

# Does Community Policing Build Trust in Police and Reduce Crime? Evidence from Six Coordinated Field Experiments

Graeme Blair,<sup>1\*</sup> Fotini Christia,<sup>2</sup> Jeremy Weinstein,<sup>3</sup> Eric Arias,<sup>4</sup> Emile Badran,<sup>5</sup>  
Robert A. Blair,<sup>6, 7</sup> Ali Cheema,<sup>8</sup> Ahsan Farooqui,<sup>9</sup> Thiemo Fetzer,<sup>10</sup> Guy Grossman,<sup>11</sup>  
Dotan Haim,<sup>12</sup> Zulfiqar Hameed,<sup>13</sup> Rebecca Hanson,<sup>14, 15</sup> Ali Hasanain,<sup>8</sup> Dorothy Kronick,<sup>11</sup>  
Benjamin Morse,<sup>16</sup> Robert Muggah,<sup>5</sup> Fatiq Nadeem,<sup>17</sup> Lily Tsai,<sup>2</sup> Matthew Nanes,<sup>18</sup> Tara Slough,<sup>19</sup>  
Nico Ravanilla,<sup>20</sup> Jacob N. Shapiro,<sup>21</sup> Barbara Silva,<sup>5</sup> Pedro C. L. Souza,<sup>10</sup> Anna Wilke<sup>22</sup>

\*To whom correspondence should be addressed; E-mail: [graeme.blair@ucla.edu](mailto:graeme.blair@ucla.edu).

<sup>1</sup>Dept. of Political Science, University of California–Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095

<sup>2</sup>Dept. of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139

<sup>3</sup>Dept. of Political Science, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305

<sup>4</sup>Government Dept., College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23185

<sup>5</sup>Igarapé Institute, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil 22281

<sup>6</sup>Dept. of Political Science, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912

<sup>7</sup>Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912

<sup>8</sup>Dept. of Economics, Lahore University of Management Sciences, Lahore, Pakistan 54792

<sup>9</sup>Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives, Lahore, Pakistan 54000

<sup>10</sup>Dept. of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom CV4 7AL

<sup>11</sup>Dept. of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104

<sup>12</sup>Dept. of Political Science, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306

<sup>13</sup>Punjab Police, Government of Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan 54000

<sup>14</sup>Center for Latin American Studies, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611

<sup>15</sup>Dept. of Sociology, Criminology, & Law, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611

<sup>16</sup>Poverty Action Lab, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139

<sup>17</sup>Bren School, University of California–Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA 93117

<sup>18</sup>Dept. of Political Science, Saint Louis University, St. Louis, MO 63103

<sup>19</sup>Wilf Family Dept. of Politics, New York University, New York City, NY, 10003

<sup>20</sup>School of Global Policy and Strategy, University of California–San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093

<sup>21</sup>Dept. of Politics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544

<sup>22</sup>Dept. of Political Science, Columbia University, New York City, NY, 10027

**Is it possible for societies to reduce crime without creating or exacerbating adversarial relationships between the police and citizens? Community-oriented policing is a widely celebrated and adopted reform that aims to do so. However, the evidence base is limited to a small number of countries, does not generally study the bundle of practices commonly implemented together, and is largely silent on effects on trust. We designed six field experiments with police agencies in the Global South to study community policing, with coordinated measures of crime and the attitudes and behaviors of citizens and police from both surveys and administrative data. In a preregistered meta-analysis, we find that community policing does not improve citizen-police relations and does not reduce crime. In these contexts, structural reforms to police agencies may be required for incremental reforms such as community policing to succeed.**

## **Introduction**

Over the past quarter century, the death toll from war dramatically declined (1). In its place, other forms of violence surged. Today, more than one quarter of the world's population lives in conditions of insecurity due to high levels of crime and violence unrelated to war, especially in the Global South (2). Even where crime rates are falling, including in North America and Europe, crime victimization remains highly unequal, falling disproportionately on people of color and other marginalized groups (3). Importantly, insecurity is driven not just by criminals, but also by police, who victimize citizens physically (4–6) and financially (7).

Reducing crime and insecurity now stands at the top of the global policy agenda. The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, adopted in 2015, commit countries to achieve “just, peaceful, and inclusive societies,” with a focus on insecurity due to crime and violence. At the same time, with widespread Black Lives Matter protests against police abuse in the United States and around the world, the issue of how to address inequalities in the criminal justice system and rein in police abuse has never been more salient.

How can societies effectively reduce crime and insecurity? One important answer to this challenge begins with the police (8,9). Since the origins of modern policing in

the early 1800s, societies around the world have relied on a professional, uniformed, and regulated authority to prevent crime and maintain order (10). But the creation of modern policing generated problems of its own: the lack of independence of police from political influence, the misuse of their coercive capability, and the challenges of maintaining the respect, approval, and cooperation of the public. These problems are particularly severe in the Global South where modern policing had its origins in coercive institutions of colonial control.

Strikingly, mistrust of the police is widespread, though it takes a different form in advanced economies and the Global South. In advanced economies, while the majority express confidence in the capability and fairness of the police, this view is not shared by people of color and marginalized groups who feel unfairly targeted and victimized by police misconduct. In the Global South, confidence in the police is low. Concerns that the police misuse their authority to enrich themselves or to advance the political interests of the government are broadly shared. This underlines the central tension in efforts to address widespread crime and insecurity, especially as greater investments are made in police capability. Is it possible to reduce crime and insecurity without creating or exacerbating adversarial relationships between the police and communities?

In recent decades, perhaps the most celebrated reform to address both crime and citizen-police trust has been the introduction of community policing. Broadly, community policing departs from traditional policing by “involv[ing] average citizens directly in the police process” to build channels of dialogue and improve police-citizen collaboration (11). Community policing programs often involve increasing the frequency of beat patrols; decentralized decision-making; community engagement programs, such as town halls; and problem-oriented policing programs to act on information from citizens to prevent crime (12, 13). By expanding opportunities for communication and engagement, community policing is designed to generate trust and build more effective police agencies in environments of low trust (11, 12, 14). A reform that had its origins

in new practices pioneered in the U.S. and United Kingdom is increasingly advanced as a solution to the mistrust that characterizes police-community relations in developing countries.

However, despite the great enthusiasm of professionals for community policing, the evidence is mixed and incomplete. Through a systematic review, we identified 27 randomized trials, the majority of which study two important sub-components of community policing: increasing the presence of police in communities, e.g., more frequent foot patrols (20 studies); and problem-oriented policing (7). The weight of evidence suggests these interventions reduce crime, but a number of studies find mixed or null results especially for community presence interventions. There is little evidence on how these interventions impact perceptions of insecurity or the frequency of police abuse. Moreover, there is little evidence on other common components of community policing including community meetings and tip-lines. Most notably, the studies are nearly all from the U.S., the U.K., and Australia. A very small number come from the Global South (15–21). In short, our analysis is in line with a National Academy of Sciences panel on improving the fairness and effectiveness of police, which concluded that there is “not yet enough evidence” on the effectiveness of community policing (22).

In this paper, we report on the results of a multi-site randomized trial of community policing in six contexts. The trials were conducted in Santa Catarina State in Brazil; the city of Medellin in Colombia; Liberia’s capital city, Monrovia; Sorgoson Province in the Philippines; nationally in Uganda; and in two districts in Punjab province in Pakistan. In each site, we collaborated directly with the relevant local police agency, which implemented a community policing intervention. The community policing intervention had a core set of common elements across all six contexts, but also a set of locally-appropriate elements. In addition, the six research teams coordinated on an empirical strategy and harmonized outcome measures of crime, insecurity, and trust in the police, all of which were pre-registered. In total, community policing was implemented in 598 neighbor-

hoods, districts, and villages reaching approximately 6.6 million people. Across the coordinated studies, we ask whether the implementation of community policing generated changes in the level of trust in the police, observed cooperation by citizens with the police, and the rate of crime, among other outcomes. We measure these outcomes through harmonized surveys of citizens and police officers and with administrative data from the police on crime and citizen cooperation. 16,869 citizens and 664 police officers were interviewed in our post-intervention surveys.

The main contribution of this study is the systematic evaluation of community policing across a set of highly diverse contexts. In this sense, we address four particular shortcomings of the existing evidence base. First, we measure a harmonized and comprehensive set of outcomes including crime rates, citizen perceptions of and cooperation with the police, and police abuse. Without evidence on all of these outcomes from the same studies, it is difficult to determine whether decreases in crime rates (if any) are accompanied by an erosion of trust as in past police reform efforts, or whether community policing improves police-community relations. Second, we examine the full complement of policies advanced by advocates of community policing, including police-community forums, increased police presence in communities, and problem-oriented policing. When studied in isolation, the interactive and cumulative effects of these programs, which tend to be implemented together in actual practice, would be missed. Third, these studies were designed jointly, pre-registered, and implemented during the same period, thus increasing our confidence in the comparability of the results and avoiding the widespread challenge of publication bias. Finally, this project expands the scope of evidence on community policing to the Global South, where these reforms are increasingly deployed and where there is considerable policy momentum to address rising levels of crime.

Our preregistered meta-analysis finds that community policing does not generate greater trust between citizens and the police or reduce crime: we are able to reject even small improvements in our key outcomes measures. We detected evidence of compli-

ance with the interventions, including stepped up foot patrols and regular community meetings. But across the six sites, community policing did not lead to changes in crime victimization, perceived future insecurity, perceptions of police, police perceptions of citizens, police abuse, crime reporting, crime tips, or the reporting of police abuse. Community policing did not work in any of our six sites, in high or low crime communities, or among individuals with high or low baseline levels of trust in the police. Moreover, crime displacement does not appear to explain our results. In short, as implemented in developing countries, community policing does not deliver the benefits claimed by its advocates. Incremental reforms to police practices, such as community policing, may have to be accompanied by structural reforms in order to be successful.

## **Prior evidence on community policing**

To assess the existing literature on community policing, we conducted a systematic review of studies on the effectiveness of the component parts of community policing, such as foot patrols and problem-oriented policing.<sup>1</sup> The review identified a total of 1,963 studies, of which 177 were deemed relevant. From these studies, 238 estimates of effectiveness were analyzed.<sup>2</sup> We classified the type of intervention and the type of outcome each study examines as well as whether results suggested an increase or decrease, were null, or were mixed with some positive, negative, and null. Details on the search protocol, filtering, and coding are in the Supplementary Materials.

The 177 studies include 37 randomized trials, whose results we describe in Table 1, as well 140 observational studies described in the Supplementary Materials. 22 of the randomized trials are published in peer-reviewed journals. Only two of the trials were

---

<sup>1</sup>We follow the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines for reporting. The review includes English-language studies published on or after 1970. In addition to published articles, unpublished studies are included to reduce the impact of publication bias against null findings. The review also covers articles with a range of methodological approaches from randomized controlled trials to observational analyses and qualitative cases studies.

<sup>2</sup>Studies with multiple interventions and outcomes are treated as separate estimates to evaluate an intervention's individual effect on each outcome.

preregistered. The bulk of experimental evidence comes from three countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia (82%). More than two-thirds of observational evidence was also collected in these three countries.

We find that problem-oriented policing likely reduces crime (23). In addition, 10 randomized trials find that community presence reduces crime incidence, but four trials find null results and eight yield mixed results (68%). The evidence is not conclusive, but it appears increasing community presence does not significantly impact citizen perceptions of safety or their views of the police. It appears, with limited evidence, that problem-oriented policing may increase perceptions of safety.

As illustrated by the “evidence gap map” in Table 1, however, what we know is outweighed by what we do not. Few studies examine multiple families of outcomes (e.g., crime and perceptions of the police). Though we have collected substantial evidence on how components of community policing affect crime rates, we know little about how perceived insecurity, police abuse, and citizen cooperation with the police are affected.

## **Community policing across contexts**

An implicit theory of citizen-police relations underlies community policing. Citizens are a critical source of valuable information about where crime is happening, who is committing it, and the concerns they have about suspicious people or activities. This kind of information, when provided consistently, helps the police allocate their time and attention in ways that will prevent crime and improve public safety (24).

When citizens consider whether to cooperate with the police, they weigh the costs of this cooperation against the expected returns (25). Citizens often face search costs: they may not know how or on what issues to engage the police, may need to travel long distances to reach police stations, or may lack access to telephones to call the police. They may also fear retaliation (and judge the police to be unable to protect them). In terms of benefits, citizens have expectations about their capacity or willingness to act

in response to reports. In environments of high corruption, low capacity, or predatory police behavior, citizens may calculate that the costs of engaging the police exceed the benefits. When citizens do not cooperate with police, police may be less effective, which may affect citizen perceptions of police intentions, generating a vicious cycle.

Community policing aims to break this cycle, by affecting the costs and benefits of cooperation and directly affecting police behaviors. Costs are brought down by significantly increasing the visibility and accessibility of police officers, and creating an environment in which it becomes accepted to engage and work closely with the security forces. Formal meetings and regular lines of communication reinforce this new norm. Expected benefits are increased by changing perceptions about both the intentions and capacity of the police. By increasing interaction with citizens, community policing may also more directly affect police behavior, by increasing the risks to abusing their positions and victimizing citizens or simply by improving intentions toward citizens.

A wide range of individual programs are labeled community policing, including local beat patrols; town-hall meetings between police and citizens; citizen crime reporting hotlines; frequent confidence-building patrols; citizen ombuds-persons; home visits by police; neighborhood watches; and government oversight of non-criminal issues, such as building code enforcement. Yet four principles are common to many programs identified by experts as exemplars: (1) implementation of beat patrols in which officers are assigned to patrol small neighborhoods or villages, (2) decentralization of decision-making authority to those beat officers and their supervisors, (3) community engagement programs to solicit information on community problems from citizens and transmit information about police programs to citizens; and (4) problem-oriented policing programs, in which police address problems identified through community engagement programs directly with dedicated budgets for small projects and/or indirectly with the assistance of other public or private agencies (12,13).

To understand the efficacy of community policing in developing countries, indepen-



dent research teams coordinated on the design and implementation of randomized trials working with the police agencies in six different contexts — all of which experience pervasive insecurity and high levels of mistrust in the police. Each study included an intervention that was coordinated across teams (“common arm”) as well as a study-specific treatment. Table 2 summarize the six interventions.

We sought to harmonize two elements across the six sites. First, in each country, the intervention increased the frequency of interaction with the police, mostly via formal town-hall meetings between police and community members with the goal of identifying problems and building trust. In the Philippines, this was accomplished via more frequent police patrols. Second, at most sites, treatment areas benefited also from focused, problem-oriented policing with decentralized authorities and/or budgets to facilitate police efforts to follow-up on community concerns. In some cases, these efforts involved dedicated task forces and local police with the responsibility to address issues raised by community members; in other contexts, decentralized authority was paired with additional resources to facilitate this work or the activation of community watch teams to work with the police.

Given the different baseline conditions across the country contexts, other aspects of the core intervention vary. For example, while Brazil and Colombia already have a strong community presence, police agencies in the other countries have committed to substantially increase their physical presence in treatment communities. Some countries already reporting structures in place, while in other contexts, these were created as part of the intervention. Although it might be ideal to launch identical interventions across contexts, that was unrealistic in the context of actual police work. Instead, each team focused on working with their respective police department to identify specific and concrete ways they could increase their commitment to community- and problem-oriented policing. The result is a set of interventions with core features in common, and complementary elements that differ across contexts. Importantly, these interventions were

hypothesized to impact community-level outcomes and attitudes, not only the outcomes for individuals who encountered the police or participated in a community meeting. We interpret our effects as estimates of what happens a police agency decides to implement a typical package of community policing reforms, tailored based on their existing policing practices.

## **Experimental design**

We designed our study to test community policing across multiple, varied contexts. Our aim was to study not only whether it works, but under what circumstances it works. The six study sites varied in terms of initial rates of crime victimization, trust in police, officer intentions toward citizens, citizen cooperation with police, and police capacity (see Table 5). Our harmonized measure of trust in police ranged at baseline from 19% (Colombia) to 86% (Philippines). Violent crime was frequent in some contexts (23% of respondents in Pakistan and 19% in Uganda reported having a murder committed in their community) and rare in others (only 1% reported a murder in the community in the past year in the Philippines). Police ranged widely from high-capacity forces in Brazil (annual budget per officer of \$56,000) to those in which police officers did not have regular access to a gun, radio, or vehicle (Liberia).

The six studies use experimental designs to test whether the introduction of community policing programs changed citizen, police, and crime outcomes. The randomization procedures differed. In each study, urban neighborhoods or rural districts were randomly-assigned into a control group (with no changes to police practices) and a treatment group in which community policing practices were introduced. We measured changes in crime rates and in the attitudes and behaviors of citizens and the police. To do so, we draw on unique, rich data from the six contexts including detailed surveys of citizens and police officers and administrative data on citizen and police behaviors collected through our partnerships with the police agencies. Each of the studies as well

as the meta-analysis was preregistered before data analysis.

Table 3 summarizes the key elements of each study's design. In what follows, we detail the sampling and treatment assignment procedures and outcome measures as well as the meta-analysis design.<sup>3</sup>

## Outcome measurement

We collected four sets of harmonized outcome measures across all sites: crime, citizen attitudes toward the police, citizen cooperation with the police, and police behavior.<sup>4</sup> Building on past surveys of crime victimization and police trust (25, 26), we aimed to measure a comprehensive set of outcomes, all of those community policing is hypothesized both by academics and police practitioners to affect. We outline our primary outcomes in Table 4.<sup>5</sup>

To develop these outcome measures, we rely on several data sources:

**Surveys of citizens** Citizen surveys were conducted at two times in each study: a pre-treatment baseline survey and a post-treatment endline survey.<sup>6</sup> Surveys were, in all cases, conducted in person. We coordinated the surveys across countries to maximize comparability. In each study, we translated the questionnaire into local language(s) and pretested the question wordings. We adjusted the wording of question and answer options to fit local contexts when necessary. The wording of questions and answer options for items used in the meta analysis are presented in Table SM38.

Estimating treatment effects on crime reporting presents a special problem and re-

---

<sup>3</sup>In the Supplementary Materials, we provide study-specific details on sampling and treatment assignment procedures (SM Section A.) as well as a codebook of the outcome measures (Table SM38).

<sup>4</sup>These outcome measures directly relate to the nine different categories of hypotheses included in SM Section E.. Details on the construction of these outcome indices are included in Table SM38.

<sup>5</sup>In some cases, index items could not be collected or had to be collected in ways that deviated from our harmonized items and indices. We detail these differences in Table SM37. We present analyses based on the subsets of sites we can analyze the exactly harmonized items and indices in Table SM33.

<sup>6</sup>In the Philippines study, an additional survey wave was collected at midline, after the community engagement intervention was implemented and before the problem-oriented policing intervention commenced. Following our preanalysis plan, we do not analyze that midline data in this paper.

quires additional theoretical assumptions, as emphasized in (27). To avoid post-treatment bias by analyzing reporting conditional on crime victimization, we examined two sets of average treatment effects: the effect of treatment on crime victimization rates; and the effect of treatment on a recoded reporting variable where zero represents either not being victimized or being victimized and not reporting and one represents victimization and reporting. We can interpret our effects on this variable in tandem with the effects on crime victimization: if there are null effects on crime victimization then a null effect on our reporting variable is interpreted as a null on victimization. If there is a positive effect on victimization, then further assumptions are required in order to interpret the effect of the reporting variable.

**Administrative data** In each study, three main sets of outcomes were constructed from police administrative records provided through agreements with our partner police agencies. We collect reported crime incidence; crime prevention tips; and reports of abuse by the police. We do not rely on administrative data as a primary measure of the incidence of crime, because they confound incidence and reporting. In Table SM32, we present secondary analyses using these data.

**Surveys of police officers** We collected surveys of officers in each setting. In Colombia, Pakistan, and Uganda, by virtue of the randomization of neighborhoods and police stations, officers were randomized into treated areas and control areas. In these settings, we estimate the effect of community policing on officer attitudes.<sup>7</sup>

## Sampling procedures

In all studies, there were two relevant units of analysis, an administrative unit for which we measured crime incidence from administrative data and a citizen unit for which we

---

<sup>7</sup>In the other sites some officers work in multiple jurisdictions making separation of officers that work in treated and control areas impossible. In these cases, we draw on officer surveys for descriptive analyses, but not for estimating effects of community policing.

measured individual-level outcomes of citizens. In Colombia and Brazil, we study all neighborhoods in the study area and there is no sampling of administrative units.<sup>8</sup> In the Philippines, we study all barangays in Sorsogon Province that were deemed safe from insurgent activity by the Philippines military. In Pakistan and Uganda, we sample administrative units from a sample frame of all units. In Liberia, we select a set of high-crime geographic areas as well as a random sample of other areas. Citizens are randomly sampled in study areas to participate in surveys.

## **Treatment assignment**

The studies rely on randomization of neighborhoods, districts, or police stations to a control condition or the common community policing treatment arm, in some cases blocking on pretreatment covariates measured in baseline surveys and from administrative crime data. In most studies, there was also a third treatment group that we will not analyze in this study.<sup>9</sup> In the Philippines site, a community engagement program was rolled out first and then a problem-oriented policing program;<sup>10</sup> in the other five the intervention was rolled out all at once. In Brazil, the treatment is an encouragement to form community-police fora on WhatsApp.

## **Estimation strategy**

**Study effects.** To estimate the effects of treatment in each study, we use linear regressions with an indicator for the common treatment arm<sup>11</sup> controlling, when possible, for baseline outcomes and, if assignment is block-randomized, block fixed effects. However, in Brazil, we estimate the complier average causal effect using instrumental variables es-

---

<sup>8</sup>In Brazil, only large municipalities are selected for the citizen survey.

<sup>9</sup>We preregistered that these additional arms would be reported on in separate papers by each site's authors.

<sup>10</sup>We estimate the combined effect of the two components by comparing the common treatment condition to control at endline after both programs have been implemented.

<sup>11</sup>In the Philippines study, we include treatment indicators for crossed treatment conditions due to its factorial design.

timization with block fixed effects and baseline outcomes.<sup>12</sup> We weight the regressions by the inverse of the product of the probability of inclusion in the sample and assignment to treatment, if either varied across blocks (28). We report robust standard errors clustered at the level of treatment assignment.

**Meta-analysis.** We pool the results from each study. We rely on the random effects meta-analysis model, which weights estimates according to both the within-study variance and the between-study variance.<sup>13</sup> Variance in effects in this meta-analysis are implied by variation in study context, including different police organizations and different baseline levels of citizen cooperation.<sup>14</sup> We use the restricted maximum likelihood random-effects model for estimation.

Given the large number of hypotheses and of outcomes measured in this study, the risk of false discovery (rejecting a true null hypothesis) is high. We address this risk by following the Benjamini-Hochberg (30) adjustment to p-values, which controls the false discovery rate, in our case to 5%. We adjust the tests for our primary hypotheses, eight indices testing H1 through H4c. Together, these represent the test of a grand hypothesis that community policing is effective.<sup>15</sup> In addition, we construct indices of related outcomes for several hypotheses to reduce the number of comparisons.

## Ethics

The experiments described in this paper raise an important and unique set of ethical considerations (see SM Section B. for a longer discussion of ethical issues). Each ex-

---

<sup>12</sup>We elected to combine estimates of complier effects in Brazil with intent-to-treat effects in other studies due to the nature of the treatment. The randomized encouragement consisted of a single meeting with a police commander in which residents were provided information about how to form a community forum. The endogenous treatment is the forum being formed, which is similar to treatment in the other sites in which watch forums were created and community meetings held throughout the treatment period.

<sup>13</sup>This model is derived from an interpretation of effect sizes across studies that are drawn from a common distribution and the aim is to estimate the moments of that distribution (29).

<sup>14</sup>In the case where in fact there is no between-study variance in effects, the random effects reduces to the fixed effects meta-analysis model.

<sup>15</sup>We adjust with the same procedure each set of p-values within the hypothesis, for example all of the outcomes representing H1 and, separately, all of the outcomes representing H4c.

periment was motivated by high levels of citizen mistrust in the police, as well as concerns about police behavior including corruption and abuse of power. Yet all of the experiments involved direct collaboration between research teams and these same police agencies. Although in each case we had a shared goal of understanding how potential reforms to police practices might change police behavior and police-citizen interactions, we were also highly attentive to concerns that these partnerships might implicate us as researchers in actions that might cause harm to individuals. For this reason, the research teams not only met the traditional standards imposed by Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) and national laws. In addition, as part of this joint project, each site's team weighed seriously the costs and benefits of partnering with each police agency, focused on how to minimize the risk of any potential harm from the intervention, and sought to provide transparency and informed consent to all participants in the research.

A number of best practices emerged in the process. First, the appropriateness of the local context was carefully considered in the design of each field experiment. For example, with obvious concerns about police complicity in the abusive war on drugs in the Philippines, the research team focused their collaboration with the police in Sorsogon, a province in which drug trafficking is not a salient issue. More broadly, teams engaged in significant pre-vetting of both police units and areas to ensure the work was being done in places where risks to citizens were relatively low. Second, significant care was taken to provide comprehensive training for local police partners as part of the intervention. This went beyond securing the high-level buy-in of police authorities. The focus was on developing meaningful training practices that could influence how police officers think about their relationship to citizens and carry out community policing activities. Third, and perhaps most importantly, each team developed an extensive risk mitigation plan. The teams often deployed monitors on-the-ground to observe police activities, and each team developed clear redlines that would guide decisions about whether to end participation in the experiment/partnership as a function of concerns about public safety and

police behavior. Finally, teams were fully committed to transparency about the research and the protection of confidentiality for research subjects. Given the sensitivity of survey responses about police behavior and abuse, it was important that the information we collected be fully anonymized and presented only in the aggregate to our police partners.

Importantly, although we worked in partnership with the police, we did not see this as transferring our ethical responsibilities to the third party. Throughout, we were careful to evaluate the risks associated with these partnerships, the potential of the research to improve police practices for the better, and the ways in which we could identify and mitigate potential harms throughout the research process.

## Results

The police complied with the assigned community policing practices, holding community meetings and increasing the frequency of patrols in treatment areas in five of our six studies. In each of these studies, our index measure of citizen awareness of community meetings and police patrol frequency increased (Figure 1). In Liberia, there was a 1.7 standard deviation increase ( $p = 0.000$ ) in the compliance index; in the other cases the increases were smaller, between 0.16 and 0.45 s.d. (all statistically distinguishable from no effect at the 0.05 level). However, our measures of compliance are imperfect: several sites did not aim to increase foot or vehicle patrol frequency (for example, in Colombia, where frequent foot patrols was already in place). We see large changes in awareness of community meetings that we cannot distinguish from zero (estimate = 1.023 s.d.,  $p = 0.104$ ) and small increases in foot patrols (est. = 0.064,  $p = 0.239$ ) and vehicle patrol frequency (est. = 0.091,  $p = 0.064$ ).

In Brazil, however, there were substantial compliance issues of two forms. Broadly, the police did not participate as expected in the planning and execution of community policing for the study. In some cases, treated sites did not hold induction meetings as



planned. Some commanders who initially evinced interest left the study altogether. We then found that the low buy-in from the police translated into a low compliance rate in terms of citizens forming community-police groups on WhatsApp, the core treatment. We present the meta-analysis results including Brazil as we preregistered, and in the appendix we provide estimates excluding Brazil from the analysis (see SM Section I.).

Community policing generated none of the effects we hypothesized. In the meta-analysis, we find no effects of community policing on any of our primary outcomes: crime victimization, perceptions of insecurity, citizen perceptions of police, police abuse, or citizen cooperation with police (Figure 2 top panel).<sup>16</sup>

We are able to rule out even very small effects on most variables. We can rule out reductions in crime larger than -0.072 standard deviations — or increases of larger than 0.041 — a precise null. Using the standard rule of thumb of  $2.8 \times$  the standard error, this implies we have a minimum detectable effect size for crime of 0.0812 standard deviations. In terms of overall perceptions of police, our results suggest that effects, if any, must be smaller than 0.109 standard deviations. Given that our confidence intervals are narrow, it is unlikely that we are simply missing large effects. Instead, if there are effects of community policing, they are likely to be very small and not the large effects found in the prior literature and expected by practitioners who advocate community policing in the Global South.

The null effects do not hide heterogeneity across sites: community policing did not lead to the expected changes across our eight hypotheses in any of the six sites (Figure 3). We do find effects on secondary measures of citizen attitudes toward the police in Liberia, Colombia, and Pakistan. In Liberia and Pakistan, we find sizable shifts in our measure of perceived police intentions (Liberia: 0.572 s.d.,  $p = 0.001$ ; Pakistan: 1.323 s.d.,  $p = 0.000$ ). In Colombia, perceptions of police capacity increase (0.115 s.d.;  $p = 0.006$ ). However, no other effects in eight outcome families are large or distinguishable

---

<sup>16</sup>In the Supplementary Materials, we present tables of estimated effects, standard errors, confidence intervals, raw p-values, and adjusted p-values.

from zero in any of the six sites.<sup>17</sup> Nor do they hide heterogeneity in index components: there are no effects of community policing on any index item in the eight primary indices (Figure 3). Within each site, the null effects do not reflect cross-cutting effects in opposing directions: we do not find heterogeneous effects by baseline crime rate, trust in police, community trust, or perceived state legitimacy. Moreover, we find no evidence of heterogeneous effects across any factor in tests of equal variances across treatment and control groups in any site at the  $\alpha = 0.05$  level (SM Section H.1).

Moreover, there are no effects on any of the intermediate outcomes we hypothesized as mechanisms for improving citizen trust and effectiveness of the police (Figure 2 middle panel). Community policing did not increase citizen perceptions of police intentions, knowledge of criminal justice procedures, norms of cooperation with police, perceptions of police capacity, or perceptions of the responsiveness of police. Community policing also did not affect trust in the state or communal trust, our secondary outcomes (Figure 2 bottom panel).

Why did community policing fail to increase cooperation and reduce crime victimization? We can rule out several explanations. We do not see evidence that citizens refused to cooperate with police because of a mismatch between raised citizen expectations and the police's inability to deliver on promised changes in practice: there was no change, positive or negative, in citizen perceptions of police capacity or intentions ( $p = 0.332$ ;  $p = 0.152$ ). We also see no evidence that community policing, by increasing contact between police who may engage in abuse or extortion and citizens, crowded out positive changes: the rate of police abuse did not change ( $p = 0.879$ ).

Crime displacement also does not appear to drive our results. If community policing reduced crime by pushing criminal activity out to other places, we would expect to see reductions in treated areas between baseline and endline and increases in control areas. We do not observe this pattern in crime victimization measured in citizen surveys or

---

<sup>17</sup>There are large, but extremely imprecise estimates in Brazil due to the low compliance rates and instrumental variables estimation.

police data in any site. We fail to reject the null of no difference at the  $\alpha = 0.05$  level.

We designed our outcome measurement to capture the impact of community policing broadly, whether or not our theory of citizen-police relations underlies its effects. We obtained extraordinary access to the police’s internal data to measure crime, citizen cooperation, and police behaviors. We conducted surveys of both citizens and the police, including a gold-standard crime victimization survey. We measured all five families of outcomes our systematic review identified in past studies — crime incidence, perceptions of safety, perceptions of police, police accountability, and citizen reporting — as well as a number that were not measured in past work. As a result, our null results imply that if community policing has effects, it is on peripheral outcomes that have not been identified by scholars as of central importance.

Community policing in the Global South does not deliver the benefits claimed by its advocates: it does not reduce crime, it does not build citizen trust in the police, and it does not create a virtuous cycle of citizen cooperation with police efforts to fight crime.

## Discussion

We studied community policing in six varied contexts. We found it did not work in any of them. Given their heterogeneity, it is unlikely that that we simply got unlucky and selected hard cases in which community policing was unlikely to be effective. Why then did community policing fail to deliver across all these sites?

One possibility is that our community policing interventions were not sufficiently strong to generate the hypothesized effects. We are able to compare the intensity of several components of our intervention to past studies. The duration of our treatment, between 6 months (Pakistan) and 17 months (Philippines) is comparable to past studies which have a median duration of 7 months and largely range between 1 and 12 months. The police in our sites appear to patrol on foot less intensely at baseline and in treatment areas than prominent past studies in the U.S. In the Philadelphia Foot Patrol experiment,

for example, officers patrolled 16 hours a day five days a week in treatment areas (31). We do not have direct measures of foot patrol frequency, but we surveyed citizens about how frequently they see officers patrolling on foot. At the low end, 25% of citizens in the Philippines report seeing officers daily. The rest range from 63% (Colombia) to 89% (Uganda). There was not a large increase in foot patrol frequency, except in Pakistan which went up from 60% at baseline to 71% in treated areas at endline.

By contrast with foot patrols, our six sites compare favorably to recent tests of increasing citizen-police contact, including 20-30 minute face-to-face visits with households over single 1-3 day visits to rural villages in Liberia (21); face-to-face household visits in New Haven averaging 10 minutes and ranging 5 to 40 (32); and town hall meetings with citizens 4-5 times over 14 months lasting 1.5 to 3 hours in rural Liberia (18). In our sites, town hall meetings were held semi-annually (Brazil) or bimonthly (Colombia, Liberia, and Uganda). In the Philippines, the community engagement treatment was not community meetings, but more intensive interactions in small groups during foot patrols. Additional meetings as part of community watch forums were held in Liberia and Uganda.

We cannot compare directly the strength of our treatment overall to past studies, because past evidence focuses on individual components of community policing in isolation. Our interventions were instead designed to test the bundled set of changes to police practices commonly implemented by police agencies. We chose this design for two reasons: we need evidence on the effectiveness of community policing as practiced in the real world and there may be interaction effects between components that are missed when studied alone. The fact that foot patrols are less frequent in our intervention, as a result, reflects the choices of police agencies in the Global South who decide how to implement locally-appropriate community policing.

Another possibility is that our treatment had large effects on those directly affected, i.e. community meeting participants, but none on others. Our surveys measured out-

comes of all citizens in treated and control areas, not participants. If this is the case, we would expect to see null effects overall, because our sample of meeting participants is (intentionally) small. We leave this question to further research, but note that this is not the theory of change proposed by advocates of community policing, who argue that the bundle of changes to police practices lead to changes in citizen cooperation, police attitudes toward citizens, and crime that feed off each other. Our results, at a minimum, suggest that effects of on communities as a whole will be small.

Instead, we interpret the null effect of community policing to be a function of other conditions that were not in place for this kind of reform to generate meaningful change. In particular, we observed three structural constraints that may have prevented substantive change: a lack of prioritization of community policing by police leadership; the rotation of community policing officers and of the police leaders championing the reform; and limited resources to follow-up on concerns identified by citizens.

The first problem was prioritizing community policing among the other responsibilities of the police. Police agencies that chose to partner with us were interested in implementing community policing reforms and also interested in learning whether community policing was an effective tool. At the outset, we believed these partnerships represented a best-case in terms of police buy-in, and that compliance would if anything be higher than in typical practice. Instead, in our observations and interviews with citizens and the police, it was clear in several sites that this was not the case. In Uganda, senior leadership in the Uganda Police Force did not ultimately commit substantial political capital to the project, and in general have limited ability (and will) to supervise station-level officers. As a result, station leadership could safely not prioritize community policing responsibilities.

Prioritizing tasks not traditionally within the police remit was a particular problem. In community meetings, citizens often raised local issues distinct from the major crimes that often occupied police effort. Though sharing concerns that reflect underlying causes

of insecurity is a core component of community policing, there were formal and informal barriers to spending time on them. In the Philippines, officers received the message from commanders that “major” crimes related to murder, drugs, and a local insurgency were higher priority than the “local” issues often raised by citizens. In Pakistan, the barriers are institutional: police could not by law respond to many of the problems consistently identified by the community during their forum discussions because they involved non-cognizable crimes such as domestic abuse, harassment, and financial malfeasance.<sup>18</sup> As one community policing officer put it, “We take these problems to our [station lead officer] and instead of helping us implement the agreed actions, he ignores them and gives us other tasks to do.”<sup>19</sup> Similarly, officers in the Philippines often referred issues not in the remit of the police to other government agencies, but it was common knowledge that these other agencies had low capacity for addressing the referrals.

The regular rotation of police leadership in several contexts also interrupted initially strong interest. In Pakistan, regional and district level leaders were transferred multiple times during the study period, which led to further changes at the station house level and transfers of community police officers. In the Philippines, our primary partner in the Sorsogon provincial police was promoted out of the province weeks into the implementation of the study, reducing buy-in for the intervention. Municipal police leaders were also rotated out.

Rotation was even more frequent for local station chiefs and rank-and-file officers in many sites. We depended on local leaders to align incentives and provide resources for rank-and-file officers in their stations to carry out community policing tasks. Turnover in officers assigned to carry out community policing tasks may be a problem for two

---

<sup>18</sup>Cognizable offenses in Pakistan include robbery, murder, kidnapping, and other serious crimes for which officers can arrest the perpetrator and begin the investigative process without warrant from a magistrate. Non-cognizable offenses, for officers cannot conduct an arrest or investigate without permission from a magistrate, include most forms of domestic violence, lesser crimes against persons such as assault, and most property crimes such as burglary, fraud, and forgery.

<sup>19</sup>Administrative records of community meetings in the Pakistan site confirm this pattern: less than 25 percent of the problems selected by the forums were followed up.

reasons: (1) a lack of training for officers who join the program after its inception; (2) difficulty establishing rapport with citizens and local leaders during short assignments. In Uganda, officers rotate between police posts on average every 17 months, in Colombia every 15 months, and in Pakistan every month. There, the police did not have resources to train up new officers rotated into treated posts, so many did not receive direct training in community policing practices. In the Philippines, we estimate that only 25% of officers in our study area at midline were still in the same post at endline, just 11 months later.

Effects may be also muted due to capacity constraints. Officers in some cases reported that they were asked to carry out additional duties related to community policing, such as investigating concerns raised by citizens in community fora, but not provided additional resources to do so. In others, the resource constraint was already binding in terms of salary, transportation, or materials for investigation.<sup>20</sup> If the police cannot investigate crimes and concerns raised by citizens, community policing is unlikely to lead either to reductions in crime or to build citizen trust. In Liberia, Pakistan, and Uganda, a lack of funds for investigations and even for travel appear to have been binding constraints. In Liberia, for example, after taking into account salaries, funds for supplies and logistics expenses such as fuel amount to just 41 cents per citizen (cites). In Uganda, only 10% of police stations in urban areas receive a monthly fuel allowance; none of the posts in rural areas do. The average Ugandan police station has a single motorbike for transportation and rural posts less than one.

At a time when police departments in the United States and around the world are considering reforms efforts to foster greater trust between citizens and the police, it is more important than ever to ask hard questions about the evidence base for some of the most popular reform proposals.

---

<sup>20</sup>In Pakistan, an officer told us: “Yesterday, I was on beat patrolling all night that was unconnected to the program. Today I was asked by the SHO to travel to Lahore on my own expense to appear in court in connection with a case that is unconnected to the program. I haven’t eaten anything since the morning, it is unfair to expect me to be punctual and behave well in community meetings with such a tough work routine.”

This evidence suggests that community policing may not be an effective intervention without structural changes to police departments that prioritize openness to citizen input, incentivize unit commanders and rank-and-file officers to change how they engage with the community, and provide officers with the resources they need to respond to concerns raised by citizens. It is possible that the beneficial effects of community policing observed in some advanced economies reflect not only the intervention itself, but these important background conditions. This coordinated study makes clear, however, that in diverse contexts across the Global South, the additional conditions needed to transform community policing interventions into greater trust and security are simply not in place.

More broadly, one can think of community policing as one of a number of incremental reforms to police practices that have been proposed to reduce crime, improve citizen-police trust, and reduce police abuse. The use of bodyworn cameras is another example, having been adopted across the United States and proposed around the world, to reduce police abuse by mitigating principal-agent problems between police leadership and rank-and-file officers and providing a mechanism for citizens to hold officers accountable in court proceedings. As in our study of community policing, however, recent experimental evidence finds no effect of cameras (33). One interpretation of this finding is that officers are rarely charged, convicted, or professionally reprimanded after abuse and so the cameras changed the evidence that could be brought in judicial proceedings but did not fundamentally alter a key structural constraint to reform: the role of police unions and contracts in making it difficult for the judicial system to hold officers accountable for abuse.

The bottom line is that individual reforms — whether community policing or bodyworn cameras — are implemented in complex institutional environments. On its own, community policing practices appear unable to address the systemic barriers to more effective policing and greater trust between citizens and police officers. The challenge



Draft – Not for Distribution

going forward is to identify the conditions that must be in place for incremental reforms to matter, or to refocus attention on the major structural changes in police departments that are needed, especially in the Global South.

## References

1. T. Pettersson, K. Eck, *Journal of Peace Research* **55**, 535–547 (2017).
2. S. Baranyi, P. Beaudet, U. Locher, World development report 2011: conflict, security, and development (2011).
3. R. D. Peterson, L. J. Krivo, *Divergent social worlds: Neighborhood crime and the racial-spatial divide* (Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 2010).
4. J. Legewie, *American Journal of Sociology* **122**, 379 (2016).
5. F. Edwards, H. Lee, M. Esposito, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* **116**, 16793 (2019).
6. J. W. Buehler, *American journal of public health* **107**, 295 (2017).
7. P. Wambua, Police corruption in Africa undermines trust, but support for law enforcement remains strong, *Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 56*, Afrobarometer (2015).
8. L. W. Sherman, D. Gottfredson, P. Reuter, S. Bushway, Preventing crime: What works, what doesn't, what's promising (1998). National Institute of Justice Research in Brief.
9. D. Weisburd, J. E. Eck, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* **593**, 42 (2004).
10. C. Reith, *A new study of police history* (Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1956).
11. J. R. Greene, S. D. Mastrofski, *Community policing: Rhetoric or reality* (Praeger New York, 1988).
12. W. G. Skogan, *Community policing: Can it work?* (Wadsworth/Thomson Learning Belmont, 2004).
13. Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, The key elements of problem oriented policing (2018). Report.
14. W. G. Skogan, S. M. Hartnett, *Community policing, Chicago style* (Oxford University Press, 1997).
15. A. Banerjee, R. Chattopadhyay, E. Duflo, D. Keniston, N. Singh, *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* (Forthcoming).
16. J. F. Garcia, D. Mejia, D. Ortega, Police reform, training and crime: Experimental evidence from colombia's plan cuadrantes (2013). Documento CEDE No. 2013-04.
17. R. Muggah, I. S. de Carvalho, N. Alvarado, L. Marmolejo, R. Wang, Making cities safer: Citizen security innovations from latin america (2016). Igarapé Institute Report.
18. R. Blair, S. Karim, B. Morse, *American Political Science Review* **113**, 641 (2019).

19. C. Blattman, D. P. Green, D. Ortega, S. Tobón, Place-based interventions at scale: The direct and spillover effects of policing and city services on crime (2018). NBER Working Paper 23941.
20. D. Collazos, E. García, D. Mejía, S. Tobón, D. Ortega, Hot spots policing in a high crime environment: An experimental evaluation in medellín (2019). Working paper.
21. S. Karim, *American Political Science Review* pp. 536–551 (2020).
22. W. Skogan, K. Frydl, *Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence* (The National Academies Press, 2004).
23. D. Weisburd, C. W. Telep, J. C. Hinkle, J. E. Eck, *Criminology & Public Policy* **9**, 139 (2010).
24. G. Akerlof, J. L. Yellen, Gang behavior, law enforcement, and community values (1994). Brookings Institution Paper.
25. R. Blair, S. Karim, B. Morse, *American Political Science Review* **113**, 641 (2019).
26. J. Sunshine, T. R. Tyler, *Law & Society Review* **37**, 513 (2003).
27. T. Slough, On theory and identification: When and why we need theory for causal identification (2019). Working paper.
28. J. E. Pustejovsky, E. Tipton, *Journal of Business & Economic Statistics* (2016).
29. M. Borenstein, L. V. Hedges, J. Higgins, H. R. Rothstein, *Introduction to Meta-Analysis* (Wiley, 2009).
30. Y. Benjamini, Y. Hochberg, *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B (Methodological)* pp. 289–300 (1995).
31. J. H. Ratcliffe, T. Taniguchi, E. R. Groff, J. D. Wood, *Criminology* **49**, 795 (2011).
32. K. Peyton, M. Sierra-Arévalo, D. G. Rand, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* **116**, 19894 (2019).
33. D. Yokum, A. Ravishankar, A. Coppock, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* **116**, 10329 (2019).

## Acknowledgments

A preanalysis plan was registered with EGAP at <http://egap.org/registration/5154> and is archived at OSF at <https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/2JUYZ>. This research was approved by IRBs for each site: Brazil by the Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro IRB (VRAC 11/2018); Colombia by the University of Pennsylvania IRB (827913) and the University of Florida IRB (201701883); Liberia by the MIT IRB (1704947586);

Pakistan by the Princeton University IRB (7250); Philippines by the UCSD IRB (161252S, 170415S, and 170974S); Uganda by the Brown University IRB (1897), the Columbia University IRB (AAAS2586), the Mildmay Uganda Research Ethics Committee (0306-2017), the University of Pennsylvania IRB (827645), and the Uganda National Council for Science and Technology (SS 4421). The meta-analysis was approved as exempt by the UCLA IRB (19-001869).

We thank Jaclyn Leaver for leadership and support throughout; Jason Lyall and Cyrus Samii for their substantial service in developing the project; Macartan Humphreys, Susan Hyde, and Cyrus Samii for assistance in their roles as EGAP executive directors; Jake Bowers, Alex Coppock, Don Green, and Tara Slough for methodological advice; and Ellen Chapin, Andrew Miller, Catlan Reardon, and Valerie Wirtschafter for research assistance.

## Funding

Funding for the Brazil, Colombia, Liberia, Pakistan, and Uganda sites as well as overall study coordination and the meta-analysis were provided by UK Aid (205133). Funding for the Philippines study was provided by a grant from the Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund (5896). Individual studies received supplementary funding or in-kind support from various sources. The Pakistan study was supported from the Jameel Poverty Action Lab Crime and Violence Initiative (PKGR-0895); Philippines from the University of California–San Diego Policy Design and Evaluation Lab; Uganda from Oxford Policy management (A0014-21585); and Colombia from the University of California–Berkeley Economic Development and Institutions program and Corporación Andina de Fomento.

## Figures and tables

Table 1: Systematic Evidence Review on Community Policing

<i>Intervention</i> Effect direction	Crime incidence	Perceptions of safety	Perceptions of police	Police accountability	Citizen reporting
<i>Community Fora</i>					
Increase	–	–	1	–	–
Null	–	1	–	–	–
<i>Community Presence</i>					
Increase	–	2	2	1	1
Null	4	3	4	–	1
Decrease	10	–	–	–	–
Mixed	8 (7 -/o; 1 -/+)	1 (+/o)	1 (+/o)	1 (+/o)	–
<i>Citizen Feedback</i>					
Null	–	–	1	–	–
Mixed	–	–	1 (+/o)	–	–
<i>Problem-Oriented Policing</i>					
Increase	–	2	1	–	–
Null	1	1	1	–	–
Decrease	6	–	–	–	–

Table 2: Presence of Community Policing Policies by Experimental Condition

Site	Experimental condition	Town hall meetings	Foot patrols	Problem- oriented policing	Citizen feedback	Watch forum
Brazil	Control	Never	Occasional	No	No	No
	Treatment	Semi-annual	Occasional	Yes	WhatsApp	No
Colombia	Control	None	Daily	Yes	Hotline; Mobile application	No
	Treatment	Bi-monthly	Daily	Yes	Hotline; Mobile application	No
Liberia	Control	Occasional	Occasional	No	No	Some
	Treatment	Bi-monthly	Bi-monthly	No	No	Yes
Pakistan	Control	No	Occasional	No	Hotline	No
	Treatment	Monthly	Frequent	Yes	Hotline (use encouraged)	Yes
Philippines	Control	No	Occasional	No	No	No
	Treatment	No	Weekly	Yes	Hotline <sup>a</sup>	No
Uganda	Control	Never	Occasional	No	No	Some
	Treatment	Bi-monthly	Occasional	No	No	Yes

<sup>a</sup> In the Philippines, a hotline was advertised to half of treated units.

Table 3: Study Site Experimental Designs

	Brazil	Colombia	Liberia	Pakistan	Philippines	Uganda
Unit of assignment	Neighborhoods	Beats	Communities	Beats	Barangays	Police stations (CP); villages (alt.)
Assignment strategy	Two-arm (control, CP <sup>a</sup> )	Factorial (control, CP, alt. <sup>b</sup> , CP + alt.)	Two-arm (control, CP)	Three-arm (control, CP, alt. <sup>c</sup> )	Two-arm (control, CP) with addl. cross-randomizations <sup>d</sup>	Three arm (Control, CP, CP+alt. <sup>e</sup> )
Blocking	Municipality	Police station	Police zone	Police station	Municipality, baseline crime rate	Baseline covariates
Officers randomized	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓
Crime data units	Neighborhoods	Beats	Communities	Beats	Barangays <sup>f</sup>	Police stations
Survey primary units	Neighborhoods	Beats	Communities	Beats	Barangays	Villages
Duration of treatment	7 months	12 months	11 months	6 months	17 months	13 months
Citizen surveys						
Design	Panel	Panel	Cross-section	Panel	Cross-section	Panel
Baseline	✓	✓	✓	✓	Partial	✓
Endline	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Officer surveys						
Design	Cross-section	Cross-section	Cross-section	Cross-section	Cross-section	Panel
Baseline	✓	X	X	✓	Partial	✓
Endline	✓	✓	X	✓	✓	✓
Administrative crime data	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Admin. data time period						
Baseline	Jan'17 - May'18		Aug'16-Jan'17	Jan'17-Mar'19	Aug'16-Feb'17	
Endline	Jun'18 - Feb'19		Jan'18-Jul'18	Mar'19-Nov'19	Jan'18-Jul'18	

<sup>a</sup> Harmonized common community policing treatment.

<sup>b</sup> In Colombia, an additional treatment arm involved distributing flyers about (i) resources for victims of domestic violence; (b) Colombia's new Police Code; (c) community-level crime trends; and (d) information on crime reporting. We do not analyze the effects of this treatment following our pre-analysis plan.

<sup>c</sup> In Pakistan, an additional treatment group involved the harmonized common community policing treatment but involved additional training provided to citizens to address gender-related and family crimes. These sessions involved a female police officer who regularly interacted with female members of the community by engaging female union councilors, female school teachers and lady health worker alongside.

<sup>d</sup> In Philippines, the study teams included multiple alternate treatment arms, all of which involved the harmonized common community policing treatment along with the creation of problem oriented policing teams which identified and addressed the most pressing issues in each treated barangay. In the first alternative arm, officers are supplied with promotional stickers to pass out during their engagement that include the new PNP provincial hotline number, along with a call for citizens to text/call in reports, complaints, or suggestions. In the second alternative arm, officers are told that they will be evaluated based on their performance during the community engagement program, and that the top performers will be recognized at a public ceremony. In the third and fourth alternative arms, the policing teams are either composed of local government members or local government members and police officers. In the fifth alternative arm, the teams are told that they are being evaluated by one of two political principals, the Mayor's Office of the corresponding municipality and the Department of Interior and Local Government.

<sup>e</sup> In Uganda, we implement the harmonized common community policing treatment with follow-up meetings focused on reiteration of the earlier meeting and addressing any follow-up questions/concerns that citizens would have.

<sup>f</sup> Barangays are the lowest level of the police hierarchy, equivalent to rural villages and urban neighborhoods.

Table 4: Outcome Measures and Data Sources

Hyp.	Primary outcome index	Index components	Data source
1a.	Crime victimization index <sup>a</sup>	Violent crime (personal); Nonviolent crime (personal); Violent crime (community); Non-violent crime (community)	Citizen survey
1b.	Perceived future insecurity index	Feared violent crime; Feared walking	Citizen survey
2.	Overall perceptions of police index	Trust in police; Trust in service of police	Citizen survey
3a.	Police perceptions of citizens index <sup>b</sup>	Abuse index; Accountability index; Corruption index; Empathy index	Officer survey
3b.	Police abuse	Abuse (binary); Bribe amount; Bribe frequency	Citizen survey
4a.	Crime reporting index	Violent crime (personal); Violent crime (community); Nonviolent crime reporting (community); Nonviolent crime reporting (personal); Resolution of crime index	Citizen survey
4b.	Crime tips index	Crime tips index	Citizen survey
		Tips count (hotline); Tips count (comment box)	Administrative
4c.	Police abuse reporting index	Beating community member; Verbal abuse	Citizen survey
M1a.	Perceived police intentions index	Corruption; Treat fairly; Treat seriously	Citizen survey
M1b.	Knowledge of criminal justice <sup>c</sup>	Legal knowledge; Knowledge of how to report crimes	Citizen survey
M1c.	Cooperation norms index	Reporting norm (theft); Reporting norm (domestic abuse); Obey police norm	Citizen survey
M2a.	Perceived police capacity index	Police timeliness; Police investigation capacity	Citizen survey
M2b.	Perceived police responsiveness		Citizen survey
S1.	Perceived state legitimacy <sup>d</sup>		Citizen survey
S2.	Community trust		Citizen survey
C.	Compliance index	Foot patrol frequency; Vehicle patrol frequency; Community meeting awareness	Citizen survey

<sup>a</sup> Colombia estimates not included in meta-estimate, due to a difference in measurement. A common measure of crime victimization with all estimates is included in the Supplementary Materials.

<sup>b</sup> Brazil, Liberia, and Philippines sites not included in meta-analysis, because officers were not randomized into participation in community policing or control due to the organizational structure of the police agency.

<sup>c</sup> Philippines' estimates not included due to a difference in measurement.

<sup>d</sup> Uganda and Pakistan sites not included in the meta-analysis; state legitimacy was not measured in these two cases.

Table 5: Descriptive Analysis of Crime and Policing in Six Contexts

	Brazil	Colombia	Liberia	Pakistan	Philippines	Uganda
Location	Santa Caterina	Medellin	Monrovia	Punjab Province	Sorgoson Province	
Type	State	Large city	Large city	Two districts	Province	Country
Crime victimization <sup>a</sup>						
Simple assault	1	5	6	5	3	6
Burglary	4	15	17	16	2	19
Armed robbery	0	6	3	10	0	2
Murder	1	9	7	21	1	19
Trust in police <sup>b</sup>	79	47	46	23	86	62
Officer intentions <sup>c</sup>	-	78	-	64	-	79
Citizen cooperation <sup>d</sup>	1	5	-	2	1	5
Police capacity <sup>e</sup>						
Vehicle	✓			✓		
Motorbike	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Gun	✓	✓		✓	✓	
Radio	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Computer	✓	✓		✓	✓	
Printer	✓	✓		✓	✓	
Camera	✓	✓		✓	✓	
Daily supervisor check-in	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Officers per capita	1:473	1:333	1:950	1:560 <sup>f</sup>	1:991 <sup>i</sup>	1:910 <sup>j</sup>
Budget per officer	\$56,000	\$18,000	\$3,642	\$3,400 <sup>f</sup>	\$18,000	-
Citizens per station	-	143,000 <sup>g</sup>	21,428	500,000 <sup>h</sup>	800,000	-
Officer rotation	-	15 months	-	1 month	2.75 months <sup>k</sup>	17 months

<sup>a</sup> We report here the proportion of citizens who say they or a member of their household have been a victim of the crime at least once. These numbers represent baseline data for all studies except Philippines and Brazil, where control group data at endline are used.

<sup>b</sup> Respondents were asked whether they generally agree or disagree with the following statement “I generally trust the police.” We report here proportion of people who agree with the statement. These numbers represent baseline data for all studies except Philippines and Brazil, where control group data at endline are used.

<sup>c</sup> Police officers were asked whether they agree or disagree with the following statement “When people complain about the police, they usually have a good reason.” We report here proportion of police officers who strongly agree with the statement.

<sup>d</sup> We ask respondents who were a victim of the crimes mentioned that whether they reported these crimes to the police or not. We report here the proportion of citizens who say they or a member of their household have been a victim of one or more than one crime and these crimes were reported to the police. These numbers represent baseline data for all studies except Philippines and Brazil, where control group data at endline are used.

<sup>e</sup> These data comes from the study teams’ observations during the implementation of the treatment.

<sup>f</sup> Census 2017 and Punjab Police Statuary Annual Report 2018-19.

<sup>g</sup> In Medellin, there are seventeen stations and 2.47 million residents (1:143,000). There are many more small Centros de Atención Integral, where residents can speak with police. There are about 47 of these, or one per 52,000 residents.

<sup>h</sup> Census 2017 and Pakistan Bureau of Statistics.

<sup>i</sup> 2015 Census.

<sup>j</sup> World Internal Security & Police Index Report 2016.

<sup>k</sup> Only 25% of officers in the Philippines’ study area at midline were still in the same post at endline, 11 months later.






Figure 1: Compliance rates. We report the meta-analytic estimate and country estimates of the average compliance rates, measured using three variables measuring the frequency of patrols, frequency of encounters with police, and citizen knowledge of community engagement community meetings with police.




Figure 2: Main effects of community policing. We report meta-analytic estimates of average treatment effects pooling across contexts for each of the primary outcomes, mechanisms, and secondary outcomes.




Figure 3: Variation in effects across contexts. We report the country-level estimates of average treatment effects for each main effect estimate presented in Figure 2. These country estimates are pooled to construct the meta-analytic estimates presented in Figure 2.




Figure 4: Variation in effects across outcomes. We report meta-analytic estimates of average treatment effects pooling across contexts for the constituent measures of the main effects.

## Contents

<b>A. Study experimental designs</b>	<b>39</b>
A.1 Brazil . . . . .	39
A.2 Colombia . . . . .	41
A.3 Liberia . . . . .	43
A.4 Pakistan . . . . .	45
A.5 Philippines . . . . .	50
A.6 Uganda . . . . .	53
<b>B. Ethics</b>	<b>56</b>
<b>C. Pre-registered outcome measures</b>	<b>59</b>
<b>D. Balance tables</b>	<b>61</b>
<b>E. Meta-analysis results</b>	<b>62</b>
E.1 Compliance results . . . . .	62
E.2 Primary hypotheses . . . . .	63
E.3 Secondary hypotheses . . . . .	63
E.4 Primary hypotheses (as pre-registered) . . . . .	64
E.5 Secondary hypotheses (as pre-registered) . . . . .	64
E.6 Primary hypotheses (using list-wise deletion) . . . . .	65
E.7 Secondary hypotheses (using list-wise deletion) . . . . .	65
E.8 Primary hypotheses by item . . . . .	66
E.9 Secondary hypotheses by item . . . . .	70
<b>F. Study Results</b>	<b>72</b>
F.1 Compliance results . . . . .	72
F.2 Primary hypotheses . . . . .	73
F.3 Secondary hypotheses . . . . .	76
F.4 Primary hypotheses (as pre-registered) . . . . .	77
F.5 Secondary hypotheses (as pre-registered) . . . . .	79
F.6 Primary hypotheses (using list-wise deletion) . . . . .	80
F.7 Secondary hypotheses (using list-wise deletion) . . . . .	83
F.8 Primary hypotheses by item . . . . .	84
F.9 Secondary hypotheses by item . . . . .	91
<b>G. Brazil study: First stage results</b>	<b>96</b>
<b>H. Heterogeneous effects</b>	<b>97</b>
H.1 Test for heterogeneous effects . . . . .	97
H.2 Heterogeneous effects by crime victimization index (baseline) . . . . .	99
H.3 Heterogeneous effects by trust in police (baseline) . . . . .	101
H.4 Heterogeneous effects by community trust (baseline) . . . . .	103
H.5 Heterogeneous effects by perceived state legitimacy (baseline) . . . . .	105

<b>I. Alternative meta-analysis results (excluding Brazil site)</b>	<b>107</b>
I.1 Compliance results . . . . .	107
I.2 Main figures . . . . .	108
I.3 Primary hypotheses . . . . .	112
I.4 Results for secondary hypotheses . . . . .	112
I.5 Primary hypotheses (as pre-registered) . . . . .	113
I.6 Secondary hypotheses (as pre-registered) . . . . .	113
I.7 Primary hypotheses (using list-wise deletion) . . . . .	114
I.8 Secondary hypotheses (using list-wise deletion) . . . . .	114
I.9 Primary hypotheses by item . . . . .	115
I.10 Secondary hypotheses by item . . . . .	116
<b>J. Deviations from preanalysis plan</b>	<b>118</b>

# **Community Policing Does Not Build Trust or Reduce Crime: Evidence from Six Coordinated Field Experiments**

## **Materials and Methods**

### **A. Study experimental designs**

We provide declarations of the experimental design for each of the six sites in words and in code using `DeclareDesign` (*SM1*). This code is also included in the replication materials.

#### **A.1 Brazil**

**Sample frame.** The sample frame is a set of 196 physical locations, and the 300 meter circles surrounding them, selected by commanders in 24 participating municipalities in Santa Catarina State in Brazil.

**Sampling.** The study is conducted in all of the 196 locations. A random walk pattern is used to select 68 households for locations in the treatment group and 34 households in locations the control group (an average of 43 and 33 were found in the study).<sup>21</sup> Whenever there were not a sufficient number of households found through the random walk pattern at a location, all households were interviewed. When that insufficient, we expanded the radius to 350m or 400m. If a sufficient number of households was still not found, no further interviews were conducted at the location.

**Outcome measurement.** Outcomes are measured at baseline and endline in citizen surveys and at endline in officer surveys. Police crime data was provided a point level and spatially matched to points, and collapsed into preintervention (Jan'17 to May'18) and postintervention (Jun'18 to Feb'19) periods.

Data collection was mistakenly not conducted in two locations with noncompliance. In an appendix, we reanalyze the Brazil data with an extreme value bounds analysis to assess the robustness of the findings to differential attrition for these two locations. [TBD]

**Treatment assignment.** We randomly assigned the 196 locations with equal probability to the encouragement treatment (hold meeting and advertise on Facebook) or control (no meeting or advertisement) via block randomization within participating municipalities.

---

<sup>21</sup>The aim of oversampling households in treatment locations was to increase the likelihood of capturing households that eventually will participate in Rede de Vizinhos groups.

Due to a transcription error during implementation, four units received a different treatment status than the one they were assigned. We analyze the data using the assigned treatment status, meaning that this is an additional source of noncompliance.

**Estimation.** *Administrative data outcomes*

```
iv_robust(acrime_num ~ groupformed + acrime_num_baseline +
          as.factor(municipalities) | Z + acrime_num_baseline + as.factor(municipalities)
          data = bra_data_crime)
# coefficient of interest: groupformed
```

*Citizen Survey outcomes*

```
iv_robust(responsive_act ~ groupformed + responsive_act_baseline +
          as.factor(municipalities) | Z + responsive_act_baseline + as.factor(municipalities)
          clusters = locations,
          weights = 1 / S_citizens_inclusion_prob,
          data = bra_data_citizen)
# coefficient of interest: Z
```

**Design declaration.**

```
sd_Y0 <- 1
encouragement_effect_size <- 0.5
std_effect_size <- 0.1

bra_design <-
  declare_population(
    municipalities = add_level(
      N = 24,
      municipality_fx = rnorm(N, sd = 5),
      N_locations = c(2, 10, 10, 10, 3, 10, 10, 10, 4, 15, 10, 10, 10, 20, 5, 8, 4, 3, 2),
    ),
    locations = add_level(N = N_locations, location_fx = rnorm(N, sd = 5)),
    citizens = add_level(N = 68, Y_baseline = rnorm(N, sd = sqrt(0.5)), u = rnorm(N, sd = 1)),
  ) +
  declare_potential_outcomes(
    D ~ if_else(encouragement_effect_size * Z + Y_baseline + u > 0, 1, 0),
    assignment_variables = Z
  ) +
  declare_potential_outcomes(Y ~ std_effect_size * D + u, assignment_variables = D) +
  declare_assignment(
    clusters = locations,
    blocks = municipalities,
    prob = 0.5
```



```

) +
declare_sampling(strata = locations, n_unit = if_else(Z == 1, 68, 34)) +
declare_reveal(D, Z) +
declare_reveal(Y, D) +
declare_estimator(
  Y ~ D | Z + Y_baseline + as.factor(municipalities),
  clusters = locations,
  model = iv_robust
)

```

## A.2 Colombia

**Sample frame.** We study the 413 *cuadrantes* (police beats) in the city of Medellin. We defined a “prioritized neighborhood” around each beat as the set of inhabited, contiguous city blocks closest to the centroid of the police beat. Each prioritized neighborhood comprised about four blocks, depending on the residential density, so as to ensure similar populations. When the centroid of the police beat fell in (for example) a park, we began the prioritized neighborhood at the inhabited block closest to the centroid. There are 413 *cuadrantes* in the city; 66 were excluded that were (a) located in remote areas of the city, or (b) non-residential (e.g., the local airport).

**Sampling.** The study is conducted in all 347 selected *cuadrantes*. We surveyed 15 respondents per prioritized neighborhood. Households are surveyed randomly within each neighborhood through a random walk method, with a random starting point. At endline, we found a low recontact rate for baseline survey respondents. 620 respondents were re-contacted and 298 new interviewees were found.

**Outcome measurement.** Outcomes are measured at baseline and endline in citizen surveys (as noted, 298 endline respondent do not have baseline outcomes recorded) and at endline in officer surveys. Police crime data was provided a point level and spatially matched to *cuadrantes*, and collapsed into preintervention (XX time) and postintervention (XX time) periods.

**Treatment assignment.** We randomly assigned the 387 *cuadrantes* with equal probability into one of four groups in a factorial design: (1) control, with no changes to status quo policing; (2) the harmonized community policing treatment; (3) informational flyers; and (4) both harmonized community policing and informational flyers.

**Estimation.** Due to research constraints, we do not control for outcomes at baseline in the officer survey. In addition, we are only able to control for some baseline outcomes from the citizen survey.<sup>22</sup>

---

<sup>22</sup>Outcomes for which we are unable to control for at baseline include: *polcasefair*, *burglaryres*, *bribe\_whatfor*, *bribe\_amt*, *armedrob\_satisfied*, *burglary\_satisfied*, *simpleassault\_satisfied*,

*Administrative data outcomes* (Controlling for baseline outcome if available.)

```
lm_robust(
  acrime_num ~ Z_common + Z_alt + acrime_num_baseline + as.factor(block_ID),
  data = col_data_crime)
# coefficient of interest: Z_common
```

*Citizen survey outcomes* (Controlling for baseline outcome if available.)

```
lm_robust(
  responsive_act ~ Z_common + Z_alt + responsive_act_baseline + as.factor(block_ID),
  clusters = cuadrantes,
  weights = 1 / S_citizens_inclusion_prob,
  data = col_data_citizen)
# coefficient of interest: Z_common
```

*Officer survey outcomes* (Note an officer baseline was not conducted, so not controlling for baseline outcome).

```
lm_robust(
  empathy_idx ~ Z_common + Z_alt + as.factor(block_ID),
  weights = 1 / S_inclusion_prob,
  data = col_data_officer)
# coefficient of interest: Z_common
```

## Design declaration.

```
col_design <-
  declare_population(
    cuadrantes = add_level(N = 347, block_fx = rnorm(N, sd = 5)),
    citizens = add_level(N = 15,
      Y_baseline = rnorm(N, sd = sqrt(0.5)),
      u = rnorm(N, sd = sqrt(0.5)))) +
  declare_potential_outcomes(
    Y_Z_0 = Y_baseline + u,
    Y_Z_1 = Y_baseline + std_effect_size + u,
    Y_Z_2 = Y_baseline + std_effect_size + u,
    Y_Z_3 = Y_baseline + std_effect_size + u) +
  declare_assignment(
    # within each block, we will assign each micro-neighborhood to one of four groups:
    # (0) pure control (no intervention);
    # (1) treated only with police-community meetings;
```

---

other\_any, other\_report, other\_satisfied, caggassault\_any, caggassault\_num, caggassault\_report, cmurder\_num, cmurder\_report, cother\_any, cother\_report, fear\_violent, know\_law\_suspect, know\_law\_lawyer, know\_law\_fees, know\_law\_vaw, know\_report\_station, and obeynorm. All other outcomes are controlled for at baseline.

```
# (2) treated only with information provision;
# (3) treated with both police-community meetings and information provision.
# blocked by block, clustered by micro_neighborhood_ID (b/c multiple months)
clusters = cuadrantes,
# blocks = block_ID,
prob_each = rep(1/4, 4),
conditions = c(0, # control
               1, # common arm
               2, # alt
               3)) + # both
declare_step(
  # recode treatment status for analysis
  Z_common = if_else(Z == 1 | Z == 3, 1, 0),
  Z_alt = if_else(Z == 2 | Z == 3, 1, 0),
  handler = mutate) +
  declare_reveal(Y, Z) +
  declare_estimator(
    Y ~ Z_common + Z_alt + Y_baseline, # + as.factor(block_ID),
    clusters = cuadrantes,
    # weights = 1 / S_citizens_inclusion_prob,
    model = lm_robust)
```

### A.3 Liberia

**Sample frame.** Monrovia is divided into ten administrative police zones, which are akin to police precincts in major U.S. cities and typically composed of between 15 and 40 communities or neighborhoods. Communities are sub-divided into anywhere from three to six blocks, which are akin to small neighborhoods or street blocks in the United States. The intervention targeted the most central block in each community plus the largest two adjacent blocks.

**Sampling.** Within each zone, local research assistants worked with the police to identify any “high priority” communities to be nominated for the intervention based on assessments of crime rates, police-community relations, or other factors. This process identified 35 high priority communities. Because this sample size was smaller than anticipated and would have resulted in an under-powered study, an additional 65 communities were randomly sampled from the remaining population of communities for a total of 100 communities. During the baseline survey and before treatment assignment, two communities were found to be duplicates of other communities and were dropped. During implementation, staffing constraints within the research team required that the smallest police zone (Zone 6) be dropped. Within each community, 20 respondents for the survey were randomly sampled from the selected blocks following a random walk procedure.

**Outcome measurement.** Outcomes are measured at baseline and endline in citizen surveys. Officer surveys were not conducted. Police crime data was provided at the community level, and collapsed into preintervention (August 2016 to January 2017) and postintervention (January 2018 to July 2018) periods.

**Treatment assignment.** Half of the communities within each zone were randomly assigned to treatment via block randomization.<sup>23</sup>

**Estimation.** *Administrative data outcomes* (Controlling for baseline outcome if available.)

```
lm_robust(acrime_num ~ Z + acrime_num_baseline + as.factor(police_zones),
          weights = 1 / S_communities_inclusion_prob,
          data = lbr_data_crime)
# coefficient of interest: Z
```

*Citizen Survey outcomes* (Controlling for baseline outcome if available.)

```
lm_robust(responsive_act ~ Z + responsive_act_baseline + as.factor(police_zones),
          clusters = communities,
          weights = 1 / (S_communities_inclusion_prob *
                        S_citizens_inclusion_prob),
          data = lbr_data_citizen)
# coefficient of interest: Z
```

**Design declaration.**

```
sd_Y0 <- 1
std_effect_size <- 0.1

lbr_design <-
  declare_population(
    police_zones = add_level(
      N = 10,
      N_communities = c(22, 43, 29, 32, 16, 12, 16, 20, 35, 19),
      zone_fx = rnorm(N, sd = 5)),
    communities = add_level(N = N_communities,
                            high_crime = c(rep(1, 35),
                                           rep(0, 209))),
    blocks = add_level(N = 3, block_fx = rnorm(N, sd = 5)),
    citizens = add_level(N = 20,
                        Y_baseline = rnorm(N, sd = sqrt(0.5)),
```

---

<sup>23</sup>In zones with an odd number of communities,  $(N_b - 1)/2$  communities were assigned to treatment, where  $N_b$  denotes the number of communities in block  $b$ , resulting in a slightly less or slightly higher than  $1/2$  probability of assignment to treatment, depending on rounding. We account for this in the analysis by weighting observations by the inverse of the probability of assignment.

```

      u = rnorm(N, sd = sqrt(0.5)))) +
declare_potential_outcomes(
  Y_Z_0 = Y_baseline + u,
  Y_Z_1 = Y_baseline + std_effect_size + u,
  Y_Z_2 = Y_baseline + std_effect_size + u,
  Y_Z_3 = Y_baseline + std_effect_size + u) +
declare_sampling(
  handler = function(data) {
    # randomly sample 65 communities from among communities not prioritized
    data$S_remainder <- NA
    data$S_remainder[data$high_crime == FALSE] <-
    cluster_rs(clusters = data$communities[data$high_crime == FALSE], n = 65)
    # select prioritized communities plus the 65 sampled communities
    data %>% filter(high_crime == TRUE | S_remainder == 1) %>% select(-S_remainder)
  }
) +
declare_assignment(clusters = communities, prob = 0.5, blocks = police_zones) +
declare_reveal(Y, Z) +
declare_estimator(
  Y ~ Z + Y_baseline + as.factor(police_zones),
  clusters = communities,
  # weights = 1 / S_citizens_inclusion_prob,
  model = lm_robust)

```

## A.4 Pakistan

**Sample frame.** We study community policing in Sheikhpura and Nankana districts in Sheikhpura Region of Pakistan’s Punjab Province. Sheikhpura and Nankana districts have a combined population size of 4.6 million people. These two districts consist of 27 police stations and 151 beats consisting of 1053 villages and 516 urban neighborhoods. Sheikhpura and Nankana have roughly 340 police officers at the Sub-Inspector (SI) and Assistant Sub-Inspector (ASI) rank.

**Sampling.** We draw two independent samples of beats and combine them. First, within each of the 27 police stations we randomly sample three beats for a total of 81 sampled beats. Second, excluding those 81 beats we conduct a probability-proportional-to-size sample of 27 additional beats across all stations in Sheikhpura and Nankana districts, based on AsiaPop grid-cell data on population. (The sampling takes place as part of the random assignment of beats, described below.)

We draw a random sample of 3,456 individuals in the 108 sampled beats, stratified by beat with 32 sampled per beat. We then independently draw an additional sample of 864 respondents (8 per beat) with the same beat-stratified method. We use probability-proportional-to-size sampling for sampling respondents within beats. We take the AsiaPop 100-meter grid cell population data, aggregate to 500x500 meter grid cells, and

draw a population-proportional-to-size sample of four grid cells within each beat. We then choose a random starting point within each sampled grid, and then use a left-hand rule from the starting point for eight houses. This yields a sample of 3,456 individuals in the 108 sampled beats. We repeat this exercise, sampling one grid cell within each beat and eight households within each cell, to draw an additional sample of 864 respondents to be used as replacements.

**\*\* Details on officer sampling**

**Outcome measurement.** Outcomes are measured at baseline and endline in citizen and officer surveys. Police crime data was provided at the beat level, and collapsed into preintervention (January 2017 to March 2019) and postintervention (March to November 2019) periods.

**Random assignment.** We randomly assign beats through two independent randomizations. First, we randomly assign the stratified sample of three beats per station using randomization blocked on stations: one beat assigned to control, one to the common arm, and one to the alternative arm. We then randomize the sample of 27 additional beats into the three conditions using complete random assignment with nine beats assigned to each condition. Note that the assignment process includes the sampling process. The treatment variable then is calculated by combining the two indicators: if the beat is not assigned to a treatment in the first stage, it is available in the second stage; if it selected in neither, it is not sampled.

**Estimation.** *Administrative data outcomes* (Controlling for baseline outcome if available.)

```
lm_robust(acrime_num ~ Z_common + Z_alt + acrime_num_baseline + as.factor(stations),
          weights = 1 / (Z_multistage_assignment_prob *
                        S_multistage_inclusion_prob),
          data = pak_data_crime)
# coefficient of interest: Z_common
```

*Citizen Survey outcomes* (Controlling for baseline outcome if available.)

```
lm_robust(
  responsive_act ~ Z_common + Z_alt + responsive_act_baseline + as.factor(stations),
  clusters = beats,
  weights = 1 / (Z_multistage_assignment_prob * S_multistage_inclusion_prob_survey),
  data = pak_data_citizen)
# coefficient of interest: Z_common
```

*Officer survey outcomes* (Controlling for baseline outcome if available.)

```
lm_robust(empathy_idx ~ Z_common + Z_alt + empathy_idx_baseline + as.factor(stations),
          clusters = beats,
          weights = 1 / (Z_multistage_assignment_prob *
```

```
          S_multistage_inclusion_prob),
  data = pak_data_officer)
# coefficient of interest: Z_common
```

### Design declaration.

```
std_effect_size <- 0.1
beats_per_station <-
  c(rep(3, 3),
    rep(4, 5),
    rep(5, 5),
    rep(6, 2),
    rep(7, 3),
    rep(8, 5),
    rep(9, 2),
    rep(3, 2))

pak_design <-
  declare_population(
    districts = add_level(
      N = 2,
      district_name = c("Sheikhupura", "Nankana"),
      N_stations = c(16, 11)),
    stations = add_level(
      N = N_stations,
      N_beats = beats_per_station),
    beats = add_level(
      N = N_beats,
      beat_population = sample(1000:2000, N, replace = TRUE)),
    citizen_ID = add_level(
      N = beat_population,
      Y_baseline = rnorm(N, sd = sqrt(0.5)),
      u = rnorm(N, sd = sqrt(0.5)))) +
  declare_potential_outcomes(
    Y_Z_0 = Y_baseline + u,
    Y_Z_1 = Y_baseline + std_effect_size + u,
    Y_Z_2 = Y_baseline + std_effect_size + u) +
  # declare_sampling(handler = filter) +
  declare_assignment(
    # assign ~1/3 beats to common arm treatment (Z = 1),
    # assign ~1/3 beats to ADR alternative arm treatment (Z == 2),
    # assign ~1/3 beats to control (Z = 0)
    clusters = beats, blocks = stations,
    block_m_each =
      cbind(matrix(rep(1, 3),
```

```

        ncol = 3,
        nrow = 27),
        beats_per_station - 3),
conditions = c(0, # control
               1, # common arm
               2, # alternative arm (ADR)
               99), # available to assign in second stage
assignment_variable = "S1") +
declare_assignment(
  clusters = beats, blocks = S1,
  block_m_each = rbind(c(rep(0, 3), 27, 0),
                       c(rep(0, 3), 27, 0),
                       c(rep(0, 3), 27, 0),
                       c(rep(9, 3), 0, 43)),
  conditions = c(0, # control
               1, # common arm
               2, # alternative arm (ADR)
               99, # assigned in first stage
               88), # not sampled
  assignment_variable = "S2") +
declare_step(handler = function(data){
  prob_mat <-
    block_and_cluster_ra_probabilities(
      clusters = data$beats,
      blocks = data$stations,
      block_m_each =
        cbind(matrix(rep(1, 3),
                      ncol = 3,
                      nrow = 27),
              beats_per_station - 3),
      conditions =
        c(0, # control
          1, # common arm
          2 # alternative arm)) # available to assign in second stage
  colnames(prob_mat) <- paste0("S1_", colnames(prob_mat))
  data <- cbind(data, prob_mat)

  prob_mat <-
    block_and_cluster_ra_probabilities(
      clusters = data$beats,
      blocks = data$S1,
      block_m_each =
        rbind(c(rep(0, 3), 27, 0),
              c(rep(0, 3), 27, 0),
              c(rep(0, 3), 27, 0),

```



```

        c(rep(9, 3), 0, 43)),
    conditions =
      c(0, # control
        1, # common arm
        2, # alternative arm (ADR)
        99, # assigned in first stage
        88)) # not sampled)
    colnames(prob_mat)
    cbind(data, prob_mat)
  }) +
  declare_step(filter, S2 != 88) +
  declare_sampling(
    # sample 32 citizens for baseline from each community + 8 replacements
    # independently, survey 32 + 8 citizens for endline from each community
    strata = beats, n = 40,
    sampling_variable = "S_citizen") +
  declare_sampling(
    # assign 8 / 40 per beat-wave as replacements
    # 32 to be used first
    strata = beats, n = 32,
    sampling_variable = "S_primary_respondents") +
  # calculate probability of inclusion in sample from two-stage sampling procedure
  # and then citizen sampling
  declare_step(mutate,
    S_multistage_inclusion_prob_survey =
      (1 - S1_prob_99 * S2_prob_88) *
      S_citizen_inclusion_prob *
      S_primary_respondents_inclusion_prob) +
  # construct single assignment variable, whether beat assigned in stage 1 or 2
  declare_step(mutate, Z = ifelse(S1 == 99, S2, S1)) +
  # calculate probability of assignment from two-stage sampling procedure
  declare_step(mutate,
    Z_multistage_assignment_prob =
      ifelse(S1 == 99,
        S1_cond_prob * S2_cond_prob,
        S1_cond_prob)) +
  declare_step(mutate,
    Z_common = if_else(Z == 1, 1, 0),
    Z_alt = if_else(Z == 2, 1, 0)) +
  declare_reveal(Y, Z) +
  declare_estimator(
    Y ~ Z_common + Z_alt + Y_baseline + as.factor(stations),
    clusters = beats,
    weights = 1 / (Z_multistage_assignment_prob * S_multistage_inclusion_prob_survey),
    model = lm_robust)

```

## A.5 Philippines

**Sample frame.** We study policing in the 541 barangays (neighborhoods or villages) in Sorsogon Province in the Philippines. The Philippines National Police is organized in three hierarchical levels: Provincial, Municipal, and Barangay. The Provincial office includes the police chief, administrative staff, and special duty officers. The 15 Municipal offices include all rank-and-file officers along with a Municipal Police Chief and administrative staff. In Sorsogon City (the provincial capital), there are three district offices that serve similar functions to the municipal office.

**Sampling.** The Armed Forces of the Philippines 9th Infantry Division declared 298 barangays in Sorsogon Province to be safe enough for our enumerators to operate. We conduct our evaluation in all 298 of these barangays. Within each barangay, citizens were randomly sampled from the full roster of certified voters at midline and form a panel for the midline and endline survey. For the midline survey, we randomly selected 10 respondents per barangay. (A small baseline survey was conducted in a subsample of areas; this baseline is not analyzed in the study.) If the selected individual's household could not be located, the enumerator moved on to the next randomly-selected name. If the enumerator located the selected individual's household, but the respondent was unavailable and not expected to return in the same day (or was unwilling to participate), the enumerator interviewed an available adult member of the same household. For the endline, we first attempted to re-contact the individuals surveyed at midline. Enumerators succeeded in interviewing 63.9% of midline respondents. We then randomly selected additional respondents in each barangay from the list of registered voters and contacted them using the same procedures as used during midline until we had achieved 15 responses per barangay.

**Outcome measurement.** Outcomes are measured in citizen surveys at midline (after implementing the community engagement program) and endline (after implementing the problem-oriented policing program). Following the preanalysis plan, we do not analyze the midline data, which is reported on separately. Officer surveys were conducted at endline, but are only analyzed descriptively here as officers were not randomized into the common treatment in this site. Police crime data was provided at the barangay level, and collapsed into preintervention (August 2016 to February 2017) and postintervention (January to July 2018) periods.

**Random assignment.** We use a factorial experimental design implemented in two phases: a CEP phase and a POP phase. In the first phase (CEP), barangays are randomly assigned to 1) a control condition, 2) a treatment condition in which CEP is implemented along with an encouragement to use the SMS tip line, and 3) a treatment condition in which CEP is implemented without an encouragement to use the SMS tip line. In addition, CEP-treated barangays are assigned to either A) a control condition, or B) a treatment condition in which police officers have a chance to be given a certificate of recognition conditional on performance.

In the second phase (POP), CEP-treated barangays are randomly assigned to 1) a treatment condition in which POP is implemented by Barangay Council and Tanods alone, and 2) a treatment condition in which POP is implemented by PNP and Barangay Council and Tanods in coordination with each other. The pure control group is common across CEP and POP phases. In addition, villages treated with POP are assigned to either A) a control condition or B) a treatment condition in which POP teams receive top-down accountability from the Mayor's office, or C) a treatment condition in which POP teams receive top-down accountability from the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Provincial Office.

The procedure for this initial randomization unintentionally led to two deviations from the planned design. In particular, most units were put into a single large block due to the way the Stata *randtreat* command treats missing values and several units were put into blocks of size 1. As a result, we do not include blocked fixed effects. We estimated the probabilities of assignment through simulation and found they varied across blocks only within a very narrow range (very close to 0.33), so we do not reweight our estimates based on the assignment probabilities. (This plan was registered in a PAP amendment before analysis.)

**Estimation.** *Administrative data outcomes* (Not controlling for baseline)

```
lm_robust(acrime_num ~ Z_common + Z_officer + Z_mayor + Z_dilg,
          data = phl_data_crime)
# coefficient of interest: Z_common
```

*Citizen Survey outcomes* (Not controlling for baseline)

```
lm_robust(responsive_act ~ Z_common + Z_officer + Z_mayor + Z_dilg,
          clusters = barangay,
          data = phl_data_citizen)
# coefficient of interest: Z_common
```

**Design declaration.**

```
sd_Y0 <- 1
std_effect_size <- 0.1

phl_design <-
  declare_population(
    barangays = add_level(N = 298),
    citizens = add_level(N = 15, Y_baseline = rnorm(N, sd = sqrt(0.5)),
                        u = rnorm(N, sd = sqrt(0.5)))) +
  declare_potential_outcomes(
    Y_Z_common_0 = Y_baseline + u,
    Y_Z_common_1 = Y_baseline + std_effect_size + u,
    Y_Z_common_2 = Y_baseline + std_effect_size + u) +
```

```
declare_assignment(  
  # assign 1/3 of barangays to control, 1/3 to CEP intervention plus tipline,  
  # 1/3 to CEP intervention with no tipline (both are common arm)  
  clusters = barangays, prob_each = c(1/3, 1/3, 1/3),  
  conditions =  
    c(0, # control  
      1, # CEP without tipline (common arm)  
      2), # CEP with tipline (common arm)  
  assignment_variable = Z_cep) +  
declare_assignment(  
  # within CEP treatment status, assign  
  # half to officer recognition program  
  # half to no officer recognition (control)  
  clusters = barangays, blocks = Z_cep, block_prob = c(0, 0.5, 0.5),  
  assignment_variable = Z_officer) +  
# Phase 2 of study - POP intervention after midline survey  
declare_assignment(  
  # within CEP treatment status,  
  # assign 1/3 of barangays to tanod, 1/3 to tanod+ police,  
  # 1/3 to control  
  clusters = barangays, blocks = Z_cep,  
  # block_prob_each = matrix(c(1, 0, 0, rep(1/3, 3), rep(1/3, 3)),  
  # nrow = 3, ncol = 3, byrow = TRUE),  
  block_prob_each =  
    matrix(c(1, 0, 0,  
             0, 1/2, 1/2,  
             0, 1/2, 1/2),  
           nrow = 3,  
           ncol = 3,  
           byrow = TRUE),  
  conditions =  
    c(0, # control  
      1, # PNP_LGU - police & tanod  
      2), # LGU - tanod  
  assignment_variable = Z_pop) +  
  
declare_assignment(  
  # within POP treatment status, assign 1/3 of barangays to have no accountability,  
  # 1/3 with top-down accountability (Mayor),  
  # and 1/3 with top-down accountability (DILG)  
  clusters = barangays, blocks = Z_pop,  
  block_prob_each =  
    matrix(c(1, 0, 0, rep(1/3, 3), rep(1/3, 3)),  
           nrow = 3, ncol = 3, byrow = TRUE),  
  conditions =
```

```

c(0, # no accountability
  1, # top-down accountability (Mayor)
  2), # top-down accountability (DILG)
assignment_variable = Z_accountability) +
declare_step(
  mutate,
  Z_common = if_else(Z_cep != 0 & Z_pop != 0, 1, 0),
  Z_tipline = if_else(Z_cep == 2, 1, 0),
  Z_lgu_only = if_else(Z_pop == 2, 1, 0),
  Z_lgu_pnp = if_else(Z_pop == 1, 1, 0),
  Z_dilg = if_else(Z_accountability == 2, 1, 0),
  Z_mayor = if_else(Z_accountability == 1, 1, 0)) +
declare_reveal(Y, Z_common) +
declare_estimator(
  Y ~ Z_common + Z_officer + Z_mayor + Z_dilg,
  clusters = barangays,
  model = lm_robust)

```

## A.6 Uganda

**Sample frame.** We study the 380 police units of the Uganda Police Force (UPF), which are a mixture of stations (124) and sub-station posts (256). The UPF is organized with district level central police stations; each district has one. Central police stations supervise sub-county level stations. Some sub-county level stations supervise police posts covering a few parishes; some have no posts under them. Posts are analogous to beats in the US, with 2-4 police officers deployed to each post.

**Sampling.** We purposively selected 72 police stations. Out of the 134 districts of Uganda, UPF selected 13 for the study. UPF applied two inclusion criteria in selecting these districts: equal representation of Uganda’s four regions (North, Central, East, and West), and, within each region, relatively high crime rate based on the 2014 UPF national crime report. Of the 23 highest-crime districts in the country, two were excluded because they were too close to Kampala and thus peri-urban;<sup>24</sup> six were excluded because they were located in regions that were over-represented in the sample;<sup>25</sup> and two were excluded due to high levels of insecurity, and correspondingly high military presence.<sup>26</sup> UPF determined that community policing would not be an appropriate strategy in these districts.

We listed all police stations in the 13 districts and non-randomly selected 72, dropping the most urban ones. Where available, we selected one post under the jurisdiction of each station. For stations that do not have a post under them, we used the station itself. We

---

<sup>24</sup>Luwero and Mpigi.

<sup>25</sup>Masindi, Mubende, Kamwenge (Central Region), Soroti, Palissa (Eastern Region), and Amuru (Northern Region).

<sup>26</sup>Masaka and Kasese.

sampled a total of 72 units (44 posts and 28 stations). We focus the study on the parish where the unit is physically located. Out of all the villages in the selected parish, we randomly select four to participate. In each village, we randomly sampled six men and six women during the baseline survey. The endline survey was a panel in which we re-interviewed these same 12 respondents in each village. We were unable to recontact some respondents and sampled 500 replacements from the same villages.

In each of the 72 police stations and posts, we interviewed the Officer in Charge (OC) and, whenever possible, the Community Liaison Officer (CLO) and the Child and Family Protection Unit (CFPU) officer. Then among all the more junior officers, we randomly selected as many as needed to reach 5 officers. (53 of the 72 stations and posts have five or fewer officers. We survey all officers in these cases.) We interviewed the same officers during the endline survey. Among the 198 officers we interviewed at endline, only 44 were also interviewed at baseline (for an attrition rate of 80%); the rest were randomly-selected replacement officers.

**Outcome measurement.** Outcomes are measured at baseline and endline in citizen and officer surveys. Police crime data was provided at the police station level, and collapsed into preintervention (XX) and postintervention (XX) periods.

**Random assignment.** A two-stage randomization procedure was used. Police stations were formed into blocks of four within regions, based on baseline covariates.<sup>27</sup> Half of each block was assigned to control and half to treatment. We then randomized assignment to the secondary treatment arm, additional training for community watch teams, at the village level. Within each of the 36 police stations that were assigned to the primary treatment arm, we assigned two of the four study villages to receive our secondary treatment arm.

**Estimation.** *Administrative data outcomes* (Controlling for baseline outcome if available.)

```
lm_robust(acrime_num ~ Z_common + acrime_num_baseline + as.factor(block_ID),
          data = uga_data_crime)
# coefficient of interest: Z_common
```

*Citizen Survey outcomes* (Controlling for baseline outcome if available.)

```
lm_robust(responsive_act ~ Z_common + responsive_act_baseline + as.factor(block_ID),
          clusters = station_id,
          data = uga_data_citizen)
# coefficient of interest: Z_common
```

---

<sup>27</sup>Stations were blocked on the number of police posts, parishes, villages, and officers under the jurisdiction of the station, as well as a set of demographic indicators from the 2014 Census including population size, percent male, average age, percent literate, mean household size, mean years of education, mean number of meals eaten per day, percent involved in an occupation other than subsistence agriculture, a standardized household asset index, a standardized household quality index, and a standardized index of social services available.

*Officer survey outcomes* (Controlling for baseline outcome if available.)

```
lm_robust(empathy_idx ~ Z_common + empathy_idx_baseline + as.factor(block_ID),
          clusters = station_id,
          data = uga_data_officer)
# coefficient of interest: Z_common
```

### Design declaration.

```
sd_Y0 <- 1
std_effect_size <- 0.1

uga_design <-
  declare_population(
    districts = add_level(
      N = 13,
      district_name =
        c('Arua', 'Gulu', 'Iganga',
          'Jinja', 'Kabale', 'Kamuli',
          'Lira', 'Mbale', 'Mbarara',
          'Mityana', 'Ntungamo', 'Rakai',
          'Tororo'),
      N_stations = c(1, 1, 14, 12, 1, 13, 2, 11, 16, 3, 4, 10, 2),
      district_fx = rnorm(N, sd = 5)),
    police_stations = add_level(
      N = N_stations,
      police_station_fx = rnorm(N, sd = 5),
      block_ID = cut(police_station_fx, breaks = 4)),
    # parishes =
      add_level(N = N_communities,
                high_crime = c(rep(1, 35), rep(0, 209))),
    villages = add_level(N = 4, village_fx = rnorm(N, sd = 5)),
    citizens = add_level(
      N = 12,
      female = c(rep(0, 6), rep(1, 6)),
      Y_baseline = rnorm(N, sd = sqrt(0.5)),
      u = rnorm(N, sd = sqrt(0.5))) +
    declare_potential_outcomes(
      Y_Z_0 = Y_baseline + u,
      Y_Z_1 = Y_baseline + std_effect_size + u,
      Y_Z_2 = Y_baseline + std_effect_size + u) +
    # declare_sampling(handler = filter) +
    declare_assignment(
      blocks = block_ID,
      clusters = police_stations,
```

```

    assignment_variable = "Z_common") +
# declare_assignment(
#   blocks = police_stations_Z, clusters = villages, block_m = ) +
declare_assignment(
  Z_alt =
    block_and_cluster_ra(blocks = police_stations,
                        clusters = villages,
                        m = 2),
  Z_alt_cond_prob =
    obtain_condition_probabilities(assignment = Z_alt,
    blocks = police_stations,
    clusters = villages, m = 2),
  Z_alt = if_else(Z_common == 1, Z_alt, 0L),
  Z_multistage_cond_prob =
    if_else(Z_common == 1,
            Z_common_cond_prob * Z_alt_cond_prob,
            Z_common_cond_prob),
  handler = mutate) +
declare_step(
  mutate,
  Z = case_when(Z_common == 1 & Z_alt == 1 ~ 2L,
                Z_common == 1 & Z_alt == 0 ~ 1L,
                Z_common == 0 ~ 0L)) +
declare_reveal(Y, Z) +
declare_estimator(
  Y ~ Z_common + Y_baseline + as.factor(block_ID),
  clusters = police_stations,
  model = lm_robust
)

```

## B. Ethics

As with any field experiment, the consideration of ethics was key in both the design and implementation of this effort. From the start, our teams worked carefully to ensure the alignment of our police partnerships with the Belmont principles of respect for persons, beneficence, and justice. This required that we first assess whether a partnership with a particular police agency had the potential to yield appropriate and meaningful benefits for treated communities. Police-researcher partnerships have increasingly been the subject of scholarly attention. Importantly, recent scholarship has found that working with the local police can help to broker healthier exchanges between police departments and community members, which can result in greater trust in these localities (SM2).

In addition, we carefully considered the burdens that the police would shoulder in carrying out community policing, as well as practices that would minimize risk to both police officers and citizens. We developed protocols for informed consent of research



subjects, and obtained approval for our protocols from the universities where our participating scholars are affiliated. We also developed a set of best practices to address and mitigate potential harms. These included:

- **Careful Consideration of Local Context.** The aim of any field experiment is for researchers and police departments to “share skills and experiences, trade information, and produce answers that can inform sustainable policies that make safety and legitimacy that much more possible (*SM<sub>3</sub>*, *SM<sub>4</sub>*). Therefore, it was important for each of our teams to tailor their program directly to the context faced by each country’s police agencies. In Pakistan, for example, researchers conducted focus groups in the study districts to generate qualitative evidence to frame the appropriate design within the local context. Additionally, in Colombia, the research team altered police-community meetings by including local beat cops, rather than only police leadership, to facilitate opportunities for neighborhood-level conversations that citizens had been lacking. While the teams standardized many of their procedures, these tailored components ensured that we were increasing the likelihood that the treatment would be beneficial in each context.
- **Training for Local Police Partners.** Working with any police agency requires buy-in at the highest level. But this does not always mean that local officers will follow orders and accommodate any kind of policy change. Therefore, our research teams worked to provide comprehensive training to local officers. In designing the Ugandan intervention, for example, the researchers helped facilitate a working group that included police officers from the CP department and from the Research and Planning directorate, as well their partner NGO. That working group sought to codify what constitutes community policing in Uganda by writing up a set standard operating procedures. In the Philippines as well, field officers received extensive training in detecting and reporting anything that might have been indicative of abuses being associated with activities related to the intervention.
- **Extensive Risk Mitigation Plan.** It is critically important that police researchers should not be seen as “ethnographic referees” who constantly are stepping in to modify police behavior (*SM<sub>5</sub>*). That being said, our teams also recognized that they needed to take steps to protect citizens from harm by clearly delineating the point at which they would have stopped the experiment. All teams created detailed plans for ending their partnership in case of any kind of police violence or risk to public safety. Additionally, each team deployed researchers to monitor the intervention over time. In Liberia, for example, members of the research team embedded within the LNP for the duration of the study, to both observe the intervention and to establish independent communication with community leaders, in case of misconduct.
- **Sensitive Handling of Administrative Data.** In designing and implementing baseline, midline, and endline surveys, our teams prioritized the protection of administrative data and confidentiality for data collected from citizens. For example, in Pakistan, the research team worked with the officer heading the IT department for

the province to develop protocols for data sharing. The protocol included receiving vehicle logs data at the office of the Inspector General, where a member of the research team would conduct proposed analyses and retrieve only analysis results, leaving the raw data safely at the main office.

In addition to these steps taken across our intervention sites, the research teams were careful to address ethical considerations specific to each of their countries. For example, as we mentioned, the team in the Philippines recognized that their most important ethical concern was to find an appropriate way to engage with the police during President Duterte's War on Drugs. After carefully selecting Sorsogon as an appropriate setting for the intervention, the research team also ensured that a field officer was also present at each police meeting in the Philippines study. They also conducted spot checks during implementation.

In Uganda too, the police have often been seen as an instrument to advance the President's political agenda. Therefore, the research team was careful to avoid asking questions that were too politically sensitive and sought to draw distinctions between local officers and political operatives. Additionally, the team prioritized working in rural areas, which are both underserved and where police officers are seen to be less politicized, and carried out the intervention in between elections.

Colombia faced a similar challenge, given citizen distrust of the police. As recently as the early 1990s, the Colombian police committed hundreds, if not thousands, of extrajudicial murders every year. While today they rank as one of the least violent in Latin America, the research team recognized that they needed to look at more micro-relationships within neighborhoods, rather than across localities. These smaller interventions ensured the researchers could better monitor the behavior of individual officers and quickly surface any citizen concerns.

While all field experiments present ethical challenges, our partnerships with the police demanded special attention to these issues. Each of our teams carefully weighed the issues at stake, while setting in place protocols to ensure the safety and well-being of subjects. By working with police directly, our goal was to develop and test a community policing strategy that could generate sustainable improvements in citizen security.

## C. Pre-registered outcome measures

Table SM1: Outcome Measures and Data Sources

Hyp.	Primary outcome index	Index components	Data source
1a.	Crime victimization index <sup>a</sup>	Violent crime (personal); Nonviolent crime (personal); Violent crime (community) <sup>b</sup> ; Non-violent crime (community)	Citizen survey
1b.	Perceived future insecurity index	Feared violent crime; Feared non-violent crime <sup>c</sup> ; Feared walking	Citizen survey
2.	Overall perceptions of police index	Trust in police; Trust in service of police	Citizen survey
3a.	Police perceptions of citizens index <sup>d</sup>	Abuse index; Accountability index; Corruption index; Empathy index	Officer survey
3b.	Police abuse	Abuse (binary); Abuse (counts) <sup>e</sup> ; Bribe amount; Bribe frequency	Citizen survey
4a.	Crime reporting index	Violent crime (personal) <sup>f</sup> ; Violent crime (community) <sup>f</sup> ; Nonviolent crime reporting (community) <sup>g</sup> ; Nonviolent crime reporting (personal) <sup>g</sup> ; Resolution of crime index	Citizen survey
4b.	Crime tips index	Crime tips index	Citizen survey
		Tips count (hotline) <sup>h</sup> ; Tips count (comment box) <sup>h</sup>	Administrative
4c.	Police abuse reporting index	Beating community member; Verbal abuse; Physical abuse <sup>i</sup> ; Drinking on duty <sup>i</sup> ; Victimization reports (hotline) <sup>h</sup> ; Victimization reports (comment box) <sup>h</sup> ; Victimization reports (police station) <sup>h</sup>	Citizen survey
M1a.	Perceived police intentions index	Corruption; Treat fairly; Treat seriously	Citizen survey
M1b.	Knowledge of criminal justice <sup>j</sup>	Legal knowledge <sup>k</sup> ; Knowledge of how to report crimes <sup>l</sup>	Citizen survey
M1c.	Cooperation norms index	Reporting norm (theft); Reporting norm (domestic abuse); Obey police norm	Citizen survey
M2a.	Perceived police capacity index	Police timeliness; Police investigation capacity	Citizen survey
M2b.	Perceived police responsiveness		Citizen survey
S1.	Perceived state legitimacy <sup>m</sup>		Citizen survey
S2.	Community trust		Citizen survey
C.	Compliance index	Foot patrol frequency; Vehicle patrol frequency; Community meeting awareness	Citizen survey

<sup>a</sup> Colombia estimates not included in meta-estimate, due to a difference in measurement. A common measure of crime victimization with all estimates is included in the Supplementary Materials.

<sup>b</sup> Murder count was not included in the primary meta-analysis since it was not collected in Liberia.

<sup>c</sup> Feared non-violent crime was not included in the primary meta-analysis since it was not collected in Colombia.

<sup>d</sup> Brazil, Liberia, and Philippines sites not included in the primary meta-analysis, because officers were not randomized into participation in community policing or control due to the organizational structure of the police agency.

<sup>e</sup> Counts of police abuse were dropped in the meta-analysis since they were not collected in Colombia.

<sup>f</sup> Report of other crimes were dropped in the meta-analysis since they were not collected in Colombia.

<sup>g</sup> Report of other crimes were dropped in the meta-analysis since they were not collected in Colombia. Report of all murder crimes were also dropped since they were not collected in Liberia.

<sup>h</sup> These items were not included since they were not collected in any of the sites.

<sup>i</sup> Physical abuse and drinking on duty were not included in the primary meta-analysis since they were not collected in Colombia.

<sup>j</sup> Philippines' estimates for this index were not included in the primary meta-analysis; Knowledge of criminal justice was measured differently in this site.

<sup>k</sup> Knowledge about domestic abuse was not included in the primary meta-analysis because it was not collected in Liberia.

<sup>l</sup> Knowledge about domestic abuse and knowledge of police officers' duties to follow-up on reported crimes was not included in the primary meta-analysis because these were not collected in Liberia and Pakistan.

<sup>m</sup> Uganda and Pakistan sites were not included in the primary meta-analysis; state legitimacy was not measured in these two cases.

## Supplementary Materials References

- SM1. G. Blair, J. Cooper, A. Coppock, M. Humphreys, *American Political Science Review* **113**, 838 (2019).
- SM2. S. S. Hyland, E. Davis, Local police departments, 2016: Personnel (2019). U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin.
- SM3. C. B. Erin M. Kerrison, Phillip Atiba Goff, J. M. Hyatt, *Police Practice and Research* **20** (2019).
- SM4. J. R. Greene, *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice* **8**, 379 (2014).
- SM5. L. Westmarland, *British journal of criminology* **41**, 523 (2001). National Institute of Justice Research in Brief.
- SM6. A. S. Gerber, D. P. Green, *Field experiments: Design, analysis, and interpretation* (W.W. Norton, 2012).

Draft – Not for Distribution

## **D. Balance tables**

*Forthcoming*

## E. Meta-analysis results

### E.1 Compliance results

Table SM2: Compliance results

Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
Compliance	0.572	0.256	(0.070, 1.074)	0.026
Vehicle patrol frequency	0.091	0.049	(-0.005, 0.187)	0.064
Foot patrol frequency	0.064	0.054	(-0.043, 0.171)	0.239
Community meeting awareness	1.023	0.629	(-0.209, 2.256)	0.104

## E.2 Primary hypotheses

Table SM3: Results Table for Primary Hypotheses

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p- value
1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.016	0.029	(-0.072, 0.041)	0.585	0.879
1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.026	0.035	(-0.042, 0.094)	0.453	0.879
2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.053	0.029	(-0.003, 0.109)	0.065	0.272
3a	Police perceptions of citizens idx.	0.070	0.137	(-0.198, 0.339)	0.606	0.879
3b	Police abuse idx.	-0.010	0.040	(-0.088, 0.068)	0.804	0.879
4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.005	0.031	(-0.057, 0.066)	0.879	0.879
4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.042	0.023	(-0.087, 0.003)	0.068	0.272
4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.008	0.022	(-0.035, 0.051)	0.725	0.879
M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	0.372	0.260	(-0.137, 0.881)	0.152	
M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	0.049	0.033	(-0.015, 0.113)	0.136	
M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	-0.009	0.023	(-0.053, 0.035)	0.694	
M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	0.041	0.043	(-0.042, 0.125)	0.332	
M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.032	0.031	(-0.028, 0.092)	0.293	
S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.045	0.034	(-0.022, 0.112)	0.192	
S2	Community trust	0.028	0.025	(-0.021, 0.076)	0.261	

## E.3 Secondary hypotheses

Table SM4: Results Table for Secondary Hypotheses

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	0.137	0.103	(-0.065, 0.338)	0.183
1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization idx. (expanded crimes)	-0.027	0.142	(-0.304, 0.250)	0.849
1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	-0.022	0.025	(-0.071, 0.027)	0.382

## E.4 Primary hypotheses (as pre-registered)

Table SM5: Results Table for Primary Hypotheses (pre-registered)

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.013	0.021	(-0.055, 0.029)	0.546	0.767
1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	-0.024	0.079	(-0.179, 0.131)	0.763	0.767
2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.053	0.029	(-0.003, 0.109)	0.065	0.272
3a	Police perceptions of citizens idx.	0.070	0.137	(-0.198, 0.339)	0.606	0.767
3b	Police abuse idx.	-0.012	0.040	(-0.090, 0.067)	0.767	0.767
4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.011	0.026	(-0.039, 0.061)	0.672	0.767
4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.042	0.023	(-0.087, 0.003)	0.068	0.272
4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.020	0.027	(-0.034, 0.073)	0.469	0.767
M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	0.372	0.260	(-0.137, 0.881)	0.152	
M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	0.065	0.031	(0.005, 0.125)	0.033	
M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	-0.009	0.023	(-0.053, 0.035)	0.694	
M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	0.041	0.043	(-0.042, 0.125)	0.332	
M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.032	0.031	(-0.028, 0.092)	0.293	
S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.045	0.034	(-0.022, 0.112)	0.192	
S2	Community trust	0.028	0.025	(-0.021, 0.076)	0.261	

## E.5 Secondary hypotheses (as pre-registered)

Table SM6: Results Table for Secondary Hypotheses

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	0.137	0.103	(-0.065, 0.338)	0.183
1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization idx. (expanded crimes)	-0.027	0.142	(-0.304, 0.250)	0.849
1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	-0.022	0.025	(-0.071, 0.027)	0.382



## E.6 Primary hypotheses (using list-wise deletion)

Table SM7: Results Table for all indices (based on listwise indices)

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.016	0.029	(-0.072, 0.041)	0.585	0.911
1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.022	0.038	(-0.052, 0.096)	0.562	0.911
2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.056	0.029	(-0.000, 0.112)	0.051	0.261
3a	Abuse	0.040	0.073	(-0.103, 0.184)	0.581	0.911
3a	Accountability	-0.087	0.046	(-0.177, 0.004)	0.060	0.261
3a	Corruption	0.091	0.188	(-0.278, 0.460)	0.629	0.911
3a	Empathy	-0.010	0.089	(-0.185, 0.165)	0.912	0.912
3b	Police abuse idx.	-0.013	0.041	(-0.093, 0.068)	0.759	0.911
4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.005	0.031	(-0.057, 0.066)	0.879	0.912
4a	Resolution of crime	-0.016	0.016	(-0.047, 0.015)	0.314	0.911
4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.041	0.022	(-0.085, 0.003)	0.065	0.261
4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.007	0.020	(-0.032, 0.047)	0.715	0.911
M1a	Corruption	-0.007	0.021	(-0.047, 0.034)	0.744	
M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	0.328	0.258	(-0.178, 0.835)	0.204	
M1b	Crime reporting	0.058	0.025	(0.009, 0.108)	0.022	
M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	1.000	
M1b	Law	-0.003	0.028	(-0.057, 0.052)	0.919	
M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	-0.011	0.022	(-0.055, 0.032)	0.609	
M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	0.045	0.042	(-0.038, 0.128)	0.290	
M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.032	0.031	(-0.028, 0.092)	0.293	
S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.045	0.034	(-0.022, 0.112)	0.192	
S2	Community trust	0.028	0.025	(-0.021, 0.076)	0.261	

## E.7 Secondary hypotheses (using list-wise deletion)

Table SM8:

Results Table for Secondary Hypotheses

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	0.137	0.103	(-0.065, 0.338)	0.183
1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization idx. (expanded crimes)	-0.027	0.142	(-0.304, 0.250)	0.849
1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	-0.022	0.025	(-0.071, 0.027)	0.382

## E.8 Primary hypotheses by item

Table SM9: Components Table for Main Hypotheses

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.013	0.021	(-0.055, 0.029)	0.546	
1a	Violent crimes (personal)	0.000	0.002	(-0.003, 0.004)	0.838	0.838
1a	Armed robbery (personal)	0.002	0.002	(-0.002, 0.005)	0.388	
1a	Simple assault (personal)	0.005	0.015	(-0.025, 0.035)	0.728	
1a	Other violent crimes (personal)	0.011	0.022	(-0.032, 0.054)	0.623	
1a	Non-violent crimes (personal)	-0.007	0.015	(-0.037, 0.022)	0.625	0.838
1a	Burglary (personal)	-0.007	0.014	(-0.034, 0.020)	0.613	
1a	Other non-violent crimes (personal)	-0.026	0.030	(-0.086, 0.033)	0.389	
1a	Violent crimes (community)	0.007	0.029	(-0.050, 0.065)	0.808	0.838
1a	Armed robbery (community)	0.019	0.024	(-0.027, 0.065)	0.420	
1a	Aggravated assault (community)	0.006	0.022	(-0.037, 0.049)	0.772	
1a	Simple assault (community)	-0.001	0.022	(-0.044, 0.041)	0.960	
1a	Sexual assault (community)	0.002	0.021	(-0.040, 0.044)	0.911	
1a	Domestic abuse (community)	0.005	0.026	(-0.047, 0.056)	0.850	
1a	Murder (community)	0.012	0.029	(-0.044, 0.069)	0.675	
1a	Other violent crimes (community)	-0.005	0.016	(-0.037, 0.027)	0.772	
1a	Non-violent crimes (community)	-0.043	0.029	(-0.099, 0.013)	0.131	0.523
1a	Burglary (community)	-0.046	0.030	(-0.105, 0.014)	0.130	
1a	Other non-violent crimes (community)	0.046	0.032	(-0.018, 0.110)	0.156	
1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	-0.024	0.079	(-0.179, 0.131)	0.763	
1b	Feared violent crime	0.043	0.026	(-0.008, 0.094)	0.095	
1b	Fear non-violent crime	-0.092	0.130	(-0.348, 0.163)	0.479	
1b	Feared walking	-0.021	0.064	(-0.147, 0.104)	0.738	
2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.053	0.029	(-0.003, 0.109)	0.065	
2	Trust in police	0.048	0.030	(-0.011, 0.108)	0.112	
2	Trust in service of police	0.099	0.063	(-0.024, 0.222)	0.113	
3a	Police perceptions of citizens idx.	0.070	0.137	(-0.198, 0.339)	0.606	
3a	Empathy idx.	-0.010	0.089	(-0.185, 0.165)	0.912	0.912
3a	Empathy (complaints)	0.024	0.100	(-0.172, 0.220)	0.810	
3a	Empathy (reports)	-0.070	0.177	(-0.418, 0.277)	0.691	
3a	Police accountability idx.	-0.087	0.046	(-0.177, 0.004)	0.060	0.239
3a	Police takes complaints seriously	-0.065	0.080	(-0.221, 0.091)	0.416	

Table SM9: Components Table for Main Hypotheses (*continued*)

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
3a	Hypothetical 2: disciplinary punishment	-0.143	0.088	(-0.316, 0.030)	0.106	
3a	Hypothetical 2: report fellow officer	-0.088	0.079	(-0.243, 0.067)	0.264	
3a	Hypothetical 2: reports by other officers	-0.040	0.084	(-0.205, 0.124)	0.630	
3a	Hypothetical 3: disciplinary punishment	-0.115	0.066	(-0.245, 0.016)	0.084	
3a	Hypothetical 3: report fellow officer	-0.126	0.137	(-0.395, 0.143)	0.358	
3a	Hypothetical 3: reports by other officers	-0.066	0.098	(-0.257, 0.126)	0.502	
3a	Hypothetical 5: disciplinary punishment	-0.019	0.081	(-0.179, 0.141)	0.817	
3a	Hypothetical 5: report fellow officer	0.050	0.084	(-0.115, 0.214)	0.552	
3a	Hypothetical 5: reports by other officers	0.022	0.084	(-0.143, 0.186)	0.797	
3a	Police abuse idx.	0.040	0.073	(-0.103, 0.184)	0.581	0.839
3a	Hypothetical 5: own misconduct	0.008	0.078	(-0.144, 0.161)	0.913	
3a	Hypothetical 5: others' misconduct	0.047	0.079	(-0.107, 0.201)	0.551	
3a	Police corruption idx.	0.091	0.188	(-0.278, 0.460)	0.629	0.839
3a	Hypothetical 2: own misconduct (corruption)	0.040	0.071	(-0.100, 0.179)	0.576	
3a	Hypothetical 2: others' misconduct (corruption)	0.201	0.325	(-0.436, 0.837)	0.536	
3a	Hypothetical 3: own misconduct (corruption)	-0.017	0.142	(-0.295, 0.262)	0.907	
3a	Hypothetical 3: others' misconduct (corruption)	0.092	0.223	(-0.346, 0.530)	0.680	
3b	Police abuse idx.	-0.012	0.040	(-0.090, 0.067)	0.767	
3b	Police abuse	-0.017	0.019	(-0.054, 0.021)	0.381	0.558
3b	Police abuse	-0.025	0.028	(-0.080, 0.031)	0.381	0.558
3b	Bribe frequency	0.022	0.027	(-0.031, 0.076)	0.419	0.558
3b	Bribe amount	-0.001	0.002	(-0.005, 0.003)	0.771	0.771
4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.011	0.026	(-0.039, 0.061)	0.672	
4a	Violent crimes reported (personal)	-0.004	0.006	(-0.015, 0.007)	0.459	0.626
4a	Armed robbery reported (personal)	-0.003	0.008	(-0.019, 0.014)	0.736	
4a	Simple assault reported (personal)	-0.001	0.004	(-0.009, 0.007)	0.806	
4a	Other violent crimes reported (personal)	0.000	0.037	(-0.072, 0.071)	0.996	
4a	Non-violent crimes reported (personal)	0.012	0.018	(-0.023, 0.047)	0.501	0.626
4a	Burglary reported (personal)	0.025	0.026	(-0.027, 0.077)	0.342	
4a	Other non-violent crimes reported (personal)	-0.043	0.030	(-0.101, 0.016)	0.155	
4a	Violent crimes reported (community)	0.002	0.016	(-0.030, 0.033)	0.911	0.911
4a	Armed robbery reported (community)	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.298	
4a	Aggravated assault reported (community)	0.007	0.016	(-0.025, 0.039)	0.664	
4a	Simple assault reported (community)	-0.001	0.010	(-0.021, 0.019)	0.934	
4a	Sexual assault reported (community)	-0.005	0.011	(-0.027, 0.016)	0.616	

Table SM9: Components Table for Main Hypotheses (*continued*)

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
4a	Domestic physical abuse reported (community)	0.004	0.004	(-0.003, 0.012)	0.252	
4a	Other violent crime reported (community)	0.006	0.018	(-0.028, 0.041)	0.716	
4a	Non-violent crime reported (community)	-0.019	0.019	(-0.056, 0.018)	0.317	0.626
4a	Burglary reported (community)	-0.006	0.021	(-0.048, 0.036)	0.776	
4a	Other non-violent crime reported (community)	0.038	0.040	(-0.041, 0.116)	0.346	
4a	Resolution of crime index	-0.016	0.016	(-0.047, 0.015)	0.314	0.626
4a	Burglary resolution	-0.019	0.020	(-0.059, 0.022)	0.364	
4a	Domestic abuse resolution	-0.003	0.031	(-0.064, 0.058)	0.917	
4a	Armed robbery resolution	-0.055	0.022	(-0.098, -0.012)	0.012	
4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.042	0.023	(-0.087, 0.003)	0.068	
4b	Contacted police for suspicious activity	-0.053	0.024	(-0.100, -0.006)	0.026	
4b	Gave information to police	-0.027	0.024	(-0.075, 0.021)	0.271	
4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.020	0.027	(-0.034, 0.073)	0.469	
4c	Reported drinking on duty	0.027	0.031	(-0.034, 0.087)	0.388	0.434
4c	Reported police beating	0.019	0.025	(-0.029, 0.068)	0.434	0.434
4c	Reported police abuse	-0.024	0.029	(-0.082, 0.033)	0.404	0.434
4c	Victimization reported to police station	0.833	0.408	(0.034, 1.632)	0.041	
M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	0.372	0.260	(-0.137, 0.881)	0.152	
M1a	Police will investigate	0.346	0.281	(-0.205, 0.898)	0.218	
M1a	Police will be fair	0.053	0.031	(-0.008, 0.113)	0.089	
M1a	Political interest idx.	-0.007	0.021	(-0.047, 0.034)	0.744	
M1a	Police are corrupt	-0.030	0.023	(-0.075, 0.015)	0.195	
M1a	Police serve equally	0.032	0.046	(-0.059, 0.123)	0.491	
M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	0.065	0.031	(0.005, 0.125)	0.033	
M1b	Legal knowledge idx.	-0.003	0.028	(-0.057, 0.052)	0.919	
M1b	Legal Knowledge (suspect)	-0.009	0.079	(-0.163, 0.146)	0.914	
M1b	Legal Knowledge (lawyer)	0.025	0.026	(-0.026, 0.076)	0.339	
M1b	Legal Knowledge (fees)	0.023	0.071	(-0.117, 0.163)	0.745	
M1b	Legal Knowledge (domestic abuse)	-0.033	0.036	(-0.104, 0.038)	0.364	
M1b	Reporting knowledge idx.	0.058	0.025	(0.009, 0.108)	0.022	
M1b	Police Knowledge (followup)	0.063	0.035	(-0.005, 0.131)	0.069	
M1b	Police Knowledge (where is station)	0.023	0.052	(-0.080, 0.125)	0.665	
M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	-0.009	0.023	(-0.053, 0.035)	0.694	
M1c	Reporting norm (theft)	-0.025	0.038	(-0.100, 0.051)	0.523	
M1c	Reporting norm (domestic abuse)	0.017	0.027	(-0.035, 0.070)	0.513	

Table SM9: Components Table for Main Hypotheses (*continued*)

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
M1c	Obey police norm	0.019	0.025	(-0.029, 0.067)	0.441	
M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	0.041	0.043	(-0.042, 0.125)	0.332	
M2a	Police timeliness	0.038	0.046	(-0.052, 0.128)	0.406	
M2a	Police investigation capacity	0.042	0.036	(-0.030, 0.113)	0.254	
M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.032	0.031	(-0.028, 0.092)	0.293	
S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.045	0.034	(-0.022, 0.112)	0.192	
S2	Community trust	0.028	0.025	(-0.021, 0.076)	0.261	

## E.9 Secondary hypotheses by item

Table SM10: Components Table for Secondary Hypotheses

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	0.137	0.103	(-0.065, 0.338)	0.183
1a. (alt. i)	Violent crimes (administrative data)	0.151	0.121	(-0.085, 0.388)	0.210
1a. (alt. i)	Armed robbery (administrative data)	0.197	0.160	(-0.117, 0.510)	0.218
1a. (alt. i)	Aggravated assault (administrative data)	0.158	0.170	(-0.174, 0.491)	0.352
1a. (alt. i)	Simple assault (administrative data)	-0.024	0.345	(-0.700, 0.652)	0.944
1a. (alt. i)	Sexual assault (administrative data)	0.384	0.128	(0.133, 0.634)	0.003
1a. (alt. i)	Domestic abuse (physical) (administrative data)	0.084	0.077	(-0.066, 0.235)	0.271
1a. (alt. i)	Murder (administrative data)	0.333	0.221	(-0.101, 0.767)	0.132
1a. (alt. i)	Other violent crimes (administrative data)	0.388	0.337	(-0.273, 1.048)	0.250
1a. (alt. i)	Non-violent crimes (administrative data)	0.092	0.065	(-0.036, 0.219)	0.159
1a. (alt. i)	Burglary (administrative data)	0.160	0.137	(-0.108, 0.428)	0.242
1a. (alt. i)	Other non-violent crimes (administrative data)	0.046	0.052	(-0.057, 0.149)	0.381
1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization idx. (expanded crimes)	-0.027	0.142	(-0.304, 0.250)	0.849
1a. (alt. ii)	Violent crimes (expanded, personal)	0.014	0.024	(-0.032, 0.061)	0.554
1a. (alt. ii)	Armed Robbery (expanded, personal)	0.002	0.002	(-0.002, 0.005)	0.388
1a. (alt. ii)	Aggravated assault (expanded, personal)	-0.046	0.235	(-0.506, 0.415)	0.846
1a. (alt. ii)	Sexual assault (expanded, personal)	0.306	0.331	(-0.343, 0.955)	0.355
1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (expanded, personal)	-0.544	0.205	(-0.945, -0.142)	0.008
1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (expanded, personal)	0.005	0.015	(-0.025, 0.035)	0.728
1a. (alt. ii)	Other violent crimes (expanded, personal)	0.011	0.022	(-0.032, 0.054)	0.623
1a. (alt. ii)	Non-violent crimes (expanded, personal)	0.007	0.097	(-0.183, 0.197)	0.942
1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (expanded, personal)	-0.007	0.014	(-0.034, 0.020)	0.613
1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (verbal) (expanded, personal)	-0.063	0.115	(-0.289, 0.162)	0.582
1a. (alt. ii)	Land crimes (expanded, personal)	0.048	0.305	(-0.550, 0.646)	0.875
1a. (alt. ii)	Other non-violent crimes (expanded, personal)	-0.026	0.030	(-0.086, 0.033)	0.389
1a. (alt. ii)	Violent crimes (community, expanded)	-0.008	0.041	(-0.090, 0.073)	0.837
1a. (alt. ii)	Armed robbery (community, expanded)	0.019	0.024	(-0.027, 0.065)	0.420
1a. (alt. ii)	Aggravated assault (community, expanded)	0.006	0.022	(-0.037, 0.049)	0.772
1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (community, expanded)	-0.001	0.022	(-0.044, 0.041)	0.960
1a. (alt. ii)	Sexual assault (community, expanded)	0.002	0.021	(-0.040, 0.044)	0.911
1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (community, expanded)	0.005	0.026	(-0.047, 0.056)	0.850
1a. (alt. ii)	Murder (community, expanded)	0.012	0.029	(-0.044, 0.069)	0.675

Table SM10: Components Table for Secondary Hypotheses (*continued*)

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
1a. (alt. ii)	Mob (community, expanded)	-0.016	0.046	(-0.107, 0.075)	0.733
1a. (alt. ii)	Other violent crimes (community, expanded)	-0.005	0.016	(-0.037, 0.027)	0.772
1a. (alt. ii)	Non-violent crimes (community, expanded)	0.010	0.281	(-0.540, 0.560)	0.972
1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (community, expanded)	-0.046	0.030	(-0.105, 0.014)	0.130
1a. (alt. ii)	Land crimes (community, expanded)	2.875	2.133	(-1.306, 7.056)	0.178
1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (verbal) (community, expanded)	-0.081	0.054	(-0.187, 0.024)	0.132
1a. (alt. ii)	Other non-violent crimes (community, expanded)	0.046	0.032	(-0.018, 0.110)	0.156
1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	-0.022	0.025	(-0.071, 0.027)	0.382
1a. (alt. iii)	Violent crime (personal, binary)	0.008	0.020	(-0.030, 0.047)	0.667
1a. (alt. iii)	Armed robbery (personal, binary)	-0.017	0.021	(-0.058, 0.024)	0.420
1a. (alt. iii)	Simple assault (personal, binary)	0.008	0.018	(-0.027, 0.044)	0.648
1a. (alt. iii)	Other violent crimes (personal, binary)	0.011	0.022	(-0.032, 0.054)	0.623
1a. (alt. iii)	Non-violent crimes (personal, binary)	-0.003	0.022	(-0.047, 0.040)	0.882
1a. (alt. iii)	Burglary (personal, binary)	-0.006	0.021	(-0.047, 0.034)	0.755
1a. (alt. iii)	Other non-violent crimes (personal, binary)	-0.026	0.030	(-0.086, 0.033)	0.389
1a. (alt. iii)	Violent crimes (community, binary)	0.006	0.027	(-0.048, 0.060)	0.828
1a. (alt. iii)	Armed Robbery (community, binary)	0.019	0.025	(-0.030, 0.068)	0.443
1a. (alt. iii)	Aggravated assault (community, binary)	-0.025	0.038	(-0.098, 0.049)	0.511
1a. (alt. iii)	Simple assault (community, binary)	-0.009	0.039	(-0.084, 0.067)	0.825
1a. (alt. iii)	Sexual assault (community, binary)	-0.008	0.027	(-0.061, 0.045)	0.761
1a. (alt. iii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (community, binary)	0.012	0.028	(-0.042, 0.067)	0.661
1a. (alt. iii)	Murder (community, binary)	0.007	0.033	(-0.057, 0.072)	0.821
1a. (alt. iii)	Other violent crimes (community, binary)	-0.005	0.016	(-0.037, 0.027)	0.772
1a. (alt. iii)	Non-violent crimes (community, binary)	-0.047	0.035	(-0.115, 0.021)	0.171
1a. (alt. iii)	Burglary (community, binary)	-0.053	0.037	(-0.125, 0.018)	0.143
1a. (alt. iii)	Other non-violent crimes (community, binary)	0.046	0.032	(-0.018, 0.110)	0.156

## F. Study Results

### F.1 Compliance results

Table SM11: Compliance results

Study	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Prop. Missing	Differential attrition p-value
Uganda	Compliance	0.159	0.064	(0.031, 0.286)	0.016	0.000	–
Philippines	Compliance	0.276	0.111	(0.056, 0.496)	0.014	0.000	0.317
Pakistan	Compliance	0.429	0.143	(0.001, 0.857)	0.050	0.004	0.202
Liberia	Compliance	1.662	0.216	(1.232, 2.093)	0.000	0.000	–
Colombia	Compliance	0.447	0.070	(0.308, 0.587)	0.000	0.000	–
Brazil	Compliance	22.519	361.304	(-706.189, 751.227)	0.951	0.012	0.963
Brazil	Community meeting awareness	3.705	38.000	(-72.941, 80.351)	0.923	0.019	0.957
Colombia	Community meeting awareness	0.838	0.092	(0.655, 1.021)	0.000	0.000	–
Liberia	Community meeting awareness	3.639	0.394	(2.854, 4.424)	0.000	0.000	–
Pakistan	Community meeting awareness	0.401	0.136	(-0.003, 0.804)	0.051	0.023	0.526
Philippines	Community meeting awareness	0.107	0.068	(-0.028, 0.242)	0.119	0.002	0.028
Uganda	Community meeting awareness	0.311	0.070	(0.171, 0.451)	0.000	0.001	0.627
Brazil	Foot patrol frequency	25.977	429.819	(-840.906, 892.860)	0.952	0.008	0.951
Colombia	Foot patrol frequency	0.003	0.049	(-0.094, 0.101)	0.945	0.071	0.084
Liberia	Foot patrol frequency	0.080	0.148	(-0.216, 0.376)	0.593	0.004	0.649
Pakistan	Foot patrol frequency	0.293	0.132	(-0.105, 0.692)	0.104	0.026	0.431
Philippines	Foot patrol frequency	0.163	0.102	(-0.039, 0.366)	0.113	0.029	0.001
Uganda	Foot patrol frequency	-0.039	0.069	(-0.177, 0.099)	0.574	0.001	0.044
Colombia	Vehicle patrol frequency	0.003	0.050	(-0.097, 0.102)	0.960	0.024	0.797
Liberia	Vehicle patrol frequency	0.019	0.146	(-0.271, 0.309)	0.897	0.006	0.855
Pakistan	Vehicle patrol frequency	0.209	0.072	(-0.007, 0.425)	0.055	0.011	0.617
Philippines	Vehicle patrol frequency	0.233	0.127	(-0.018, 0.483)	0.069	0.009	0.520
Uganda	Vehicle patrol frequency	0.056	0.061	(-0.067, 0.179)	0.365	0.001	0.058



## F.2 Primary hypotheses

Table SM12: Results Table for Main Hypotheses (by study)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Brazil	1a	Crime victimization	-0.478	8.195	(-17.006, 16.049)	0.954	0.98
Colombia	1a	Crime victimization	0.047	0.047	(-0.046, 0.140)	0.317	0.507
Liberia	1a	Crime victimization	1.514	1.193	(-0.867, 3.895)	0.209	0.585
Pakistan	1a	Crime victimization	-0.032	0.067	(-0.226, 0.162)	0.660	0.698
Philippines	1a	Crime victimization	-0.075	0.046	(-0.165, 0.016)	0.105	0.57
Uganda	1a	Crime victimization	-0.012	0.048	(-0.109, 0.085)	0.809	0.882
Brazil	1b	Perceived future insecurity	0.965	17.520	(-34.371, 36.302)	0.956	0.98
Colombia	1b	Perceived future insecurity	0.086	0.046	(-0.005, 0.177)	0.064	0.258
Liberia	1b	Perceived future insecurity	0.033	0.201	(-0.369, 0.435)	0.870	0.87
Pakistan	1b	Perceived future insecurity	-0.141	0.082	(-0.372, 0.091)	0.164	0.295
Philippines	1b	Perceived future insecurity	0.037	0.058	(-0.077, 0.151)	0.525	0.735
Uganda	1b	Perceived future insecurity	0.036	0.048	(-0.060, 0.131)	0.455	0.882
Brazil	2	Overall perceptions of police	4.949	80.531	(-157.472, 167.371)	0.951	0.98
Colombia	2	Overall perceptions of police	0.059	0.043	(-0.025, 0.144)	0.168	0.361
Liberia	2	Overall perceptions of police	0.162	0.227	(-0.291, 0.615)	0.477	0.668
Pakistan	2	Overall perceptions of police	0.464	0.151	(0.035, 0.892)	0.040	0.295
Philippines	2	Overall perceptions of police	0.020	0.066	(-0.110, 0.150)	0.762	0.86
Uganda	2	Overall perceptions of police	0.010	0.052	(-0.093, 0.113)	0.847	0.882
Colombia	3a	Police perceptions of citizens	0.362	0.183	(-0.002, 0.727)	0.051	0.258
Pakistan	3a	Police perceptions of citizens	0.071	0.084	(-0.098, 0.239)	0.404	0.538
Uganda	3a	Police perceptions of citizens	-0.188	0.159	(-0.510, 0.134)	0.245	0.882
Brazil	3b	Police abuse	-0.047	1.868	(-3.815, 3.722)	0.980	0.98
Colombia	3b	Police abuse	-0.025	0.038	(-0.102, 0.051)	0.511	0.584
Liberia	3b	Police abuse	0.031	0.175	(-0.319, 0.380)	0.861	0.87
Pakistan	3b	Police abuse	-0.163	0.100	(-0.452, 0.126)	0.185	0.295
Philippines	3b	Police abuse	-0.036	0.034	(-0.103, 0.031)	0.292	0.681
Uganda	3b	Police abuse	0.108	0.051	(0.004, 0.211)	0.041	0.331
Brazil	4a	Crime reporting	-1.560	24.010	(-49.986, 46.865)	0.948	0.98
Colombia	4a	Crime reporting	0.063	0.046	(-0.030, 0.155)	0.181	0.361
Liberia	4a	Crime reporting	-0.088	0.067	(-0.222, 0.047)	0.197	0.585
Pakistan	4a	Crime reporting	0.047	0.112	(-0.284, 0.379)	0.698	0.698

Table SM12: Results Table for Main Hypotheses (by study) (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p- value
Philippines	4a	Crime reporting	-0.040	0.058	(-0.155, 0.075)	0.496	0.735
Uganda	4a	Crime reporting	0.031	0.063	(-0.096, 0.158)	0.624	0.882
Brazil	4b	Crime tips	16.645	296.825	(-582.009, 615.299)	0.956	0.98
Colombia	4b	Crime tips	-0.011	0.041	(-0.092, 0.069)	0.783	0.783
Liberia	4b	Crime tips	-0.225	0.194	(-0.611, 0.162)	0.251	0.585
Pakistan	4b	Crime tips	-0.101	0.044	(-0.231, 0.029)	0.095	0.295
Philippines	4b	Crime tips	-0.065	0.047	(-0.158, 0.027)	0.163	0.57
Uganda	4b	Crime tips	-0.005	0.033	(-0.071, 0.061)	0.882	0.882
Colombia	4c	Police abuse reporting	0.027	0.038	(-0.049, 0.103)	0.485	0.584
Liberia	4c	Police abuse reporting	0.108	0.128	(-0.146, 0.363)	0.399	0.668
Pakistan	4c	Police abuse reporting	-0.182	0.086	(-0.435, 0.070)	0.111	0.295
Philippines	4c	Police abuse reporting	-0.007	0.038	(-0.081, 0.068)	0.860	0.86
Uganda	4c	Police abuse reporting	0.042	0.045	(-0.048, 0.133)	0.353	0.882
Brazil	M1a	Perceived police intentions	-3.167	66.834	(-137.961, 131.628)	0.962	
Colombia	M1a	Perceived police intentions	0.065	0.045	(-0.024, 0.154)	0.152	
Liberia	M1a	Perceived police intentions	0.572	0.170	(0.231, 0.913)	0.001	
Pakistan	M1a	Perceived police intentions	1.323	0.119	(0.997, 1.649)	0.000	
Philippines	M1a	Perceived police intentions	-0.036	0.060	(-0.154, 0.082)	0.551	
Uganda	M1a	Perceived police intentions	-0.018	0.049	(-0.116, 0.079)	0.711	
Colombia	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice	0.041	0.044	(-0.048, 0.129)	0.364	
Liberia	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice	-0.258	0.247	(-0.751, 0.236)	0.301	
Pakistan	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice	0.028	0.131	(-0.354, 0.410)	0.842	
Uganda	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice	0.079	0.054	(-0.029, 0.186)	0.147	
Brazil	M1c	Cooperation norms	-3.971	63.352	(-131.745, 123.803)	0.950	
Colombia	M1c	Cooperation norms	-0.021	0.031	(-0.083, 0.041)	0.499	
Liberia	M1c	Cooperation norms	0.470	0.243	(-0.015, 0.956)	0.057	
Pakistan	M1c	Cooperation norms	0.160	0.120	(-0.182, 0.503)	0.258	
Philippines	M1c	Cooperation norms	0.010	0.054	(-0.097, 0.116)	0.859	
Uganda	M1c	Cooperation norms	-0.036	0.045	(-0.127, 0.054)	0.425	
Brazil	M2a	Perceived police capacity	-4.997	92.606	(-191.776, 181.781)	0.957	
Colombia	M2a	Perceived police capacity	0.115	0.041	(0.034, 0.196)	0.006	
Liberia	M2a	Perceived police capacity	0.323	0.174	(-0.025, 0.671)	0.069	
Pakistan	M2a	Perceived police capacity	0.032	0.087	(-0.224, 0.287)	0.735	
Philippines	M2a	Perceived police capacity	-0.004	0.068	(-0.137, 0.130)	0.956	

Table SM12: Results Table for Main Hypotheses (by study) (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p- value
Uganda	M2a	Perceived police capacity	-0.039	0.033	(-0.105, 0.027)	0.241	
Brazil	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.203	11.839	(-23.675, 24.082)	0.986	
Colombia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.051	0.045	(-0.038, 0.140)	0.257	
Liberia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.040	0.248	(-0.535, 0.455)	0.872	
Pakistan	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.030	0.113	(-0.292, 0.353)	0.803	
Uganda	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.015	0.046	(-0.077, 0.107)	0.746	
Colombia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.065	0.046	(-0.027, 0.157)	0.165	
Liberia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	-0.186	0.215	(-0.616, 0.243)	0.390	
Pakistan	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.113	0.104	(-0.185, 0.411)	0.343	
Philippines	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.005	0.061	(-0.115, 0.125)	0.933	
Brazil	S2	Community trust	1.471	18.755	(-36.356, 39.299)	0.938	
Colombia	S2	Community trust	0.070	0.039	(-0.008, 0.147)	0.078	
Liberia	S2	Community trust	-0.218	0.210	(-0.636, 0.201)	0.303	
Pakistan	S2	Community trust	-0.037	0.173	(-0.554, 0.480)	0.843	
Philippines	S2	Community trust	-0.029	0.065	(-0.157, 0.100)	0.659	
Uganda	S2	Community trust	0.019	0.038	(-0.058, 0.095)	0.629	

### F.3 Secondary hypotheses

Table SM13: Results Table for Secondary Hypotheses (by study)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
Colombia	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization (administrative data)	0.059	0.065	(-0.069, 0.186)	0.365
Liberia	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization (administrative data)	-0.042	0.229	(-0.496, 0.413)	0.856
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization (administrative data)	0.169	0.199	(-0.227, 0.566)	0.397
Philippines	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization (administrative data)	-0.008	0.039	(-0.084, 0.069)	0.845
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization (administrative data)	0.494	0.112	(0.273, 0.715)	0.000
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization (expanded crimes)	-0.523	1.550	(-3.618, 2.573)	0.737
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization (expanded crimes)	-0.679	0.598	(-2.394, 1.037)	0.325
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization (expanded crimes)	-0.069	0.047	(-0.163, 0.025)	0.147
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization (expanded crimes)	0.417	0.319	(-0.223, 1.057)	0.197
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization (binary survey measures)	0.045	0.043	(-0.040, 0.131)	0.292
Liberia	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization (binary survey measures)	-0.062	0.066	(-0.193, 0.069)	0.346
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization (binary survey measures)	-0.068	0.044	(-0.197, 0.061)	0.208
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization (binary survey measures)	-0.036	0.054	(-0.143, 0.072)	0.511
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization (binary survey measures)	-0.013	0.057	(-0.127, 0.101)	0.821

## F.4 Primary hypotheses (as pre-registered)

Table SM14: Results Table for Primary Hypotheses (based on original indices)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Colombia	1a	Crime victimization idx.	0.051	0.047	(-0.043, 0.144)	0.284	0.454
Liberia	1a	Crime victimization idx.	1.433	1.169	(-0.900, 3.767)	0.224	0.835
Pakistan	1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.041	0.061	(-0.217, 0.135)	0.541	0.618
Philippines	1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.069	0.047	(-0.163, 0.025)	0.147	0.495
Uganda	1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.010	0.031	(-0.072, 0.051)	0.739	0.882
Colombia	1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.086	0.046	(-0.005, 0.177)	0.064	0.258
Liberia	1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	-0.010	0.195	(-0.401, 0.380)	0.957	0.957
Pakistan	1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	-0.300	0.062	(-0.475, -0.126)	0.009	0.073
Philippines	1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.053	0.060	(-0.065, 0.172)	0.375	0.495
Uganda	1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.050	0.053	(-0.057, 0.156)	0.358	0.715
Brazil	2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	4.949	80.531	(-157.472, 167.371)	0.951	0.98
Colombia	2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.059	0.043	(-0.025, 0.144)	0.168	0.361
Liberia	2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.162	0.227	(-0.291, 0.615)	0.477	0.668
Pakistan	2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.464	0.151	(0.035, 0.892)	0.040	0.295
Philippines	2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.020	0.066	(-0.110, 0.150)	0.762	0.86
Uganda	2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.010	0.052	(-0.093, 0.113)	0.847	0.882
Colombia	3a	Police perceptions of citizens idx.	0.362	0.183	(-0.002, 0.727)	0.051	0.258
Pakistan	3a	Police perceptions of citizens idx.	0.071	0.084	(-0.098, 0.239)	0.404	0.538
Uganda	3a	Police perceptions of citizens idx.	-0.188	0.159	(-0.510, 0.134)	0.245	0.882
Colombia	3b	Police abuse idx.	-0.025	0.038	(-0.102, 0.051)	0.511	0.584
Liberia	3b	Police abuse idx.	0.011	0.135	(-0.259, 0.281)	0.933	0.957
Pakistan	3b	Police abuse idx.	-0.195	0.106	(-0.505, 0.115)	0.149	0.297
Philippines	3b	Police abuse idx.	-0.036	0.036	(-0.107, 0.036)	0.328	0.495
Uganda	3b	Police abuse idx.	0.099	0.046	(0.007, 0.191)	0.036	0.145
Colombia	4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.063	0.046	(-0.030, 0.155)	0.181	0.361
Liberia	4a	Crime reporting idx.	-0.022	0.048	(-0.118, 0.074)	0.653	0.914
Pakistan	4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.055	0.123	(-0.308, 0.417)	0.683	0.683
Philippines	4a	Crime reporting idx.	-0.047	0.059	(-0.163, 0.069)	0.425	0.495
Uganda	4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.026	0.061	(-0.097, 0.148)	0.679	0.882
Brazil	4b	Crime tips idx.	16.645	296.825	(-582.009, 615.299)	0.956	0.98
Colombia	4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.011	0.041	(-0.092, 0.069)	0.783	0.783
Liberia	4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.225	0.194	(-0.611, 0.162)	0.251	0.585
Pakistan	4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.101	0.044	(-0.231, 0.029)	0.095	0.295
Philippines	4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.065	0.047	(-0.158, 0.027)	0.163	0.57
Uganda	4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.005	0.033	(-0.071, 0.061)	0.882	0.882
Colombia	4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.027	0.038	(-0.049, 0.103)	0.485	0.584
Liberia	4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	-0.132	0.155	(-0.441, 0.177)	0.396	0.835
Pakistan	4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	-0.152	0.093	(-0.424, 0.120)	0.188	0.3
Philippines	4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.038	0.046	(-0.053, 0.128)	0.412	0.495
Uganda	4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.352	0.163	(0.025, 0.678)	0.036	0.145
Brazil	M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	-3.167	66.834	(-137.961, 131.628)	0.962	

Table SM14: Results Table for Primary Hypotheses (based on original indices) (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Colombia	M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	0.065	0.045	(-0.024, 0.154)	0.152	
Liberia	M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	0.572	0.170	(0.231, 0.913)	0.001	
Pakistan	M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	1.323	0.119	(0.997, 1.649)	0.000	
Philippines	M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	-0.036	0.060	(-0.154, 0.082)	0.551	
Uganda	M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	-0.018	0.049	(-0.116, 0.079)	0.711	
Colombia	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	0.046	0.044	(-0.042, 0.135)	0.302	
Liberia	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	-0.258	0.247	(-0.751, 0.236)	0.301	
Pakistan	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	0.020	0.117	(-0.323, 0.362)	0.875	
Uganda	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	0.104	0.046	(0.011, 0.196)	0.028	
Brazil	M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	-3.971	63.352	(-131.745, 123.803)	0.950	
Colombia	M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	-0.021	0.031	(-0.083, 0.041)	0.499	
Liberia	M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	0.470	0.243	(-0.015, 0.956)	0.057	
Pakistan	M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	0.160	0.120	(-0.182, 0.503)	0.258	
Philippines	M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	0.010	0.054	(-0.097, 0.116)	0.859	
Uganda	M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	-0.036	0.045	(-0.127, 0.054)	0.425	
Brazil	M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	-4.997	92.606	(-191.776, 181.781)	0.957	
Colombia	M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	0.115	0.041	(0.034, 0.196)	0.006	
Liberia	M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	0.323	0.174	(-0.025, 0.671)	0.069	
Pakistan	M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	0.032	0.087	(-0.224, 0.287)	0.735	
Philippines	M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	-0.004	0.068	(-0.137, 0.130)	0.956	
Uganda	M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	-0.039	0.033	(-0.105, 0.027)	0.241	
Brazil	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.203	11.839	(-23.675, 24.082)	0.986	
Colombia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.051	0.045	(-0.038, 0.140)	0.257	
Liberia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.040	0.248	(-0.535, 0.455)	0.872	
Pakistan	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.030	0.113	(-0.292, 0.353)	0.803	
Uganda	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.015	0.046	(-0.077, 0.107)	0.746	
Colombia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.065	0.046	(-0.027, 0.157)	0.165	
Liberia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	-0.186	0.215	(-0.616, 0.243)	0.390	
Pakistan	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.113	0.104	(-0.185, 0.411)	0.343	
Philippines	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.005	0.061	(-0.115, 0.125)	0.933	
Brazil	S2	Community trust	1.471	18.755	(-36.356, 39.299)	0.938	
Colombia	S2	Community trust	0.070	0.039	(-0.008, 0.147)	0.078	
Liberia	S2	Community trust	-0.218	0.210	(-0.636, 0.201)	0.303	
Pakistan	S2	Community trust	-0.037	0.173	(-0.554, 0.480)	0.843	
Philippines	S2	Community trust	-0.029	0.065	(-0.157, 0.100)	0.659	
Uganda	S2	Community trust	0.019	0.038	(-0.058, 0.095)	0.629	

## F.5 Secondary hypotheses (as pre-registered)

Table SM15: Results Table for Secondary Hypotheses (by study)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
Colombia	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization (administrative data)	0.059	0.065	(-0.069, 0.186)	0.365
Liberia	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization (administrative data)	-0.042	0.229	(-0.496, 0.413)	0.856
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization (administrative data)	0.169	0.199	(-0.227, 0.566)	0.397
Philippines	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization (administrative data)	-0.008	0.039	(-0.084, 0.069)	0.845
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization (administrative data)	0.494	0.112	(0.273, 0.715)	0.000
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization (expanded crimes)	-0.523	1.550	(-3.618, 2.573)	0.737
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization (expanded crimes)	-0.679	0.598	(-2.394, 1.037)	0.325
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization (expanded crimes)	-0.069	0.047	(-0.163, 0.025)	0.147
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization (expanded crimes)	0.417	0.319	(-0.223, 1.057)	0.197
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization (binary survey measures)	0.045	0.043	(-0.040, 0.131)	0.292
Liberia	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization (binary survey measures)	-0.062	0.066	(-0.193, 0.069)	0.346
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization (binary survey measures)	-0.068	0.044	(-0.197, 0.061)	0.208
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization (binary survey measures)	-0.036	0.054	(-0.143, 0.072)	0.511
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization (binary survey measures)	-0.013	0.057	(-0.127, 0.101)	0.821

## F.6 Primary hypotheses (using list-wise deletion)

Table SM16: Results Table for all indices (based on listwise indices)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Colombia	1a	Crime victimization idx.	0.047	0.047	(-0.046, 0.140)	0.317	0.554
Liberia	1a	Crime victimization idx.	1.514	1.193	(-0.867, 3.895)	0.209	0.588
Pakistan	1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.032	0.067	(-0.226, 0.162)	0.660	0.698
Philippines	1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.075	0.046	(-0.165, 0.016)	0.105	0.372
Uganda	1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.012	0.048	(-0.109, 0.085)	0.809	0.887
Colombia	1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.088	0.046	(-0.004, 0.179)	0.061	0.422
Liberia	1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.033	0.201	(-0.369, 0.435)	0.870	0.87
Pakistan	1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	-0.142	0.079	(-0.367, 0.083)	0.151	0.255
Philippines	1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.033	0.059	(-0.084, 0.150)	0.580	0.812
Uganda	1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.035	0.048	(-0.061, 0.131)	0.465	0.887
Colombia	2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.064	0.043	(-0.021, 0.149)	0.137	0.422
Liberia	2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.181	0.225	(-0.268, 0.630)	0.423	0.593
Pakistan	2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.464	0.151	(0.035, 0.893)	0.040	0.255
Philippines	2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.023	0.066	(-0.109, 0.154)	0.734	0.851
Uganda	2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.010	0.051	(-0.093, 0.114)	0.841	0.887
Colombia	3a	Corruption	0.465	0.138	(0.190, 0.741)	0.001	0.005
Colombia	3a	Abuse	0.155	0.134	(-0.112, 0.422)	0.250	0.334
Colombia	3a	Accountability	-0.114	0.078	(-0.270, 0.043)	0.151	0.302
Colombia	3a	Empathy	-0.074	0.153	(-0.378, 0.230)	0.630	0.63
Pakistan	3a	Corruption	0.014	0.098	(-0.182, 0.211)	0.883	0.971
Pakistan	3a	Abuse	0.004	0.105	(-0.207, 0.215)	0.971	0.971
Pakistan	3a	Accountability	-0.036	0.074	(-0.185, 0.113)	0.628	0.971
Pakistan	3a	Empathy	0.109	0.147	(-0.187, 0.406)	0.461	0.971
Uganda	3a	Corruption	-0.189	0.122	(-0.434, 0.057)	0.129	0.333
Uganda	3a	Abuse	-0.037	0.158	(-0.356, 0.282)	0.818	0.818
Uganda	3a	Accountability	-0.126	0.089	(-0.306, 0.054)	0.167	0.333
Uganda	3a	Empathy	-0.085	0.166	(-0.419, 0.249)	0.609	0.813
Colombia	3b	Police abuse idx.	-0.025	0.038	(-0.102, 0.051)	0.511	0.664
Liberia	3b	Police abuse idx.	0.046	0.175	(-0.304, 0.397)	0.793	0.87
Pakistan	3b	Police abuse idx.	-0.160	0.097	(-0.440, 0.120)	0.182	0.255
Philippines	3b	Police abuse idx.	-0.045	0.032	(-0.108, 0.018)	0.160	0.372
Uganda	3b	Police abuse idx.	0.109	0.052	(0.005, 0.212)	0.041	0.284
Brazil	4a	Resolution of crime	5.052	85.009	(-166.398, 176.502)	0.953	0.953
Colombia	4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.063	0.046	(-0.030, 0.155)	0.181	0.422
Colombia	4a	Resolution of crime	-0.007	0.024	(-0.055, 0.041)	0.761	0.94
Liberia	4a	Crime reporting idx.	-0.088	0.067	(-0.222, 0.047)	0.197	0.588
Liberia	4a	Resolution of crime	-0.063	0.121	(-0.305, 0.178)	0.602	0.894
Pakistan	4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.047	0.112	(-0.284, 0.379)	0.698	0.698
Pakistan	4a	Resolution of crime	0.007	0.037	(-0.103, 0.116)	0.870	0.87
Philippines	4a	Crime reporting idx.	-0.040	0.058	(-0.155, 0.075)	0.496	0.812
Philippines	4a	Resolution of crime	-0.138	0.056	(-0.250, -0.027)	0.016	0.078



Table SM16: Results Table for all indices (based on listwise indices) (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Uganda	4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.031	0.063	(-0.096, 0.158)	0.624	0.887
Uganda	4a	Resolution of crime	-0.007	0.029	(-0.065, 0.051)	0.810	0.938
Colombia	4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.011	0.041	(-0.092, 0.069)	0.783	0.783
Liberia	4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.224	0.194	(-0.610, 0.163)	0.252	0.588
Pakistan	4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.094	0.042	(-0.219, 0.032)	0.102	0.255
Philippines	4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.068	0.048	(-0.163, 0.026)	0.154	0.372
Uganda	4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.005	0.033	(-0.071, 0.061)	0.887	0.887
Colombia	4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.018	0.032	(-0.045, 0.082)	0.569	0.664
Liberia	4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.108	0.128	(-0.148, 0.364)	0.402	0.593
Pakistan	4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	-0.174	0.086	(-0.430, 0.081)	0.125	0.255
Philippines	4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	-0.007	0.038	(-0.082, 0.068)	0.851	0.851
Uganda	4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.039	0.042	(-0.046, 0.123)	0.363	0.887
Brazil	M1a	Corruption	-3.977	103.185	(-212.080, 204.126)	0.969	
Colombia	M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	0.063	0.044	(-0.025, 0.151)	0.159	
Colombia	M1a	Corruption	-0.018	0.030	(-0.077, 0.041)	0.540	
Liberia	M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	0.320	0.261	(-0.204, 0.843)	0.226	
Liberia	M1a	Corruption	0.474	0.208	(0.058, 0.890)	0.026	
Pakistan	M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	1.325	0.122	(0.983, 1.666)	0.000	
Pakistan	M1a	Corruption	0.741	0.244	(0.028, 1.453)	0.045	
Philippines	M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	-0.013	0.061	(-0.133, 0.108)	0.838	
Philippines	M1a	Corruption	-0.050	0.057	(-0.164, 0.063)	0.383	
Uganda	M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	-0.017	0.048	(-0.113, 0.079)	0.725	
Uganda	M1a	Corruption	-0.004	0.034	(-0.072, 0.065)	0.914	
Colombia	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	0.046	0.044	(-0.042, 0.135)	0.302	
Colombia	M1b	Law	-0.029	0.023	(-0.074, 0.017)	0.216	
Colombia	M1b	Crime reporting	0.081	0.042	(-0.003, 0.166)	0.059	
Liberia	M1b	Law	-0.094	0.168	(-0.429, 0.240)	0.575	
Pakistan	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.998	
Pakistan	M1b	Law	-0.041	0.059	(-0.210, 0.129)	0.531	
Pakistan	M1b	Crime reporting	0.057	0.089	(-0.209, 0.323)	0.563	
Uganda	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.566	
Uganda	M1b	Law	0.041	0.020	(0.000, 0.082)	0.048	
Uganda	M1b	Crime reporting	0.044	0.034	(-0.024, 0.111)	0.202	
Colombia	M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	-0.023	0.031	(-0.085, 0.038)	0.451	
Liberia	M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	0.430	0.244	(-0.058, 0.918)	0.083	
Pakistan	M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	0.067	0.097	(-0.204, 0.338)	0.528	
Philippines	M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	0.015	0.054	(-0.093, 0.122)	0.787	
Uganda	M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	-0.036	0.045	(-0.125, 0.054)	0.430	
Colombia	M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	0.115	0.041	(0.034, 0.196)	0.006	
Liberia	M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	0.326	0.175	(-0.022, 0.675)	0.066	
Pakistan	M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	0.043	0.089	(-0.221, 0.307)	0.660	
Philippines	M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	-0.001	0.069	(-0.137, 0.135)	0.990	
Uganda	M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	-0.035	0.033	(-0.101, 0.031)	0.294	
Brazil	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.203	11.839	(-23.675, 24.082)	0.986	

Table SM16: Results Table for all indices (based on listwise indices) (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Colombia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.051	0.045	(-0.038, 0.140)	0.257	
Liberia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.040	0.248	(-0.535, 0.455)	0.872	
Pakistan	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.030	0.113	(-0.292, 0.353)	0.803	
Uganda	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.015	0.046	(-0.077, 0.107)	0.746	
Colombia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.065	0.046	(-0.027, 0.157)	0.165	
Liberia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	-0.186	0.215	(-0.616, 0.243)	0.390	
Pakistan	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.113	0.104	(-0.185, 0.411)	0.343	
Philippines	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.005	0.061	(-0.115, 0.125)	0.933	
Brazil	S2	Community trust	1.471	18.755	(-36.356, 39.299)	0.938	
Colombia	S2	Community trust	0.070	0.039	(-0.008, 0.147)	0.078	
Liberia	S2	Community trust	-0.218	0.210	(-0.636, 0.201)	0.303	
Pakistan	S2	Community trust	-0.037	0.173	(-0.554, 0.480)	0.843	
Philippines	S2	Community trust	-0.029	0.065	(-0.157, 0.100)	0.659	
Uganda	S2	Community trust	0.019	0.038	(-0.058, 0.095)	0.629	

## F.7 Secondary hypotheses (using list-wise deletion)

Table SM17: Results Table for Secondary Hypotheses

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	0.045	0.043	(-0.040, 0.131)	0.292
Colombia	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	0.059	0.065	(-0.069, 0.186)	0.365
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization idx. (expanded crimes)	-0.523	1.550	(-3.618, 2.573)	0.737
Liberia	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	-0.062	0.066	(-0.193, 0.069)	0.346
Liberia	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	-0.042	0.229	(-0.496, 0.413)	0.856
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization idx. (expanded crimes)	-0.679	0.598	(-2.394, 1.037)	0.325
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	-0.068	0.044	(-0.197, 0.061)	0.208
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	0.169	0.199	(-0.227, 0.566)	0.397
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization idx. (expanded crimes)	-0.069	0.047	(-0.163, 0.025)	0.147
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	-0.036	0.054	(-0.143, 0.072)	0.511
Philippines	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	-0.008	0.039	(-0.084, 0.069)	0.845
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization idx. (expanded crimes)	0.417	0.319	(-0.223, 1.057)	0.197
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	-0.013	0.057	(-0.127, 0.101)	0.821
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	0.494	0.112	(0.273, 0.715)	0.000

## F.8 Primary hypotheses by item

Table SM18: All components

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Prop. Missing	Differential attrition p-value
Brazil	1a	Violent crimes (personal)	-0.437	7.716	(-16.000, 15.126)	0.955	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Violent crimes (personal)	0.009	0.042	(-0.075, 0.092)	0.838	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Violent crimes (personal)	0.594	0.613	(-0.632, 1.820)	0.337	0.000	–
Pakistan	1a	Violent crimes (personal)	0.000	0.002	(-0.005, 0.006)	0.890	0.000	–
Philippines	1a	Violent crimes (personal)	-0.001	0.035	(-0.070, 0.069)	0.986	0.000	–
Uganda	1a	Violent crimes (personal)	0.012	0.022	(-0.032, 0.056)	0.599	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Armed robbery (personal)	-0.024	0.042	(-0.108, 0.061)	0.579	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Armed robbery (personal)	0.165	0.470	(-0.775, 1.105)	0.727	0.000	–
Pakistan	1a	Armed robbery (personal)	0.002	0.002	(-0.004, 0.007)	0.440	0.006	0.732
Philippines	1a	Armed robbery (personal)	-0.029	0.027	(-0.083, 0.024)	0.281	0.000	0.317
Uganda	1a	Armed robbery (personal)	0.032	0.025	(-0.019, 0.083)	0.215	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Simple assault (personal)	0.036	0.034	(-0.032, 0.103)	0.296	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Simple assault (personal)	0.745	0.761	(-0.775, 2.264)	0.331	0.001	0.313
Pakistan	1a	Simple assault (personal)	-0.089	0.057	(-0.259, 0.082)	0.208	0.013	0.635
Philippines	1a	Simple assault (personal)	0.082	0.068	(-0.052, 0.217)	0.229	0.001	0.038
Uganda	1a	Simple assault (personal)	0.000	0.019	(-0.037, 0.037)	0.999	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Other violent crimes (personal)	-0.074	0.158	(-0.390, 0.243)	0.644	0.003	0.209
Pakistan	1a	Other violent crimes (personal)	0.078	0.055	(-0.084, 0.241)	0.237	0.000	–
Philippines	1a	Other violent crimes (personal)	-0.024	0.037	(-0.096, 0.048)	0.513	0.000	–
Uganda	1a	Other violent crimes (personal)	0.018	0.033	(-0.047, 0.084)	0.576	0.000	0.321
Brazil	1a	Non-violent crimes (personal)	-1.145	19.563	(-40.601, 38.311)	0.954	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Non-violent crimes (personal)	0.021	0.049	(-0.077, 0.118)	0.675	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Non-violent crimes (personal)	2.032	2.013	(-1.988, 6.052)	0.317	0.000	–
Pakistan	1a	Non-violent crimes (personal)	-0.024	0.045	(-0.157, 0.109)	0.626	0.000	–
Philippines	1a	Non-violent crimes (personal)	-0.033	0.031	(-0.096, 0.029)	0.288	0.000	–
Uganda	1a	Non-violent crimes (personal)	0.002	0.021	(-0.039, 0.043)	0.920	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Burglary (personal)	0.017	0.041	(-0.065, 0.099)	0.687	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Burglary (personal)	1.854	1.918	(-1.973, 5.682)	0.337	0.002	0.829
Pakistan	1a	Burglary (personal)	-0.035	0.040	(-0.152, 0.083)	0.437	0.009	0.260
Philippines	1a	Burglary (personal)	-0.033	0.031	(-0.094, 0.029)	0.298	0.000	0.640
Uganda	1a	Burglary (personal)	0.003	0.019	(-0.034, 0.040)	0.868	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Other non-violent crimes (personal)	-0.295	0.164	(-0.623, 0.032)	0.076	0.003	0.103
Pakistan	1a	Other non-violent crimes (personal)	0.154	0.194	(-0.423, 0.732)	0.478	0.000	–
Philippines	1a	Other non-violent crimes (personal)	-0.010	0.051	(-0.111, 0.091)	0.850	0.000	0.186
Uganda	1a	Other non-violent crimes (personal)	-0.028	0.040	(-0.107, 0.052)	0.487	0.000	0.321
Brazil	1a	Violent crimes (community)	-0.031	0.492	(-1.022, 0.961)	0.950	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Violent crimes (community)	0.037	0.044	(-0.050, 0.123)	0.401	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Violent crimes (community)	0.682	0.904	(-1.125, 2.488)	0.454	0.000	–
Pakistan	1a	Violent crimes (community)	-0.062	0.112	(-0.389, 0.265)	0.611	0.000	–
Philippines	1a	Violent crimes (community)	-0.027	0.058	(-0.143, 0.088)	0.642	0.000	–
Uganda	1a	Violent crimes (community)	0.004	0.063	(-0.122, 0.131)	0.945	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Armed robbery (community)	0.040	0.041	(-0.042, 0.122)	0.335	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Armed robbery (community)	-0.012	0.242	(-0.496, 0.473)	0.961	0.002	0.625
Pakistan	1a	Armed robbery (community)	0.025	0.088	(-0.233, 0.283)	0.792	0.005	0.809
Philippines	1a	Armed robbery (community)	-0.015	0.041	(-0.095, 0.065)	0.710	0.001	0.362
Uganda	1a	Armed robbery (community)	0.037	0.047	(-0.057, 0.131)	0.434	0.001	1.000
Liberia	1a	Aggravated assault (community)	0.721	1.236	(-1.753, 3.196)	0.562	0.002	0.776
Pakistan	1a	Aggravated assault (community)	-5.694	5.200	(-21.142, 9.753)	0.344	0.017	0.157
Philippines	1a	Aggravated assault (community)	-0.019	0.041	(-0.099, 0.062)	0.642	0.001	0.361
Uganda	1a	Aggravated assault (community)	0.016	0.026	(-0.035, 0.068)	0.528	0.001	0.564
Colombia	1a	Simple assault (community)	-0.012	0.040	(-0.092, 0.068)	0.769	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Simple assault (community)	1.522	1.623	(-1.716, 4.760)	0.352	0.000	–
Pakistan	1a	Simple assault (community)	0.055	0.068	(-0.147, 0.257)	0.471	0.012	0.532
Philippines	1a	Simple assault (community)	-0.064	0.048	(-0.158, 0.030)	0.180	0.005	0.890

Table SM18: All components (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Prop. Missing	Differential attrition p-value
Uganda	1a	Simple assault (community)	0.025	0.034	(-0.044, 0.094)	0.476	0.002	0.243
Colombia	1a	Sexual assault (community)	-0.011	0.038	(-0.086, 0.065)	0.783	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Sexual assault (community)	-0.150	0.267	(-0.683, 0.384)	0.577	0.000	–
Pakistan	1a	Sexual assault (community)	0.009	0.033	(-0.091, 0.109)	0.806	0.027	0.548
Philippines	1a	Sexual assault (community)	-0.001	0.064	(-0.128, 0.125)	0.984	0.003	0.418
Uganda	1a	Sexual assault (community)	0.021	0.055	(-0.089, 0.131)	0.705	0.001	0.179
Colombia	1a	Domestic abuse (community)	0.022	0.041	(-0.060, 0.104)	0.589	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Domestic abuse (community)	1.029	1.749	(-2.461, 4.519)	0.558	0.000	–
Pakistan	1a	Domestic abuse (community)	-0.112	0.233	(-0.807, 0.583)	0.661	0.029	0.961
Philippines	1a	Domestic abuse (community)	0.000	0.040	(-0.079, 0.079)	0.997	0.002	0.738
Uganda	1a	Domestic abuse (community)	-0.021	0.069	(-0.159, 0.117)	0.766	0.005	0.188
Colombia	1a	Murder (community)	0.032	0.046	(-0.059, 0.123)	0.487	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Murder (community)	0.135	0.138	(-0.140, 0.410)	0.331	0.000	–
Pakistan	1a	Murder (community)	-0.018	0.046	(-0.156, 0.120)	0.713	0.019	0.977
Philippines	1a	Murder (community)	0.074	0.111	(-0.147, 0.294)	0.510	0.002	0.041
Uganda	1a	Murder (community)	-0.042	0.092	(-0.226, 0.141)	0.645	0.001	0.645
Liberia	1a	Other violent crimes (community)	0.013	0.048	(-0.083, 0.108)	0.792	0.001	0.654
Pakistan	1a	Other violent crimes (community)	0.323	0.413	(-0.907, 1.554)	0.485	0.000	–
Philippines	1a	Other violent crimes (community)	0.066	0.073	(-0.079, 0.210)	0.370	0.000	–
Uganda	1a	Other violent crimes (community)	-0.012	0.018	(-0.048, 0.024)	0.505	0.004	0.820
Brazil	1a	Non-violent crimes (community)	0.312	5.088	(-9.949, 10.573)	0.951	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Non-violent crimes (community)	0.049	0.057	(-0.065, 0.162)	0.394	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Non-violent crimes (community)	0.621	0.749	(-0.877, 2.119)	0.410	0.000	–
Pakistan	1a	Non-violent crimes (community)	-0.043	0.052	(-0.192, 0.106)	0.459	0.000	–
Philippines	1a	Non-violent crimes (community)	-0.097	0.046	(-0.189, -0.006)	0.037	0.000	–
Uganda	1a	Non-violent crimes (community)	-0.059	0.047	(-0.154, 0.035)	0.212	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Burglary (community)	0.043	0.051	(-0.059, 0.144)	0.405	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Burglary (community)	0.640	0.795	(-0.951, 2.231)	0.424	0.000	–
Pakistan	1a	Burglary (community)	-0.061	0.054	(-0.214, 0.092)	0.325	0.014	0.679
Philippines	1a	Burglary (community)	-0.101	0.047	(-0.193, -0.009)	0.032	0.004	0.815
Uganda	1a	Burglary (community)	-0.060	0.046	(-0.151, 0.032)	0.195	0.001	0.160
Liberia	1a	Other non-violent crimes (community)	0.068	0.126	(-0.183, 0.319)	0.590	0.001	0.641
Pakistan	1a	Other non-violent crimes (community)	0.037	0.508	(-1.474, 1.549)	0.945	0.000	–
Philippines	1a	Other non-violent crimes (community)	0.014	0.061	(-0.107, 0.135)	0.816	0.001	0.054
Uganda	1a	Other non-violent crimes (community)	0.058	0.040	(-0.023, 0.138)	0.159	0.004	0.835
Brazil	1b	Feared violent crime	4.565	71.447	(-139.543, 148.674)	0.949	0.012	0.950
Colombia	1b	Feared violent crime	0.044	0.041	(-0.038, 0.126)	0.286	0.013	0.103
Liberia	1b	Feared violent crime	-0.051	0.188	(-0.426, 0.324)	0.787	0.001	0.325
Pakistan	1b	Feared violent crime	0.034	0.064	(-0.149, 0.216)	0.627	0.000	–
Philippines	1b	Feared violent crime	0.058	0.064	(-0.070, 0.185)	0.371	0.015	0.977
Uganda	1b	Feared violent crime	0.046	0.051	(-0.056, 0.148)	0.373	0.005	0.004
Brazil	1b	Fear non-violent crime	3.608	62.027	(-121.503, 128.719)	0.954	0.012	0.951
Liberia	1b	Fear non-violent crime	-0.084	0.210	(-0.504, 0.336)	0.691	0.001	0.326
Pakistan	1b	Fear non-violent crime	-0.424	0.060	(-0.596, -0.252)	0.003	0.000	–
Philippines	1b	Fear non-violent crime	0.071	0.062	(-0.052, 0.194)	0.254	0.013	0.672
Uganda	1b	Fear non-violent crime	0.070	0.056	(-0.042, 0.182)	0.213	0.005	0.022
Brazil	1b	Feared walking	-2.370	39.077	(-81.185, 76.445)	0.952	0.006	0.960
Colombia	1b	Feared walking	0.087	0.042	(0.003, 0.171)	0.043	0.009	0.679
Liberia	1b	Feared walking	0.124	0.243	(-0.362, 0.611)	0.611	0.001	0.395
Pakistan	1b	Feared walking	-0.239	0.060	(-0.418, -0.061)	0.022	0.014	0.443
Philippines	1b	Feared walking	0.001	0.053	(-0.103, 0.105)	0.986	0.014	0.878
Uganda	1b	Feared walking	0.012	0.037	(-0.062, 0.086)	0.745	0.000	–
Brazil	2	Trust in police	2.339	29.559	(-57.278, 61.956)	0.937	0.008	0.951
Colombia	2	Trust in police	0.045	0.051	(-0.056, 0.146)	0.376	0.004	0.535
Liberia	2	Trust in police	0.082	0.247	(-0.410, 0.575)	0.740	0.005	0.182
Pakistan	2	Trust in police	0.431	0.140	(0.027, 0.836)	0.042	0.008	0.302
Philippines	2	Trust in police	0.007	0.066	(-0.125, 0.138)	0.921	0.010	0.240

Table SM18: All components (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Prop. Missing	Differential attrition p-value
Uganda	2	Trust in police	0.025	0.050	(-0.075, 0.124)	0.623	0.001	0.938
Brazil	2	Trust in service of police	6.244	107.570	(-210.726, 223.214)	0.954	0.010	0.951
Colombia	2	Trust in service of police	0.086	0.045	(-0.005, 0.176)	0.062	0.007	0.041
Liberia	2	Trust in service of police	0.235	0.213	(-0.191, 0.661)	0.275	0.004	0.721
Pakistan	2	Trust in service of police	0.458	0.149	(0.040, 0.876)	0.038	0.011	0.224
Philippines	2	Trust in service of police	0.031	0.059	(-0.086, 0.148)	0.600	0.021	0.630
Uganda	2	Trust in service of police	-0.008	0.051	(-0.110, 0.095)	0.879	0.001	0.654
Colombia	3a	Empathy (complaints)	0.008	0.155	(-0.300, 0.316)	0.961	0.398	0.502
Pakistan	3a	Empathy (complaints)	-0.028	0.159	(-0.347, 0.291)	0.861	0.193	0.001
Uganda	3a	Empathy (complaints)	0.173	0.233	(-0.297, 0.643)	0.461	0.005	0.344
Colombia	3a	Empathy (reports)	-0.162	0.206	(-0.572, 0.248)	0.433	0.393	0.500
Pakistan	3a	Empathy (reports)	0.238	0.168	(-0.100, 0.575)	0.163	0.193	0.000
Uganda	3a	Empathy (reports)	-0.338	0.206	(-0.754, 0.078)	0.108	0.005	0.345
Colombia	3a	Police takes complaints seriously	-0.061	0.163	(-0.386, 0.264)	0.711	0.391	0.401
Pakistan	3a	Police takes complaints seriously	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.716	0.197	0.278
Uganda	3a	Police takes complaints seriously	-0.276	0.149	(-0.576, 0.025)	0.071	0.005	0.347
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 2: disciplinary punishment	-0.167	0.126	(-0.418, 0.084)	0.189	0.384	0.447
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 2: disciplinary punishment	-0.241	0.222	(-0.688, 0.205)	0.282	0.209	0.734
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 2: disciplinary punishment	-0.064	0.150	(-0.366, 0.237)	0.669	0.005	0.346
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 2: report fellow officer	-0.047	0.121	(-0.289, 0.194)	0.697	0.400	0.278
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 2: report fellow officer	-0.075	0.126	(-0.328, 0.177)	0.552	0.201	0.067
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 2: report fellow officer	-0.208	0.184	(-0.579, 0.162)	0.263	0.005	0.347
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 2: reports by other officers	0.004	0.127	(-0.247, 0.256)	0.972	0.398	0.342
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 2: reports by other officers	0.000	0.157	(-0.316, 0.317)	0.998	0.236	0.304
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 2: reports by other officers	-0.153	0.159	(-0.473, 0.168)	0.342	0.005	0.343
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 2: disciplinary punishment	-0.210	0.116	(-0.442, 0.021)	0.074	0.384	0.447
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 3: disciplinary punishment	-0.070	0.154	(-0.379, 0.239)	0.650	0.217	0.155
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 3: disciplinary punishment	-0.067	0.095	(-0.260, 0.125)	0.484	0.010	0.737
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 3: report fellow officer	-0.297	0.156	(-0.608, 0.014)	0.061	0.398	0.211
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 3: report fellow officer	0.118	0.129	(-0.141, 0.378)	0.364	0.213	0.560
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 3: report fellow officer	-0.242	0.165	(-0.574, 0.090)	0.149	0.005	0.345
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 3: reports by other officers	-0.145	0.151	(-0.446, 0.157)	0.342	0.398	0.233
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 3: reports by other officers	0.072	0.165	(-0.260, 0.403)	0.666	0.220	0.814
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 3: reports by other officers	-0.133	0.204	(-0.544, 0.279)	0.519	0.010	0.722
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 5: disciplinary punishment	0.042	0.135	(-0.226, 0.310)	0.756	0.384	0.447
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 5: disciplinary punishment	-0.046	0.156	(-0.360, 0.269)	0.771	0.189	
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 5: disciplinary punishment	-0.060	0.135	(-0.333, 0.213)	0.659	0.010	0.744
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 5: report fellow officer	0.029	0.132	(-0.235, 0.293)	0.825	0.393	0.235
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 5: report fellow officer	0.083	0.125	(-0.167, 0.334)	0.507	0.197	0.127
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 5: report fellow officer	0.003	0.219	(-0.439, 0.445)	0.991	0.005	0.345
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 5: reports by other officers	0.022	0.142	(-0.261, 0.305)	0.878	0.391	0.286
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 5: reports by other officers	0.070	0.137	(-0.205, 0.345)	0.610	0.213	0.001
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 5: reports by other officers	-0.045	0.160	(-0.367, 0.277)	0.778	0.005	0.346
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 5: own misconduct	0.135	0.157	(-0.177, 0.447)	0.392	0.391	0.286
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 5: own misconduct	0.013	0.118	(-0.224, 0.250)	0.912	0.205	0.589
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 5: own misconduct	-0.095	0.137	(-0.372, 0.182)	0.494	0.005	0.346
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 5: others' misconduct	0.169	0.133	(-0.096, 0.434)	0.207	0.393	0.265
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 5: others' misconduct	-0.031	0.112	(-0.257, 0.195)	0.783	0.228	0.000
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 5: others' misconduct	0.018	0.197	(-0.378, 0.415)	0.926	0.005	0.345
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 2: own misconduct (corruption)	0.123	0.110	(-0.095, 0.341)	0.266	0.400	0.336
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 2: own misconduct (corruption)	0.022	0.115	(-0.208, 0.253)	0.847	0.189	
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 2: own misconduct (corruption)	-0.108	0.163	(-0.437, 0.221)	0.511	0.005	0.346
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 2: others' misconduct (corruption)	0.890	0.234	(0.425, 1.356)	0.000	0.398	0.439
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 2: others' misconduct (corruption)	-0.098	0.120	(-0.339, 0.143)	0.419	0.217	0.041
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 2: others' misconduct (corruption)	-0.132	0.195	(-0.526, 0.261)	0.501	0.005	0.348
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 3: own misconduct (corruption)	0.149	0.160	(-0.169, 0.467)	0.352	0.396	0.189
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 3: own misconduct (corruption)	0.107	0.123	(-0.139, 0.354)	0.385	0.244	0.811

Table SM18: All components (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Prop. Missing	Differential attrition p-value
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 3: own misconduct (corruption)	-0.296	0.136	(-0.570, -0.023)	0.035	0.005	0.346
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 3: others' misconduct (corruption)	0.572	0.213	(0.148, 0.995)	0.009	0.393	0.232
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 3: others' misconduct (corruption)	-0.016	0.152	(-0.321, 0.290)	0.919	0.268	0.590
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 3: others' misconduct (corruption)	-0.206	0.135	(-0.477, 0.066)	0.134	0.005	0.347
Brazil	3b	Police abuse	-0.203	3.746	(-7.758, 7.352)	0.957	0.000	–
Colombia	3b	Police abuse	0.009	0.037	(-0.065, 0.083)	0.801	0.000	–
Liberia	3b	Police abuse	-0.033	0.034	(-0.100, 0.035)	0.340	0.001	0.326
Pakistan	3b	Police abuse	-0.289	0.143	(-0.711, 0.134)	0.125	0.037	0.935
Philippines	3b	Police abuse	-0.035	0.043	(-0.121, 0.050)	0.416	0.000	–
Uganda	3b	Police abuse	0.015	0.041	(-0.068, 0.098)	0.723	0.000	0.322
Brazil	3b	Police abuse	-0.144	2.648	(-5.484, 5.197)	0.957	0.000	–
Liberia	3b	Police abuse	-0.055	0.047	(-0.150, 0.039)	0.248	0.000	–
Pakistan	3b	Police abuse	-0.147	0.074	(-0.366, 0.072)	0.129	0.000	–
Philippines	3b	Police abuse	-0.015	0.039	(-0.091, 0.062)	0.701	0.000	–
Uganda	3b	Police abuse	0.018	0.019	(-0.021, 0.057)	0.349	0.000	–
Brazil	3b	Bribe frequency	0.221	4.236	(-8.323, 8.765)	0.959	0.000	–
Colombia	3b	Bribe frequency	-0.008	0.049	(-0.105, 0.089)	0.870	0.000	–
Liberia	3b	Bribe frequency	0.082	0.317	(-0.550, 0.714)	0.797	0.000	–
Pakistan	3b	Bribe frequency	-0.032	0.067	(-0.223, 0.160)	0.664	0.021	0.265
Philippines	3b	Bribe frequency	0.003	0.046	(-0.088, 0.093)	0.955	0.001	0.673
Uganda	3b	Bribe frequency	0.083	0.041	(0.002, 0.165)	0.045	0.000	0.322
Brazil	3b	Bribe amount	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.951	0.000	–
Colombia	3b	Bribe amount	-0.088	0.084	(-0.255, 0.078)	0.294	0.000	–
Liberia	3b	Bribe amount	0.005	0.020	(-0.035, 0.046)	0.792	0.000	–
Pakistan	3b	Bribe amount	-0.009	0.009	(-0.036, 0.018)	0.392	0.021	0.165
Philippines	3b	Bribe amount	-0.040	0.026	(-0.092, 0.012)	0.131	0.002	0.785
Uganda	3b	Bribe amount	0.121	0.080	(-0.040, 0.282)	0.137	0.000	0.322
Brazil	4a	Violent crimes reported (personal)	-4.260	68.149	(-141.707, 133.187)	0.950	0.000	–
Colombia	4a	Violent crimes reported (personal)	0.037	0.048	(-0.058, 0.132)	0.437	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Violent crimes reported (personal)	-0.005	0.006	(-0.017, 0.006)	0.371	0.000	–
Pakistan	4a	Violent crimes reported (personal)	0.228	0.218	(-0.418, 0.874)	0.364	0.000	–
Philippines	4a	Violent crimes reported (personal)	0.012	0.047	(-0.081, 0.105)	0.798	0.000	–
Uganda	4a	Violent crimes reported (personal)	-0.003	0.038	(-0.080, 0.074)	0.936	0.000	–
Colombia	4a	Armed robbery reported (personal)	0.036	0.040	(-0.043, 0.115)	0.367	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Armed robbery reported (personal)	-0.005	0.009	(-0.022, 0.013)	0.582	0.007	0.555
Uganda	4a	Armed robbery reported (personal)	0.000	0.039	(-0.079, 0.079)	0.997	0.003	0.598
Colombia	4a	Simple assault reported (personal)	-0.002	0.050	(-0.101, 0.097)	0.969	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Simple assault reported (personal)	-0.001	0.004	(-0.009, 0.007)	0.818	0.025	0.712
Uganda	4a	Simple assault reported (personal)	-0.003	0.028	(-0.060, 0.054)	0.915	0.018	0.416
Uganda	4a	Other violent crimes reported (personal)	0.000	0.037	(-0.073, 0.073)	0.996	0.000	–
Brazil	4a	Non-violent crimes reported (personal)	3.210	52.129	(-101.926, 108.346)	0.951	0.000	–
Colombia	4a	Non-violent crimes reported (personal)	0.033	0.045	(-0.057, 0.123)	0.470	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Non-violent crimes reported (personal)	-0.007	0.019	(-0.044, 0.030)	0.716	0.000	–
Philippines	4a	Non-violent crimes reported (personal)	0.006	0.046	(-0.086, 0.097)	0.905	0.000	–
Uganda	4a	Non-violent crimes reported (personal)	0.066	0.042	(-0.019, 0.151)	0.123	0.000	–
Colombia	4a	Burglary reported (personal)	0.027	0.037	(-0.047, 0.102)	0.466	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Burglary reported (personal)	-0.007	0.019	(-0.046, 0.031)	0.711	0.037	0.293
Uganda	4a	Burglary reported (personal)	0.083	0.041	(0.001, 0.166)	0.047	0.052	0.714
Uganda	4a	Other non-violent crimes reported (personal)	-0.043	0.030	(-0.103, 0.018)	0.161	0.000	–
Brazil	4a	Violent crimes reported (community)	-3.373	54.063	(-112.409, 105.663)	0.951	0.000	–
Colombia	4a	Violent crimes reported (community)	-0.003	0.041	(-0.084, 0.078)	0.940	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Violent crimes reported (community)	-0.002	0.019	(-0.040, 0.035)	0.897	0.000	–
Pakistan	4a	Violent crimes reported (community)	0.037	0.099	(-0.257, 0.331)	0.730	0.000	–
Philippines	4a	Violent crimes reported (community)	0.074	0.099	(-0.121, 0.270)	0.453	0.000	–
Uganda	4a	Violent crimes reported (community)	0.021	0.068	(-0.117, 0.158)	0.764	0.000	–
Colombia	4a	Armed robbery reported (community)	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.301	0.332	0.947
Liberia	4a	Armed robbery reported (community)	-0.028	0.036	(-0.100, 0.043)	0.434	0.022	0.756

Table SM18: All components (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Prop. Missing	Differential attrition p-value
Uganda	4a	Armed robbery reported (community)	0.039	0.052	(-0.065, 0.144)	0.453	0.010	0.371
Liberia	4a	Aggravated assault reported (community)	0.006	0.018	(-0.030, 0.042)	0.737	0.021	0.146
Uganda	4a	Aggravated assault reported (community)	0.011	0.037	(-0.063, 0.086)	0.765	0.009	0.367
Colombia	4a	Simple assault reported (community)	-0.018	0.039	(-0.095, 0.058)	0.636	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Simple assault reported (community)	-0.001	0.011	(-0.023, 0.022)	0.947	0.042	0.321
Uganda	4a	Simple assault reported (community)	0.013	0.036	(-0.058, 0.084)	0.718	0.038	0.110
Colombia	4a	Sexual assault reported (community)	-0.010	0.038	(-0.086, 0.065)	0.782	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Sexual assault reported (community)	-0.007	0.011	(-0.030, 0.016)	0.552	0.009	0.686
Uganda	4a	Sexual assault reported (community)	0.061	0.068	(-0.076, 0.198)	0.374	0.010	0.889
Colombia	4a	Domestic physical abuse reported (community)	0.006	0.041	(-0.074, 0.087)	0.876	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Domestic physical abuse reported (community)	0.004	0.004	(-0.003, 0.012)	0.246	0.057	0.888
Uganda	4a	Domestic physical abuse reported (community)	-0.017	0.044	(-0.105, 0.072)	0.707	0.070	0.666
Uganda	4a	Other violent crime reported (community)	0.006	0.018	(-0.029, 0.042)	0.718	0.000	–
Brazil	4a	Non-violent crime reported (community)	-5.022	81.266	(-168.924, 158.880)	0.951	0.000	–
Colombia	4a	Non-violent crime reported (community)	0.095	0.080	(-0.064, 0.255)	0.239	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Non-violent crime reported (community)	-0.015	0.024	(-0.063, 0.033)	0.525	0.000	–
Philippines	4a	Non-violent crime reported (community)	-0.081	0.044	(-0.167, 0.005)	0.066	0.000	–
Uganda	4a	Non-violent crime reported (community)	0.004	0.052	(-0.100, 0.108)	0.938	0.000	–
Colombia	4a	Burglary reported (community)	0.078	0.066	(-0.053, 0.209)	0.241	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Burglary reported (community)	-0.017	0.025	(-0.066, 0.033)	0.506	0.045	0.704
Uganda	4a	Burglary reported (community)	-0.013	0.053	(-0.119, 0.094)	0.814	0.121	0.223
Uganda	4a	Other non-violent crime reported (community)	0.038	0.040	(-0.042, 0.118)	0.350	0.000	–
Brazil	4a	Resolution of crime index	5.052	85.009	(-166.398, 176.502)	0.953	0.000	–
Colombia	4a	Resolution of crime index	-0.007	0.024	(-0.055, 0.041)	0.761	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Resolution of crime index	-0.063	0.121	(-0.305, 0.178)	0.602	0.000	–
Pakistan	4a	Resolution of crime index	0.007	0.037	(-0.103, 0.116)	0.870	0.000	–
Philippines	4a	Resolution of crime index	-0.138	0.056	(-0.250, -0.027)	0.016	0.000	–
Uganda	4a	Resolution of crime index	-0.007	0.029	(-0.065, 0.051)	0.810	0.000	–
Brazil	4a	Burglary resolution	10.341	169.864	(-332.249, 352.932)	0.952	0.000	–
Colombia	4a	Burglary resolution	-0.007	0.035	(-0.076, 0.062)	0.837	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Burglary resolution	0.003	0.108	(-0.213, 0.220)	0.977	0.000	–
Pakistan	4a	Burglary resolution	0.045	0.047	(-0.095, 0.185)	0.401	0.000	–
Philippines	4a	Burglary resolution	-0.095	0.055	(-0.203, 0.014)	0.087	0.000	–
Uganda	4a	Burglary resolution	-0.040	0.038	(-0.116, 0.036)	0.300	0.000	–
Brazil	4a	Domestic abuse resolution	0.437	14.358	(-28.520, 29.395)	0.976	0.000	–
Colombia	4a	Domestic abuse resolution	-0.007	0.029	(-0.063, 0.050)	0.816	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Domestic abuse resolution	0.091	0.081	(-0.071, 0.253)	0.266	0.000	–
Pakistan	4a	Domestic abuse resolution	-0.006	0.089	(-0.272, 0.260)	0.949	0.000	–
Philippines	4a	Domestic abuse resolution	-0.097	0.049	(-0.193, -0.001)	0.049	0.000	–
Uganda	4a	Domestic abuse resolution	0.061	0.057	(-0.054, 0.176)	0.290	0.000	–
Brazil	4a	Armed robbery resolution	4.377	73.555	(-143.973, 152.727)	0.953	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Armed robbery resolution	-0.207	0.115	(-0.436, 0.022)	0.076	0.000	–
Pakistan	4a	Armed robbery resolution	-0.012	0.061	(-0.193, 0.169)	0.856	0.000	–
Philippines	4a	Armed robbery resolution	-0.109	0.054	(-0.215, -0.002)	0.045	0.000	–
Uganda	4a	Armed robbery resolution	-0.042	0.027	(-0.096, 0.012)	0.128	0.000	–
Brazil	4b	Contacted police for suspicious activity	6.899	123.734	(-242.655, 256.453)	0.956	0.010	0.951
Colombia	4b	Contacted police for suspicious activity	-0.062	0.043	(-0.147, 0.024)	0.156	0.000	–
Liberia	4b	Contacted police for suspicious activity	-0.181	0.173	(-0.526, 0.164)	0.299	0.000	–
Pakistan	4b	Contacted police for suspicious activity	-0.099	0.043	(-0.228, 0.030)	0.096	0.018	0.323
Philippines	4b	Contacted police for suspicious activity	-0.060	0.049	(-0.156, 0.037)	0.223	0.008	0.316
Uganda	4b	Contacted police for suspicious activity	0.006	0.039	(-0.072, 0.083)	0.883	0.001	0.990
Brazil	4b	Gave information to police	-0.219	5.777	(-12.127, 11.688)	0.970	0.872	0.950
Colombia	4b	Gave information to police	0.039	0.039	(-0.038, 0.117)	0.317	0.000	–
Liberia	4b	Gave information to police	-0.228	0.215	(-0.657, 0.201)	0.294	0.001	0.902
Pakistan	4b	Gave information to police	-0.074	0.042	(-0.199, 0.052)	0.168	0.017	0.876
Philippines	4b	Gave information to police	-0.059	0.042	(-0.142, 0.025)	0.170	0.013	0.052
Uganda	4b	Gave information to police	-0.014	0.034	(-0.083, 0.054)	0.672	0.000	–



Table SM18: All components (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Prop. Missing	Differential attrition p-value
Liberia	4c	Reported drinking on duty	-0.433	0.199	(-0.831, -0.036)	0.033	0.006	0.462
Pakistan	4c	Reported drinking on duty	-0.032	0.124	(-0.391, 0.328)	0.813	0.037	0.727
Philippines	4c	Reported drinking on duty	0.059	0.044	(-0.028, 0.146)	0.180	0.013	0.199
Uganda	4c	Reported drinking on duty	0.023	0.048	(-0.073, 0.119)	0.628	0.003	0.978
Colombia	4c	Reported police beating	0.019	0.039	(-0.058, 0.097)	0.624	0.010	0.919
Liberia	4c	Reported police beating	0.186	0.194	(-0.202, 0.574)	0.342	0.003	0.701
Pakistan	4c	Reported police beating	-0.111	0.091	(-0.380, 0.158)	0.301	0.041	0.909
Philippines	4c	Reported police beating	0.025	0.047	(-0.068, 0.117)	0.599	0.009	0.668
Uganda	4c	Reported police beating	0.042	0.051	(-0.060, 0.145)	0.412	0.002	0.503
Colombia	4c	Reported police abuse	0.018	0.026	(-0.035, 0.070)	0.507	0.000	–
Liberia	4c	Reported police abuse	-0.016	0.012	(-0.039, 0.007)	0.177	0.000	–
Pakistan	4c	Reported police abuse	-0.158	0.045	(-0.293, -0.024)	0.032	0.000	–
Philippines	4c	Reported police abuse	-0.009	0.047	(-0.101, 0.084)	0.856	0.000	–
Uganda	4c	Reported police abuse	0.024	0.047	(-0.071, 0.119)	0.614	0.000	–
Uganda	4c	Victimization reported to police station	0.833	0.408	(0.016, 1.651)	0.046	0.000	–
Brazil	M1a	Police will investigate	1.110	5.156	(-9.305, 11.524)	0.831	0.268	0.949
Colombia	M1a	Police will investigate	0.066	0.043	(-0.020, 0.152)	0.131	0.019	0.546
Liberia	M1a	Police will investigate	0.330	0.225	(-0.120, 0.780)	0.148	0.016	0.824
Pakistan	M1a	Police will investigate	1.440	0.120	(1.104, 1.775)	0.000	0.017	0.164
Philippines	M1a	Police will investigate	-0.021	0.061	(-0.142, 0.100)	0.733	0.008	0.454
Uganda	M1a	Police will investigate	-0.063	0.048	(-0.158, 0.033)	0.192	0.003	0.279
Brazil	M1a	Police will be fair	3.411	132.867	(-264.588, 271.409)	0.980	0.054	0.971
Colombia	M1a	Police will be fair	0.086	0.045	(-0.003, 0.175)	0.058	0.032	0.247
Liberia	M1a	Police will be fair	0.114	0.191	(-0.269, 0.497)	0.554	0.019	0.544
Pakistan	M1a	Police will be fair	0.667	0.213	(0.064, 1.270)	0.037	0.024	0.480
Philippines	M1a	Police will be fair	0.001	0.050	(-0.097, 0.099)	0.986	0.023	0.410
Uganda	M1a	Police will be fair	0.017	0.051	(-0.085, 0.119)	0.738	0.003	0.501
Brazil	M1a	Police are corrupt	-1.377	12.913	(-27.423, 24.669)	0.916	0.052	0.964
Colombia	M1a	Police are corrupt	-0.064	0.042	(-0.148, 0.020)	0.135	0.044	0.046
Liberia	M1a	Police are corrupt	0.408	0.224	(-0.039, 0.856)	0.073	0.085	0.843
Pakistan	M1a	Police are corrupt	0.333	0.123	(-0.033, 0.699)	0.064	0.009	0.416
Philippines	M1a	Police are corrupt	-0.059	0.066	(-0.189, 0.070)	0.366	0.070	0.028
Uganda	M1a	Police are corrupt	-0.037	0.032	(-0.101, 0.027)	0.249	0.007	0.282
Brazil	M1a	Police serve equally	-2.645	79.886	(-163.781, 158.491)	0.974	0.023	0.951
Uganda	M1a	Police serve equally	0.032	0.046	(-0.061, 0.125)	0.494	0.002	0.674
Colombia	M1b	Legal Knowledge (suspect)	-0.096	0.038	(-0.171, -0.021)	0.013	0.000	–
Liberia	M1b	Legal Knowledge (suspect)	-0.002	0.317	(-0.637, 0.632)	0.994	0.087	0.970
Uganda	M1b	Legal Knowledge (suspect)	0.079	0.040	(-0.000, 0.159)	0.051	0.012	0.728
Colombia	M1b	Legal Knowledge (lawyer)	0.046	0.040	(-0.034, 0.126)	0.253	0.000	–
Liberia	M1b	Legal Knowledge (lawyer)	-0.250	0.185	(-0.620, 0.120)	0.182	0.034	0.702
Uganda	M1b	Legal Knowledge (lawyer)	0.018	0.035	(-0.051, 0.088)	0.595	0.064	0.765
Colombia	M1b	Legal Knowledge (fees)	-0.050	0.047	(-0.144, 0.043)	0.289	0.000	–
Liberia	M1b	Legal Knowledge (fees)	-0.045	0.299	(-0.641, 0.552)	0.882	0.050	0.035
Uganda	M1b	Legal Knowledge (fees)	0.107	0.051	(0.004, 0.210)	0.042	0.017	0.556
Uganda	M1b	Legal Knowledge (domestic abuse)	-0.033	0.036	(-0.106, 0.040)	0.369	0.003	0.496
Uganda	M1b	Police Knowledge (followup)	0.063	0.035	(-0.006, 0.132)	0.074	0.021	0.532
Uganda	M1b	Police Knowledge (where is station)	0.023	0.052	(-0.082, 0.127)	0.666	0.000	–
Colombia	M1c	Reporting norm (theft)	-0.080	0.046	(-0.172, 0.012)	0.087	0.046	0.618
Liberia	M1c	Reporting norm (theft)	0.135	0.273	(-0.411, 0.680)	0.624	0.015	0.012
Pakistan	M1c	Reporting norm (theft)	0.099	0.083	(-0.127, 0.325)	0.295	0.022	0.730
Philippines	M1c	Reporting norm (theft)	0.022	0.053	(-0.084, 0.127)	0.682	0.016	0.746
Uganda	M1c	Reporting norm (theft)	-0.091	0.053	(-0.197, 0.016)	0.093	0.001	0.558
Colombia	M1c	Reporting norm (domestic abuse)	-0.022	0.042	(-0.106, 0.063)	0.609	0.023	0.211
Liberia	M1c	Reporting norm (domestic abuse)	0.363	0.193	(-0.023, 0.748)	0.065	0.024	0.344
Pakistan	M1c	Reporting norm (domestic abuse)	0.173	0.114	(-0.140, 0.487)	0.202	0.010	0.274
Philippines	M1c	Reporting norm (domestic abuse)	0.015	0.057	(-0.097, 0.127)	0.789	0.014	0.055
Uganda	M1c	Reporting norm (domestic abuse)	0.020	0.047	(-0.075, 0.115)	0.673	0.002	0.210

Table SM18: All components (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Prop. Missing	Differential attrition p-value
Brazil	M1c	Obey police norm	-3.971	63.352	(-131.745, 123.803)	0.950	0.009	0.953
Colombia	M1c	Obey police norm	0.063	0.041	(-0.019, 0.145)	0.132	0.016	0.721
Liberia	M1c	Obey police norm	0.188	0.162	(-0.136, 0.512)	0.251	0.004	0.710
Pakistan	M1c	Obey police norm	-0.102	0.126	(-0.462, 0.258)	0.466	0.004	0.263
Philippines	M1c	Obey police norm	-0.014	0.046	(-0.104, 0.077)	0.767	0.012	0.281
Uganda	M1c	Obey police norm	0.001	0.045	(-0.090, 0.091)	0.989	0.001	0.677
Brazil	M2a	Police timeliness	-0.972	19.103	(-39.500, 37.556)	0.960	0.051	0.953
Colombia	M2a	Police timeliness	0.111	0.042	(0.027, 0.194)	0.010	0.014	0.681
Liberia	M2a	Police timeliness	0.403	0.177	(0.049, 0.757)	0.026	0.015	0.485
Pakistan	M2a	Police timeliness	-0.029	0.097	(-0.318, 0.260)	0.783	0.016	0.257
Philippines	M2a	Police timeliness	-0.001	0.065	(-0.130, 0.129)	0.992	0.018	0.806
Uganda	M2a	Police timeliness	-0.041	0.037	(-0.115, 0.033)	0.276	0.005	0.307
Brazil	M2a	Police investigation capacity	-44.425	4278.467	(-8673.867, 8585.016)	0.992	0.046	0.953
Colombia	M2a	Police investigation capacity	0.100	0.036	(0.027, 0.172)	0.008	0.017	0.103
Liberia	M2a	Police investigation capacity	0.173	0.171	(-0.167, 0.514)	0.314	0.014	0.323
Pakistan	M2a	Police investigation capacity	0.095	0.081	(-0.142, 0.332)	0.313	0.019	0.854
Philippines	M2a	Police investigation capacity	-0.004	0.064	(-0.132, 0.123)	0.949	0.029	0.538
Uganda	M2a	Police investigation capacity	-0.028	0.034	(-0.095, 0.040)	0.414	0.003	0.243
Brazil	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.203	11.839	(-23.675, 24.082)	0.986	0.036	0.950
Colombia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.051	0.045	(-0.038, 0.140)	0.257	0.009	0.722
Liberia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.040	0.248	(-0.535, 0.455)	0.872	0.019	0.894
Pakistan	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.030	0.113	(-0.292, 0.353)	0.803	0.025	0.062
Uganda	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.015	0.046	(-0.077, 0.107)	0.746	0.002	0.454
Colombia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.065	0.046	(-0.027, 0.157)	0.165	0.013	0.136
Liberia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	-0.186	0.215	(-0.616, 0.243)	0.390	0.025	0.449
Pakistan	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.113	0.104	(-0.185, 0.411)	0.343	0.015	0.483
Philippines	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.005	0.061	(-0.115, 0.125)	0.933	0.014	0.008
Brazil	S2	Community trust	1.471	18.755	(-36.356, 39.299)	0.938	0.013	0.963
Colombia	S2	Community trust	0.070	0.039	(-0.008, 0.147)	0.078	0.019	0.976
Liberia	S2	Community trust	-0.218	0.210	(-0.636, 0.201)	0.303	0.006	0.138
Pakistan	S2	Community trust	-0.037	0.173	(-0.554, 0.480)	0.843	0.005	0.460
Philippines	S2	Community trust	-0.029	0.065	(-0.157, 0.100)	0.659	0.014	0.323
Uganda	S2	Community trust	0.019	0.038	(-0.058, 0.095)	0.629	0.000	0.326
Brazil	C	Foot patrol frequency	25.977	429.819	(-840.906, 892.860)	0.952	0.008	0.951
Colombia	C	Foot patrol frequency	0.003	0.049	(-0.094, 0.101)	0.945	0.071	0.084
Liberia	C	Foot patrol frequency	0.080	0.148	(-0.216, 0.376)	0.593	0.004	0.649
Pakistan	C	Foot patrol frequency	0.293	0.132	(-0.105, 0.692)	0.104	0.026	0.431
Philippines	C	Foot patrol frequency	0.163	0.102	(-0.039, 0.366)	0.113	0.029	0.001
Uganda	C	Foot patrol frequency	-0.039	0.069	(-0.177, 0.099)	0.574	0.001	0.044
Colombia	C	Vehicle patrol frequency	0.003	0.050	(-0.097, 0.102)	0.960	0.024	0.797
Liberia	C	Vehicle patrol frequency	0.019	0.146	(-0.271, 0.309)	0.897	0.006	0.855
Pakistan	C	Vehicle patrol frequency	0.209	0.072	(-0.007, 0.425)	0.055	0.011	0.617
Philippines	C	Vehicle patrol frequency	0.233	0.127	(-0.018, 0.483)	0.069	0.009	0.520
Uganda	C	Vehicle patrol frequency	0.056	0.061	(-0.067, 0.179)	0.365	0.001	0.058
Brazil	C	Community meeting awareness	3.705	38.000	(-72.941, 80.351)	0.923	0.019	0.957
Colombia	C	Community meeting awareness	0.838	0.092	(0.655, 1.021)	0.000	0.000	–
Liberia	C	Community meeting awareness	3.639	0.394	(2.854, 4.424)	0.000	0.000	–
Pakistan	C	Community meeting awareness	0.401	0.136	(-0.003, 0.804)	0.051	0.023	0.526
Philippines	C	Community meeting awareness	0.107	0.068	(-0.028, 0.242)	0.119	0.002	0.028
Uganda	C	Community meeting awareness	0.311	0.070	(0.171, 0.451)	0.000	0.001	0.627

**F.9 Secondary hypotheses by item<sup>28</sup>**

Table SM19: Components Table for Secondary Hypotheses

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
Colombia	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	0.059	0.065	(-0.069, 0.186)	0.365
Liberia	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	-0.042	0.229	(-0.496, 0.413)	0.856
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	0.169	0.199	(-0.227, 0.566)	0.397
Philippines	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	-0.008	0.039	(-0.084, 0.069)	0.845
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	0.494	0.112	(0.273, 0.715)	0
Colombia	1a. (alt. i)	Violent crimes (administrative data)	0.007	0.081	(-0.153, 0.167)	0.934
Liberia	1a. (alt. i)	Violent crimes (administrative data)	-0.024	0.258	(-0.537, 0.49)	0.927
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Violent crimes (administrative data)	0.255	0.247	(-0.236, 0.746)	0.304
Philippines	1a. (alt. i)	Violent crimes (administrative data)	-0.013	0.078	(-0.167, 0.141)	0.866
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Violent crimes (administrative data)	0.524	0.108	(0.312, 0.737)	0
Liberia	1a. (alt. i)	Armed robbery (administrative data)	0.304	0.245	(-0.184, 0.792)	0.219
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Armed robbery (administrative data)	0.022	0.408	(-0.805, 0.849)	0.958
Philippines	1a. (alt. i)	Armed robbery (administrative data)	-0.036	0.049	(-0.132, 0.06)	0.461
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Armed robbery (administrative data)	0.532	0.182	(0.174, 0.889)	0.004
Liberia	1a. (alt. i)	Aggravated assault (administrative data)	-0.073	0.177	(-0.425, 0.278)	0.679
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Aggravated assault (administrative data)	1.09	0.861	(-0.655, 2.836)	0.213
Philippines	1a. (alt. i)	Aggravated assault (administrative data)	-0.036	0.068	(-0.169, 0.097)	0.59
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Aggravated assault (administrative data)	0.453	0.099	(0.257, 0.649)	0
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Simple assault (administrative data)	-0.024	0.345	(-0.724, 0.675)	0.945
Liberia	1a. (alt. i)	Sexual assault (administrative data)	0.591	0.364	(-0.133, 1.314)	0.108
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Sexual assault (administrative data)	-0.202	0.808	(-1.84, 1.437)	0.804
Philippines	1a. (alt. i)	Sexual assault (administrative data)	-	-	(-, -)	-
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Sexual assault (administrative data)	0.371	0.138	(0.099, 0.644)	0.008
Colombia	1a. (alt. i)	Domestic abuse (physical) (administrative data)	-0.005	0.085	(-0.172, 0.163)	0.957
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Domestic abuse (physical) (administrative data)	0.266	0.282	(-0.306, 0.837)	0.352
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Domestic abuse (physical) (administrative data)	0.162	0.099	(-0.032, 0.356)	0.102
Liberia	1a. (alt. i)	Murder (administrative data)	0.338	-	(-, -)	-
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Murder (administrative data)	0.338	0.431	(-0.535, 1.212)	0.437
Philippines	1a. (alt. i)	Murder (administrative data)	0.036	0.14	(-0.24, 0.311)	0.798
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Murder (administrative data)	0.636	0.151	(0.339, 0.933)	0
Colombia	1a. (alt. i)	Other violent crimes (administrative data)	0.07	0.082	(-0.091, 0.232)	0.393
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Other violent crimes (administrative data)	0.745	0.183	(0.384, 1.106)	0
Colombia	1a. (alt. i)	Non-violent crimes (administrative data)	0.086	0.037	(0.013, 0.158)	0.021
Liberia	1a. (alt. i)	Non-violent crimes (administrative data)	-0.051	0.188	(-0.425, 0.323)	0.788
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Non-violent crimes (administrative data)	0.086	0.15	(-0.212, 0.384)	0.566
Philippines	1a. (alt. i)	Non-violent crimes (administrative data)	0	0	(0, 0)	0.386
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Non-violent crimes (administrative data)	0.387	0.122	(0.147, 0.626)	0.002
Colombia	1a. (alt. i)	Burglary (administrative data)	0.08	0.037	(0.007, 0.153)	0.032
Liberia	1a. (alt. i)	Burglary (administrative data)	-0.051	0.188	(-0.425, 0.323)	0.788
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Burglary (administrative data)	0.343	0.646	(-0.967, 1.653)	0.599

<sup>28</sup>NA in this table are unavailable results due to very little variation in outcomes.

Table SM19: Components Table for Secondary Hypotheses (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
Philippines	1a. (alt. i)	Burglary (administrative data)	0	0	(0, 0)	0.386
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Burglary (administrative data)	0.636	0.154	(0.334, 0.939)	0
Colombia	1a. (alt. i)	Other non-violent crimes (administrative data)	0.059	0.056	(-0.051, 0.168)	0.292
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Other non-violent crimes (administrative data)	-0.055	0.156	(-0.362, 0.252)	0.725
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization idx. (expanded crimes)	-0.523	1.55	(-3.618, 2.573)	0.737
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization idx. (expanded crimes)	-0.679	0.598	(-2.394, 1.037)	0.325
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization idx. (expanded crimes)	-0.069	0.047	(-0.163, 0.025)	0.147
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization idx. (expanded crimes)	0.417	0.319	(-0.223, 1.057)	0.197
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Violent crimes (expanded, personal)	-0.001	0.035	(-0.07, 0.069)	0.986
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Violent crimes (expanded, personal)	0.026	0.032	(-0.038, 0.09)	0.419
Colombia	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed Robbery (expanded, personal)	-0.024	0.042	(-0.108, 0.061)	0.579
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed Robbery (expanded, personal)	0.165	0.47	(-0.775, 1.105)	0.727
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed Robbery (expanded, personal)	0.002	0.002	(-0.004, 0.007)	0.44
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed Robbery (expanded, personal)	-0.029	0.027	(-0.083, 0.024)	0.281
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed Robbery (expanded, personal)	0.032	0.025	(-0.019, 0.083)	0.215
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Aggravated assault (expanded, personal)	-0.114	0.513	(-1.145, 0.917)	0.825
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Aggravated assault (expanded, personal)	-0.028	0.264	(-0.577, 0.522)	0.918
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Sexual assault (expanded, personal)	-0.036	0.48	(-0.996, 0.923)	0.94
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Sexual assault (expanded, personal)	0.617	0.457	(-0.394, 1.628)	0.205
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (expanded, personal)	0.362	1.138	(-1.958, 2.681)	0.753
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (expanded, personal)	-0.574	0.208	(-1.002, -0.146)	0.011
Colombia	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (expanded, personal)	0.036	0.034	(-0.032, 0.103)	0.296
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (expanded, personal)	0.745	0.761	(-0.775, 2.264)	0.331
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (expanded, personal)	-0.089	0.057	(-0.259, 0.082)	0.208
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (expanded, personal)	0.082	0.068	(-0.052, 0.217)	0.229
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (expanded, personal)	0	0.019	(-0.037, 0.037)	0.999
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Other violent crimes (expanded, personal)	-0.074	0.158	(-0.39, 0.243)	0.644
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Other violent crimes (expanded, personal)	0.078	0.055	(-0.084, 0.241)	0.237
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Other violent crimes (expanded, personal)	-0.024	0.037	(-0.096, 0.048)	0.513
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Other violent crimes (expanded, personal)	0.018	0.033	(-0.047, 0.084)	0.576
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Non-violent crimes (expanded, personal)	-0.033	0.031	(-0.096, 0.029)	0.288
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Non-violent crimes (expanded, personal)	0.239	0.23	(-0.223, 0.701)	0.305
Colombia	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (expanded, personal)	0.017	0.041	(-0.065, 0.099)	0.687
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (expanded, personal)	1.854	1.918	(-1.973, 5.682)	0.337
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (expanded, personal)	-0.035	0.04	(-0.152, 0.083)	0.437
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (expanded, personal)	-0.033	0.031	(-0.094, 0.029)	0.298
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (expanded, personal)	0.003	0.019	(-0.034, 0.04)	0.868
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (verbal) (expanded, personal)	2.542	8.02	(-13.712, 18.796)	0.753
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (verbal) (expanded, personal)	-0.064	0.115	(-0.296, 0.168)	0.582
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Land crimes (expanded, personal)	-0.003	0.022	(-0.068, 0.062)	0.905
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Land crimes (expanded, personal)	1.881	1.832	(-1.794, 5.557)	0.309
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Other non-violent crimes (expanded, personal)	-0.295	0.164	(-0.623, 0.032)	0.076
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Other non-violent crimes (expanded, personal)	0.154	0.194	(-0.423, 0.732)	0.478
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Other non-violent crimes (expanded, personal)	-0.01	0.051	(-0.111, 0.091)	0.85

Table SM19: Components Table for Secondary Hypotheses (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Other non-violent crimes (expanded, personal)	-0.028	0.04	(-0.107, 0.052)	0.487
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Violent crimes (community, expanded)	-0.027	0.058	(-0.143, 0.088)	0.642
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Violent crimes (community, expanded)	0.01	0.058	(-0.107, 0.127)	0.862
Colombia	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed robbery (community, expanded)	0.04	0.041	(-0.042, 0.122)	0.335
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed robbery (community, expanded)	-0.012	0.242	(-0.496, 0.473)	0.961
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed robbery (community, expanded)	0.025	0.088	(-0.233, 0.283)	0.792
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed robbery (community, expanded)	-0.015	0.041	(-0.095, 0.065)	0.71
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed robbery (community, expanded)	0.037	0.047	(-0.057, 0.131)	0.434
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Aggravated assault (community, expanded)	0.721	1.236	(-1.753, 3.196)	0.562
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Aggravated assault (community, expanded)	-5.694	5.2	(-21.142, 9.753)	0.344
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Aggravated assault (community, expanded)	-0.019	0.041	(-0.099, 0.062)	0.642
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Aggravated assault (community, expanded)	0.016	0.026	(-0.035, 0.068)	0.528
Colombia	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (community, expanded)	-0.012	0.04	(-0.092, 0.068)	0.769
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (community, expanded)	1.522	1.623	(-1.716, 4.76)	0.352
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (community, expanded)	0.055	0.068	(-0.147, 0.257)	0.471
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (community, expanded)	-0.064	0.048	(-0.158, 0.03)	0.18
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (community, expanded)	0.025	0.034	(-0.044, 0.094)	0.476
Colombia	1a. (alt. ii)	Sexual assault (community, expanded)	-0.011	0.038	(-0.086, 0.065)	0.783
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Sexual assault (community, expanded)	-0.15	0.267	(-0.683, 0.384)	0.577
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Sexual assault (community, expanded)	0.009	0.033	(-0.091, 0.109)	0.806
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Sexual assault (community, expanded)	-0.001	0.064	(-0.128, 0.125)	0.984
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Sexual assault (community, expanded)	0.021	0.055	(-0.089, 0.131)	0.705
Colombia	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (community, expanded)	0.022	0.041	(-0.06, 0.104)	0.589
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (community, expanded)	1.029	1.749	(-2.461, 4.519)	0.558
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (community, expanded)	-0.112	0.233	(-0.807, 0.583)	0.661
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (community, expanded)	0	0.04	(-0.079, 0.079)	0.997
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (community, expanded)	-0.021	0.069	(-0.159, 0.117)	0.766
Colombia	1a. (alt. ii)	Murder (community, expanded)	0.032	0.046	(-0.059, 0.123)	0.487
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Murder (community, expanded)	0.135	0.138	(-0.14, 0.41)	0.331
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Murder (community, expanded)	-0.018	0.046	(-0.156, 0.12)	0.713
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Murder (community, expanded)	0.074	0.111	(-0.147, 0.294)	0.51
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Murder (community, expanded)	-0.042	0.092	(-0.226, 0.141)	0.645
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Mob (community, expanded)	0.083	0.296	(-0.51, 0.677)	0.779
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Mob (community, expanded)	-0.119	0.589	(-2.234, 1.996)	0.855
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Mob (community, expanded)	-0.018	0.047	(-0.114, 0.078)	0.71
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Other violent crimes (community, expanded)	0.013	0.048	(-0.083, 0.108)	0.792
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Other violent crimes (community, expanded)	0.323	0.413	(-0.907, 1.554)	0.485
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Other violent crimes (community, expanded)	0.066	0.073	(-0.079, 0.21)	0.37
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Other violent crimes (community, expanded)	-0.012	0.018	(-0.048, 0.024)	0.505
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Non-violent crimes (community, expanded)	-0.097	0.046	(-0.189, -0.006)	0.037
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Non-violent crimes (community, expanded)	0.743	0.727	(-0.714, 2.2)	0.311
Colombia	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (community, expanded)	0.043	0.051	(-0.059, 0.144)	0.405
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (community, expanded)	0.64	0.795	(-0.951, 2.231)	0.424
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (community, expanded)	-0.061	0.054	(-0.214, 0.092)	0.325

Table SM19: Components Table for Secondary Hypotheses (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (community, expanded)	-0.101	0.047	(-0.193, -0.009)	0.032
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (community, expanded)	-0.06	0.046	(-0.151, 0.032)	0.195
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Land crimes (community, expanded)	2.875	2.133	(-1.403, 7.154)	0.183
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (verbal) (community, expanded)	0.448	1.344	(-2.271, 3.167)	0.741
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (verbal) (community, expanded)	-0.082	0.054	(-0.191, 0.026)	0.135
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Other non-violent crimes (community, expanded)	0.068	0.126	(-0.183, 0.319)	0.59
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Other non-violent crimes (community, expanded)	0.037	0.508	(-1.474, 1.549)	0.945
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Other non-violent crimes (community, expanded)	0.014	0.061	(-0.107, 0.135)	0.816
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Other non-violent crimes (community, expanded)	0.058	0.04	(-0.023, 0.138)	0.159
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	0.045	0.043	(-0.04, 0.131)	0.292
Liberia	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	-0.062	0.066	(-0.193, 0.069)	0.346
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	-0.068	0.044	(-0.197, 0.061)	0.208
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	-0.036	0.054	(-0.143, 0.072)	0.511
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	-0.013	0.057	(-0.127, 0.101)	0.821
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Violent crime (personal, binary)	0.006	0.035	(-0.063, 0.076)	0.854
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Violent crime (personal, binary)	0.008	0.048	(-0.136, 0.151)	0.88
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Violent crime (personal, binary)	-0.008	0.047	(-0.1, 0.085)	0.87
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Violent crime (personal, binary)	0.019	0.034	(-0.049, 0.087)	0.574
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Armed robbery (personal, binary)	-0.024	0.042	(-0.108, 0.061)	0.579
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Armed robbery (personal, binary)	0.064	0.086	(-0.189, 0.317)	0.502
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Armed robbery (personal, binary)	-0.057	0.037	(-0.129, 0.015)	0.121
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Armed robbery (personal, binary)	0.011	0.035	(-0.06, 0.082)	0.754
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Simple assault (personal, binary)	0.036	0.034	(-0.032, 0.103)	0.296
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Simple assault (personal, binary)	-0.084	0.053	(-0.243, 0.076)	0.206
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Simple assault (personal, binary)	0.016	0.046	(-0.076, 0.107)	0.735
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Simple assault (personal, binary)	0.012	0.027	(-0.043, 0.067)	0.665
Liberia	1a. (alt. iii)	Other violent crimes (personal, binary)	-0.074	0.158	(-0.39, 0.243)	0.644
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Other violent crimes (personal, binary)	0.078	0.055	(-0.084, 0.241)	0.237
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Other violent crimes (personal, binary)	-0.024	0.037	(-0.096, 0.048)	0.513
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Other violent crimes (personal, binary)	0.018	0.033	(-0.047, 0.084)	0.576
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Non-violent crimes (personal, binary)	0.017	0.041	(-0.065, 0.099)	0.687
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Non-violent crimes (personal, binary)	-0.04	0.047	(-0.18, 0.1)	0.451
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Non-violent crimes (personal, binary)	0.004	0.052	(-0.098, 0.107)	0.932
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Non-violent crimes (personal, binary)	0	0.041	(-0.082, 0.082)	0.997
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Burglary (personal, binary)	0.017	0.041	(-0.065, 0.099)	0.687
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Burglary (personal, binary)	-0.053	0.039	(-0.17, 0.064)	0.26
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Burglary (personal, binary)	0.012	0.052	(-0.091, 0.115)	0.817
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Burglary (personal, binary)	0.007	0.036	(-0.066, 0.08)	0.855
Liberia	1a. (alt. iii)	Other non-violent crimes (personal, binary)	-0.295	0.164	(-0.623, 0.032)	0.076
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Other non-violent crimes (personal, binary)	0.154	0.194	(-0.423, 0.732)	0.478
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Other non-violent crimes (personal, binary)	-0.01	0.051	(-0.111, 0.091)	0.85
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Other non-violent crimes (personal, binary)	-0.028	0.04	(-0.107, 0.052)	0.487
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Violent crimes (community, binary)	0.029	0.037	(-0.044, 0.103)	0.429
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Violent crimes (community, binary)	-0.071	0.078	(-0.301, 0.159)	0.422

Table SM19: Components Table for Secondary Hypotheses (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Violent crimes (community, binary)	-0.006	0.073	(-0.15, 0.137)	0.933
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Violent crimes (community, binary)	-0.003	0.063	(-0.13, 0.124)	0.963
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Armed Robbery (community, binary)	0.04	0.041	(-0.042, 0.122)	0.335
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Armed Robbery (community, binary)	0.005	0.098	(-0.285, 0.294)	0.966
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Armed Robbery (community, binary)	-0.007	0.044	(-0.093, 0.079)	0.876
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Armed Robbery (community, binary)	0.027	0.051	(-0.075, 0.129)	0.6
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Aggravated assault (community, binary)	-0.056	0.056	(-0.223, 0.111)	0.382
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Aggravated assault (community, binary)	0.001	0.051	(-0.099, 0.102)	0.98
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Simple assault (community, binary)	-0.012	0.04	(-0.092, 0.068)	0.769
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Simple assault (community, binary)	0.055	0.038	(-0.057, 0.167)	0.227
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Simple assault (community, binary)	-0.08	0.046	(-0.172, 0.012)	0.087
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Sexual assault (community, binary)	-0.011	0.038	(-0.086, 0.065)	0.783
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Sexual assault (community, binary)	-0.039	0.061	(-0.221, 0.143)	0.558
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Sexual assault (community, binary)	0.008	0.082	(-0.153, 0.17)	0.92
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Sexual assault (community, binary)	0.023	0.064	(-0.106, 0.151)	0.723
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (community, binary)	0.022	0.041	(-0.06, 0.104)	0.589
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (community, binary)	-0.088	0.21	(-0.708, 0.532)	0.701
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (community, binary)	0.029	0.05	(-0.069, 0.128)	0.555
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (community, binary)	-0.027	0.061	(-0.149, 0.095)	0.657
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Murder (community, binary)	0.032	0.046	(-0.059, 0.123)	0.487
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Murder (community, binary)	-0.027	0.062	(-0.213, 0.16)	0.696
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Murder (community, binary)	0.089	0.135	(-0.178, 0.356)	0.51
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Murder (community, binary)	-0.05	0.088	(-0.226, 0.126)	0.572
Liberia	1a. (alt. iii)	Other violent crimes (community, binary)	0.013	0.048	(-0.083, 0.108)	0.792
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Other violent crimes (community, binary)	0.323	0.413	(-0.907, 1.554)	0.485
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Other violent crimes (community, binary)	0.066	0.073	(-0.079, 0.21)	0.37
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Other violent crimes (community, binary)	-0.012	0.018	(-0.048, 0.024)	0.505
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Non-violent crimes (community, binary)	0.043	0.051	(-0.059, 0.144)	0.405
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Non-violent crimes (community, binary)	-0.121	0.05	(-0.266, 0.024)	0.08
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Non-violent crimes (community, binary)	-0.078	0.049	(-0.176, 0.019)	0.114
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Non-violent crimes (community, binary)	-0.031	0.05	(-0.131, 0.069)	0.532
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Burglary (community, binary)	0.043	0.051	(-0.059, 0.144)	0.405
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Burglary (community, binary)	-0.13	0.054	(-0.285, 0.024)	0.078
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Burglary (community, binary)	-0.086	0.049	(-0.184, 0.011)	0.083
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Burglary (community, binary)	-0.043	0.051	(-0.145, 0.06)	0.405
Liberia	1a. (alt. iii)	Other non-violent crimes (community, binary)	0.068	0.126	(-0.183, 0.319)	0.59
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Other non-violent crimes (community, binary)	0.037	0.508	(-1.474, 1.549)	0.945
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Other non-violent crimes (community, binary)	0.014	0.061	(-0.107, 0.135)	0.816
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Other non-violent crimes (community, binary)	0.058	0.04	(-0.023, 0.138)	0.159

## G. Brazil study: First stage results

Table SM20: First stage results by endogenous variable

Group formed var.	Estimate	S.E.	p-value	Conf. Int.	F test statistic	F test p-value
Presence of meeting: June 2018	0.004	0.103	0.971	(-0.204, 0.212)	0.001	0.971
Presence of meeting: Oct 2018	0.007	0.116	0.951	(-0.227, 0.242)	0.004	0.950
Share of area under RdV: June 2018	0.014	0.044	0.746	(-0.074, 0.103)	0.106	0.745
Share of area under RdV: Oct 2018	0.058	0.048	0.234	(-0.039, 0.156)	1.455	0.228
Know about RdV	-0.395	0.582	0.502	(-1.571, 0.782)	0.460	0.498



## H. Heterogeneous effects

### H.1 Test for heterogeneous effects

We conduct an F-test for equal variances between the treatment and control group (comparing the common treatment group to the control group) following Gerber and Green (*SM6*) (pg. 292-293) in each site for each of the eight primary outcomes. We collapse data to the level of treatment assignment (e.g., beats in Pakistan) in order to account for clustering in outcomes. We exclude outliers in the 99th percentile or above for continuous outcomes, because variance calculations are highly sensitive to large outliers and these differences in variances do not reflect substantial effect heterogeneity. We correct for multiple comparisons following the same Benjamini-Hochberg procedure used in the main results (“Adj. p-value” represents the corrected p-value).

Table SM21: Tests of Equal Variance for Main Hypotheses

Study	Measure	Var. Ratio	p-value	Adj. p-value
Colombia	Crime victimization idx.	0.800	0.303	0.425
Liberia	Crime victimization idx.	1.118	0.705	0.705
Pakistan	Crime victimization idx.	1.156	0.670	0.735
Philippines	Crime victimization idx.	0.705	0.040	0.279
Uganda	Crime victimization idx.	0.994	0.986	0.986
Colombia	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.799	0.300	0.425
Liberia	Perceived future insecurity idx.	1.745	0.062	0.437
Pakistan	Perceived future insecurity idx.	1.974	0.048	0.191
Philippines	Perceived future insecurity idx.	1.113	0.555	0.778
Uganda	Perceived future insecurity idx.	1.421	0.304	0.514
Colombia	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.948	0.807	0.807
Liberia	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.728	0.291	0.595
Pakistan	Overall perceptions of police idx.	1.446	0.280	0.448
Philippines	Overall perceptions of police idx.	1.005	0.994	0.994
Uganda	Overall perceptions of police idx.	1.507	0.230	0.514
Pakistan	Police perceptions of citizens idx.	0.587	0.096	0.193
Uganda	Police perceptions of citizens idx.	0.713	0.321	0.514
Colombia	Police abuse idx.	1.153	0.510	0.595
Liberia	Police abuse idx.	1.218	0.506	0.705

Pakistan	Police abuse idx.	0.478	0.032	0.191
Philippines	Police abuse idx.	1.065	0.734	0.856
Uganda	Police abuse idx.	0.986	0.967	0.986
Colombia	Crime reporting idx.	1.756	0.010	0.068
Liberia	Crime reporting idx.	1.328	0.340	0.595
Pakistan	Crime reporting idx.	0.844	0.619	0.735
Philippines	Crime reporting idx.	1.146	0.449	0.778
Uganda	Crime reporting idx.	1.417	0.307	0.514
Colombia	Crime tips idx.	0.744	0.173	0.404
Liberia	Crime tips idx.	0.877	0.664	0.705
Pakistan	Crime tips idx.	0.544	0.076	0.193
Philippines	Crime tips idx.	1.262	0.195	0.456
Uganda	Crime tips idx.	0.862	0.662	0.883
Colombia	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.740	0.164	0.404
Liberia	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.699	0.234	0.595
Pakistan	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.891	0.735	0.735
Philippines	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.795	0.178	0.456
Uganda	Police abuse reporting idx.	4.743	0.000	0.000

## H.2 Heterogeneous effects by crime victimization index (baseline)

Table SM22: Results Table for heterogeneous effects for meta-estimates

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.090	0.106	(-0.298, 0.118)	0.395	0.827
1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	-0.026	0.096	(-0.214, 0.161)	0.782	0.913
2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.000	0.097	(-0.190, 0.190)	1.000	1
3b	Police abuse idx.	-0.154	0.068	(-0.287, -0.020)	0.024	0.671
4a	Crime reporting idx.	-0.039	0.053	(-0.142, 0.064)	0.457	0.827
4b	Crime tips idx.	0.014	0.085	(-0.153, 0.181)	0.868	0.941
4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	-0.013	0.110	(-0.228, 0.203)	0.908	0.941
M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	-0.045	0.093	(-0.228, 0.138)	0.631	
M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	-0.040	0.194	(-0.420, 0.340)	0.836	
M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	-0.018	0.081	(-0.177, 0.141)	0.823	
M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	0.044	0.072	(-0.096, 0.184)	0.539	
M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.067	0.107	(-0.277, 0.143)	0.531	
S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.163	0.132	(-0.096, 0.421)	0.217	
S2	Community trust	-0.044	0.085	(-0.209, 0.122)	0.605	

Table SM23: Results Table for heterogeneous effects for study-estimates

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Colombia	1a	Crime victimization	-0.173	0.167	(-0.506, 0.159)	0.302	0.733
Liberia	1a	Crime victimization	3.784	2.316	(-1.021, 8.590)	0.117	0.588
Pakistan	1a	Crime victimization	-0.107	0.190	(-0.574, 0.360)	0.593	0.923
Uganda	1a	Crime victimization	0.019	0.200	(-0.404, 0.442)	0.925	0.979
Colombia	1b	Perceived future insecurity	0.001	0.152	(-0.304, 0.305)	0.996	0.996
Liberia	1b	Perceived future insecurity	-0.064	0.224	(-0.529, 0.401)	0.778	0.947
Pakistan	1b	Perceived future insecurity	0.211	0.207	(-0.293, 0.716)	0.346	0.728
Uganda	1b	Perceived future insecurity	-0.286	0.208	(-0.727, 0.155)	0.189	0.979
Colombia	2	Overall perceptions of police	-0.027	0.133	(-0.292, 0.238)	0.840	0.966
Liberia	2	Overall perceptions of police	-0.093	0.284	(-0.683, 0.497)	0.747	0.947
Pakistan	2	Overall perceptions of police	0.198	0.231	(-0.369, 0.764)	0.425	0.744
Uganda	2	Overall perceptions of police	-0.055	0.231	(-0.544, 0.435)	0.816	0.979
Colombia	3b	Police abuse	-0.202	0.085	(-0.372, -0.032)	0.021	0.291
Liberia	3b	Police abuse	-0.207	0.208	(-0.637, 0.224)	0.331	0.894
Pakistan	3b	Police abuse	-0.018	0.174	(-0.446, 0.410)	0.921	0.957
Uganda	3b	Police abuse	0.006	0.217	(-0.454, 0.465)	0.980	0.98
Colombia	4a	Crime reporting	-0.272	0.162	(-0.595, 0.052)	0.098	0.549
Liberia	4a	Crime reporting	-0.012	0.062	(-0.139, 0.116)	0.852	0.95
Pakistan	4a	Crime reporting	-0.069	0.153	(-0.445, 0.308)	0.669	0.957
Uganda	4a	Crime reporting	0.142	0.250	(-0.388, 0.672)	0.579	0.979
Colombia	4b	Crime tips	-0.122	0.141	(-0.404, 0.161)	0.393	0.733

Table SM23: Results Table for heterogeneous effects for study-estimates (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Liberia	4b	Crime tips	0.030	0.252	(-0.492, 0.553)	0.906	0.95
Pakistan	4b	Crime tips	0.169	0.085	(-0.037, 0.375)	0.092	0.586
Uganda	4b	Crime tips	-0.082	0.109	(-0.312, 0.149)	0.465	0.979
Colombia	4c	Police abuse reporting	-0.087	0.134	(-0.354, 0.180)	0.519	0.812
Liberia	4c	Police abuse reporting	-0.208	0.123	(-0.464, 0.048)	0.107	0.588
Pakistan	4c	Police abuse reporting	0.317	0.225	(-0.235, 0.870)	0.209	0.65
Uganda	4c	Police abuse reporting	0.156	0.207	(-0.281, 0.594)	0.460	0.979
Colombia	M1a	Perceived police intentions	-0.191	0.149	(-0.490, 0.107)	0.205	
Liberia	M1a	Perceived police intentions	0.178	0.237	(-0.312, 0.668)	0.459	
Pakistan	M1a	Perceived police intentions	0.048	0.203	(-0.444, 0.540)	0.820	
Uganda	M1a	Perceived police intentions	-0.033	0.189	(-0.433, 0.367)	0.863	
Liberia	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice	-0.138	0.347	(-0.857, 0.582)	0.695	
Pakistan	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice	0.623	0.447	(-0.466, 1.712)	0.212	
Uganda	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice	-0.204	0.234	(-0.700, 0.292)	0.396	
Colombia	M1c	Cooperation norms	-0.091	0.108	(-0.307, 0.125)	0.405	
Liberia	M1c	Cooperation norms	-0.078	0.267	(-0.633, 0.478)	0.775	
Pakistan	M1c	Cooperation norms	0.169	0.186	(-0.287, 0.626)	0.398	
Uganda	M1c	Cooperation norms	0.050	0.207	(-0.388, 0.487)	0.813	
Colombia	M2a	Perceived police capacity	0.055	0.123	(-0.191, 0.302)	0.656	
Liberia	M2a	Perceived police capacity	-0.161	0.192	(-0.559, 0.237)	0.409	
Pakistan	M2a	Perceived police capacity	0.132	0.141	(-0.216, 0.479)	0.387	
Uganda	M2a	Perceived police capacity	0.053	0.139	(-0.242, 0.347)	0.710	
Colombia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.014	0.159	(-0.332, 0.304)	0.930	
Liberia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.161	0.294	(-0.769, 0.447)	0.589	
Pakistan	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.271	0.348	(-1.117, 0.575)	0.465	
Uganda	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.043	0.188	(-0.442, 0.356)	0.823	
Colombia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	-0.013	0.171	(-0.353, 0.328)	0.942	
Liberia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.171	0.281	(-0.413, 0.755)	0.549	
Pakistan	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.356	0.185	(-0.096, 0.809)	0.102	
Colombia	S2	Community trust	-0.061	0.131	(-0.323, 0.201)	0.644	
Liberia	S2	Community trust	0.111	0.264	(-0.436, 0.659)	0.677	
Pakistan	S2	Community trust	-0.052	0.277	(-0.721, 0.618)	0.858	
Uganda	S2	Community trust	-0.064	0.136	(-0.352, 0.223)	0.641	

### H.3 Heterogeneous effects by trust in police (baseline)

Table SM24: Results Table for heterogeneous effects for meta-estimates

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
1a	Crime victimization idx.	0.006	0.018	(-0.030, 0.042)	0.748	0.913
1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	-0.014	0.018	(-0.048, 0.021)	0.443	0.827
2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.019	0.026	(-0.033, 0.071)	0.477	0.827
3b	Police abuse idx.	0.019	0.029	(-0.037, 0.076)	0.502	0.827
4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.042	0.022	(-0.002, 0.085)	0.060	0.671
4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.018	0.018	(-0.054, 0.018)	0.322	0.827
4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	-0.036	0.046	(-0.126, 0.055)	0.442	0.827
M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	0.016	0.021	(-0.025, 0.058)	0.437	
M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	0.008	0.027	(-0.045, 0.061)	0.774	
M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	0.006	0.021	(-0.035, 0.048)	0.760	
M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	-0.013	0.020	(-0.051, 0.026)	0.520	
M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.012	0.023	(-0.057, 0.032)	0.585	
S1	Perceived state legitimacy	-0.050	0.051	(-0.150, 0.050)	0.325	
S2	Community trust	-0.012	0.043	(-0.096, 0.073)	0.788	

Table SM25: Results Table for heterogeneous effects for study-estimates

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Colombia	1a	Crime victimization	-0.012	0.047	(-0.105, 0.081)	0.802	0.966
Liberia	1a	Crime victimization	2.687	3.293	(-4.073, 9.446)	0.422	0.894
Pakistan	1a	Crime victimization	0.008	0.035	(-0.108, 0.124)	0.843	0.957
Uganda	1a	Crime victimization	0.010	0.024	(-0.039, 0.058)	0.691	0.979
Colombia	1b	Perceived future insecurity	-0.051	0.054	(-0.159, 0.056)	0.343	0.733
Liberia	1b	Perceived future insecurity	0.282	0.784	(-1.315, 1.879)	0.722	0.947
Pakistan	1b	Perceived future insecurity	-0.052	0.048	(-0.196, 0.092)	0.352	0.728
Uganda	1b	Perceived future insecurity	-0.002	0.020	(-0.041, 0.037)	0.933	0.979
Colombia	2	Overall perceptions of police	0.059	0.044	(-0.030, 0.147)	0.191	0.733
Liberia	2	Overall perceptions of police	0.058	0.809	(-1.586, 1.701)	0.944	0.95
Pakistan	2	Overall perceptions of police	0.044	0.112	(-0.322, 0.411)	0.722	0.957
Uganda	2	Overall perceptions of police	-0.003	0.029	(-0.062, 0.055)	0.912	0.979
Colombia	3b	Police abuse	0.028	0.070	(-0.110, 0.167)	0.688	0.963
Liberia	3b	Police abuse	1.508	0.830	(-0.184, 3.199)	0.079	0.588
Pakistan	3b	Police abuse	0.025	0.084	(-0.251, 0.300)	0.791	0.957
Uganda	3b	Police abuse	0.014	0.034	(-0.054, 0.082)	0.686	0.979
Colombia	4a	Crime reporting	-0.026	0.048	(-0.121, 0.069)	0.584	0.86
Liberia	4a	Crime reporting	0.015	0.235	(-0.464, 0.494)	0.950	0.95
Pakistan	4a	Crime reporting	0.047	0.038	(-0.076, 0.170)	0.303	0.728
Uganda	4a	Crime reporting	0.064	0.026	(0.013, 0.115)	0.015	0.319
Colombia	4b	Crime tips	-0.008	0.048	(-0.104, 0.087)	0.863	0.966

Table SM25: Results Table for heterogeneous effects for study-estimates (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Liberia	4b	Crime tips	0.208	0.619	(-1.062, 1.478)	0.740	0.947
Pakistan	4b	Crime tips	0.004	0.037	(-0.119, 0.126)	0.928	0.957
Uganda	4b	Crime tips	-0.029	0.023	(-0.075, 0.017)	0.215	0.979
Colombia	4c	Police abuse reporting	-0.127	0.042	(-0.211, -0.043)	0.003	0.098
Liberia	4c	Police abuse reporting	0.378	0.415	(-0.468, 1.224)	0.369	0.894
Pakistan	4c	Police abuse reporting	0.004	0.068	(-0.218, 0.226)	0.957	0.957
Uganda	4c	Police abuse reporting	0.007	0.031	(-0.054, 0.069)	0.813	0.979
Colombia	M1a	Perceived police intentions	0.016	0.052	(-0.086, 0.119)	0.751	
Liberia	M1a	Perceived police intentions	-0.522	0.625	(-1.793, 0.748)	0.409	
Pakistan	M1a	Perceived police intentions	-0.011	0.060	(-0.207, 0.186)	0.871	
Uganda	M1a	Perceived police intentions	0.022	0.025	(-0.028, 0.072)	0.383	
Liberia	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice	0.557	0.844	(-1.164, 2.278)	0.514	
Pakistan	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice	0.030	0.060	(-0.165, 0.224)	0.656	
Uganda	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice	0.001	0.030	(-0.059, 0.062)	0.962	
Colombia	M1c	Cooperation norms	-0.007	0.034	(-0.075, 0.060)	0.828	
Liberia	M1c	Cooperation norms	-0.272	0.732	(-1.764, 1.220)	0.713	
Pakistan	M1c	Cooperation norms	0.068	0.050	(-0.095, 0.230)	0.270	
Uganda	M1c	Cooperation norms	-0.006	0.031	(-0.068, 0.057)	0.855	
Colombia	M2a	Perceived police capacity	0.000	0.045	(-0.089, 0.089)	0.996	
Liberia	M2a	Perceived police capacity	0.444	0.660	(-0.898, 1.785)	0.506	
Pakistan	M2a	Perceived police capacity	-0.017	0.049	(-0.180, 0.147)	0.759	
Uganda	M2a	Perceived police capacity	-0.016	0.025	(-0.065, 0.033)	0.516	
Colombia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.015	0.055	(-0.095, 0.124)	0.788	
Liberia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.809	0.933	(-1.090, 2.709)	0.392	
Pakistan	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.235	0.133	(-0.672, 0.203)	0.181	
Uganda	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.011	0.025	(-0.062, 0.040)	0.676	
Colombia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	-0.052	0.060	(-0.171, 0.067)	0.387	
Liberia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.136	0.651	(-1.192, 1.464)	0.836	
Pakistan	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	-0.050	0.099	(-0.365, 0.266)	0.649	
Colombia	S2	Community trust	-0.067	0.048	(-0.163, 0.030)	0.173	
Liberia	S2	Community trust	0.065	0.701	(-1.364, 1.495)	0.926	
Pakistan	S2	Community trust	-0.079	0.198	(-0.717, 0.559)	0.717	
Uganda	S2	Community trust	0.029	0.024	(-0.020, 0.077)	0.245	

## H.4 Heterogeneous effects by community trust (baseline)

Table SM26: Results Table for heterogeneous effects for meta-estimates

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.042	0.026	(-0.092, 0.008)	0.103	0.671
1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.022	0.019	(-0.015, 0.059)	0.247	0.827
2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	-0.029	0.049	(-0.126, 0.068)	0.563	0.83
3b	Police abuse idx.	-0.025	0.025	(-0.074, 0.024)	0.314	0.827
4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.021	0.018	(-0.014, 0.055)	0.249	0.827
4b	Crime tips idx.	0.021	0.023	(-0.024, 0.065)	0.366	0.827
4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.017	0.035	(-0.051, 0.085)	0.625	0.876
M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	0.000	0.023	(-0.045, 0.045)	0.988	
M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	-0.019	0.041	(-0.099, 0.061)	0.646	
M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	0.007	0.019	(-0.030, 0.045)	0.694	
M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	-0.006	0.024	(-0.053, 0.041)	0.812	
M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.019	0.025	(-0.031, 0.069)	0.453	
S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.005	0.030	(-0.054, 0.063)	0.877	
S2	Community trust	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.918	

Table SM27: Results Table for heterogeneous effects for study-estimates

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Colombia	1a	Crime victimization	-0.039	0.044	(-0.126, 0.048)	0.374	0.733
Liberia	1a	Crime victimization	0.470	0.482	(-0.491, 1.432)	0.333	0.894
Pakistan	1a	Crime victimization	-0.111	0.053	(-0.326, 0.104)	0.163	0.586
Uganda	1a	Crime victimization	-0.012	0.037	(-0.087, 0.063)	0.756	0.979
Colombia	1b	Perceived future insecurity	0.039	0.041	(-0.043, 0.121)	0.349	0.733
Liberia	1b	Perceived future insecurity	0.050	0.034	(-0.018, 0.119)	0.147	0.588
Pakistan	1b	Perceived future insecurity	-0.048	0.042	(-0.212, 0.116)	0.364	0.728
Uganda	1b	Perceived future insecurity	0.028	0.032	(-0.036, 0.093)	0.383	0.979
Colombia	2	Overall perceptions of police	0.050	0.040	(-0.030, 0.130)	0.219	0.733
Liberia	2	Overall perceptions of police	0.010	0.053	(-0.095, 0.115)	0.852	0.95
Pakistan	2	Overall perceptions of police	-0.198	0.065	(-0.460, 0.064)	0.085	0.586
Uganda	2	Overall perceptions of police	-0.010	0.036	(-0.083, 0.063)	0.782	0.979
Colombia	3b	Police abuse	0.003	0.039	(-0.075, 0.081)	0.934	0.975
Liberia	3b	Police abuse	-0.016	0.049	(-0.114, 0.082)	0.743	0.947
Pakistan	3b	Police abuse	-0.061	0.057	(-0.286, 0.165)	0.392	0.732
Uganda	3b	Police abuse	-0.075	0.066	(-0.206, 0.056)	0.260	0.979
Colombia	4a	Crime reporting	0.008	0.044	(-0.080, 0.096)	0.860	0.966
Liberia	4a	Crime reporting	0.003	0.006	(-0.010, 0.015)	0.688	0.947
Pakistan	4a	Crime reporting	0.066	0.030	(-0.055, 0.187)	0.150	0.586
Uganda	4a	Crime reporting	0.033	0.049	(-0.065, 0.131)	0.506	0.979
Colombia	4b	Crime tips	-0.008	0.043	(-0.094, 0.078)	0.855	0.966

Table SM27: Results Table for heterogeneous effects for study-estimates (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Liberia	4b	Crime tips	0.077	0.045	(-0.013, 0.168)	0.091	0.588
Pakistan	4b	Crime tips	-0.014	0.055	(-0.237, 0.210)	0.825	0.957
Uganda	4b	Crime tips	0.018	0.042	(-0.065, 0.102)	0.662	0.979
Colombia	4c	Police abuse reporting	-0.066	0.038	(-0.142, 0.010)	0.088	0.549
Liberia	4c	Police abuse reporting	0.079	0.033	(0.013, 0.145)	0.019	0.546
Pakistan	4c	Police abuse reporting	0.054	0.067	(-0.207, 0.316)	0.494	0.814
Uganda	4c	Police abuse reporting	0.009	0.039	(-0.067, 0.086)	0.806	0.979
Colombia	M1a	Perceived police intentions	0.005	0.049	(-0.093, 0.102)	0.925	
Liberia	M1a	Perceived police intentions	0.024	0.039	(-0.054, 0.101)	0.544	
Pakistan	M1a	Perceived police intentions	-0.071	0.064	(-0.330, 0.188)	0.376	
Uganda	M1a	Perceived police intentions	-0.002	0.042	(-0.086, 0.083)	0.970	
Liberia	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice	0.012	0.039	(-0.065, 0.090)	0.750	
Pakistan	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice	0.037	0.068	(-0.220, 0.294)	0.630	
Uganda	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice	-0.100	0.052	(-0.203, 0.003)	0.057	
Colombia	M1c	Cooperation norms	-0.009	0.029	(-0.066, 0.049)	0.765	
Liberia	M1c	Cooperation norms	0.007	0.048	(-0.089, 0.103)	0.887	
Pakistan	M1c	Cooperation norms	0.049	0.038	(-0.099, 0.197)	0.317	
Uganda	M1c	Cooperation norms	-0.011	0.046	(-0.102, 0.080)	0.810	
Colombia	M2a	Perceived police capacity	0.021	0.045	(-0.068, 0.111)	0.636	
Liberia	M2a	Perceived police capacity	-0.002	0.041	(-0.083, 0.080)	0.967	
Pakistan	M2a	Perceived police capacity	0.021	0.120	(-0.464, 0.507)	0.875	
Uganda	M2a	Perceived police capacity	-0.036	0.042	(-0.119, 0.047)	0.387	
Colombia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.001	0.045	(-0.091, 0.089)	0.988	
Liberia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.018	0.062	(-0.105, 0.142)	0.768	
Pakistan	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.040	0.077	(-0.273, 0.354)	0.648	
Uganda	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.029	0.040	(-0.051, 0.109)	0.471	
Colombia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.013	0.045	(-0.076, 0.103)	0.768	
Liberia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	-0.062	0.046	(-0.153, 0.029)	0.177	
Pakistan	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.039	0.027	(-0.070, 0.147)	0.279	
Colombia	S2	Community trust	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.854	
Liberia	S2	Community trust	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.634	
Pakistan	S2	Community trust	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.977	
Uganda	S2	Community trust	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.952	



## H.5 Heterogeneous effects by perceived state legitimacy (baseline)

Table SM28: Results Table for heterogeneous effects for meta-estimates

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.067	0.040	(-0.146, 0.012)	0.098	0.671
1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	-0.041	0.026	(-0.092, 0.011)	0.120	0.671
2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	-0.004	0.036	(-0.076, 0.067)	0.902	0.941
3b	Police abuse idx.	-0.021	0.034	(-0.087, 0.046)	0.546	0.83
4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.010	0.032	(-0.052, 0.071)	0.762	0.913
4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.014	0.035	(-0.083, 0.055)	0.685	0.913
4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	-0.020	0.024	(-0.067, 0.026)	0.392	0.827
M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	-0.001	0.027	(-0.054, 0.051)	0.956	
M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	0.088	0.052	(-0.013, 0.190)	0.087	
M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	-0.008	0.024	(-0.054, 0.039)	0.743	
M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	0.011	0.027	(-0.043, 0.064)	0.693	
M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.008	0.030	(-0.051, 0.067)	0.783	
S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.981	
S2	Community trust	-0.022	0.026	(-0.073, 0.029)	0.398	

Table SM29: Results Table for heterogeneous effects for study-estimates

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Colombia	1a	Crime victimization	-0.037	0.037	(-0.111, 0.037)	0.321	0.733
Liberia	1a	Crime victimization	-0.215	0.281	(-0.775, 0.345)	0.447	0.894
Pakistan	1a	Crime victimization	-0.125	0.067	(-0.351, 0.101)	0.167	0.586
Colombia	1b	Perceived future insecurity	-0.027	0.033	(-0.093, 0.039)	0.425	0.743
Liberia	1b	Perceived future insecurity	-0.064	0.043	(-0.149, 0.021)	0.140	0.588
Pakistan	1b	Perceived future insecurity	-0.026	0.181	(-0.619, 0.568)	0.896	0.957
Colombia	2	Overall perceptions of police	0.034	0.033	(-0.032, 0.100)	0.310	0.733
Liberia	2	Overall perceptions of police	-0.021	0.044	(-0.110, 0.067)	0.631	0.947
Pakistan	2	Overall perceptions of police	-0.318	0.166	(-0.868, 0.232)	0.157	0.586
Colombia	3b	Police abuse	0.028	0.044	(-0.059, 0.116)	0.522	0.812
Liberia	3b	Police abuse	-0.037	0.046	(-0.129, 0.055)	0.424	0.894
Pakistan	3b	Police abuse	-0.116	0.083	(-0.393, 0.161)	0.264	0.728
Colombia	4a	Crime reporting	-0.048	0.038	(-0.123, 0.026)	0.201	0.733
Liberia	4a	Crime reporting	0.005	0.007	(-0.009, 0.019)	0.515	0.947
Pakistan	4a	Crime reporting	0.087	0.045	(-0.064, 0.237)	0.157	0.586
Colombia	4b	Crime tips	0.003	0.037	(-0.070, 0.075)	0.940	0.975
Liberia	4b	Crime tips	0.039	0.044	(-0.048, 0.127)	0.376	0.894
Pakistan	4b	Crime tips	-0.083	0.041	(-0.221, 0.054)	0.144	0.586
Colombia	4c	Police abuse reporting	-0.052	0.026	(-0.105, 0.000)	0.050	0.471
Liberia	4c	Police abuse reporting	0.017	0.034	(-0.050, 0.085)	0.612	0.947
Pakistan	4c	Police abuse reporting	-0.012	0.044	(-0.156, 0.132)	0.808	0.957

Table SM29: Results Table for heterogeneous effects for study-estimates (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Colombia	M1a	Perceived police intentions	0.004	0.038	(-0.072, 0.080)	0.909	
Liberia	M1a	Perceived police intentions	0.001	0.039	(-0.077, 0.079)	0.974	
Pakistan	M1a	Perceived police intentions	-0.074	0.112	(-0.450, 0.303)	0.560	
Liberia	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice	0.100	0.054	(-0.008, 0.208)	0.069	
Pakistan	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice	-0.029	0.171	(-0.590, 0.532)	0.876	
Colombia	M1c	Cooperation norms	0.000	0.026	(-0.052, 0.052)	0.996	
Liberia	M1c	Cooperation norms	-0.049	0.057	(-0.163, 0.064)	0.390	
Pakistan	M1c	Cooperation norms	0.020	0.138	(-0.444, 0.485)	0.893	
Colombia	M2a	Perceived police capacity	0.038	0.040	(-0.041, 0.117)	0.345	
Liberia	M2a	Perceived police capacity	-0.030	0.037	(-0.104, 0.044)	0.416	
Pakistan	M2a	Perceived police capacity	0.050	0.060	(-0.152, 0.252)	0.472	
Colombia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.025	0.039	(-0.053, 0.103)	0.523	
Liberia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.024	0.048	(-0.119, 0.072)	0.619	
Pakistan	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.135	0.200	(-0.544, 0.813)	0.553	
Colombia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.782	
Liberia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.743	
Pakistan	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.987	
Colombia	S2	Community trust	-0.014	0.031	(-0.075, 0.048)	0.657	
Liberia	S2	Community trust	-0.059	0.050	(-0.158, 0.041)	0.242	
Pakistan	S2	Community trust	0.160	0.169	(-0.394, 0.714)	0.418	

## I. Alternative meta-analysis results (excluding Brazil site)

### I.1 Compliance results

Table SM30: Compliance results

Study	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
Meta-analysis	Community meeting awareness	1.023	0.629	(-0.210, 2.256)	0.104
Meta-analysis	Foot patrol frequency	0.064	0.054	(-0.043, 0.171)	0.239
Meta-analysis	Vehicle patrol frequency	0.091	0.049	(-0.005, 0.187)	0.064
Meta-analysis	Compliance	0.572	0.256	(0.070, 1.074)	0.026

## I.2 Main figures




Figure SM5: Compliance rates. We report the meta-analytic estimate and country estimates of the average compliance rates, measured using three variables measuring the frequency of patrols, frequency of encounters with police, and citizen knowledge of community engagement community meetings with police.




Figure SM6: Main effects of community policing. We report meta-analytic estimates of average treatment effects pooling across contexts for each of the primary outcomes, mechanisms, and secondary outcomes.




Figure SM7: Variation in effects across contexts. We report the country-level estimates of average treatment effects for each main effect estimate presented in Figure 2. These country estimates are pooled to construct the meta-analytic estimates presented in Figure 2.




Figure SM8: Variation in effects across outcomes. We report meta-analytic estimates of average treatment effects pooling across contexts for the constituent measures of the main effects.

### I.3 Primary hypotheses

Table SM31: Results Table for Primary Hypotheses

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p- value
1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.016	0.029	(-0.072, 0.041)	0.585	0.879
1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.026	0.035	(-0.042, 0.094)	0.453	0.879
2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.053	0.029	(-0.003, 0.109)	0.065	0.272
3a	Police perceptions of citizens idx.	0.070	0.137	(-0.198, 0.339)	0.606	0.879
3b	Police abuse idx.	-0.010	0.040	(-0.088, 0.068)	0.804	0.879
4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.005	0.031	(-0.057, 0.066)	0.879	0.879
4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.042	0.023	(-0.087, 0.003)	0.068	0.272
4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.008	0.022	(-0.035, 0.051)	0.725	0.879
M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	0.372	0.260	(-0.137, 0.881)	0.152	
M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	0.049	0.033	(-0.015, 0.113)	0.136	
M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	-0.009	0.023	(-0.053, 0.035)	0.695	
M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	0.041	0.043	(-0.042, 0.125)	0.332	
M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.032	0.031	(-0.028, 0.092)	0.293	
S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.045	0.034	(-0.022, 0.112)	0.192	
S2	Community trust	0.028	0.025	(-0.021, 0.076)	0.261	

### I.4 Results for secondary hypotheses

Table SM32: Results Table for Secondary Hypotheses

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	0.137	0.103	(-0.065, 0.338)	0.183
1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization idx. (expanded crimes)	-0.027	0.142	(-0.304, 0.250)	0.849
1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	-0.022	0.025	(-0.071, 0.027)	0.382



## I.5 Primary hypotheses (as pre-registered)

Table SM33: Results Table for Primary Hypotheses (based on original indices)

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.013	0.021	(-0.055, 0.029)	0.546	0.767
1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	-0.024	0.079	(-0.179, 0.131)	0.763	0.767
2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.053	0.029	(-0.003, 0.109)	0.065	0.272
3a	Police perceptions of citizens idx.	0.070	0.137	(-0.198, 0.339)	0.606	0.767
3b	Police abuse idx.	-0.012	0.040	(-0.090, 0.067)	0.767	0.767
4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.011	0.026	(-0.039, 0.061)	0.672	0.767
4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.042	0.023	(-0.087, 0.003)	0.068	0.272
4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.020	0.027	(-0.034, 0.073)	0.469	0.767
M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	0.372	0.260	(-0.137, 0.881)	0.152	
M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	0.065	0.031	(0.005, 0.125)	0.033	
M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	-0.009	0.023	(-0.053, 0.035)	0.695	
M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	0.041	0.043	(-0.042, 0.125)	0.332	
M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.032	0.031	(-0.028, 0.092)	0.293	
S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.045	0.034	(-0.022, 0.112)	0.192	
S2	Community trust	0.028	0.025	(-0.021, 0.076)	0.261	

## I.6 Secondary hypotheses (as pre-registered)

## I.7 Primary hypotheses (using list-wise deletion)

Table SM34: Results Table for all indices (based on listwise indices)

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.016	0.029	(-0.072, 0.041)	0.585	0.911
1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.022	0.038	(-0.052, 0.096)	0.562	0.911
2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.056	0.029	(-0.000, 0.112)	0.051	0.261
3a	Abuse	0.040	0.073	(-0.103, 0.184)	0.581	0.911
3a	Accountability	-0.087	0.046	(-0.177, 0.004)	0.060	0.261
3a	Corruption	0.091	0.188	(-0.278, 0.460)	0.629	0.911
3a	Empathy	-0.010	0.089	(-0.185, 0.165)	0.912	0.912
3b	Police abuse idx.	-0.013	0.041	(-0.093, 0.068)	0.759	0.911
4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.005	0.031	(-0.057, 0.066)	0.879	0.912
4a	Resolution of crime	-0.016	0.016	(-0.047, 0.015)	0.314	0.911
4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.041	0.022	(-0.085, 0.003)	0.065	0.261
4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.007	0.020	(-0.032, 0.047)	0.715	0.911
M1a	Corruption	0.155	0.133	(-0.106, 0.416)	0.246	
M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	0.328	0.258	(-0.178, 0.835)	0.204	
M1b	Crime reporting	0.058	0.025	(0.009, 0.108)	0.022	
M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	1.000	
M1b	Law	-0.003	0.028	(-0.057, 0.052)	0.919	
M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	-0.011	0.022	(-0.055, 0.032)	0.609	
M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	0.045	0.042	(-0.038, 0.128)	0.290	
M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.032	0.031	(-0.028, 0.092)	0.293	
S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.045	0.034	(-0.022, 0.112)	0.192	
S2	Community trust	0.028	0.025	(-0.021, 0.076)	0.261	

## I.8 Secondary hypotheses (using list-wise deletion)

## I.9 Primary hypotheses by item

Table SM35: Components Table for Main Hypotheses

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
1a	Violent crime (personal)	0.000	0.002	(-0.003, 0.004)	0.838	0.838
1a	Violent crime (community)	0.007	0.029	(-0.050, 0.065)	0.805	0.838
1a	Non-violent crime (personal)	-0.007	0.015	(-0.037, 0.022)	0.625	0.838
1a	Non-violent crime (community)	-0.043	0.029	(-0.099, 0.013)	0.131	0.523
3a	Empathy	-0.010	0.089	(-0.185, 0.165)	0.912	0.912
3a	Corruption	0.091	0.188	(-0.278, 0.460)	0.629	0.839
3a	Accountability	-0.087	0.046	(-0.177, 0.004)	0.060	0.239
3a	Abuse	0.040	0.073	(-0.103, 0.184)	0.581	0.839
3b	Bribe frequency	0.022	0.027	(-0.031, 0.076)	0.419	0.419
3b	Bribe amount	-0.009	0.008	(-0.025, 0.006)	0.253	0.419
3b	Abuse (binary)	-0.017	0.019	(-0.054, 0.021)	0.382	0.419
3b	Abuse	-0.025	0.028	(-0.080, 0.031)	0.382	0.419
4a	Violent crime reporting (personal)	-0.004	0.006	(-0.015, 0.007)	0.459	0.626
4a	Violent crime reporting (community)	0.002	0.016	(-0.030, 0.033)	0.911	0.911
4a	Resolution of crime	-0.016	0.016	(-0.047, 0.015)	0.314	0.626
4a	Non-violent crime (personal)	0.012	0.018	(-0.023, 0.047)	0.501	0.626
4a	Non-violent crime (community)	-0.019	0.019	(-0.056, 0.018)	0.318	0.626
4c	Physical/verbal abuse	-0.024	0.029	(-0.082, 0.033)	0.404	0.434
4c	Drinking on duty	0.027	0.031	(-0.034, 0.087)	0.388	0.434
4c	Beating community member	0.019	0.025	(-0.029, 0.068)	0.434	0.434
M1a	Treat seriously	0.344	0.282	(-0.209, 0.898)	0.223	
M1a	Treat fairly	0.053	0.031	(-0.008, 0.113)	0.089	
M1a	Corruption	0.155	0.133	(-0.106, 0.416)	0.246	
M1b	Law	-0.003	0.028	(-0.057, 0.052)	0.919	
M1b	Crime reporting	0.058	0.025	(0.009, 0.108)	0.022	
M2a	Timeliness	0.038	0.046	(-0.052, 0.128)	0.406	
M2a	Investigation capacity	0.042	0.036	(-0.030, 0.113)	0.254	

## I.10 Secondary hypotheses by item

Table SM36: Components Table for Secondary Hypotheses

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
1a. (alt. i)	Aggravated assault (administrative data)	0.158	0.170	(-0.174, 0.491)	0.352
1a. (alt. i)	Armed robbery (administrative data)	0.197	0.160	(-0.117, 0.510)	0.218
1a. (alt. i)	Burglary (administrative data)	0.160	0.137	(-0.108, 0.428)	0.242
1a. (alt. i)	Domestic abuse (physical) (administrative data)	0.084	0.077	(-0.066, 0.235)	0.271
1a. (alt. i)	Murder (administrative data)	0.333	0.221	(-0.101, 0.767)	0.132
1a. (alt. i)	Non-violent crimes (administrative data)	0.092	0.065	(-0.036, 0.219)	0.159
1a. (alt. i)	Other non-violent crimes (administrative data)	0.046	0.052	(-0.057, 0.149)	0.381
1a. (alt. i)	Other violent crimes (administrative data)	0.388	0.337	(-0.273, 1.048)	0.250
1a. (alt. i)	Sexual assault (administrative data)	0.384	0.128	(0.133, 0.634)	0.003
1a. (alt. i)	Simple assault (administrative data)	-0.024	0.345	(-0.700, 0.652)	0.944
1a. (alt. i)	Violent crimes (administrative data)	0.151	0.121	(-0.085, 0.388)	0.210
1a. (alt. ii)	Aggravated assault (community, expanded)	0.006	0.022	(-0.037, 0.049)	0.772
1a. (alt. ii)	Aggravated assault (expanded, personal)	-0.046	0.235	(-0.506, 0.415)	0.846
1a. (alt. ii)	Armed robbery (community, expanded)	0.019	0.024	(-0.027, 0.065)	0.420
1a. (alt. ii)	Armed Robbery (expanded, personal)	0.002	0.002	(-0.002, 0.005)	0.388
1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (community, expanded)	-0.046	0.030	(-0.105, 0.014)	0.130
1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (expanded, personal)	-0.007	0.014	(-0.034, 0.020)	0.613
1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (community, expanded)	0.005	0.026	(-0.047, 0.056)	0.850
1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (expanded, personal)	-0.544	0.205	(-0.945, -0.142)	0.008
1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (verbal) (community, expanded)	-0.081	0.054	(-0.187, 0.024)	0.132
1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (verbal) (expanded, personal)	-0.063	0.115	(-0.289, 0.162)	0.582
1a. (alt. ii)	Land crimes (community, expanded)	2.875	2.133	(-1.306, 7.056)	0.178
1a. (alt. ii)	Land crimes (expanded, personal)	0.048	0.305	(-0.550, 0.646)	0.875
1a. (alt. ii)	Mob (community, expanded)	-0.016	0.046	(-0.107, 0.075)	0.733
1a. (alt. ii)	Murder (community, expanded)	0.012	0.029	(-0.044, 0.069)	0.675
1a. (alt. ii)	Non-violent crimes (expanded, personal)	0.007	0.097	(-0.183, 0.197)	0.942
1a. (alt. ii)	Non-violent crimes (community, expanded)	0.010	0.281	(-0.540, 0.560)	0.972
1a. (alt. ii)	Other non-violent crimes (community, expanded)	0.046	0.032	(-0.018, 0.110)	0.156
1a. (alt. ii)	Other non-violent crimes (expanded, personal)	-0.026	0.030	(-0.086, 0.033)	0.389
1a. (alt. ii)	Other violent crimes (community, expanded)	-0.005	0.016	(-0.037, 0.027)	0.772
1a. (alt. ii)	Other violent crimes (expanded, personal)	0.011	0.022	(-0.032, 0.054)	0.623
1a. (alt. ii)	Sexual assault (community, expanded)	0.002	0.021	(-0.040, 0.044)	0.911

Table SM36: Components Table for Secondary Hypotheses (*continued*)

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
1a. (alt. ii)	Sexual assault (expanded, personal)	0.306	0.331	(-0.343, 0.955)	0.355
1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (community, expanded)	-0.001	0.022	(-0.044, 0.041)	0.960
1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (expanded, personal)	0.005	0.015	(-0.025, 0.035)	0.728
1a. (alt. ii)	Violent crimes (community, expanded)	-0.008	0.041	(-0.090, 0.073)	0.837
1a. (alt. ii)	Violent crimes (expanded, personal)	0.014	0.024	(-0.032, 0.061)	0.554
1a. (alt. iii)	Aggravated assault (community, binary)	-0.025	0.038	(-0.098, 0.049)	0.511
1a. (alt. iii)	Armed Robbery (community, binary)	0.019	0.025	(-0.030, 0.068)	0.443
1a. (alt. iii)	Armed robbery (personal, binary)	-0.017	0.021	(-0.058, 0.024)	0.420
1a. (alt. iii)	Burglary (community, binary)	-0.053	0.037	(-0.125, 0.018)	0.143
1a. (alt. iii)	Burglary (personal, binary)	-0.006	0.021	(-0.047, 0.034)	0.755
1a. (alt. iii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (community, binary)	0.012	0.028	(-0.042, 0.067)	0.661
1a. (alt. iii)	Murder (community, binary)	0.007	0.033	(-0.057, 0.072)	0.821
1a. (alt. iii)	Non-violent crimes (community, binary)	-0.047	0.035	(-0.115, 0.021)	0.171
1a. (alt. iii)	Non-violent crimes (personal, binary)	-0.003	0.022	(-0.047, 0.040)	0.882
1a. (alt. iii)	Other non-violent crimes (community, binary)	0.046	0.032	(-0.018, 0.110)	0.156
1a. (alt. iii)	Other non-violent crimes (personal, binary)	-0.026	0.030	(-0.086, 0.033)	0.389
1a. (alt. iii)	Other violent crimes (community, binary)	-0.005	0.016	(-0.037, 0.027)	0.772
1a. (alt. iii)	Other violent crimes (personal, binary)	0.011	0.022	(-0.032, 0.054)	0.623
1a. (alt. iii)	Sexual assault (community, binary)	-0.008	0.027	(-0.061, 0.045)	0.761
1a. (alt. iii)	Simple assault (community, binary)	-0.009	0.039	(-0.084, 0.067)	0.825
1a. (alt. iii)	Simple assault (personal, binary)	0.008	0.018	(-0.027, 0.044)	0.648
1a. (alt. iii)	Violent crime (personal, binary)	0.008	0.020	(-0.030, 0.047)	0.667
1a. (alt. iii)	Violent crimes (community, binary)	0.006	0.027	(-0.048, 0.060)	0.828

J. Deviations from preanalysis plan

Table SM37: Variable construction deviations from the pre-analysis plan

Hyp.	Index	Constituent item	Meta-analysis	Brazil	Colombia	Liberia	Pakistan	Philippines	Uganda
1a	crime_victim_idx	armedrob_num	✓		Asked as a binary response item; excluded Colombia's items from meta-analysis				
		simpleassault_num	✓		Asked as a binary response item; excluded Colombia's items from meta-analysis				
		other_any_violent	✓		Asked as a binary response item; excluded Colombia's items from meta-analysis				
		burglary_num,	✓		Asked as a binary response item; excluded Colombia's items from meta-analysis				
		other_any_nonviolent	✓		Asked as a binary response item; excluded Colombia's items from meta-analysis				
		carmedrob_num	✓		Asked as a binary response item; excluded Colombia's items from meta-analysis				

Table SM37: Variable construction deviations from the pre-analysis plan (*continued*)

Hyp.	Index	Constituent item	Meta-analysis	Brazil	Colombia	Liberia	Pakistan	Philippines	Uganda
		caggassault_num	✓		Asked as a binary response item; excluded Colombia's items from meta-analysis				
		csimpleassault_num	✓		Asked as a binary response item; excluded Colombia's items from meta-analysis				
		csexual_num	✓		Asked as a binary response item; excluded Colombia's items from meta-analysis				
		cdomestic_phys_num	✓		Asked as a binary response item; excluded Colombia's items from meta-analysis				
		cmurder_num	✓		Asked as a binary response item; excluded Colombia's items from meta-analysis	Not collected			
		cother_any_violent	✓		Asked as a binary response item; excluded Colombia's items from meta-analysis				
1b	future_insecurity_idx	fear_violent	✓						
		fear_nonviolent	X		Not collected				
		feared_walk	✓						

Table SM37: Variable construction deviations from the pre-analysis plan (*continued*)

Hyp.	Index	Constituent item	Meta-analysis	Brazil	Colombia	Liberia	Pakistan	Philippines	Uganda
2	satis_idx	satis_trust	✓						
		satis_general	✓						
3a	officer_attitude_idx	empathy_complaints	✓	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	Different options and one category omitted in error; Included in meta-analysis for all studies
		empathy_reports	✓	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	Different options and one category omitted in error; Included in meta-analysis for all studies
		account_pol_matter	✓	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	
		hypothetical2_punishmen	✓	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	Measured as multiple response; included in meta-analysis for all studies
		hypothetical2_reportself	✓	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	
		hypothetical2_reportother	✓	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	
		hypothetical3_punishmen	✓	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	Measured as multiple response; included in meta-analysis for all studies
		hypothetical3_reportself	✓	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	
		hypothetical3_reportother	✓	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	
		hypothetical5_punishmen	✓	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	Measured as multiple response; included in meta-analysis for all studies



Table SM37: Variable construction deviations from the pre-analysis plan (*continued*)

Hyp.	Index	Constituent item	Meta-analysis	Brazil	Colombia	Liberia	Pakistan	Philippines	Uganda
		hypothetical5_reportself	✓	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	
		hypothetical5_reportother	✓	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	
		hypothetical5_abuseself	✓	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	
		hypothetical5_abuseother	✓	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	
		hypothetical2_corruptself	✓	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	
		hypothetical2_corruptother	✓	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	
		hypothetical3_corruptself	✓	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	
		hypothetical3_corruptother	✓	Not collected		Not collected		Not collected	
3b	police_abuse_idx	policeabuse_verbal_any	✓						
		policeabuse_phys_any	✓						
		policeabuse_verbal_num	X		Not collected				
		policeabuse_phys_num	X		Not collected				
		bribe_freq	✓		Only measured in baseline				
		bribe_amt <sup>29</sup>	✓		Only measured in baseline				
4a	crime_reporting_idx	armedrob_report	✓						
		simpleassault_report	✓						
		other_report_violent	X		Not collected				
		burglary_report	✓						
		other_report_nonviolent	X		Not collected				
		carmedrob_report	✓						
		caggassault_report	✓						
		csimpleassault_report	✓						
		csexual_report	✓						
		cdomestic_phys_report	✓						
		cmurder_report	X			Not collected			
		cother_report_violent	X		Not collected				

<sup>29</sup>For the variable bribe\_amt, we replace to 0 for any observations where bribe\_freq = 0. We mistakenly did not include this rule in the PAP as we did for other similar

Table SM37: Variable construction deviations from the pre-analysis plan (*continued*)

Hyp.	Index	Constituent item	Meta-analysis	Brazil	Colombia	Liberia	Pakistan	Philippines	Uganda
		cburglary_report	✓						
		cother_report_nonviolent	X		Not collected				
		burglaryres	✓						
		dviolres	✓						
		armedrobres	X		Not collected				
4b	tips_idx	contact_pol_susp_activity	✓						
		give_info_pol_investigatio	✓						
		atips_hline	X	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected
		atips_box	X	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected
4c	police_abuse_report_idx	policeabuse_verbal_report	✓						
		policeabuse_phys_report	X		Not collected				
		dutydrink_report	X		Not collected				
		policebeating_report	✓						
		apolvtm_hline	X	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected
		apolvtm_cmtbox	X	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected
		apolvtm_station	X	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected	Not collected	
M1a	intentions_idx	polcaseserious	✓						
		polcasefair	✓	Not collected at baseline			Different response items		
		polint_corrupt	✓				Different response items		
		polint_quality	✓						
M1b	know_idx	know_law_suspect	✓		Not collected at baseline			Not collected	
		know_law_lawyer	✓		Not collected at baseline			Not collected	
		know_law_fees	✓		Not collected at baseline			Not collected	
		know_law_vaw	X		Not collected at baseline	Not collected		Not collected	
		know_report_followup	X		Not collected at baseline	Not collected	Not collected		

Table SM37: Variable construction deviations from the pre-analysis plan (*continued*)

Hyp.	Index	Constituent item	Meta-analysis	Brazil	Colombia	Liberia	Pakistan	Philippines	Uganda
		know_report_station	✓		Not collected at baseline				
M1c	norm_idx	reportnorm_theft	✓		Different response items				
		reportnorm_abuse	✓						
		obeynorm	X		Not collected				
M2a	police_capacity_idx	polcap_timely	✓						
		polcap_investigate	✓						
		polcap_timely	✓						
		polcap_investigate	✓						
M2b	responsive_act	responsive_act	✓						
S1	legit_trust	legit_trust	✓				Not collected		Not collected
S2	trust_community	trust_community	✓				Different response items	Different response items	Different response items
C	compliance_idx	compliance_patrol	✓				Different response items		Different response items
		compliance_freq	✓				Different response items		Different response items
		compliance_meeting	✓						

Table SM38: Variable Coding and Survey Questionnaire

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
<b>PRIMARY OUTCOME FAMILY 1: SECURITY OF LIFE AND PROPERTY</b>				
<b>1a. Negative effect on incidence of crime</b>				
armedrob_num <sup>30</sup>	In the past 6 months, were you or any member of your household the victim of any ARMED ROBBERY? [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	Numeric		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident. <sup>31</sup>			
armedrob_bin		Numeric	Recoded 1 if armedrob_num > 0; 0 if armedrob_num = 0	Citizen survey
burglary_num <sup>32</sup>	Besides any armed robbery, in the past 6 months, were you or any member of your household the victim of BURGLARY or THEFT? [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	Numeric		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident. <sup>33</sup>	Freeform		

<sup>30</sup>Adapted from Blair et al. (2017); Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

<sup>31</sup>Blair et al. (2017).

<sup>32</sup>Adapted from Blair et al. (2017); Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

<sup>33</sup>Blair et al. (2017).

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
burglary_bin		Numeric	Recoded 1 if burglary_num > 0; 0 if burglary_num = 0	Citizen survey
simpleassault_num <sup>34</sup>	In the past 6 months, has anyone attacked you or any member of your household WITHOUT a weapon? [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	Numeric		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident. <sup>35</sup>	Freeform		Citizen survey
simpleassault_bin		Numeric	Recoded 1 if simpleassault_num > 0; 0 if simpleassault_num = 0	Citizen survey
aggassault_num <sup>36</sup>	Besides any armed robbery, in the past 6 months, has anyone attacked you or any member of your household WITH A WEAPON? (INCLUDING GUNS, CUTLASSES, STICKS, ETC.) [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	Numeric		Citizen survey

<sup>34</sup>Adapted from Blair et al. (2017); Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

<sup>35</sup>Blair et al. (2017).

<sup>36</sup>Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
sexual_num <sup>37</sup>	In the past 6 months, have you or any member of your household been a victim of SEXUAL ABUSE OR RAPE? (INCLUDING RAPE) [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	Numeric		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident.	Freeform		Citizen survey
domestic_phys_num <sup>38</sup>	Besides any sexual abuse, in the past 6 months, has anyone in your household ever PHYSICALLY ABUSED you? (INCLUDING PUSHING, SLAPPING, PUNCHING, KICKING, CHOKING, ETC.) (IF YES:) How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	Numeric		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident.	Freeform		Citizen survey
domestic_verbal_num <sup>39</sup>	Besides any physical abuse, in the past 6 months, has anyone in your household ever VERBALLY ABUSED you? [INCLUDING SHOUTING, CUSSING, THREATS OF ABUSE, ETC.]	Numeric		Citizen survey

<sup>37</sup>Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

<sup>38</sup>Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

<sup>39</sup>Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident.	Freeform		Citizen survey
land_any <sup>40</sup>	In the past 6 months, did you or a member of your household have a LAND DISPUTE over your house land or farm land? This include disputes that ended in the past 6 months or disputes that are still ongoing up to now. [IF YES:] Was there any violence or property destruction due to this dispute?	Numeric		Citizen survey
other_any <sup>41</sup>	In the past 6 months, were you or any member of your household a victim of any OTHER CRIME that we haven't mentioned already?	0-No; 1-Yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
	[IF YES:] What was the crime?	Freeform		Citizen survey
other_any_violent	Coded as other_any if other_any is a violent crime	Freeform		Citizen survey
other_any_nonviolent	Coded as other_any if other_any is a non-violent crime	Freeform		Citizen survey
violentcrime_num			Sum of armedrob_num, simpleassault_num, other_any_violent	Citizen survey

<sup>40</sup>Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

<sup>41</sup>Not collected in the Colombia study.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
nonviolentcrime_num			Sum of burglary_num, other_any_nonviolent	Citizen survey
violentcrime_num_exp			Sum of armedrob_num, aggassault_num, sexual_num, domestic_phys_num, simpleassault_num, other_any_violent	Citizen survey
nonviolentcrime_num_ex			Sum of burglary_num, domestic_verbal_num, land_any, other_any_nonviolent	Citizen survey
violentcrime_bin			Sum of armedrob_bin, simpleassault_bin, other_any_violent	Citizen survey
nonviolentcrime_bin			Sum of burglary_bin, other_any_nonviolent	Citizen survey



<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
	Now I want to ask you some questions about different types of crimes that may have happened to SOMEONE ELSE IN THIS COMMUNITY. This can include your neighbors, friends, relatives, or any other person you know that's living IN THIS COMMUNITY. <sup>42</sup>			
carmedrob_num <sup>43</sup>	In the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community a victim of ARMED ROBBERY? (ROBBERY WITH ANY KIND OF WEAPON, INCLUDING GUNS, CUTLASSES, STICKS, ETC.) [IF YES:] As far as you know, how many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	1-Once; 2-Two to three times; 3-Four to five times; 4-Six to ten times; 5-More than ten times; 97-Do not know		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident.			Citizen survey
carmedrob_bin		Numeric	Recoded 1 if carmedrob_num > 0; 0 if carmedrob_num = 0	Citizen survey

<sup>42</sup>Adapted from Blair et al. (2017).

<sup>43</sup>Adapted from Blair et al. (2017); Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
cburglary_num <sup>44</sup>	Besides any armed robbery, in the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community a victim of BURGLARY or THEFT? (ROBBERY WITHOUT WEAPON) [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	1-Once; 2-Two to three times; 3-Four to five times; 4-Six to ten times; 5-More than ten times; 97-Do not know		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident. <sup>45</sup>			
cburglary_bin		Numeric	Recoded 1 if cburglary_num > 0; 0 if cburglary_num = 0	Citizen survey
caggassault_num <sup>46</sup>	Besides any armed robbery, in the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community attacked WITH A WEAPON? (INCLUDING GUNS, CUTLASSES, STICKS, ETC.) [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	1-Once; 2-Two to three times; 3-Four to five times; 4-Six to ten times; 5-More than ten times; 97-Do not know		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident. <sup>47</sup>			

<sup>44</sup>Adapted from Blair et al. (2017); Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

<sup>45</sup>Adapted from Blair et al. (2017).

<sup>46</sup>Adapted from Blair et al. (2017); Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

<sup>47</sup>Adapted from Blair et al. (2017).

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
caggassault_bin		Numeric	Recoded 1 if caggassault_num > 0; 0 if caggassault_num = 0	Citizen survey
csimpleassault_num <sup>48</sup>	In the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community attacked WITHOUT a weapon? [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	1-Once; 2-Two to three times; 3-Four to five times; 4-Six to ten times; 5-More than ten times; 97-Do not know		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident. <sup>49</sup>			
csimpleassault_bin		Numeric	Recoded 1 if csimpleassault_num > 0; 0 if csimpleassault_num = 0	Citizen survey
csexual_num <sup>50</sup>	In the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community SEXUALLY ABUSED? (INCLUDING RAPE) [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	1-Once; 2-Two to three times; 3-Four to five times; 4-Six to ten times; 5-More than ten times; 97-Do not know		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident.			

<sup>48</sup>Adapted from Blair et al. (2017); Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

<sup>49</sup>Adapted from Blair et al. (2017).

<sup>50</sup>Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
csexual_bin		Numeric	Recoded 1 if csexual_num > 0; 0 if csexual_num = 0	Citizen survey
cdomestic_phys_num <sup>51</sup>	Besides any sexual abuse, in the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community PHYSICALLY ABUSED by someone in their own household? (INCLUDING PUSHING, SLAPPING, PUNCHING, KICKING, CHOKING, ETC.) [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	1-Once; 2-Two to three times; 3-Four to five times; 4-Six to ten times; 5-More than ten times; 97-Do not know		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident.			
cdomestic_phys_bin		Numeric	Recoded 1 if cdomestic_phys_num > 0; 0 if cdomestic_phys_num = 0	Citizen survey
cmurder_num <sup>52</sup>	In the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community MURDERED? [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	1-Once; 2-Two to three times; 3-Four to five times; 4-Six to ten times; 5-More than ten times; 97-Do not know		Citizen survey

<sup>51</sup>Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

<sup>52</sup>Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident.			
cmurder_bin		Numeric	Recoded 1 if cmurder_num > 0; 0 if cmurder_num = 0	Citizen survey
cland_any	In the past 6 months, did anyone you know in this community have a LAND DISPUTE over their house land or farm land? This includes disputes that ended in the past 6 months or disputes that are still ongoing up to now.	0-No; 1-Yes		Citizen survey
cdomestic_verbal_any	Besides any physical abuse, in the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community been VERBALLY ABUSED by someone in their own household? [INCLUDING SHOUTING, CUSSING, THREATS OF ABUSE, ETC.]	0-No; 1-Yes		Citizen survey
cmob_num <sup>53</sup>	In the past 6 months, were there any incidents of MOB JUSTICE in this community (i.e. beating or flogging of someone suspected of committing a crime)? [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	1-Once; 2-Two to three times; 3-Four to five times; 4-Six to ten times; 5-More than ten times		Citizen survey

<sup>53</sup>Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
cother_any <sup>54</sup>	In the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community a victim of any OTHER CRIME that we haven't mentioned already?	0-No; 1-Yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
	[IF YES:] What was the crime?	Freeform	To be added to the relevant dummies and indices, depending on whether the crime is violent or non-violent	Citizen survey
cother_any_violent	Coded as cother_any if cother_any is a violent crime (see general coding rule for violent crimes)			
cother_any_nonviolent	Coded as cother_any if cother_any is a non-violent crime (see general coding rule for non-violent crimes)			
cviolentcrime_num			Sum of carmedrob_num, caggassault_num, csimpleassault_num, csexual_num, cdomestic_phys_num, cmurder_num, cother_any_violent	

<sup>54</sup>Only collected at endline in the Colombia study.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
cnonviolentcrime_num			Sum of cburglary_num, cother_any_nonviolent	
cviolentcrime_num_exp			Sum of carmedrob_num, caggassault_num, csimpleassault_num, csexual_num, cdomestic_phys_num, cmurder_num, cmob_num, cother_any_violent	
cnonviolentcrime_num_bin			Sum of cburglary_num, cland_any, cdomestic_verbal_num, cother_any_nonviolent	
cviolentcrime_bin			Sum of carmedrob_bin, caggassault_bin, csimpleassault_bin, csexual_bin, cdomestic_phys_bin, cmurder_bin, cother_any_violent	
cnonviolentcrime_bin			Sum of cburglary_bin, cother_any_nonviolent	

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
crime_victim_idx			Index of violentcrime_num, nonviolentcrime_num, cviolentcrime_num, cnonviolentcrime_num	
crime_victim_idx_exp			Index of violentcrime_num_exp, nonviolentcrime_num_exp, cviolentcrime_num_exp, cnonviolentcrime_num_exp	
crime_victim_idx_bin			Index of violentcrime_bin, nonviolentcrime_bin, cviolentcrime_bin, cnonviolentcrime_bin	
aarmedrob_num	Number of reports of armed robbery in community in past 6 months			Administrative
aburglary_num	Number of reports of burglary or theft in community in past 6 months			Administrative
aaggassault_num	Number of reports of aggravated assault in community in past 6 months			Administrative
asimpleassault_num	Number of reports of simple assault in community in past 6 months			Administrative
asexual_num	Number of reports of sexual abuse in community in past 6 months			Administrative



<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
adomestic_phys_num	Number of reports of domestic violence (physical) in community in past 6 months			Administrative
adomestic_verbal_num	Number of reports of domestic violence (verbal) in community in past 6 months			Administrative
aland_num	Number of reports of land disputes in community in past 6 months			Administrative
aland_violent_num	Number of reports of violent land disputes in community in past 6 months			Administrative
amob_num	Number of reports of mob justice in community in past 6 months			Administrative
ariot_num	Number of reports of riots in community in past 6 months			Administrative
amurder_num	Number of reports of murder in community in past 6 months			Administrative
aother_num	Number of reports of other crimes in community in past 6 months			Administrative
aother_num_violent	Coded as aother_num if aother_num is a violent crime (see general coding rule for violent crimes)			Administrative
aother_num_nonviolent	Coded as aother_num if aother_num is a non-violent crime (see general coding rule for violent crimes)			Administrative

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
aviolentcrime_num	Sum of aarmedrob_num, aaggassault_num, asimpleassault_num, asexual_num, adomestic_phys_num, amurder_num, aother_num_violent			
anonviolentcrime_num	Sum of aburglary_num, aother_num_nonviolent			
1b. Positive effect on perceptions of safety (personal, land, and possessions)				
fear_violent <sup>55</sup>	How worried are you that you or a member of your household will be the victim of a VIOLENT CRIME in the coming year? [INCLUDING ARMED ROBBERY, ASSAULT WITH A WEAPON, ASSAULT WITHOUT A WEAPON, ETC.]	0-Not at all worried; 1-Somewhat worried; 2-Worried; 3-Very worried		Citizen survey
fear_nonviolent <sup>56</sup>	How worried are you that you or a member of your household will be the victim of a NON-VIOLENT CRIME in the coming year? [INCLUDING BURGLARY, THEFT, ETC.]	0-Not at all worried; 1-Somewhat worried; 2-Worried; 3-Very worried		Citizen survey
feared_walk <sup>57</sup>	In the past 6 months, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family felt unsafe walking in your neighborhood?	0-Never; 1-Just once or twice; 2-Several times; 3-Many times; 4-Always		Citizen survey

<sup>55</sup>Adapted from Cheema et al. (2017)

<sup>56</sup>Adapted from Cheema et al. (2017); Not collected for Colombia.

<sup>57</sup>Adapted from Afrobarometer (2016).

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
future_insecurity_idx			Index of fear_violent, fear_nonviolent, feared_walk	Citizen survey
PRIMARY OUTCOME FAMILY 2: CITIZEN PERCEPTIONS OF THE POLICE				
2. Positive effect on citizen perceptions of police				
satis_trust <sup>58</sup>	I generally trust the police. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
satis_general <sup>59</sup>	I am satisfied with the service that the police provide. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
satis_idx			Index of satis_trust and satis_general	Citizen survey
PRIMARY OUTCOME FAMILY 3: POLICE PERCEPTIONS OF AND BEHAVIORS TOWARD CITIZENS				
3a. Positive effect on perceptions of police empathy, accountability, and abuse and corruption concerns				
empathy_complaints <sup>60</sup>	When people complain about the police, they usually have a good reason. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Agree; 3-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey

<sup>58</sup>The question text and responses recorded for Colombia are as follows: "How much do you trust the following institutions or groups? National Police of Colombia." 1-do not trust at all; 2-trust very little; 3-trust somewhat; 4-trust a lot

<sup>59</sup>Not collected for Colombia at baseline.

<sup>60</sup>In Uganda the category "3-Strongly agree" was not measured for some respondents.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
empathy_reports	Most things that people report to the police are worth taking seriously. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Agree; 3-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
empathy_idx			Index of empathy_complaints, empathy_reports	
account_pol_matter	The police leadership takes citizen complaints about officers seriously. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Agree; 3-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
hypothetical2_punishment	If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if any discipline do YOU think WILL follow?	0-None; 1-Verbal reprimand; 2-Written reprimand; 3-Period of suspension without pay; 4-Demotion in rank; 5-Dismissal; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
hypothetical2_reports6	Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?	0-Definitely not; 1-Probably not; 2-Probably yes; 3-Definitely yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer; 99-other		Officer survey
hypothetical2_reporttot	Do you think MOST POLICE OFFICERS would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?	0-Definitely not; 1-Probably not; 2-Probably yes; 3-Definitely yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey

<sup>61</sup>This was collected in Uganda as a multiple response item.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
hypothetical3_punishme	If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if any discipline do YOU think WILL follow?	0-None; 1-Verbal reprimand; 2-Written reprimand; 3-Period of suspension without pay; 4-Demotion in rank; 5-Dismissal; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
hypothetical3_reportse	Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?	0-Definitely not; 1-Probably not; 2-Probably yes; 3-Definitely yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
hypothetical3_reporttot	Do you think MOST POLICE OFFICERS would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?	0-Definitely not; 1-Probably not; 2-Probably yes; 3-Definitely yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
hypothetical5_punishme	If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if any discipline do YOU think WILL follow?	0-None; 1-Verbal reprimand; 2-Written reprimand; 3-Period of suspension without pay; 4-Demotion in rank; 5-Dismissal; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
hypothetical5_reportse	Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?	0-Definitely not; 1-Probably not; 2-Probably yes; 3-Definitely yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey

<sup>62</sup>This was collected in Uganda as a multiple response item.

<sup>63</sup>This was collected in Uganda as a multiple response item.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
hypothetical15_reportot accountability_idx	Do you think MOST POLICE OFFICERS would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?	0-Definitely not; 1-Probably not; 2-Probably yes; 3-Definitely yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer	Index of account_pol_matter, hypothetical2_punish hypothetical2_report hypothetical2_report hypothetical3_punish hypothetical3_report hypothetical3_report hypothetical5_punish hypothetical5_report hypothetical5_report	Officer survey
hypothetical15_abusesel	Two police officers on foot patrol surprise a man who is attempting to break into an automobile. The man flees. They chase him for about two blocks before apprehending him by tackling him and wrestling him to the ground. After he is under control, both officers punch him a couple of times in the stomach as punishment for fleeing and resisting. Do YOU CONSIDER THIS BEHAVIOR TO BE SERIOUS MISCONDUCT?	0-Not at all serious; 1-Somewhat serious; 2-Serious; 3-Very serious; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
hypothetical5_abuseotl	Do MOST POLICE OFFICERS consider this behavior to be serious misconduct?	0-Not at all serious; 1-Somewhat serious; 2-Serious; 3-Very serious; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
abuse_idx			Index of hypothetical5_abuses, hypothetical5_abuseo	
hypothetical2_corrupts	A police officer routinely accepts free meals, cigarettes, and other items of small value from merchants on his beat. He does not solicit these gifts and is careful not to abuse the generosity of those who give gifts to him. Do you consider this behavior to be serious misconduct?	0-Not at all serious; 1-Somewhat serious; 2-Serious; 3-Very serious; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
hypothetical2_corruptc	A police officer routinely accepts free meals, cigarettes, and other items of small value from merchants on his beat. He does not solicit these gifts and is careful not to abuse the generosity of those who give gifts to him. Do MOST POLICE OFFICERS consider this behavior to be serious misconduct?	0-Not at all serious; 1-Somewhat serious; 2-Serious; 3-Very serious; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
hypothetical3_corrupt	A police officer stops a motorist for speeding. The officer agrees to accept a personal gift of half of the amount of the fine in exchange for not issuing a citation. Do you consider this behavior to be serious misconduct?	0-Not at all serious; 1-Somewhat serious; 2-Serious; 3-Very serious; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
hypothetical3_corrupt	A police officer stops a motorist for speeding. The officer agrees to accept a personal gift of half of the amount of the fine in exchange for not issuing a citation. Do MOST POLICE OFFICERS consider this behavior to be serious misconduct?	0-Not at all serious; 1-Somewhat serious; 2-Serious; 3-Very serious; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
corrupt_idx			Index of hypothetical2_corrupt hypothetical2_corrupt hypothetical3_corrupt hypothetical3_corrupt	
officer_attitude_idx			Index of corrupt_idx, abuse_idx, accountability_idx, empathy_idx	

3a. Negative effect reporting of police abuse and bribery



<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
policeabuse_phys_any <sup>64</sup>	In the past 6 months, have you ever witnessed or heard about police officers PHYSICALLY ABUSING people from your community? [INCLUDING PUSHING, SLAPPING, PUNCHING, KICKING, CHOKING, ETC.]	0-No; 1-Yes; 97- Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
policeabuse_verbal_any	Besides any incidents of physical abuse, in the past 6 months, have you ever witnessed or heard about police officers VERBALLY ABUSING people from your community? [INCLUDING SHOUTING, CUSSING, ETC.] This includes verbal abuse against you or someone in your family.	0-No; 1-Yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
policeabuse_any			Recoded 0 if policeabuse_verbal_any = 0 and policeabuse_phys_any = 0; 1 if policeabuse_verbal_any = 1 or policeabuse_phys_any = 1	

<sup>64</sup>Adapted from Blair et al. (2017).

<sup>65</sup>Adapted from Blair et al. (2017).

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
policeabuse_phys_num <sup>66</sup>	In the past 6 months, have you ever witnessed or heard about police officers PHYSICALLY ABUSING people from your community? (INCLUDING PUSHING, SLAPPING, PUNCHING, KICKING, CHOKING, ETC.) [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	Numeric		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident. <sup>67</sup>			
policeabuse_verbal_num	Besides any incidents of physical abuse, in the past 6 months, have you ever witnessed or heard about police officers VERBALLY ABUSING people from your community? [INCLUDING SHOUTING, CUSSING, ETC.] This includes verbal abuse against you or someone in your family. [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	Numeric		Citizen survey

<sup>66</sup>Adapted from Blair et al. (2017); Not collected in Colombia.

<sup>67</sup>Blair et al. (2017).

<sup>68</sup>Adapted from Blair et al. (2017); Not collected in Colombia.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident. <sup>69</sup>			
policeabuse_num			Sum of number of incidents of verbal (policeabuse_verbal_r or physical abuse (policeabuse_phys_num by police officers in the past 6 months	
policeabuse_verbal_rep	To the best of your knowledge, was this incident reported to anyone? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-No; 1-Community leaders; 2-Police station or police commander; 3-Any other government agency; 4-NGO; 5-Journalist; 6-[OTHER COUNTRY-SPECIFIC VENUES]; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer	Recoded 0 if policeabuse_verbal_num = 0 or policeabuse_verbal_rep = 0; 1 if policeabuse_verbal_num > 0 and policeabuse_verbal_rep = 2	Citizen survey
policeabuse_phys_rep	To the best of your knowledge, was this incident reported to anyone? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-No; 1-Community leaders; 2-Police station or police commander; 3-Any other government agency; 4-NGO; 5-Journalist; 6-[OTHER COUNTRY-SPECIFIC VENUES]; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer	Recoded 0 if policeabuse_phys_num = 0 or policeabuse_phys_rep = 0; 1 if policeabuse_phys_num > 0 and policeabuse_phys_rep = 2	Citizen survey

<sup>69</sup>Blair et al. (2017).

<sup>70</sup>Not collected in the Colombia study.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
policeabuse_report			Recoded 0 if policeabuse_verbal_r = 0 and policeabuse_phys_rep = 0; 1 if policeabuse_verbal_r > 0 or policeabuse_phys_rep > 0	
bribe_freq <sup>71</sup>	How many times in the past 6 months have you made an unofficial payment to the police?	1-None; 2-Once; 3-Between 2 and 5 times; 4-More than 5 times; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer	Categorical variable for frequency of unofficial payments to the police in the past 6 months	Citizen survey
bribe_amt <sup>72</sup>	[IF ANY:] The last time you made an unofficial payment to the police, how much was it? <sup>73</sup>	Numeric	Recoded bribe_amt = 0 if bribe_freq == 0	Citizen survey
police_abuse_idx			Index of policeabuse_any, policeabuse_num, bribe_freq, bribe_amt	

#### PRIMARY OUTCOME FAMILY 4: BEHAVIORAL COOPERATION OF CITIZENS WITH THE POLICE

##### 4a. Positive effect on reporting of crime victimization

<sup>71</sup>Adapted from Cheema et al. (2017); Not collected for Colombia at baseline.

<sup>72</sup>Not collected for Colombia at baseline. For the variable bribe\_amt, we replace to 0 for any observations where bribe\_freq = 0. We mistakenly did not include this rule in the PAP as we did for other similar

<sup>73</sup>We standardize the amount for bribes to be in USD for exchange rates at November 1st, 2019.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
acrime_hline	Total number of reports of crimes to hotline			Administrative
aviolent_hline	Number of reports of violent crimes to hotline			Administrative
anonviolent_hline	Number of reports of non-violent crimes to hotline			Administrative
acrime_station	Total number of reports of crimes to nearest police station			Administrative
aviolent_station	Number of reports of violent crimes to nearest police station			Administrative
anonviolent_station	Number of reports of non-violent crimes to nearest police station			Administrative
aburglary_hline	Number of reports of burglary to hotline			Administrative
aarmedrob_hline	Number of reports of armed robbery to hotline			Administrative
arape_hline	Number of reports of rape to hotline			Administrative
amurder_hline	Number of reports of murder to hotline			Administrative
asimpleassault_hline	Number of reports of simple assault to hotline			Administrative
aaggassault_hline	Number of reports of aggravated assault to hotline			Administrative
atheft_hline	Number of reports of theft to hotline			Administrative

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
aburglary_station	Number of reports of burglary to nearest police station			Administrative
aarmedrob_station	Number of reports of armed robbery to nearest police station			Administrative
arape_station	Number of reports of rape to nearest police station			Administrative
amurder_station	Number of reports of murder to nearest police station			Administrative
asimpleassault_station	Number of reports of simple assault to nearest police station			Administrative
aaggassault_station	Number of reports of aggravated assault to nearest police station			Administrative
atheft_station	Number of reports of theft to nearest police station			Administrative
<i>Actual crime (survey)</i>				
armedrob_report <sup>74</sup>	In the past 6 months, were you or any member of your household the victim of any ARMED ROBBERY? (ROBBERY WITH ANY KIND OF WEAPON, INCLUDING GUNS, CUTLASSES, STICKS, ETC.) Where did you report this case? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other; 98-Refuse to Answer	Recoded 0 if armedrob_num = 0 or armedrob_report = 0; 1 if armedrob_num > 0 and armedrob_report = 1	Citizen survey

<sup>74</sup>Adapted from Blair et al. (2017).

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
burglary_report <sup>75</sup>	Besides any armed robbery, in the past 6 months, were you or any member of your household the victim of BURGLARY or THEFT? [ROBBERY WITHOUT WEAPON]. Where did you report this case? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other	Recoded 0 if burglary_num = 0 or burglary_report = 0; 1 if burglary_num > 0 and burglary_report = 1	Citizen survey
simpleassault_report <sup>76</sup>	Besides any armed robbery, in the past 6 months, has anyone attacked you or any member of your household WITH A WEAPON? [INCLUDING GUNS, CUTLASSES, STICKS, ETC.] Where did you report this case? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other	Recoded 0 if simpleassault_num = 0 or simpleassault_report = 0; 1 if simpleassault_num > 0 and simpleassault_report = 1	Citizen survey
other_report <sup>77</sup>	In the past 6 months, were you or any member of your household a victim of any OTHER CRIME that we haven't mentioned already? Where did you report this case? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other	Recoded 0 if other_num = 0 or other_report = 0; 1 if other_num > 0 and other_report = 1	Citizen survey

<sup>75</sup>Blair et al. (2017).

<sup>76</sup>Blair et al. (2017).

<sup>77</sup>Blair et al. (2017); Not collected in the Colombia study.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
other_report_violent			Coded as other_report if other_any is a violent crime	
other_report_nonviolence			Coded as other_report if other_any is a non-violent crime	
violentcrime_report_n			Sum of armedrob_report, simpleassault_report other_report_violent	
nonviolentcrime_report			Sum of burglary_report, other_report_nonviolence	
carmedrob_report <sup>78</sup>	In the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community a victim of ARMED ROBBERY and [ROBBERY WITH ANY KIND OF WEAPON, INCLUDING GUNS, CUTLASSES, STICKS, ETC.] to the best of your knowledge, was this incident reported to anyone? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other	Recoded 0 if carmedrob_num = 0 or carmedrob_report = 0; 1 if carmedrob_num > 0 and carmedrob_report = 1	Citizen survey

<sup>78</sup>Adapted from Blair et al. (2017).



<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
cburglary_report <sup>79</sup>	Besides any armed robbery, in the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community a victim of BURGLARY or THEFT and [ROBBERY WITHOUT WEAPON] to the best of your knowledge, was this incident reported to anyone? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other	Recoded 0 if cburglary_num = 0 or cburglary_report = 0; 1 if cburglary_num > 0 and cburglary_report = 1	Citizen survey
caggassault_report <sup>80</sup>	Besides any armed robbery, in the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community attacked WITH A WEAPON and [INCLUDING GUNS, CUTLASSES, STICKS, ETC.] to the best of your knowledge, was this incident reported to anyone? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other	Recoded 0 if caggassault_num = 0 or caggassault_report = 0; 1 if caggassault_num > 0 and caggassault_report = 1	Citizen survey
csimpleassault_report <sup>81</sup>	In the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community attacked WITHOUT a weapon and to the best of your knowledge, was this incident reported to anyone? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other	Recoded 0 if csimpleassault_num = 0 or csimpleassault_report = 0; 1 if csimpleassault_num > 0 and csimpleassault_report = 1	Citizen survey

<sup>79</sup>Adapted from Blair et al. (2017).

<sup>80</sup>Adapted from Blair et al. (2017); Not collected in the Colombia study.

<sup>81</sup>Adapted from Blair et al. (2017).

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
csexual_report	In the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community SEXUALLY ABUSED? [INCLUDING RAPE] and to the best of your knowledge, was this incident reported to anyone? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other	Recoded 0 if csexual_num = 0 or csexual_report = 0; 1 if csexual_num > 0 and csexual_report = 1	Citizen survey
cdomestic_phys_report	Besides any sexual abuse, in the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community PHYSICALLY ABUSED by someone in their own household and [INCLUDING PUSHING, SLAPPING, PUNCHING, KICKING, CHOKING, ETC.] to the best of your knowledge, was this incident reported to anyone? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other	Recoded 0 if cdomestic_phys_num = 0 or cdomestic_phys_report = 0; 1 if cdomestic_phys_num > 0 and cdomestic_phys_report = 1	Citizen survey
cmurder_report <sup>82</sup>	In the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community MURDERED and to the best of your knowledge, was this incident reported to anyone? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other	Recoded 0 if cmurder_num = 0 or cmurder_report = 0; 1 if cmurder_num > 0 and cmurder_report = 1	Citizen survey

<sup>82</sup>Not collected in the Colombia study.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
cother_report <sup>83</sup>	In the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community a victim of any OTHER CRIME that we haven't mentioned already? To the best of your knowledge, was this incident reported to anyone? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other	Recoded 0 if cother_num = 0 or cother_report = 0; 1 if cother_num > 0 and cother_report = 1	Citizen survey
cother_report_violent	Coded as cother_report if cother_any is a violent crime (see general coding rule for violent crimes)		Recoded such that a zero represents either that the person responded that the community did not experience any other violent crimes or they did not report the crime. E.g., 0 if cother_num_violent = 0 or cother_report_violent = 0; 1 if cother_num_violent > 0 and cother_report_violent = 1	

<sup>83</sup>Not collected in the Colombia study.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
cother_report_nonviolent	Coded as cother_report if cother_any is a non-violent crime (see general coding rule for non-violent crimes)		Recoded such that a zero represents either that the person responded that the community did not experience any other non-violent crimes or they did not report the crime. E.g., 0 if cother_num_nonviolent = 0 or cother_report_nonviolent = 0; 1 if cother_num_nonviolent > 0 and cother_report_nonviolent = 1	
cviolentcrime_report_index			Sum of carmedrob_report, caggassault_report, csimpleassault_report, csexual_report, cdomestic_phys_report, cmurder_report, cother_report_violent	
cnonviolentcrime_report_index			Sum of cburglary_report, cother_report_nonviolent	

*Hypothetical crime (survey)*

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
	There are many places you can go to solve your crime here in [COUNTRY]. We got the POLICE, community leaders, [COUNTRY SPECIFIC FORUM 1], and [COUNTRY SPECIFIC FORUM 2]. Now I want to ask about what you think should happen for different types of crime that might happen in your community. <sup>84</sup>			
burglaryres <sup>85</sup>	If there's a BURGLARY in your community, who you would most like to resolve the situation? [DO NOT READ OPTIONS]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-[Town chief or elders]; 4-[Community watch group]; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 97-Don't know; 98-Refuse to answer	Recoded such that burglaryres = 1 if respondent prefers the police or courts to resolve the situation; burglaryres = 0 if otherwise.	Citizen survey

<sup>84</sup>Blair et al. (2017).

<sup>85</sup>Blair et al. (2017); Only collected at endline in the Colombia study.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
dviolres <sup>86</sup>	If a MAN BEAT HIS WOMAN in your community, who you would most like to resolve the situation? [DO NOT READ OPTIONS]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 97-Don't know; 98-Refuse to answer	Recoded such that dviolres = 1 if respondent prefers the police or courts to resolve the situation; dviolres = 0 if otherwise.	Citizen survey
armedrobres <sup>87</sup>	If there's an ARMED ROBBERY in your community, who you would most like to resolve the situation? [DO NOT READ OPTIONS]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 97-Don't know; 98-Refuse to answer	Recoded such that armedrobres = 1 if respondent prefers the police or courts to resolve the situation; armedrobres = 0 if otherwise.	Citizen survey
crimeres_idx			Index of burglaryres, dviolres, and armedrobres	Citizen survey

<sup>86</sup>Blair et al. (2017).

<sup>87</sup>Blair et al. (2017); Not collected in the Colombia study.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
crime_reporting_idx			Index of violentcrime_report_ nonviolentcrime_repo: cviolentcrime_report. cnonviolentcrime_rep crimeres_idx	Citizen survey
<b>4b. Positive effect on reporting of crime prevention tips<sup>88</sup></b>				
atips_hline <sup>89</sup>	Number of crime prevention tips reported via hotline (if available in both T and C locations)		Number of crime prevention tips reported	Administra- tive
atips_box <sup>90</sup>	ADMIN: Number of crime prevention tips reported via comment boxes (if available in both T and C locations)		Number of crime prevention tips reported	Administra- tive
contact_pol_susp_acti	In the past 6 months, have you ever contacted the police to alert them to suspicious or criminal activity in your community?	0-No; 1-Yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
give_info_pol_investi	In the past 6 months, have you ever given information to the police to assist with an investigation?	0-No; 1-Yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
crime_tips_idx			Index of contact_pol_susp_act: and give_info_pol_invest:	

<sup>88</sup>Not collected for Philippines.

<sup>89</sup>Not collected in Liberia.

<sup>90</sup>Not collected in Liberia or the Philippines.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
tips_idx			Index of atips_hline, atips_box, crime_tips_idx	
<b>4c. Positive effect on reporting of victimization by the police</b>				
apolvtm_hline	Number of incidents of victimization by the police reported via hotline (if available in both T and C locations)			Administrative
apolvtm_cmtbox <sup>91</sup>	Number of incidents of victimization by the police reported via comment boxes (if available in both T and C locations)			Administrative
apolvtm_station <sup>92</sup>	Number of incidents of victimization by the police reported to nearest station			Administrative
	See Section 3a.i. Incidence of victimization by police on reporting of police abuse.			Administrative
<i>Reporting of victimization by the police (hypothetical)</i>				
dutydrink_report <sup>93</sup>	Suppose you see a uniformed police officer drinking alcohol in your community. How likely would you be to report that situation?	1-Very unlikely; 2-Unlikely; 3-Likely; 4-Very likely; 97-Don't know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey

<sup>91</sup>Not collected in Liberia or the Philippines.

<sup>92</sup>Only collected for Uganda.

<sup>93</sup>Not collected in Colombia, because officers often wear uniforms off-duty so distinguishing on-duty drinking is difficult.



<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
policebeating_report	Suppose you see a group of officers unjustifiably beating someone in your community. How likely would you be to report that situation?	1-Very unlikely; 2-Unlikely; 3-Likely; 4-Very likely; 97-Don't know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
police_abuse_report_ic			Index of dutydrink_report, policebeating_report, policeabuse_report, apolvtm_hline, apolvtm_cmtbox, apolvtm_station	
<b>MECHANISM FAMILY 1: PERCEIVED COST TO CITIZENS COOPERATING WITH THE POLICE</b>				
<b>M1a. Positive effect on beliefs about police intentions</b>				
<i>Perceptions of police intentions (case management)</i>				
	Imagine someone is a VICTIM of an armed robbery in your community and they take the case to the POLICE. I want to ask you what you think will happen.			
polcaseserious <sup>94</sup>	The police will take the case seriously and investigate. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey

<sup>94</sup>Responses in Pakistan followed a different coding scheme.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
polcasefair <sup>95</sup>	The police will be fair to both complainant and defendant in the investigation. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
<i>Perceptions of police intentions (general)</i>				
	Ok, now I want to ask you about what you think about the police in general.			
polint_corrupt <sup>96</sup>	The police are corrupt. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer	In our construction of this variable we reverse the order of this variable to ensure that a higher value indicates a positive effect on citizen belief about police intentions.	Citizen survey
polint_quality <sup>97</sup>	The police provide the same quality of service to all citizens. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
polint_idx			Index of polint_corrupt and polint_quality	

<sup>95</sup>Responses in Pakistan followed a different coding scheme; Not collected in Colombia at baseline.

<sup>96</sup>Adapted from Sunshine and Tyler (2003).

<sup>97</sup>Sunshine and Tyler (2003).

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
intentions_idx			Index of polcaseserious, polcasefair, polint_idx	
<b>M1b. Positive effect on knowledge of criminal justice system</b>				
know_law_suspect <sup>98</sup>	If you see a dead body lying in the street and you report it to the police, [COUNTRY] law says the police must hold you as a suspect. True or false?	0-False; 1-True; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
know_law_lawyer <sup>99</sup>	If you take your case to court and you don't have money to pay a lawyer, [COUNTRY] law says the government must provide a lawyer for you. True or false?	0-False; 1-True; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
know_law_feesOnly collected at endline in the Colombia study; Not collected in the Philippines study.	If you take a case to the police, [COUNTRY] law says the police can charge a fee to register the case. True or false?	0-False; 1-True; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
know_law_vawOnly collected at endline in the Colombia study; Not collected in the Liberia and Philippines study.	According to [COUNTRY] law, it is a crime to beat on one's wife. True or false?	0-False; 1-True; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey

<sup>98</sup>Only collected at endline in the Colombia study; Not collected in the Philippines study.

<sup>99</sup>Only collected at endline in the Colombia study; Not collected in the Philippines study.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
know_law_idx			Index of know_law_suspect, know_law_lawyer, know_law_fees, and know_law_vaw	
know_report_followup <sup>100</sup> collected at endline in the Colombia study; Not collected in the Pakistan, Liberia and Philippines study.	If a crime is reported to the police using the hotline, an officer must follow up with the complainant in person in order for the crime to be recorded by the police. True or False? [ENUMERATOR: IS RESPONDENT CORRECT?]	0-No; 1-Yes		Citizen survey
know_report_station <sup>100</sup>	Do you know where the nearest police station is? [ENUMERATOR: IS RESPONDENT CORRECT?]	0-No; 1-Yes		Citizen survey
know_report_idx			Index of know_report_followup know_report_station	
know_idx			Index of know_law_idx, know_report_idx	
<b>M1c. Positive effect on norms of citizens cooperation with police</b>				

<sup>100</sup>Blair et al. (2017). Only collected at endline in the Colombia study; Not collected in the Philippines study

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
reportnorm_theft <sup>101</sup>	If there is a BURGLARY in your community, people can get angry if you take it to the police. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer	In our construction of this variable we reverse the order for the responses to ensure that a higher value indicates a positive effect on norms of citizen cooperation with police.	Citizen survey
reportnorm_abuse <sup>102</sup>	If a MAN BEATS HIS WIFE in your community, people can get angry if you take it to the police. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer	In our construction of this variable we reverse the order for the responses to ensure that a higher value indicates a positive effect on norms of citizen cooperation with police.	Citizen survey

<sup>101</sup>Blair et al. (2017). Different response options collected in Colombia

<sup>102</sup>Blair et al. (2017).

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
obeynorm <sup>103</sup>	You should do what the police tell you to do even when you do not understand the reasons for their decisions. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer	In our construction of this variable we reverse the order for the responses to ensure that a higher value indicates a positive effect on norms of citizen cooperation with police.	Citizen survey
norm_idx			Index of reportnorm_theft, reportnorm_abuse, obeynorm	
MECHANISM FAMILY 2: PERCEIVED RETURNS TO CITIZENS COOPERATING WITH THE POLICE				
<b>M2a. Positive effect on beliefs about police capacity</b>				
polcap_timely	The police have the capacity to respond to incidents of crime in a timely manner. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
polcap_investigate	The police have the capacity to investigate crimes and gather evidence effectively. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey

<sup>103</sup>Sunshine and Tyler (2003). Not collected in the Colombia study.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
police_capacity_idx			Index of polcap_timely, polcap_investigate	
<b>M2b. Positive effect on perceptions of responsiveness to citizen feedback</b>				
responsive_act	The police act upon citizen comments and complaints about security in my community. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
<b>SECONDARY OUTCOME FAMILY 1: INCREASE IN TRUST IN THE STATE</b>				
<b>S1. Positive effect on trust in the state</b>				
legit_trust <sup>104</sup>	How much do you trust the government of [COUNTRY]?	1-Not at all; 2-Just a little; 3-Somewhat; 4-A lot; 97-Don't know; 98-Refuse to answer		
<b>SECONDARY OUTCOME FAMILY 2: INCREASE IN COMMUNAL TRUST</b>				
<b>S2. Positive effect on communal trust</b>				
trust_community <sup>105</sup>	Most people in my community can be trusted. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Agree; 3-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
<b>COMPLIANCE WITH TREATMENT: CITIZEN INTERACTIONS WITH POLICE</b>				
<b>C. Positive effect on rate of citizen interactions with police</b>				
ameeting_count <sup>106</sup>	Attendance sheets at community meetings	Percentage Attendance		Administrative

<sup>104</sup>Different question text in Pakistan; Different response options collected in Philippines; Not collected in Uganda.

<sup>105</sup>Different question text and options for Uganda. Different response options for Pakistan and Philippines.

<sup>106</sup>Not collected for Philippines since community meetings were not part of the CEP intervention

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
compliance_patrol <sup>107</sup>	About how often do you see police officers patrolling your area on FOOT?	1-Daily; 2-Weekly; 3-Monthly; 4-Seasonally; 5-Less than seasonally; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer	In our construction of this variable we reverse the order of this variable such that a higher value indicates a positive effect on citizen interactions with the police.	Citizen survey
compliance_freq <sup>108</sup>	About how often do you see police officers patrolling your area while in a vehicle or on a motorbike?	1-Daily; 2-Weekly; 3-Monthly; 4-Seasonally; 5-Less than seasonally; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer	In our construction of this variable we reverse the order of this variable such that a higher value indicates a positive effect on citizen interactions with the police.	Citizen survey
compliance_meeting	In the past 6 months, have you HEARD ABOUT, SEEN, OR ATTENDED community meetings with police officers taking place in your area?	0-No; 1-Yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
compliance_idx			Index of compliance_patrol, compliance_freq, compliance_meeting	

<sup>107</sup>Additional response option i.e. "Never" also elicited in Pakistan and Uganda.

<sup>108</sup>Additional response option i.e. "Never" also elicited in Pakistan and Uganda.