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PROBLEM SET 5
Due back by Tuesday May 2.

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Instructions:

- Make sure you are working on your problem set as each problem set is different.
- **The answers to the questions of this problem set are to be given exclusively in the answer sheet**
- **The answers sheet MUST be printed and not photocopied. Photocopies will not be accepted.**
- Questions marked with the symbol ♣ admit more than one correct answer
- Please fill the boxes in the answer sheet completely using a **black pen** as follows

Question 1: ■ B C D E

- The answer sheet must not be creased or folded otherwise your problem set won't be graded.
- You can hand back your problem set at the END of class on May 2.

1

With a sample of 706 observations, we estimate the following model:

$$ln(hwage_i) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 age_i + \beta_2 age_i^2 + \beta_3 educ_i + \beta_4 yngkid_i + u_i$$

and obtain these results:

$$ln(hwage_i) = \underset{0.41175}{-1.00179} + \underset{0.01941}{0.07121} age_i - \underset{0.00024}{0.00076} age_i^2 + \underset{0.01116}{0.07131} educ_i + \underset{0.07006}{0.09439} yngkid_i$$

where *lhwage* is the logarithm of the hourly wage in euro, *age* is measured in years, *educ* is years of education and *yngkid* is a variable equal to 1 in case the person has a child younger than three years.

Question 1 What is the interpretation of β_1?

A Increasing age by one year, the hourly wage increases by 7.1% on average, ceteris paribus.

B Increasing age by one year and keeping its square fixed, the hourly wage increases by 7.1% on average, ceteris paribus.

C By itself does not have a proper interpretation.

D Increasing age by one year, the hourly wage increases by 0.071 euros on average, ceteris paribus.

Question 2 What is the interpretation of β_4?

A If a person has one small kid more, he/she earns about 0.095 more per hour with respect to someone who does not have small kids, ceteris paribus.

B If a person has small kids (¡ 3 years old), he/she earns about 0.095 euros more per hour with respect to someone who does not have small kids, ceteris paribus.

C If a person has one small kid more, he/she earns about 9.5% more per hour with respect to someone who does not have small kids, ceteris paribus.

D If a person has small kids (¡ 3 years old), he/she earns about 9.5% more per hour with respect to someone who does not have small kids, ceteris paribus.

Question 3 What is our null hypothesis when we test whether β_1 and β_2 are jointly significant?

A We check whether the logarithm of hourly wage depends on age.

B We check whether the logarithm of hourly wage depends linearly on age.

C We check whether the relationship between the logarithm of hourly wage and age is convex or concave.

D We check whether the logarithm of hourly wage is 0 when age is equal to 0.

Question 4 What are we testing when we check whether β_2 is significant?

A We check whether the logarithm of hourly wage depends negatively on age.

B We check whether the logarithm of hourly wage depends linearly on age.

C We check whether the logarithm of hourly wage depends positively on age.

D We check whether the logarithm of hourly wage depends on age.

Question 5 Using a subset of the variables in the previous model, we would like to write a new one such that we obtain the elasticity of the hourly wage to education, and that, given in increase of one year in age, it returns a change in hourly wage in percent points. Choose the correct model among these:

A $ln(hwage_i) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 age + ln(\beta_2 educ_i) + u_i$

B $hwage_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 ln(age_i) + \beta_2 educ_i + u_i$

C $ln(hwage_i) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 age_i + \beta_2 ln(educ_i) + u_i$

D $hwage_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 age_i + \beta_2 ln(educ_i) + u_i$

E $ln(hwage_i) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 ln(age_i) + \beta_2 educ_i + u_i$

Question 6 Keeping other variables fixed, at what age the logarithm of hourly wage is maximized?

A At about 0, but this makes no sense.

B At about 56.3 years.

C At about 46.7 years.

D At about 93.3 years.

2

Let us define with Y the amount of cholesterol in mlg in the blood and with Med a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for medication B and 0 for medication A, where A and B are two different medications that lower cholesterol. Female is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for females and 0 otherwise.

Consider the following regression:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \times med + \beta_2 \times female + \beta_3 \times med \times female + u.$$

Question 7 What is the effect of using medication B with respect to no medication for men?

A $\beta_0 + \beta_1$

B β_1

C β_1-β_0

D None of the others.

E β_0

Question 8 What is the average cholesterol value for women using medication A?

A $\beta_0+\beta_2$

B β_0

C $\beta_0+\beta_2 + \beta_3$

D β_2

E None of the others.

Question 3

These data are taken from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey survey conducted in 1996. These data were provided by Professor Harvey Rosen of Princeton University and were used in his paper with Craig Perry "The Self-Employed Are Less Likely Than Wage-Earners to Have Health Insurance. So What?" in Douglas Holtz-Eakin and Harvey S. Rosen, eds., Entrepeneurship and Public Po licy, MIT Press 2004.

Among the variables in the dataset, `ins` is a dummy equal to one if the interviewee has the insurance; `selfemp` is equal to one if the interviewee is a self-employed workers; `gender` is equal to one if the in dividual is a male; `married` is one if the individual is married; `health` is one if the individual reports to be in good health; `educ` is 0 if the person has no education, 1 if he/she achieved middle school diploma, 2 for the high school diploma, 3 for the bachelor degree, 4 for the master degree and 5 for the PhD; `age` is in years and `age2` is the square of age.

We estimate two models:

$$\begin{aligned} Pr(ins=1|X) &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \times selfemp + \beta_2 \times married + \beta_3 \times gender + \beta_4 \times health \\ &\quad + \beta_5 \times gender * health + \beta_6 \times educ + \beta_7 \times age + \beta_8 \times age^2 \end{aligned}$$

```
Coefficients:
               Estimate Std. Error t value  Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)    0.2974634  0.0580248    5.13   0.0000003
selfemp       -0.1742361  0.0141740  -12.29   < 2e-16
married        0.1181062  0.0094187   12.54   < 2e-16
gender        -0.0232270  0.0343575   -0.68   0.49903
health         0.0744310  0.0247243    3.01   0.00262
genderxhealth -0.0206248  0.0353131   -0.58   0.55920
educ           0.0529807  0.0029210   18.14   < 2e-16
age            0.0105315  0.0027482    3.83   0.00013
age2          -0.0000788  0.0000333   -2.37   0.01796
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Heteroskadasticity robust standard errors used
```

$$\begin{aligned} Pr(ins=1|X) = \Phi(&\beta_0 + \beta_1 \times selfemp + \beta_2 \times married + \beta_3 \times gender + \beta_4 \times health \\ &+ \beta_5 \times gender * health + \beta_6 \times educ + \beta_7 \times age + \beta_8 \times age^2) \end{aligned} \quad \text{(II)}$$

```
Coefficients:
               Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)   -0.844932   0.195991   -4.31 0.000016
selfemp       -0.651923   0.046842  -13.92  < 2e-16
married        0.455241   0.034845   13.06  < 2e-16
gender        -0.040238   0.111653   -0.36  0.71856
health         0.300503   0.082988    3.62  0.00029
genderxhealth -0.124880   0.116613   -1.07  0.28422
education      0.226139   0.012852   17.60  < 2e-16
age            0.029150   0.009899    2.94  0.00323
age2          -0.000162   0.000126   -1.29  0.19821
---
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Question 9 How do you interpret the intercept under model (I)?

A It is the probability to have an insurance for a female, not self employed, non-married, with a bad health status, no education and with age equal to 0.

B It does not have a real meaning in this case.

C It is the probability to have an insurance for a male, not self employed, non-married, with a bad health status, no education and with age equal to 0.

D It is the average probability of having an insurance in our sample.

Question 10 What is the intepretation of β_2 in model (I)?

A On average, increasing married by one increases the probability to have an insurance of 11.8%, *ceteris paribus*.

B It does not have a proper interpretation.

C On average, married individuals are 11.8% more likely than others to have an insurance, controlling for all other factors.

D On average, married individuals are 11.8% less likely than others to have an insurance, controlling for all other factors.

Question 11 Does increasing level of education have a positive impact on the probability to buy an insurance at 5% level under model (II)?

A Yes, since the t-test on the coefficient β_6 is higher than 1.64.

B Yes, since the model includes the variable "educ".

C It depends on the values of all other covariates.

D No, since the coefficient β_6 is not significant.

Question 12 Does increasing level of education have a significant impact on the probability to buy an insurance at 5% level under model (I)?

A Yes, since the coefficient β_6 is significant.

B It depends on the values of all other covariates.

C No, since the coefficient β_6 is not significant.

D Yes, since the model includes the variable "educ".

Question 13 ♣ Under model (II), which of the following statements are true?

A The probability of having an insurance for a married person is, on average, 45.5% higher than for other people, *ceteris paribus*.

B We cannot possibly know whether education level has an effect on the probability of having an insurance.

C We cannot interpret directly the estimated coefficients in terms of magnitude.

D On average, self employment has a negative effect on the probability of having an insurance, *ceteris paribus*.

E *None of these answers are correct.*

Question 14 ♣ Under model (I), which of the following statements are true?

A If the person is a female, the effect of good health on the probability to have an insurance is $\beta_4 + \beta_5$.

B Statistically speaking, having a good health has the same impact on the probability of having an insurance for male and female, holding other factors constant.

C A higher education is associated, on average, with an higher probability of having an insurance, *ceteris paribus*.

D We cannot interpret the estimated coefficients in terms of magnitude.

E *None of these answers are correct.*

Question 15 What is the effect of education on the z-score?

A A change in the level of education is linked with an increase of the z-score of about 0.22, *ceteris paribus*.

B An increase of one year in education is linked with an increase of the z-score of about 22%, *ceteris paribus*.

C A change in the level of education is linked with an increase of the z-score of about 0.22, *ceteris paribus*.

D An increase of one year in education is linked with an increase of the z-score of about 0.22%, *ceteris paribus*.

Question 16 What is the estimated probability that a 24 years old non-educated non-self-employed single female who is not in good health and with middle school diploma will buy insurance coverage?

A I cannot say because the model is nonlinear.

B Less than 5%.

C Approximately 0.5.

D More than 95%.



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- Answers must be given exclusively on this sheet: answers given on the other sheets will be ignored.
- **This sheet MUST be printed out and not photocopied. Photocopies will not be accepted.**
- Please fill the boxes below completely using a **black pen**.
- Do not crease or fold.
- Due back: Tuesday, May 2 (right after class)

Question 1: [A] [B] [C] [D]
Question 2: [A] [B] [C] [D]
Question 3: [A] [B] [C] [D]
Question 4: [A] [B] [C] [D]
Question 5: [A] [B] [C] [D] [E]
Question 6: [A] [B] [C] [D]
Question 7: [A] [B] [C] [D] [E]
Question 8: [A] [B] [C] [D] [E]
Question 9: [A] [B] [C] [D]
Question 10: [A] [B] [C] [D]
Question 11: [A] [B] [C] [D]
Question 12: [A] [B] [C] [D]
Question 13: [A] [B] [C] [D] [E]
Question 14: [A] [B] [C] [D] [E]
Question 15: [A] [B] [C] [D]
Question 16: [A] [B] [C] [D]