

REPORT 60B0B4A7BC0D4400198902F6

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Number of analyses 1

User 60a9cb528bfa1219abf290cb

REPORT SUMMARY

Analyses ID Main source file Detected vulnerabilities

8bcacd37-94ab-4fe9-8702-5e4988e06a7a

MasterChef.sol

58

Started Fri May 28 2021 09:15:24 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)

Finished Fri May 28 2021 10:00:45 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)

Mode Deep

Client Tool Remythx

MasterChef.Sol Main Source File

DETECTED VULNERABILITIES

(HIGH	(MEDIUM	(LOW
0	23	35

ISSUES

MEDIUM Function could be marked as external.

The function definition of "renounceOwnership" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to SWC-000 mark it as "external" instead.

Source file MasterChef.sol Locations

```
\ensuremath{^{\star}} thereby removing any functionality that is only available to the owner.
```

649 function renounceOwnership() public virtual onlyOwner {
emit OwnershipTransferred(_owner, address(0)); 650

651

652

653

654 655

SWC-000

The function definition of "transferOwnership" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead.

Source file

MasterChef.sol

Locations

```
657 | * Can only be called by the current owner
658
        function transferOwnership address newOwner) public virtual onlyOwner []
require newOwner [!= address 0]. "Ownable: new owner is the zero address"),
emit OwnershipTransferred(_owner _ newOwner _
659
660
         _owner = newOwner;
662
663
664
665
```

MEDIUM Function could be marked as external.

SWC-000

The function definition of "symbol" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead.

Source file MasterChef.sol

Locations

```
738 | * name
     function symbol() public override view returns (string memory) {
740
     return _symbol;
741
742
743
744
```

MEDIUM Function could be marked as external.

SWC-000

The function definition of "decimals" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead.

Source file MasterChef.sol

```
745 | * @dev Returns the number of decimals used to get its user representation.
746
     function decimals() public override view returns (uint8) {
747
748
     return _decimals;
749
750
751
```

SWC-000

The function definition of "totalSupply" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead.

Source file

MasterChef.sol

Locations

```
752 * @dev See {BEP20-totalSupply}.
753
     function totalSupply() public override view returns (uint256) {
     return _totalSupply;
755
756
757
758
```

MEDIUM Function could be marked as external.

SWC-000

The function definition of "transfer" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead.

Source file

MasterChef.sol

Locations

```
* - the caller must have a balance of at least 'amount'
      function transfer(address recipient, uint256 amount public override returns (bool) {
    transfer(_msgSender(), recipient amount)
773
774
      return true;
775
776
777
      /**
778
```

MEDIUM Function could be marked as external.

SWC-000

The function definition of "allowance" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as

Source file

MasterChef.sol

```
779 * @dev See {BEP20-allowance}.
780
     function allowance(address owner, address spender) public override view returns (uint256) {
781
     return _allowances[owner][spender];
782
783
784
     /**
```

The function definition of "approve" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as

SWC-000

Source file MasterChef.sol

Locations

```
790 | * - 'spender' cannot be the zero address.
791
  792
793
794
795
  }
796
797
```

MEDIUM Function could be marked as external.

SWC-000

The function definition of "transferFrom" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead.

Source file

MasterChef.sol

Locations

```
808
     function transferFrom (address sender, address recipient, uint256 amount) public override returns (bool) {
     _transfer(sender, recipient, amount);
810
811
812
813
     _allowances[sender][_msgSender()].sub(amount, 'BEP20: transfer amount exceeds allowance')
815
816
     return true;
817
     }
818
819
```

MEDIUM Function could be marked as external.

SWC-000

The function definition of "increaseAllowance" is marked "publio". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead.

Source file

MasterChef.sol

```
829 | * - 'spender' cannot be the zero address.
830
  831
832
  return true;
833
834
835
836
```

SWC-000

The function definition of "decreaseAllowance" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead.

Source file

MasterChef.sol

Locations

```
848 | * `subtractedValue`
849
 850
851
853
 }
854
855
```

MEDIUM Function could be marked as external.

SWC-000

The function definition of "mint" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead.

Source file

MasterChef.sol

Locations

```
\star - 'msg.sender' must be the token owner
862
      function \ mint(uint256 \ amount) \ public \ onlyOwner \ returns \ (bool) \ \{
864
      return true;
865
866
867
868
```

MEDIUM Function could be marked as external.

SWC-000

The function definition of "mint" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead.

Source file

MasterChef.sol

```
965 | contract GragasToken is BEP20('GragasFinance', 'GRAGAS') {
    /// @notice Creates `_amount` token to `_to`. Must only be called by the owner (MasterChef).
966
    967
968
969
970
971
    // Copied and modified from YAM code:
```

MEDIUM

Function could be marked as external.

SWC-000

The function definition of "add" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead.

Source file

```
MasterChef.sol
```

```
// Add a new lp to the pool. Can only be called by the owner.
1285
      // XXX DO NOT add the same LP token more than once. Rewards will be messed up if you do.
1286
      function add(uint256 _allocPoint, IBEP20 _lpToken, uint16 _depositFeeBP, bool _withUpdate) public onlyOwner
      require(_depositFeeBP <= 10000, "add: invalid deposit fee basis points");</pre>
1288
      if (_withUpdate) {
1290
1291
      uint256 lastRewardBlock = block number > startBlock ? block number : startBlock;
1292
      totalAllocPoint = totalAllocPoint add(_allocPoint);
1293
      poolInfo.push(PoolInfo(
1294
      lpToken: _lpToken,
1295
      allocPoint: _allocPoint,
1296
      lastRewardBlock: lastRewardBlock,
1297
      accGragasPerShare: 0,
      depositFeeBP: _depositFeeBP
1299
1300
1301
1302
      // Update the given pool's GRAGAS allocation point and deposit fee. Can only be called by the owner.
```

MEDIUM

Function could be marked as external.

SWC-000

The function definition of "set" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead.

Source file MasterChef.sol

```
1302
      // Update the given pool's GRAGAS allocation point and deposit fee. Can only be called by the owner.
1303
      function_set(uint256 _pid, uint256 _allocPoint, uint16 _depositFeeBP, bool _withUpdate) public onlyOwner {
1304
      require(_depositFeeBP <= 10000, "set: invalid deposit fee basis points");</pre>
1305
      if (_withUpdate) {
1306
1307
1308
      totalAllocPoint = totalAllocPoint.sub(poolInfo[_pid].allocPoint).add(_allocPoint).
1309
      poolInfo[_pid].allocPoint = _allocPoint;
1310
      poolInfo[_pid] depositFeeBP = _depositFeeBP:
1311
1312
      // Return reward multiplier over the given _from to _to block.
1314
```

The function definition of "deposit" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead.

SWC-000

Source file MasterChef.sol

```
1359
      // Deposit LP tokens to MasterChef for GRAGAS allocation.
1360
1361
      function deposit(uint256 _pid, uint256 _amount) public {
      PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[_pid];
1362
      UserInfo storage user = userInfo[_pid][msg.sender];
1363
      updatePool(_pid);
1364
      if (user.amount > 0) {
1365
      uint256 pending = user.amount.mul(pool.accGragasPerShare).div(1e12).sub(user.rewardDebt);
1366
      if(pending > 0) {
1367
      safeGragasTransfer(msg.sender, pending);
1368
1369
1370
      if(_amount > 0) {
1371
      pool.lpToken.safeTransferFrom(address(msg.sender), address(this), _amount);
      if(pool depositFeeBP > 0){
1373
     uint256 depositFee = _amount mul(pool depositFeeBP .div(10000)
1374
      pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(feeAddress, depositFee);
1375
      user.amount = user.amount.add(_amount).sub(depositFee);
1376
1377
      user.amount = user.amount.add(_amount);
1378
1379
1380
      user rewardDebt = user amount.mul(pool accGragasPerShare).div(1e12);
1381
      emit Deposit(msg.sender, _pid, _amount);
1382
1383
1384
      // Withdraw LP tokens from MasterChef.
1385
```

SWC-000

The function definition of "withdraw" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead.

Source file

MasterChef.sol

Locations

```
1384
      // Withdraw LP tokens from MasterChef.
1385
1386
      function withdraw(uint256 _pid, uint256 _amount) public {
      PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[_pid];
1387
      UserInfo storage user = userInfo[_pid][msg sender];
1388
      require(user amount >= _amount, "withdraw: not good");
1389
1390
             Pool(_pid);
      uint256 pending = user amount.mul(pool accGragasPerShare).div(1e12).sub(user.rewardDebt);
1391
      if(pending > 0) {
1392
      safeGragasTransfer(msg.sender, pending);
1393
1394
      if(_amount > 0) {
1395
      user.amount = user.amount.sub(_amount);
1396
1397
1398
      user rewardDebt = user amount.mul(pool accGragasPerShare).div(1e12);
1399
      emit Withdraw(msg.sender, _pid, _amount);
1400
1401
      // Withdraw without caring about rewards. EMERGENCY ONLY.
1403
```

MEDIUM

Function could be marked as external.

SWC-000

The function definition of "emergencyWithdraw" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead.

Source file

MasterChef.sol

```
1402
     \label{thm:caring} \ensuremath{\text{// Withdraw without caring about rewards. EMERGENCY ONLY.}}
1403
      function emergencyWithdraw(uint256 _pid) public {
1404
     PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[_pid];
1405
      UserInfo storage user = userInfo[_pid][msg sender];
1406
     uint256 amount = user.amount;
1497
     user.amount = 0;
     user.rewardDebt = 0;
1409
     1410
1411
1412
1413
     // Safe gragas transfer function, just in case if rounding error causes pool to not have enough GRAGASs.
1414
```

SWC-000

The function definition of "dev" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as

Source file

MasterChef.sol

Locations

```
1423
      // Update dev address by the previous dev.
1424
      function dev(address _devaddr) public {
      require(msg_sender == devaddr, "dev: wut?");
1426
1428
1429
     function setFeeAddress(address _feeAddress) public{
1430
```

MEDIUM Function could be marked as external.

SWC-000

The function definition of "setFeeAddress" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead.

Source file

MasterChef.sol

Locations

```
1429
      function setFeeAddress(address _feeAddress) public{
1430
      require(msg sender == feeAddress, "setFeeAddress: FORBIDDEN");
1431
      feeAddress = _feeAddress;
1432
1433
1434
      //Pancake has to add hidden dummy pools inorder to alter the emission, here we make it simple and transparent to all.
```

MEDIUM Function could be marked as external.

The function definition of "updateEmissionRate" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to SWC-000 mark it as "external" instead.

Source file

MasterChef.sol

```
1434
      //Pancake has to add hidden dummy pools inorder to alter the emission, here we make it simple and transparent to all.
1435
      function updateEmissionRate(uint256 _gragasPerBlock | public onlyOwner _
1436
1437
      gragasPerBlock = _gragasPerBlock
1438
1439
1440
```

MEDIUM

Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.

SWC-113

This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).

Source file

MasterChef.sol

Locations

```
428
429 // solhint-disable-next-line avoid-low-level-calls
430 (bool success, bytes memory returndata) = target call value value (data);
431 return _verifyCallResult(success, returndata, errorMessage);
432 }
```

MEDIUM

Loop over unbounded data structure.

SWC-128

Gas consumption in function "massUpdatePools" in contract "MasterChef" depends on the size of data structures or values that may grow unboundedly. If the data structure grows too large, the gas required to execute the code will exceed the block gas limit, effectively causing a denial-of-service condition. Consider that an attacker might attempt to cause this condition on purpose.

Source file

MasterChef.sol

Locations

```
function massUpdatePools() public {

uint256 length = poolInfo.length;

for (uint256 pid = 0; pid < length; ++pid) {

updatePool(pid);

}
```

LOW

A floating pragma is set.

SWC-103

The current pragma Solidity directive is "">=0.6.0<0.8.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

Source file

MasterChef.sol

```
5  // File: contracts\libs\SafeMath.sol
6
7  pragma solidity >= 0.6.0 < 0.8.0
8
9  /**</pre>
```

A floating pragma is set.

SWC-103

The current pragma Solidity directive is "">=0.6.4"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

Source file

MasterChef.sol

Locations

LOW SWC-103

A floating pragma is set.

The current pragma Solidity directive is "">=0.6.2<0.8.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

Source file

MasterChef.sol

Locations

LOW

A floating pragma is set.

The current pragma Solidity directive is "">=0.6.0<0.8.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

SWC-103

Source file
MasterChef.sol

```
502  // File: contracts\libs\SafeBEP20.sol
503
504  pragma solidity >=0.6.0 <0.8.0
505
506  /**</pre>
```

A floating pragma is set.

SWC-103

The current pragma Solidity directive is "">=0.6.0<0.8.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

Source file

MasterChef.sol

Locations

LOW SWC-103

A floating pragma is set.

The current pragma Solidity directive is "">=0.6.0<0.8.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

Source file

MasterChef.sol

Locations

```
// File: contracts\libs\Ownable.sol

pragma solidity >= 8.6.0 < 8.8.0

/**

* @dev Contract module which provides a basic access control mechanism, where
```

LOW

A floating pragma is set.

SWC-103

The current pragma Solidity directive is "">=0.4.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

Source file

MasterChef.sol

Read of persistent state following external call.

SWC-107

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file

MasterChef.sol

Locations

```
if(_amount > 0) {
    pool.lpToken.safeTransferFrom(address(msg.sender), address(this), _amount);
    if(pool.depositFeeBP > 0){
        uint256 depositFee = _amount.mul(pool.depositFeeBP).div(10000);
    pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(feeAddress, depositFee);
}
```

LOW

Read of persistent state following external call.

SWC-107

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file

MasterChef.sol

Locations

LOW

Write to persistent state following external call.

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

SWC-107

Source file
MasterChef.sol

```
1376     user.amount = user.amount.add(_amount).sub(depositFee);
1377     }else{
1378     user.amount = user.amount.add(_amount);
1379     }
1380 }
```

Read of persistent state following external call.

SWC-107

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file

MasterChef.sol

Locations

LOW

Read of persistent state following external call.

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

SWC-107

Source file
MasterChef.sol

Locations

```
1379 }
1380 }
1381 user.rewardDebt = user amount mul(pool.accGragasPerShare).div(1e12);
1382 emit Deposit(msg.sender, _pid, _amount);
1383 }
```

LOW

Write to persistent state following external call.

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

SWC-107

Source file
MasterChef.sol

```
1379 | }
1380 | }
1381 | user rewardDebt = user amount mulipool accGragasPerShare | div/le12 |;
1382 | emit Deposit(msg.sender, _pid, _amount);
1383 | }
```

Read of persistent state following external call.

SWC-107

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file

MasterChef.sol

Locations

```
pool.lpToken.safeTransferFrom(address(msg.sender), address(this), _amount);
1372
      \hspace{0.1cm} \textbf{if}(\texttt{pool.depositFeeBP} > \textbf{0}) \{
1373
1374
      uint256 depositFee = _amount.mul(pool_depositFeeBP).div(10000);
      pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(feeAddress, depositFee);
1375
      user.amount = user.amount.add(_amount).sub(depositFee);
```

LOW

Read of persistent state following external call.

SWC-107

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file

MasterChef.sol

Locations

```
1373 | if(pool.depositFeeBP > 0){
      uint256 depositFee = _amount.mul(pool.depositFeeBP).div(10000);
     pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(feeAddress, depositFee);
1375
1376
     user.amount = user.amount.add(_amount).sub(depositFee);
     }else{
1377
```

LOW

Read of persistent state following external call.

SWC-107

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file

MasterChef.sol

```
1373 | if(pool.depositFeeBP > 0){
     uint256 depositFee = _amount.mul(pool.depositFeeBP).div(10000);
1374
      pool lpToken.safeTransfer(feeAddress, depositFee);
     user.amount = user.amount.add(_amount).sub(depositFee);
1376
1377
      }else{
```

Read of persistent state following external call.

SWC-107

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file

MasterChef.sol

Locations

```
424 */
425 function functionCallWithValue(address target, bytes memory data, uint256 value, string memory errorMessage) internal returns (bytes memory) {
426 require(address this) balance >= value, "Address: insufficient balance for call");
427 require(isContract(target), "Address: call to non-contract");
428
```

LOW

Read of persistent state following external call.

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

SWC-107

Source file MasterChef.sol

Locations

```
uint256 depositFee = _amount.mul(pool.depositFeeBP).div(10000);

pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(feeAddress, depositFee);

user.amount = user amount.add(_amount).sub(depositFee);

}

selse{

user.amount = user.amount.add(_amount);
```

LOW

Write to persistent state following external call.

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

SWC-107

Source file
MasterChef.sol

```
uint256 depositFee = _amount.mul(pool.depositFeeBP).div(10000);

pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(feeAddress, depositFee);

user amount = user amount addf_amount = subr depositFee ;

}else{

user.amount = user.amount.add(_amount);
```

Read of persistent state following external call.

SWC-107

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file

MasterChef.sol

Locations

```
pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(address(msg.sender), _amount);
1397
1398
      user.rewardDebt = user.amount.mul(pool.accGragasPerShare).div(1e12);
      emit Withdraw(msg.sender, _pid, _amount);
1400
```

LOW

Read of persistent state following external call.

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

SWC-107

Source file

MasterChef.sol

Locations

```
1397 | pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(address(msg.sender), _amount);
      user.rewardDebt = user.amount.mul(pool.accGragasPerShare).div(1e12);
1399
      emit Withdraw(msg.sender, _pid, _amount);
1401
```

LOW

Write to persistent state following external call.

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

SWC-107

Source file MasterChef.sol

```
1397 | pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(address(msg.sender), _amount);
1398
      user rewardDebt = user amount.mul(pool.accGragasPerShare).div(1e12);
      emit Withdraw(msg.sender, _pid, _amount);
1400
1401
```

Potential use of "block.number" as source of randonmness.

SWC-120

The environment variable "block.number" looks like it might be used as a source of randomness. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

Source file

MasterChef.sol

Locations

```
returns (uint256)

{

require(blockNumber < block number, "GRAGAS::getPriorVotes: not yet determined");

uint32 nCheckpoints = numCheckpoints[account];
```

LOW

Potential use of "block.number" as source of randonmness.

SWC-120

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Source file

MasterChef.sol

Locations

```
internal
{
uint32 blockNumber = safe32(block number, "GRAGAS::_writeCheckpoint: block number exceeds 32 bits");

if (nCheckpoints > 0 85 checkpoints[delegatee][nCheckpoints - 1].fromBlock == blockNumber) {
```

LOW

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SWC-120

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Source file

MasterChef.sol

```
1290    massUpdatePools();
1291
1292    uint256 lastRewardBlock = block number > startBlock ? block.number : startBlock;
1293    totalAllocPoint = totalAllocPoint.add(_allocPoint);
1294    poolInfo.push(PoolInfo({
```

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Source file

```
MasterChef.sol
```

```
1290    massUpdatePools();
1291  }
1292    uint256 lastRewardBlock = block.number > startBlock ? block number : startBlock;
1293    totalAllocPoint = totalAllocPoint.add(_allocPoint);
1294    poolInfo.push(PoolInfo({
```

LOW

Potential use of "block.number" as source of randonmness.

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Source file MasterChef.sol Locations

```
uint256 accGragasPerShare = pool.accGragasPerShare;
uint256 lpSupply = pool.lpToken.balanceOf(address(this));
if (block number > pool.lastRewardBlock 88 lpSupply != 0) {
uint256 multiplier = getMultiplier(pool.lastRewardBlock, block.number);
uint256 gragasReward = multiplier.mul(gragasPerBlock).mul(pool.allocPoint).div(totalAllocPoint);
```

LOW

Potential use of "block.number" as source of randonmness.

SWC-120

The environment variable "block.number" looks like it might be used as a source of randomness. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

Source file MasterChef.sol

```
Locations
```

```
uint256 lpSupply = pool.lpToken.balanceOf(address(this));

if (block.number > pool.lastRewardBlock & lpSupply != 0) {

uint256 multiplier = getMultiplier(pool.lastRewardBlock, block number);

uint256 gragasReward = multiplier.mul(gragasPerBlock).mul(pool.allocPoint).div(totalAllocPoint);

accGragasPerShare = accGragasPerShare.add(gragasReward.mul(1e12).div(lpSupply));
```

Potential use of "block.number" as source of randonmness.

SWC-120

The environment variable "block.number" looks like it might be used as a source of randomness. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

Source file

MasterChef.sol

Locations

```
function updatePool(uint256 _pid) public {
PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[_pid];
if (block number <= pool.lastRewardBlock) {
return;
}
```

LOW

Potential use of "block.number" as source of randonmness.

SWC-120

The environment variable "block.number" looks like it might be used as a source of randomness. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

Source file

MasterChef.sol Locations

```
uint256 lpSupply = pool.lpToken.balanceOf(address(this));

if (lpSupply == 0 || pool.allocPoint == 0) {
    pool.lastRewardBlock = block number;

return;
}
```

LOW

Potential use of "block.number" as source of randonmness.

SWC-120

The environment variable "block.number" looks like it might be used as a source of randomness. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

Source file

MasterChef.sol

Potential use of "block.number" as source of randonmness.

SWC-120

The environment variable "block number" looks like it might be used as a source of randomness. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

Source file
MasterChef.sol
Locations

```
gragas.mint(address(this), gragasReward);
pool.accGragasPerShare = pool.accGragasPerShare.add(gragasReward.mul(1e12).div(lpSupply));
pool.lastRewardBlock = block.number;
}

358
}
```

LOW Requirement violation.

A requirement was violated in a nested call and the call was reverted as a result. Make sure valid inputs are provided to the nested call (for instance, via passed arguments).

SWC-123

Source file
MasterChef.sol

Source file MasterChef.sol

```
Locations
      1211
              // Have fun reading it. Hopefully it's bug-free. God bless.
              contract MasterChef is Ownable {
       1213
             using SafeMath for uint256;
       1214
              using SafeBEP20 for IBEP20;
       1215
       1216
              // Info of each user.
             struct UserInfo {
       1218
              uint256 amount; // How many LP tokens the user has provi
       1219
              uint256 rewardDebt; // Reward debt. See explanation below.
       1220
              \ensuremath{\text{//}} We do some fancy math here. Basically, any point in time, the amount of GRAGASs
       1222
              // entitled to a user but is pending to be distributed is:
       1224
              // pending reward = (user.amount * pool.accGragasPerShare) - user.rewardDebt
       1226
              // Whenever a user deposits or withdraws LP tokens to a pool. Here's what happens:

    The pool's 'accGragasPerShare' (and 'lastRewardBlock') gets updated.
    User receives the pending reward sent to his/her address.

       1228
       1229
              // 3. User's 'amount' gets updated.
// 4. User's 'rewardDebt' gets updated.
       1230
       1231
       1232
       1233
              // Info of each pool.
       1234
       1235
              IBEP20 lpToken, // Address of LP token contract.
       1236
              uint256 allocPoint // How many allocation points assigned to this pool. GRAGASs to distribute per block, uint256 lastRewardBlock; // Last block number that GRAGASs distribution occurs.
       1238
              uint256 accGragasPerShare, // Accumulated GRAGASs per share, times 1e12. See below.
       1239
              uint16 depositFeeBP; // Deposit fee in basis points
       1240
       1241
       1242
              // The GRAGAS TOKEN!
       1243
              GragasToken public gragas;
       1244
       1245
                 dress <mark>public devaddr</mark>;
       1246
       1247
              uint256 public gragasPerBlock;
       1248
              // Bonus muliplier for early gragas makers.
       1249
              uint256 public constant BONUS_MULTIPLIER = 1;
       1250
              // Deposit Fee address
       1252
              address public feeAddress;
             // Info of each pool.
       1254
              PoolInfo[] public poolInfo;
       1255
```

```
1256
         Info of each user that stakes LP tokens.
      mapping (uint256 | > mapping (address | > UserInfo)) public userInfo
1258
       // Total allocation points. Must be the sum of all allocation points in all pools.
1259
      uint256 public totalAllocPoint = 0;
         The block number when GRAGAS mining starts.
1260
      uint256 public startBlock;
1261
1262
      event Deposit(address indexed user, uint256 indexed pid. uint256 amount)
event Withdraw(address indexed user, uint256 indexed pid, uint256 amount)
1263
1264
1265
                   encyWithdraw(address indexed user, uint256 indexed pid, uint256 amount);
1266
1267
      constructor(
      GragasToken _gragas,
1268
1269
      address _feeAddress
1270
      uint256 _gragasPerBlock,
1272
      uint256 _startBlock
1274
      gragas = _gragas;
1275
      devaddr = _devaddr;
1276
      feeAddress = _feeAddress;
      gragasPerBlock = _gragasPerBlock;
      startBlock = _startBlock;
1279
1280
      function poolLength() external view returns (uint256) {
1281
      return poolInfo.length;
1282
1283
1284
1285
      \ensuremath{//} Add a new lp to the pool. Can only be called by the owner.
1286
      // XXX DO NOT add the same LP token more than once. Rewards will be messed up if you do.
       function_add(uint256_allocPoint_IBEP20_lpToken, uint16_depositFeeBP, bool_withUpdate; public_onlyOwner (
1287
1288
      require(_depositFeeBP <= 10000, "add: invalid deposit fee basis points");</pre>
1289
      if (_withUpdate) {
1290
1291
1292
      uint256 lastRewardBlock = block.number > startBlock ? block.number : startBlock;
1293
      totalAllocPoint = totalAllocPoint.add(_allocPoint);
      poolInfo.push(PoolInfo({
1294
1295
      lpToken: _lpToken,
      allocPoint: _allocPoint,
1296
1297
      lastRewardBlock: lastRewardBlock,
1298
      accGragasPerShare: 0,
1299
      depositFeeBP: _depositFeeBP
1300
1301
1302
      // Update the given pool's GRAGAS allocation point and deposit fee. Can only be called by the owner
1303
1304
      function set(uint256 _pid, uint256 _allocPoint, uint16 _depositFeeBP, bool _withUpdate) public onlyOwner {
      require(_depositFeeBP <= 10000, "set: invalid deposit fee basis points</pre>
1305
      if (_withUpdate) {
1306
1307
1308
      totalAllocPoint = totalAllocPoint.sub(poolInfo[_pid].allocPoint).add(_allocPoint);
1309
1310
      poolInfo[_pid].allocPoint = _allocPoint;
      poolInfo[_pid] depositFeeBP = _depositFeeBP;
1313
      // Return reward multiplier over the given _from to _to block.
1314
      function getMultiplier(uint256 _from, uint256 _to) public view returns (uint256) {
      return _to.sub(_from).mul(BONUS_MULTIPLIER);
1316
1317
1318
```

```
// View function to see pending GRAGASs on frontend.
function pendingGragas(uint256 _pid, address _user) external view returns (uint256) {
1319
1320
1321
       PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[_pid];
1322
       UserInfo storage user = userInfo[_pid][_user];
       uint256 accGragasPerShare = pool accGragasPerShare;
       uint256 lpSupply = pool.lpToken.balanceOf(address(this));
       if (block number > pool lastRewardBlock && lpSupply != 0) {
1326
       uint256 multiplier = getMultiplier(pool lastRewardBlock, block number);
1327
             56 gragasReward = multiplier.mul(gragasPerBlock).mul(pool.allocPoint).div(totalAllocPoint);
1328
       accGragasPerShare = accGragasPerShare.add(gragasReward_mul(1e12).div(lpSupply));
1329
1330
       return user.amount.mul(accGragasPerShare).div(1e12).sub(user.rewardDebt);
1331
1333
       // Update reward variables for all pools. Be careful of gas spending!
function massUpdatePools() public {
1334
1335
       uint256 length = poolInfo length;
1336
       for (uint256 pid = 0; pid < length; ++pid) {</pre>
1337
             ePool(pid);
1338
1339
1340
       // Update reward variables of the given pool to be up-to-date.
1341
       function updatePool(uint256 _pid) public {
1342
1343
       PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[_pid];
1344
       if (block.number <= pool.lastRewardBlock) {</pre>
1345
1346
1347
       uint256 lpSupply = pool.lpToken.balanceOf(address(this));
1348
       if (lpSupply == 0 || pool allocPoint == 0) {
1349
       pool,lastRewardBlock = block.number;
1350
1351
       uint256 multiplier = getMultiplier(pool lastRewardBlock, block.number);
1352
1353
       uint256 gragasReward = multiplier.mul(gragasPerBlock).mul(pool.allocPoint).div(totalAllocPoint);
1354
       gragas.mint(devaddr, gragasReward.div(10));
1355
                   :(address(this), gragasReward);
1356
       pool accGragasPerShare = pool accGragasPerShare add(gragasReward mul(1e12).div(lpSupply));
1357
       pool.lastRewardBlock = block.number;
1358
1359
       // Deposit LP tokens to MasterChef for GRAGAS allocation.
function deposit(uint256 _pid uint256 _amount) public
1360
1361
1362
       PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[_pid];
1363
      UserInfo storage user = userInfo[_pid][msg.sender];
1364
          datePool(_pid);
1365
       if (user.amount > 0) {
       uint256 pending = user.amount.mul(pool accGragasPerShare).div(1e12).sub(user.rewardDebt);
1366
       if(pending > 0) {
1368
       safeGragasTransfer(msg.sender, pending);
1369
1370
1371
      if(_amount > 0) {
1372
      {\color{blue} \textbf{pool.lpToken}.safeTransferFrom(address(\textbf{msg}\ \textbf{sender}),\ address(\textbf{this}),\ \underline{-}\textbf{amount}),}
       if(pool depositFeeBP > 0){
       uint256 depositFee = _amount.mul(pool depositFeeBP).div(10000);
1375
       pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(feeAddress, depositFee);
1376
       user.amount = user.amount.add(_amount).sub(depositFee);
1377
       user.amount = user.amount.add(_amount);
1379
1380
      user.rewardDebt = user.amount.mul(pool.accGragasPerShare).div(1e12);
```

```
1382
       emit Deposit(msg.sender, _pid, _amount);
1383
1384
1385
       // Withdraw LP tokens from MasterChef.
       function_withdraw(uint256 _pid, uint256 _amount) public {
1386
1387
       PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[_pid];
1388
       UserInfo storage user = userInfo[_pid][msg.sender];
1389
       require(user.amount >= _amount, "withdraw: not good");
1390
1391
       uint256 pending = user.amount.mul(pool.accGragasPerShare).div(1e12).sub(user.rewardDebt);
1392
       if(pending > 0) {
1393
       safeGragasTransfer(msg.sender, pending);
1394
1395
       user amount = user amount sub(_amount);
pool lpToken safeTransfer(address(msg sender), _amount ;
1396
1397
1398
1399
       user.rewardDebt = user amount.mul(pool accGragasPerShare).div(1e12);
1400
       emit Withdraw(msg.sender, _pid, _amount);
1401
1402
       // Withdraw without caring about rewards, EMERGENCY ONLY,
function emergencyWithdraw(uint256 _pid, public
1403
1404
1405
       PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[_pid];
1406
       UserInfo storage user = userInfo[_pid][msg.sender];
1407
       uint256 amount = user.amount;
1408
1409
       user.rewardDebt = 0;
       1411
1412
1413
      // Safe gragas transfer function, just in case if rounding error causes pool to not have enough GRAGASs.
function safeGragasTransfer(address _to _uint256 _amount) internal {
uint256 _gragasBal = gragas.balanceOf(address(this));
1414
1415
1416
       if (_amount > gragasBal) {
1418
       gragas.transfer(_to, gragasBal);
       } else {
1420
       gragas.transfer(_to, _amount);
1421
1422
1423
       // Update dev address by the previous dev.
function dev(address _devaddr) public [
1424
1425
       require(msg_sender == devaddr, "dev: wut?");
1427
       devaddr = _devaddr;
1428
1429
1430
       function setFeeAddress(address _feeAddress) public(
1431
       require(msg.sender == feeAddress, "setFeeAddress: FORBIDDEN");
1432
       feeAddress = _feeAddress;
1433
1434
       //Pancake has to add hidden dummy pools inorder to alter the emission, here we make it simple and transparent to all, function updateEmissionRate(uint256 _gragasPerBlock) public onlyOwner
1436
1437
1438
       gragasPerBlock = _gragasPerBlock;
1439
1440
```

Potentially unbounded data structure passed to builtin.

SWC-128

Gas consumption in function "delegateBySig" in contract "GragasToken" depends on the size of data structures that may grow unboundedly. Specifically the "1-st" argument to builtin "keccak256" may be able to grow unboundedly causing the builtin to consume more gas than the block gas limit, effectively causing a denial-of-service condition.Consider that an attacker might attempt to cause this condition on purpose.

Source file

```
MasterChef.sol
Locations
```

```
1048
       abi.encode(
       DOMAIN_TYPEHASH,
1049
1050
       getChainId(),
1051
       \mathsf{address}(\mathsf{this})
```

LOW

Loop over unbounded data structure.

SWC-128

Gas consumption in function "getPriorVotes" in contract "GragasToken" depends on the size of data structures or values that may grow unboundedly. If the data structure grows too large, the gas required to execute the code will exceed the block gas limit, effectively causing a denial-of-service condition. Consider that an attacker might attempt to cause this

Source file

MasterChef.sol Locations

```
1123 | uint32 lower = 0;
1124
      uint32 upper = nCheckpoints - 1;
     while (upper > lower) {
1125
     uint32 center = upper - (upper - lower) / 2; // ceil, avoiding overflow
     Checkpoint memory cp = checkpoints[account][center];
```