to ask you what you think will happen.			
`polcaseserious`[103]	The police will take the case seriously and investigate. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey

[103]Responses in Pakistan followed a different coding scheme.

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
`polcasefair`[104]	The police will be fair to both complainant and defendant in the investigation. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
Perceptions of police intentions (general)				
	Ok, now I want to ask you about what you think about the police in general.			
`polint_corrupt`[105]	The police are corrupt. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer	In our construction of this variable we reverse the order of this variable to ensure that a higher value indicates a positive effect on citizen belief about police intentions.	Citizen survey
`polint_quality`[106]	The police provide the same quality of service to all citizens. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
`polint_idx`			Index of `polint_corrupt` and `polint_quality`	

[104]Responses in Pakistan followed a different coding scheme; Not collected in Colombia at baseline.
[105]Adapted from Sunshine and Tyler (2003).
[106]Sunshine and Tyler (2003).

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
intentions_idx			Index of polcaseserious, polcasefair, polint_idx	
M1b. Positive effect on knowledge of criminal justice system				
know_law_suspect[107]	If you see a dead body lying in the street and you report it to the police, [COUNTRY] law says the police must hold you as a suspect. True or false?	0-False; 1-True; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
know_law_lawyer[108]	If you take your case to court and you don't have money to pay a lawyer, [COUNTRY] law says the government must provide a lawyer for you. True or false?	0-False; 1-True; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
know_law_feesOnly collected at endline in the Colombia study; Not collected in the Philippines study.	If you take a case to the police, [COUNTRY] law says the police can charge a fee to register the case. True or false?	0-False; 1-True; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
know_law_vawOnly collected at endline in the Colombia study; Not collected in the Liberia and Philippines study.	According to [COUNTRY] law, it is a crime to beat on one's wife. True or false?	0-False; 1-True; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey

[107]Only collected at endline in the Colombia study; Not collected in the Philippines study.
[108]Only collected at endline in the Colombia study; Not collected in the Philippines study.

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
know_law_idx			Index of know_law_suspect, know_law_lawyer, know_law_fees, and know_law_vaw	
know_report_followupOr collected at endline in the Colombia study; Not collected in the Pakistan, Liberia and Philippines study.	If a crime is reported to the police using the hotline, an officer must follow up with the complainant in person in order for the crime to be recorded by the police. True or False? [ENUMERATOR: IS RESPONDENT CORRECT?]	0-No; 1-Yes		Citizen survey
know_report_station[109]	Do you know where the nearest police station is? [ENUMERATOR: IS RESPONDENT CORRECT?]	0-No; 1-Yes		Citizen survey
know_report_idx			Index of know_report_followup know_report_station	
know_idx			Index of know_law_idx, know_report_idx	
M1c. Positive effect on norms of citizens cooperation with police				

[109]Blair et al. (2017). Only collected at endline in the Colombia study; Not collected in the Philippines study

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
`reportnorm_theft`[110]	If there is a BURGLARY in your community, people can get angry if you take it to the police. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer	In our construction of this variable we reverse the order for the responses to ensure that a higher value indicates a positive effect on norms of citizen cooperartion with police.	Citizen survey
`reportnorm_abuse`[111]	If a MAN BEATS HIS WIFE in your community, people can get angry if you take it to the police. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer	In our construction of this variable we reverse the order for the responses to ensure that a higher value indicates a positive effect on norms of citizen cooperartion with police.	Citizen survey

[110]Blair et al. (2017). Different response options collected in Colombia
[111]Blair et al. (2017).

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
`obeynorm`[112]	You should do what the police tell you to do even when you do not understand the reasons for their decisions. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer	In our construction of this variable we reverse the order for the responses to ensure that a higher value indicates a positive effect on norms of citizen cooperartion with police.	Citizen survey
`norm_idx`			Index of `reportnorm_theft`, `reportnorm_abuse`, `obeynorm`	
Mechanism Family 2: Perceived Returns to Citizens Cooperating with the Police				
M2a. Positive effect on beliefs about police capacity				
`polcap_timely`	The police have the capacity to respond to incidents of crime in a timely manner. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
`polcap_investigate`	The police have the capacity to investigate crimes and gather evidence effectively. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey

[112]Sunshine and Tyler (2003). Not collected in the Colombia study.

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
`police_capacity_idx`			Index of `polcap_timely`, `polcap_investigate`	
M2b. Positive effect on perceptions of responsiveness to citizen feedback				
`responsive_act`	The police act upon citizen comments and complaints about security in my community. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
Secondary Outcome Family 1: Increase in trust in the state				
S1. Positive effect on trust in the state				
`legit_trust`[113]	How much do you trust the government of [COUNTRY]?	1-Not at all; 2-Just a little; 3-Somewhat; 4-A lot; 97-Don't know; 98-Refuse to answer		
Secondary Outcome Family 2: Increase in communal trust				
S2. Positive effect on communal trust				
`trust_community`[114]	Most people in my community can be trusted. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Agree; 3-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
Compliance with Treatment: Citizen Interactions with Police				
C. Positive effect on rate of citizen interactions with police				
`ameeting_count`[115]	Attendance sheets at community meetings	Percentage Attendance		Administrative

[113]Different question text in Pakistan; Different response options collected in Philippines; Not collected in Uganda.
[114]Different question text and options for Uganda. Different response options for Pakistan and Philippines.
[115]Not collected for Philippines since community meetings were not part of the CEP intervention

Variable name	*Question text*	*Response options*	*Variable construction*	*Data Source*
`compliance_patrol`[116]	About how often do you see police officers patrolling your area on FOOT?	1-Daily; 2-Weekly; 3-Monthly; 4-Seasonally; 5-Less than seasonally; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer	In our construction of this variable we reverse the order of this variable such that a higher value indicates a positive effect on citizen interactions with the police.	Citizen survey
`compliance_freq`[117]	About how often do you see police officers patrolling your area while in a vehicle or on a motorbike?	1-Daily; 2-Weekly; 3-Monthly; 4-Seasonally; 5-Less than seasonally; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer	In our construction of this variable we reverse the order of this variable such that a higher value indicates a positive effect on citizen interactions with the police.	Citizen survey
`compliance_meeting`	In the past 6 months, have you HEARD ABOUT, SEEN, OR ATTENDED community meetings with police officers taking place in your area?	0-No; 1-Yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
`compliance_idx`			Index of `compliance_patrol`, `compliance_freq`, `compliance_meeting`	

[116] Additional response option i.e. "Never" also elicited in Pakistan and Uganda.
[117] Additional response option i.e. "Never" also elicited in Pakistan and Uganda.