
# From Blockchain Research to Production Network

Vincent Gramoli

University of Sydney

Redbelly Network

# Genesys



### Intellectual Property

CSIRO – Commercialisation Party

University of Sydney – IP owner

• Inventors: Vincent, Tyler, Chris, Guillaume

### Commercialisation Strategies

### 1. Put it in the public domain

- Not in the interest of the IP owner (University of Sydney)
- May reduce value of the invention

#### 2. Get a licence to find customers


- Very easy in the US
- Very hard in Australia



### 3. Sell the IP

- Cost a lot of money
- Buyer is free to use as they wish

### Milestones



### Accelerator

### ON Program - CSIRO

• The *ON Program* is centred on equipping researchers with the entrepreneurial and commercialisation skills they need to help them engage with business and drive greater uptake of their research and ideas.

• ON Prime - This nine-week program will help you develop the skills and confidence you need to undertake customer discovery and market validation activities. In ON Prime we work with researchers at any stage of their project who are exploring all pathways to impact.


### ON Program - CSIRO

How to communicate an elevator pitch

How to write a pitch deck

How to write a business model

=> I won a prize



## Incubator

### Incubate – The University of Sydney

Teamed up with a mentor

Learned how to harass prospects

Did some homeworks (weekly meetings)

=> I learned my limits

# Networking

### Networking

• Go to meetups, events, conferences

Meet the industry

Understand the industry pain points

Be patient with government

### Redbelly Blockchain (2018)



Creation of the company Redbelly Blockchain

Vincent – CEO



Partner – Kosmos Ventures

CSIRO did not want to sell the IP to this partnership

# Academic Journey

### 1. Finding Vulnerabilities (2015)

We hacked Ethereum PoW



- We inform R3 consortium of financial institutions
- We hacked Ethereum PoA
- We informed CBA



We are invited by Ethereum at the community conference

### 2. Finding a Fix (2016)

- We design the DBFT consensus algorithm
- We publish it at IEEE NCA 2018

```
operation bin_propose(v_i) is
(01) est_i \leftarrow v_i; r_i \leftarrow 0;
(02) while (true) do
         r_i \leftarrow r_i + 1;
         BV_broadcast EST[r_i](est_i); // add to bin_values[r_i] upon BV_delivery
         wait_until (bin\_values_i[r_i] \neq \emptyset);
         broadcast AUX[r_i](bin\_values_i[r_i]);
(06)
         wait_until (messages AUX[r_i](b\_val_{p(1)}), ..., AUX[r_i](b\_val_{p(n-t)}) have been received
                            from (n-t) different processes p(x), 1 \le x \le n-t, and their contents are
                            such that \exists a non-empty set values_i where (i) values_i = \bigcup_{1 \le x \le n-t} b_v val_{p(x)}
                            and (ii) values_i \subset bin \ values_i[r_i]);
          b_i \leftarrow r_i \mod 2;
         if (values_i = \{v\}) // values_i is a singleton whose element is v
(10)
            then est_i \leftarrow v; if (v = b_i) then decide(v) if not yet done end if;
(11)
             else est_i \leftarrow b_i
(12)
          end if:
(13) end while.
(14) when B-VAL[r](v) is BV-delivered by BV_broadcast[r] do
          bin\ values_i[r] \leftarrow bin\ values_i[r] \cup \{v\};
```

#### DBFT: Efficient Leaderless Byzantine Consensus and its Application to Blockchains

Tyler Crain and Vincent Gramoli University of Sydney Australia

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Abstract-This paper introduces a new leaderless Byzantine consensus called the Democratic Byzantine Fault Tolerance (DBFT) for blockchains. While most blockchain consensus protocols rely on a correct leader or coordinator to terminate, our algorithm can terminate even when its coordinator is faulty.

The key idea is to allow processes to complete asynchronous rounds as soon as they receive a threshold of messages, instead of having to wait for a message from a coordinator that may be slow. The resulting decentralization is particularly appealing for blockchains for two reasons: (i) each node plays a similar role in the execution of the consensus, hence making the decision inherently "democratic"; (ii) decentralization avoids bottlenecks by balancing the load, making the solution scalable.

DBFT is deterministic, assumes partial synchrony, is resilience optimal, time optimal and does not need signatures. We first present a simple safe binary Byzantine consensus algorithm, modify it to ensure termination, and finally present an optimized reduction from multivalue consensus to binary consensus whose fast path terminates in 4 message delays.

Index Terms-Byzantine consensus, weak coordinator, geo-

#### I. INTRODUCTION AND RELATED WORK

To circumvent the impossibility of solving consensus in asynchronous message-passing systems [22] where processes can be faulty or Byzantine [30], researchers typically use randomization [3], [6], [14] or additional synchrony assumptions. Randomized algorithms can use per-process "local" coins or a shared "common" coin to solve consensus probabilistically among n processes despite  $t < \frac{n}{2}$  Byzantine processes. When based on local coins, the existing algorithms converge in  $O(n^{2.5})$  expected time [26]. A recent randomized algorithm without signature [34] solves consensus in O(1) expected time under a fair scheduler. The fair scheduler assumption was later relaxed in an extended version [35] that we refer to as Coin in the remainder of the paper. Unfortunately, implementing a common coin increases the message complexity of the consensus algorithm.

To avoid the need of a common coin and solve the consensus problem deterministically, researchers have assumed partial or eventual synchrony [21]. Interestingly, these solutions typically require a unique coordinator, or leader, to be non-

then the coordinator broadcasts its proposal to all processes and this value is decided after a constant number of message delays. The well-known drawback of this approach is that a faulty coordinator can dramatically impact the algorithm performance [1], [5], [17] by leveraging the power it has in a round and imposing its value to all.

In this paper, we present Democratic Byzantine Fault Tolerance (DBFT), a Byzantine consensus algorithm that copes with this problem by not relying on a classic coordinator or leader. Instead, DBFT uses what we refer to as a weak coordinator that does not impose its value. On the one hand, this allows non-faulty processes to decide a value quickly without the help of the coordinator. On the other hand, the coordinator helps the algorithm terminating if non-faulty processes know that they proposed values that might all be decided. Furthermore, having a weak coordinator allows rounds to be executed optimistically without waiting for a specific message. Finally, DBFT is time optimal, resilience optimal and does not need signatures.

To mitigate the limitations of leader-based Byzantine consensus, other approaches were previously explored. Some protocols progressively reduce the time allocated to a coordinator to solve consecutive consensus instances in order to force the change of a slow coordinator [5], [17]. While this still requires a classic coordinator in each round, it favors the fastest coordinator in successive rounds. An exponential information gathering tree was used to terminate in t+3rounds without a coordinator [9]. Other solutions [21], [43] require at least O(t) rounds. By contrast our weak coordinator only helps agreement by suggesting a value while still allowing a fast path termination in a constant number of message delays, hence differing from the classic coordinator [16], [21] or the eventual leader approaches that cannot be implemented in  $\mathcal{BAMP}_{n,t}[t < n/3]$ .

Application to blockchains. To motivate our algorithm, we study its applicability to the recent context of blockchains [37]. Blockchains originally aimed at tracking ownerships of digital assets where any Internet user could solve a cryptopuzzle before proposing, for consensus, a block of asset transactions. faulty [4], [8], [15], [20], [21], [27], [31], [32]. The advantage New blockchain models became promising at reducing the is that if the coordinator is non-faulty and if the messages amount of resources consumed by avoiding to resolve the are delivered in a timely manner in an asynchronous round, cryptopuzzle but restricting the set of proposers to a subset


### 2. Building a Blockchain PoC (2017)

We extend DBFT

Unspent Transaction Outputs (UTXO) model

Signature verifications

### 3. Largest Blockchain Experiment




### 3. Largest Blockchain Experiment

 We used all the 14 availability zones of Amazon Web Services (AWS)



- AWS suspected a DoS attacks from us, they banned us
- I had to call my friends at AWS research to re-enable our account
- They decided to do a press release to talk about our results in the media



### 4. Idea Dissemination (2017)

Silvio Micali publishes Algorand few months later

Facebook
launches the
Diem
blockchain one
year later

• Presentation at MIT, Cambridge MA, USA

Presentation at Facebook – Menlo Park, CA, USA

Presentation at Visa Research – Palo Alto, CA, USA

Visa publishes
RapidChain one
year later

• • •










### 4. Patent (2018-2024)

Submitted in 2018

- Described:
  - Superblock optimisations
  - Verification sharding

Approved in 2024 in the US



### 4. National Roadmap (2020)

• 1000 machines

• 660,000 TPS

• 3s avg latency





# THE NATIONAL BLOCKCHAIN ROADMAP:

Progressing towards a blockchain-empowered future.

### 3. Flagship Security Conference

The paper gets rejected many times

We improved a lot and did not give up

IBM releases a draft with similar ideas

Redbelly gets published in IEEE S&P 2021

#### Mir-BFT: High-Throughput BFT for Blockchains

Chrysoula Stathakopoulou IBM Research - Zurich

Tudor David IBM Research - Zurich

Marko Vukolić IBM Research - Zurich

2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)

#### Red Belly: A Secure, Fair and Scalable Open Blockchain

Tyler Crain University of Sydney Australia

Christopher Natoli University of Sydney Australia

Vincent Gramoli University of Sydney and CSIRO Australia

Abstract: Blockchain has found applications to track ownblocks instead of a single block; (ii) adopting a fair leaderless design to offer censorship-resistance guaranteeing the commit of correctly requested transactions; (iii) introducing sharded verification to limit the number of signature verifications without hampering security. We evaluate RBBC on up to 1000 scales in that its throughput increases to hundreds of consensus nodes and achieves 30k TPS throughput and 3 second latency of consensus nodes can be changed before being bribed. on 1000 VMs, hence improving by 3× both the latency and the throughput of its closest competitor.

#### I. INTRODUCTION

Unlike classic replicated state machines (RSM), blockchains [73] aim at offering a peer-to-peer model where many geodistributed participants replicate the system state and where even more requesters can check their balance and issue cryptographically signed transactions. While permissionless blockchains allow any nodes to participate in the consensus protocol and permissioned blockchains allow only a pre-determined set of nodes to participate, new blockchain designs will likely be open permissioned where permissioned nodes offer a Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) consensus service to which permissionless clients have access [15]: Ethereum v2.0 gives permissions in exchange of a proof-of-stake while other blockchains are naturally building upon BFT consensus [50], [37], [63]. The limitation of these blockchains is that they cannot offer high throughput when deployed on hundreds of nodes: verifying all transactions is computationally intensive while agreeing on a block is communication intensive.

In this paper, we propose Red Belly Blockchain (RBBC),

1"Red belly" stems from the name of the red-bellied black snake endemic to the Sydney region where this blockchain was designed and implemented.

ership of digital assets. Yet, several blockchains were shown tributed consensus nodes. As far as we know, previous vulnerable to network attacks. It is thus crucial for companies blockchains either assume synchrony (a known bound on to adopt secure blockchains before moving them to production. message delays) or their performance drops when the number In this paper, we present Red Belly Blockchain (RBBC), the of nodes increases, By contrast, RBBC achieves a strong form first secure blockchain whose throughput scales to hundreds of scalability where throughput does not drop as the number of of geodistributed consensus participants. To this end, we drastically revisited Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) blockchains nodes is ideal for a decentralized representative governance through three contributions: (i) defining the Set Byzantine Con- where at least one consensus node can run in each of the sensus problem of agreeing on a superblock of all proposed 195 independent sovereign nations around the world to serve the requests of many more nodes. RBBC is secure in that it prevents double spending [73] by resolving conflicts and not forking-even with asynchrony-and is resilience optimal in that, among the n nodes executing each of its consecutive consensus instances, up to t < n/3 can be Byzantine [60]. VMs of 3 different types, spread across 4 continents, and under The consensus protocol of RBBC is also time optimal [35] attacks. Although its performance is affected by attacks. RBBC and was proved correct for any number of nodes using model checking [9]. As RBBC supports reconfiguration [87], the set

> To achieve scalability, RBBC offers a new balancing method that totally orders all transactions while assigning them to distinct groups of proposer and verifier nodes. (i) Its leaderless design balances the communication load on multiple proposers, hence avoiding the congestion and slowdown induced by the least responsive node. As opposed to classic Byzantine consensus protocols that rely on a leader to propose transactions, RBBC's multiple proposers combine distinct sets of transactions into a superblock to solve the new Set Byzantine Consensus problem and commit more transactions per consensus instance. (ii) Its verification sharding balances the computation load across verifiers. As opposed to existing blockchains where all n nodes typically verify every transaction, each of our transaction signatures is verified by between t+1 and 2t+1 verifiers.

> We conducted the most extensive experiment of a secure blockchain on a thousand virtual machines (VMs) spread over more than 10 countries in 4 continents, under normal conditions and under adversarial attacks. We implemented RBBC over a period of 4 years in 30k lines of code and compared it to the traditional leader-based PBFT [18] with well-known optimizations [10], [50] and the HoneyBadgerBFT [68], and observed that, only RBBC scales to hundreds of geodistributed VMs be they high-end (18 hyperthreaded cores) or low-end VMs (4 vCPUs). The absence of a leader without the need for

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## MVP


### Minimum Viable Product

### **Development**

- ~3 years
- 100,000+ LOC
- 10 developers
- 6 programming languages

### **Components**


- Explorer (dashboard)
- Parser (explore blocks)
- Java client
- Dart client
- C# client
- State Machine Replication
- Consensus
- Network



### Dashboard

### Byzantine Fault Tolerance

- Consensus is deterministic
- Forks are impossible even in infinite executions
- Proof of correctness (cf. p.30-39 of <a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/1702.03068.pdf">https://arxiv.org/pdf/1702.03068.pdf</a>)
- Formally verified with model checking



## Joint Venture

### Block8

- 2021 Block8 is a blockchain service company at the time
- The business grows slowly
- Bull market: many contracts
- Bear market: few contracts
- Product company would allow the business to grow better

### Joint Venture








CSIRO accepts to sell most of the IP.

### Joint Venture







THE UNIVERSITY OF



### **Key Value Proposition**



### Investors (2024)













BRILLIANCE 3.0






















### Investment Rounds (before launch)



# Convincing the Central Bank

### Convincing the Central Bank


- 2020 RBA opens a lab
- Discussion between Vincent and RBA



- Vincent proposes to backup the New Payment Platform
- RBA is very slow at deciding
- 2024 Redbelly participate in a call for pilot organized by the RBA
- 2025 Redbelly win the call


### In Production

### Redbelly Network in Production Today



# Partnerships

### Ecosystem (2023)



### Partnership

# Google





#### REDBELLY

# Convergence of Regulated Agentic AI and Blockchain

Vincent Gramoli - Founder & CTO

# Backup

### Investment Rounds (before launch)

Category	Year of Raise	Supply (billion)	Supply (%)	Price	FDV	Assets committed on chain	USD Equivalent (million)	Listing unlock %	Lock-up Cliff	Vesting
Seed	2020	1.3	13%	\$0.004	\$40m	\$0	\$5.2m	0	6 months	32 months
Private Sale A	2022	0.73	7.3%	\$0.0064	\$64m	\$0	\$4.7m	0	2 months	12 months
Private Sale B	2023	0.69	6.9%	\$0.008	\$80m	\$2.5b	\$5.5m	0	2 months	10 months
Private Sale C	2024	0.07	0.7%	\$0.030	\$300m	\$83.8b	\$2.1m	10%	2 months	8 months
Team		1.0	10%					0	12 months	24 months
USYD & CSIRO		0.2	2%					0	6 months	30 months
Governance DAO		0.3	3%					33%	1 month	35 months
Ecosystem & Community		3.71	37.1%					0	As earned	As earned
Reserve		2.0	20%					0	-	-
TOTAL		10 billion	100%							

<sup>\*</sup>Includes ~18M tokens (or 0.018% of supply) allocated for Marketing Partnerships ^As earned or unlocked from achieving Milestones