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PROBLEM SET 5
Due on Friday, Apr 29.

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Id: 190791

Instructions:

- Make sure you are working on your problem set as each problem set is different.
- The answers to the questions of this problem set are to be given exclusively in the answer sheet
- The answers sheet **MUST** be printed and not photocopied. Photocopies will not be accepted.
- Questions marked with the symbol ♣ admit more than one correct answer
- Please fill the boxes in the answer sheet completely using a **black pen** as follows

Question 1:  ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E

- The answer sheet must not be creased or folded otherwise your problem set won't be graded.
- You can hand back your problem set at the **END** of class on **Friday, April 29th**.



With a sample of 706 observations, we estimate the following model:

$$\ln(hwage_i) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 age_i + \beta_2 age_i^2 + \beta_3 educ_i + \beta_4 yngkid_i + u_i$$

and obtain these results:

$$\ln(hwage_i) = \underset{0.41175}{-1.00179} + \underset{0.01941}{0.07121}age_i - \underset{0.00024}{0.00076}age_i^2 + \underset{0.01116}{0.07131}educ_i + \underset{0.07006}{0.09439}yngkid_i$$

where $\ln(hwage)$ is the logarithm of the hourly wage in euro, age is measured in years, $educ$ is years of education and $yngkid$ is a variable equal to 1 in case the person has a child younger than three years.

Question 1 What is the interpretation of β_2 ?

- ☐ A Increasing the square of age by one year, the hourly wage decreases by 0.077% on average, ceteris paribus.
- ☐ B Increasing the square of age by one year, the hourly wage decreases by 0.00077 euros on average, ceteris paribus.
- ☐ C Increasing age by one year, the hourly wage decreases by 0.077% on average, ceteris paribus.
- ☐ D By itself does not have a proper interpretation.

Question 2 What is the interpretation of β_4 ?

- ☐ A If a person has one small kid more, he/she earns about 0.095 more per hour with respect to someone who does not have small kids, ceteris paribus.
- ☐ B If a person has one small kid more, he/she earns about 9.5% more per hour with respect to someone who does not have small kids, ceteris paribus.
- ☐ C If a person has small kids (< 3 years old), he/she earns about 0.095 euros more per hour with respect to someone who does not have small kids, ceteris paribus.
- ☐ D If a person has small kids (< 3 years old), he/she earns about 9.5% more per hour with respect to someone who does not have small kids, ceteris paribus.

Question 3 What is our null hypothesis when we test whether β_1 and β_2 are jointly significant?

- ☐ A We check whether the logarithm of hourly wage is 0 when age is equal to 0.
- ☐ B We check whether the relationship between the logarithm of hourly wage and age is convex or concave.
- ☐ C We check whether the logarithm of hourly wage depends on age.
- ☐ D We check whether the logarithm of hourly wage depends linearly on age.

Question 4 What are we testing when we check whether β_2 is significant?

- ☐ A We check whether the logarithm of hourly wage depends positively on age.
- ☐ B We check whether the logarithm of hourly wage depends negatively on age.
- ☐ C We check whether the logarithm of hourly wage depends linearly on age.
- ☐ D We check whether the logarithm of hourly wage depends on age.

Question 5 Keeping other variables fixed, at what age the logarithm of hourly wage is maximized?

- ☐ A At about 93.3 years.
- ☐ B At about 46.7 years.
- ☐ C At about 56.3 years.
- ☐ D At about 0, but this makes no sense.



Question 6 Using a subset of the variables in the previous model, we would like to write a new one such that we obtain the elasticity of the hourly wage to education, and that, given an increase of one year in age, it returns a change in hourly wage in percent points. Choose the correct model among these:

- ☐ A $\ln(hwage_i) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 age + \ln(\beta_2 educ_i) + u_i$
- ☐ B $\ln(hwage_i) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln(age_i) + \beta_2 educ_i + u_i$
- ☐ C $hwage_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 age_i + \beta_2 \ln(educ_i) + u_i$
- ☐ D $hwage_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln(age_i) + \beta_2 educ_i + u_i$
- ☐ E $\ln(hwage_i) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 age_i + \beta_2 \ln(educ_i) + u_i$

Let us define with Y the amount of cholesterol in mlg in the blood and with Med a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for medication B and 0 for medication A, where A and B are two different medications that lower cholesterol. Female is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for females and 0 otherwise.

Consider the following regression:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \times med + \beta_2 \times female + \beta_3 \times med \times female + u$$

Question 7 What is the average cholesterol value for men when using medication B?

- ☐ A $\beta_1 + \beta_3$
- ☐ B None of the others.
- ☐ C β_0
- ☐ D β_3
- ☐ E $\beta_0 + \beta_1$
- ☐ F β_1

Question 8 Suppose you use this model: $Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \times med + \beta_2 \times female + u$ In this case, what is the effect of medication B for men and women, respectively?

- ☐ A $\beta_0 + \beta_1$ and $\beta_0 + \beta_1 + \beta_2$.
- ☐ B β_1 for both genders.
- ☐ C β_1 and $\beta_1 + \beta_2$.
- ☐ D None of the others.
- ☐ E $\beta_1 - \beta_0$ for both genders.



These data are taken from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey survey conducted in 1996. These data were provided by Professor Harvey Rosen of Princeton University and were used in his paper with Craig Perry "The Self-Employed Are Less Likely Than Wage-Earners to Have Health Insurance. So What?" in Douglas Holtz-Eakin and Harvey S. Rosen, eds., *Entrepreneurship and Public Policy*, MIT Press 2004.

Among the variables in the dataset, **ins** is a dummy equal to one if the interviewee has the insurance; **selfemp** is equal to one if the interviewee is a self-employed workers; **gender** is equal to one if the individual is a male; **married** is one if the individual is married; **health** is one if the individual reports to be in good health; **educ** is 0 if the person has no education, 1 if he/she achieved middle school diploma, 2 for the high school diploma, 3 for the bachelor degree, 4 for the master degree and 5 for the PhD; **age** is in years and **age2** is the square of age.

We estimate two models:

$$\begin{aligned} Pr(ins = 1|X) = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \times selfemp + \beta_2 \times married + \beta_3 \times gender + \beta_4 \times health \\ & + \beta_5 \times gender * health + \beta_6 \times educ + \beta_7 \times age + \beta_8 \times age^2 \end{aligned}$$

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
(Intercept)	0.2974634	0.0580248	5.13	0.0000003
selfemp	-0.1742361	0.0141740	-12.29	< 2e-16
married	0.1181062	0.0094187	12.54	< 2e-16
gender	-0.0232270	0.0343575	-0.68	0.49903
health	0.0744310	0.0247243	3.01	0.00262
genderxhealth	-0.0206248	0.0353131	-0.58	0.55920
educ	0.0529807	0.0029210	18.14	< 2e-16
age	0.0105315	0.0027482	3.83	0.00013
age2	-0.0000788	0.0000333	-2.37	0.01796

Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors used

$$\begin{aligned} Pr(ins = 1|X) = & \Phi(\beta_0 + \beta_1 \times selfemp + \beta_2 \times married + \beta_3 \times gender + \beta_4 \times health \\ & + \beta_5 \times gender * health + \beta_6 \times educ + \beta_7 \times age + \beta_8 \times age^2) \quad (II) \end{aligned}$$

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(> z)
(Intercept)	-0.844932	0.195991	-4.31	0.000016
selfemp	-0.651923	0.046842	-13.92	< 2e-16
married	0.455241	0.034845	13.06	< 2e-16
gender	-0.040238	0.111653	-0.36	0.71856
health	0.300503	0.082988	3.62	0.00029
genderxhealth	-0.124880	0.116613	-1.07	0.28422
education	0.226139	0.012852	17.60	< 2e-16
age	0.029150	0.009899	2.94	0.00323
age2	-0.000162	0.000126	-1.29	0.19821

Question 9

Under model (I), what is the effect of being in good health on the probability of having an insurance, for men and women respectively?

- ☐ A 7.44% for women, 5.38% for men.
- ☐ B 7.44% for men, 5.38% for women.
- ☐ C 7.44% for women, -2,06% for men.
- ☐ D 7.44% for men, -2,06% for women.



Question 10 What is the interpretation of β_1 in model (1)?

- ☐ A On average, increasing selfemp by one decreases the probability to have an insurance of 17.4%, *ceteris paribus*.
- ☐ B On average, self employed individuals are 17.4% more likely than other workers to have an insurance, controlling for all other factors.
- ☐ C On average, increasing selfemp by one increases the probability to have an insurance of 17.4%, *ceteris paribus*.
- ☐ D On average, self employed individuals are 17.4% less likely than other workers to have an insurance, controlling for all other factors.



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- Answers must be given exclusively on this sheet: answers given on the other sheets will be ignored.
 - **This sheet MUST be printed out and not photocopied. Photocopies will not be accepted.**
 - Please fill the boxes below completely using a **black pen**.
 - Do not crease or fold.
 - You can hand back your problem set by putting it into my mailbox on the fifth floor of the viale Romania campus by noon of Friday, March 25 at noon.
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Question 1: ☐ A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D

Question 2: ☐ A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D

Question 3: ☐ A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D

Question 4: ☐ A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D

Question 5: ☐ A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D

Question 6: ☐ A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E

Question 7: ☐ A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F

Question 8: ☐ A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E

Question 9: ☐ A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D

Question 10: ☐ A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D